Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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John L. Lewis was injured by a vehicle owned and operated by a federal reserve
bank, and brought action alleging jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
District Court dismissed the case by ruling that the federal reserve bank was not a
federal agency within meaning of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the court therefore
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Appeals court affirmed the decision.
The court stated Examining the organization and function of the Federal Reserve
Banks, and applying the relevant factors, we conclude that the Reserve Banks are
not federal instrumentalities for purpose of the FTCA, but are independent, privately
owned and locally controlled corporations.
However, this does not imply, as so many wrongly interpret, that private individuals
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own the banks for the court also stated Each Federal Reserve Bank is a separate
corporation owned by commercial banks in its region. The stockholding commercial
banks elect two thirds of each Banks nine member board of directors. The
remaining three directors are appointed by the Federal Reserve Board. The Federal
Reserve Board regulates the Reserve Banks, but direct supervision and control of
each Bank is exercised by its board of directors. 12 U.S.C. Sect. 301. The directors
enact by-laws regulating the manner of conducting general Bank business, 12 U.S.C.
Sect. 341, and appoint officers to implement and supervise daily Bank activities.
These activities include collecting and clearing checks, making advances to private
and commercial entities, holding reserves for member banks, discounting the notes
of member banks, and buying and selling securities on the open market. See 12
U.S.C. Sub-Sect. 341361.
Serving a federal purpose does not necessarily imply being a federal agency
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by
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
(All Rights Reserved)
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(3) the application of the maxim inclusion unius est exclusio alterius is obvious
here, namely, the omission
of territorial courts clearly shows that they were intended to be
omitted:
Not only did the promulgating order use the term District Courts
of the United States in its historic and proper sense, but the
omission of pr sions for the application of the rules to the
territorial courts and other courts mentioned in the
authorizing act clearly shows the limitation that was intended.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201] [emphasis added]
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Citizens
may resist unlawful arrest to the point of taking an arresting officers life if
necessary. Plummer v. State, 136 Ind. 306. This premise was upheld by the
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Supreme Court of the United States in the case: John Bad Elk v. U.S., 177 U.S. 529.
The Court stated: Where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which
naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very
different eyes upon the transaction, when the officer had the right to make the
arrest, from what it does if the officer had no right. What may be murder in the first
case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might
show that no offense had been committed. An arrest made with a defective
warrant, or one issued without affidavit, or one that fails to allege a crime is within
jurisdiction, and one who is being arrested, may resist arrest and break away. Lf the
arresting officer is killed by one who is so resisting, the killing will be no more than
an involuntary manslaughter. Housh v. People, 75 111. 491; reaffirmed and quoted
in State v. Leach, 7 Conn. 452; State v. Gleason, 32 Kan. 245; Ballard v. State, 43
Ohio 349; State v Rousseau, 241 P. 2d 447; State v. Spaulding, 34 Minn. 3621.
When a person, being without fault, is in a place where he has a right to be, is
violently assaulted, he may, without retreating, repel by force, and if, in the
reasonable exercise of his right of self defense, his assailant is killed, he is justified.
Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80; Miller v. State, 74 Ind. 1.
These principles apply as well to an officer attempting to make an arrest, who
abuses his authority and transcends the bounds thereof by the use of unnecessary
force and violence, as they do to a private individual who unlawfully uses such force
and violence. Jones v. State, 26 Tex. App. I; Beaverts v. State, 4 Tex. App. 1 75;
Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93, 903.
An illegal arrest is an assault and battery. The person so attempted to be restrained
of his liberty has the same right to use force in defending himself as he would in
repelling any other assault and battery. (State v. Robinson, 145 ME. 77, 72 ATL.
260).
Each person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest. In such a case, the person
attempting the arrest stands in the position of a wrongdoer and may be resisted by
the use of force, as in self- defense. (State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E. 2D
100).
One may come to the aid of another being unlawfully arrested, just as he may
where one is being assaulted, molested, raped or kidnapped. Thus it is not an
offense to liberate one from the unlawful custody of an officer, even though he may
have submitted to such custody, without resistance. (Adams v. State, 121 Ga. 16,
48 S.E. 910).
Story affirmed the right of self-defense by persons held illegally. In his own
writings, he had admitted that a situation could arise in which the checks-andbalances principle ceased to work and the various branches of government
concurred in a gross usurpation. There would be no usual remedy by changing the
law or passing an amendment to the Constitution, should the oppressed party be a
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minority. Story concluded, If there be any remedy at all ... it is a remedy never
provided for by human institutions. That was the ultimate right of all human beings
in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice.
(From Mutiny on the Amistad by Howard Jones, Oxford University Press, 1987, an
account of the reading of the decision in the case by Justice Joseph Story of the
Supreme Court.
As for grounds for arrest: The carrying of arms in a quiet, peaceable, and orderly
manner, concealed on or about the person, is not a breach of the peace. Nor does
such an act of itself, lead to a breach of the peace. (Whartons Criminal and Civil
Procedure, 12th Ed., Vol.2: Judy v. Lashley, 5 W. Va. 628, 41 S.E. 197)
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The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of
its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may
change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency,
and not with the agent; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state
government.
1794 US Supreme Court case Glass v. Sloop Betsey: ... Our government is founded upon
compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people 1829 US Supreme Court case Lansing v. Smith:
People of a state are entitled to all rights which formerly belong to the King, by his
prerogative.
US Supreme Court in 4 Wheat 402:
The United States, as a whole, emanates from the people... The people, in their capacity as
sovereigns, made and adopted the Constitution...
US Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1, 12 Led 581: ... The governments are but
trustees acting under derived authority and have no power to delegate what is not delegated to
them. But the people, as the original fountain might take away what they have delegated and
intrust to whom they please. ...The sovereignty in every state resides in the people of the state
and they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure. US Supreme
Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, page 370: While sovereign powers are delegated
to ... the government, sovereignty itself remains with the people.. Yick Wo is a powerful antidiscrimination case. You might get the impression that the legislature can write perfectly legal
laws, yet the laws cannot be enforced contrary to the intent of the people. Its as if servants do
not make rules for their masters. Its as if the Citizens who created government were their
masters. Its as if civil servants were to obey the higher authority. You are the higher authority
of Romans 13:1. You as ruler are not a terror to good works per Romans 13:3. Imagine that!
Isnt it a shame that your government was surrendered to those who are a terror to good works?
Isnt it a shame that you enlisted to obey them? US Supreme Court in Julliard v. Greenman, 110
US 421: There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the
United States .... In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no
power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld. US
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 US 653, 667 (1979): In common usage,
the term person does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily
construed to exclude it. US Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 S.Ct 742
(1941): Since in common usage the term `person does not include the sovereign, statutes
employing that term are ordinarily construed to exclude it. US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 67 Sct677 (1947): In common usage, the term
`person does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed
to do so. US Supreme Court in US v. Fox, 94 US 315:
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Since in common usage, the term `person does not include the sovereign, statutes
employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.
U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530: In common usage the word
`person does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed
to exclude the sovereign. Church of Scientology v. US Department of Justice, 612 F.2d 417
@425 (1979): the word `person in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which
normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings., see e.g. 1, U.S.C.
para 1. In the 1935 Supreme Court case of Perry v. US (294 US 330) the Supreme Court found
that: In United States, sovereignty resides in people... the Congress cannot invoke the sovereign
power of the People to override their will as thus declared.,
Income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Revenue Act, means gain...
And in such connection Gain means profit...proceeding from property, severed from capital,
however invested or employed, and coming in, received, or drawn by the taxpayer, for his
separate use, benefit and disposal... Income is not a wage or compensation for any type of
labor.
There is a clear distinction between `profit and `wages, or a compensation for labor.
Compensation for labor (wages) cannot be regarded as profit within the meaning of the law. The
word `profit, as ordinarily used, means the gain made upon any business or investment a
different thing altogether from the mere compensation for labor.
The Treasury cannot by interpretive regulations, make income of that which is not income
within the meaning of the revenue acts of Congress, nor can Congress, without apportionment,
tax as income that which is not income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.
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... The government can collect the tax from a district court suitor by exercising its power of
distraint... But we cannot believe that compelling resort to this extraordinary procedure is either
wise or in accord with congressional intent. Our system of taxation is based upon
<http://www.prostar.com/web/amerika/cfr601.htmVOLUNTARY ASSESSMENT AND PAYMENT ,
NOT UPON DISTRAINT
[Footnote 43]
If the government is forced to use these remedies(distraint) on a large scale, it will affect
adversely the taxpayers willingness to perform under our VOLUNTARY assessment system.
Evens v Gore, 253 U.S. 245. US Supreme court, never overruled After further
consideration, we adhere to that view and accordingly hold that the Sixteenth
Amendment does not authorize or support the tax in question. (A tax on salary)
The phraseology of form 1040 is somewhat obscure .... But it matters little what it does mean;
the statute and the statute alone determines what is income to be taxed. It taxes only income
derived from many different sources; one does not derive income by rendering services and
charging for them... IRS cannot enlarge the scope of the statute.
McCutchin v Commissioner of IRS, 159 F2d, The 16th Amendment does not
authorize laying of an income tax upon one person for the income derived solely
from another.[wages]
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Brushaber v Union Pacific R/R 240 U.S. I, 17; 36 S.Ct. 236, 241.
Income has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax of 1909
(36 Stat. 112). The worker does not receive a profit or gain from his/her labors-merely an equal
exchange of funds for services
Central Illinois Publishing Service v. U.S., 435 U.S. 31 Decided cases have
made the distinction between wages and income and have refused to equate the
two.
Bowers vs Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 US 174D Income has been taken to mean
the same thing as used in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth
Amendment and in the various revenue acts subsequently passed ....
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 The conclusion reached in the
Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and
necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on the contrary
recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be
enforced as such...
An income tax is neither a property tax nor a tax on occupations of common right, but is an
http://www.prostar.com/web/amerika/courts2.htm EXCISE tax...The legislature may declare as
privileged and tax as such for state revenue, those pursuits not matters of common right, but it
has no power to declare as a privilege and tax for revenue purposes, occupations that are of
common right.
Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746. 1883 Among these
unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence is the right of
men to pursue their happiness, by which is meant, the right any lawful business or
vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may
increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give them their highest
enjoyment...It has been well said that, THE PROPERTY WHICH EVERY MAN HAS
IS HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF ALL OTHER
PROPERTY SO IT IS THE MOST SACRED AND INVIOLABLE...
a.. 1818: U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S.336. Establishes two separate > jurisdictions within
the United States Of America: 1. The federal > zone and 2. the 50 States. The
I.R.C. Only has jurisdiction > within the federal zone. > > The exclusive
jurisdiction which the United States have in forts > and dock-yards ceded to them,
is derived from the express assent > of the states by whom the cessions are made.
It could be derived > in no other manner; because without it, the authority of the
state > would be supreme and exclusive therein, 3 Wheat., at 350, 351. > > a..
1883: Butchers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 > U.S. 746. Defines labor as
property, and the most sacred kind > of property > > Among these unalienable
rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration > of Independence is the right of men to
pursue their happiness, > by which is meant, the right any lawful business or
vocation, > in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, > which
may increase their prosperity or develop their faculties, > so as to give them their
highest enjoyment...It has been well said > that, THE PROPERTY WHICH EVERY MAN
HAS IS HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS > THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION OF ALL OTHER
PROPERTY SO IT IS THE MOST
> SACred AND INVIOLABLE...
>
> a.. 1894: Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211. Restricts jurisdiction
> of the federal government inside the states.
