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No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of tje ^niteb States;

MARCUS ISAIAH WASHINGTON,


Petitioner,
V.

W I L L I A M MORRIS E N D E A V O R E N T E R T A I N M E N T L L C (formerly the W I L L I A M


MORRIS A G E N C Y ) , J E F F M E A D E and SARAH WINIARSKI,
Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States


Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

MOTION F O R L E A V E T O P R O C E E D EV FORMA PAUPERIS & APPLICATION T O


J U S T I C E SONIA SOTOMAYOR F O R AN E X T E N S I O N O F T I M E TO F I L E A
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Mr. Marcus Isaiah Washington


Pro Se Petitioner
54 Boerum Street, Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, N Y 11206
(646) 504-6497
humanrights. areamust(^gmail. com

From the beginning, this landmark employment discrimination, antitrust and human rights case
has been intentionally tangled in a web of procedural errors that renders any decision from the
Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit' void. Throughout the entirety of this
litigation, various Article III federal judges have hidden their corruption under their black robes
by undermining the law and taking advantage of a system that is supposed to ensure justice for all.
The reason for these errors, in large part, is due to the "impartial" finder of fact's refusal to
acknowledge the realities of global white supremacy (racism)^ and institutionalized, structural and
unconscious forms of racism throughout our society.^ While no finder of fact has explicitly
discussed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, I have been accused of engaging in "bad faith" conduct
and raising "frivolous" legal arguments that "lack an argument in either law or in fact."

' Justice Sonia Sotomayor was a district court judge for the Southern District of New Yoric between August 12, 1992
- October 7, 1998 and an appellate court judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit between
October 7, 1998 - .
^ In the book. The [sis (YSSIS) Papers: The Keys to the Colors, general and child psychiatrist Dr. Frances Cress
Welsing provides a "functional definition of racism" and describes "global white supremacy" as:
"the local and global power system structured and maintained by persons who classify themselves as
white, whether consciously or subconsciously determined: this system consists of patterns of perception,
logic, symbol formation, thought, speech, action and emotion response, as conducted simultaneously in all
areas of people activity (economics, education, entertainment, labor, law, politics, religion, sex and war).
The ultimate purpose of the system is to prevent white genetic annihilation on Earth - a planet in which
the overwhelming majority of people are classified as non-white (black, brown, red and yellow) by
whiteskinned people. All of the non-white people are genetically dominant (in terms of skin coloration)
compared to the genetically recessive white-skinned people ' (emphasis added)
^ The 5-4 conservative majority on the Supreme Court has been described the New York Times as being typically
"hostile to civil rights" cases. The same ideological divide regarding race that exists between myself and the various
finders of fact in this case is the same ideological divide that exists amongst the Justices on the Supreme Court. In
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion),
Chief Justice John. G. Roberts, Jr. stated that the "way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race." In Justice Sotomayor dissent in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action. Integration and Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary. 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676
(2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) she disagreed that "examining the racial impact of legislation only perpetuates racial
discrimination," and criticized what she characterized as the majority's decision to "sit back and wish away, rather
than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our society." Sotomayor wrote: "Race matters. Race matters in part
because of the long history of racial minorities being denied access to the political process. ... Race also matters
because o f persistent racial inequality in society inequality that cannot be ignored and that has produced stark
socioeconomic disparities." See also, Matt Berman and Elahe Izadi. "Why the Supreme Court Ignores Race." April
23, 2014. http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/why-the-supreme-court-sidesteps-race-2014Q423.

In order to realign the record in the direction of truth and have this grave "miscarriage of
justice" corrected, I,pro se petitioner Marcus Isaiah Washington, respectfully submit this Motion
For Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Application to Justice Sonia Sotomayor To Extend the
Time to File A Petition For A Writ of Certiorari to ask for leave to file the accompanying Rule 21
Motion to Disbar Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone, Michael Bametf* & Others and Vitiate All
Decisions In Favor of William Morris Endeavor Entertainment Due To Loeb & Loeb LLP's
Intentional "Pattern and Practice" of Committing "Fraud Upon the Court" pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 8.^
L

Supreme Court Rule 13.5: Extension of Time

Supreme Court Rule 13.5 states:


For good cause, a Justice may extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari for a
period not exceeding 60 days. An application to extend the time to file shall set out the basis
for jurisdiction in this Court, identify the judgment sought to be reviewed, include a copy of
the opinion and any order respecting the rehearing, and set out the specific reasons why an
extension of time is justified.
I am seeking review of all judgments issued by P. Kevin Castel of the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, See Exhibit A, affirming the district court's September 5, 2014, See Exhibit B, and
October 22, 2014, See Exhibit C , judgments was entered on March 11, 2015. A timely petition
for rehearing was filed on March 25, 2015. The petition for rehearing was denied by the Second

* Michael Barnett entered the case on March 3, 2014. In or around December of 2014, he withdrew from the case
although he never filed a Motion to Withdraw. He is now an Asst. U.S. Attorney for the Department of Justice.
' Since Castel and the Second Circuit have ignored my claims of "fraud upon the Court," granted William Morris and
Loeb & Loeb LLP's Motion for a Filing Injunction and the Respondents are not obligated to respond to my petition,
I am additionally filing a Motion pursuant to Rule 8, which seeks the disqualification of Michael P. Zweig, Christian
Carbone and Loeb & Loeb LLP and/or seeks extreme disciplinary and monetary sanctions against William Morris'
counsel since they technically should have zero involvement with this case based on the "pattern" of fraud they have
perpetrated upon the court in two racial discrimination lawsuits involving William Morris in the last 17 years. E.KCuse
any grammatical errors, typos, etc. since I had to spend just as much time writing my Motion to Disqualify and I ' m
working on this case by myself
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Circuit en banc on April 30, 2015. See Exhibit D. A timely Motion to Recall the Mandate was
filed on June 1, 2015 and the motion was denied without explanation on June 16, 2015. Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1254, this Court has jurisdicfion.^
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Procedural History

Both procedurally and substantively, this case is one of a kind,^ After senior management refused
to take my claims of racial discrimination seriously and the EEOC investgator Andrea Hahm
conducted no investigation into my complaint, I filed a detailed 80-page Complaint with the
Southern District of New York on December 22, 2010. In the Complaint, I alleged that my former
employer William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC (fonnerly known as the William Morris
Agency) - the oldest and largest talent agency in Hollywood - was intentionally engaging in a
pattern and practice of discriminating against African Americans spanning 112 years, maintaimng
employment practices, policies and procedures that created a glaring disparate impact against
qualified African Ainericans from being hired and/or promoted to higher-status, higher-paying
positions such as Agent and Agent Trainee, pre and-post hiring individual disparate treatment,
retaliation and aiding & abetting claims against HR personnel Jeff Meade and Sarah Winiarski
(now known as Sarah Van Hoven) in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. 1981 ("Secfion 1981"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C.

^ Since all of my claims are interrelated and the evidence supports that Loeb & Loeb LLP should have never been
allowed to represent William Morris in this case based on the fraud Loeb & Loeb LLP and attorney Michael P. Zweig
engaged in in Rowe Entertainment. Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.. No. 98 CV 8272, 2005 W L 22833 (S.D.N. Y.
Jan. 5, 2005), afPd, 167 F. App'x 227 (2d Cir. 2005), cert, denied, 549 U.S. 887, 127 S.Ct. 283, 166 L.Ed.2d 152
(2006), if the Supreme Court grants my Rule 8 Motion to Disbar Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone & Disqualify
Loeb & Loeb LLP Due To Engaging In A "Pattern" of "Fraud Upon the Court" and issues extreme disciplinary and
monetary sanctions against Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attorneys for its "highly unethical and criminal conduct," it
"would dispose of the entire case or would affect the final judgment to be entered." Supreme Court Rule 21.2(b).
' The original and only lawfijlly appointed arbitrator in this case - David L. Gregory [of the American Arbitration
Association] who has more than 30 years' experience as both an arbitrator for the AAA and employment & labor law
professor at St. John's University Law - stated throughout his decisions: "In my thirty years as an Arbitrator of Labor
& Employment Disputes, this case presents the most extensive Motion practice that I have encountered." [Arbitrator
Gregory Partial Final Award, 3.]
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2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title W " ) , the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive
Law 290 et. seq. (the "NYSHRL") and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York
Administrative Code 8-101 el. seq. (the "NYCHRL").^ After submitting an Affidavit detailing
my current financial situation. Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska granted my in forma pauperis request
on January 4, 2011. See Exhibit E.
On February 8, 2011, Loeb & Loeb LLP attorney Michael P. Zweig stated in a letter to
Castel that all of my claims were "wholly without merit, legally and factually" and on February
25, 2011, they filed a Motion to Dismiss, Or in the Alternative, Compel Arbitration. On March 21,
2011,1 raised a unique. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11-compliant argument that used antidiscrimination law
within the framework of the Federal Arbitration Act, to show that the two mandatory, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements I signed as a condition of employment were unconscionable due to William
Morris' century-plus history of intentionally excluding qualified African Americans from
meaningful positions of employment such as Agent and Agent Trainee. On July 20, 2011 federal
judge P. Kevin Castel compelled my case the case into arbitration.^ See Exhibit F . On four
separate occasions, I sought to appeal Castel's interlocutory order, as well as sought Castel and
Magistrate Judge James C. Francis' disqualification, but each interlocutory appeal was denied in
less than five sentences as being "moot" and lack of jurisdiction by appellate judges Gerard E .
Lynch, Peter W. Hall and Denny Chin. See Exhibit G.
On June 15, 2012, I filed a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA") and the AAA waived all costs and fees on June 27, 2012. On August 15,

^ I formally added claims of antitrust violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act, \ U.S.C. 1 etseq. and Donnelly
Act, General Business Law 340 etseq., as well as claims of conspiracy to interfere with the human rights of African
Americans in violation of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) when I submitted my Demand for
Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on June 15, 2012.
^ Pursuant to the "Delegation Provision" contained in the second arbitration agreement I signed following the merger
of the William Morris Agency and Endeavor Talent Agency in July of 2009, Castel concluded that the issue of
arbitrability had to be decided by the arbitrator.

2012,1 filed for summary judgment and in my reply, sought to stay arbitration pending discovery
and an oral hearing. After issuing three Interim Decisions, Arbitrator David L. Gregory abruptly
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"suspended" discovery, cancelled the oral hearing and instructed the parties to submit Final
Position Statements before rendering his "omnibus final decision." My due process objections
were ignored and Arbitrator Gregory issued a Partial Final Award on December 17, 2013,
concluding that I proved by a "preponderance of the evidence," that "WiUiam Moms Endeavor
Entertainment LLC discriminated against [me] in violation of pertinent federal, state and local law
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race." See Exhibit H. He also indicated
that during phase two of the bifurcated proceeding, that I would be awarded the full gamut of
monetary damages, including punitive damages, pro se attorneys' fees and "recompense for
avoidable delays."' On Januar)' 2, 2014,1 appealed Arbitrator Gregory's Partial Final Award."
On March 17, 2014, I filed a voluminous 97-page Motion, which sought extraordinary
relief, including but not limited to, the disqualification of the federal judges assigned to the case
and/or the disqualification of William Morris' counsel for engaging in a "pattern" of "fraud upon
the Court." On March 27, 2014, Castel reflised to disqualify himself He concluded that "[vjiewed
as a totahty, an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying facts would not
entertain significant doubt that justice would be done in this action absent recusal of the
undersigned."
On April 10, 2014, I submitted a Motion for Reconsideration, which was nothing more
than a condensed version of my March 17, 2014 pleading. After Timothy K. Lewis dismissed my

Arbitrator Gregory granted William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP $1,000 for defamation and libel although they
never stated what 1 said that wasn't true and they never presented any case law to support their argument.
" A few days later, Loeb & Loeb LLP filed a second Motion to Disqualify Arbitrator Gregory and the A A A granted
their Motion without reason or explanation. .

