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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES:
ExplainingInnovation
in Competitive
PartySystems
By HERBERT P. KITSCHELT*
IN
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
195
THEORETICAL
MODELS
OF POLITICAL
MOBILIZATION
OF PARTY SYSTEMS
The mobilizationof new politicaldemands, whetherby social movements,interestgroups,or politicalparties,has been explained by means
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196
WORLD POLITICS
of threedifferenttheoreticalmodels: breakdown,structuralchange,and
resourcemobilization.3Advocates of the breakdown model see political
mobilization as a response to societal strainsand relative deprivation.
Crises occur when societiesgeneratepopularloyaltybased on institutionalized norms and values, but fail to attaintheirown standardsof institutional stabilityand legitimation.For instance,modern welfare states
promiseeconomic securityand opportunityforupward mobilitythrough
enhanced education and training.In the view of many of theircitizens,
however particularlythe youngergeneration the economic crises of
the 1970s and i980s have shatteredthesehopes. The experienceof a widening gap betweenexpectedand realized benefitstriggerscollectiveprotestwhen the existingsocial order is held to be responsibleforthis discrepancy.
Proponentsof structuralchange models argue that societiesare well
able to meet the demands and aspirationson which theirlegitimacyis
based. But, because the societiesare involved in continuouschange and
thisvery"success" may generatenew preferenceswhich
transformation,
cannot be satisfiedby the existinginstitutionsand thus become new
Societal transformation
provokescollectivemosourcesof dissatisfaction.
bilization around new issues and new lines of conflict.Breakdown
to Marxistand functionalisttheories,which
models bear a close affinity
predictcollectivemobilization when capitalistsocietiesexperienceeconomic crisis;structuralchange models are closerto Weber's and Schumdemocracywill be
peter'sview thatcapitalismand liberalrepresentative
victimsof theirown success.
Adherents of resource mobilization theories maintain that neither
crises nor structuralchange by themselvesexplain the organization of
new collectivepoliticaldemands. Grievancesand institutionalchange are
endemicin mostsocieties,but theyrarelytranslateintocollectivepolitical
action. Instead, the actors' skills and resourcesand the broader institutional opportunitystructuresdeterminewhen individualsare able to engage in collectivemobilization.In particular,the choice of a specificye3Among a growingbody of literatureon social movementsand politicalprotest,see Gary
T. Marx and JamesL. Wood, "Strandsof Theoryand Researchin CollectiveBehavior,"Annual ReviewofSociologyI 0975),363-428; JohnD. McCarthyand MayerN. Zald, "Resource
JournalofSociology82 (No.
Mobilizationand Social Movements:A PartialTheory,"American
6, I977), I2I2-4I;
CharlesTilly,FromMobilizationtoRevolution(Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall,I978); Craig J.Jenkins,"SociopoliticalMovements,"in Samuel I. Long, ed.,HandbookofPoliticalBehaviorVol. IV (New York: PlenumPress,i98i); Alain Touraine,The Voice
and theEye (New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,i982); Claus Offe,"New Social MovePolitics,"Social Research52 (No. 4, i985),
ments:Challengingthe Boundariesof Institutional
817-68.A fourththeoreticalmodel standsin theWeberiansociologicaltraditionand emphasizes the changeof world views and definitions
of collectiveidentities.I incorporatethisperstructuraltheoryof movementsand partyformation.
spectivein a broadlyinterpreted
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
197
THE CASES
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WORLD POLITICS
198
ofelectoralsupport.There
tions,butalso similarsocioeconomic
profiles
electorates
thatcoversall counis no systematic
studyofleft-libertarian
trieswithsignificant
parties,butexistingsurveysshowthatall of these
draw votersfromtheranksof theyounger,
partiesoverproportionally
middleclass;theyareemployedin humanservices(teachwell-educated
ing,healthcare,social work),have left-of-center
politicalconvictions,
withenvironmensubscribe
to "postmaterialist"
values,and sympathize
and peacemovements.4
tal,feminist,
in advanced
Left-libertarian
partiescan obviouslymake a difference
industrial
democracies
onlyiftheyreceivea minimumlevelofelectoral
haveelectorally
left-libertarsupport.Whydo somecountries
significant
tochoosea singleand universally
ianparties,
butothersnot?It is difficult
fordistinguishing
applicablemeasureofelectoralsupportas thecriterion
"significant"
from"insignificant"
left-libertarian
parties.Sincetheseparovera
tiesvaryin age, one cannotaveragetheirelectoralperformance
betweenpartyblocsin a
longperiodof time,and sincethecompetition
numberof Europeancountriesis veryclose and oftendeterminedby
thecriterion
ofsignificance
should
marginalchangesinelectoralsupport,
notbe too stringent.
In someinstances,
a shareof 2 or 3 percentof the
theformation
votemayplacea left-libertarian
partyina positiontoaffect
ofgovernmental
majorities.
if theyhave reI have classifiedleft-libertarian
partiesas significant
ceivedabout4 percentor moreofthevotein a nationalparliamentary
or
at
in
the
election
least
once
i980s.