>
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the land. The United States marshal could only have invaded the
house of the accused when armed with a warrant issued as required
by the Constitution, upon sworn information, and describing with
reasonable particularity the thing for which the search was to be
made. Instead, he acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted
by the desire to bring further proof to the aid of the government,
and under color of his office undertook to make a seizure of private
papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against
such action. Under such circumstances, without sworn information
and particular description, not even an order of court would [232
U.S. 383, 394] have justified such procedure; much less was it within
the authority of the United States marshal to thus invade the house
and privacy of the accused. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 ,
48 L. ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372, this court said that the 4 th
Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in person and property
against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers
of the law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This
protection is equally extended to the action of the government
and officers of the law acting under it. Boyd Case, 116 U.S. 616 ,
29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524. To sanction such proceedings
would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not
an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended
for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
b.. 1916: Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 240
U.S. 1. Established that the 16th Amendment had no affect on the
constitution, and that income taxes could only be sustained as
excise taxes and not as direct taxes.
...the proposition and the contentions under [the 16 th
Amendment]...would cause one provision of the Constitution to
destroy another;
That is, they would result in bringing the provisions of
the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct
taxes be apportioned;
This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making
clear the limitations of the taxing power, which obviously the
Amendment must have intended to accomplish, would create radical
and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply
confusion.
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c.. 1916: Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103. Declared that
the 16th Amendment conferred no new powers of taxation to the
U.S. Government, but simply prevented income taxes from being
taken out of the category of indirect (excise) taxes to which they
inherently belonged.
..by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of
the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but
simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income
taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken
out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently
belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject
to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the
income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was
--a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin
or source of the income taxed.
a.. 1918: Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165. Stated that the 16 th Amendment
does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects,
but removed the need to apportion direct taxes on income.
The plaintiff is a domestic corporation chiefly engaged in buying
goods in the several states, shipping them to foreign countries and
there selling them. In 1914 its net income from this business was
$30,173.66, and from other sources $12,436.24. An income tax for that
year, computed on the aggregate of these sums, was assessed against
it and paid under compulsion. It is conceded that so much of the
tax as was based on the income from other sources was valid, and the
controversy is over so much of it as was attributable to the income
from shipping goods to foreign countries and there selling them.
The tax was levied under the Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 11,
38 Stat. 166, 172, which provided for annually subjecting every
domestic corporation to the payment of a tax of a specified per
centum of its entire net income arising or accruing from all
sources during the preceding calendar year. Certain fraternal and
other corporations, as also income from certain enumerated sources,
were specifically excepted, but none of the exceptions included
the plaintiff or any part of its income. So, tested merely by the
terms of the act, the tax collected from the plaintiff was rightly
computed on its total net income. But as the act obviously could not
impose a tax forbidden by the Constitution, we proceed to consider
whether the tax, or rather the part in question, was forbidden by
the constitutional provision on which the plaintiff relies.
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As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new
subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might
exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on
income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 , 17-19,
36 Sup. Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414; Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 , 112 et seq., 36 Sup. Ct. 278;
Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 , 173 S., 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language,
requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose
construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income,
those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment
according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and
personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important
function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded
by the courts.
[.]
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard
Dict.; Websters Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to
add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under
the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Strattons Independence v. Howbert,
231 U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467,
469 [62 L. Ed. 1054]), Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined, provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case,
247 U.S. 183, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing
attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the
present controversy. The government, although basing its
argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis
upon the word gain, which was extended to include a variety
of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived. Derived-from- capital; the
gain-derived-from-capital, etc. Here we have the essential matter:
not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value
in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable
value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital,
however invested or employed, and coming in, being derived-that
is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his
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which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would
be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word `among is, it may very properly
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one. . . . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated;
and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. Id.,
at 194-195.
For nearly a century thereafter, the Courts Commerce Clause
decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress power,
and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state
legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 573-575 (1853) (upholding a
state-created steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation
of wholly internal commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17,
20-22 (1888) (upholding a state prohibition on the manufacture
of intoxicating liquor because the commerce power does not
comprehend the purely domestic commerce of a State which is carried
on between man and man within a State or between different parts
of the same State); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). Under this line of precedent, the Court
held that certain categories of activity such as production,
manufacturing, and mining were within the province of state
governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942)
(describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
[.]
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. Perez v. United States, supra, at 150; see also
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, at
276-277. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S., at 114 ; Heart
of Atlanta Motel, supra, at 256 (`[T]he authority of Congress
to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open
to question. (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491 (1917)). Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
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Act of state
An act of state cannot be questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in a court of law
Banco Nacional de Cuba vs. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398: Ricaud vs. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304:
Oetjen vs. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297:
F. Palacio y Compania, S.A. vs. Brush, 389 U.S. 830; 256 F. Supp. 481; 375 F.2nd 1011:
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed. Pgs. 33-34.
Page 92 of 131
RESTRICTIONSONSEARCHANDSEIZUREDISTRICTCOURT
CLERKSMANUALOvertonv.Ohio,151L.Ed2d317(October2001): The
Fourth Amendment provides that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const., Amdt. 4. The
probable-cause determination must be made by a neutral magistrate in order to
insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer will be interposed
between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of the
information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause. If there is
no victim, there is no crime. This case makes it clear there shall be NO
anonymous complaints, and it is the courts duty to interpose a neutral and
detached judicial officer between the complaining parties to determine if a
PUBLIC offense has been committed. In California, a warrant can only be issued
on a FELONY.
Page 94 of 131
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTTELLYOUWHATYOUCANAND
CANNOTDOANDOWN CaliforniaPenalCode1548(d): Laws of the United
States means (1) those laws of the United States passed by Congress pursuant to
authority given to Congress by the Constitution of the United States where the laws
of the United States are controlling, and (2) those laws of the United States not
controlling the several states of the United States but which are not in conflict with
the provisions of this chapter. CONGRESS makes laws, NOT counties, cities,
code enforcement, or dog-catchers.
Schadv.Ephraim,452U.S.61,68L.Ed.2d671,101S.Ct.2176: Convictions,
pursuant to zoning ordinance prohibiting live entertainmen live nude dancing, held
invalid under First and Fourteenth Amendments. A town or county may not
legislatively prevent its citizens from engaging in or having access to forms of
protective expression that are incompatible with its majoritys conception of
decent life solely because these activities are sufficiently available in other
locales. If the Supreme Court said that the city and county cannot dictate against
live nude dancing, they certainly cannot dictate raising small or large animals or
owning old cars either. Property ownership, and especially farming, are forms of
expression. Farmers, like painters, actors, musicians, writers, dancers, etc., use
their experience, imagination, and skill to produce something from nothing. The
Supreme Court said this is PROTECTED.
WestVirginiaStateBoardofEducationetal.v.Barnettetal.,319U.S.624,63
S.Ct.1178 The United States Government was set up by the consent of the
governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to
coerce that consent. The Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states protects
the citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures. Ones right to life, liberty
and property and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote, and they
depend on the outcome of no election The Supreme Court said that if the STATE
cannot take away any inalienable right, the CITY or COUNTY cannot, either!
DUEPROCESSANDEMINENTDOMAIN U.S.CONSTITUTION
Amendment5.SelfIncrimination; Double Jeopardy; Due process. No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
Page 95 of 131
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. If any city or
county wants to regulate, restrict or eliminate ANY private property, or restrict any
right, it must PAY for it out of its General Fund. Regulations and restrictions are
TAKINGS, and must be compensated. So POST your property No Trespassing to
show that it belongs to YOU.
Protection;CaliforniaConstitutionArticle1,section9DueProcess;Equal
PrivilegesandImmunities: (a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws. Due
process means that anybody wishing to restrain property or file a protest against
property of another, be it land, livestock, etc. must first put up a Bond to indemnify
the lawful owner(s) for the takings, THEN go through the process of having the
matter decided by a jury. THAT is Due Process.
Montereyv.DelMonteDunes,526U.S.__,143LEd2d882,119S.Ct.___
(1999): [T]he District Courts jury instructions directed the jury that (1) it should
find for the landowner if the jury found that (a) the landowner had been denied all
economically viable use of its property, or (b) the citys decision did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose (the jury awarded the landowner
$8 million for the takings and $1.45 million for the citys unlawful acts -no just
compensation or providing an adequate post deprivation remedy for the loss). The
County is liable for any city employee violating the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The property owner owns all bundle of rights that come with his
Deed, as he bought it as is and nobody can convert, alter, change or amend his
deed except him. The law forbids the City or County to amend any deed, steal any
deed, restrict its use, or to use deceit, extortion, fear, and threats to get the owner to
amend it by restricting his ownership and use of livestock, property, or his land.
Post-deprivation loss also attaches to the sale of any agriculture or other
commodity in interstate OR intrastate commerce, which sales were diminished by
the takings/restriction. This includes anything the landowner would buy for his use
and enjoyment of his property building materials, landscaping/gardening
supplies, animal feed, livestock, pets, vehicles, etc. Damages for the takings
without just compensation and for the extortion will be decided by a jury pursuant
to the Seventh Amendment.
Page 96 of 131
offered, the city or county is committing fraud, theft, racketeering and terrorism if
it wants to exert acts of ownership or control private property and livestock
ownership rights. It is illegal to impose public policy upon private land; to do so
constitutes a takings for which the City and County are liable for compensating the
owner for his loss, no matter how small the intrusion.
Palazzolov.RhodeIsland,533U.S.__,150L.E.d.2d592,121S.Ct.__(2001)
(quoting both Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council): Petitioners acquisition of title after the regulations effective date did not
bar his takings claims. This Court rejects the State Supreme Courts sweeping rule
that a purchaser or a successive title holder like petitioner is deemed to have notice
of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a taking.
Were the Court to accept that rule, the postenactment transfer of title would
absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no
matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and
value of land.
TheTakingsClauseoftheFifthAmendment,applicabletotheStatesthroughthe
FourteenthAmendment,Chicago,B.&Q.R.Co.v.Chicago,166U.S.226(1897),
prohibitsthegovernmentfromtakingprivatepropertyforpublicusewithoutjust
compensation.InPennsylvaniaCoalCo.v.Mahon,260U.S.393(1922),Justice
Holmeswellknownformulation,whilepropertymayberegulatedtoacertain
extent,ifaregulationgoestoofaritwillberecognizedasataking.(Toquote
JusticeStevens)Itiswrongforthegovernmenttotakeproperty,evenforpublic
use,withouttenderingjustcompensationTheSupremeCourtruledover100years
agothatitiswrongforgovernmenttosteal.Iftherestrictionisnotlistedinthe
Deed,thecityorcountycannotcomeinAFTERthefactandsayitsrestricted,
eveniftherestrictionoccurredbeforethepropertywaspurchased.Ifthecitydid
notreimbursetheFORMERownerfortheregulatorytaking,itcannotgetaway
withfailingtoreimbursethePRESENTowner.ThatisFRAUD.Ifitisntlistedin
theDeed,ITISNOTRESTRICTED.Andifthecityorcountystillwantsto
imposeanyrestriction,theyhavetolawfullyacquirethepropertybyjustly
compensatingtheowner/buyingtheland.
Page 98 of 131
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTDOILLEGALSEARCHAND
SEIZURE
Steagaldv.UnitedStates,68L.Ed.2d38Held:2. The search in question violated
the Fourth Amendment, where it took place in the absence of consent or exigent
circumstances. (a) Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a home may not be
searched without a warrant (c) A search warrant requirement will not significantly
impede effective law enforcement effortsno warrant is required to apprehend a
suspected felon in a public place. Moreover, the exigent-circumstances doctrine
significantly limits the situations in which a search warrant is needed. And in those
situations in which a search warrant is necessary, the inconvenience incurred by the
police is generally insignificant. In any event, whatever practical problems there
are in requiring a search warrant they cannot outweigh the constitutional interest at
stake in protecting the right of presumptively innocent people to be secure in their
homes from unjustified, forcible intrusions by the government The purpose of a
warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer to assess whether the police have
probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search. As we have often explained,
the placement of this checkpoint between the Government and the citizen
implicitly acknowledges that an officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948), at 14,
may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence
supporting the contemplated action against the individual's interests in protecting
his own liberty and the privacy of his home. Warrantless search or arrest can
ONLY occur IN A PUBLIC PLACE during hot pursuit. In all other cases, a fair,
neutral and detached judicial officer determines FROM THE COMPLAINT that a
warrant should issue based upon the commission OF A FELONY. This is where the
publics ignorance is used by robbers posing as code enforcement, etc.,
THEREARENOFISHINGEXPEDITIONSTOSEIZEPROPERTYTHAT
ISNOTREPORTEDASSTOLEN!!!