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case with "prejudice and on the merits" on June 25, 2013,'^ See Exhibit I, the Appellees sought
to confirm Lewis' fraudulently procured "Final Award" on July 3, 2014. On July 12, 2014, I
submitted a letter to Castel stating that the arguments raised in my March 17, 2014 and April 10,
2014 Motions "diametrically oppose[d] and void[ed] any 'legal' argument put forth by WME
Entertainment and Loeb & Loeb LLP" and that their motions should be denied.
After waiting six months to decide issues included in my March 17 and April 10, 2014
Motions, Castel issued his Final Order on September 5, 2015. To summarize, he: (1.) upheld the
fraudulently procured Final Award of Schnader LLP attorney and A A A board of director Timothy
K. Lewis, (2.) upheld a judgment of $43,707.60, (3.) granted William Morris and Loeb & Loeb
LLP's request for a filing injunction, (4.) prejudiced my appeal by stating that it would not be
made in "good faith," and (5.) revoked my in forma pauperis status despite being aware of my dire
financial circumstances. On October 3, 2014 I submitted a 54-page Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 Fraud Upon
the Court Motion, which explained in detail why all of Castel's legal conclusions were erroneous
as both a matter of law and public policy. On October 22, 2014 Castel denied this Motion in an
Order contaimng two paragraphs. See Exhibit C.
Since I was unable to afford the $505 filing fee to submit my Notice of Appearance, I
submitted an Expedited Motion to Restore In Forma Pauperis Status, Suspend Filing Injunction
and Remove All Prejudice Pending "Good-Faith" Appeal on November 21, 2014 with the Second
Circuit, seeking in part, to have my in forma pauperis status restored and/or transferring my appeal
to another circuit. On March 11, 2015, the three panel judges Dennis Jacobs, Lohier, Jr. and
Southern District of New York judge Laura Taylor Swain, dismissed my appeal and denied my

On July 16, 2014, I filed a Motion seeking to Modify Lewis' Final Award due to the numerous factual errors and
inaccuracies contained in the Award. On July 22, 2014, he denied my Motion because pursuant to A A A Employment
Rule 40, the "arbitrator [was] not empowered to redetermine the merits" although I simply asked him truthful.

Motion in two sentences, stating that it "lack[ed] an arguable basis in either fact or in law." See
Exhibit A. On March 25, 2015, I filed a 15 page Motion for Reconsideration and on April 30,
2015, the court en banc denied my Motion without explanation or providing an ethical judicial
opinion. On May 21, 2015, the Second Circuit issued the Mandate to the Southern District of New
York despite my request to stay the mandate and on June 1, 2015, 1 filed a Motion to Recall &
Stay the Mandate, Pending the Filing of A Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
This Motion was also denied without reason or explanation on June 16, 2015.
in.
Legal Arguments In Support of Restoring Mr. Washington's In Forma Pauperis
Status and Granting An Extension of Time To File Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari.
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A. Legal Standard on In Forma Pauperis


In Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the Supreme Court of the United States of America
stated:
The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 and presently codified as 28 U.S.C.
1915, IS designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal
courts... Toward this end, 1915(a) allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in
federal court in forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, inter alia, that he is
unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.
Id. at 324. To prevent such abusive or captious litigation, 1915(e)(2) authorizes federal courts to
"dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue;
or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief"
(emphasis added)
In Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), the Supreme Court stated:
[I]n order to respect the congressional goal of assuring equality of consideration for all
litigants, the initial assessment of the in forma pauperis plaintiffs factual allegations must be
weighted in the plaintiffs favor. A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the
facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are
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judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. An in forma pauperis complaint may
not be dismissed, however, simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely.
Some improbable allegations might properly be disposed of on summary judgment, but to
dismiss them as frivolous without any factual development is to disregard the age old insight
that many allegations might be "strange, but true; for truth is always strange. Stranger than
fiction." Lord Byron, Don Juan, canto XIV, stanza 101 (T. Steffan, E. Steffan & W. Pratt eds.
1977).
Id. at 25-26.

B. All Decisions of the AAA, SDNY and the Second Circuit Are Erroneous As A Matter of
Law and Contravenes Public Policy
Throughout this nearly five year litigation. Republican appointed federal judge P. Kevin Castel
has issued four key decisions'^ in this landmark human rights, employment discrimination and
antitrust case that are individually, as well as cumulatively, erroneous as both a matter of law and
public policy. After "ignoring my arguments, omitting pertinent facts and misapplying the law" to
compel this case into arbitration on July 20, 2011, and refusing to disqualify himself from the case
on March 27, 2014, Castel confirmed the AAA's fraudulent dismissal of my case and pretended
to summarize the arguments raised in my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court and April 10,
2014 Motion for Reconsideration into four parts. He stated:
"In opposition to the defendants' motion to confirm the award, Washington provides four
arguments as to why the arbitral award should be set aside. First, Washington argues that
Arbitrator Gregory was improperly removed and, consequently, all of Arbitrator Lewis' orders,
including vacating Arbitrator Gregory's partial award, are void. Second, Washington asserts
that Arbitrator Gregory and Arbitrator Lewis's decisions to enforce the arbitration agreement
were in manifest disregard of the law. Third, Washington argues that the failure to disclose
the alleged relationship between opposing counsel and an AAA employee biased the
arbitral proceeding in the defendants' favor. Finally, he asserts that the opposing counsel has
been engaging in a pattern of bad faith litigation warranting their removal and sanctions "

Those decisions are: (1.) July 20, 2011 Stay Order compelling arbitration, (2.) March 27, 2014 Order refijsing to
disqualify, (3.) September 5, 2014 Final Order and (5.) October 22, 2014 Order denying plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration.

(emphasis added) [PKC Final Order, 14.] Since filing my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court
Motion with Castel, I have presented a number of rational arguments in law or fact to support my
claim for relief Unfortunately, they have been ignored by Castel and the Second Circuit. Here is
a summary of one of the reasons why all of P. Kevin Castel's legal conclusions are erroneous as a
matter of law and public policy:

The Partial Final Award Issued By Arbitrator David L . Gregory Was Both Ripe and
"Final" for the Sake of Judicial Review and Thus, His Disqualification by the AAA
and Castel's Refusal Violated Due Process: P. Kevin Castel erroneously relied on one
of two cases cited by Loeb & Loeb LLP - Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d
411 (2d Cir. 1980) - in his September 5, 2014 Final Order to conclude that Arbitrator
Gregory's Partial Final Award was not reviewable and thus, the A A A had jurisdiction to
disqualify Gregory and allow the replacement "arbitrator" - Timothy K. Lewis - to vacate
Gregory's Award, despite the AAA informing both parties that the later would not happen.
In order to understand this unique area of the law, I read a number of law articles on this
topic. James Gaitis has published two informative and extremely insightful law articles on
this topic,''* and it is without question that Michaels is not controlling or applicable to the
Award issued by Arbitrator Gregory.'^ In a desperate attempt to prevent me from filing a

The two articles are Finality, Ripeness, and Fundus Officio: The Interlocutory Arbitral Award Conundrum. Journal
of the ACCL. Vol. 7, No. 2.. 2013 and The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the Issuance
of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1, 2006.
" It is well settled that "non-fmal arbitral decisions" and "interlocutory arbitral awards" (e.g., "Interim Decisions" and
"Partial Final Awards") have been deemed reviewable by the federal court since Michaels' decision in 1980. See e.g..
Trade & Transport. Inc. v. Natural Petroleum Charterers. Inc.. 931 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1991) ('partial final award' that
solely adjudicated the issue of liability, but not damages, was subject to immediate judicial review); Dealer Computer
Services. Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford. 547 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2008) (court of appeals concluded that an interlocutory
arbitral decision that was not final might nonetheless be subject to immediate judicial review based on a finding of
ripeness); Andrea Doreen. Ltd. v. Building Material Local Union 282. 250 F. Supp. 2d 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (district
court held that an interim award finding certain 'defenses are not adequate to prevent liability' was subject to
immediate confirmation); Home Ins. Co. v. RHA/Pennsylvania Nursing Homes. Inc.. 127 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (district court concluded that an interim award that adjudicated only a portion of a damages claim and ordered
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motion that would seek Loeb & Loeb LLP's disqualification. Christian Carbone wrote a
letter to Castel on March 7, 2014, that intentionally created the false impression that
Arbitrator Gregory and the A A A were not aware that I sought a bifurcated proceeding i f
the arbitration agreement was enforced. See Providence Journal Co. v. Providence
Newspaper Guild, 271 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (an interlocutory arbitral determination on
liability could be immediately enforced by the district court, even though the parties had
only 'informally agreed' upon bifurcation). Even i f bifurcation hadn't been discussed,
Arbitrator Gregory had no choice than to bifurcate the proceeding since William Morris
and Loeb & Loeb LLP engaged in contumacious conduct to prevent discovery over the
span of six months. They complied with none of my discovery requests and produced zero
documents, including pertinent financial documents that would allow my economic expert
to compute the monetary damages I was owed to be made whole and hundreds of "nigger"
e-mails that were concealed in a prior racial discrimination case Rowe.
On more than six occasions, 1 raised these same legal arguments with Castel and the Second
Circuit. As demonstrated above, Castel's reliance on Michaels is erroneous as a matter of law and
public policy. I f 1 am correct on this point, Castel's Final Order and the final decisions of the
Second Circuit have to be vacated because Castel has confirmed the Award of an unlawfully
appointed "arbitrator" - Schnader LLP and A A A board of director Timothy K. Lewis - who
dismissed my case with prejudice and on the merits because 1 objected to his jurisdiction over the
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immediate payment was final and subject to immediate enforcement even though other liability and damages issues
relating to same claim remained). Additionally, a plain reading of ]6(a)(l)(D) of the FAA supports that Arbitrator
Gregory's Partial Final Award was reviewable by the federal court. It states that an appeal can be taken fi-om an order
"confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award " (emphasis added)
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course of five months. For this to 10 reason alone, all final decisions rendered by Castel and the
Second Circuit should be vitiated pursuant of the FAA.
Due to page constraints, I do not have the space to explain in further detail why the rest of
Castel's legal conclusions are erroneous as both a matter of law and pubhc policy. A condensed
summary of these legal arguments can be read in my March 25, 2015 Motion for Reconsideration
En Banc to the Second Circuit. See Exhibit J .
C. Unconstitutional and Unlawful Actions of P, Kevin Castel, the Second Circuit and the
American Arbitration Association Have Resulted In A Deprivation of Mr.
Washington's Constitutional, Statutory & Inalienable Rights Under the Color of Law.
After Castel issued his July 20, 2011 Stay Order, I could not grasp how a person could write such
a one-sided opinion. But as I looked more into Castel's history, as well as the history of the political
party that appointed him to a lifelong term on the bench, his highly unethical and unlawful actions
made perfect sense because he was merely doing what he was hired to do.'^ Due to the executive
branch's "conservative judicial agenda" that has taken place since Ronald Regan was appointed to
presidency has been well documented, the Supreme Court's ideological divide regarding race is
no different than the ideological divide that exists between myself and opposing counsel & the
various finders of fact who work for historically all-white institutions.'For the following reasons

