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Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems


Author(s): Herbert P. Kitschelt
Source: World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jan., 1988), pp. 194-234
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010362
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES:
ExplainingInnovation
in Competitive
PartySystems
By HERBERT P. KITSCHELT*

IN

and changeare inticontemporary


democracies,
politicalstability

matelylinked to developmentsin the partysystems.For at least two


generationspriorto the 1970s, mostdemocraticpartysystemswere structuredalong stablepatternsofsocietalcleavagessuch as class,religion,ethrelations.'Since the i96os, however,electoral
nicity,and center/periphery
It is pardealignmentand realignmenthave underminedthiscontinuity.2
ticularlysignificantthatpoliticalparties,mostlyof recentorigin,have developed programsand attractedelectoralconstituenciesthat cut across
the establishedcleavage structures.
Probably the most significantcohort of new political parties in advanced democraciesare "left-libertarian"
parties.These partiesappeared
in
and
first Scandinavia,France,
the Netherlandsunder "New Left" labels and competedwiththeestablishedcommunistand social democratic
parties.More recently,in Austria,Belgium,Switzerland,and West Germany,new "ecology"or "green" partieshave attractedconsiderableelectoral support. By now, New Left and ecology partieshave converging

* An earlierversionof thispaper was


presentedat the Annual Meetingof the American
PoliticalScienceAssociation,Washington,DC, August28-3 I, I986. For helpfulcommentson
the firstdraftI would like to thankRobertBates,Staf Hellemans,Peter Katzenstein,Peter
Lange, PeterMerkl,and George Tsebelis.
l For European partysystems,this argumentwas made by SeymourMartin Lipset and
Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures,PartySystems,and Voter Alignments:An Introduction,"in SeymourMartinLipset and Stein Rokkan,eds.,PartySystems
and Voters
Alignments
(New York: Free Press,i967). Lipset and Rokkan are concernedwiththe societalnatureof
cleavagesthatare representedon thelevelof partycompetition,
notwiththerelativestrength
ofparticularparties.Criticsand supportersoftheirargumentare mistakenwhen theytestthe
persistenceof cleavagesby the electoralstabilityof individualparties.See Richard Rose and
Derek Urwin,"Persistenceand Change in WesternPartySystemsSince I945," PoliticalStudies i8 (No. 3, I970), 287-3I9; Maria Maguire,"Is There StillPersistence?ElectoralChange in
WesternEurope, I948-i979," in Hans Daalder and PeterMair, eds., Western
EuropeanParty
Systems:Continuity
and Change (BeverlyHills, CA: Sage i983); and Michal Shamir, "Are
WesternPartySystems'Frozen'? A ComparativeDynamic Analysis,"Comparative
Political
StudiesI2 (No. i, i984), 35-792As a surveyon contemporary
debates about the dealignmentand realignmentof party
systems,see RussellJ.Dalton, ScottC. Flanagan,and Paul Allen Beck, eds.,ElectoralChange
in AdvancedIndustrial
Democracies(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,i985).

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

195

programmaticoutlooks and electoralconstituencies.All left-libertarian


partiesare criticalof thelogicof societaldevelopmentand theinstitutions
that underlie the postwarcompromisebetween capital and labor in industrialsocieties.They oppose the prioritythateconomic growthhas on
the political agenda, the patternsof policy making that restrictdemocraticparticipationto elitebargainingamong centralizedinterestgroups
and partyleaders,and the bureaucraticwelfarestate.Their political alternativesconformneitherto traditionalconservativenor to socialistprograms, but link libertariancommitmentsto individual autonomy and
popular participation,witha leftistconcernforequality.
This essay will explore why left-libertarian
partieshave been able to
attractsignificant
groupsof new votersin some Westerndemocracies.In
particular,it will examine whetherthe rise of left-libertarian
parties is
traceable to structuraland institutionalconditionsin advanced democracies or to transitory
grievancesand deprivationsin societiesand party
systemsthatare essentiallystable.Conditionsthatexplain the rise of politicalpartiesmay not necessarilyexplain theirpersistence.Nevertheless,
if structuralfactorsare responsibleforthe emergenceof left-libertarian
parties,these partiesare likelyto signal lastingchanges in the cleavage
structureof partysystems.If, on the otherhand, conjuncturalfactorssuch as short-termeconomic fluctuationsand single issues-explain the
riseof left-libertarian
parties,thenew partiesmay well be passingfadsor
"flashparties."
Researchon the supporters,organization,and strategyof left-libertarian partiesshould demonstratewhich explanationis correct.The parties
objectof studyiftheyare indeed grounded in
become a more interesting
the structuraland institutionaldevelopmentsof moderndemocracies.In
that case, theirbases of supportand patternsof mobilizationmay have
lastingconsequencesforpoliticalparticipationand public policymaking.
A comparativestudyofeighteendemocracies,some ofwhichhave sizable
left-libertarian
parties,will demonstratethatthesenew partiesmark the
riseof a new politicalcleavage and representa significantchallengeto the
dominantformsof interestintermediation
betweenstateand civil society
in a distinctivesubsetof advanced democracies.
I.

THEORETICAL

MODELS

OF POLITICAL

AND THE RESTRUCTURING

MOBILIZATION

OF PARTY SYSTEMS

The mobilizationof new politicaldemands, whetherby social movements,interestgroups,or politicalparties,has been explained by means

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196

WORLD POLITICS

of threedifferenttheoreticalmodels: breakdown,structuralchange,and
resourcemobilization.3Advocates of the breakdown model see political
mobilization as a response to societal strainsand relative deprivation.
Crises occur when societiesgeneratepopularloyaltybased on institutionalized norms and values, but fail to attaintheirown standardsof institutional stabilityand legitimation.For instance,modern welfare states
promiseeconomic securityand opportunityforupward mobilitythrough
enhanced education and training.In the view of many of theircitizens,
however particularlythe youngergeneration the economic crises of
the 1970s and i980s have shatteredthesehopes. The experienceof a widening gap betweenexpectedand realized benefitstriggerscollectiveprotestwhen the existingsocial order is held to be responsibleforthis discrepancy.
Proponentsof structuralchange models argue that societiesare well
able to meet the demands and aspirationson which theirlegitimacyis
based. But, because the societiesare involved in continuouschange and
thisvery"success" may generatenew preferenceswhich
transformation,
cannot be satisfiedby the existinginstitutionsand thus become new
Societal transformation
provokescollectivemosourcesof dissatisfaction.
bilization around new issues and new lines of conflict.Breakdown
to Marxistand functionalisttheories,which
models bear a close affinity
predictcollectivemobilization when capitalistsocietiesexperienceeconomic crisis;structuralchange models are closerto Weber's and Schumdemocracywill be
peter'sview thatcapitalismand liberalrepresentative
victimsof theirown success.
Adherents of resource mobilization theories maintain that neither
crises nor structuralchange by themselvesexplain the organization of
new collectivepoliticaldemands. Grievancesand institutionalchange are
endemicin mostsocieties,but theyrarelytranslateintocollectivepolitical
action. Instead, the actors' skills and resourcesand the broader institutional opportunitystructuresdeterminewhen individualsare able to engage in collectivemobilization.In particular,the choice of a specificye3Among a growingbody of literatureon social movementsand politicalprotest,see Gary
T. Marx and JamesL. Wood, "Strandsof Theoryand Researchin CollectiveBehavior,"Annual ReviewofSociologyI 0975),363-428; JohnD. McCarthyand MayerN. Zald, "Resource
JournalofSociology82 (No.
Mobilizationand Social Movements:A PartialTheory,"American
6, I977), I2I2-4I;
CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution(Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall,I978); Craig J.Jenkins,"SociopoliticalMovements,"in Samuel I. Long, ed.,HandbookofPoliticalBehaviorVol. IV (New York: PlenumPress,i98i); Alain Touraine,The Voice
and theEye (New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,i982); Claus Offe,"New Social MovePolitics,"Social Research52 (No. 4, i985),
ments:Challengingthe Boundariesof Institutional
817-68.A fourththeoreticalmodel standsin theWeberiansociologicaltraditionand emphasizes the changeof world views and definitions
of collectiveidentities.I incorporatethisperstructuraltheoryof movementsand partyformation.
spectivein a broadlyinterpreted

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

197

hide of mobilization,such as a politicalparty,can be explained only in


termsof actors' resourcesand opportunities.
I will argue thata combinationof structuralchange and resourcemobilizationtheoriesexplainstheemergenceofleft-libertarian
partiesbetter
than breakdown theoriesdo. Theories of structuralchange highlightthe
necessarybackground conditionsfor the rise of left-libertarian
parties;
but the sufficient
conditionsare providedonly by favorablepoliticalopportunitystructures.Breakdown theoriesas such do not help us to identifynecessaryor sufficient
conditionsof partyformation.The competing
explanationswill be testedin a macrocomparisonof eighteenadvanced
democracies.
II.

THE CASES

Common ideological and programmaticconvictions,similarcompositions of electoralconstituencies,and a minimum level of voter support


determinewhich partiesqualifyas significant
left-libertarian
parties.The
formalpartylabels (left-socialist,
ecological,or libertarian),the age, and
thepoliticaloriginof left-libertarian
partiesare not relevantforthesecriteria.With respectto politicalideology,left-libertarian
partiesgrow out
of the sentimentthatthe realms of instrumentalaction in modern society the market place and bureaucraticorganization dominate too
much of social lifeand have displaced relationsof solidarity(in the private sphere of interpersonalcommunication)and participatorypolitical
deliberation(in the public sphere of collectivedecision making). Leftlibertariansmistrustmarketsbecause thelatterorienthuman preferences
toward the pursuitof materialcommodities,devalue social community,
and endanger the supplyand protectionof many nonmarketablecollective goods not the least of which is an intactenvironment.Simultaneously, left-libertarians
oppose the centralizedbureaucraticwelfarestate
and the hegemonyof professionalexpertisein public policyand society.
In theirview, the formalrationalitiesof marketsand bureaucraciesexpropriatethe citizens'capacityto determinetheirown lives and must be
checked by institutionsthat impose substantivestandardsof rationality
on theirboundlessexpansivedynamic.
Consistentwiththesocialistlegacy,left-libertarians
are "left";theyoppose the marketplace and insiston solidarityand equality.They are also
"libertarian"in thattheyrejectcentralizedbureaucraciesand call forindividual autonomy,participation,and the self-governanceof decentralized communities.
Left-libertarian
partiesnot onlyhave common programmaticorienta-

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WORLD POLITICS

198

ofelectoralsupport.There
tions,butalso similarsocioeconomic
profiles
electorates
thatcoversall counis no systematic
studyofleft-libertarian
trieswithsignificant
parties,butexistingsurveysshowthatall of these
draw votersfromtheranksof theyounger,
partiesoverproportionally
middleclass;theyareemployedin humanservices(teachwell-educated
ing,healthcare,social work),have left-of-center
politicalconvictions,
withenvironmensubscribe
to "postmaterialist"
values,and sympathize
and peacemovements.4
tal,feminist,
in advanced
Left-libertarian
partiescan obviouslymake a difference
industrial
democracies
onlyiftheyreceivea minimumlevelofelectoral
haveelectorally
left-libertarsupport.Whydo somecountries
significant
tochoosea singleand universally
ianparties,
butothersnot?It is difficult
fordistinguishing
applicablemeasureofelectoralsupportas thecriterion
"significant"
from"insignificant"
left-libertarian
parties.Sincetheseparovera
tiesvaryin age, one cannotaveragetheirelectoralperformance
betweenpartyblocsin a
longperiodof time,and sincethecompetition
numberof Europeancountriesis veryclose and oftendeterminedby
thecriterion
ofsignificance
should
marginalchangesinelectoralsupport,
notbe too stringent.
In someinstances,
a shareof 2 or 3 percentof the
theformation
votemayplacea left-libertarian
partyina positiontoaffect
ofgovernmental
majorities.
if theyhave reI have classifiedleft-libertarian
partiesas significant
ceivedabout4 percentor moreofthevotein a nationalparliamentary
or
at
in
the
election
least
once
i980s.
Alliances
presidential
amongleft-libto counttowardthe4-percent
threshold.
ertarianpartiesare permitted
The dependentvariableis thusa dummywithtwo values indicating
has (= i) or doesnothave(= o) significant
whethera country
left-libertarianparties.