Carrerav.Bertaini,63C.A.3D721;134Cal.Rptr.14: [I]mpoundment of an
owners farm animals without prior notice or hearing, and without a hearing in the
superior court was unlawful and the owner was entitled either to have animals
returned or their reasonable value the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Page 99 of 131
Amendment requires some form of notice and hearing the hearing must take place
before the property is taken. Cities try to wriggle around this one, by holding
public hearings. These hearings, however, are NOT proper hearings with the
property owner or his counsel present in superior court with the value of all
property and bundle of rights tallied and presented for just compensation by the
city or county out of the General Fund. The County is liable for the city using fraud
and deceit to try to con the public into believing that public hearings take the place
of a notice and hearing in superior court.
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTVIOLATETHEFOURTH
AMENDMENT
U.S.CONSTITUTIONAmendment4.SearchandSeizure. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. We have
forgotten that this was drafted to correct the evils of swarms of the Kings officers
barging in, and arbitrarily confiscating seditious material, which was determined
by them to be seditious, without benefit of a judge or a public trial. Today, we see
the same set of circumstances invasion and terrorism because somebody else
invaded our privacy and did a bench trial because they determined that our lifestyle
was seditious.
th
Peoplev.Camacho,23Cal.4824;98Cal.Rptr.2d232;3P.3d878(2000):
Police
observation from non-public area constitutes unlawful search. The County is liable
for Fourth Amendment violations, and has no immunity when its employees
trespass upon areas that members of the public cannot be said to have been
implicitly invited. No such implicit public invitation exists in a side yard, back
yard, or neighbors yard for county employees or anybody else to conduct invasion
of privacy and/or pretextual search without probable cause to inventory livestock
or other property by peeking over or through fences, even chain-link fences, which
are there to exclude the eyes of strangers and trespassers.
th
U.S.v.Hotal,143F.3d1223(9Cir.1998).
To comply with Fourth Amendment,
anticipatory search warrant must either on its face or on the face of the
accompanying affidavit clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering
event. Consent to search that is given after illegal entry is tainted and invalid under
the Fourth Amendment. Plain-view doctrine did not apply to seizure of evidence
from defendants residence after officers conducted initial search based on invalid
anticipatory search warrant Plain-view doctrine does not apply unless the initial
entry is lawful pursuant to a valid warrant. The county is liable for its
agents/employees stealing anything without probable cause on a tainted warrant
that fails to narrowly list things with particularity that are connected with a crime,
and that fails to have an attached affidavit from a victim injured in his or her
business or property. State and federal law protects the unalienable right to own
property / livestock, so the county is liable for its employees fabricated charges and
pretextual search without probable cause.
more. It appears that terrorist bombers have more constitutional protections than a
livestock owners today.
Camarav.MunicipalCourt,387US523,18L.ed.2d930,87S.Ct.1727: The basic
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials; the Amendment
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is basic to a free
society. The guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the
Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states by reason of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The protection of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to a situation in which an
individual is suspected of criminal behavior. The County is liable for violations of
the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by their agents / employees for
suspecting that a citizen is a criminal because he or she happens to own and raise
livestock for their own use. The County needs to remember the hundreds of
innocent citizens who were released in the Rampart scandal, because corrupt city
and county employees fabricated charges and committed perjury.
Hanlonv.Berger,526U.S.,143L.Ed2d978,119S.Ct. : It is a violation of the
Fourth Amendment for media to be present during the execution of a search
warrant. The County is liable and has no immunity for using the local media to
invade the privacy of, and slander fowl and livestock owners while falsely
representing the Countys racketeering enterprise is lawful to facilitate raids on
other livestock owners for the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity
prohibited under Title 18 1962 Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act.
CITESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTVIOLATECIVILRIGHTSTitle42
Section1983:Everypersonwho,undercolorofanystatute,ordinance,regulation,
custom,orusage,ofanyStateorTerritoryortheDistrictofColumbia,subjects,or
causestobesubjected,anycitizenoftheUnitedStatesorotherpersonwithinthe
jurisdictionthereoftothedeprivationofanyrights,privileges,orimmunities
securedbytheConstitutionandlaws,shallbeliabletothepartyinjuredinan
actionatlaw,suitinequity,orotherproperproceedingforredress...TheCounty
wouldbeliablefordiscriminationagainstlivestockowners,4H,FFA,feedstores,
andfeedmills.
Title28UnitedStatesCodeSection1343Civilrightsandelectivefranchise.(a)
Thedistrictcourtsshallhaveoriginaljurisdictionofanycivilactionauthorizedby
lawtobecommencedbyanyperson:
(1)Torecoverdamagesforinjurytohispersonorproperty,orbecauseofthe
deprivationofanyrightorprivilegeofacitizenoftheUnitedStates,byanyact
doneinfurtheranceofanyconspiracymentionedinsection1985ofTitle42;
(2)Torecoverdamagesfromanypersonwhofailstopreventortoaidin
preventinganywrongsmentionedinsection1985ofTitle42whichhehad
knowledgewereabouttooccurandpowertoprevent;
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
[theplaintiff(s)]possessedaconstitutionalrightofwhich[theywere]deprived;the
actsoromissionsofthedefendantwereintentional;thedefendantactedunder
coloroflaw;andtheactsoromissionsofthedefendantcausedtheconstitutional
deprivation.
Thecourtalsostatedthat,toestablishmunicipalliability,aplaintiffmustshow
that:
[theplaintiff]possessedaconstitutionalrightofwhich[he/she]wasdeprived;the
municipalityhadapolicyorcustom;
thispolicyorcustomamountstodeliberateindifferenceto[theplaintiff's]
constitutionalright;and
thepolicyorcustomcausedtheconstitutionaldeprivation.
Thedistrictcourtthenstated,however,that[b]eforetherecanbeanyliability
undersection1983,theremustbeadirectcausallinkbetweenthepersonalconduct
ofDeputyLopezorthemunicipalconductofSonomaCountyandthealleged
constitutionaldeprivation,inthiscasethemurderofMariaTeresaMacias.Ineach
ofthesecases,theSupremeCourtandthiscourttreatedthedeprivationofa
constitutionalrightastheallegedinjury.SeeMonellv.Dept.ofSocialServices,
435U.S.658,690(1978),436U.S.At692(holdingthata1983plainlyimposes
liabilityonagovernmentthat,undercolorofsomeofficialpolicy,causesan
employeetoviolateanothersconstitutionalrights);CityofCantonv.Harris,489
U.S.378(1989)at385(statingthatourfirstinquiryinanycaseallegingmunicipal
liabilityunder1983isthequestionwhetherthereisadirectcausallinkbetweena
municipalpolicyorcustomandtheallegedconstitutionaldeprivation);Cityof
Springfieldv.Kibbe,480U.S.378(1987)at267(statingthattheCourtrepeatedly
hasstressedtheneedtofindadirectcausalconnectionbetweenmunicipalconduct
andtheconstitutionaldeprivation);Harrisv.CityofRoseburg,664F.2d1121(9th
Cir.1981)at1125(liabilityunder1983canbeestablishedbyshowingthatthe
defendantseitherpersonallyparticipatedinadeprivationoftheplaintiff'srights,or
causedsuchadeprivationtooccur).Thereisaconstitutionalright,however,to
havepoliceservicesadministeredinanondiscriminatorymannerarightthatis
Page 104 of 131
violatedwhenastateactordeniessuchprotectiontodisfavoredpersons.See
Navarrov.Block,72F.3d712,71517(9thCir.1996)(recognizingacauseof
actionunder1983baseduponthediscriminatorydenialofpoliceservices);
Balistreriv.PacificaPoliceDept.,901F.2d696,701(9thCir.1990)(same);see
alsoPenrodv.Zavaras,94F.3d1399,1406(10thCir.1996)(statingthat[a]nequal
protectionviolationoccurswhenthegovernmenttreatssomeonedifferently[from]
anotherwhoissimilarlysituated).Theallegedconstitutionaldeprivationinthis
matterwastheallegeddenialofequalpoliceprotectiontoMrs.Macias.There
becameadirectcausallinkbetweenthecityandtheconstitutionaldeprivationof
itscitizensunderequalprotectionwhenthecity,throughitsagentsandemployees,
showedindifferencetotherightsofitsresidentsandbusinessmen(feedmills)and
adoptedacustomorpolicytodiscriminateagainstdisfavoredindividuals,who
weredisenfranchisedbecausetheyownedorraisedlivestockorwerekeepingany
propertythecitydoesn'tlike;thispolicyorcustomamountstodeliberate
indifferencetoinjuredcitizensconstitutionalrights.Anyhearingsdonein
conspiracywithotherprivateindividualstorestrictcommerceanddeprivecitizens
ofequalprotectionconstitutesthecause/pointofthreattocitizensunalienable
rightsofpropertyownership,equalprotection,andbenefitofhonestgovernment
servicesbeforethecitizengetsrobbed.
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTENGAGEINEXTORTIONATE
CREDITTRANSACTIONSTitle18USCsections891896.Section891
Definitionandrulesofconstruction:(7)Anextortionatemeansisanymeanswhich
involvestheuse,oranexpressorimplicitthreatofuse,ofviolenceorother
criminalmeanstocauseharmtotheperson,reputation,orproperty.Thisappliesto
bogusutilityliensorattorneysfees,whichsanctionsareonlyforlicensed
attorneys,andonlyforDEFENDANTSforcausingunduedelayandneedlessly
increasingthecostoflitigation.Privateattorneysconspiringwithprivate
corporations/HumaneSocietiestobribefederalorstatejudges,etc.toget
rulings/judgmentsfavorabletotherobbersfitstheserulesofconstruction,asonly
Hitlerpunishedthosewhosuedandconfiscatedtheirproperty.Thecountyisnot
immuneforcitiescriminalprofiteeringwithinthecounty,whentheyarepaidto
protectandserve,NOTtorobanddothesewhitecollarcongames.
Page 105 of 131
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTIMPERSONATEFEDERAL
AUTHORITY
UnderTitle7section2159, Congress restrains all states subject to Public Law
regarding animals and livestock. All investigations for alleged animal neglect fall
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, NOT the County. The
United States Department of Agriculture Secretary, sends a request to the United
States Attorney General, now John Ashcroft, to request of a United States District
Court Judge to issue a restraining order or injunction pursuant to section 2159 of
Title 7 United States Code, whenever the Secretary has reason to believe the health
of any animal [is] in serious danger. The County employees and agents are not the
United States Department of Agriculture Secretary, and The County Board of
Supervisors are not United States District Court judges, therefore, they conspired
to intentionally and willfully impersonate federal authority, restricted since 1966
under the following explicit statute:
Title7,Section2159.AuthoritytoApplyforInjunctions.(a)Request.Whenever
theSecretaryhasreasontobelievethatanydealer,carrier,exhibitor,or
intermediatehandlerisdealinginstolenanimals,orisplacingthehealthofany
animalinseriousdangerinviolationofthisActortheregulationsorstandards
promulgatedthereunder,theSecretaryshallnotifytheAttorneyGeneralwhomay
applytotheUnitedStatesdistrictcourtinwhichsuchdealer,carrier,exhibitor,or
intermediatehandlerresidesorconductsbusinessforatemporaryrestrainingorder
orinjunctiontopreventanysuchpersonfromoperatinginviolationofthisActor
theregulationsandstandardsprescribedunderthisAct.TheCountyisnotimmune
fromcityscriminalconduct,andimpersonatingfederalauthorityinorderto
committerrorismandtheftundercoloroflaw.