Alliances
presidential
amongleft-libto counttowardthe4-percent
threshold.
ertarianpartiesare permitted
The dependentvariableis thusa dummywithtwo values indicating
has (= i) or doesnothave(= o) significant
whethera country
left-libertarianparties.
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
199
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TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
BEST PERFORMANCE
I. COUNTRIES
IN WESTERN
DEMOCRA
1980- I 986
A. "Clear" Cases
Austria (A)
Belgium (B)
Denmark (DK)
Netherlands (NL)
Norway (N)
West Germany (FRG)
Iceland
Luxemburg
The Greens
AGALEV/ECOLO
Socialist People's Party
Left Socialist Party
PPR/PSP/CPN (Green
ProgressiveAccord)
Socialist People's Party
The Greens
Women's Party
The Green Alternative
4.6%
6.2%
11.5%
2.7%
5.7%
(national
(national
(national
(national
(national
5.4%
5.6%
5.0%
5.2%
(national
(national
(national
(national
B. "Borderline" Cases
France (F)
Sweden (S)
Switzerland (CH)
3.9% (presiden
Ecologists
1.2% (parliame
Les Verts
Left Communist Party
5.4% (national
12.4% (national
Center Party
Greens
2.9% (national
ProgressiveOrganizations 2.7% (national
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(no cont
0.2% (nationa
1.1% (in distr
1983 nat
Greens
Comhaontas Glas/Greens
Radical Party
Various local Green lists
Green Party
Green Party
Citizens' Party
New World Alliance
C. No Parties Declared
Australia (AUS)
Greece
Portugal
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1.4% (nationa
(no cont
2.2% (nationa
(no cont
(declared
(declared
partic
tions)
0.1% (preside
(no cont
202
WORLI) POLITICS
left-libertarian
party(France = i) and withoutit (France = o). If France
is a truecase of left-libertarian
partyformation,variablesthatpredictthe
presenceof these partiesin the othercountriesshould do the same for
France. If,however,theadditionof theFrenchcase to thecountrieswith
left-libertarianparties weakens the correlationbetween various independentvariablesand left-libertarian
partyformation,France should be
excluded fromthisgroup.
In twelve otherWesterndemocracies,significantleft-libertarian
parties do not exist. Many of them have verysmall ecology or left-socialist
splinterparties(which are not necessarilylisted in the table); but these
partiesare electorallyinsignificant
bymycriteria.Closest to the threshold
of political significanceare Italy,where the Radical Party managed to
surpass3 percentin one nationalelectionduringthe 1970s, and Finland,
where a small ecologypartyis actuallyrepresentedin thenationalparliament.WhetherI have classifiedthesetwo cases correctlycan be validated
by checking if the absence of left-libertarian
partiesis explained by the
same factorsin thesecases as in the othercountrieswithoutsuch parties.
Nine of thetwelvecountrieswithoutsignificantleft-libertarian
parties
are included in the comparativeanalysis.Greece, Portugal, and Spain
were dropped because theirtransitionto democracyis too recent.An initial exploration,moreover,showed thattheyhave none of the attributes
thatfacilitatetheriseof left-libertarian
partiesin othercountries.Adding
thesecountrieswould thusconfirmmyanalysis.
The developmentof left-libertarian
partiescannot be reviewed individuallyand by countryin thispaper.6In general,New Left partiesare
theoldestsubgroup;theyhave attractedelectoralsupportin Scandinavia,
the Netherlands,and Switzerland.The newer left-libertarian
partiesappeared in the late I970s; theyare the ecologyor "green" partiesof Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland,and West Germany. Despite their
names, these parties are not narrow environmentalistpressuregroups,
but address the entirerange of left-libertarian
demands. In addition to
Case materialsfora comparativestudyof left-libertarian
partiesin general,and ecology
partiesin particular,can be foundin Jurgei1
Baumgarten,ed., Linkssozialhsten
in Europa: Alternative
zu Sozialdemokratie
und kommunistzschen
Parteien[Leftsocialistsin Europe: Alternativesto social democracyand communistpartiesi(Hamburg: Junius,1982); Frank DeRoose, "De Groene Golf: Over de nationalsdiversiteit
van een international
fenomeen"[The
Green wave: On the nationaldiversityof an international
phenomenonI,De GroeneSchrziften
7, pp. 33-6i; PatrickFlorizoone,De Groenen:Idee,bewegingen
enpartijen[The Greens: Ideas,
movements,and parties](Deurne: Kluver, 1985); Ferdinand Mtiller-Rommel,"'Parteien
neuen Typs' in Westeuropa:Eine vergleichendeAnalyse"I'Partiesofa new type'in Western
Europe: A comparativeanalysis],Zeitschriftfar
I3 (No. 3, 1982), 369-9o, and
Parlamentsfiragen
"New Social Movementsand Smaller Parties: A ComparativePerspective,"WestEuropean
Politics8 (No. i, I985), 41-54; WolfgangRildig,"The Greens in Europe. Ecological Parties
and the European Electionsof i984," Parliamentary
Affairs
38 (No. i, i985), 56-72.
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
203
ILL. METHODOLOGY
OF COMPARISON
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WORLD POLITICS
204
IV.