Table i showsthatpartiesin eightWestEuropeandemocracies


easily
meetthiscriterion.
Luxemburgand Icelandare toosmallto be included
in thepresentcomparative
analysis.In threeof thesix remainingcases,
4 ElectoralanalysisofScandinavianNew Leftpartiesare providedin JohnLogue, Socialism
and Abundance(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1982), chaps. 6 and 8; Alastair
H. Thomas, "Social Democracyin Scandinavia:Can Dominance Be Regained?" in William
E. Patersonand AlastairH. Thomas, eds., The FutureofSocial Democracy(Oxford: Clarendon Press, i986). For France, see Daniel Boy, "Le vote ecologistsen i978" [The ecological
votein I 978], Revuefiranaisede sciencepolitique3 I (No. 2, I 981), 394-4 I 6. For West Germany,
compare Hans JoachimVeen, "Wer wdhltgrin? Zum Profilder Neuen Linken in der
[Who votesGreen? On the profileof the New Left in the affluent
Wohlstandsgesellschaft"
34 (Septemberi984), 3-17; and Wilhelm P. Biirklin,
society],Aus Politikund Zeitgeschichte
"The Greens: Ecology and the New Left,"in H. G. Wallach and George K. Romoser,eds.,
(New York: Praeger i985). For
WestGermanPoliticsin theMid-Eighties:Crisisand Continuity
othercountries,see Ferdinand MUller-Rommel,"The Greens in WesternEurope: Similar
PoliticalScienceReview6 (No. 4, 1985), 483-99.
but Different,"International

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

199

(Denmark, the Netherlands,and Norway), the left-libertarian


parties
may be classifiedas New Leftor left-socialist.
They originatedin the late
yearstheyhave
1950s and i960s and languishedin the 1970s, butinrecent
developed a profileof voter supportand a programmaticoutlook that
qualifiesthemas left-libertarians.
The threeotherunambiguouscases are
the Austrian,Belgian, and West German ecology parties.They are less
visionsthatalways
than ten yearsold and startedfromenvironmentalist
commitment.
involveda genuinelyleft-libertarian
Three additional countrieshave borderlineleft-libertarian
parties.In
Switzerland, the New Left and ecologypartiescoexistside by side and
cooperatewitheach other.In Sweden, two establishedparries the CenterPartyand the CommunistParty-have moved toward the left-libertarianagenda and preemptedthesuccessfulformationofeitherNew Left
or ecology parties. Since theyhave not entirelyrenounced their traditional clientelesand ideologicalaffinities,
theymustbe treatedas borderline cases. Norway and the Netherlandsalso have centristor liberal parties that have moved toward the left-libertarian
agenda. They are not
included in my listbecause theiroutlook is more ambiguous than thatof
thosethatare included.5
In France, which is themost difficult
case to classify,left-socialist
parties played some role in the i960s and 1970s, but have now virtuallydisappeared fromthepoliticalscene.France was actuallythefirstcountryin
which the ecologistsenjoyed some modest success in local and regional
electionsin the 1970S, but theirperformanceat thenationallevel has been
inconsistentand disappointing.Althoughthe ecologycandidate received
almost4 percentofthevotein thefirstroundofthe i98i presidentialelection,theecologistshave faredbadlyin all electionsto theFrench national
assembly.
A totalof nine countriesmay be consideredeitherclear or borderline
cases with significantleft-libertarian
parties.My classificationdoes not
predeterminethefindingsof thecomparativeanalysis,however;it is itself
subjectto test.If some of theborderlinecases do not conformto a pattern
of determinationthatexplains the rise of left-libertarian
partiesin most
othercases, we will have to reclassifythe countries.France is most likely
left-libertarian
nota case of true,significant
parties.In theempiricalanalas a case witha significant
ysis,I will thereforecountFrance alternatively
5The Norwegian party,unlikeitsSwedishcounterpart,
barelyclearedthe3% thresholdin
the i98os, and finallylost itsparliamentary
in i985. See JohnModeley,"Norrepresentation
way's i985 Election: A Pro-WelfareBacklash,"WestEuropeanPolitics9 (No. 2, i986), 289-92.
For an analysisof the Swedishand Norwegiancentristlibertarianparties,see Neil Elder and
RolfGooderham,"The CentrePartiesof Norway and Sweden," Government
and Opposition
I3 (No. 2, I978), 2i8-35-

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TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

BEST PERFORMANCE
I. COUNTRIES

IN WESTERN

DEMOCRA

1980- I 986

WITH SIGNIFICANT LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

A. "Clear" Cases
Austria (A)
Belgium (B)
Denmark (DK)
Netherlands (NL)
Norway (N)
West Germany (FRG)
Iceland
Luxemburg

The Greens
AGALEV/ECOLO
Socialist People's Party
Left Socialist Party
PPR/PSP/CPN (Green
ProgressiveAccord)
Socialist People's Party
The Greens
Women's Party
The Green Alternative

4.6%
6.2%
11.5%
2.7%
5.7%

(national
(national
(national
(national
(national

5.4%
5.6%
5.0%
5.2%

(national
(national
(national
(national

B. "Borderline" Cases
France (F)
Sweden (S)
Switzerland (CH)

3.9% (presiden
Ecologists
1.2% (parliame
Les Verts
Left Communist Party
5.4% (national
12.4% (national
Center Party
Greens
2.9% (national
ProgressiveOrganizations 2.7% (national

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II. COUNTRIES WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

A. Marginal Parties Exist


Canada (CND)
New Zealand (NZ)
United Kingdom (UK)

Green Partyof Canada


Values Party
Ecology/GreenParty

(no cont
0.2% (nationa
1.1% (in distr
1983 nat

B. Proto-Partiesor Loose Electoral Coalitions Exist


Finland (FI)
Ireland (IRE)
Italy (I)
Japan (J)
Spain
United States (US)

Greens
Comhaontas Glas/Greens
Radical Party
Various local Green lists
Green Party
Green Party
Citizens' Party
New World Alliance

C. No Parties Declared
Australia (AUS)
Greece
Portugal

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1.4% (nationa
(no cont
2.2% (nationa
(no cont
(declared
(declared
partic
tions)
0.1% (preside
(no cont

202

WORLI) POLITICS

left-libertarian
party(France = i) and withoutit (France = o). If France
is a truecase of left-libertarian
partyformation,variablesthatpredictthe
presenceof these partiesin the othercountriesshould do the same for
France. If,however,theadditionof theFrenchcase to thecountrieswith
left-libertarianparties weakens the correlationbetween various independentvariablesand left-libertarian
partyformation,France should be
excluded fromthisgroup.
In twelve otherWesterndemocracies,significantleft-libertarian
parties do not exist. Many of them have verysmall ecology or left-socialist
splinterparties(which are not necessarilylisted in the table); but these
partiesare electorallyinsignificant
bymycriteria.Closest to the threshold
of political significanceare Italy,where the Radical Party managed to
surpass3 percentin one nationalelectionduringthe 1970s, and Finland,
where a small ecologypartyis actuallyrepresentedin thenationalparliament.WhetherI have classifiedthesetwo cases correctlycan be validated
by checking if the absence of left-libertarian
partiesis explained by the
same factorsin thesecases as in the othercountrieswithoutsuch parties.
Nine of thetwelvecountrieswithoutsignificantleft-libertarian
parties
are included in the comparativeanalysis.Greece, Portugal, and Spain
were dropped because theirtransitionto democracyis too recent.An initial exploration,moreover,showed thattheyhave none of the attributes
thatfacilitatetheriseof left-libertarian
partiesin othercountries.Adding
thesecountrieswould thusconfirmmyanalysis.
The developmentof left-libertarian
partiescannot be reviewed individuallyand by countryin thispaper.6In general,New Left partiesare
theoldestsubgroup;theyhave attractedelectoralsupportin Scandinavia,
the Netherlands,and Switzerland.The newer left-libertarian
partiesappeared in the late I970s; theyare the ecologyor "green" partiesof Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland,and West Germany. Despite their
names, these parties are not narrow environmentalistpressuregroups,
but address the entirerange of left-libertarian
demands. In addition to
Case materialsfora comparativestudyof left-libertarian
partiesin general,and ecology
partiesin particular,can be foundin Jurgei1
Baumgarten,ed., Linkssozialhsten
in Europa: Alternative
zu Sozialdemokratie
und kommunistzschen
Parteien[Leftsocialistsin Europe: Alternativesto social democracyand communistpartiesi(Hamburg: Junius,1982); Frank DeRoose, "De Groene Golf: Over de nationalsdiversiteit
van een international
fenomeen"[The
Green wave: On the nationaldiversityof an international
phenomenonI,De GroeneSchrziften
7, pp. 33-6i; PatrickFlorizoone,De Groenen:Idee,bewegingen
enpartijen[The Greens: Ideas,
movements,and parties](Deurne: Kluver, 1985); Ferdinand Mtiller-Rommel,"'Parteien
neuen Typs' in Westeuropa:Eine vergleichendeAnalyse"I'Partiesofa new type'in Western
Europe: A comparativeanalysis],Zeitschriftfar
I3 (No. 3, 1982), 369-9o, and
Parlamentsfiragen
"New Social Movementsand Smaller Parties: A ComparativePerspective,"WestEuropean
Politics8 (No. i, I985), 41-54; WolfgangRildig,"The Greens in Europe. Ecological Parties
and the European Electionsof i984," Parliamentary
Affairs
38 (No. i, i985), 56-72.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

203

thesetwo main subgroups,thereare a few center-left


partieswith a leftlibertarianagenda in Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.

