1.

) SECRETARY OF DENR VS MAYOR JOSE YAP

Boracay Landowners vs DENR

on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also
invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.

These are two consolidated cases.

G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-ininterest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an
unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified
as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay
Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al. The OSG
appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed
with the Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed

The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable
and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to
release the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title
to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine
dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no such proclamation,
executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation
that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private
claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.

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Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso facto
converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants continued possession
under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is alienable. It is plain
error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land
Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide
claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their
continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
2.) ISAGANI CRUZ VS DENR
FACTS: Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may
include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in
the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there
was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained.
Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the
regalian doctrine.
3.) LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O.
RAMOS, Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources;
HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR);
RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception
to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively
to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by nonFilipinos.
FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before
the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized
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under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23,
which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company - sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still
pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR
to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment
of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for
allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.
HELD: 1. First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting

fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or
lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the countrys
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nations natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as
the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
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The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of
the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional,
all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.
2. Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent

to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks
to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which
they spring must be struck down.
6.) MANOTOK vs. BARQUE

FACTS:
Piedad Estate originally owned by Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila
Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands. (It is a Friar
Land.)
o The subject parcel Lot No. 823 is part of the Piedad Estate and is located in
QC.

On 23 December 1903, Piedad Estate was acquired by the Philippine

Government pursuant to the Friar Lands Act. The certificate of title in the name of
the government was OCT No. 614. The Estate was placed under the administration
of the Director of Lands.

Controversy arising from conflicting claims over Lot 823 began after a fire
gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988 which destroyed records
stored in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

In 1990, Manotoks filed a petition with the LRA for administrative

reconstitution of TCT No. 372302 covering Lot No. 823 with an area of 342,945
square meters GRANTED TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) was issued in 1991.

In 1996, 8 years after the fire the Barques filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer Barque also
covering Lot 823. In support of their petition, the Barques submitted copies of the
alleged owners duplicate of the TCT, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a
Plan Fls 3168-D covering the property.
o MANOTOKs opposed alleging that TCT No. 210177 was spurious.

Although both titles of the Manotoks and the Barques refer to land belonging
to Lot No. 823, TCT No. 210177 actually involves 2 parcels with an aggregate area
of 342,945 square meters, while TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) pertains only to a 1
parcel of land, with a similar area of 342,945 square meters.

1997 Barques petition was DENIED. Lot. No. 823 already registered in
the name of the Manotoks.
--> Barques MR was denied They appealed to the
LRA LRA Reversed.

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o LRA found that the reconstitution of the Manotok title was fraudulent. Hence, it
ordered the Barque title to be reconstituted. BUT cancellation must 1st be sought in a
court of competent jurisdiction of the 1991 Manotok TCT.

The LRA denied the Manotoks MR and the Barques prayer for immediate
reconstitution. Both the Manotoks and the Barques appealed the LRA decision to the
CA.
In the CA, Felicitas Manahan filed a motion to intervene and sought the dismissal
of the cases claiming ownership of the subject property.

2002 and 2003 2 separate divisions of the CA both directed the RD of QC to

cancel the Reconstituted Manotok Title and to reconstitute the Barques valid,
genuine and existing TCT No. 210177.
o Hence, the Manotoks filed the present separate petitions which were ordered
consolidated on August 2, 2004.

December 12, 2005, SC First Division affirmed both decisions of the CA.
Manotoks filed MR Denied in April 2006 Resolution.
o Thereafter, the Manotoks filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second MR with
their MR attached. Denied in June 2006 Resolution. Eventually entry of judgment
was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment on May 2, 2006. In the meantime, the
Barques filed multiple motions with the First Division for execution of the judgment,
while the Manotoks filed an Urgent Motion to Refer Motion for Possession to the SC
En Banc (with prayer to set motion for oral arguments). Case was referred to the
En Banc in July 2006.

On September 7, 2006, Felicitas Manahan and Rosendo Manahan filed a

motion to intervene, to which was attached their petition in intervention. They
alleged that their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Manahan, was issued Sale
Certificate No. 511 covering Lot No. 823 and attached the findings of the NBI that
the documents of the Manotoks were not as old as they were purported to be.
Consequently, the Director of the Legal Division of the LMB recommended to the
Director of the LMB the reconstituted Manotok Title should be reverted to the state.
o Oral arguments were held on July 24, 2007.