STRUCTURAL
CHANGE
AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
Most contemporarytheoriesof structuralchange adopt the Schumpeterianperspectivethat the success of capitalistinstitutionsand values
will ultimatelybringabout the demise of capitalism'sorganizationaland
moral foundations.7These theoriesidentifythe spread of markets and
bureaucraciesas thesourceofnew dissatisfaction.
They interpretthe programmatic concerns of left-libertarian
parties as a protestagainst the
emergingbureaucraticand meritocraticpostindustrialsociety.
Accordingto thesetheories,modernwelfarecapitalismwas made possible by an unprecedentedperiod of economicgrowth,affluence,and institutionalstability.The new social movementsand left-libertarian
parties are mobilizing against certain consequences of this process and
articulatingnew preferencesforsocial change. They respond to tendencies in postindustrialsocietiesthat(I) produce unacceptablerisksto human lifeand theenvironment,
(2) restraintheautonomyof theindividual
citizen,and (3) undercuta democraticgovernanceof social change. Although these societiespromotesophisticatededucation,theysimultaneously frustratedemands for more political participationand centralize
controlin hierarchiesof expertsand bureaucracies.They fosterindividualism and mobility,but denya more autonomousdefinitionof individual lifestylesand collectiveidentitiesat the local level. Theories of postindustrial society suggest that the growing tension between citizens'
demands forautonomyand participationon the one hand, and the increasinglycomprehensiveand complex hierarchiesof social controlon
the other,is what leads to the formationof left-libertarian
parties.
A simple way to explorethe link betweensocietaltransformation
and
is
to
left-libertarian
the
incomes
of
the Westparties
compare
per capita
ern democracies. The more affluentcountries should create stronger
preferencesand individualcapacitiesto pursue leftand libertariangoals.
At the same time,thesecountriestend to regulatesocial lifemore tightly
throughmarketexchangerelationsand organizationalhierarchies.Table
2 shows thatlevelsofeconomicaffluence
correctlypredictthepresenceor
absence of left-libertarian
partiesin sixteenout of eighteencases. The average income in countrieswith relevantleft-libertarian
partiesis noticeof reproducibility
is
ably higherthanin thosewithout,and thecoefficient
than
chance.
The
LOGIT
much higher
analysisshows thatthe association
7Macrostructuraltheoriesare especiallyinfluencedby the work of JiirgenHabermas,LegitimationCrisis(Boston: Beacon Press,I975), and Habermas, Communication
and theEvolutionof Society(Boston: Beacon Press, I979); Alain Touraine, The Self-Production
of Society
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, I977); and Claus Offe,Contradictions
of the Welfare
State(Cambridge: MIT Press,i984).
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
205
TABLE 2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
(i98o)
Income Greaterthan
$11,000per Capita
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= $13,001)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
IncomeSmallerthan
$11,000per Capita
B
DK
F
FRG
N
NL
S
CH
(11,816)
(12,952)
(12,136)
(13,305)
(14,019)
(11,851)
(14,761)
(15,922)
(10,251)
Us
(11,364)
AUS
Fl
I
(10,129)
(10,440)
( 6,906)
(Average = $8,972)
IRE
NZ
UK
CND
( 5,193)
( 8,873)
( 7,441)
( 9,335)
(10,582)
STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION
Coefficient
of
Reproducibility
(CR)*
*CR=
FrancewithLeftLibertarianParty
(France = 1)
Francewithout
Left-Libertarian
Party
(France = 0)
.89
.83
.71
.04
.75
Level
Significance
(LOGIT Regression)
.055
N of mistakes
-N
of cases
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206
WORLD POLITICS
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FIGURE
BETWEEN
RELATIONSHIP
IN THE
AND THE
VOTE
GREEN
GERMAN
WEST
IN STATE
207
PARTIES
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
I
PER
INCOME
CAPITA
STATES
AND NATIONAL
(I980)
ELECTIONS
(I98I-I985)
11
mWB
10-
mBRE
*BRE
0
8-
/HAM
B-W
HES
*
>4
"HAM
mWB
z
7-
44
, B-W
/HES
6
0
m
jS-H
HES
mnNS
i)
>
HAM
mNS
*R pBAY*NR-W
~~~4
i-
W
o
mNR-W
SAAR
4-
adjusted r2 = 3445
t = 3.618
S-H
3
mSAAR
0
20.000
24.000
28.000
31.000
36.000
40.000
44.000
Deutschland(StuttderBundesrepublik
Jahrbuch
Source: StatistischesBundesamt,Statistisches
gart: Kohlhammer,I984).
Key: S-H = Schleswig-Holstein;SAAR = Saarland; NS = Niedersachsen(Lower Saxony); R-P = Rheinland-Pfalz(Rhineland-Palatinate)[same resultin two elections];
(Northrhine-Westfalia);
BAY = Bayern (Bavaria); NR-W = Nordrhein-Westfalen
HES = Hessen (Hesse); WB = West Berlin; BRE =
B-W = Baden-Wiurttemberg;
Bremen; HAM = Hamburg.