See e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller. "Bush Vows To Seek Conservative Judges." New York Times. March 29, 2002.
http://vyww.nytimes.com/2002/03/29/us/bush-vows-to-seek-conservative-judges.html. (On March 27, 2002, George
W. Bush stated to a crowd of more than 1,000 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel: "We've got to get good, conservative
judges appointed to the bench and approved by the United States Senate."); Bush "'packed the courts' with
'extremists' who share an agenda of hostility to regulations the rights of women, minorities and workers."
& e e.g., Charlie Savage. "Appeals Courts Pushed By Right By Bush Choices." New York Times. October 28, 2008.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/us/29judges.htmi?pagewanted=all; JoeL. Selig. The Reagan Justice Department
and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong? 1985 U. 111. L. Rev, 785 (1985); Jules Lobel and Barbara Wolvovitz. The
Enforcement of Civil Rights Statutes: The Reagan Administration's Record, 9 Black L, J. 252 (1986); Neil A, Lewis,
"The 1992 Campaign; Selection o f Conservative Judges Insures a President's Legacy." New York Times. July 1,
1992.
http://www.nytimes.eom/l 992/07/01/us/the-1992-campaign-selection-of-conservative-judges-insures-apresident-slegacy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; A. Leon Higginbotham. "The Case of the Missing Black Judges."
New
York Times. July 29, 1992. http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/29/opinion/the-case-of-the-missingblackjudges,html?pagewanted=all&src=pm,; Will Evans, "Money Trails To The Federal Bench." Center for
Investigative Reporting. October 31, 2006. (discussing results from a four-month investigation of Bush-appointed
judges which revealed that six appellate court judges and 18 district court judges, including district judge P. Kevin
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below, I will explain why the Supreme Court's conservative majority failure to acknowledge the
realities of racism in our highly race conscious society has eviscerated the substantive strength of
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to deter the most egregious violators of Title VII to comply with the
law and diversify the workplace.
[Title V I I & It's Purpose] The main problem throughout this case is that the Respondents,
their counsel and the various finders of fact presiding over this case have tried to downplay the
realities of global white supremacy (racism) and institutionalized racism, especially in corporate
America and Hollywood. Prior to this case, I knew nothing about law and I ' d never read any of
our nation's antidiscrimination statutes prior to this case, but once I did, it supported that I worked
for a company that was intentionally violating our nation's antidiscrimination laws with "malice
and/or reckless indifference" to the federally protected rights of African Americans and people of
color
Title V I I explicitly states that it is "unlawful" for an employer to.
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, tenns, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.

Castel, contributed a total of more than $44,000 to politicians who were influential in their appointments. Judge Castel
contributed $2,000 to Bush after he was nominated in March 2003. These political contributions further raises ethical
concerns about Castel's impartiality); LisaMichalleEllman, David Schkade and CassR. Sustein. "Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation," University of Chicago. September 2003. (examination
of more than 4,480 legal opinions, involving politically divisive issues indicated that there's a relationship between a
judge's political ideology and their judicial opinions since they overwhelmingly decide cases according to the
philosophical position of the party that appointed them.); David Lauter. "Civil Rights Bill Vetoed By Bush." Los
Angeles Times. October 23, 1990. http://articles.latimes.eom/1990-10-23/n ews/mn-2961_l_civilrights-leaders.
("The measure's supporters accuse the President of playing to white conservatives.")
12

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a). Under the theory of disparate impact formulated in Griggs v. Duke Power
Ca, 401 U. S. 424 (1971), an employer can be found liable of violating our nation's
antidiscrimination laws even i f discrimmation isn't intentional. Pursuant to 2000e-2(k)(l)(A), an
employer can also be found guilty of violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 i f
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the complaining party makes the
demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment
practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
Ultimately, disparate treatment and disparate impact are two ways of proving the same thing:
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("it is
abundantly clear that Title V I I tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise")
The objectives of Title V I I are twofold: (1) to end workplace discrimination, and (2) to
remedy individual injuries. [Claimant Recall Mandate, 5.] While the main thrust, initially, was to
prohibit purposeful discrimination. International Broth, of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.l5 (1977) ("[ujndoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII"), "it was clear to Congress that "[t]he crux of the problem [was] to open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to
them,'... and it was to this problem that Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination in
employment was primarily addressed." United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203, (1979) (citation omitted).'*

See also McDonnell Douglas v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The language of Title V I I makes plain the
purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens."); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (stating that "the primary objective [of Title
V I I ] was a prophylactic one") (emphasis added).

i
13

I used a holistic and multidisciplinary approach by presenting a pyramid of historical,


statistical, circumstantial,'^" anecdotal and the forms of evidence to establish a prima facie-plus
case to show that my race, color and/or national origin played a "motivating factor" as to why I
was not hired and/or promoted to an Agent position at William Morris and that William Morris
was intentionally maintaining employment practices, policies and procedures that maintained zero
and/or a gross underrepresentation of qualified African Americans and people of color from
meaningful positions of employment throughout all of its offices throughout the U.S. and abroad.
While "Title V I I . . . is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out the purposes
of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of [unlawful]
discrimination." Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391-92 (8th Cir. 1977), the
Defendants and the various finders of fact have narrowly construed our nation's antidiscrimination
and/or ignored the statute altogether. One of the issues that will be important for the Supreme
Court to resolve, is whether individual litigants can establish claims of discrimination under pattern
and practice discrimination, especially i f the inexorable zero is present in the work place. See
Bamer v. Citv of Harvey, No. 95 C 3316, 1998 WL 664951, at *50 ( N D . 111. Sept. 18, 1998) ("In
cases, such as this one, the 'inexorable zero' speaks volumes and clearly supports an inference of
discrimination."^'

Evidence of historical discrimination can draw "an inference of purposeRil discrimination" in cases where it can be
shown that "discriminatory practices were commonly utilized, [and] were abandoned when enjoined by courts or made
illegal by civil rights legislation, [then] were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, serve
to maintain the status quo." Rogers v. Lodge. 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012(1982).
^
Circumstantial
evidence
can
be
just
as
useful
and
persuasive
as
direct
evidence, and sometimes more so. See Desert Palace. Inc. v. Costa. 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) ("The reason for
treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: 'Circumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.'") (citation omitted).
2' Ortiz-Del "Valle v. National Basketball Ass'n. 42 F. Supp. 2d 33 (S.D.N. Y. 1999) (recognized that evidence of an
inexorable zero can support a jury's finding of discrimination against a motion for judgment as a matter of law);
Victory V . Hewlett-Packard Company. 34 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (read Teamsters as holding that an
inexorable zero standing alone could support a disparate impact claim of sex discrimination in promotions, asserting
that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeated countenanced the use of statistical evidence, and evidence of the absence of a
14

i
I

From 2000 to 2010, African American Agent Trainees had a zero percent rate of promotion
in the New York office while whites/"Jews" Agent Trainees had a 10 percent rate of promotion.
There were also zero African American Agent Trainees, zero African American Coordinators and
zero African American Agents or Agent Trainees when 1 began employment in the New York in
September of 2008. See Exhibit K. Out of the 50 Agents employed in the New York office, only
one was a person of color and she was Asian. William Morris hired me to their entry-level position
knowing that I had a zero percent chance of advancing to Agent, especially since the SVP of Urban
Contemporary Music rarely allowed Agent Trainees to assist for her due to her demanding
personality, she had a high rate of turnover on her desk and had three assistants. 1 was extremely
more qualified than my similarly situated white/ "Jewish" counterparts, since majority of them
were recent college graduates with no work experience, but they all advanced above me and the
i
I

other African American Agent Trainee who was hired six months after me.^^ See Exhibit L . In
this enviromnent, I began to feel I was being "set up to fail." I was given a high-frequency of deadI
end assignments and Sisyphean tasks. Many of my co-workers were lying on me (e.g. Chris Walsh,
Jason Hodes, etc.) and Human Resources always assumed their statements were true. Throughout
the case, Loeb & Loeb LLP argued that I was worst performing employee, but this was not true.
They do no dispute that former co-COO Cara Stein's statements during a meeting with all of the
Agent Trainees and Floaters, in which she informed everyone that the feedback from the Agents
and Assistants about the Floaters' work was poor and that everyone would be given a "second
chance." I never got that. My Complaint explains discusses many of the other things I went
I
single minority employee being hired, labeled the 'inexorable zero,' would in and of itself support an inference of
discrimination.").
William Morris hired me to their entry-level position knowing that I had a zero percent chance of advancing to
Agent. After I left the company, she promoted two white women to Agent and semi-Agent positions.
^^ During arbitration, Loeb & Loeb LLP raised the opposite argument. Only one party is telling the truth. Although
they were the only party in possession of the resumes, they reftised to produce them because their arguments are
pretextual.
15

through, including being told by Stein that the company "would never" discriminate against black
people. Since learning the law, 1 now know that she looked me in my eye, and lied to me.
Loeb & Loeb LLP argued that as an individual litigant, I was unable to file a "pattern and
practice" claim and treated my disparate impact claims as if they were irrelevant. This presents an
issue of first impression for the Supreme Court since all finders of fact ignored this aspect of my
claims, and thus, would never be able to award affirmative relief In the first appeal that I filed
with the Second Circuit, as well as my Motion for Summary Judgment, I cited Quinn v. JP Morgan
Chase & Co., 12 Misc.3d 1160, 819 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup Ct New York County 2006) and Hughes
V . UPS, (2004 N Y . Slip Op 510008 [NY Sup Ct 2004]) as two cases decided in New York that
have allowed pattern and practice claims in non-class action settings. The historical and statistical
evidence of pattern and continuing practice discrimination proves that racial discrimination is
William Morris' "standard operating procedure" and that William Morris was intentionally
violating Title V I I before and during my employment and that I entered into an insidiously
I
discriminatory environment. |
While William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP never met their heightened burden of
I
I

production and persuasion^'' and they refused to comply with any of my good-faith discovery

Typically, under the McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework, only the burden of production shifts once a plaintiff
establishes a/;/7/wa/Grc7e case of discrimination, but where a higher initial showing is made by the plaintiff, the "strong
medicine" of a shift in the burden of persuasion is justified.^'' See Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 262 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In that case. Justice O'Connor stated: "[0]ur decisions in Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition
that presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the
statute are not alien to our Title V I I jurisprudence." Id. at 267. At that point, the burden shifts to the employer to
demonstrate with more than a scintilla of evidence that the plaintiffs proof is "either inaccurate or insignificant."
Teamsters, at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867. The employer then carries the burden to demonstrate that the individual
employment decision was made for lawful reasons. Id. The employer's failure to carry this burden creates a
presumption of discrimination. Id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 1868.
The establishment of a prima facie case creates a mandatory presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against the employees. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506(1993). This "presumprion"
is therefore more than just an inference of a threshold showing: it is a predicate finding that obligates the employer to
come forward with an explanation or contrary proof Teamsters. 431 U.S. at 361; Hicks. 509 U.S. at 506. I f the
employer fails to respond to Plaintiffs' prima facie case, or if it fails to carry its burden to dispel the prima facie case,
16

requests, they repeatedly accused me of bemg "racist" and "anti-Semitic" - suggesting that this
was possibly a reason why 1 was unable to advance Agent as an Agent Trainee.^^ Without identify
anything that I said that was untrue or citing any case law, William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP
also accused me of engaging in defamation and l i b e l . T h e i r claims of being "anti-Semitic" are
nothing but smokesscreens and Strawman arguments because the original Jews were dark-skinned
people who did not originate from EurAsia.^^ I take great offense to being called racist and "antiSemitic," especially since I have always pursued this case in good faith and I have never disliked
someone merely because of the amount of skin melanin a person's body produces.^* It cannot be
disputed that William Moms was founded in New York City by a German "Jewish" immigrant