2008 - En Banc set aside the December 2005 1st division decision and entry of
judgment recalled and the CAs Amended Decisions in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 66642 and
66700 were reversed and set aside. The En Banc remanded the case to the CA.
o The CA was directed to receive evidence of and focus on the issue of WON the
Manotoks can trace their claim of title to a valid alienation by the Government of Lot
No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, which was a Friar Land. PURPOSE: to decide WON
the title of the Maotoks should be annulled.

CAs findings None of the parties were able to prove a valid alienation of
Lot 823 from the government in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1120
otherwise known as the Friar Lands Act. Notably lacking in the deed of
conveyance of the Manotoks is the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce as required by Section 18 of the said law. Upon close scrutiny, the factual
allegations and voluminous documentary exhibits relating to the purchase of Lot 823
by the predecessors-in-interest of the claimants revealed badges of fraud and
irregularity.
BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS FOR OWNERSHIP:
Manotoks Their grandfather bought Lot 823 from the Government in 1919. They
have since occupied the land, built their houses and buildings on it. The subject land
is now known as Manotok Compound.
Barques Teresita claims her father (Homer) bought land from Emiliano Setosta
who had a TCT in his name.
Manahans The lot originally belonged to his parents but was subsequently bought
by his wife. They had a caretaker on the property but she was ousted by armed men
in 1950s so they just declared the property for taxation to protect their rights.
ISSUE: Who has the better right over Lot No. 823? NO ONE! It belongs to the
National Government.
RATIO:
From the proceedings in the CA, it was established that while records
of the DENR-LMB indicate the original claimant/applicant of Lot 823 as a certain
Valentin Manahan, only the Manotoks were able to produce a sale certificate in the
name of their predecessors-in-interest, certified by the LMB Records Management
Division. In addition, the Manotoks submitted photocopies of original documents
entitled Assignment of Sale Certificate dated 1919, 1920 and 1923.

Sale Certificate No. 1054 was not signed by the Director of Lands nor
approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The Certificates of Assignment of Sale
contained only the signature of the Director of Lands. The Manotoks belatedly
secured from the National Archives a certified copy of Deed of Conveyance No.
29204 dated December 7, 1932, which likewise lacks the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources as it was signed only by the Director of Lands.

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Act No. 1120 SECTION 18. No lease or sale made by Chief of the Bureau of Public
Lands under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until approved by the Secretary
of the Interior.

It is clear from the foregoing provision and from jurisprudence that the sale of
friar lands shall be valid only if approved by the Secretary of the Interior (later the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce).

In their Memorandum, the Manotoks pointed out that their photocopy of the
original Deed of Conveyance No. 29204, sourced from the National Archives, shows
on the second page a poorly imprinted typewritten name over the words Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which name is illegible, and above it an even
more poorly imprinted impression of what may be a stamp of the Secretarys
approval.

The Manotoks are invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance

of the RDs task in issuing the TCT in the Manotok name. The Manotoks contend
that we can assume that the Manotok deed of conveyance was in fact approved by
the Department Secretary because the register of deeds did issue TCT No. 22813 in
the name of the buyer Severino Manotok. FURTHER, the Manotoks assert that
even if we were to ignore the presumption of validity in the performance of official
duty, Department Memorandum Order No. 16-05 issued on October 27, 2005 by then
DENR Secretary Michael T. Defensor, supplies the omission of approval by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in deeds of conveyances over friar
lands.
o NO! These arguments fail.

Citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club which applied the rule in the Solid State
and Liao Cases the absence of approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce in the sale certificate and assignment of sale certificate made the sale null
and void ab initio. Necessarily, there can be no valid titles issued on the basis of
such sale or assignment.
o SC in the MR of the Alonso case underscored that the approval is a MADATORY
requirement. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or
inferred from certain acts since the law is explicit in its mandate. Petitioners have
not offered any cogent reason that would justify a deviation from this rule.

DENR Memorandum Order No. 16, invoked by both the Manotoks and the
Manahans, states that some Deeds of Conveyance on record in the field offices of the

LMB do not bear the Secretarys signature despite full payment for the Friar Land.
They are deemed signed or otherwise ratified by this Memo provided that the
applicant really paid the purchase price and complied with all the requirements under
the Friar Lands Act.
o The CA opined that the Manotoks cannot benefit from the above department
issuance because it makes reference only to those deeds of conveyance on file with
the records of the DENR field offices. The Manotoks copy of the alleged Deed of
Conveyance No. 29204 issued in 1932, was sourced from the National Archives.