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208
WORLD POLITICS
TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
SERVICE
OF THE
SECTOR
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PattiesExist
(Average= 57.9%)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 57.1%)
Percentage
Greater
than57.5%
B
(62.3%)
DK
(63.3%)
NL
(62.1%)
N
(61.8%)
S
(62.2%)
AUS
CND
UK
US
(62.4%)
(66.0%)
(59.2%)
(65.9%)
i960-80(Paris:OECD,
Source:OECD, Historical
Statistics,
STATISTICAL
CR
p
(LOGIT)
F1
I
IRE
(54.0%)
(48.0%)
(48.4%)
(54.2%)
NZ
I982),
Table2.I
I,
(55.2%)
p. 35.
INTERPRETATION
France = i
Lower
Percentage
than57.5%
A
(51.5%)
CH (52.3%)
F
(55.3%)
FRG (49.2%)
France = o
.56
.o6
.6
.79 (n.s.)
.67 (n.s.)
.I
Inglehartand Dalton argue thatvalue change does not instantlytranslate into electoralrealignments."Still,thisdoes not explain why the apparent "lags" between value change and partyrealignmentsdifferfrom
countryto country.Theories of postmaterialism
eitherdo not use reliable
and valid measuresof value change or theyunderratethe importanceof
changing cognitive capabilities and of institutionalopportunitiesand
constraintsas determinantsof collectivepoliticalaction.
Thus, theoriesof postindustrialist
societyand value change at best account forchangingindividual orientations,preferences,and capabilities
to engage in collectiveprotest.But theydo not sufficiently
predict the
conditionsand opportunitiesunder which these values and preferences
lead to the formationof left-libertarian
parties.
II See Ronald Inglehart,"The ChangingStructure
of PoliticalCleavages in WesternSocieties,"in Dalton et al. (fn.2), 62, and RussellJ.Dalton, "Environmentalism
and Value Change
in WesternDemocracies,"paper preparedfordeliveryat the Annual Meetingof the American PoliticalScience Association,Washington,DC, August30-September2, i984.
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
V. POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES
THE DEVELOPMENT
209
OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
ON
PARTIES
WORLD POLITICS
210
i981),
39-4I-
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
211
TABLE 4
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
AND SOCIAL
SECURITY
EXPENDITURE
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 23.6%)
IRE (20.6%)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 14.9%)
Expenditure
Smallerthan19%
CH
(12.8%)
AUS (11.6%)
CND (14.8%)
Fl
(18.0%)
I
(16.3%)
J
( 9.8%)
NZ
UK
US
(14.1%)
(16.9%)
(12.2%)
(OverallAverage= 19.2%)
EleventhInternational
Source: InternationalLabor Office,The CostofSocial Security.
Inquiry
I978-80 (Geneva: ILO, i985).
STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION
France = i
France = o
CR
'
.89
.83
.72
.6i
.02
.03
(LOGIT)
tionof left-libertarian
demands,labor-interest
organizationsand government participationby the socialistsprovideconstraintsthatpreventthese
demands frombeing articulatedthroughestablishedpolitical channels.
Labor corporatismand leftpartygovernmentsincrease the rigidityand
unresponsivenessof political systemsto left-libertarian
policy demands,
and therebyspeed the formationof new parties.
In capitalistdemocracies,labor can gain power onlyifit is well organized. It must representa large share of a country'swage earners and it
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WORLD POLITICS
212
must centralizeorganizationaldecision making. This formof mobilization increaseslabor's capacityto engage in elite bargainingwith business
and politicalparties.'5Each participanthas theresourcesto do damage to
the others,but it also has capacities to enterinto and enforcecompromises.
Corporatistinterestintermediationconstrainsleft-libertarian
demands
in at least two ways. Because of the verycentralist,formalorganization
of the participantsin corporatistpolicy-makingarenas, it is comparativelymore difficultfornew, less well-organizedintereststo be heard in
the political system.In particular,existingpoliticalpartieswill discount
new demands ifno organizationis behindthem.Moreover,businessand
labor have a common interestas economic producersin preservingthe
logic of industrialgrowthand bureaucraticregulation preciselythe institutionsthat left-libertarianforces attack. When producer interests
can hope to disrupt this
dominate the political agenda, left-libertarians
policy-makingsystemonly by establishingnew vehiclesof interestrepresentation.
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
213
PARTIES
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
*
NL
B
S
DK FRG
Low Labor
Corporatism
F
CH
F1
AUS
CND
IRE
I
UK
US
Sources: The measure was developed by Schmitter(fn. i6), 294. Japanand Australiawere
added to Schmitter'ssample as cases of low labor corporatism,based on data reported in David Cameron, "Social Democracy,Corporatism,Labour Quiescence,
and the Representationof Economic Interestin Advanced CapitalistSociety,"in
Capitalism(London:
JohnH. Goldthorpe,ed., Orderand Conflictin Contemporary
OxfordUniversityPress,i984), I43-78, at i65.