TERRORISMISAGAINSTTHELAWFEDERALCRIMINALCODES:
Title18USCCHAPTER113BTERRORISM, Section 2331. Definitions. As
used in this chapter (1) the term international terrorism means activities that - (A)
involve violent acts; (B) appear to be intended - (I) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
Page 106 of 131
ThePresidenthasdeclaredWARonterrorism.AfterSeptember11,2001,
ANYBODYwhoconspirestointerferewithlandsforgrowinglivestockgets30
yearsinjailandafineforcommittingSABOTAGEagainsttheUnitedStates.
Anonymouscomplaintswereabolishedover200yearsago.
Title18CHAPTER113STOLENPROPERTY,Section2311 Definitions: As
used in this chapter: aircraft means any contrivance now known or hereafter
invented, used, or designed for navigation of or for flight in the air; cattle means
one or more bulls, steers, oxen, cows, heifers, or calves, or the carcass or carcasses
thereof; livestock means any domestic animals raised for home use, consumption,
or profit, such as horses, pigs, llamas, goats, fowl, sheep, buffalo, and cattle, or the
carcasses thereof; money means the legal tender; motor vehicles includes an
automobile truck wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle; securities
includes any note, stock certificate, bond check, draft, warrant, traveler's check,
letter of credit, warehouse receipt bill of lading valid or blank motor vehicle title;
certificate of interest in property, tangible or intangible; tax stamp includes any tax
stamp, tax token, tax meter imprint; value means the face, par, or market value,
whichever is the greatest, and the aggregate value of all goods, wares, and
merchandise, securities, and money referred to in a single indictment shall
constitute the value thereof. The first capital offense prosecuted in this nation was
for stealing chickens and eggs. Chickens and eggs were used as currency during
the Depression, and are still on the books as valuable property, more important
than stolen money or stolen car. Owning and raising cats, dogs, livestock, pigeons,
etc. is an unalienable right guaranteed by the Constitution, and anybody stealing or
conspiring to steal small animals or livestock gets 10 years in jail.
Title18section43.Animalenterpriseterrorism.Whoever(2)intentionallycauses
physicaldisruptiontothefunctioningofananimalenterprisebyintentionally
stealingorcausingthelossof,anyproperty(includinganimalsorrecords)or
conspirestodoso;shallbefinedunderthistitleorimprisonednotmorethanone
year,orboth...(d)Definitionsthetermanimalenterprisemeans(A)acommercial
oracademicenterprisethatusesanimalsforfoodorfiberproduction,agriculture
(B)azoo,aquarium,circus,rodeo,orlawfulcompetitiveanimalevent;or(C)any
Page 108 of 131
fairorsimilareventintendedtoadvanceagricultureartsandsciences(b)
Aggravatedoffense;Whoevercausesseriousbodilyinjuryshallbefinedor
imprisonednotmorethan10years,orboth.TheCountyisliablefortheirorcities
employeestakinganonymouscomplaintsandusingthreats,fear,andintimidation
(animalterrorism)torestrictfederallyprotectedeventsintendedtoadvance
agricultureartsandsciences,namely,all4HandFFAprojects,allhobbyistswho
raiselivestockandsmallanimalsandbirdsincludingpigeonsforshowsand
competitions,andanybodywhoraisesananimalforfood.NOTE:TheHumane
Societyisaprivatecorporation,contractedwiththeCountytogetridofunwanted
petsandnuisancewildlife.TheyareNOTcontractedtoviolatetheFourth
Amendmentinordertoinventoryandstealdogs,cats,chickens,horses,etc.under
ANYpretext,ortoconspirewithcorruptjudges,lawyersandcourtclerkstouse
thecourtsasaracketeeringenterprise.TheHumaneSocietywasdeclaredbythe
FBItobeananimalterroristorganizationin1993,andtheyusebribe/protection
moneytovoidjudgmentsagainstthemincourt.SeeREPORTTOCONGRESS
ONTHEEXTENTOFDOMESTICANDINTERNATIONALTERRORISM
ONANIMALENTERPRISEonlineatDepartmentofJusticeReportsat
findlaw.comorfirstgov.gov.
Title18section3112.RepealedNovember16,1981.Thisfederallawusedto
providefortheissuanceofsearchwarrantsforseizureofanimals,birds,andeggs,
butitwasrepealed,whichmeansthatithasbeenillegalsince1981foranybodyto
issueawarranttoseizeananimal,abird,oranegg.TheCountyisliableforanyof
itscities,agentsoremployeesactingoutsidethelawtorestrictownershipof
livestock,andusingfear,threat,intimidation,andfraudtocoercecitizenstogive
uptheirpropertyrights.
THREATTODOMESTIC&NATIONALSECURITYTitle18,section3592.
Mitigatingandaggravatingfactorstobeconsideredindeterminingwhethera
sentenceofdeathisjustified:(b)Aggravatingfactorsforespionageandtreason.In
determiningwhetherasentenceofdeathisjustifiedforanoffensethecourtshall
considereachofthefollowingaggravatingfactorsforwhichnoticehasbeengiven
anddeterminewhich,ifany,exist:(2)Graverisktonationalsecurity.Inthe
commissionoftheoffensethedefendantknowinglycreatedagraveriskofdanger
Page 109 of 131
tothenationalsecurity.Ourdwindlingresourceoffarmersisbeingwipedoutby
vigilantesingovernmentandprivatesectorscommittingterrorism,racketeering
andtheftundercoloroflaw.Farmers,bytheirownhardwork,producesomething
outofnothingtofeedournation.The3millionfarmersleftintheUnitedStates
todayareunderthreatofdwindlingdowntozero,becauseTitle18sec.43Animal
enterpriseterrorismisadoptedandperpetratedbycountyemployees.TheCounty
isliableforanyofitsagentsoremployeestakinganonymouscomplaint'sand
illegallyimposinglimitsorrestrictionsonlivestockandpropertyownership
withoutjustcompensation,andwhothreatenfoodsuppliesthroughregulationand
controlofallwealthwiththeaidofprivatevigilantestoenforceanoownership
policyuponcitizenstothepointwheretheycannolongerkeepandraiselivestock,
foodorpets.TheCountywouldbeliableforitsagentsthreateningnational
security/foodsupply.
CITIES&COUNTIESCANNOTLEGISLATEEXCEPTASTOLANDS
THEYOWN.
UNITEDSTATESCONSTITUTIONArticle6,Cl.2 Supremacy of
Constitution. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary not withstanding. We have three separate branches of
government legislative, administrative, and judicial set up this way to ensure we
would not become a dictatorship. Dictatorship means that one branch assumes all
control, takes over the other branches, and becomes a legislator who makes its own
laws, administrates to set up its own and country prosecutes its own laws. Under a
dictatorship, citizens have no rights, and property ownership is eliminated, as the
dictatorship assumes regulation and control over all private property. The penalty
for conspiring to overthrow the government of the United States is death or life
imprisonment.
Schulzv.Milne,849F.Supp.708(N.D.Cal.1994: [D]efendants fail to apprehend
basic constitutional tenets restricting the extent to which state power may be
Page 110 of 131
delegated to private parties. See also page 6694, footnotes 1 & 5: 1. It appears to
the court that the City may have improperly contracted away its legislative and
governmental functions to the Board and Milne, both of whom are private parties.
The Ninth Circuit clearly held that a municipality may not surrender its control of a
municipal function to a private party. Cities and Counties are private
municipalities; they CANNOT assume legislative powers without the Governors
signature, or without it going through the State Legislature. Only the Governor can
sign laws against consumer goods. If any city or county does this, it's racketeering,
fraud, embezzlement, extortion, and impersonating an officer; in this case, a State
Legislator or the Governor.
InreEllett,254F.3d1135(9thCir.2001):UnderExParteYounganditsprogeny,
asuitseekingprospectiveequitablereliefagainstastateofficialwhohasengaged
inacontinuingviolationoffederallawisnotdeemedtobeasuitagainsttheState
forpurposesofstatesovereignimmunity;ExParteYoung,209U.S.At159160,
28S.Ct.441;Willv.Mich.DeptofStatePolice,491U.S.58,71n.10,109S.Ct.
2304,105L.Ed.2d45(1989)(statingthatofficialcapacityactionsforprospective
reliefarenottreatedasactionsagainsttheState.).SincetheStatecannotauthorize
itsofficerstoviolatefederallaw,suchofficersarestrippedof[their]officialor
representativecharacterand[are]subjectedin[their]persontotheconsequencesof
[their]individualconduct.ExParteYoung,209U.S.At160,28S.Ct.441Ex
Parte.YounggiveslifetotheSupremacyClause,asremediesdesignedtoenda
continuingviolationoffederallawarenecessarytovindicatethefederalinterestin
assuringthesupremacyofthatlaw.CitiesandCountiesareprivatemunicipalities;
theyCANNOTassumelegislativepowerstoregulatefederallyprotectedarticles
livestock(includingdogs,catsandpigeons)andfeedsincommerce.Citiesand
countieshaveNOIMMUNITYforlegislatingawayANYpropertyrightsand/or
ownershiprightswithouttheGovernor'ssignature,orwithoutitgoingthroughthe
StateLegislature.Iftheydo,itsimpersonatinganofficerandtreasonagainstthe
UnitedStates.
THECOUNTYCANNOTSHIRKITSLIABLEFORTHECONDUCTOF
ITSEMPLOYEESORAGENTS,ORANYCITYEMPLOYEESOR
AGENTS
rd
th
Allenv.CityofPortland,73F.3,232(9
Cir.1995):
By definition, probable
cause to arrest can only exist in relation to criminal conduct; civil disputes cannot
give rise to probable cause, contract dispute cannot give rise to probable cause to
arrest. Cities or counties CANNOT butt in on any civil dispute between neighbors,
or presume there is any criminal activity related to ownership of livestock, fowl or
other property. Civil disputes go through the DISTRICT ATTORNEY. If the city
gets involved, it commits domestic terrorism.
th
Watkinsv.CityofOakland,145F.3d1087(9Cir.1998)at1088:
6. Civil Rights
214(4) Municipality is not entitled to the shield of qualified immunity from
liability under 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983. Discrimination against disenfranchised
citizens because they own fowl (roosters) and/or other livestock, and/or are
Latinos, strips the County of immunity.
Burnsv.Reed,500U.S.478,486,111S.Ct.1934,114L.Ed.2d547(1991): [T]he
law requires that the official seeking immunity to bear the burden of demonstrating
that immunity attaches to the particular function. County or city employees could
not bear the burden of demonstrating that sabotage, terrorism, extortion, theft
under color of law, discrimination, racketeering, violation of due process, and
takings without compensation attaches to their particular function of upholding the
Constitution and protecting the property and rights of tax-paying citizens and
property owners; therefore, the County would not be immune, either for the
conduct of criminals posing as city or county employees.
Brandonv.Holt,105S.Ct.873(1985)atpp.873,874:2. Civil Rights 13.16 In
cases arising under section 1983, judgment against a public servant in his official
capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents provided the public
entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond. 42 U.S.C.A. Section 1983.
Held: 2. In cases under section 1983, a judgment against a public servant in his
official capacity imposes liability on the entity that he represents. This rule was
plainly implied in Monell, supra; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57
L.Ed.2d 522; and Owen v. City of Independence, 455 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63
Page 112 of 131
L.Ed.2d 673. Cities and counties cannot take anonymous complaints. The
Supreme Court says that the County is the municipality upon which liability is
imposed for civil rights claims against city employees within its jurisdiction. Any
County Claim Form filed regarding these terrorist acts, frauds and swindles will be
the Countys Notice and Opportunity to be heard regarding city or county
employees criminal conduct/conspiring to steal property.
th
Lalondev.CountyofRiverside,204F.3d947(9Cir.2000):
If, however, there is
a material dispute as to the facts regarding what the officer or the plaintiff actually
did, the case must proceed to trial, before a jury if requested even when immunity
from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution so requires See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
304, 317-318 (1995) (holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts
render not appealable a pre-trial denial of summary judgment on the issue of
qualified immunity) [O]nce the plaintiff established that material issues of fact
existed, the court was required to submit the factual dispute to a jury. Thomson v.
Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1997) ([W]here there is a genuine issue of fact
on a substantive issue of qualified immunity, ordinarily the controlling principles
of summary judgment and, if there is a jury demand and a material issue of fact,
the Seventh Amendment, require submission to a jury. It would be impossible for
the County to prove any immunity, when, after receiving a Claim or civil RICO
suit with additional charges of terrorism and sabotage, it automatically rejects it in
order to play the odds that the Claimant would be too ignorant to follow up where
these issues would be taken to trial. The rejected Claim would become Exhibit A.
Robinsonv.SolanoCounty,2000DailyJournalD.A.R.7643:[T]hecourtawarded
partialsummaryjudgementafterRobinsonfiledbothstateandfederalclaimsin
federalcourt.Astothecounty,thecourtfoundthatRobinsonhadfailedtoprovide
evidencetosupportmunicipalliabilityundertherulesetoutinMonellv.Dept.of
SocialServices,435U.S.658,690(1978).However,Californiahasrejectedthe
Monellrule,underwhichacountymaybeheldliableina1983suitonlyifithas
adoptedanillegalorunconstitutionalpolicyorcustom.Californiaholdscounties
liableforactsoftheiremployeesunderthedoctrineofrespondeatsuperior,and
grantsimmunitytocountiesonlywherethepublicemployeewouldalsobe
immunefromliability.SeeC.G.C.SS815.2;seealsoScottv.CountyofLos
Page 113 of 131
Angeles,32Cal.Rptr.2D643,650(Ct.App.1994)(UnderGovernmentCode
section815.2,subdivision(a),theCountyisliableforactsandomissionsofits
employeesunderthedoctrineofrespondeatsuperiortothesameextentasaprivate
employer.
CITIESANDCOUNTIESCANNOTVIOLATERACKETEERINGLAWS
Title18section1951InterferencewithCommerce: Whoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays or affects commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires to do so shall be fined
or imprisoned not more than twenty years (2) the term extortion means the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of
actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. Title 7,
section 2 [Agricultural commodities] Definitions: The word person shall include
individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts. The word
commodity shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain
sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, [Irish potatoes], wool, wool tops, fats and oils
cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles.
Title 7 section 2131 The Congress finds that animals and activities which are
regulated under this chapter are either in interstate or foreign commerce or
substantially affect such commerce or the free flow thereof, and that regulation of
animals and activities as provided in this chapter is necessary to prevent and
eliminate burdens upon such commerce and to effectively regulate such commerce,
in order. (3) to protect the owners of animals from theft of their animals by
preventing the sale or use of animals which have been stolen. Title 18 section
1962. Prohibited activities: (b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce (d) It
shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. Title 18 Stolen Property, section 2311
Definitions: As used in this chapter livestock means any domestic animals raised
for home use, consumption, or profit, such as horses, pigs, llamas, goats, fowl,
Page 114 of 131
sheep, buffalo, and cattle, or the carcasses thereof. Title 7 Agriculture section 601:
No state can restrict the raising of any commodity (chicken hen or cock, other
poultry, cattle, horse, goat, pig, sheep, parakeet, frog, fish, chinchilla, guinea pig,
rabbit, etc.) for personal use. If the state is forbidden to restrict commodities,
neither can the city or county. City or county employees get 20 years in prison for
conspiring to restrict the free flow of commerce and agricultural commodities
known as chickens (roosters and hens), birds and poultry, cattle, crowing fowl,
pigeons, goats, horses, pigs, sheep, other small farm animals (rabbits, fish,
chinchillas, frogs, parakeets, guinea pigs, etc.), and animal/livestock feed
consisting of mill feeds: rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, and grain sorghums.
The penalty is 20 years imprisonment or $250,000 fine.
Salinasv.UnitedStates,118S.Ct.469(1997): [I]nterprative canon is not license
for judiciary to rewrite language enacted by legislature. Predominant elements in
substantive Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations
are (1) conduct (2) of enterprise (3) through pattern of racketeering activity. 18
U.S.C. SS1962(c). Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.
SS1962(d). (RICO) conspiracy conviction does not require overt or specific act.
If conspirators have plan which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate crime and
others to provide support, supporters are as guilty as perpetrators. Conspiracy may
exist and be punished whether or not substantive crime ensues, for conspiracy is a
distinct evil, dangerous to the public, and punishable in itself. Judges and cities are
forbidden to rewrite language enacted by legislature. They are forbidden to even
think about using the courts to uphold bogus, fabricated charges for hot pursuit of
revenue. By their conduct of falsely representing the character, amount, or legal
status of any debt, participants violate 15 U.S.C. Sections 1681s-2 and 1692(e),
and become principles in a pattern of racketeering by putting false liens or debts on
court or credit records without verifying that the liens or debts were illegally valid
as the result of having the matter determined by a jury prior to having an abstract
of judgment entered. The fraud continues when these bogus judgments are used for
collection of unlawful debt. The language of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681s-2 is
particularly clear: a person shall not furnish any information relating to a consumer
to any consumer reporting agency if the person knows or consciously avoids
knowing that the information is inaccurate.
Amortization:TheWorldBookDictionarydefinesamortizeas:1.Tosetmoney
asideregularlyinaspecialfundforfuturewipingoutof(adebt);2.Law.To
convey(property)toabody,especiallyanecclesiasticalbody,whichdoesnothave
therighttosellorgiveitaway.Amortizationis:1.Theactofamortizingadebt;2.
Themoneysetasideforthispurpose.TheCountyisliableforcitiesfraudulent
misuseofthewordamortizationtomeanan18monthgraceperiodbeforecounty
agentscrackdownonalllivestockandothersmallfarmanimalowners,4H,and
FFA.Thecorrectdefinitionofamortizationmeansthatthecountyandcitiesneed
tosetmoneyasiderightnowforconveyingproperty(deeds/bundleofrights
chickens/chickenfeed/livestock)toabody,(cityorcountyagents),whichdoesnot
havetherighttosellorgiveitaway.ThisishardevidenceofCountysliabilityfor
fraudwhentheyknowtheyhavenorighttoconcitizensintoamendingtheirown
Deedsbygivinguptheirproperty,butcountonthepublicbeingtooignorantto
lookuptherealdefinitionofamortize.
CIVILRICObyDAVIDB.SMITHandTERRANCEG.REED,1999Edition
publishedbyMATTHEWBENDER,publicationupdateSeptember1999,front
page:InjuriestoBusinessorProperty:Interpretingthescopeofcompensable
businessorpropertyinjuriesundersection1964(c),THESixthCircuitrecently
heldinIsaakv.TrumbleSavings&LoanCo.,169F.3d390(6thCir.1999),thatthe
useandenjoymentofrealestateconstitutespropertywithinthemeaningofRICO
soastotriggertheaccrualofaRICOclaim.Thecountyanditscitiesareliablefor
racketeeringconductofitsemployees/agentsuseoffear,threats,andintimidation
tointerferewiththeuseandenjoymentofpropertybycitizenswhopaycityand
countyemployeestoprotectandservetheirpropertyrights.
Section 1962(d). More than two predicate acts occur when private individuals
conspire with public employees to violate state and federal law by restricting
property ownership without just compensation in furtherance of a racketeering
scheme or artifice (denial of honest government services and theft under color of
law); therefore, the County is the municipality upon which the liability is imposed
for conduct constituting RICO conspiracy through fraud and deceit to effect
takings without due process and without just compensation, which is theft under
color. The county needs to remember the judicial officers who went to jail in this
Frega case for operating the courts as a racketeering enterprise, the $42 million that
went back into Uncle Sams Treasury as fruits of a racketeering enterprise, and
needs to remember the 1,500 crooked employees who used to work for the DMV
and who took bribes to do favors and manufacture fake licenses for their friends. In
the Frega case, the feds only collected $42 million, because it was pled improperly
and a lot more big fish escaped the net.
Salinasv.UnitedStates,118S.Ct.469(1997): [C]onspiracy is a distinct evil,
dangerous to the public, and punishable in itself. City and county employees are
liable for conspiring to restrict property (including old cars) and agricultural
commodities (Title 7, section 2) without just compensation, and conspiring to
target disenfranchised livestock owners and feed mills in violation of Title 42
section 1983, when they admit to having met (conspired) with code enforcement
and private persons in violation of the Brown Act in order to steal. The county is
liable for its employees intent (conspiracy) to conduct city and county business as a
racketeering enterprise.
InReGrandJuryProceedings,87F.3d377(9thCir.1996)at378:Attorneyneed
knownothingaboutclient'songoingorplannedillicitactivityforcrimefraud
exceptiontoattorneyclientprivilegetoapply.TheCountyisliableforcity
employeesplannedillicitactivitytoturnpropertyownershipintoacrime,andany
attorneyrepresentingthecityorcountyagentsinalawsuitisliableundercrime
fraudexception,andtheirmalpracticeinsurancewillnotcoverRICOallegations;
norcananyoftheirclientsrecoverANYattorneyfees(thisnotionwasrejectedby
thefullHousein1970seeCIVILRICO,footnote25)
th
Crowev.Henry,43F.3d198,199(5Cir.1995):
A pre-answer Motion to Dismiss
action for failure to state a claim admits facts alleged in complaint but challenges
plaintiff's right to relief based upon those facts. The County would have no hope of
using a 12(b)(6) motion to deny the fact that any of its citizens exists, and that one
citizen was subjected to Animal Enterprise Terrorism, threats, fear, intimidation,
trespass, and robbery by city employees.
Guerrerov.Gates,etal,CV007165,WILLIAMJ.REA,August28,2000,United
StatesDistrictCourtfortheCentralDistrictofCalifornia,quotingpertinentparts
relatingtonationwidenewstheLAPDCONDUCTSUBJECTTOCIVILRICO:
DISCUSSION:LegalStandardPursuanttoFederalRuleofCivilProcedure12(b)
(6):Apartymaybringamotiontodismissaplaintiff'sclaimsiftheplaintiff's
allegationsfailtostateaclaimuponwhichreliefcanbegranted.Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6).Generally,[a]complaintshouldnotbedismissedforfailuretostatea
claimunlessitappearsbeyonddoubtthattheplaintiffcanprovenosetoffactsin
supportofhisclaimwhichwouldentitlehimtorelief.Conleyv.Gibson,355U.S.
41,4546(1957).Thus,dismissalisproperwherethecomplaintlackseithera
cognizablelegaltheoryorinsufficientfactstosupportacognizablelegaltheory.
SeeBalistreriv.PacificaPoliceDept.,901F.2d696,699(9thCir.1990).In
reviewingaRule12(b)(6)motion,acourtmustconstrueallallegationscontained
inthecomplaintinthelightmostfavorabletotheplaintiff,andmustacceptastrue
allmaterialallegationsinthecomplaint,aswellasanyreasonableinferencestobe
drawnfromthem.SeeHospitalBldg.Co.v.TrusteesoftheRexHosp.,425U.S.
738(1976).Thus,nomatterhowimprobabletheallegedfactsare,thecourtmust
acceptthemastrueforthepurposesoftheaction.SeeNietzkev.Williams,490
U.S.319,32627(1989).Thefirstamendedcomplaintallegesplantingevidence
andextortionbyRampartpolice,whicharebothracketeeringviolationsunder
Title18.Attorneysforthedefendantpolicemadeamotiontodismissbasedon
failuretostateaclaim.Thecourtrecommendedthatthismotionbedenied,and
encouragedtheplaintifftopursuehisracketeeringclaims.Likewise,itwouldbe
veryeasytoprovethesetoffactsthatthecityandcountyemployeesaidedand
abettedracketeeringactivitybyrestrictingpropertyuse,andbyconspiringwith
privateindividualsandcorporationstoterrorizetaxpayingcitizens.
