TRILLANES VS.

PIMENTEL
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts:
July 27, 2003- more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials.
Later that day, Former President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces
to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with
coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
June 30, 2007 - petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate
June 22, 2007 - petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or
opinions to the press or the media
(e) To be allowed to receive reporters and other members of the media
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of
the Senate and related activities
July 25, 2007 - the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs
(b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.
- September 18, 2007 - trial court just the same denied the motion, citing the
Jalosjos case
Trillanes petitioned for certiorari on the following grounds
- The jurisprudence cited by the honorable court is inapplicable
a. The accused in the Jalosjos case was already convicted. He was not,
therefore he still enjoys the presumption of innocence
b. Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. He was
charged with "coup d'etat," a political offense
c. Jalosjos attempted to flee. He did not.
- The recommendation to allow the petitioner to attend the senate sessions was

not overruled
- His election by the people as senator provides the proper justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate
- There are enough precedents to allow liberal treatment of detention prisoners
who are held without bail
a. Joseph Estrada
b. Nur Misuari
Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Trillanes are tenable
Ruling: No. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided bylaw. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. All prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their
profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE

Facts:
An information for murder was filed and raffled in the sala of Judge Infante. Said
information contained a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.
Based on the said information, without the accused filing a petition for bail and
without hearing, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to the accused
and another releasing the accused from custody.

Atty. Gacal, private prosecutor, upon learning the orders, made a very urgent motion
to cancel the bailbond and to enforce or re-issue a new warrant of arrest but the
same was denied by Judge Infante on the ground that it was a pro forma, without
conformity coming from the public prosecutor, and that he was not authorized to act
as such under Section of 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. He further directed that
the bail issue be held in abeyance awaiting the comment of the public prosecutor.
The public prosecutor, in his comment, stated that the bail and the releasing of the
accused was proper based on his recommendation and that such recommendation
was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to bail hearing.
Atty. Gacal then filed an administrative complaint against Judge Infante, that the
granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing
being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

Held:
Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines on the matter of
bail: (1) in case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable; and
(2) public prosecutors failure to oppose application for bail or to adduce evidence did
not dispense with hearing.
Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional
competence. His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of
the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by
incompetence and irresponsible conduct.
In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail
in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the
rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial
discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a
hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the

Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his
granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused.
Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not
a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.