CR = .82 (France = I)
CR = .88 (France = o)
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WORLD POLITICS
214
TABLE 6
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average = 85.1%)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average = 458.3%)
(71)
Loss Morethan
260 Daysper
Year
F
(278)
AUS
CND
F1
I
IRE
UK
US
(427)
(707)
(358)
(840)
(484)
(375)
(411)
STATISTICAL
INTERPRETATION
France = i
CR
r
p
(LOGIT)
.88
France = o
.94
-.77
-*78
.02
.05
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
215
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216
WORLD POLITICS
left-libertarians
may thereforebe temptedto abandon socialist parties.
Second, the longer socialistpartiesparticipatein government,the more
will be to defectfromthem.The performancereclikelyleft-libertarians
ord of socialistgovernmentsantagonizes left-libertarians
and dampens
hopes thatthe traditionalleftcan incorporatenew demands into its policies while simultaneouslycateringto its traditionalworking class constituency.Finally, where traditionalleftparties are weak and permanently confined to the opposition, voters have nothing to lose by
supportinga new left-libertarian
party.'9From these hypotheses,one
would expect a curvilinearassociationbetween socialistparticipationin
governmentand relevantleft-libertarian
parties,with high probabilities
both when socialistparticipationin governmentis high and when it is
negligible.
The level of electoralsupportfortraditionalleftpartiesis not a good
empiricalpredictorof left-libertarian
partiesbecause it does not fullyreflectthecompetitivepositionand influenceof thelefton theformationof
governmentsand public policymaking; socialistparticipationin government mattersmore. As Table 7 shows,governmentparticipationby the
leftbetween I970 and i980 is positivelyassociatedwith the formationof
significantleft-libertarian
is also supported
parties.2oThis interpretation
by the LOGIT analysisof the bivariateassociationand the correlationcoefficient.However, the relationshipbetween socialist participationin
governmentand the appearance of left-libertarian
parties is linear, not
curvilinear.With the exceptionof France, countrieswith weak socialist
partieshave not produced left-libertarian
parties.Even France may be a
electoralsupportdwindled with
misleadingcase because left-libertarian
the rise of the socialist-communist
alliance in the late I970S and early
i980s. Statistically,
theassociationbetweenleft-libertarian
partiesand socialistparticipationin governmentstrengthenswhen France is dropped
fromthe sample of countrieswith left-libertarian
parties.
The structureof partysystems,especiallythe internalcohesivenessof
rightand leftpartyblocs and theirabilityto controlthe stateexecutive,
"9 The argumentthatweak oppositionpartiesspawn new oppositionpartieswas developed
byMaurice Pinard,The Riseofa ThirdParty:A Studyin CrisisPolitics,enlargeded. (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's UniversityPress,I975).
Some mayargue thatthe periodfromI970 to i980 misspecifies
the leftgovernmentvariable forthosecountriesin whichleft-libertarian
partieswere formedmuch earlierthan the
late I970s-i.e., the Scandinaviancountriesand theNetherlands.The use of earliertime periodsforthesecountries,however,would notsubstantially
alterthe result.What is more importantis thatonlyin the laterI970s, aftera periodof organizationaland/orelectoralcrisis,
did the Scandinavianand Dutch New Left partiesbegin to adopt the entireleft-libertarian
agenda, includingecologicaldemands,and to abandon traditionalnotionsof socialism.The
electoralconstituency
ofScandinavianNew Leftpartiesunderwenta dramaticchangeduring
thisperiod.Compare Logue (fn.4).
20
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
TABLE
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
AND
PARTIES
217
7
SOCIALIST/COMMUNIST
MAJOR
PARTY
IN GOVERNMENT
PARTICIPATION
Participation
Morethan61
Months
A
(132)
B
(90)
CH (132)
FRG (132)
DK
(97)
N
(85)
S
(82)
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 89.1%)
Fl
UK
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average= 32.9%)
Participation
Lessthan61
Months
F
(0)
NL (52)
AUS (35)
CND (0)
I
(0)
IRE (51)
J
(0)
NZ (36)
US
(0)
(112)
(62)
Source: Keesing'sContemporary
I 970-1980.
Atrchives,
STATISTICAL
INTERPRETATION
France =
France
CR
.78
.59
.83
.74
.03
.03
'
(LOGIT)
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WORLD POLITICS
218
label. This rationale explains the cases of Austria, Belgium, and West
Germany.
In thesame way,we can interpretthefindingthatNew Leftor centerleftlibertarianpartiesemerged in partysystemscharacterizedby longtermrisingelectoralvolatility,while ecologypartiesproved successfulin
systemswith decliningvolatility(Table 8). It is truethatthe rise of leftlibertarianpartiesitselfaffectsthe regressionline of partysystemvolatility,but high volatilityusually indicatesthat many partieswin and lose
voters simultaneously.Such systemsoffera good opportunityfor the
early formationof left-libertarian
parties,a situation that prevails in
countrieswith unstablebourgeois partyblocs. When volatilitydeclines,
bourgeoispartyblocs are generallystableand make theformationof new
left-libertarian
partiesmore difficult.