then the court "must find the existence of the presumed fact of unlawful discrimination and must, therefore, render a
verdict for the plaintiff." Hicks. 509 U.S. at 509-510 n.3; see also Burdine. 450 U.S. at 254 ("[I]f the employer is silent
in the face of presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the
case.").
Neal Gabler. Jews Invented Hollywood;
Arbitrator Gregory awarded William Morris $1,000 for their "injuries" although Gregory concluded under the
"political question doctrine" that he could not decide my two conspiracy claims and he did not have jurisdiction to
decide claims of ethical attorney misconduct.
Since Africa is considered the "Cradle of Mankind" and "original man" was dark-skinned, it is impossible for
descendants of Eur Asians to claim that land in the "Middle East" - e.g. Israel - belongs to them. Due to the "Jews"
of EurAsian descent's monopolistic control over Hollywood, the media and "marketplace of ideas," these converts
have deceived the world into believing that they are actually "God's chosen people." See e.g. John Henrik Clarke's
Introduction to John G. Jackson's Introduction to African Civilization, pg. 3. 1970. ("Most Western historians have
not been willing to admit that there is an African history to be written about, and that this history predates the
emergence of Europe by thousands of years. It is not possible for the world to have waited in darkness for the
Europeans to bring the light because, for most of the early history of man, the Europeans themselves were in darkness.
When the light of culture came for the first time to the people who would later call themselves Europeans, it came
from Africa and Middle Eastern Asia. Most history books tend to deny or ignore this fact.")
Before this case, I knew nothing about institutional racism, global white supremacy (racism) or knew anything about
the history of my African ancestors pre-slavery in the Americas - even though I excelled in school and have a
Bachelors in Psychology & Media Management and Masaters in Music Business and Entertainment Industries from
the University of Miami. See e.g.; Cheikh Anta Diop, The African Origin Of Civilization: Myth or Realty (1957);
Yosef A.A. ben-Jochannan, African Origins of the Major 'Western Religions' (1970); Tom Burrell, Brainwashed:
Challenging the Myths of Black Inferiority (2010); Jack Gratus, The Great White Lie: Slavery, Emancipation and
Changing Racial Attitudes (1973); OMichael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equity in American History
(2007); Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White (2005); J.A Rogers, Nature Knows No Color-Line
(1952); Rogers, Sex & Race Vol. 1 (1952); Carter G. Woodson, The Mis-Education of the Negro (1933); Malcolm X,
The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1964). Currendy reading John G. Jackson's Introduction to African Civilization,
1970; Ivan Van Sertima, They Came Before Columbus: The African Presence in Ancient America. 1976; T. Owens
Moore, Ph.D., The Science of Melanin: Dispelling the Myths. 1995; R. A. Schwaller deLubicz. Sacred Science. 1961;
John G. Jackson, Introduction to African Civilizations. 1970.
17

named Zelman Moses (later known as William Morris) in 1898 and that the company continues to
overrepresented by "Jews" of European descent today.^^ It cannot be disputed that from 1898 to
1961, William Morris had an explicit policy of not hiring African Americans. It cannot be disputed
that "Jews" of European descent are overrepresented in positions of power in Hollywood, based
on the fact that they only represent approximately 2 percent of the U.S. population.^ Due to the
fact that all talent agencies are carbon copies of William Morris, majority of the talent agencies
like Creative Artists Agency,^' ICM, UTA and others have zero and/or a gross underrepresentation
of qualified African Americans and people of color employed as Agents and Agent Trainees. After
118 years of excluding qualified people of color from higher-status, higher-paying positions in
i

Hollywood, it is clear that these companies, although competitors in public, are conspiring to
maintain a race-based monopoly in violation of our nation's federal and state antitrust laws. The
i

same can be said for other businesses in Hollywood, such as the studios, networks, production
companies, the media, etc.
I have presented clear and convincing evidence to support that this company and others are
engaged in a per se, race-based conspiracy^^ containing horizontal and vertical elements to exclude
i

Current co-CEO of William Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC is Ariel Emanuel, who is also "Jewish." The entire
company also observes "Jewish" holidays.
John W. Cones, Esq. "What's Really Going On In Hollywood!" (1997) http;//www.filmreform.org/whats.htm.
("The small group of Jewish males of European heritage who continue to control Hollywood today, are not necessarily
representative of Jews generally, nor can it be implied that they behave the way they do because they are Jewish.");
Who Controls Hollywood? ("Of the sixty (60) senior executives of the major Hollywood studios, trade unions, and
talent agencies, fifty (50) are Jews or have Jewish spouses. This is a numerical representation of 83%. Jews are
approximately 2% of the U.S. population. Therefore Jews are over-represented among the senior executives of the
major Hollywood studios, trade unions, and talent agencies by a factor of 41.5 times (4,150 percent)."); Joel Stein. "Is
Hollywood
Run
by
Jews?
You
Bet."
LA
Times.
December
19,
2008.
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/19/opinion/oe-steinl9. ("But I don't care i f Americans think we're rurming the
news media, Hollywood, Wall Street or the government. I just care that we get to keep running them")
See exhibit obtained in Rowe of a letter written by CAA Agent Trainee Quentin Embree. See Exhibit M.
A violation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is described by one word"monopolize." It condemns the
exclusionary practices of a single firm and prohibits those who "monopolize, attempt to monopolize or combine and
conspire to monopolize " 15 U.S.C. 2 ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony") (emphasis added). See also Verizon
Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 405-11 (2004) (discussing 2 liability for
18

African Americans and people of color from meaningful employment opportunities throughout
Hollywood and the entertainment industry. This ensures the preservation of wealth in the hands of
the world's minority and is a contributing cause for the many socioeconomic disparities found
between blacks and whites in all areas of life here America. As a result, this narrowly defined
racial, ethnic or cultural group has monopolistic control over the marketplace of ideas in our
multicultural democracy and has used its unjust power to spread its racial animus and project its
bias onto the collective psyche of the world through undeniably powerful communicative mediums
such as television and film - thus maintaining and perpetuating the myth of "race" and racial
superiority."

According to "State of Media: TV Usage Trends Q2 2010" data released by Nielsen, there
are an estimated 286 million persons in the U.S. viewing an average of 143 hours of television
i

each month. As our nation's education ranking continues to decline globally, television has
become a large source for how Americans receive information. The research indicates that these
mediums of "social conditioning"^'* are a major source for unconscious racism^^ and have the
ability to distort our views on race as early as age four. I f bias exists amongst those who have the
power and control over the marketplace of ideas - from our news to film - the Court must consider
what effect this has on the millions absorbing these subtly tainted messages and how that

a firm's refusal to deal with competitors); United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F3d 34, 49-50 (DC Cir 2001)
(discussing 2 enforcement against single firms in technologically dynamic markets). Section 2 "bears an intimate
relationship to section 1; section 1 is essentially directed at some of the means by which monopolization may be
sought, i.e., conspiratorial restraints of trade, and section 2 is directed at the end sought by those means, i.e., the
monopolization. " See e.g., Louis AJtman and Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies (4th Edition).(December 2012).
For example, in the recent film Kings and Gods - a movie set in ancient Egypt, then called Kemet which meant
"land of the blacks" the white director depicted all o f the kings and Gods to be white, while all the slaves and
criminals were black or dark-skinned.
Tim Wise. Colorblind: The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat From Racial Equity, p. 82-83. (2010)
Charles R. Lawrence 111 Id, Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism. 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317
(1987); Also look up information on the Implicit Association Tests (lATs).
19

influences their views - consciously and unconsciously - on race. With the repeated negative,
stereotypical representations of blacks on television, film and the media, black life continues to be
criminalized, demonized and dehumanized.^^ The reason for the lack of racial diversity on
television & film, is because of the ridiculously low amount of people of color employed in
meaningful positions at the studios, networks and talent agencies in Hollywood. Since racism is a
learned behavior that distorts reality and white racial superiorit>' is based on a myth, no one group
should have a monopoly over Hollywood and the marketplace of ideas - especially those who
falsely proclaim to be "God's chosen people." In a very in-depth and informative article on
Hollywood's history of racism and its dangers on society as a whole, John W. Cones, Esq. - a
white male - concludes:
[l]t is time that this privately controlled culture-promotion machine be dismantled, so that all
segments of this nation's multi-cultural society have an equal opportunity to tell their important
cultural stories through this significant medium for the communication of ideas. After all, it is
also clear that regardless of who controls Hollywood and with what results, it is absolutely
inappropriate in our multi-cultural society for any readily identifiable interest group (whether
the group identity is based on ethnicity, culture, religion, class or otherwise) to be allowed to
dominate or control this, or any important communications medium. Diversity is the key."
I
At the minimum, entitied to permanent injunctive, monetary and affirmative relief as a
matter of law to prevent racial discrimination from occurring in the future.
What impact has this had on the rise of recent police killings of unarmed black men, women and children? Every
cop that has racially profiled, stop and frisked, murdered unarmed black citizens, etc. has been brainwashed to live in
fear of black life.
|
Cones. Supra at 30.
With offices located in Beverly Hills, Nashville and other cities throughout the U.S. and around the world, less than
25 out of more than 500 Agents (or less than five percent) have been African American since the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was passed. Had William Morris been in compliance with Title VII, especially after Rowe, there would have
been at least five African Americans Agents employed in each of the New York office departments - television, music,
theater, literary and commercials - when I began employment in the company's New York office. This would have
fostered a more inclusive work environment and increased my chances of being hired and/or promoted to Agent.
Although this is not a class action, I should be prevented fi-om showing pattern and pracfice discrimination, esp. when
the "inexorable zero" is present. Over the last 51 years, William Morris and Hollywood have been given many
opportunities to diversify and yet, the problem of institutionalized racism in Hollywood continues to persist, so they've
made it perfectly clear that they do not want to. William Morris must be reminded that it is not located in Israel or
Europe and that it is the antidiscrimination laws of the U.S. that ultimately governs a company's employment
decisions. See e.g., John Horn. "Hollywood Is Losing the Race For Ethnic and Gender Inclusion." L A Times.
20

[Deprivation of Rights and Violation of 1983, 1985] Like racism, judicial corruption is
not always blatant - hence the importance of judicial opinions. Judicial opinions offer a glimpse
into a judge's state of mind. Although Castel's decisions present a "veneer of fairness," they are
all "intellectually dishonest" and meant to deceive Using Castel's extremely biased decisions as
a lens, it can be easily demonstrated that at the minimum, an "appearance" and/or actual bias,
prejudice, partiality and/or impropriety existed with the federal judge presiding over this case.
Since this case deals with a complex, social issue and majority of the finders of fact and
officers of the court do not "face bigotry and discrimination on the basis of color or a legacy of
oppression and unequal opportunity dating back generations,"^^ I had no choice than to relate Title
V I I to the historical "social problems that generated the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and that continue to be a structural part of our economy and society."'' Title V I I was a direct
legislative byproduct of the black-led civil rights movement'*^ and the larger struggle of African
Americans to live free from both invidious and institutional racism in all areas of life in
America/^ The purpose of the Act was to "remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor
an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Griggs at 429-430 (emphasis
added); See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. Inc.. 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) ("Congress

December
26,
2013.
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/moviesnow/la-et-mn-backstage-blackFilmmakers-20131226-story. html#axzz2obL44haU. ("Even if Hollywood likes to present itself as magnanimous and
liberal, its hiring decisions including jobs handed to women continue to be demographically constricted, with
most work still going to white men.")
Tim Wise. Colorblind: The Rise of Post-Racial Politics and the Retreat From Racial Equity, p. 41. 2010.
Merrick T. Rossein. Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation (2012).
See e.g.. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (PBS television broadcast, 1986). Each episode of this six
part series can be viewed on Youtube.; see also, Daniel B. Rodriquez and Barry R. Weingast. The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation. 151 U . Pa. L. Rev.
1417, (2002).
''^ Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro. Can We Talk? How Triggers for Unconscious Racism Strengthen the Importance of Dialogue.
22 Nat'l Black L. J. I , 21 (Fall 2009) ("During slavery and Jim Crow it was not unusual for African descendants to
be treated in debasing ways, including being address with demeaning labels such as 'nigger.' Race and racism were
part of the very fabric of the society, and although other racial groups were treated in a discriminatory fashion, the
premier story of racism in the United States has been the treatment of African descendants.").
21

II
intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment
opportunity due to discrimination [prohibited by Title VIII...and ordained that its policy of
outlawing such discrimination should have the highest priority.") (emphasis added); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) ("Congress' primary concern m enactmg the
prohibition against racial discrimination in Title V I I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the
plight of the Negro in our economy.'") (quoting Senator Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6548)
(emphasis added). The finder of fact cannot ignore historical evidence of racial discrimination,
especially when there are zero African Americans employed in meaningful positions.
[Arbitration & Jurisdiction] Without discussing Title V I I or making any mention that my
claims also included systemic disparate treatment, disparate impact and pre-hiring individual
disparate treatment, Castel stated in his July 20, 2011 Stay Order that I "ha[d] not shown that
Congress intended to preclude arbitration for claims asserted under either Title V I I or 42 U.S.C.
1981," but It's clear that I have. [PKC Stay Order, 18.] Had Castel actually considered the
legislative history and public policy goals of the various antidiscrimination statutes, he would have
concluded that the "Plaintiff ha[d] [ ] shown that Congress intended to preclude arbitration for [the
various] claims asserted [against William Morris] under either Title VII or 42. U.S.C. 1981."
"[T]he burden lies with the party attempting to avoid arbitration 'to show that Congress intended
I
to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum' for his claims." Arciniaga v. General Motors Corp., 460
F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26. 1991.).
[PKC Stay Order, 17.]