Manotoks also point out that the Friar Lands Act itself states that the
Government ceases reservation of its title once the buyer had fully paid the price.
(They were claiming that they fully paid!) Their basis is SECTION 15[2] of the Friar
Lands Act.

Court found that the old rule would support the Manotoks contention however,
the new rule Pugeda v. Trias, the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or
purchaser, or the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the
property, subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be cancelled if the
price agreed upon is not paid for in full.

Clearly, it is the execution of the contract to sell and delivery of the certificate
of sale that vests title and ownership to the purchaser of friar land. Such certificate of
sale must, of course, be signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as evident from Sections 11[3], 12[4] and the 2nd paragraph of Section
15[5], in relation to Section 18.
CONCLUSIONS
Manotoks could not have acquired ownership of the subject
lot as they had no valid certificate of sale issued to them by the Government because
their Certificate lacks the signature of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources

The decades-long occupation by the Manotoks of Lot 823, their payment of

real property taxes and construction of buildings, are of no moment. It must be noted
that the Manotoks miserably failed to prove the existence of the title allegedly issued
in the name of Severino Mantotok after the latter had paid in full the purchase price.
The Manotoks did not offer any explanation as to why the only copy of TCT No.
22813 was torn in half and no record of documents leading to its issuance can be
found in the registry of deeds. As to the certification issued by the Register of Deeds
of Caloocan, it simply described the copy presented as DILAPIDATED without
stating if the original copy of TCT No. 22813 actually existed in their records, nor
any information on the year of issuance and name of registered owner.
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o As we stressed in Alonso: Prescription can never lie against the Government.

RE: MANAHANS No copy of the alleged Sale Certificate No. 511 can be
found in the records of either the DENR-NCR, LMB or National Archives. Although
the OSG submitted a certified copy of Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511
allegedly executed by Valentin Manahan in favor of Hilaria de Guzman, there is no
competent evidence to show that the claimant Valentin Manahan or his successorsin-interest actually occupied Lot 823, declared the land for tax purposes, or paid the
taxes due thereon.

Even assuming arguendo the existence and validity of the alleged Sale
Certificate No. 511 and Assignment of Sale Certificate No. 511 presented by the
Manahans, the CA correctly observed that the claim had become stale after the lapse
of 86 years from the date of its alleged issuance. Citing Liao v. CA the certificates
of sale x x x became stale after 10 years from its issuance and hence cannot be the
source documents for issuance of title more than 70 years later.
Dispositive:
Manotok Appeal denied
Manahan Petition for intervention denied
Petition for reconstitution of the Barque title denied
All the TCTs in the name of Manotoks, Manahans and Barque, are NULL and VOID.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and/or Quezon City are hereby ordered to
CANCEL the said titles.
Lot No. 823 is property of the National Government of the Philippines w/o prejudice
to Reversion proceedings
[1] EN BANC DECISION
[2] The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold
under the provisions of this Act until the full payment of all installments or purchase

money and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or encumbrance
made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
shall be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim. Xxx
[3] SECTION 11. Should any person who is the actual and bona fide settler upon,
and occupant of, any portion of said lands at the time the same is conveyed to the
Government of the Philippine Islands desire to purchase the land so occupied by
him, he shall be entitled to do so at the actual cost thereof to the Government, and
shall be granted fifteen years from the date of the purchase in which to pay for the
same in equal annual installments, should he so desire paying interest at the rate of
four per centum per annum on all deferred payments.
The terms of purchase shall be agreed upon between the purchaser and the
Director of Lands, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
[4] SECTION 12. ...When the cost thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler and occupant a
certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has agreed to sell to
such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed,
payable as provided in this Act. . .and that upon the payment of the final installment
together with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and
occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of conveyance, which
shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in section one hundred
and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act.
[5] SECTION 15. The right of possession and purchase acquired by certificates of
sale signed under the provisions hereof by purchasers of friar lands, pending final
payment and the issuance of title, shall be considered as personal property for the
purposes of serving as security for mortgages, and shall be considered as such in
judicial proceedings relative to such security.

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