Only Switzerland has generatedboth New Left and ecology parties
that have sustained electoral significance(in part because they have
Swiss cantons).The case of France is an intereststrongholdsin different
In
the New LeftParti Socialiste
outlier.
the
late
ing
I950S and i960s,
Unifie flourishedin an environmentof high electoralvolatility,but faltered as the French party system became intenselypolarized in the
forcestriedto make a new startwithecologyparI 970s.21 Left-libertarian
TABLE
ELECTORAL
VOLATILITY
AND 'NEW
8
LEFT'
OR 'ECOLOGICAL
LEFT-LIBERTARIANs
RisingVolatility
(1948-1977)
DecliningVolatility
(1948-1977)
Countrieswith
CH
Countries
with
Left-Socialist
DK
NL
N
S
CH
"Green"or
EcologyParties
or "New Left"
Parties
B
F
FRG
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
219
ties in the late I970s and early i980S, but made littleheadway in an environmentinhospitableto the formationof a left-libertarian
party(no labor corporatism,brieflefttenurein government).
The trade-offbetweenNew Left and ecologypartiessuggeststhatthe
two are politicalequivalentsand membersof the same familyof parties.
Where New Left partieshave won significantelectoralsupport,ecology
partieshave not been successfuleven when theyappealed to voterswho
were ideologicallymore moderate. Moreover,in the cases of Norway,
Sweden, and the Netherlands,these moderate libertariansare already
liberal partiesthatare complementaryto the New
served by center-left
Left. Conversely,most successfulecologypartieshave appeared in countrieswithoutsuccessfulNew Leftor centerleft-libertarian
parties.While
the New Left has embraced the "ecology" agenda, most ecology parties
have accepted the libertarianand anticapitalistspiritof the New Left.
To complete this analysis,we must consider a final catalystthat has
triggeredthe riseof contemporaryleft-libertarian
partiesand theconvergence of ecologism and the New Left: the nuclear power controversy.
Antinuclearactivistsfirstattemptedto work throughtheestablishedparties,but neitherconservativenor socialistpartieswere willing to represent and supportthem,particularlyin countrieswith high labor corporatism and left party governments.In these countries,a high level of
alienation from the established political institutionsencouraged leftlibertariansto resortto the mobilizationof antinuclearmovementsin order to advance theiragenda. Althoughthestruggleagainstnuclearpower
originatedin the pragmaticconcernsof scientistsand citizens for their
health and safety,nuclear power rapidlybecame a symbolforthe technocratic domination of societyby governmentagencies, private enterprise,and unionswho defendeconomicgrowthand bureaucraticwelfare
statesagainstthe left-libertarian
challenge.
The strengthor weakness of the nuclearcontroversy
is difficultto determinebecause cross-nationaldata on the mobilizationof opponentsto
nuclear power are confinedto inventoriesof case studies.22Ideally,opinion polls, the incidenceof mass demonstrationsagainstnuclear facilities,
and politicallymotivateddelays in the constructionand licensingof nuclear facilitieswould be valuable measuresof the strengthof antinuclear
movements.In practice,we must relyon informedjudgmentabout the
intensityof conflictsin each country(see Table 9).
See Anna Gyorgy,ed., No Nukes:Everyone'sGuideto NuclearPower (Boston: Southend
Press,I979), and Lutz Mez, ed.,Der Atomkonfiikt:
Atomindustrie,
Atompolitik
undAnti-Atombewegungim internationalen
Vergleich
[Nuclearconflict:Nuclear industry,
nuclearpolicy,and
the antinuclearmovementin international
comparison](Berlin:Olle & Wolter,I979).
22
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WORLD POLITICS
220
TABLE 9
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY
(1975-1980)
IntenseNuclear
Controversy
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
DK
NL
S
No IntenseNuclear
Controversy
B
F
N
CH
FRG
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
US
AUS
CND
F1
IRE
I
NZ
UK
CR
CR
=
=
.78 (France= I)
.83 (France= o)
parties,onlythe
Among the countrieswithoutrelevantleft-libertarian
United States sustained a fairly intense nuclear power controversy
throughoutthe early I970s, even thoughBritain,Canada, Finland, Italy,
and Japanalso developed extensivenuclearpower programs.From about
partieshave experiencedinI975 on, mostcountrieswith left-libertarian
and France are excontroversies.
Norway,
tensenuclear power
Belgium,
ceptions.Belgium was already faradvanced with its nuclear power program beforeantinuclearprotestsreached their peak in the mid-I970s.