ARzoning:ExistinganimalkeepingusesintheARAgriculturalResidential
Districtwhichbecomenonconformingbyreasonofdevelopmentonanadjoining
Page 118 of 131
sitewhichwasvacantwhentheanimalkeepingusewasestablishedmaybe
continuedindefinitely;provided,however,iftheanimalkeepinguseisabandoned
ordiscontinuedforaperiodofeighteen(18)months,itshallnotberesumedexcept
inconformitywiththeprovisionsofSection93.420ofthisarticle.TheCountyis
liableforillegallyproposing(extortion)thatcitizensbegiven18monthstogetrid
ofchickensorfacechargesinordertothreatenandintimidatecitizenstogiveup
theirpropertyrights,whichisaschemeorartificetodefraudundercolorofofficial
right.TheCountyisliableforanyofitsemployees/agentsusingextortion,threats,
fearandintimidationtocoercecitizenstoamendtheirDeedsandgiveuptheir
propertyrightswithoutjustcompensationordueprocess,andforfalsely
purportingthatifthechickensorotherlivestock/smallfarmanimalsaregonefor
18months,theCountycanthenfraudulentlyamendtheownersdeed,illegally
convertthetitle,andgetridoftheProp13taxbreak.
DeweyJ.Jonesv.UnitedStates,529U.S.__,146L.Ed.2d902,120S.Ct.__
(2000):Held:Becauseanowneroccupiedresidencenotusedforanycommercial
purposedoesnotqualifyaspropertyusedincommerceorcommerceaffecting
activity,arsonofsuchadwellingisnotsubjecttoprosecution.TheSupremeCourt
saysthatyoucannotbeprosecutedbyanybodyfordamagingyourownproperty.
Thecountyisliableforitsemployees/agentsfraud,perjury,andextortiontosteal
propertyundertheguiseofrescuingitfromitslawfulowner.
PROPERTYOWNERSSTANDINGTOSUEUNDERRICORotellav.Wood,
528US__,145Led2d1047,120Sct.__,atpg.1047:TheRacketeerInfluenced
andCorruptOrganizationsAct(RICO)(18USCS1961etseq.)providesthat
(1)itisunlawfultoconductanenterprise'saffairsthroughapatternofracketeering
activity(18USCS1962(c),(2)apatternrequiresatleasttwoactsofracketeering
activity,thelastofwhichoccurswithin10yearsafterthecommissionofaprior
act(18USCS1962(c),(3)apersoninjuredbyaRICOviolationcanbringacivil
RICOaction(18USCS1964(c)).Anypersoninjuredbyracketeeringactivitycan
fileacivilRICOlawsuit.Racketeeringactivityisanythingwhichinterfereswith
landuseandpropertyrights,threats,fear,falseprocess,falseliens,etc.
CITIESANDCOUNTIESAREFORBIDDENTOINTERFEREWITH
FEDERALLYPROTECTEDANDFUNDEDPROGRAMSFFAand4H
Title18section666.TheftorbriberyconcerningprogramsreceivingFederal
funds.WhoeverbeinganagentofaState,orlocalgovernment,oranyagency
thereof(A)embezzles,steals,obtainsbyfraud,orotherwiseconvertstotheuseof
anypersonotherthantherightfulownershallbefinedunderthistitle,imprisoned
notmorethan10years,orboth.Thecircumstancesreferredtoisthatthe
organization,government,oragencyreceives,inanyoneyearperiod,benefitsin
excessof$10,000underaFederalprograminvolvingagrant,contract,subsidy,
loan,guarantee,insurance,orotherformofFederalassistanceAsusedinthis
section(1)thetermagentmeansapersonauthorizedtoactonbehalfofanother
personorgovernmentandincludesaservantoremployee,andapartner,director,
officer,manager,andrepresentative;(2)thetermgovernmentagencymeansa
subdivisionoftheexecutive,legislative,judicial,orotherbranchofgovernment,
includingadepartment,independentestablishment,commission,administration,
authority,board,andbureau,andacorporationorotherlegalentityestablished,
andsubjecttocontrol,byagovernmentalorintergovernmentalprogram.The
Countyisliableforitsservantsoremployees,boards,etc.embezzlementoffederal
fundsinexcessof$10,000forrestrictingfederallyfundedandprotectedanimal
enterprisesincludinghobbyists,pettingzoos,fairs,aquariums,4HandFFA,
pigeonshows,etc.bystealing,obtainingbyfraud,orotherwiseconverttotheuse
ofanypersonotherthantherightfulownerlivestockandsmallanimalslawfully
ownedwithintheCounty.Thecountydoesnotgettoreceivefederalfundsfor
protected4HandFFAprograms,thenturnaroundandrestrictthem.Notonlyis
thisacrimeagainstthetaxpayingcitizensintheCounty,itisacrimeagainstthe
UnitedStates.Anythingwhichinterfereswithlanduseisracketeering.
Bench: I
have considered the Defense Motions & they are all DENIED. Real
Man: I did not file any motions, I filed affidavits. Bench: Well
Page 120 of 131
VETO MESSAGE.
WASHINGTON, July 10, 1832.
To the Senate.
The bill " to modify and continue " the act entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the
Bank of the United States " was presented to me on the 4th July instant. Having considered it with
that solemn regard to the principles of the Constitution which the day was calculated to inspire, and
come to the conclusion that it ought not to become a law, I herewith return it to the Senate, in which
it originated, with my objections.
A bank of the United States is in many respects convenient for the Government and useful to the
people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply impressed with the belief that some of the powers and
privileges possessed by the existing bank are unauthorized by the Constitution, subversive of the
rights of the States, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, I felt it my duty at an early period of
my Administration to call the attention of Congress to the practicability of organizing an institution
combining all its advantages and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret that in the act before
me I can perceive none of those modifications of the bank charter which are necessary, in my
opinion, to make it compatible with justice, with sound policy, or with the Constitution of our country.
The present corporate body, denominated the president, directors, and company of the Bank of
the United States, will have existed at the time this act is intended to take effect twenty years. It
enjoys an exclusive privilege of banking under the authority of the General Government, a monopoly
of its favor and support, and, as a necessary consequence, almost a monopoly of the foreign and
domestic exchange. The powers, privileges, and favors bestowed upon it in the original charter, by
increasing the value of the stock far above its par value, operated as a gratuity of many millions to
the stockholders.
An apology may be found for the failure to guard against this result in the consideration that the
effect of the original act of incorporation could not be certainly foreseen at the time of its passage.
The act before me proposes another gratuity to the holders of the same stock, and in many cases to
the same men, of at least seven millions more. This donation finds no apology in any uncertainty as
to the effect of the act. On all hands it is conceded that its passage will increase at least so or 30 per
cent more the market price of the stock, subject to the payment of the annuity of $200,000 per year
secured by the act, thus adding in a moment one-fourth to its par value. It is not our own citizens
only who are to receive the bounty of our Government. More than eight millions of the stock of this
bank are held by foreigners. By this act the American Republic proposes virtually to make them a
present of some millions of dollars. For these gratuities to foreigners and to some of our own opulent
citizens the act secures no equivalent whatever. They are the certain gains of the present
stockholders under the operation of this act, after making full allowance for the payment of the
bonus.
Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public, which
ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow on the
stockholders of the existing bank must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American
people. It is due to them, therefore, if their Government sell monopolies and exclusive privileges, that
they should at least exact for them as much as they are worth in open market. The value of the
monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty-eight millions of stock would
probably be at an advance of 50 per cent, and command in market at least $42,000,000, subject to
the payment of the present bonus. The present value of the monopoly, therefore, is $17,000,000,
and this the act proposes to sell for three millions, payable in fifteen annual installments of $200,000
each.
It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the
Government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the
original contract. If we must have such a corporation, why should not the Government sell out the
whole stock and thus secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted? Why
should not Congress create and sell twenty-eight millions of stock, incorporating the purchasers with
all the powers and privileges secured in this act and putting the premium upon the sales into the
Treasury?
But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be
predicated on the erroneous idea that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right not only to
the favor but to the bounty of Government. It appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held
by foreigners and the residue is held by a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest
class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the
purchase of this monopoly and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth. This seems the
less excusable because some of our citizens not now stockholders petitioned that the door of
competition might be opened, and offered to take a charter on terms much more favorable to the
Government and country.
But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to
all the private stock in the existing bank, has been set aside, and the bounty of our Government is
proposed to be again bestowed on the few who have been fortunate enough to secure the stock and
at this moment wield the power of the existing institution. I can not perceive the justice or policy of
this course. If our Government must sell monopolies, it would seem to be its duty to take nothing
less than their full value, and if gratuities must be made once in fifteen or twenty years let them not
be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government nor upon a designated and favored class of
men in our own country. It is but justice and good policy, as far as the nature of the case will admit, to
confine our favors to our own fellow-citizens, and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to profit by
our bounty. In the bearings of the act before me upon these points I find ample reasons why it should
not become a law.
It has been urged as an argument in favor of rechartering the present bank that the calling in its
loans will produce great embarrassment and distress. The time allowed to close its concerns is
ample, and if it has been well managed its pressure will be light, and heavy only in case its
management has been bad. If, therefore, it shall produce distress, the fault will be its own, and it
would furnish a reason against renewing a power which has been so obviously abused. But will
there ever be a time when this reason will be less powerful? To acknowledge its force is to admit that
the bank ought to be perpetual, and as a consequence the present stockholders and those inheriting
their rights as successors be established a privileged order, clothed both with great political power
and enjoying immense pecuniary advantages from their connection with the Government.
The modifications of the existing charter proposed by this act are not such, in my view, as make
it consistent with the rights of the States or the liberties of the people. The qualification of the right of
the bank to hold real estate, the limitation of its power to establish branches, and the power reserved
to Congress to forbid the circulation of small notes are restrictions comparatively of little value or
importance. All the objectionable principles of the existing corporation, and most of its odious
features, are retained without alleviation.
The fourth section provides " that the notes or bills of the said corporation, although the same
be, on the faces thereof, respectively made payable at one place only, shall nevertheless be
received by the said corporation at the bank or at any of the offices of discount and deposit thereof if
tendered in liquidation or payment of any balance or balances due to said corporation or to such
office of discount and deposit from any other incorporated bank." This provision secures to the State
banks a legal privilege in the Bank of the United States which is withheld from all private citizens. If a
State bank in Philadelphia owe the Bank of the United States and have notes issued by the St. Louis
branch, it can pay the debt with those notes, but if a merchant, mechanic, or other private citizen be
in like circumstances he can not by law pay his debt with those notes, but must sell them at a
discount or send them to St. Louis to be cashed. This boon conceded to the State banks, though not
unjust in itself, is most odious because it does not measure out equal justice to the high and the low,
the rich and the poor. To the extent of its practical effect it is a bond of union among the banking
establishments of the nation, erecting them into an interest separate from that of the people, and its
necessary tendency is to unite the Bank of the United States and the State banks in any measure
which may be thought conducive to their common interest.
The ninth section of the act recognizes principles of worse tendency than any provision of the
present charter.
It enacts that " the cashier of the bank shall annually report to the Secretary of the Treasury the
names of all stockholders who are not resident citizens of the United States, and on the application
of the treasurer of any State shall make out and transmit to such treasurer a list of stockholders
residing in or citizens of such State, with the amount of stock owned by each." Although this
provision, taken in connection with a decision of the Supreme Court, surrenders, by its silence, the
right of the States to tax the banking institutions created by this corporation under the name of
branches throughout the Union, it is evidently intended to be construed as a concession of their right
to tax that portion of the stock which may be held by their own citizens and residents. In this light, if
the act becomes a law, it will be understood by the States, who will probably proceed to levy a tax
equal to that paid upon the stock of banks incorporated by themselves. In some States that tax is
now I per cent, either on the capital or on the shares, and that may be assumed as the amount
which all citizen or resident stockholders would be taxed under the operation of this act. As it is only
the stock held in the States and not that employed within them which would be subject to taxation,
and as the names of foreign stockholders are not to be reported to the treasurers of the States, it is
obvious that the stock held by them will be exempt from this burden. Their annual profits will
therefore be I per cent more than the citizen stockholders, and as the annual dividends of the bank
may be safely estimated at 7 per cent, the stock will be worth 10 or 15 per cent more to foreigners
than to citizens of the United States. To appreciate the effects which this state of things will produce,
we must take a brief review of the operations and present condition of the Bank of the United States.