Due to Castel ignoring a substantial part of my claims and the Second Circuit concluding that my appeal was "moot,"
this prejudiced the arbitrator's decisions on the issue of arbitrability, hence the reason why they upheld the arbitration
agreements without any discussion of my legal arguments and never resolved my claims of systemic disparate
treatment, disparate impact, etc. In this case, the principle of stare decisis never existed. Castel and the Second Circuit
knowingly and willingly disregarded "clear and controlling law" and distorted the facts in the record to do so.

Although Castel tried to create the impression that my arguments were not worthy of his
consideration/'* the legal sufficiency of my defense is supported by O'Regan v. Arbitration
Forums, Inc.. 246 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2001) and Miriam A. Cherry's "Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration:
Using Title V I I Disparate Impact Analysis To Invalidate Employment Contracts That
Discriminate.'"*^ In Q'Regan, the district judge had no difficulty a'pplying antidiscrimination law
within the framework of the FAA.'*^ Since William Morris was intentionally violating Title VII by
maintaining a racially segregated workplace, they entered into the agreement with "unclean
hands." And while there is a "strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, that policy has limits
since there have been a cases in which arbitration agreements have been deemed invalid due to the
egregiousness of the employer's actions. See e.g., Jones v. Halliburton Co., No. 08-20380 (5th Cir.
Sept. 15, 2009); Michael Bumblis v. American Apparel Retail Inc. et al., case No. BC496498, in
the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles.'*'' Regardless of what the
arbitrator decided, the federal court is "vested with the final responsibility for [Title VII's]
enforcement through the construction and interpretation of the statutes, the adjudication of claims,
and the issuance of relief'"*^ See e.g.. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 454 U.S. 461, 479 n.20

One of the first things I stated was: "[T]he arbitration agreements on [their] face appear reasonable. However, when
scrutinized fijrther[,] one will notice that the terms [pertaining to 'discrimination' and 'retaliation' are unconscionable
and are in direct violation of Section 1981 and Title "VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." [PI. Opp. Motion, 3-4.]In
William Morris' particular work environment, it's impossible for whites/"Jews" to be discriminated against because
of their race, color and/or national origin. As a result, the "terms, conditions and privileges" are unequal based on the
employee's race, and as a result, the contract becomes "racialize[d]' and is in direct violation of Section 1981 and
Title VTI. [PI. Opp. Motion, 11]
Miriam A. Cherry. Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title V I I Disparate Impact Analysis To Invalidate
Employment Contracts That Discriminate. Harvard Women's Law Journal. Vol. 21: 267-307. 1998. In Cherry's 1998
law article, she "advocate[s] the use of a Title V I I disparate impact claim against employers with a history of
discriminatory workplace practices choosing to institute pre-dispute mandatory arbitration policies."
'^^ When I raised these arguments to the Second Circuit during my interlocutory appeal, Loeb & Loeb LLP did not
challenge my claims that Castel applied the wrong legal standard to determine the issue of unconscionability. Yet, a
few months later in arbitration, when I raised the arbitrability arguments pursuant to Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order,
Loeb & Loeb LLP argued that Castel had already decided those issues.
"^ Matthew Heller. "American Apparel Can't Arbitrate Claim CEO Choked Employee." Law360. May 24, 2013.
http://wufw.law360.com/articles/445001/american-apparel-can-t-arbitrate-claim-ceo-choked-employee.
Thomas E. Carbonneau. Employment Arbitration. 2nd ed. pg. 65-66. 2006.
23

(1982) ("federal courts were entrusted with ultimate enforcement responsibility" of Title VII);
New York Gaslight Club. Inc. v. Carey. 447 U.S. 54, 64 (1980) ("Of course the 'ultimate authority'
to secure compliance with Title V I I resides in the federal courts").'*^
My case should have remained in the federal court and that the merits of my case should
have ultimately been decided by an impartial jury reflecting the rich diversity of New York City.
Even after I complied with Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order and an Award was rendered, he still
refused to acknowledge my legal arguments or apply Title V I I after retaining complete jurisdiction
over the case.

Based on all the facts and circumstances, it is clear that arbitration was never the

appropriate forum to resolve the merits of this case.^' Since the arbitration agreements are
I
unenforceable as a matter of law and public policy, any arbitrator that decided the merits of my
claims "exceeded [their] powers" pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 10. No arbitrator should have decided
the merits of my claims - that decision should have been made by an impartial jury reflecting the
rich diversity of New York City.

I
^' See e.g., See Blakelv v. Washington. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538-39 (2004) ("[T]he right of jup>' trial...is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures
the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the
judiciary.")
^ Michael Zweig's first letter to Castel sought permission to file the Motion to Compel Arbitration. After reading a
number of articles regarding the Federal Arbitration Act and arbitration for five days, J raised these similar arguments.
Castel granted Zweig's request and stated: " I have reviewed Mr. Washington's letter and I adhere to my Order of
February 9, 2011 Mr. Washington will have a full opportunity to oppose the motion on its merits." I f the Castel
ignored my Fed. R. Civ. P. 11-compliant legal arguments and misapplied the law, then Castel did not provide me with
the full opportunity to oppose arbitration and as a result, he has intentionally deprived me of my constitutional,
statutory and inalienable rights by rendering a predetermined decision.
" Although the FAA embodies a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011), does that outweigh Title VII's public policy goal of eradicating
institutionalized racism from the American workplace? Should an employer that intentionally engages in a pattern and
practice of excluding qualified African Americans from meaningful positions throughout the workplace and has acted
with "malice and/or reckless indifference" to the federally protected rights of African Americans be allowed to
determine the forum in which employment disputes pertaining to racial discrimination are decided?
" Hoffman v. Cargill. Inc.. 142 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Iowa 2000), provides a "rare example of an opinion that
connects a concern over loss of jury access with the more general loss of access to a judicial forum." In Chief Judge
Bennett's "strongly worded critique of mandatory arbitration," he stated, "In light of what is likely to be a rising tide
of arbitration of disputes in our society, there is a real potential that literally hundreds of thousands of citizens will be
deprived of their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in federal courts by insertion of arbitration clauses in what
are often, in my view, classic adhesion contracts."
24
I

i
!

I
I
"[S]o long as long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chr\^sler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985). As a venue for this case, arbitration was fundamentally unsuited for this kind of dispute.^^
In Michael LeRoy's article Jmy Revival Or Jmy Reviled? Wljen Employees Are Compelled to
Waive Jury Trial, he explains:
The Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury in civil trials. But this does not mean that
all civil cases are tned by a jury. Consider employment discrimination lav^^suits. Early in the
history of Title VII, Congress precluded access to juries. Only bench trials could occur because
of concern for racial bias. This changed in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, when Congress
concluded that juries should be able to hear these cases. The provision for tort-like remedies
to Title VII adds another fact to jury access. Because relief is expanded beyond equitable
remedies to include damages, juries now play a remedial role in cases of intentional
discrimination. But the empowerment of Title VII juries in the 1991 law collides with a
different authority. Gilmer, decided the same year, disenfranchises juries by allowing an
employer to require arbitration. In other words, an employer can subvert congressional intent
to toughen the enforcement of Title V I I by opting out of the law's elaborate remedy structure.
Under Gilmer, an employee agrees to work without these new legislative protections or is fired.
This countermanding of legislative intent is approved, interestingly enough, by the same
Congress who increased enforcement of Title VII. Section 118 of the 1991 law marginalizes
juries by allowing "alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration." This sends
a mixed signal about Congress' desire to provide discrimination plaintiffs a jury trial. Courts
who give weight to the vague arbitration policy section 118 enforce Gilmer contracts. This
replaces a jury with an arbitrator. But other courts reason that if Title V I I plaintiffs are "forced
into binding arbitration, [they] would be surrendering their nght to trial by jury - a right that
civil rights plaintiffs...fought hard for and finally obtained in the 1991 amendments to Title
VII. 5"
I

See e.g., Wendi S. Lazar. "Mandatory Arbitration: Searching For Fairness." Law.com. March 5, 2015.
http://www.law.com/sites/articles/2015/03/05/mandatory-arbitration-searching-for-fairness/.
("Arbitration,
particularly as it is practiced in employment law...is an unfair system that is forced or imposed on employees and
consumers while disregarding our civil rights and liberties in favor of an abbreviated, and at times perverse, form of
justice.") ("[Fjorced arbitration in discrimination cases, where the plaintiff employee would otherwise have had
existing federal rights and remedies (both statutory and common law), and the right to be heard in a federal court with
a federal judge and the right to appeal, is blatantly unjust.") ("[A]t this point the federal policy favoring arbitration is
so entrenched in the courts that a legislative solution is the only way out of the mire. Despite the shibboleth that
Congress is broken, recent legislation (and an executive order) may suggest that change is on the way.")
Michael LeRoy. Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees Are Compelled To Waive Jury Trial. 7 U . Pa.
Journal of Labor and Employment Law 767, 780. 2005.
25

i
I

Since "the end-goal of all antidiscrimination law is social equality,"^^ litigating this
particular case in the federal court - not in arbitration - would have generated several enforcement
mechanisms that are integral to securing the end of workplace discrimination in America.'^ Using
judges rather than arbitrators to adjudicate employment discrimination cases better serves the goals
of the discrimination laws. And in theory, ethical judicial decisions, as well as a jury trial, would
have allowed the Court to refine the law and strengthen Title VH. Finally, this case would have
educated the public and allowed for meaningful discourse about the realities of continuing racism
in our "post-racial society." The Supreme Court must reconsider its pro-arbitration policy to
workplace disputes, especially those involving claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
privatized, for-profit, quasi-judicial forum dropped the ball big time and this case supports why
it's mandatory for Congress to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act.^^
Castel sits at the head of the Grievance Committee for the Southern District of New York
- the committee that handles complaints of attorney misconduct - yet he whitewashed my legal
arguments and made no mention of Rowe, Arbitrator Gregory's decision regarding "Exhibit 31"
or y claims of "fraud upon the Court. "^^ After Arbitrator Gregory decided the issue of arbitrability

Green, Structural Approach. Pg. 853.


