Espinosa & Glindo vs Atty.

Omana
Principles
Civil Law - This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the
conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.
Administrative Law - The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership,3 which is exactly what Omana did in this case.
Administrative Law - In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a
number of cases where the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar
documents as the contract in this case, such as: notarizing a document
between the spouses which permitted the husband to take a concubine and
allowed the wife to live with another man, without opposition from each
other;5 ratifying a document entitled Legal Separation where the couple
agreed to be separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing
their rights and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and
renouncing any action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a
document authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine
years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have
against the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal
partnership dissolved.8
Legal Ethics - We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and
notarizing a void document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that
the Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public
policy. Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10
Facts
On November 17, 1997, Espinosa, a complainant, and his wife
Elena Marantal, sought Atty Omanas legal advice on whether they could
legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July
1983. Omana, the respondent, then prepared a document entitled Kasuduan
ng Paghihiwalay (Contract). In the contract, it was stipulated that Espinosa
and his wife would separate and could cohabit with whomever they desired.

The dissolution of the property regime and liquidation of properties were also
stipulated. The contract was signed by the respondent in her capacity as
notarial officer. However, his wife took custody of their children and took
most of the property acquired during their union.
Glindo, law graduate, a complainant, told Espinosa that the contract
was not valid. Then, Glindo and Espinosa hired services of a lawyer to file a
case against Atty. Omana.
In her defense, the respondent told that it was Espinosa who requested
the notarization of the contract. She said that the contract was illegal. The
respondent said that Espinosa returned on the next day while she was out of
the office and persuaded her part-time staff to notarize the contract. Later
on, the respondent retracted her testimony and said that it was her maid
who notarized the document.
IBP CBD found her guilty of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
According to IBP-CBD, the respondent has a propensity to resort to lies and
deceit. The respondent first said that it was her part time staff who notarized
the contract but later changed her statement by saying that it was the maid
who notarized it. IBP Board of Directors denied the respondents motion for
recommendation.
Issues
Whether or not Atty. Omana violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
in the notarization of Espinosa and Marantals Kasunduan ng Paghihiwalay.
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility.
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of Selanova vs. Judge Mendoza wherein
it was stated that some lawyers were sanctioned for notarizing documents
such as the contract in the case because they encourage families to
disintegrate. Also the extrajudicial dissolution of the Conjugal property
without judicial approval was void. Also, the respondent was responsible for
the notarization of the contract even if assuming that her office staff signed
it, it was still the responsibility of the respondent. Supreme Court agreed with
the recommendation of IBP-CBD.

Republic vs. Albios

Principles
Civil Law - Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and
46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
Civil Law - In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is
a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Civil Law - A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the

essential and formal requisites precribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid
Civil Law - Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The
State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or
no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all
the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer and Albios were married by Judge Ofelia
Calo of MTC, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed
a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage because they never
intended to enter into a married state or comply with any marriage
obligations; it was made in jest. RTC ordered the Assistant prosecutor to
determine if there was collusion. The Assistant prosecutor replied that she
could not make a determination for Fringer and Albios because Fringer and
Albios failed to appear during the scheduled investigation.
RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. It was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General as the petitioner. The appeal did not prosper. On September
29, 2011, CA affirmed the RTC ruling because the marriage was performed
for personal gain. Fringer wanted the $2000.00 dollar payment in exchange
of Albios US citizenship.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the question of law when
it held that the marriage is a marriage in jest because consent is present.
Ruling:
Court of Appeals erred. According to the Supreme Court, there is
consent to perform such act. The formal and essential requisites in their

marriage are present. The petition was granted, annulling and dismissing the
decisions of CA and RTC.
Sevilla vs Cardenas
Principles:
Civil Law - Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we
cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or
falsity of entries therein.

Administrative Law - As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are

public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.

Facts: In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that
on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed
upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latters father, retired Colonel
Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went
to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied
for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did
they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that
she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of

Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the
lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that
they failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
is registered, for the reason that the employee handling is
already retired. With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume
that the marriage license specified in the parties marriage contract was not
issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San
Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the
fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered. Simply
put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong
possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.

Issue: Whether or not there was a marriage license issued.

Ruling:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that

despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be
found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must

categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as

stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an

officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the

Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that
the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate
the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance

of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in
the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of
entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation,

an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.

Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony.Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed,
in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume
marriage.30

Ninal vs Bayadog
Fact:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first
wife Teodulfas death. Pepito and Norma got married without any marriage
license because they lived together for 5 years and thus exempt from
marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession
only occurs after the death of an ascendant) due to the second marriage,
filed a petition for declaration for nullity of marriage (a.k.a. declaration of
nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the
absence of a marriage license as a legal basis.
Issues:
The lower court dismissed the petition because:
(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a cause of action. Can
there be such a petition when the heirs parent is deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a proper party?

(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the
beginning) is a must but is a different matter. Void marriages cannot be
attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has
prescribed.
The lower court ruled:
(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their
fathers marriage before the latters death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding
were used as a basis to dismiss petitioners case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that:
(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code
and not the Family Code. (In determining the validity of marriage, it is to be
tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders
marriage void ab initio. The exemption for a marriage license, the
cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not the one
described by the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first
marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires five years. If the
respondent took into consideration the other years and months before the
second marriage, then the cohabitation would include the period of the first
marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not
count cohabitation.

This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken.
(4) The judges ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are
made identical is erroneous. Void and voidable marriages are not identical.
A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to
have taken place.
A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while a void marriage can never be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties
and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children
born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,
the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second

marriage before determining succession rights.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into
a second marriage.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such
as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that
may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such
final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Republic vs. Dayot

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the

National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.
Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months
before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential
fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also
ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.