ILL. METHODOLOGY

OF COMPARISON

The small numberof cases, the definitionof the dependentvariable as


a dummy,and thecollinearityamong theindependentvariablespreempt
a sophisticatedmultivariatestatisticalanalysisand causal modelingof the
paths that lead to left-libertarian
parties.In view of these limitations,I
will use some less powerfulquantitativeand semi-quantitativemeasures
and techniquesto draw inferencesabout theassociationof variables.The
analysisis theory-driven
and itsconclusionsgo beyondwhat thestatistical
analysisalone would warrant.
of dichotomizedinMy main analytictechniqueis thecross-tabulation
and
I
dependent
dependentvariables. dichotomizeordinal- or intervalscaled variablesaround themedian. Because theeighteencountriesin my
comparisonare evenlydistributedover each of the two values thatindependent and dependent variables can assume, we can calculate by how
much the actual distributionof countriesover the cells of the resulting
two-by-twotablesdivergesfromrandomprobability.If a hypothesispredicts thatall cases may be found in two of the fourcells,while random
probabilitywould lead us to expect 50 percentof the cases in these cells,
the differencebetween the actual number of cases and the so-percent
mark indicatesthe explanatorypower of thathypothesis.For each table,
a "coefficientof reproducibility"calculates the percentageof cases that
are correctlyclassifiedaccordingto the hypothesisbeing tested.
In addition,if independentvariablesare metricor interval-scaled,we
can compare whethercountrieswith left-libertarian
partieshave different mean values on thesevariablesfromcountrieswhere thesepartiesare
absent.In such cases,I have used regressionanalysis.Because thedependent variable is a dummy,I have used a loglinearregressionmodel (LOGIT)
to testthe statisticalsignificanceof the associationbetweenindependent
variablesand left-libertarian
parties.In addition,I providePearson linear
correlationcoefficients
to measurethestrengthof theassociationbetween
the variables.
All empiricalindicatorsare at themacrolevel.They presupposemicrofoundationsthat cannot be explicitlytestedin this paper. There are no
sufficientcomparativedata to determinehow and why individual supportersof left-libertarian
partiesdifferfromthe overallelectoratesin the
eighteendemocracies.

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WORLD POLITICS

204
IV.

STRUCTURAL

CHANGE

AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

Most contemporarytheoriesof structuralchange adopt the Schumpeterianperspectivethat the success of capitalistinstitutionsand values
will ultimatelybringabout the demise of capitalism'sorganizationaland
moral foundations.7These theoriesidentifythe spread of markets and
bureaucraciesas thesourceofnew dissatisfaction.
They interpretthe programmatic concerns of left-libertarian
parties as a protestagainst the
emergingbureaucraticand meritocraticpostindustrialsociety.
Accordingto thesetheories,modernwelfarecapitalismwas made possible by an unprecedentedperiod of economicgrowth,affluence,and institutionalstability.The new social movementsand left-libertarian
parties are mobilizing against certain consequences of this process and
articulatingnew preferencesforsocial change. They respond to tendencies in postindustrialsocietiesthat(I) produce unacceptablerisksto human lifeand theenvironment,
(2) restraintheautonomyof theindividual
citizen,and (3) undercuta democraticgovernanceof social change. Although these societiespromotesophisticatededucation,theysimultaneously frustratedemands for more political participationand centralize
controlin hierarchiesof expertsand bureaucracies.They fosterindividualism and mobility,but denya more autonomousdefinitionof individual lifestylesand collectiveidentitiesat the local level. Theories of postindustrial society suggest that the growing tension between citizens'
demands forautonomyand participationon the one hand, and the increasinglycomprehensiveand complex hierarchiesof social controlon
the other,is what leads to the formationof left-libertarian
parties.
A simple way to explorethe link betweensocietaltransformation
and
is
to
left-libertarian
the
incomes
of
the Westparties
compare
per capita
ern democracies. The more affluentcountries should create stronger
preferencesand individualcapacitiesto pursue leftand libertariangoals.
At the same time,thesecountriestend to regulatesocial lifemore tightly
throughmarketexchangerelationsand organizationalhierarchies.Table
2 shows thatlevelsofeconomicaffluence
correctlypredictthepresenceor
absence of left-libertarian
partiesin sixteenout of eighteencases. The average income in countrieswith relevantleft-libertarian
partiesis noticeof reproducibility
is
ably higherthanin thosewithout,and thecoefficient
than
chance.
The
LOGIT
much higher
analysisshows thatthe association
7Macrostructuraltheoriesare especiallyinfluencedby the work of JiirgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis(Boston: Beacon Press,I975), and Habermas, Communication
and theEvolutionof Society(Boston: Beacon Press, I979); Alain Touraine, The Self-Production
of Society
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, I977); and Claus Offe,Contradictions
of the Welfare
State(Cambridge: MIT Press,i984).

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

205

TABLE 2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

AND PER CAPITA INCOME

(i98o)
Income Greaterthan
$11,000per Capita
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

(Average= $13,001)

No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

IncomeSmallerthan
$11,000per Capita

B
DK
F
FRG
N
NL
S
CH

(11,816)
(12,952)
(12,136)
(13,305)
(14,019)
(11,851)
(14,761)
(15,922)

(10,251)

Us

(11,364)

AUS
Fl
I

(10,129)
(10,440)
( 6,906)

(Average = $8,972)

IRE

NZ
UK
CND

( 5,193)

( 8,873)

( 7,441)
( 9,335)
(10,582)

Source: OECD, HistoricalStatistics


i960-i980 (Paris: OECD, I 982).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

Coefficient
of
Reproducibility
(CR)*

*CR=

FrancewithLeftLibertarianParty
(France = 1)

Francewithout
Left-Libertarian
Party
(France = 0)

.89

.83
.71
.04

.75

Level
Significance
(LOGIT Regression)

.055

N of mistakes
-N

of cases

of income and partyformationis close to thecommonlyaccepted level of


statisticalsignificance,and the correlationcoefficientis quite strong.
Nevertheless,the link is not perfect:Austria and the United States are
anomalies not explainedby thetheory.France strengthens
thecorrelation
ifit is countedas a case with left-libertarian
parties.
Within West Germany,the relationshipbetween affluenceand left-

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206

WORLD POLITICS

libertarianpartystrengthholds trueat an even more disaggregatelevel.


If we regressthe electoralsupportforthe West German Greens in state
and national electionsfromi98i to i985 on the per capita income of the
West German states,thereis a strongand significant
correlationbetween
income levels and electoralsupport.8Figure i illustratesthislink. Other
variables,such as the industrialstructureor the competitivepositionof
differentpartiesin each state,may explain the remainingvariance. We
will returnto thesevariablesin the cross-nationalanalysis.
Postindustrialsocietiesare said to be characterizedby a high percentage of the economicallyactive population working in the servicesector
and by increasinglevelsof educationin the population.But in the eighteen democraciesin the sample,no associationbetweenthe sectoralstructure of the economyand left-libertarian
partiescan be found (see Table
3). Similarly,the relativesize of the studentpopulation in advanced edThese negativefindingssugucation shows no link to partyformation.9
offeronly limitedexgest that sociologicaltheoriesof postindustrialism
planationsat bestforthe riseof new parties.
This conclusionis reinforcedwhen we analyze the link of postmaterialistvalues in affluentdemocraciesto the formationof left-libertarian
voters do preferpostparties. Surveys show that most left-libertarian
materialistvalues. But the reversedoes not hold true:not all postmaterialists supportleft-libertarian
parties.Although we do not have data on
the entireset of eighteendemocraciesto substantiatethisassertion,data
existon six European countrieswithand withoutleft-libertarian
parties.
In the countrieswith left-libertarian
parties(West Germany,the Netherlands,Belgium,and France as a borderlinecase), the percentageof citvalues is notunambiguouslygreaterthanin the
izens withpostmaterialist
countriesthatdo not have such parties(Britainand Italy).I0
8 Autocorrelation
betweenthevalues of Green electoralsupportwithineach German state
may make the correlationlook strongerthan it is. But in view of the small numberof cases
and the limitedpurposeof thisanalysis,I have settledfora simplebivariateanalysis.
9 The numberof college studentsper ioo,ooo inhabitantsis taken as a measureof educationaladvancement.Data are providedbyUNESCO, Statistical
D'gest 1984 (Paris: UNESCO,
I 984).

'o Data on the distributionof materialistsand postmaterialists


in thesecountriesare provided by Paul R. Abrahamsonand Ronald Inglehart,"GenerationalReplacementand Value
Change in Six West European Societies,"paper preparedfordeliveryat the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association,Washington,DC, August 30-September2,
i984. If we average the postmaterialism
scoresfor I976-i980 in Belgium,the Netherlands,
and West Germany,theyare onlyslightlyhigherthantheaveragein France,Britain,or Italy.
West Germany'sscore is smallerthan thatof France or Britain.Belgium,which was more
in I976-i980, is much less postmaterialist
postmaterialist
than are all othercountriesin the
i980s. Finally,the postmaterialism
measureis heavilyinfluencedby theactual inflationrates
of a country.If thisvariablewas held constant,the associationbetweennationalpostmaterialism scoresand left-libertarian
partieswould probablydisappearentirely.

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FIGURE
BETWEEN

RELATIONSHIP
IN THE
AND THE

VOTE

GREEN

GERMAN

WEST

IN STATE

207

PARTIES

LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
I
PER

INCOME

CAPITA

STATES

AND NATIONAL

(I980)
ELECTIONS

(I98I-I985)

11
mWB

10-

mBRE

*BRE
0

8-

/HAM

B-W
HES
*

>4

"HAM

mWB
z

7-

44

, B-W

/HES

6
0

m
jS-H

HES

mnNS

i)