Geraldine Szott Moohr. Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law. 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
395, 400 (1999).
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015 was introduced by Sen. Al Franken and Georgia Rep. Hank Johnson and is
designed to eliminate mandatory arbitration clauses in employment, consumer civil rights and antitrust cases by the
Federal Arbitration Act to its original meaning. Sen. Johnson stated in a statement: "There is overwhelming evidence
that forced arbitration creates an unaccountable system of winners and losers. Unlike America's civil justice system,
which has evolved through centuries of jurisprudence and social progress, forced arbitration does not provide
important procedural guarantees of fairness and due process that are the hallmarks of courts of law."
"Exhibit 31" is the search summary results findings of Electronic Evidence Discovery's search into the 1998-1999
backup tapes of William Morris and Creative Artists Agency during e-discovery in Rowe. Attorneys from both sides
conspired to conceal this evidence and to this day, the underlying e-mails have never been produced. Afler six months
of deliberation and reviewing evidence. Arbitrator Gregory' admitted this document into the evidence of record in my
case - federal judge Robert P. Patterson refused to do so in Rowe - and compelled William Morris to produce these
e-mails in his third Interim Decision in his September 25, 2013 Interim Decision.
26

and admitted "Exhibit 3 1 " into the evidence of the record, I could have moved to the Southern
District of New York to confinn, modify and/or vacate his Interim Decision.
While Castel publicly proclaimed to be "[c]onstruing [my] argument[s] liberally in light of
[my] pro se status" in his July 20, 2011 and September 5, 2015 Orders, he knew that he was doing
the opposite since he was intentionally ignoring the substance of my legal arguments. Castel and
the various appellate judges have violated many Canons under the Judicial Code of Conduct. The
Judicial Code of Conduct "provides guidance for judges on issues of judicial integrity and
independence, judicial diligence and impartiality, permissible extrajudicial activities, and the
avoidance of impropriety or even its appearance."^"^ The four key Canons that Castel has violated
are Canon 2(A), 2(B), 3(A)(1) and 3(A)(4).

^' I also could have sought default judgment on all claims due to the fi"aud engaged in by Loeb & Loeb LLP and its
attorneys from the before and during my case, but I waited until after Arbitrator Gregory issued his "final" decision
on the issue of liability before taking the case back to the federal court. It is well settled that a motion to disqualify a
law firm and/or an attorney for purported violations of professional rules of ethics, can only be decided by the federal
court, not arbitrators.^^ Bidermann Industries Licensing. Inc. v. Avmar N.V.. 570 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1991)
("Issues of attorney disqualification ... involve interpretation and application of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules, as well as the potential deprivation of counsel of the client's choosing,"
traditionally issues for a court); See also Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Insco Ltd. 2011 W L 4552997 (S.D. N.Y.
2011).
Canon 1 states: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should
maintain and enforce high standards of conduct and should personally observe those standards, so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed
and applied to further that objective " Canon 2(A) states: "Ajudge should respect and comply with the law and should
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 2(B)
states: " A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. A judge should neither lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private
interests of the judge or others nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge " Canon 3(A)(1) states: " A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional
competence in, the law and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism." 3(A)(4)
states: "A judge should accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, and that person's lawyer,
the full right to be heard according to law. Except as set out below, a judge should not initiate, permit, or consider
ex parte communications or consider other communications concerning a pending or impending matter that are made
outside the presence of the parties or their lawyers. I f a judge receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing
on the substance of a matter, the judge should promptly notify the parties of the subject matter of the communication
and allow the parties an opportunity to respond, if requested." Canon 3(B)(5) states: " A judge should take appropriate
action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood that a judge's conduct contravened this Code or a
lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct." Canon 3(C)(lX it states: "A judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances in which: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding"; see also, Charles Gardner Geyh. Judicial Disqualification: An
Analysis of Federal Law. Federal Judicial Center, 2nd edition. (2010); Paul M . Perell. The Disqualification of Judges
27

No matter how much case law, law articles and sociological jurisprudence I've cited and
applied to the facts of this case, Castel and the Second Circuit have demonstrated that it doesn't
matter. This is not "accidental" or "due to chance." As described by various articles published in
the New York Tmies, "[t]he conservative effort to reshape the judiciary began as a backlash to a
i

string of liberal court rulings in the 1960s and 1970s."^' In an effort to judges "strictly interpret[ed]
the Constitution based on its original meaning,"*"" Republican Presidents beginning with Ronald
Reagan and continuing with the Bushes''^ vetted out "strict constructionist judge[s]" with a
"conservative judicial philosophy," who were "sympathetic to conservative jurisprudence."^''*
This is not the first ttme Castel's narrow construction of our nation's laws in an
employment discrimination case has had to be overturned by amending legislation due to his
narrowed construction of our nation's antidiscrimination laws, particularly the New York City
Human Rights Law.*^^ The Civil Rights Restoration Act, N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 (2005),
amended NYCHRL in 2005 to broaden its protections and expressly decouple interpretation of the
statute from federal and state law. It states:
In particular, through passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the
provisions of the New York City's Human Rights Law are to be construed independently
from similar or identical provision of New York state or federal statutes. Interpretations
of New York City Human Rights Law, viewing similarly worded provisions of federal and
state civil rights laws as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall, rather
than a ceiling above which the local law cannot rise.
I

and Judgments on the Grounds of Bias or the Reasonable Apprehension of Bias. 29 Advoc. Q. 102, (2004); Michael
W. Martin. Current Issues in Judicial Disqualifications. 30 Review of Litigation 639, (2011).
Charlie Savage. "Appeals Court Pushed to Right By Bush Choices." New York Times. October 28, 2008.
On November 19, 2001 P. Kevin Castel was appointed to a lifelong term on the bench by then Republican President
George W. Bush. As part of an Article I I I federal judge's Oath of Office, they swear: " I , X X X X X X , do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfijlly and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as X X X
under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God." 28 U.S.C. 453.
Neil A. Lewis. "Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored." New York Times. April 10, 1990.
Castel, Gregory, Lewis nor the Second Circuit have mentioned or applied NYCHRL in Washington.
i

28

N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85, 1 (2005) (emphasis added).^^ Although Castel applied NYCHRL to
deny an employer's motion to dismiss in Wang v. Phoenix Satellite Television U.S., Inc., 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143627 (S.D.N. Y. Oct. 3, 2013), he ruled that an intern could not sue for sexual
harassment because they were not an "employee."^^
I tried to give Castel the benefit of the doubt. Since Castel - a white male bom before 1964
- ignored all of my legal arguments, as well as the pyramid of evidence which proves all of my
claims, repeatedly rendered one-sided opinions that made no mention of the Civil Rights Act of
1694 or my claims of "fraud upon the Court" and violations of New York Judiciary Law 487
and all of the legal conclusions reached in Castel September 5,2014 Final Award are erroneous as
both a matter of law and public pohcy, this supports that P. Kevin Castel should have disqualified
himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455 and Canon 3(C)(1) of the Judicial Code of Conduct.
Due to the corrupt and highly "dishonorable" actions of federal judges like Castel, the
various appellate judges on the Second Circuit and the majority. Republican appointed Supreme
Court Justices over time, the substantive strength of the Title VTI is on life support today.^^

^ In recognition of the 2005 amendment, the Second Circuit held on April 26, 2013 that NYCHRL claims must be
analyzed separately from federal and state discrimination claims and that federal courts must construe "the NYCHRL's
provisions broadly in favor of discrimination plaintiffs, to the extent that such a construction is reasonably possible."
Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N . Am.. Inc.. F.3 , 2013 W L 1776643, at *5 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2013)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the Second Circuit noted that despite the 2005 amendment,
"district courts continued - erroneously - to apply federal standards to NYCHRL claims."
" On March 26, 2014, the New York City Council voted unanimously to pass legislation amending the New York
City Human Rights Law to provide that interns are protect from workplace discrimination and harassment under the
NYCHRL.
See e.g., Hon. Mark W. Bennett. From the "No Spittin', No Cussin' and No Summary Judgmenf Days of
Employment Discrimination Litigation to the "Defendant's Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment" Days:
One Judge's Four Decade Experience. 57 N. Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 685 (2012-2013). ("The trends that are described here
have driven employment discrimination plaintiffs from our federal courts in unprecedented numbers. In the last few
years there has been a shocking drop of nearly 40% in the number of federal court employment discrimination
filings. This is even more dramatic, given the rise in charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).") Id. at 709. ("For much of my judicial career, employment discrimination cases 'reigned as
the largest single category of federal civil cases, at nearly ten percent of that docket." Now, they are exceeded by
personal injury, product liability, and habeas corpus petitions. Employment discrimination cases have been dropping
as a percentage of the federal court docket every year since 2001") Id. (emphasis added)
29

Historically, the black unemployment has remained double that of whites,^^ blatant forms of white
racism is worsening and many whites still proclaim that racism doesn't exist. Although
integration is legal and we've tried to assimilate into the dominant culture, we are still largely
segregated - from housing to the classroom and from

Many mdustries - e.g. Hollywood,

advertising,''' Silicon Valley,''^ Wall Street, the U.S. government & its judiciary, "corporate
America,"^^ etc.^'' - have HISTORICALLY had a gross underrepresentation of qualified African
Americans

employed, particularly in higher-status,

higher-paying positions, and many

predominately all-white companies rely on the same "ostensibly neutral" employment practices e.g. strong reliance on word of mouth hiring and referrals, strong reliance on highly subjective &
arbitrary decisionmaking, etc. - that perpetuate existing racial inequality throughout the
workplace.

After filing my Complaint with the Southern District of New York, the black unemployment rate reached a 27 year
peak at 16.7 percent in August of 2011. Although the statistics appear better today, the underemployment rates of
blacks paints a bleaker picture.
The differences in views between whites and blacks on matters concerning race and racism are drastically different.
In an early 2009 ABC News/Washington Post poll, 83 percent of whites insisted that African Americans have just as
good of a chance as whites to get a job for which they are qualified for. See e.g. "Fewer Call Racism A Major Problem
Though Discrimination Remains." January 19, 2009.
^' Marc Bendick, Jr. and Mary Lou Egan. "Research Perspectives On Race and Employment In The Advertising
Industry."
January
2009.
http://www.adweek.conVagencyspy/files/original/Bendick%20Egan%20Advertising%20Industrv%20Report%20Jan
%2009.pdf
Mike Issac. "Behind Silicon Valley's Self-Critical Tone on Diversity, A Lack of Progress." New York Times. June
28, 2015.
http:/^its.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/new-diversity-repo^ts-show-the-same-old-results/?_r=0.
Michael Cooper and Nelson D. Schwartz. "Racial Diversity Efforts Ebb for Elite Careers, Analysis Finds." New
York Times. May 27, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/texas-firm-highlights-struggle-for-blackprofessionals.html?pagewanted=l&_r=2&. ("As a partner and chief diversity officer at Thompson & Knight, Pauline
Higgins was not afraid to press the issue of hiring minorities at the 126-year-old Texas law firm. But when she left in
2003, she was replaced by an associate with less influence. Now, current and former partners say, the diversity
committee meets less often, and the firm has fewer black lawyers than before. It is a trajectory familiar in many elite
realms of American profession life. Even as racial barriers continue to fail, progress for African-Americans over all
has remained slow - and in some cases appears to be staling."
Members of secret societies and organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, New World Order, the Trilateral Commission,
Masons, Skulls & Bones, etc. are predominately white/"Jewish."
30

Since filing my complaint with the EEOC, race relations between blacks and whites in
America has worsened.