By documents submitted to Congress at the present session it appears that on the 1st of
January, 1832, of the twenty-eight millions of private stock in the corporation, $8,405,500 were held
by foreigners, mostly of Great Britain. The amount of stock held in the nine Western and
Southwestern States is $140,200, and in the four Southern States is $5,623,100, and in the Middle
and Eastern States is about $13,522,000. The profits of the bank in 1831, as shown in a statement
to Congress, were about $3,455,598; of this there accrued in the nine western States about
$1,640,048; in the four Southern States about $352,507, and in the Middle and Eastern States about
$1,463,041. As little stock is held in the West, it is obvious that the debt of the people in that section
to the bank is principally a debt to the Eastern and foreign stockholders; that the interest they pay
upon it is carried into the Eastern States and into Europe, and that it is a burden upon their industry
and a drain of their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and occasional
distress. To meet this burden and equalize the exchange operations of the bank, the amount of
specie drawn from those States through its branches within the last two years, as shown by its
official reports, was about $6,000,000. More than half a million of this amount does not stop in the
Eastern States, but passes on to Europe to pay the dividends of the foreign stockholders. In the
principle of taxation recognized by this act the Western States find no adequate compensation for
this perpetual burden on their industry and drain of their currency. The branch bank at Mobile made
last year $95,140, yet under the provisions of this act the State of Alabama can raise no revenue
from these profitable operations, because not a share of the stock is held by any of her citizens.
Mississippi and Missouri are in the same condition in relation to the branches at Natchez and St.
Louis, and such, in a greater or less degree, is the condition of every Western State. The tendency
of the plan of taxation which this act proposes will be to place the whole United States in the same
relation to foreign countries which the Western States now bear to the Eastern. When by a tax on
resident stockholders the stock of this bank is made worth 10 or 15 per cent more to foreigners than
to residents, most of it will inevitably leave the country.
Thus will this provision in its practical effect deprive the Eastern as well as the Southern and
Western States of the means of raising a revenue from the extension of business and great profits of
this institution. It will make the American people debtors to aliens in nearly the whole amount due to
this bank, and send across the Atlantic from two to five millions of specie every year to pay the bank
dividends.
In another of its bearings this provision is fraught with danger. Of the twenty-five directors of this
bank five are chosen by the Government and twenty by the citizen stockholders. From all voice in
these elections the foreign stockholders are excluded by the charter. In proportion, therefore, as the
stock is transferred to foreign holders the extent of suffrage in the choice of directors is curtailed.
Already is almost a third of the stock in foreign hands and not represented in elections. It is
constantly passing out of the country, and this act will accelerate its departure. The entire control of
the institution would necessarily fall into the hands of a few citizen stockholders, and the ease with
which the object would be accomplished would be a temptation to designing men to secure that
control in their own hands by monopolizing the remaining stock. There is danger that a president and
directors would then be able to elect themselves from year to year, and without responsibility or
control manage the whole concerns of the bank during the existence of its charter. It is easy to
conceive that great evils to our country and its institutions millet flow from such a concentration of
power in the hands of a few men irresponsible to the people.
Is there no danger to our liberty and independence in a bank that in its nature has so little to bind
it to our country? The president of the bank has told us that most of the State banks exist by its
forbearance. Should its influence become concentered, as it may under the operation of such an act
as this, in the hands of a self-elected directory whose interests are identified with those of the foreign
stockholders, will there not be cause to tremble for the purity of our elections in peace and for the
independence of our country in war? Their power would be great whenever they might choose to
exert it; but if this monopoly were regularly renewed every fifteen or twenty years on terms proposed
by themselves, they might seldom in peace put forth their strength to influence elections or control
the affairs of the nation. But if any private citizen or public functionary should interpose to curtail its
powers or prevent a renewal of its privileges, it can not be doubted that he would be made to feel its
influence.
Should the stock of the bank principally pass into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country,
and we should unfortunately become involved in a war with that country, what would be our
condition? Of the course which would be pursued by a bank almost wholly owned by the subjects of
a foreign power, and managed by those whose interests, if not affections, would run in the same
direction there can be no doubt. All its operations within would be in aid of the hostile fleets and
armies without. Controlling our currency, receiving our public moneys, and holding thousands of our
citizens in dependence, it would be more formidable and dangerous than the naval and military
power of the enemy.
If we must have a bank with private stockholders, every consideration of sound policy and every
impulse of American feeling admonishes that it should be purely American. Its stockholders should
be composed exclusively of our own citizens, who at least ought to be friendly to our Government
and willing to support it in times of difficulty and danger. So abundant is domestic capital that
competition in subscribing for the stock of local banks has recently led almost to riots. To a bank
exclusively of American stockholders, possessing the powers and privileges granted by this act,
subscriptions for $200,000,000 could be readily obtained. Instead of sending abroad the stock of the
bank in which the Government must deposit its funds and on which it must rely to sustain its credit in
times of emergency, it would rather seem to be expedient to prohibit its sale to aliens under penalty
of absolute forfeiture.
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to
be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion
I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as
deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the
States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an
argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor
of a bank; another, in 1811, decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank;
another, in 1816, decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn
from that source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expressions of legislative, judicial, and
executive opinions against the bank have been probably to those in its favor as 4 to 1. There is
nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the
act before me.
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control
the coordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must
each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath
to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of
the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to
them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority
of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive
when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their
reasoning may deserve.
But in the case relied upon the Supreme Court have not decided that all the features of this
corporation are compatible with the Constitution. It is true that the court have said that the law
incorporating the bank is a constitutional exercise of power by Congress; but taking into view the
whole opinion of the court and the reasoning by which they have come to that conclusion, I
understand them to have decided that inasmuch as a bank is an appropriate means for carrying into
effect the enumerated powers of the General Government, therefore the law incorporating it is in
accordance with that provision of the Constitution which declares that Congress shall have power "
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution. "
Having satisfied themselves that the word "necessary" in the Constitution means needful,"
"requisite," "essential," "conducive to," and that "a bank" is a convenient, a useful, and essential
instrument in the prosecution of the Government's "fiscal operations," they conclude that to "use one
must be within the discretion of Congress " and that " the act to incorporate the Bank of the United
States is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution;" "but, " say they, "where the law is not
prohibited and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the Government, to
undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department and to tread on legislative ground."
The principle here affirmed is that the "degree of its necessity," involving all the details of a
banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative consideration. A bank is constitutional, but
it is the province of the Legislature to determine whether this or that particular power, privilege, or
exemption is "necessary and proper" to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the Government,
and from their decision there is no appeal to the courts of justice. Under the decision of the Supreme
Court, therefore, it is the exclusive province of Congress and the President to decide whether the
particular features of this act are necessary and proper in order to enable the bank to perform
conveniently and efficiently the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal agent, and therefore
constitutional, or unnecessary and improper, and therefore unconstitutional.
Without commenting on the general principle affirmed by the Supreme Court, let us examine the
details of this act in accordance with the rule of legislative action which they have laid down. It will be
found that many of the powers and privileges conferred on it can not be supposed necessary for the
purpose for which it is proposed to be created, and are not, therefore, means necessary to attain the
end in view, and consequently not justified by the Constitution.
The original act of incorporation, section 2I, enacts "that no other bank shall be established by
any future law of the United States during the continuance of the corporation hereby created, for
which the faith of the United States is hereby pledged: Provided, Congress may renew existing
charters for banks within the District of Columbia not increasing the capital thereof, and may also
establish any other bank or banks in said District with capitals not exceeding in the whole
$6,000,000 if they shall deem it expedient." This provision is continued in force by the act before me
fifteen years from the ad of March, 1836.
If Congress possessed the power to establish one bank, they had power to establish more than
one if in their opinion two or more banks had been " necessary " to facilitate the execution of the
powers delegated to them in the Constitution. If they possessed the power to establish a second
bank, it was a power derived from the Constitution to be exercised from time to time, and at any time
when the interests of the country or the emergencies of the Government might make it expedient. It
was possessed by one Congress as well as another, and by all Congresses alike, and alike at every
session. But the Congress of 1816 have taken it away from their successors for twenty years, and
the Congress of 1832 proposes to abolish it for fifteen years more. It can not
be "necessary" or "proper" for Congress to barter away or divest themselves of any of the powers-
vested in them by the Constitution to be exercised for the public good. It is not " necessary " to the
efficiency of the bank, nor is it "proper''in relation to themselves and their successors. They
may properly use the discretion vested in them, but they may not limit the discretion of their
successors. This restriction on themselves and grant of a monopoly to the bank is therefore
unconstitutional.
In another point of view this provision is a palpable attempt to amend the Constitution by an act
of legislation. The Constitution declares that "the Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive
legislation in all cases whatsoever" over the District of Columbia. Its constitutional power, therefore,
to establish banks in the District of Columbia and increase their capital at will is unlimited and
uncontrollable by any other power than that which gave authority to the Constitution. Yet this act
declares that Congress shall not increase the capital of existing banks, nor create other banks with
capitals exceeding in the whole $6,000,000. The Constitution declares that Congress shall have
power to exercise exclusive legislation over this District "in all cases whatsoever," and this act
declares they shall not. Which is the supreme law of the land? This provision can not
be"necessary" or "proper" or constitutional unless the absurdity be admitted that whenever it be
"necessary and proper " in the opinion of Congress they have a right to barter away one portion of
the powers vested in them by the Constitution as a means of executing the rest.
On two subjects only does the Constitution recognize in Congress the power to grant exclusive
privileges or monopolies. It declares that "Congress shall have power to promote the progress of
science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." Out of this express delegation of power have grown our
laws of patents and copyrights. As the Constitution expressly delegates to Congress the power to
grant exclusive privileges in these cases as the means of executing the substantive power " to
promote the progress of science and useful arts," it is consistent with the fair rules of construction to
conclude that such a power was not intended to be granted as a means of accomplishing any other
end. On every other subject which comes within the scope of Congressional power there is an everliving discretion in the use of proper means, which can not be restricted or abolished without an
amendment of the Constitution. Every act of Congress, therefore, which attempts by grants of
monopolies or sale of exclusive privileges for a limited time, or a time without limit, to restrict or
extinguish its own discretion in the choice of means to execute its delegated powers is equivalent to
a legislative amendment of the Constitution, and palpably unconstitutional.
This act authorizes and encourages transfers of its stock to foreigners and grants them an
exemption from all State and national taxation. So far from being "necessary and proper" that the
bank should possess this power to make it a safe and efficient agent of the Government in its fiscal
operations, it is calculated to convert the Bank of the United States into a foreign bank, to impoverish
our people in time of peace, to disseminate a foreign influence through every section of the
Republic, and in war to endanger our independence.
The several States reserved the power at the formation of the Constitution to regulate and
control titles and transfers of real property, and most, if not all, of them have laws disqualifying aliens
from acquiring or holding lands within their limits. But this act, in disregard of the undoubted right of
the States to prescribe such disqualifications, gives to aliens stockholders in this bank an interest
and title, as members of the corporation, to all the real property it may acquire within any of the
States of this Union. This privilege granted to aliens is not "necessary" to enable the bank to perform
its public duties, nor in any sense "proper," because it is vitally subversive of the rights of the States.
The Government of the United States have no constitutional power to purchase lands within the
States except "for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful
buildings," and even for these objects only "by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the
same shall be." By making themselves stockholders in the bank and granting to the corporation the
power to purchase lands for other purposes they assume a power not granted in the Constitution
and grant to others what they do not themselves possess. It is not necessary to the receiving, safekeeping, or transmission of the funds of the Government that the bank should possess this power,
and it is not proper that Congress should thus enlarge the powers delegated to them in the
Constitution.