>

HAM

mNS

*R pBAY*NR-W

~~~4

i-

W
o

mNR-W

SAAR

GREEN VOTE - 1.37 + .000186 (GNP)

4-

adjusted r2 = 3445
t = 3.618

S-H

3
mSAAR
0

20.000

24.000

PER CAPITA INCOME

28.000

31.000

36.000

40.000

44.000

(IN DM) IN THE WEST GERMAN STATES

Deutschland(StuttderBundesrepublik
Jahrbuch
Source: StatistischesBundesamt,Statistisches
gart: Kohlhammer,I984).
Key: S-H = Schleswig-Holstein;SAAR = Saarland; NS = Niedersachsen(Lower Saxony); R-P = Rheinland-Pfalz(Rhineland-Palatinate)[same resultin two elections];
(Northrhine-Westfalia);
BAY = Bayern (Bavaria); NR-W = Nordrhein-Westfalen
HES = Hessen (Hesse); WB = West Berlin; BRE =
B-W = Baden-Wiurttemberg;
Bremen; HAM = Hamburg.

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208

WORLD POLITICS
TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

AND THE DEVELOPMENT

SERVICE

OF THE

SECTOR

(Percentageof the employedlabor force)

Significant
Left-Libertarian
PattiesExist
(Average= 57.9%)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 57.1%)

Percentage
Greater
than57.5%
B
(62.3%)
DK
(63.3%)
NL
(62.1%)
N
(61.8%)
S

(62.2%)

AUS
CND
UK
US

(62.4%)
(66.0%)
(59.2%)
(65.9%)

i960-80(Paris:OECD,
Source:OECD, Historical
Statistics,

STATISTICAL

CR
p

(LOGIT)

F1
I
IRE

(54.0%)
(48.0%)
(48.4%)
(54.2%)

NZ
I982),

Table2.I

I,

(55.2%)

p. 35.

INTERPRETATION

France = i

Lower
Percentage
than57.5%
A
(51.5%)
CH (52.3%)
F
(55.3%)
FRG (49.2%)

France = o

.56
.o6

.6

.79 (n.s.)

.67 (n.s.)

.I

Inglehartand Dalton argue thatvalue change does not instantlytranslate into electoralrealignments."Still,thisdoes not explain why the apparent "lags" between value change and partyrealignmentsdifferfrom
countryto country.Theories of postmaterialism
eitherdo not use reliable
and valid measuresof value change or theyunderratethe importanceof
changing cognitive capabilities and of institutionalopportunitiesand
constraintsas determinantsof collectivepoliticalaction.
Thus, theoriesof postindustrialist
societyand value change at best account forchangingindividual orientations,preferences,and capabilities
to engage in collectiveprotest.But theydo not sufficiently
predict the
conditionsand opportunitiesunder which these values and preferences
lead to the formationof left-libertarian
parties.
II See Ronald Inglehart,"The ChangingStructure
of PoliticalCleavages in WesternSocieties,"in Dalton et al. (fn.2), 62, and RussellJ.Dalton, "Environmentalism
and Value Change
in WesternDemocracies,"paper preparedfordeliveryat the Annual Meetingof the American PoliticalScience Association,Washington,DC, August30-September2, i984.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
V. POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITIES

THE DEVELOPMENT

209

FOR AND CONSTRAINTS

OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

ON

PARTIES

Although socioeconomictheoriesof partyformationremain unsatisfactory,we can explorethesignificanceof politicalinstitutions


and power
relations in the development of left-libertarianparties. The socioeconomic transformationof modern democracy explains why there is
pressureto representleft-libertarian
interestsin the politicalarena, but
politicalinstitutionsand power relationsexplain whetherthesepressures
are representedby specificpoliticalparties,whenthesepartiesappear,and
whatlabel theyadopt.
The formationof politicalpartiescan be examined fromthe perspective of rationalactorswho have postindustrialpoliticaldemands and are
searchingfor the most effectivestrategiesto place them on the political
agenda. Forming new partiesin orderto pressfornew politicaldemands
requiresmore effortthan using existingpoliticalchannels,such as established partiesand interestgroups. Rational actors will attemptto build
new vehicles of interestrepresentationonly if traditionalorganizations
failto respondto postindustrialdemands. Moreover,theseactorsmustbe
able to take advantage of opportunitiesand acquire resourcesto build a
new party.Thus, new politicalpartieswill formonlywhen theunresponsivenessof existingpoliticalinstitutionscoincideswith favorablepolitical
to displace existingparties.
opportunities
Four conditionsshape the opportunitiesand constraintsof left-libertarianpartyformation.Comprehensivewelfarestatesincreasethe financial resourcesand the motivationaldispositionsof importantgroups to
shifttheirpolitical attentionfromeconomic to postindustrialpolicy issues. In advanced welfarestates,stronglabor corporatismand the participation of leftpartiesin governmentconstrainthe pursuitof postindustrialdemands throughestablishedpoliticalchannels,and thusrenderthe
developmentof new politicalvehiclesforthesedemands more probable.
The likelihood of the formationof left-libertarian
partiesincreasesfurtherwhen highlyvisibleconflictsabout postindustrialpolicyissues (such
as nuclear power) mobilize social movementsand polarize society.
The welfare state protectsthe material well-being of many citizens
fromthe effectsof the businesscycleand capitalistlabor marketson their
behavior and aspirations.Social insurancesystems,public employment,
and retrainingprogramsprovide a "safetynet"
educational institutions,
and a subjectivesense of securitythatis essentialto the reorientationof
people's politicalagenda. Such arrangementsencouragethemto discount
thenegativeimpactof low economicgrowthon theirindividuallives and
increasetheirwillingnessto supportpoliciesthatrestrainprivatebusiness
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WORLD POLITICS

210

and thebureaucraticmanagementofeconomicgrowth.This typeof logic


presumesa certainmyopiaamong theactorsbecause,afterall, thewelfare
state itselfis dependent on economic performance.Nevertheless,actual
perceptionsof opportunitiesand constraintsmay be reconstructedby
such policies.
mobilizationin anothersense.
Welfarestatesencourageleft-libertarian
They organize many social services(education, social welfare, health,
Nonmarketservicesin general,and the
etc.) in bureaucraticinstitutions.
bureaucraticprovisionof social servicesin particular,may thus give rise
which in turn fuels left-libertarian
to intense consumer dissatisfaction,
demands for a decentralized, consumer-controlledreorganization of
public services.'2
If thisreasoningis valid, comprehensivewelfarestatesshould be most
likelyto generateleft-libertarian
parties.Table 4 shows thattheexistence
of left-libertarian
partiesis stronglylinkedto public social expenditureas
of reproducibility
a percentageof grossdomesticproduct.The coefficient
indicatea firmassociationbetween
as well as the correlationcoefficient
these variables.The mean social expendituresare much higherin countrieswith relevantleft-libertarian
parties,and the LOGIT analysisdemonThe welfarestateexstratesthatthisassociationis statistically
significant.
plains the "anomalies" we findwhen examiningthe associationbetween
left-libertarianparties and economic development. Austria and the
United States are now classifiedcorrectly.France, again, contributes
more to the associationif it is classifiedas a countrywith left-libertarian
parties.The associationbetweenthewelfarestateand left-libertarian
parties,however,yieldssome new anomalies: Ireland and Switzerland.Plausiblead hoc argumentsexplain at least the Swiss case.'3
The strengthof welfarestatesis the resultof economic development
The most comprehensive
and peculiar politicalforcesand institutions.'4
welfarestatesare associatedwithstrong,centralizedlabor unionsand the
frequentparticipationof social democraticand socialistpartiesin governforthe mobilizament. But while the welfarestatecreatesopportunities
12

See Albert0. Hirschman,Shifting


Involvements
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,

i981),

39-4I-

The figuresunderstatethe exceptionalsocial and economicsecuritySwiss citizensenjoy


due to Switzerland's unique positionin the world economy.See Manfred Schmidt,Der
schweizerische
Weg zur Vollbeschaftigung
[The Swiss path to full employment](Frankfurt/
Main: Campus Verlag, i985).
14 See Peter Flora and Arnold J.Heidenheimer,eds., The Development
of WelfareStatesin
Western
EuropeandNorthAmerica(New Brunswick,NJ:TransactionBooks, I 98 I), and Francis G. Castles,The ImpactofParties(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, i982). Compare,as a recentanof the welfarestate,Hannu Uusitalo,"Comparalyticsurveyof studieson the determinants
ative Researchon the Determinantsof the WelfareState: The State of the Art,"European
JournalofPoliticalResearchI2 (No. 4, i984), 403-24.
13

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

211

TABLE 4
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

AND SOCIAL

SECURITY

EXPENDITURE

(1979-198o) (Percentageof GNP)


Expenditure
Greater
than19%
A
(21.4%)
B
(24.5%)
DK (26.2%)
F
(25.5%)
FRG (23.0%)
N
(19.8%)
NL (27.6%)
S
(31.2%)

Significant

Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 23.6%)

IRE (20.6%)

No Significant

Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 14.9%)

Expenditure
Smallerthan19%
CH
(12.8%)

AUS (11.6%)

CND (14.8%)
Fl
(18.0%)
I
(16.3%)
J
( 9.8%)
NZ
UK
US

(14.1%)
(16.9%)
(12.2%)

(OverallAverage= 19.2%)
EleventhInternational
Source: InternationalLabor Office,The CostofSocial Security.
Inquiry
I978-80 (Geneva: ILO, i985).

STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION

France = i

France = o

CR
'

.89

.83

.72

.6i

.02

.03

(LOGIT)

tionof left-libertarian
demands,labor-interest
organizationsand government participationby the socialistsprovideconstraintsthatpreventthese
demands frombeing articulatedthroughestablishedpolitical channels.
Labor corporatismand leftpartygovernmentsincrease the rigidityand
unresponsivenessof political systemsto left-libertarian
policy demands,
and therebyspeed the formationof new parties.
In capitalistdemocracies,labor can gain power onlyifit is well organized. It must representa large share of a country'swage earners and it

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WORLD POLITICS

212

must centralizeorganizationaldecision making. This formof mobilization increaseslabor's capacityto engage in elite bargainingwith business
and politicalparties.'5Each participanthas theresourcesto do damage to
the others,but it also has capacities to enterinto and enforcecompromises.

Corporatistinterestintermediationconstrainsleft-libertarian
demands
in at least two ways. Because of the verycentralist,formalorganization
of the participantsin corporatistpolicy-makingarenas, it is comparativelymore difficultfornew, less well-organizedintereststo be heard in
the political system.In particular,existingpoliticalpartieswill discount
new demands ifno organizationis behindthem.Moreover,businessand
labor have a common interestas economic producersin preservingthe
logic of industrialgrowthand bureaucraticregulation preciselythe institutionsthat left-libertarianforces attack. When producer interests
can hope to disrupt this
dominate the political agenda, left-libertarians
policy-makingsystemonly by establishingnew vehiclesof interestrepresentation.

Since businessinterestsand conservativepartiesas a rule are inimical


demands formore egalitarian,participatory,
to most left-libertarian
and
the inclusionof labor in corecological economicor politicalinstitutions,
poratistinterestintermediationis vital to understandingwhy corporatism enhances pressuresto create left-libertarian
parties.Unions, labor
have a common mistrustof the marketand
parties,and left-libertarians
prefergreater equality and political redistribution.As labor organizations are drawn into corporatistinterestintermediation,they sacrifice
theiranticapitalistspiritin favorof tangibleshort-term
benefitsfortheir
constituencies(e.g., in the areas of social policyand employment).They
move away frompotentialalliances with left-libertarian
forcesand lose
theircapacityto include left-libertarian
demands in theirown political
platforms.
countrieshave labor unions shown
Only in a fewof thenoncorporatist
sympathytoward left-libertarian
positions,such as oppositionto nuclear
power. Most notably,the French and Japanese socialist unions voiced
concernabout nuclearpower in the 1970s. Some dissentfromnuclearpolicies also developed in the BritishTrade Union Congress and in some
U.S. unions. In corporatistsystems,on the other hand, unions have always supportednational nuclear policies,even if some union activistsor
see in particularPhilippeC. Schmitter
on laborcorporatism,
15In theburgeoningliterature
(BeverlyHills, CA:
Intermediation
and GerhardLehmbruch,eds., TrendsTowardCorporatist