Things are getting so bad that 50 years after the passage of Title V I I ,

whites not only believe that blacks have an equal opportunity for jobs, but there has been a "more
general mindset gaining traction among Whites in contemporary America; the notion that Whites
have replaced Blacks as the primary victims of discrimination."''^ See e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129
S. Ct. 2658 (2009); Schuette;; Fisher v. University of Texas. It's been twenty-four years since
Congress amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 - which in theory was intended to
strengthen disparate impact theory by overturning Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S.
642, 109 S.Ct 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) due to the decisions of the Supreme Court during
Ronald Regan's eight years in office.^^ Although Justice Scalia stated that disparate impact theory

I
'^ Anti-black racism is the fulcrum of white supremacy. Since racism is "essential for global white genetic survival,"
in our capitalistic society, money ensures one's "survival." And how does the average person obtain money?
Employment. Under this system, Dr. Frances Cress Welsing states that the African American male in the collective
white psyche, represents "the greatest threat to white genetic survival because only males (of any color) can impose
sexual genetic intercourse, and Black males have the greatest genetic potential (of all non-white males) to cause white
genetic annihilation. Thus, Black males must be attacked and destroyed in a power system designed to assure white
genetic survival." Further highlighting the importance of having an understanding of history in order to make sense
of our modem day social problems, Professor Lu-in Wang makes "the point that the advantage of being white was
obtained through the 'anticompetitive conduct of racism,' including slavery and Jim Crow."139 Based on this
definition and others, white supremacy implies having power over those who are "classified as nonwhite" and is
essentially a conspiracy to interfere with the civil and human rights of African Americans and other people of color a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
See e.g., Michael I . Norton and Samuel R. Sommers. Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now
Losing. 6 Perspectives on Psychology 215, (2011). ("Although legal challenges concerning so-called 'reverse racism'
date back as far as the 1970s (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978), such claims have been at the
core of an increasing number of high-profile Supreme Court cases in recent years, in domains such as equal access to
education (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003; Gruffer v. Bollinger, 2003) and employment discrimination (Ricci v. DeStefano,
2009)two of the very issues at the heart of the African American Civil Rights Movement a half-century ago. We
suggest that these trends epitomize a more general mindset gaining traction among Whites in contemporary America:
the notion that Whites have replaced Blacks as the primary victims of discrimination. This emerging perspective is
particularly notable because by nearly any metricfrom employment to police treatment, loan rates to education
statistics continue to indicate drastically poorer outcomes for Black than White Americans. We propose that Whites'
belief about the increasing prevalence of anti-White bias reflects a view of racism as a zero-sum game, which can be
summed up as 'less against you means more against me.'"); http://www.russellsage.org/blog/desegregation-privatesector-interview-kevin-stainback-and-donald-tomaskovic-devey. ("Reverse discrimination is a myth. It is the product
of whites' and males' misguided fears of a loss of privileged access to good jobs.") ("In fact, today we show that the
cities in which white men are the smallest percent of the labor force are the ones in which they have the greatest access
to the best jobs.")
In that span of time, less than three African Americans have been promoted to Agent throughout the Agent Trainee
program in New York City.
|
i

31

was possibly "unconstitutional" in Ricci, the Supreme Court recently affirmed Griggs in its
decision for Texas Dep't of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,
No. 13-1371 (2015).^^

For more than a decade, law professor Tristin K. Green has looked at the numerous ways
an employer's "organization structure, institutional practices and work culture defined along
racialized lines" perpetuates existing inequality throughout the workplace and has advocated for a
"structural approach [to employment discrimination law]" - an approach that "identifies the
facilitation of discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking as a form of discrimination. It
seeks to impose a normative and corresponding legal obligation on employers not to facilitate
I

discriminatory decisionmaking in the w o r k p l a c e . A year before I began employment at William


Morris, Green published a law article titled, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination
Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong. In it, she stated:
"Employment discrimination law is at a crossroads. A weahh of interdisciplinary research
suggests that the problem for the future of workplace equality is subtle and 'structural' rather
than overt and individual. Race, sex, and other protected group characteristics will continue to
factor into employment decisions, but the decisions are more likely to be driven by unconscious
biases and stereotypes operating within a facilitating organizational context than by conscious
animus operating in isolation.
Title VII, she and others say, "falls short" when it comes to adequately addressing and correcting
these problems.**'

This decision further supports that the arbitrators and lower courts erred by ignoring my systemic disparate
treatment, disparate impact and pre-hiring individual disparate treatment claims.
Green, Structural Approach. Pgs. 852-853
Tristin K. Green. A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong. Vanderbilt
Law Review. Pg. 850. 2007.
Green, Structural Approach. Pg. 853-854, Green states:
[E]mployer facilitation of discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking violates the longstanding norm
against different treatment in employment on the basis of protected characteristics, and thus inflicts a moral wrong
on individuals in the employment relationship, regardless of whether the employer or the decisionmaker acts with
animus or intent to harm. But a structural approach to employment discrimination law, by separating employer
from individual wrong, stands on even stronger normative footing. Under a structural approach, individual actors
need not be labeled 'evil discriminators' in order for employers to engage in wrongful discrimination.
Organizational decisions concerning workplace policies, operations, culture, decisionmaking systems the
32

Antidiscrimination law must be used to target more subtle forms of employment


discrimination, especially since employees can use e-mails, instant messenger and other tools to
communicate racist messages.Although I do not think that every white and/or "Jewish" person
that I worked with was racist or had a racial animus against black people, 1 do believe many that
made adverse employment decisions against me harbored pro-white/"Jewish" biases. As an Agent
Trainee, I was unable to be mentored or land a permanent Assistant position although I was
considerably more qualified than my similarly situated white/"Jewish" counterparts.^^ See Exhibit
L . Since these decisions are entirely subjective and may or may not be the result of conscious
and/or unconscious racial bias, racial inequality will continue to persist as long as the workplace
remains segregated and stratified by race. According to Green, a "structural approach" must be
formulated that "impose[s] an obligation on employers - through legal rights or otherwise ~ to
i

take structural measures to minimize discriminatory bias in workplace decisionmaking."


Although my strong public interest arguments regarding institutionalized racism in
Hollywood were downplayed by Castel and the Second Circuit, a recent LA Weekly article titled
"How Hollywood Keeps Minorities O u f buttresses what I've argued from day one.*^ See Exhibit

1
structures that create the context in which individual perceptions and judgments about merit are madebecome
the focus of inquiry, and the locus of employer wrong. With the normative foundation of a structural approach to
employment discrimination law in mind, legal actors judges, legislatures, agencies should be comfortable
holding employers responsible for structural discrimination. And advocates of reform should be more confident
than scholars have thus far acknowledged that their efforts to address structural discrimination will gain the
political traction needed for meaningful change.
See e.g. Amy Kaufman. "The Embarrassing Emails That Preceded Amy Pascal's Resignation." L A Times. February
5, 2015. http://vAvw.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-amy-pascal-email-rogen-hirai-20150205story.html.
In the first week of employment, I was given the opportunity to work as the third assistant to SVP of Urban
Contemporary Music. After three months, CPL relieved me from her desk and said that I was possibly "overqualified."
I would apply for other positions, but my lesser qualified white/ "Jewish" counterparts were given the positions.
Green, Structural .Approach. Pg. 850. ("This 'structural approach' aims to minimize discriminatory decisionmaking
at the individual level and to reduce unequal treatment in the workplace by pushing change at the organizational level
in work environments and decisionmaking systems.")
Dennis Romero. "How Hollywood Keeps Minorities Out." L A Weekly. February 25, 2015.
http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-hollywood-keeps-minorities-out-5402815.
33

N. On May 12, 2015 the ACLU also announced that it was "taking on Hollywood's boys-club
mentality."

The organization "called on state and federal agencies to investigate gender

discrimination at major Holl>'wood studios, networks and talent agencies, contending that 'women
are systematically excluded from or underemployed in directing jobs.'" Although gender equality
doesn't exist, it doesn't change the fact that the biggest beneficiaries of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 have been white women.^'' So while white women continue to raise claims of gender
discrimination and have the support of organizations like the ACLU, I've been accused by William
Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP of being "racist" and "anti-Semitic" when there were more African
American Agents employed in the New York office in 1963 (one) than there were during my
employment.^^ Even a blind man can see that only one party is telling the truth.^^

Oliver Gettel. "ACLU Calls For Investigation Into Gender Discrimination In Hollywood." L A Times. May 12,
2015.
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/movies/moviesnow/la-et-mn-aclu-gender-discrimination-hollywood20150512-ston,'.html; "A.C.L.U., Citing Bias Against Women, Wants Inquiry Into Hollywood's Hiring
Practices." New York Times. May 12, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/movies/aclu-citing-bias-againstwomen-wants-inquiry-into-hollywoods-hiring-practices.html.
Kevin Stainback and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey. Discrimination & Desegregation: Equal Opportunity Progress in
U.S. Private Sector Workplaces Since the Civil Rights Act. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, p. 63 (2007). The researchers conclude:
.. .from documenting these basic trends... while almost all workplaces have incorporated women and racial/ethnic
minorities as employees, status segregation within workplaces remains very high, white-males continue to have
advantaged access to the best quality jobs, most racial progress in EEO stalled after 1980, and white women seem
to have benefited the most fi-om the struggles for EEO.
See e.g., Jason Bailey. "Hacked Sony Email Confirms What Chris Rock Told Us About Racism in Hollywood."
Flavor Wire. December 11, 2014. http://flavorwire.com/493364/hacked-sony-email-confirms-what-chris-rock-toldus-about-racism-in-hollywood. ("'It's a white industry,' [Chris] Rock writes. 'It's the most liberal town in the world,
and there's a part of it that's kind of racist.'"); Cynthia Littleton. "Russell Simmons Blasts Hollywood's Racial
'Segregation."' Variety. January 22, 2015. htip://a.msn.com/0C/en-us/AA8rWlf (""Hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons
had harsh words about the business environment he has encountered in Hollywood now that he's turned his focus to
producing movies, T V shows and digital content. 'The reality is the lack of integration is deafening,' he said
Wednesday during a Q & A at the NATPE confab. 'The segregation in Hollywood is incredible.'...Simmons was
critical of the lack of diversity in most Hollywood talent agencies, noting that he recently moved from CAA to WME.
' I didn't realize they're all the same,' he said, adding that both agencies seem to have 'the one black agent.'")
Neal Gabler, "Jews, Blacks and Trouble in Hollywood," New York Times, (September 2, 1990)
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/02/movies/film-view-jews-blacks-and-trouble-in-hollywood.html;
Latoya
Peterson. Fade In Talks Racism in Hollywood. (April 21, 2009) http://www.racialicious.com/2009/04/21/fade-inmagazine-talksracism-in-hollywood/; Benjamin Hooks. "Report Says Blacks Are Underhired In Hollywood." New
York Times. September 24, 1991. http:/,/www.n>'times.com/1991/09/24/arts/report-says-blacks-are-underhired-inhollywood.html. (The study, titled "Out of Focus - Out of Sync," says that blacks are unable to make final decisions
in the motion picture process and that only a handful of blacks hold executive positions with film studios and television
networks. Although blacks purchase 25 percent of domestic movie tickets, black-owned businesses are frequently
34

The Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) stated that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." Marbury
requires judges to give reasoned opmions in cases that call for explanation. Knowing that the
Supreme Court accepts less than 1 percent of petitions filed each year, 1 repeatedly asked for the
Second Circuit to provide an ethical j udicial opimon after denying my first appeals in less than ten
sentences. If the legal arguments raised in my appeal were a condensed version of the arguments
raised in the district court, it defies logic for the Second Circuit to conclude that my appeal
"lack[ed] an arguable basis in law or in fact" i f the Arbitrator Gregory admitted "Exhibit 31,"
concluded my claims by a "preponderance of evidence" and awarded me the full gamut of
monetary damages. Since my appeal was not "frivolous,"^'' the appellate court should have
rendered an ethical judicial opinion resolving all issues, including "fraud upon the Court."^'
From day one, I have always engaged in good-faith. This case was my form of non-violent,
creative protest to challenge the legitimacy and legality of white racial superiority and
institutionalized racism. Arbitrator Gregory acknowledged this fact when he likened my efforts to
that of human rights activists such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Nelson

excluded from the entertainment industry, the report said."); Ron Walters. Hollywood's Racism Factory. FinalCall.
March 28, 2006. http://www.fmalcall.com/artman/publish/article_2515.shtml. ("The bottom line is that since the
positioning of racial images is about money, Hollywood thinks it must play to the racial stereotypes, making it the
most powerfiil purveyor of global racism that exists. It educates and reinforces the demeaning racial role that is in the
heads of both Americans and foreigners, through the economic power, to commercialize these images through the
distribution network of movies and advertising outlets. We should put more of a spotlight on the producers and
financiers of these movies who keep aUve the negative images of Black people before the world."); Jennifer Armstrong
and Margeaux Watson. "Diversity in Entertainment: Why Is TV So White?" Entertamment Weekly. June 13, 2008.
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/020206185,00.html.
Clearly, something is not right if the Second Circuit takes apro se litigant's reverse discrimination appeal seriously,
but concludes that all of my claims and appeal are "frivolous." See, DiPetto v. United States Postal Service. 383 F.
App'x 102 (2d Cir. Jul. 12, 2010) (Second Circuit reverses district court's decision in favor of white male pro se litigant
alleging race-based individual disparate treatment).
^' Since two out of three judges - Lohier and district judge Swain - were of African descent, they were in the best
position to explain why my legal arguments were wrong and explain why William Morris had not violated Title V I I
i f they were intentionally segregating their workforce by race for a century if they were being impartial.
35

Mandela. I f race is a social and legal construct and white racial superiority is a myth, then it is
clear that Justice Sotomayor and the Court's minority^- are correct in concluding that only "way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race,
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of racial
discrimination." Schuette at 1676.
The United States of America must realize that its greatest natural resource is its diversity
and until we truly act as a democracy, we will never reach our full potential. As the late J.A. Rogers
stated: "Racial understanding, racial sympathy, is the key to permanent WORLD PEACE." If we
are serious about eradiating racism from our democratic and multi-cultural society, then we have
to eradicate all sources from which this evil flows.