Norway did not have any nuclear plantsand only brieflypondered constructionof such facilities.France is difficultto classify:an initiallyintense antinuclearmobilizationin the mid-1970striggeredthe participation of ecologistsin local and regionalelections.Afterthat,government
repression,the oppositional Socialist Party's attemptsto co-opt antinuclear activists,and the movement'scomplete lack of policy impact
quelled the mobilization of collectiveprotest.23 These factorsprobably
23The interactionbetweenstateand challenginganti-nuclearmovementsis analyzed in
comparativeperspectivein HerbertKitschelt,"PoliticalOpportunityStructuresand Political
Protest.Anti-NuclearMovementsin Four Democracies,"BritishJournalofPolitialSciencei 6
(No. i, i986), 57-85-
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
221
SOCIAL
STRUCTURE
AND POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES:
SYNTHESIS
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TABLE
SUMMARY
Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden
WestGermany
OF VARIABLES
Per CapitaGNP
High
Low
X
X
X
X
Austria
Belgium
Norway
Switzerland
X
X
X
France
UnitedStates
X
X
THAT INFLUENCE
X
X
X
X
Australia
Canada
Italy
New Zealand
X
X
X
X
OF LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
SocialSecurity Strike
Activity LeftPartiesin
Expenditure
1965-1981
Governmen
High
Low
High
Low
Low
High
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Finland
Ireland
Japan
UnitedKingdom
I0
THE PRESENCE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
X
X
X
X
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
223
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224
WORLD POLITICS
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225
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
BREAKDOWN
THEORIES
AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
We are now in a positionto examine the competingbreakdown theories of partyformation.According to functionalistbreakdown theories,
collectivemobilization is rooted in conjuncturaldiscrepanciesbetween
the prevailingexpectationsin a societyand its capacityto attain them.
Collective protestwill subside when thisgap closes. Marxistbreakdown
theoriesare less optimisticabout the restorationof an equilibrium betweenexpectationsand societalperformance.For our purposes,however,
functionalistand Marxist breakdown theorieshave the same empirical
partieswhen relacontent:theypredictthe formationof left-libertarian
tivedeprivationis rising.Furthermore,the new partiesmay be expected
to decrease when societiesimprovetheirperformanceand attainthe values thatlegitimizethe existingsocial order.
Breakdown models of partyformationbuild on economic variables;
politicaland culturalconditionsalso play a role. Boy,BiIrklin,and Alber
have interpretedthe rise of ecologypartiesas a crisisresponseof the edof tightlabor marketsand
ucated youngergenerationto the frustrations
the fierce competitionfor scarce positions in the political elite.27 The
promiseof rapid upward social mobilitythataccompanied the widening
of educational opportunitiesforthe young was broken by the economic
crisesof the 1970s and i980s and the demands of labor markets.Breakdown theoristsinterpretthe supportof the educated young forecology
parties and their postmaterialistantigrowthprogram as sour-grapes
logic: because societydoes not provide the meansforrapid upward mobility,the young armyof the overeducatedand under employedalso rejects the endsof social successthatare associatedwith thissociety:affluence, power, and social status,as well as the systemof economic growth
and bureaucraticpoliticsthatsupportsthesevalues. The young counterelites thus propose an alternativemodel of societalorganizationand use
partiesto realize it.
left-libertarian
See Boy (fn.4), 4I4-15; Wilhelm P. BUrklin,"Value Change and PartisanRealignment
in West Germany1970-i983: RecentFindingsand some PoliticalInterpretations,"
paper prepared fordeliveryat the American Political Science AssociationConvention,Washington,
DC, August 30 to September2, i984; BiIrklin(fn. 4); JensAlber, "Modernisierung,neue
Spannungslinienund die politischenChancen der Grinen" [Modernization,new cleavages,
and the politicalchancesof the Greens],PolitischeVierteljahresschriften
26 (No. 3, i985), 2I 26.
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226
WORLD POLITICS
I984).
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
227
comparativeframeworkto test
ertarianparties,and theylack a systematic
theirarguments.
Breakdown theoriesrelyon the same demographicdata about voters
and sympathizersof left-libertarian
partiesas structuralchange theories,
but theyattributea sour-grapeslogic to theyoungand educated who are
stillin the earlystagesof theirprofessionalcareersor who are stillin the
educational system.In theabsence of empiricalevidence,thesedata waras well. For instance,young peorantothermotivationalinterpretations
and thereple may rejectthe presenteconomic and politicalinstitutions,
forechoose educationaltracksthatrarelylead to high-statusprofessional
careers,but possiblyto personalgrowthand a conviviallifestyle.The sovoters as such do not reveal
cial-structureattributesof left-libertarian
is correct.The
which of these competingmotivationalinterpretations
psychologicalassumptionsof breakdowntheoriesthusreston shakyempiricalground.
There are empiricaldata to refuteone specificvariantof the cultural
breakdown theory the characterizationof the West German Greens as
successorsto earlierpredemocratictraditions.Accordingto surveystaken
social movementsstronglyapin the I970s, supportersof left-libertarian
prove of democraticinstitutionsand procedures,but criticizethe unresponsivenessof theexistingpoliticalelitesto thenew issues.3'Also, Green
sympathizerswere foundto expressa radical-democraticand not an antiThe approvalof democraticinstitutions
democraticor nationalistspirit.32
coincides with rejectionof the existingpoliticalelites.33National identificationis lower among Green supportersthanamong anyothergroup in
the German population.
Breakdown theoristsalso encounterproblems with the quantitative
calibrationof theirarguments.The individualsto whom breakdown theoristsattributea sour-grapeslogic representonlya small segmentof leftlibertariansympathizers.Again, data on themostcloselyresearchedcase,
thatof theWest German Greens,are instructive.In thefirsthalfof i984,
surveysfound that I3 percentof the unemployedsupportedthe Greens.