Poleds.,Patternsof Corporatist
Sage, I979); GerhardLehmbruchand PhilippeC. Schmitter,
in
icy-Making(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, i982); and Suzanne Berger,ed., OrganizingInterests
Western
Europe(New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,i98i).

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

213

PARTIES

suborganizationsopposed thisposition.For thisreason,the formationof


left-libertarian
partiesshould increaseparallel to the firmnessof laborcorporatistarrangements.
I use Schmitter'scombinedindex of organizationalcentralizationand
associationalmonopolyof unions to measure labor corporatism.'6Table
5 shows a veryhigh associationbetween labor corporatismand the departies.Three anomalies remain: Finland,
velopmentof left-libertarian
France, and Switzerland. In the Swiss case, Schmitter'sindex may not
appropriatelytap the corporatistpatternsof interestintermediationthat
are common in thatcountry.
TABLE 5
LEFT-LIBERTARIANPARTIESANDLABORCORPORATISM*

(Combined rank order of organizationalcentralizationand


associational monopoly of unions, 1965-1980)
High Labor
Corporatism
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
*

NL

B
S
DK FRG

Low Labor
Corporatism
F

CH

F1

AUS

CND
IRE
I

UK
US

No Data on New Zealand

Sources: The measure was developed by Schmitter(fn. i6), 294. Japanand Australiawere
added to Schmitter'ssample as cases of low labor corporatism,based on data reported in David Cameron, "Social Democracy,Corporatism,Labour Quiescence,
and the Representationof Economic Interestin Advanced CapitalistSociety,"in
Capitalism(London:
JohnH. Goldthorpe,ed., Orderand Conflictin Contemporary
OxfordUniversityPress,i984), I43-78, at i65.
CR = .82 (France = I)
CR = .88 (France = o)

In view of the difficulty


of quantifyingcorporatism,I have chosen the
level of strikeactivityin thecountriesas an indirectmeasureof economic
interest intermediation. Because it facilitatescompromise between capital

and labor, labor corporatismis inverselyrelatedto strikeactivity.Table


6 shows that the associationbetween strikeactivityand left-libertarian
i6
Philippe C. Schmitter,"InterestIntermediationand Regime Governabilityin ContemporaryWesternEurope and NorthAmerica,"in Berger(fn.I5), 287-330.

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WORLD POLITICS

214

TABLE 6
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES AND STRIKE ACTIVITY*

(Working days lost per iooo employeesin the labor force,i965-198i)


Loss Less than
260 Daysper
Year
A
(10)
B
(156)
CH
(1)
DK (148)
ERG (28)
N
(28)
NL
(22)
S
(95)

Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average = 85.1%)

No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average = 458.3%)

(71)

Loss Morethan
260 Daysper
Year
F
(278)

AUS
CND
F1
I
IRE
UK
US

(427)
(707)
(358)
(840)
(484)
(375)
(411)

No Data on New Zealand

Source: InternationalLabor Office,YearbookofLabor Statistics


(Geneva: ILO, i983), quoted
in Cameron (see sources,Table 5).

STATISTICAL

INTERPRETATION

France = i
CR
r
p

(LOGIT)

.88

France = o
.94

-.77

-*78

.02

.05

parties is stronglynegative. The coefficientof reproducibilityis high;


only France-if counted as a countrywith a significantleft-libertarian
party-and Japanremainas anomalies. The mean strikeactivityamong
countrieswith left-libertarian
parties is much lower than in the other
eightcountries,and the LOGITanalysisconfirmsthatthe bivariateassociation is significant.Because France has an intermediatelevel of strikeactivity,its classificationdoes not affectthe level and significanceof the associationsmuch.
Labor corporatismis linked to two othervariablesthatI have not ex-

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

215

plicitlymodeled in thepresentanalysis.Countrieswithlabor corporatism


tend to be small and to develop politicalculturesbased on bargaining,
compromise,and the depoliticizationof conflict.Some authorshave related this"northernEuropean politymodel" to thelow level of autonomy
thatsmall countriesenjoy in theworld economy.If theywant to respond
flexiblyto externalchallenges,theycannotaffordhigh levels of domestic
conflict.'7The price of domesticconsensus,however,is centralizedelite
bargaining and the absence of popular participationin policy making.
Left-libertarians
evidentlysupporta view of politicsthatis diametrically
opposed to thesepatterns.They are a forcethatis bound to challengeand
disruptconsensualistpolicymaking.
In examining the role that politicalpartiesplay in the emergence of
left-libertarian
competitors,we must pursue the same logic as we did
withrespectto labor corporatism:independentleft-libertarian
partiesare
more likelyto develop when thetraditionalleftis unavailableas a vehicle
of protestagainstthe dominantmodel of societaldevelopment.Whether
thisis actuallythe case depends on nationalstructuresof partycompetition.

The initialpremiseis that voterswith left-libertarian


sympathiesare
mostlikelyto supporttraditionalleftpartiesin situationswhere theycan
democraticand conservativeparties.'8
chooseonlybetweensocialist/social
Even if thereis a left-libertarian
alternative,voterswill stilltend to supportthe traditionalleftwhen the socialistand conservativepartiesare of
roughlyequal electoralstrengthbecause theyfearthatdefectionfromthe
socialistswill indirectlyhelp the conservatives.For this reason, established leftpartieshave oftenadvertisedthemselvesto left-libertarian
constituenciesas the "lesser evil." Moreover,as long as the traditionalleftis
in the opposition,it can invoke both pro-laborand left-libertarian
programs to gloss over the tensionsthatan alliance betweenthesetwo forces
would create.
Three differentcompetitiveconfigurations
in partysystemsfavorthe
developmentof left-libertarian
parties.First, when the traditionalleft
governs hegemonically,a conservativegovernmentis not a real threat;
7See PeterKatzenstein,"The Small European Statesin the InternationalEconomy: Economic Dependence and CorporatistPolitics,"in JohnGerard Ruggie,ed., The Antinomies
of
Interdependence
(New York: Columbia UniversityPress, i983); Katzenstein,Small Statesin
WorldMarkets(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, i984); Michael Wallerstein,"The
Microfoundationsof Corporatism:Formal Theory and ComparativeAnalysis,"paper prepared for deliveryat the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington,DC, August30-September2, i984.
*8 In two instances,
left-libertarian
centristpartiesin Sweden (theCenterParty)and in the
Netherlands(Democrats'66) actuallysupportedconservativegovernments.
In bothinstances,
the votersdisapprovedof thesealliancesand thepartieslostvotesin subsequentelections.

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216

WORLD POLITICS

left-libertarians
may thereforebe temptedto abandon socialist parties.
Second, the longer socialistpartiesparticipatein government,the more
will be to defectfromthem.The performancereclikelyleft-libertarians
ord of socialistgovernmentsantagonizes left-libertarians
and dampens
hopes thatthe traditionalleftcan incorporatenew demands into its policies while simultaneouslycateringto its traditionalworking class constituency.Finally, where traditionalleftparties are weak and permanently confined to the opposition, voters have nothing to lose by
supportinga new left-libertarian
party.'9From these hypotheses,one
would expect a curvilinearassociationbetween socialistparticipationin
governmentand relevantleft-libertarian
parties,with high probabilities
both when socialistparticipationin governmentis high and when it is
negligible.
The level of electoralsupportfortraditionalleftpartiesis not a good
empiricalpredictorof left-libertarian
partiesbecause it does not fullyreflectthecompetitivepositionand influenceof thelefton theformationof
governmentsand public policymaking; socialistparticipationin government mattersmore. As Table 7 shows,governmentparticipationby the
leftbetween I970 and i980 is positivelyassociatedwith the formationof
significantleft-libertarian
is also supported
parties.2oThis interpretation
by the LOGIT analysisof the bivariateassociationand the correlationcoefficient.However, the relationshipbetween socialist participationin
governmentand the appearance of left-libertarian
parties is linear, not
curvilinear.With the exceptionof France, countrieswith weak socialist
partieshave not produced left-libertarian
parties.Even France may be a
electoralsupportdwindled with
misleadingcase because left-libertarian
the rise of the socialist-communist
alliance in the late I970S and early
i980s. Statistically,
theassociationbetweenleft-libertarian
partiesand socialistparticipationin governmentstrengthenswhen France is dropped
fromthe sample of countrieswith left-libertarian
parties.
The structureof partysystems,especiallythe internalcohesivenessof
rightand leftpartyblocs and theirabilityto controlthe stateexecutive,
"9 The argumentthatweak oppositionpartiesspawn new oppositionpartieswas developed
byMaurice Pinard,The Riseofa ThirdParty:A Studyin CrisisPolitics,enlargeded. (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's UniversityPress,I975).
Some mayargue thatthe periodfromI970 to i980 misspecifies
the leftgovernmentvariable forthosecountriesin whichleft-libertarian
partieswere formedmuch earlierthan the
late I970s-i.e., the Scandinaviancountriesand theNetherlands.The use of earliertime periodsforthesecountries,however,would notsubstantially
alterthe result.What is more importantis thatonlyin the laterI970s, aftera periodof organizationaland/orelectoralcrisis,
did the Scandinavianand Dutch New Left partiesbegin to adopt the entireleft-libertarian
agenda, includingecologicaldemands,and to abandon traditionalnotionsof socialism.The
electoralconstituency
ofScandinavianNew Leftpartiesunderwenta dramaticchangeduring
thisperiod.Compare Logue (fn.4).
20

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

AND

PARTIES

217

7
SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST

MAJOR

PARTY

IN GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPATION

(Months in government, I970-1980)

Participation
Morethan61
Months
A
(132)
B
(90)
CH (132)
FRG (132)
DK
(97)
N
(85)
S
(82)

Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 89.1%)

Fl
UK

No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 32.9%)

Participation
Lessthan61
Months
F
(0)
NL (52)

AUS (35)
CND (0)
I
(0)
IRE (51)
J
(0)
NZ (36)
US
(0)

(112)
(62)

Source: Keesing'sContemporary
I 970-1980.
Atrchives,

STATISTICAL

INTERPRETATION

France =

France

CR

.78
.59

.83
.74

.03

.03

'

(LOGIT)

explains the timingand the label of left-libertarian


parties.In countries
where New Left parties appeared as precursorsof contemporaryleftlibertarianparties,the leftwas united while the conservativecamp was
deeply divided among several bourgeois parties.This strengthenedthe
positionof the traditionalleftpartiesand reduced the riskthatNew Left
partieswould involuntarilysupportconservativegovernments-a situation favorableto left-libertarian
partyformationin Denmark, the Netherlands,France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.In countrieswhere
therightwas well-organizedand preventeddominationbysocialists,leftlibertarianpartiesemergedonlyin thelate I970s afterlong periodsof left
participationin government;theynow carrythe "Green" or "ecology"

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WORLD POLITICS

218

label. This rationale explains the cases of Austria, Belgium, and West
Germany.
In thesame way,we can interpretthefindingthatNew Leftor centerleftlibertarianpartiesemerged in partysystemscharacterizedby longtermrisingelectoralvolatility,while ecologypartiesproved successfulin
systemswith decliningvolatility(Table 8). It is truethatthe rise of leftlibertarianpartiesitselfaffectsthe regressionline of partysystemvolatility,but high volatilityusually indicatesthat many partieswin and lose
voters simultaneously.Such systemsoffera good opportunityfor the
early formationof left-libertarian
parties,a situation that prevails in
countrieswith unstablebourgeois partyblocs. When volatilitydeclines,
bourgeoispartyblocs are generallystableand make theformationof new
left-libertarian
partiesmore difficult.
Only Switzerland has generatedboth New Left and ecology parties
that have sustained electoral significance(in part because they have
Swiss cantons).The case of France is an intereststrongholdsin different
In
the New LeftParti Socialiste
outlier.
the
late
ing
I950S and i960s,