The old Bank of the United States possessed a capital of only $11,000,000, which was found
fully sufficient to enable it with dispatch and safety to perform all the functions required of it by the
Government. The capital of the present bank is $35,000,000-at least twenty-four more than
experience has proved to be necessary to enable a bank to perform its public functions. The public
debt which existed during the period of the old bank and on the establishment of the new has been
nearly paid off, and our revenue will soon be reduced. This increase of capital is therefore not for
public but for private purposes.
The Government is the only "proper" judge where its agents should reside and keep their offices,
because it best knows where their presence will be "necessary." It can not, therefore,
be "necessary" or "proper" to authorize the bank to locate branches where it pleases to perform the
public service, without consulting the Government, and contrary to its will. The principle laid down by
the Supreme Court concedes that Congress can not establish a bank for purposes of private
speculation and gain, but only as a means of executing the delegated powers of the General
Government. By the same principle a branch bank can not constitutionally be established for other
than public purposes. The power which this act gives to establish two branches in any State, without
the injunction or request of the Government and for other than public purposes, is not"necessary" to
the due execution of the powers delegated to Congress.
The bonus which is exacted from the bank is a confession upon the face of the act that the
powers granted by it are greater than are"necessary" to its character of a fiscal agent. The
Government does not tax its officers and agents for the privilege of serving it. The bonus of a million
and a half required by the original charter and that of three millions proposed by this act are not
exacted for the privilege of giving "the necessary facilities for transferring the public funds from place
to place within the United States or the Territories thereof, and for distributing the same in payment
of the public creditors without charging commission or claiming allowance on account of the
difference of exchange," as required by the act of incorporation, but for something more beneficial to
the stockholders. The original act declares that it (the bonus) is granted " in consideration of the
exclusive privileges and benefits conferred by this act upon the said bank, " and the act before me
declares it to be "in consideration of the exclusive benefits and privileges continued by this act to the
said corporation for fifteen years, as aforesaid." It is therefore for "exclusive privileges and benefits"
conferred for their own use and emolument, and not for the advantage of the Government, that a
bonus is exacted. These surplus powers for which the bank is required to pay can not surely
be "necessary" to make it the fiscal agent of the Treasury. If they were, the exaction of a bonus for
them would not be " proper."
It is maintained by some that the bank is a means of executing the constitutional power "to coin
money and regulate the value thereof." Congress have established a mint to coin money and passed
laws to regulate the value thereof. The money so coined, with its value so regulated, and such
foreign coins as Congress may adopt are the only currency known to the Constitution. But if they
have other power to regulate the currency, it was conferred to be exercised by themselves, and not
to be transferred to a corporation. If the bank be established for that purpose, with a charter
unalterable without its consent, Congress have parted with their power for a term of years, during
which the Constitution is a dead letter. It is neither necessary nor proper to transfer its legislative
power to such a bank, and therefore unconstitutional.
By its silence, considered in connection with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
McCulloch against the State of Maryland, this act takes from the States the power to tax a portion of
the banking business carried on within their limits, in subversion of one of the strongest barriers
which secured them against Federal encroachments. Banking, like farming, manufacturing, or any
other occupation or profession, is abusiness, the right to follow which is not originally derived from
the laws. Every citizen and every company of citizens in all of our States possessed the right until
the State legislatures deemed it good policy to prohibit private banking by law. If the prohibitory State
laws were now repealed, every citizen would again possess the right. The State banks are a
qualified restoration of the right which has been taken away by the laws against banking, guarded by
such provisions and limitations as in the opinion of the State legislatures the public interest requires.
These corporations, unless there be an exemption in their charter, are, like private bankers and
banking companies, subject to State taxation. The manner in which these taxes shall be laid
depends wholly on legislative discretion. It may be upon the bank, upon the stock, upon the profits,
or in any other mode which the sovereign power shall will.
Upon the formation of the Constitution the States guarded their taxing power with peculiar
jealousy. They surrendered it only as it regards imports and exports. In relation to every other object
within their jurisdiction, whether persons, property, business, or professions, it was secured in as
ample a manner as it was before possessed. All persons, though United States officers, are liable to
a poll tax by the States within which they reside. The lands of the United States are liable to the
usual land tax, except in the new States, from whom agreements that they will not tax unsold lands
are exacted when they are admitted into the Union. Horses, wagons, any beasts or vehicles, tools,
or property belonging to private citizens, though employed in the service of the United States, are
subject to State taxation. Every private business, whether carried on by an officer of the General
Government or not, whether it be mixed with public concerns or not, even if it be carried on by the
Government of the United States itself, separately or in partnership, falls within the scope of the
taxing power of the State. Nothing comes more fully within it than banks and the business of
banking, by whomsoever instituted and carried on. Over this whole subject-matter it is just as
absolute, unlimited, and uncontrollable as if the Constitution had never been adopted, because in
the formation of that instrument it was reserved without qualification.
The principle is conceded that the States can not rightfully tax the operations of the General
Government. They can not tax the money of the Government deposited in the State banks, nor the
agency of those banks in remitting it; but will any man maintain that their mere selection to perform
this public service for the General Government would exempt the State banks and their ordinary
business from State taxation? Had the United States, instead of establishing a bank at Philadelphia,
employed a private banker to keep and transmit their funds, would it have deprived Pennsylvania of
the right to tax his bank and his usual banking operations? It will not be pretended. Upon what
principal, then, are the banking establishments of the Bank of the United States and their usual
banking operations to be exempted from taxation ? It is not their public agency or the deposits of the
Government which the States claim a right to tax, but their banks and their banking powers,
instituted and exercised within State jurisdiction for their private emolument-those powers and
privileges for which they pay a bonus, and which the States tax in their own banks. The exercise of
these powers within a State, no matter by whom or under what authority, whether by private citizens
in their original right, by corporate bodies created by the States, by foreigners or the agents of
foreign governments located within their limits, forms a legitimate object of State taxation. From this
and like sources, from the persons, property, and business that are found residing, located, or
carried on under their jurisdiction, must the States, since the surrender of their right to raise a
revenue from imports and exports, draw all the money necessary for the support of their
governments and the maintenance of their independence. There is no more appropriate subject of
taxation than banks, banking, and bank stocks, and none to which the States ought more
pertinaciously to cling.
It can not be necessary to the character of the bank as a fiscal agent of the Government that its
private business should be exempted from that taxation to which all the State banks are liable, nor
can I conceive it "proper" that the substantive and most essential powers reserved by the States
shall be thus attacked and annihilated as a means of executing the powers delegated to the General
Government. It may be safely assumed that none of those sages who had an agency in forming or
adopting our Constitution ever imagined that any portion of the taxing power of the States not
prohibited to them nor delegated to Congress was to be swept away and annihilated as a means of
executing certain powers delegated to Congress.
If our power over means is so absolute that the Supreme Court will not call in question the
constitutionality of an act of Congress the subject of which "is not prohibited, and is really calculated
to effect any of the objects intrusted to the Government," although, as in the case before me, it takes
away powers expressly granted to Congress and rights scrupulously reserved to the States, it
becomes us to proceed in our legislation with the utmost caution. Though not directly, our own
powers and the rights of the States may be indirectly legislated away in the use of means to execute
substantive powers. We may not enact that Congress shall not have the power of exclusive
legislation over the District of Columbia, but we may pledge the faith of the United States that as a
means of executing other powers it shall not be exercised for twenty years or forever. We may not
pass an act prohibiting the States to tax the banking business carried on within their limits, but we
may, as a means of executing our powers over other objects, place that business in the hands of our
agents and then declare it exempt from State taxation in their hands. Thus may our own powers and
the rights of the States, which we can not directly curtail or invade, be frittered away and
extinguished in the use of means employed by us to execute other powers. That a bank of the
United States, competent to all the duties which may be required by the Government, might be so
organized as not to infringe on our own delegated powers or the reserved rights of the States I do
not entertain a doubt. Had the Executive been called upon to furnish the project of such an
institution, the duty would have been cheerfully performed. In the absence of such a call it was
obviously proper that he should confine himself to pointing out those prominent features in the act
presented which in his opinion make it incompatible with the Constitution and sound policy. A general
discussion will now take place, eliciting new light and settling important principles; and a new
Congress, elected in the midst of such discussion, and furnishing an equal representation of the
people according to the last census, will bear to the Capitol the verdict of public opinion, and, I doubt
not, bring this important question to a satisfactory result.
Under such circumstances the bank comes forward and asks a renewal of its charter for a term
of fifteen years upon conditions which not only operate as a gratuity to the stockholders of many
millions of dollars, but will sanction any abuses and legalize any encroachments.
Suspicions are entertained and charges are made of gross abuse and violation of its charter. An
investigation unwillingly conceded and so restricted in time as necessarily to make it incomplete and
unsatisfactory discloses enough to excite suspicion and alarm. In the practices of the principal bank
partially unveiled, in the absence of important witnesses, and in numerous charges confidently made
and as yet wholly uninvestigated there was enough to induce a majority of the committee of
investigation-a committee which was selected from the most able and honorable members of the
House of Representatives-to recommend a suspension of further action upon the bill and a
prosecution of the inquiry. As the charter had yet four years to run, and as a renewal now was not
necessary to the successful prosecution of its business, it was to have been expected that the bank
itself, conscious of its purity and proud of its character, would have withdrawn its application for the
present, and demanded the severest scrutiny into all its transactions. In their declining to do so there
seems to be an additional reason why the functionaries of the Government should proceed with less
haste and more caution in the renewal of their monopoly.
The bank is professedly established as an agent of the executive branch of the Government,
and its constitutionality is maintained on that ground. Neither upon the propriety of present action nor
upon the provisions of this act was the Executive consulted. It has had no opportunity to say that it
neither needs nor wants an agent clothed with such powers and favored by such exemptions. There
is nothing in its legitimate functions which makes it necessary or proper. Whatever interest or
influence, whether public or private, has given birth to this act, it can not be found either in the
wishes or necessities of the executive department, by which present action is deemed premature,
and the powers conferred upon its agent not only unnecessary, but dangerous to the Government
and country.
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their
selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of
talents, of education, or of wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of
the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally
entitled to protection by law; but when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just
advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich
richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society-the farmers, mechanics, and
laborers-who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right
to complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its
evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its
rains, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an
unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and unnecessary departure from
these just principles.
Nor is our Government to be maintained or our Union preserved by invasions of the rights and
powers of the several States. In thus attempting to make our General Government strong we make it
weak. Its true strength consists in leaving individuals and States as much as possible to themselvesin making itself felt, not in its power, but in its beneficence; not in its control, but in its protection; not
in binding the States more closely to the center, but leaving each to move unobstructed in its proper
orbit.
Experience should teach us wisdom. Most of the difficulties our Government now encounters
and most of the dangers which impend over our Union have sprung from an abandonment of the
legitimate objects of Government by our national legislation, and the adoption of such principles as
are embodied in this act. Many of our rich men have not been content with equal protection and
equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By attempting to
gratify their desires we have in the results of our legislation arrayed section against section, interest
against interest, and man against man, in a fearful commotion which threatens to shake the
foundations of our Union. It is time to pause in our career to review our principles, and if possible
revive that devoted patriotism and spirit of compromise which distinguished the sages of the
Revolution and the fathers of our Union. If we can not at once, in justice to interests vested under
improvident legislation, make our Government what it ought to be, we can at least take a stand
against all new grants of monopolies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our
Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many, and in favor of compromise
and gradual reform in our code of laws and system of political economy.
I have now done my duty to my country. If sustained by my fellow citizens, I shall be grateful and
happy; if not, I shall find in the motives which impel me ample grounds for contentment and peace.
In the difficulties which surround us and the dangers which threaten our institutions there is cause for
neither dismay nor alarm. For relief and deliverance let us firmly rely on that kind Providence which I
am sure watches with peculiar care over the destinies of our Republic, and on the intelligence and
wisdom of our countrymen. Through His abundant goodness and heir patriotic devotion our liberty
and Union will be preserved.
ANDREW JACKSON.