Among unemployedacademics,no less than 4I percentsaid theywould
These figuresmustbe put into
vote forthe Greens in a generalelection.34
3 See Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, eds., PoliticalAction:Mass Participation
in Five
Western
Democracies(BeverlyHills, CA: Sage, 1979).
BUrklin(fn.4), p. 206.
33BUrklin (fn.29), p. I99.
34Ursula Feist,Dieter Frdhlich,and Hubert Krieger,"Die politischenEinstellungenvon
Arbeitslosen"[The politicalattitudesof the unemployed],Aus Politikund Zeitgeschichte
34
(No. 45, I984), 3-17I
32
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WORLD POLITICS
228
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
229
develop strongleft-libertarian
parties.In Table i i, thedecline of average
economic growthratesand the increaseof average unemploymentrates
fromtheperiod I 967- I 973 to theperiod I 974- I 980 measuresthe intensity
of relativedeprivationwithinthe countries.
Columns i and 2 providethemean values forthe foureconomic "miseryindices" in the eighteendemocracieswithor withoutsignificantleftlibertarianparties.They do not reveal any positiveassociationbetween
of repropartyformationand economic misery.In fact,the coefficients
and significancelevels of the associaducibility,correlationcoefficients,
tionsin a LOGIT least squares regressionshow that,ifthereare any statistical relationships,theyare the reverseof those predictedby breakdown
left-libertarian
theories:countrieswithsignificant
partieshave lower levels of unemploymentand consumerprice increasesthan countrieswithout theseparties.A similar,thoughweaker and statistically
insignificant
associationapplies to the two othermeasuresof economic change.
Only one socioeconomicindicatortendsto supportthebreakdowntheory. In countrieswith rapidlygrowingstudentpopulations,the income
advantagesand the job securityof people witha highereducation diminish.37Due to the deteriorationof theirmarketposition,young academics
in thesecountriesmay constitutea large pool of frustrated
and politically
restlesspeople willingto supportnew politicalparties.And that,indeed,
is quite stronglyassociatedwiththepresenceofsignificant
left-libertarian
of reproducibility,
LOGIT analysis,and correlation
parties,as coefficients
reveal (see Table I2).
coefficients
Even thisfindingmustbe interpretedcautiously.We mustpresuppose
the validityof the sour-grapeslogic in order to count the impactof educationalopportunitieson left-libertarian
partiesas supportforthe breakdown theories.Moreover, only a limited percentageof left-libertarian
of a contemporaryunivervotersis exposed to the potentialfrustrations
sityeducation.Comparativeinformationis missing,but the point can be
illustratedwith West German data. Surveysshow that postmaterialist
value inclinationsare a strongerpredictorof the Green vote than educaIn one representative
tional accomplishment.38
sample,only 22.4 percent
of Green sympathizersin theearly i980s were under thirtyyearsold and
held a secondary-schooldiploma thatenabled themto attenduniversity.39
On the whole, the evidence supportingbreakdown theoriesis thus
very limited and not empiricallysolid. There can be littledoubt that
37See ArnoldJ.Heidenheimer,Hugh Heclo, and CarolynTeich-Adams,Comparative
Public Policy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin'sPress,i983), 49-5I.
38 Barklin (fn.27), Tables 7 and 8.
39Ibid.
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TABLE
INDICATORS
OF ECONOMIC
MISERY
II
AND LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
Left- CR
Left- No Significant
Significant
tion
Libertarian
Libertarian
dic
PartiesExist
PartiesExist
Averagelevelofun(1974-1980)a
employment
of
Averageincrease
theconsumer
price
index(1973-1980)b
Declinein realpercapita
GDP growth
(average1974-80vs.1967-73)c
Riseofunemployment
aspercent
oflabor
force(1974-1980)d
*
3.2%
5.0%
8.0%
12.6%
-2.0%
-2.4%
2.3%
1.5%
France = o
Sources:aOECD, Historical
Statistics,
1g60-80(Paris:OECD,
bIbid.,Table 2-I3.
cIbid., Table 3-2.
d Ibid., Table 2-I4.
i982),
Table2-I4.
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
PARTIES
231
TABLE I2
LEFT-LIBERTARIAN
STUDENT POPULATION
ioo,oooinhabitants, I975-I980)
IncreaseGreaterThan
210 Students
Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(Average 298.1%)
No Significant
Left-Libertarian
PartiesExist
(542)
(380)
FRG (324)
(277)
S
CH
(477)
(306)
NL
IncreaseSmaller Than
210 Students
DK
F
(-105)
(42)
(440)
(214)
AUS (218)
CND
F1
IRE
J
(Average 150.6%)
NZ
UK
US
(79)
(108)
(179)
(53)
(201)
(172)
(181)
STATISTICAL
INTERPRETATION
France = i
France = o
CR
'
.78
.83
.44
.57
.09
.04
(LOGIT)
Left-libertarian
partiesare likelyto emerge in economicallyadvanced
and (usually) small corporatistwelfarestates.These countriesprovide a
structuraland institutionalsettingthatis conducive to a change in popular preferencetoward left-libertarianpolitics. Simultaneously,they
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232
WORLD POLITICS
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LEFT-LIBERTARIAN PARTIES
233
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234
WORLD POLITICS
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