Unifie flourishedin an environmentof high electoralvolatility,but faltered as the French party system became intenselypolarized in the
forcestriedto make a new startwithecologyparI 970s.21 Left-libertarian
TABLE
ELECTORAL

VOLATILITY

AND 'NEW

8
LEFT'

OR 'ECOLOGICAL

LEFT-LIBERTARIANs

RisingVolatility
(1948-1977)

DecliningVolatility
(1948-1977)

Countrieswith

CH

Countries
with
Left-Socialist

DK
NL
N
S
CH

"Green"or
EcologyParties

or "New Left"

Parties

B
F
FRG

Source: Calculations of the regressionslopes forelectoralvolatilityare taken fromMogens


Pederson, "Changing Patternsof Electoral Volatilityin European PartySystems,
I948-I977:
Explorationsin Explanation," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds.,
Western
EuropeanPartySystems(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, i984), 29-66.
2 See Charles Hauss, The New Leftin France: The Unified
SocialistParty(Westport,CT:
Greenwood Press,I978), chap. 2.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

219

ties in the late I970s and early i980S, but made littleheadway in an environmentinhospitableto the formationof a left-libertarian
party(no labor corporatism,brieflefttenurein government).
The trade-offbetweenNew Left and ecologypartiessuggeststhatthe
two are politicalequivalentsand membersof the same familyof parties.
Where New Left partieshave won significantelectoralsupport,ecology
partieshave not been successfuleven when theyappealed to voterswho
were ideologicallymore moderate. Moreover,in the cases of Norway,
Sweden, and the Netherlands,these moderate libertariansare already
liberal partiesthatare complementaryto the New
served by center-left
Left. Conversely,most successfulecologypartieshave appeared in countrieswithoutsuccessfulNew Leftor centerleft-libertarian
parties.While
the New Left has embraced the "ecology" agenda, most ecology parties
have accepted the libertarianand anticapitalistspiritof the New Left.
To complete this analysis,we must consider a final catalystthat has
triggeredthe riseof contemporaryleft-libertarian
partiesand theconvergence of ecologism and the New Left: the nuclear power controversy.
Antinuclearactivistsfirstattemptedto work throughtheestablishedparties,but neitherconservativenor socialistpartieswere willing to represent and supportthem,particularlyin countrieswith high labor corporatism and left party governments.In these countries,a high level of
alienation from the established political institutionsencouraged leftlibertariansto resortto the mobilizationof antinuclearmovementsin order to advance theiragenda. Althoughthestruggleagainstnuclearpower
originatedin the pragmaticconcernsof scientistsand citizens for their
health and safety,nuclear power rapidlybecame a symbolforthe technocratic domination of societyby governmentagencies, private enterprise,and unionswho defendeconomicgrowthand bureaucraticwelfare
statesagainstthe left-libertarian
challenge.
The strengthor weakness of the nuclearcontroversy
is difficultto determinebecause cross-nationaldata on the mobilizationof opponentsto
nuclear power are confinedto inventoriesof case studies.22Ideally,opinion polls, the incidenceof mass demonstrationsagainstnuclear facilities,
and politicallymotivateddelays in the constructionand licensingof nuclear facilitieswould be valuable measuresof the strengthof antinuclear
movements.In practice,we must relyon informedjudgmentabout the
intensityof conflictsin each country(see Table 9).
See Anna Gyorgy,ed., No Nukes:Everyone'sGuideto NuclearPower (Boston: Southend
Press,I979), and Lutz Mez, ed.,Der Atomkonfiikt:
Atomindustrie,
Atompolitik
undAnti-Atombewegungim internationalen
Vergleich
[Nuclearconflict:Nuclear industry,
nuclearpolicy,and
the antinuclearmovementin international
comparison](Berlin:Olle & Wolter,I979).
22

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WORLD POLITICS

220

TABLE 9
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY

(1975-1980)
IntenseNuclear
Controversy
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

DK
NL
S

No IntenseNuclear
Controversy
B

F
N

CH
FRG
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

US

AUS
CND

F1

IRE
I

NZ
UK
CR
CR

=
=

.78 (France= I)
.83 (France= o)

parties,onlythe
Among the countrieswithoutrelevantleft-libertarian
United States sustained a fairly intense nuclear power controversy
throughoutthe early I970s, even thoughBritain,Canada, Finland, Italy,
and Japanalso developed extensivenuclearpower programs.From about
partieshave experiencedinI975 on, mostcountrieswith left-libertarian
and France are excontroversies.
Norway,
tensenuclear power
Belgium,
ceptions.Belgium was already faradvanced with its nuclear power program beforeantinuclearprotestsreached their peak in the mid-I970s.
Norway did not have any nuclear plantsand only brieflypondered constructionof such facilities.France is difficultto classify:an initiallyintense antinuclearmobilizationin the mid-1970striggeredthe participation of ecologistsin local and regionalelections.Afterthat,government
repression,the oppositional Socialist Party's attemptsto co-opt antinuclear activists,and the movement'scomplete lack of policy impact
quelled the mobilization of collectiveprotest.23 These factorsprobably
23The interactionbetweenstateand challenginganti-nuclearmovementsis analyzed in
comparativeperspectivein HerbertKitschelt,"PoliticalOpportunityStructuresand Political
Protest.Anti-NuclearMovementsin Four Democracies,"BritishJournalofPolitialSciencei 6
(No. i, i986), 57-85-

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

221

also lessened the electoralchances of the French ecologistsin the early


I 980S.
There is some evidencethatthenuclearpower controversy
was particularlyintensein countriesin which the social democratsparticipatedin
the government.In these cases, the large leftpartiessupportedthe nuclear programsunambiguously.Since the conservativepartieswere also
committedto nuclearpower,no significantpoliticalforcein the arena of
parliamentarypoliticsstood up against nuclear power. In Sweden, this
configurationprecipitatedthe move of the moderate-libertarian
Center
Partyto an antinuclearpositionand pushed theSwedish communistsfurdemands.In numerousothercountries,itcrethertowardleft-libertarian
ated or reinforcedelectoralsupportfornew left-libertarian
parties.
However, the link betweenthe left'sparticipationin governmentand
theintensityof thenuclearpower controversy
as a precipitatingcondition
of left-libertarian
partyformationis farfromperfect.The United States
is an obvious outlier: the conflictwas fairlyintenseeven though many
Democrats and even a significantnumber of northeasternRepublicans
opposed nuclear power. Belgium and Finland implementedambitious
nuclear power programsduringperiodsof socialistparticipationin government,but did not witnessstrongconflictsover nuclearpower. To sum
up, nuclear power controversiesin the I970s contributedto the emerof left-libertarian
gence or strengthening
parties,but were certainlynot
the primedeterminantsof innovationin Westernpartysystems.
VI.

SOCIAL

STRUCTURE

AND POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITIES:

SYNTHESIS

After having considered structural,institutional,and precipitating


conditionsforthe emergenceof left-libertarian
parties,we can combine
the fivestrongestpredictorsof partyformation.Since the relativelyhigh
collinearityamong the fiveindependentvariablesrulesout a meaningful
multivariateanalysisof theircontribution,
a weaker analyticaltechnique
is required. The dichotomizedvalues on the fiveindependentvariables
yielda summary"bet" of how likelyleft-libertarian
partyformationis in
each of theeighteencountries.Table io providesthisinformation.In four
countries,all variables correctlypredictpartyformation;in four other
countries,fourout of fivevariablesmake the correctprediction;and in
eight cases, the variables predictthe absence of left-libertarian
parties.
Only two ambiguous cases remain: the United Statesand France.
Individual macrosocietaland politicalvariablesreveal serious "anomalies" in a numberof countries.The explanatorymodel of fivevariables

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TABLE
SUMMARY

Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden
WestGermany

OF VARIABLES

Per CapitaGNP
High
Low
X
X
X
X

Austria
Belgium
Norway
Switzerland

X
X
X

France
UnitedStates

X
X

THAT INFLUENCE

X
X
X
X

Australia
Canada
Italy
New Zealand

X
X
X
X

OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

SocialSecurity Strike
Activity LeftPartiesin
Expenditure
1965-1981
Governmen
High
Low
High
Low
Low
High
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Finland
Ireland
Japan
UnitedKingdom

I0

THE PRESENCE

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Combined CR = .86 (France = I)


Combined CR = .87 (France = o)

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X
X
X
X
X
X

LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

223

removesmostof theseanomalies. A combinationof thefivevariablescorrectlypredictsthe presenceor absence of significantleft-libertarian


partiesin almostall countries.In thetwo ambiguouscases,thesocioeconomic
variables stronglypredictthe presenceof significantleft-libertarian
parties,but the politicalvariablesdo not. Because I may have overratedthe
nuclear controversyin the United States,the U.S. case is quite close to
thatof countrieswithoutleft-libertarian
parties.France remainsthemost
ambiguous case. Economic affluenceand thedevelopmentof the welfare
state favor the emergence of left-libertarianparties, and the nuclear
power controversymustbe placed somewherebetweenthe "strong"and
the "weak" antinuclear movements.Yet in France, as in the United
States,the relevantinstitutionaland conjuncturalpoliticalpreconditions
of left-libertarian
partyformationare clearlyabsent.France has a societal
potentialto generateleft-libertarian
parties,but it also has an unfavorable
concretepoliticalopportunitystructure.
In view of the causal patternsthat underlie the formationof leftlibertarianpartiesin each of the eighteendemocracies,France should be
reclassifiedas a countrywithoutsignificantleft-libertarian
parties.Conand
which
were
versely,Sweden
Switzerland,
originallyintroducedas
"borderline"cases along with France, clearlyshow the same causal patternencounteredin countrieswithleft-libertarian
parties;theyshould be
classifiedaccordingly.
Overall, the model's link between macro-societaland political variables makes theoreticalsense.24Societal changes drive the transformation
of citizens'wants,but theselead to theemergenceof politicalpartiesonly
ifpoliticalopportunitiesand constraintsmake it rationalforactorsto step
outside theestablishedchannelsof politicalcommunication,and ifpolarizing conflictsof high symbolicimportancecreate the initial conditions
thatestablisha consensusamong actorsabout the natureand outlook of
the new left-libertarian
parties.
If we are looking fortheoreticalparsimonyof the explanatorymodel
only,the least ambiguous predictorof left-libertarian
partiesin the sample of the eighteendemocraciesis the level of strikeactivity.(This variable-improperly predictsonly a single case: Japan.)Theoretical parsi24For the generalstudyof collectivesocial mobilization,an approach thatcombinessocial
transformation,
politicalopportunity
and precipitating
structures,
conditionswas outlinedby
Neil Smelser,The Theoryof CollectiveBehavior(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, i963). To explain
partyformation,Smelser'sframeworkhas been elaboratedby Pinard (fn. i9); Charles Hauss
and David Rayside,"The Developmentof New Parties,"in Louis Maisel and JosephCooper,
eds.,PoliticalParties:Development
and Decay (BeverlyHills, CA: Sage); and Frank L. Wilson,
"Sources of PartyTransformation:The Case of France," in Peter Merkl,ed., Western
European PartySystems(New York: Free Press,i980).

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224

WORLD POLITICS

mony,however,would be boughtat thecostof ignoringthecomplexweb


of interactingconditionsthatcumulativelymake the emergenceof leftlibertarianpartiesmore likely.Strikeactivityis onlyone indicatorin the
syndromethat includes economic development,social policy, corporatism,and left-party
governmentsand is responsiblefor the rise of leftlibertarianparties.
Conversely,one could argue thatthe analysisof politicalopportunity
structuresdeveloped above is too narrowbecause it focusesalmostexclusivelyon thepoliticalorganizationof class cleavage in advanced capitalist