Our conditions are completely malleable, but

they won't miraculously fix themselves. It's time for employers who are maintaining employment
practices, policies and procedures that fail to comply with the Titie V I I to be held accountable for
their actions. For many reasons, upholding our nation's antidiscrimination laws to eradicate
occupational segregation and institutionalized racism in Hollywood is a great place to start.

See e.g., Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200, 273-274 (1995) (Ginsburg dissenting). "The persistence
of racial inequality...and discrimination's lingering effects...are evident in our workplaces, markets, and
neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes, qualifications, and interview styles still experience different
receptions, depending on their race. White and African-American consumers still encounter different deals. People of
color looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage lenders.
Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though they are the low bidders, and they are sometimes
refused work even afler winning contracts. Bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and
unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are
ever genuinely to become this country's law and practice."
'^ I received a Bachelor degree from the University of Miami in Media Management and Psychology in May of 2006.
One area of psychology applicable to this case is social psychology. Social psychology, according to Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, is the "study of the manner in which the personality, attitudes, motivations, and behavior of the individual
influence and are influenced by social groups."
See e.g., Fred Jerome and Rodger Taylor. Einstein On Race and Racism, pg. 88. 2005. ("[Albert] Einstein almost
never spoke at universities during the last twenty years of his life. His increasingly frail health made travel difficult,
but mainly he considered the pomp and ceremony of degree presentation to be 'ostentatious.' Some may find it
remarkable that Einstein chose to break his no-college rule by going not to an Ivy League producer of prestigious
degrees, but to a traditionally black university. (Chartered in 1854, Lincoln was 'the first institution anywhere in the
world to provide a higher education in the arts and sciences for male youth of African descent.') But for Einstein, the
sixty-mile trip fi-om Princeton to Lincoln was not a casual choice. His visit was 'in a worthwhile cause,' he told the
36

rv.

Addressing Castel and the Second Circuit's Decision To Revoke Mr. Washington's
In Forma Pauperis Status

"Under 1915[(e)]'s frivolousness standard - which is intended to discourage baseless lawsuits dismissal is proper only i f the legal theory,,.or the factual contentions lack an arguable basis."
Neitzke at 319. In review of a pro se complaint or appeal under 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must
give the petitioner the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
"As the Courts of Appeals have recognized, 1915[(e)]'s term 'frivolous,' when applied to a
complaint [or appeal], embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful
factual allegation." Neitzke at 325. In Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), the Supreme
Court stated that an appeal on a matter of law is frivolous where "[none] of the legal points [are]
arguable on their merits." Id. at 744. While a litigant may be unsuccessful in proving their claims,
"not all unsuccessful claims are fnvolous." Neitzke at 320.
In enacting the federal in forma pauperis statute. Congress "intended to guarantee that no
citizen shall be denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or
criminal, in any court of the United States, solely because... poverty makes it impossible... to pay
or secure the costs" of litigation. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342
(1948) (internal quotations omitted). Attached, please find the Affidavit submitted to the Second
Circuit, See Exhibit O, and my most recent Affidavit, which details my current financial
situation.See Exhibit P.

assembled students and faculty. 'The separation of the races [segregation],' he declared, 'is not a disease of colored
people, but a disease of white people,' adding, ' I do not intend to be quiet about it.'")
Based on the fraudulently procured decisions of P. Kevin Castel, the A A A and the Second Circuit, nearly five years
of my life have been wasted. As shown, my dire financial situation has only worsened since filing my Complaint with
the Southern District of New York. Since leaving William Morris, 1 have been unemployed - despite looking for work.
My parents are no longer supporting me. I cannot afford the $300 filing fee to submit my petition for a writ of certiorari
and all of the money that I have left to my name will be spent on paying for the costs of mailing an original plus ten
copies of this Motion and my Motion to Disbar Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone with the Supreme Court.
37

"While a trial court has broad discretion in denying an application to proceed in forma
pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. 1915, it must not act arbitrarily and it may not deny the application
on erroneous ground." Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1983). Castel did not revoke my
IFP status because my claims were "fnvolous" or because my claims of poverty were untrue. It is
due to the fact that I made him aware that 1 would take legal action against him and others for
intentionally violating the U.S. Constitution, his Judicial Code of Conduct and Oath of Office, as
well as the law, to deprive me of my constitutional, statutory and inalienable rights under the color
of l a w . S e e Exhibit C. Castel revoked my in forma pauperis status to prejudice my appeal and
make it more difficult for me to have his unconstitutional and unlawful decisions vacated by the
higher courts. The actions of the Second Circuit confirm this fact.
V.

Relief^

Based on the fraud Loeb & Loeb LLP and their co-conspirators perpetrated upon the court in in
Rowe,^^ they should have had absolutely no involvement in this case and all judgments in favor of
William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP in both Rowe and Washington should be v i t i a t e d . S e e
e.g., Dausel v. Damsel, 195 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ("A court may at anytime set aside a
judgment for after discovered fraud upon the court").

Castel states: "Because a filing injunction is a drastic remedy, the Court gave considerable thought to granting
reconsideration of the denial of FFP status. The scale tipped against reconsideration by a statement in the newly-filed
motion of an intention to file an action that would be both frivolous and covered by the existing injunction. This
underscore the original need for the injunction and the correctness of the certification that no appeal would be taken
in good faith."
See Motion to Disqualify Loeb & Loeb LLP.
It is well established that "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never
becomes final." Kenner v. C.I.R.. 387 F.3d 689 (1968); see also The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling.
357 111. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fi-aud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to
judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanlev F. Sievers. 336 111. 316; 168
N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of
Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything.")
38

Throughout this case, Loeb & Loeb LLP stated on numerous occasions before the district
and appellate court, that my clanns of systemic and mdividual disparate treatment were
"unfounded," "wholly without merit, legally or factually," and that my pleadings were "filled with
outrageous, self-contradictory, and utterly unsubstantiated allegations about WME and its
employees." These statements mirror the conclusions made by Castel and the appellate court. On
June 1, 2015,1 submitted a Motion to Recall & Stay the Mandate. In response, Zweig submitted a
letter to the Second Circuit on June 10, 2015. He stated that the Motion;
... was without basis in law or fact. The pnor decisions from this Court and the Distnct Court
were well-reasoned and correctly decided and no new arguments not previously offered have
been raised on the motion. The relief Plaintiff seeks is extraordinary in nature and rarely
granted... [and the] Plaintiff has not set forth a factual or legal basis for entitlement to such
extraordinary relief
On July 3, 2015,1 submitted a letter to Castel seeking for him to vacate the filing injunction per
the instructions in Castel's September 5, 2014 Final Order.'^^ See Exhibit Q. Since it is not
"mandatory" for the Respondents to reply to my petition for a writ of certiorari, the odds are, they
would not respond i f I submitted a petition and i f they did, their response would not be much
different than their statements above.
Although the Castel and various appellate judges think they are Gods or that they don't
have to respect constitutional, statutory and inalienable rights of people of African descent and/or
litigants who are not represented by counsel, "no man in this country is so high that that he is above

On July 7, 2015, Christian Carbone responded via letter, stating: "Mr. Washington's letter improperly seeks to relitigate issues that have already been decided by both this Court and the U.S. Second Circuit on mulliple occasions."
(emphasis in original).
During our first conference call with Arbitrator Gregory on August 24, 2012, Michael P. Zweig denied my claims
that he was engaging in fraud and "highly unethical and criminal conduct" on behalf of William Morris. Zweig stated:
" I ' l l state for the record that the allegations and accusations [of unethical and criminal conduct] are absolutely false,
scurrilous and disreputable." Regarding his involvement in the corrupt conspiracy to commit "fraud upon the Court"
in Rowe he stated: "It appears that he claims - I would note that without any personal knowledge or any knowledge
at all - that somehow, everyone conspired against the plaintiffs in that case to effectuate the result ol^ a summary
dismissal. Obviously, those allegations are wholly false and beneath my dignity to respond to."
39

the law," United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 711 (11th Cir. 1982), and thus all decisions
rendered in favor of William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP in both Washington and Rowe should
be vitiated due to engaging in "fraud upon the Court."'' There should be zero tolerance forjudges
like Castel and he needs to be impeached for his "high crimes and misdemeanors."'^^ Based on
the Supreme Court's conservative majority'"'' and history of racism, is the Supreme Court capable
of impartially resolve a case seeking to eradicate institutionalized racism in Hollywood? Should
be decided by an international origination such as the United States.
I

Conclusion

This case was destined to reach and be decided by the Supreme Court.''' Since Castel should have
never revoked my in forma pauperis status and the Second Circuit should have restored it and
taken my appeal seriously, I ask the Supreme Court to use its inherent powers to grant
extraordinary relief that will correct this extreme "miscarriage of justice." "^^

See also, Norton v. Shelby County. 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) ("An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed.").
'"^ Article in says that a federal judge will serve during "good behavior." It says that a judge can be removed from
office by impeachment by the House of Representatives, followed by a trial in the Senate and a conviction of the
charges. Article I I , Section Four of the Constitution says, "The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors." Although judges are provided judicial immunity for their ertoneous decisions, they are
not immune from being investigated, indicted, prosecuted, convicted and then impeached for committing numerous
"high crimes" in our cases. See United States v. Isaacs. 493 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974) ("a federal judge is subject to indictment and trial before impeachment.").
'"^ Republican appointed Justices have a 5-4 majority. Since there is a strong possibility the Court will follow in the
footsteps of the AAA, Castel and the Second Circuit by refusing to uphold our nation's antidiscrimination laws, I ask
Justice Sotomayor and/or any other Justice who disagrees with the majority to at least write a dissent since the Second
Circuit refused to issue an ethical judicial opinion when they should have.
Review on vmt of certiorari is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. Certiorari will be granted only for
compelling reasons. Supreme Court Rule 10. As demonstrated by this Motion, my petition for a writ of certiorari is
undeniably "certworthy." This petition seeks to change the Supreme Court's collective views on race and overturn a
number of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court's ideologically conservative majority, which have eviscerated
the substantive strength of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
I'm not asking for any favors or handouts. I ' m simply asking the Supreme Court to do the same thing I've asked
all other finders of fact involved in this case: remain impartial, apply the law to the facts of the case and issue an
ethical judicial opinion.
40

Respectfully submitted.

Marcus Isaiah Washington


Pro Se Litigant
54 Boerum St. Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, New York
(646) 504-6497
hxxmannghts. areamust@gmail .com

July 18, 2015

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