democracies.While a numberof variablescommonlyemployedto characterize modern partysystemsdo not shed new lighton the rise of leftthereis some evidence thatelectoralrules influence
libertarianparties,25
thenumberand formationofnew parties.26
Indeed, none of thefivecountrieswith pluralityvotingsystems(Australia,Canada, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) has a relevantleft-libertarian
party.On the otherhand, countrieswithqualifiedproportionalelectoral
rules in which politicalforcesmust join alliances to overcomeminimum
thresholdsof parliamentaryrepresentation(e.g., 4 or 5 percent of the
vote) do in manycases have relevantleft-libertarian
parties.
All of our cases with pluralityvoting systems,however,are heavily
"overdetermined"by one or several of the structuraland institutional
variables (affluence,the welfarestate,labor corporatism,and leftparty
governments).There is no "hard" test for the significanceof electoral
in whichelectoralrulesare unfavorableto new
laws (e.g., a configuration
parties),but most othervariablessuggestthe rise of left-libertarian
parties.We find,however,thatin countrieswithmajorityrule,such as Britchalain, Canada, New Zealand, and even theUnited States,third-party
issues and cleavages do occur
lenges around other than left-libertarian
and sometimesgain electoralsupportfarstrongerthan that receivedby
left-libertarian
parties in countrieswith the most favorable structural
conditions.This observationsuggeststhatelectorallaws do not have the
overridingimportancethat some studies of partysystemsattributeto
them. Even where a majorityvotingsystempreventsa new partyfrom
winningany seats,rationalvotersmaysupportit because theybelieve the
25The fractionalization
and thenumberof cleavagesincorporatedin partysystems,forinstance,show littleassociationwiththeriseofleft-libertarian
parties.These commonmeasures
ofpartysystemsapparentlydo notcapturerelevantpoliticalopportunity
structures
to explain
cohortof parties.
thenew left-libertarian
26 Cf. Arend Lijphart,Democracies:Patterns
ofMajoritarianand ConsensusGovernment
in
Countries(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress,i984), chap. 9; RobertHarmel and
Twenty-One
JohnD. Robertson,"Formationand SuccessofNew Parties:A Cross-NationalAnalysis,"International
PoliticalScienceReview6 (No. 4, i985), 501-23.

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225

LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

new partyhas long-termprospectsof displacing one of the established


partiesor can at least forcethemto listento new politicaldemands.
VII.

BREAKDOWN

THEORIES

AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

We are now in a positionto examine the competingbreakdown theories of partyformation.According to functionalistbreakdown theories,
collectivemobilization is rooted in conjuncturaldiscrepanciesbetween
the prevailingexpectationsin a societyand its capacityto attain them.
Collective protestwill subside when thisgap closes. Marxistbreakdown
theoriesare less optimisticabout the restorationof an equilibrium betweenexpectationsand societalperformance.For our purposes,however,
functionalistand Marxist breakdown theorieshave the same empirical
partieswhen relacontent:theypredictthe formationof left-libertarian
tivedeprivationis rising.Furthermore,the new partiesmay be expected
to decrease when societiesimprovetheirperformanceand attainthe values thatlegitimizethe existingsocial order.
Breakdown models of partyformationbuild on economic variables;
politicaland culturalconditionsalso play a role. Boy,BiIrklin,and Alber
have interpretedthe rise of ecologypartiesas a crisisresponseof the edof tightlabor marketsand
ucated youngergenerationto the frustrations
the fierce competitionfor scarce positions in the political elite.27 The
promiseof rapid upward social mobilitythataccompanied the widening
of educational opportunitiesforthe young was broken by the economic
crisesof the 1970s and i980s and the demands of labor markets.Breakdown theoristsinterpretthe supportof the educated young forecology
parties and their postmaterialistantigrowthprogram as sour-grapes
logic: because societydoes not provide the meansforrapid upward mobility,the young armyof the overeducatedand under employedalso rejects the endsof social successthatare associatedwith thissociety:affluence, power, and social status,as well as the systemof economic growth
and bureaucraticpoliticsthatsupportsthesevalues. The young counterelites thus propose an alternativemodel of societalorganizationand use
partiesto realize it.
left-libertarian
See Boy (fn.4), 4I4-15; Wilhelm P. BUrklin,"Value Change and PartisanRealignment
in West Germany1970-i983: RecentFindingsand some PoliticalInterpretations,"
paper prepared fordeliveryat the American Political Science AssociationConvention,Washington,
DC, August 30 to September2, i984; BiIrklin(fn. 4); JensAlber, "Modernisierung,neue
Spannungslinienund die politischenChancen der Grinen" [Modernization,new cleavages,
and the politicalchancesof the Greens],PolitischeVierteljahresschriften
26 (No. 3, i985), 2I 26.

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226

WORLD POLITICS

Empirically,economic and political breakdown theoristsexpect that


improvingchances of upward mobility-or a resumptionof economic
growth and a readjustmentof expectationswill erode the left-libertarian electorate.Alber,forinstance,predictsthattheWest German Greens
will falterwhen the "intellectualproletariat"disappears with economic
recoveryand greaterrealismamong youngacademics.28
Some authors link cultural conditionsto the economic and political
Frustratedexpectationscoinbreakdown theoriesof partyformation.29
cide with the coming-of-ageof a thirdpoliticalgenerationof West Germans that does not share the political commitmentsof the "founding"
generationof the Republic or of its conformistoffspring,
and thatidentifiesonly weakly with the establishedparties.This generationalchange
feedsinto thegeneraldisillusionmentwiththeperformanceof industrial
societiesand triggersa shiftof values toward a romanticanti-industrial
"idealism." The Greens representsuch a convergenceof generational
change and political-economicdecline.
Other culturalbreakdown argumentshave gained popularityamong
American intellectualswho see the Greens and the peace movementas
the natural consequence of persistingpredemocratic,authoritarian,romantic,and nationalisttraditionsin German societythatrejectindustrial
Economic critechnology,liberalism,and competitivepoliticalsystems.30
sis and declining U.S. world leadership are seen to have brought this
long-standingcurrentto the surfaceagain.
Breakdown theoriesof left-libertarian
party formationmust face a
number of criticisms.They draw questionableinferencesabout individual motivationsand values froman insufficient
basis of empirical evidence. Moreover,theyfailto considerthe breadthof supportforleft-lib28 See Alber,ibid. To be fair,BUrklincombinesbreakdowntheoryand structural
change
and is more inclinedto believethatthe West GermanGreensare hereto stay.It is not clear,
however,whetherbreakdown and structuralchange argumentsare compatiblewith each
otherin BUrklin'swork.See WilhlemP. BUrklin,"The GermanGreens: The Post-Industrial
Non-Establishedand thePartySystem,"International
PoliticalScienceReview6 (No. 4, i985),
463-8I.
See Wilhelm P. Burklin,GrfinePoliti. IdeologischeZyklen,Wdhlerund Parteiensystem
[Greenpolitics:Ideologicalcycles,voters,and partysystem](Opladen: WestdeutscherVerlag,
29

I984).

3" This view is popular in liberaland conservative


editorialopinion,as well as in the work
of some recognizedhistorians.See Gordon Craig,The Germans(New York: Meridian,i982),
210-li,
and WalterLaqueur, GermanyToday:A PersonalReport(Boston:Little,Brown,i985),
162-74. For a critiqueof the West German peace movement,see especiallyRussel Berman,
"Opposition to Rearmamentand West German Culture," Telos (No. 56, i983), 141-47. A
morebalanced assessmentof thepeace movementand nationalismin German politicsis proin West Germany,"New GermanCrivided byAndreiS. Markovits,"On Anti-Americanism
tique(No. 34, i985), 3-27-

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

227

comparativeframeworkto test
ertarianparties,and theylack a systematic
theirarguments.
Breakdown theoriesrelyon the same demographicdata about voters
and sympathizersof left-libertarian
partiesas structuralchange theories,
but theyattributea sour-grapeslogic to theyoungand educated who are
stillin the earlystagesof theirprofessionalcareersor who are stillin the
educational system.In theabsence of empiricalevidence,thesedata waras well. For instance,young peorantothermotivationalinterpretations
and thereple may rejectthe presenteconomic and politicalinstitutions,
forechoose educationaltracksthatrarelylead to high-statusprofessional
careers,but possiblyto personalgrowthand a conviviallifestyle.The sovoters as such do not reveal
cial-structureattributesof left-libertarian
is correct.The
which of these competingmotivationalinterpretations
psychologicalassumptionsof breakdowntheoriesthusreston shakyempiricalground.
There are empiricaldata to refuteone specificvariantof the cultural
breakdown theory the characterizationof the West German Greens as
successorsto earlierpredemocratictraditions.Accordingto surveystaken
social movementsstronglyapin the I970s, supportersof left-libertarian
prove of democraticinstitutionsand procedures,but criticizethe unresponsivenessof theexistingpoliticalelitesto thenew issues.3'Also, Green
sympathizerswere foundto expressa radical-democraticand not an antiThe approvalof democraticinstitutions
democraticor nationalistspirit.32
coincides with rejectionof the existingpoliticalelites.33National identificationis lower among Green supportersthanamong anyothergroup in
the German population.
Breakdown theoristsalso encounterproblems with the quantitative
calibrationof theirarguments.The individualsto whom breakdown theoristsattributea sour-grapeslogic representonlya small segmentof leftlibertariansympathizers.Again, data on themostcloselyresearchedcase,
thatof theWest German Greens,are instructive.In thefirsthalfof i984,
surveysfound that I3 percentof the unemployedsupportedthe Greens.
Among unemployedacademics,no less than 4I percentsaid theywould
These figuresmustbe put into
vote forthe Greens in a generalelection.34
3 See Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds., PoliticalAction:Mass Participation
in Five
Western
Democracies(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, 1979).
BUrklin(fn.4), p. 206.
33BUrklin (fn.29), p. I99.
34Ursula Feist,Dieter Frdhlich,and Hubert Krieger,"Die politischenEinstellungenvon
Arbeitslosen"[The politicalattitudesof the unemployed],Aus Politikund Zeitgeschichte
34
(No. 45, I984), 3-17I
32

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WORLD POLITICS

228

perspective,however. Aftera short-timehigh in i984, support for the


Greens among the unemployedfellback to a level thatdifferslittlefrom
supportin the overall population.In early i985, only about 8 percentof
2.5 million unemployed,or 0.2 million voters,supported the Greens.35
That is less than io percentof the2.I millionGreen votescast in the i983
federal election. The subgroup of unemployed academics amounts to
fewerthan5 percentof theGreen voters.Moreover,itis inconsistentwith
breakdown theoriesthat the Greens enjoy considerablesupportamong
educated membersof the middle class who are in theirthirties,work in
occupationswith relativelyhigh prestige,and display a fairlyhigh level
of economic "saturation."

Like economic and culturalbreakdown theories,politicalbreakdown


argumentslack empiricalsupport.There is no evidencethatsignalsa relative or an absolute decline in the circulationof the West German political elite during the I970S and ig80s.36To the contrary,elite circulation
has probablybeen higherin recentdecades than in the 1950S and i960s
because the generationof politicalleaders who had remained in power
since the immediatepost-WorldWar II yearsfinallyhad to step aside. It
may be truethatmoreyounguniversitygraduatesavoid the "sweatshop"
of parties,bureaucracies,and corporationsto make a professionalcareer,
but thistrendwould say moreabout changingpreferencesthanabout reduced opportunitiesto risein the ranksof politicaland economic elites.
The greatestweakness of all breakdown theoriesis theirlack of comparative analysis and empirical confirmation.If the peculiar predemocraticGerman politicaltraditionis essentialto theriseof theleft-libertarian Greens and the peace movement,why is it thatcountrieswith more
fortunatedemocratic historieshave developed similar movementsand
parties?And is it truethatcountrieswitha poor recordof economic performancein the I970S were more likelyto spawn left-libertarian
parties
than countrieswith a betterrecord?
If breakdown theorieswere correct,we could expect left-libertarian
partiesin countrieswith above-averageratesof inflationand high levels
of unemployment.An even bettermeasure of relativedeprivationand
breakdown is the rate of changein economic performancewithincountriesover time.Those countriesthathave experiencedthe most precipitous economic decline in the I970S should also be the ones most likelyto
abund politischeStabjltidt:Reaktionsformen
35Hubert Krieger,"Arbeitsmarktsituation
1975-1985"
hangig Beschdftigter
auf die Arbeitsmarktentwicklung
[Labor marketsituation
and politicalstability:Patternsof reactionamong employeesto labor marketdevelopments],
Aus PolitikundZeitgeschichte
36 (No. 17, i986), 3-15.
as a cause ofleft-libertarian
36 Barklin (fns.27 and 29) emphasizesdecliningelitecirculation
partysupport.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

229

develop strongleft-libertarian
parties.In Table i i, thedecline of average
economic growthratesand the increaseof average unemploymentrates
fromtheperiod I 967- I 973 to theperiod I 974- I 980 measuresthe intensity
of relativedeprivationwithinthe countries.
Columns i and 2 providethemean values forthe foureconomic "miseryindices" in the eighteendemocracieswithor withoutsignificantleftlibertarianparties.They do not reveal any positiveassociationbetween
of repropartyformationand economic misery.In fact,the coefficients
and significancelevels of the associaducibility,correlationcoefficients,
tionsin a LOGIT least squares regressionshow that,ifthereare any statistical relationships,theyare the reverseof those predictedby breakdown
left-libertarian
theories:countrieswithsignificant
partieshave lower levels of unemploymentand consumerprice increasesthan countrieswithout theseparties.A similar,thoughweaker and statistically
insignificant
associationapplies to the two othermeasuresof economic change.
Only one socioeconomicindicatortendsto supportthebreakdowntheory. In countrieswith rapidlygrowingstudentpopulations,the income
advantagesand the job securityof people witha highereducation diminish.37Due to the deteriorationof theirmarketposition,young academics
in thesecountriesmay constitutea large pool of frustrated
and politically
restlesspeople willingto supportnew politicalparties.And that,indeed,
is quite stronglyassociatedwiththepresenceofsignificant
left-libertarian
of reproducibility,
LOGIT analysis,and correlation
parties,as coefficients
reveal (see Table I2).
coefficients
Even thisfindingmustbe interpretedcautiously.We mustpresuppose
the validityof the sour-grapeslogic in order to count the impactof educationalopportunitieson left-libertarian
partiesas supportforthe breakdown theories.Moreover, only a limited percentageof left-libertarian
of a contemporaryunivervotersis exposed to the potentialfrustrations
sityeducation.Comparativeinformationis missing,but the point can be
illustratedwith West German data. Surveysshow that postmaterialist
value inclinationsare a strongerpredictorof the Green vote than educaIn one representative
tional accomplishment.38
sample,only 22.4 percent
of Green sympathizersin theearly i980s were under thirtyyearsold and
held a secondary-schooldiploma thatenabled themto attenduniversity.39
On the whole, the evidence supportingbreakdown theoriesis thus
very limited and not empiricallysolid. There can be littledoubt that
37See ArnoldJ.Heidenheimer,Hugh Heclo, and CarolynTeich-Adams,Comparative
Public Policy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin'sPress,i983), 49-5I.
38 Barklin (fn.27), Tables 7 and 8.
39Ibid.

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TABLE
INDICATORS

OF ECONOMIC

MISERY

II
AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

Left- CR
Left- No Significant
Significant
tion
Libertarian
Libertarian
dic
PartiesExist
PartiesExist
Averagelevelofun(1974-1980)a
employment
of
Averageincrease
theconsumer
price

index(1973-1980)b

Declinein realpercapita
GDP growth
(average1974-80vs.1967-73)c
Riseofunemployment
aspercent
oflabor
force(1974-1980)d
*

3.2%

5.0%

8.0%

12.6%

-2.0%

-2.4%

2.3%

1.5%

France = o

Sources:aOECD, Historical
Statistics,
1g60-80(Paris:OECD,
bIbid.,Table 2-I3.
cIbid., Table 3-2.
d Ibid., Table 2-I4.

i982),

Table2-I4.

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES

231

TABLE I2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN

PARTIES AND THE INCREASE IN THE

STUDENT POPULATION

(Student increase per

ioo,oooinhabitants, I975-I980)

IncreaseGreaterThan
210 Students

Significant

Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average 298.1%)

No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist

(542)
(380)
FRG (324)

(277)

S
CH

(477)
(306)

NL

IncreaseSmaller Than
210 Students
DK
F

(-105)
(42)

(440)

(214)
AUS (218)

CND
F1
IRE
J

(Average 150.6%)

NZ
UK
US

(79)
(108)
(179)
(53)

(201)
(172)
(181)

(Overall Average 196.5)


Source: UNESCO, StatisticalDigest 1984 (Paris: UNESCO, i984)

STATISTICAL

INTERPRETATION

France = i

France = o

CR
'

.78

.83

.44

.57

.09

.04

(LOGIT)

macrostructuraland resource-mobilizationapproaches provide much


firmerevidence to explain the riseof left-libertarian
parties.
CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

Left-libertarian
partiesare likelyto emerge in economicallyadvanced
and (usually) small corporatistwelfarestates.These countriesprovide a
structuraland institutionalsettingthatis conducive to a change in popular preferencetoward left-libertarianpolitics. Simultaneously,they
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232

WORLD POLITICS

severely restrictthe chances that new demands can be articulated


throughestablishedpartiesand interestgroups. Electoral laws, particumayaffectthechancesof leftlarlyqualifiedproportionalrepresentation,
libertarianpartyformation;but,by themselves,theyappear to be only a
secondaryfactor.Two precipitatingconditionsincrease the chances of
partyformation.First,extendedperiodsof leftpartyparleft-libertarian
votersthat
ticipationin governmentdispel hopes among left-libertarian
poredistributive
left
traditional
the
with
theirdemands are compatible
litical agenda. Second, the nuclear power controversiesof the I970s and
and the new
i980s aggravatethe tensionsbetweenthe old redistributive
disaffectionwith the
libertarianleftand accentuatethe left-libertarians'
traditionalparties.
Macrostructuraland resource-mobilizationapproaches thus offera
of the phenomenonof the left-liberrathersophisticatedinterpretation
parties
tarian party.They lead us to the conclusionthat left-libertarian
are more than short-term"flash"parties,and resultfroma complex interactionof institutionaland conjuncturalfactors.They do not represent
merelyanothercompetitorin electoralpolitics;rather,theyresultfrom
and attacka comprehensivenetworkof interestintermediationbetween
stateand civil societyof which partiesare onlyone element.
Breakdown theories,on the other hand, predict the demise of leftlibertarianpartieswhen temporarysocietal strainsdisappear. Is it warranted, then, to inferfrommacrostructuraland resource-mobilization
partiesare about to establishthemselvespertheoriesthatleft-libertarian
manentlyin advanced welfarestatedemocracies? Even if we reject the
breakdown argument,the competingeconomic and politicalinterpretaphenomenonadds some caveats about the fution of the left-libertarian
of politicalparties
tureof thenew partycohort.Explainingtheemergence
is one thing; explaining their long-termpersistenceis another. Even
issuesapparentlyconstitutea new cleavagedimenthoughleft-libertarian
sion in modern politics,thiscleavage will not necessarilyspawn permanentindependentpoliticalparties.
electoral
The structuraland politicalchangeson which left-libertarian
supportis based are farfrombeing permanentand irreversible.The welfare state has recentlycome under attack in Europe; labor corporatism
has noticeablydeclinedin the i980s; and a reneweddisciplineof themarketplace may challenge the foundationsof economic securityand afflupartiesrest.Under such circumstances,the
ence on which left-libertarian
dominant political agenda of Western democracies would most likely
issuesso prominent
shiftaway fromthe highlypublicized left-libertarian
in the I970S and i98os-ecology, energy,feminism,and nuclear arma-

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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES

233

ment-and reestablishan exclusive hegemonyof economic-distributive


struggles.
In a sense,left-libertarian
partiespursue a politicalagenda thatcould
erode the institutionalunderpinningson which theyhave thrived.They
fightagainst the bureaucraticwelfarestate,labor corporatism,and the
structuralrigiditiesof elite bargainingin "consensual" democracies.Althoughtheirvisionof social change differsradicallyfromthatof conservativefree-marketideologies,theirattackon the post-WorldWar II politicaland economicclass compromisecould unintentionally
play intothe
hands of conservativepolitical forces; if it undermines the organized
power of labor,it may recenterthepoliticalconflicton distributiveissues.
The outlook for left-libertarian
partiesalso depends on the strategic
moves of theircompetitors.Conservativepartieswould hardlybecome a
threatto the electoralsupportof leftlibertarianparties;but in a number
of countries,socialistand social democraticpartieshave been ousted from
governmentofficein the i980S. As oppositionparties,theyhave greater
incentivesand opportunitiesto blur the issues thatseparate theirworkconstituenciesand to present
ing-class supportersfromleft-libertarian
of left-libertarian
themselvesas politicallymore effectiverepresentatives
causes than the left-libertarian
partiesthemselves.Because theirsupporters show littlepartyloyalty,thissocial democraticstrategymay become a
serious threatfor left-libertarian
are eduparties.Most left-libertarians
cated, highlysophisticatedindividualswho are more likelyto vote strategicallythanon the basis of stablepartyidentifications.
Once back in power, however,leftpartiesthathave successfullyreinelectoratewill inevitablydisplay strainsand
tegratedthe left-libertarian
conflictsamong theirdifferentelectoralconstituencies.The West German Social Democrats,forinstance,absorbedleft-libertarian
sentiments
in the early I970s, but paid a high priceforthissuccessin termsof internal organizational disruption,factionalism,and endemic conflicts
which eventuallycontributedto theirelectoraldecline in the I980S.40 In
thissense,traditionalsocial democraticor socialistpartiesmay only temporarilyhalt the riseof left-libertarian
parties.
Finally, the futureof left-libertarian
partiesdoes not depend only on
conditionsand competitorsin theirenvironment,but also on theirown
strategiccapabilities.In thisrespect,left-libertarian
partiesfacea difficult
task. On the one hand, theymustpreservethe fluid,open organizational
formand the obstructionist
qualityof theirpoliticalstrategiesthatchal4 See Gerard Braunthal,The WestGermanSocialDemocrats, g69-g982: Profileofa Partyin
Power(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress,i982).

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234

WORLD POLITICS

lenge the highlyinstitutionalizedcorporatistwelfarestateand maintain


core constituencies.On the otherhand,
the loyaltyof the left-libertarian
left-libertarian
parties must become effectivepolitical players both in
termsof electoralappeal and of impacton public policy.In parliamentary
multipartysystems,thisusuallypresupposesa cohesive,disciplinedparty
organizationwitha consistent,moderatepoliticalstrategythatappeals to
marginalvoters.Left-libertarian
partiesmustresolvetheconflictbetween
a logic of representinga constituencythatis orientedtoward the visions
of thecore partymilitantsand activistsin left-libertarian
movementsand
a logic of partycompetitionthat upholds standardsof electoral success
in the pursuitof policygains.4'
and externalstrategiceffectiveness
4 For a close analysisof the internaldynamicof left-libertarian
parties,see HerbertKitschelt,"Logics of PartyFormation.Structureand Strategyof the Belgian and West German
i988).
Ecology Parties"(mimeo),Duke University,i986 (forthcoming,

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