Professional Documents
Culture Documents
&DYHOO
David LaRocca
The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Volume 47, Number 2, Summer
2013, pp. 109-131 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\8QLYHUVLW\RI,OOLQRLV3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/jae.2013.0011
Just as there was a time when it was uncommon, not to say unfashionable
and perhaps professionally treacherous, for philosophers to write about
Ralph Waldo Emerson, there was also a time when the pertinence of Stanley
Cavells work for philosophy was a point of controversy. For some philosophers, as well as literary scholars who read and use work by philosophers,
Cavells achievements were in evidence early and consistentlyeven as he
ably ventured into new fields of research such as opera, film, Shakespeare,
the American Transcendentalists, and so onand writing about him did not
pose a problem but instead offered the pleasure of reading and commenting. Yet even with many points of critical celebration along the way, there
was a long stretch when Cavells place in, and impact on, philosophy and
other humanistic fields was either marginalized or in doubt. It seems that as
the repression of Emerson has been overcome, so too the trial period for
Cavells full membership has elapsed. Now there is little reason to worry or
complain that his work is not getting sufficient attention. In the last half dozen years, for example, there have been as many international conferences
celebrating his work, and as Cavell himself notes in his 2010 autobiography,
David LaRocca, PhD, is Writer-in-Residence in the F. L. Allen Room at the New York
Public Library and a Fellow at the Moving Picture Institute in New York. He is the
author of On Emerson (Wadsworth, 2003), and the editor of Stanley Cavells book
Emersons Transcendental Etudes (Stanford University Press, 2003) and The Philosophy
of Charlie Kaufman (University Press of Kentucky, 2011), and Estimating Emerson: An
Anthology of Criticism from Carlyle to Cavell (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013). His articles
on aesthetic theory, autobiography, film, and American philosophy have appeared
in Epoch, Afterimage, Transactions, Liminalities, Film and Philosophy, Midwest Quarterly,
and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 2013
2013 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
110LaRocca
Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory, there are now roughly as many
books on my work as works by me.2 Cavell has said that while he may be
the victim of unfortunate timing, his academic life has, for all its complications and disappointments, been charmed, and that being odd and,
staying odd has its benefits, including remaining, however precariously,
contemporary.3 It may be precisely Cavells belatedness, as I have heard
him refer to it, that contributes to the careful and ongoing reception of his
work, since it can often take time to find ones best readers.4
Given the improving and continually hopeful condition of Cavells inheritance, I do not proceed here in a mode of defense or complaint, but instead in
a mood of wonderas a philosophical anthropologist might when inquiring
after the rituals and beliefs of a tribe. I am interested in the phenomenon and
practice of reading texts that, because of their power, are capable of inspiring
new writing while also causing the inspired to feel afraid of, or otherwise
estranged from, the work. Panicked by its pedagogical force, a reader trying
to write new things may be led to defer or diminish the work that inspired
those new things, finding that the inspiration suffocates new initiatives in
prose. In this essay I attend closely to how these and other issues in the aesthetics of reading appear when engaged with the interpretation of Cavells
writing, noting along the way what might be called the manner or sensibility
of his works diverse range of inheritors as well as their philosophical commitments and reservations. Being summoned to thought by writing does not
mean one knows what to do with it, much less how to produce new work of
comparable quality. And yet reading and writing must go on.
Why should the nature of inheriting Cavells writing be of interest to a
group larger than, say, his most devoted readers and supporters? First, because the phenomenon, while made concrete in Cavells case, is sufficiently generic to warrant a wider fascination with everything from a readers
self-consciousness as a reader to a readers encounter with the criteria that
make up her professional interests, including the categories with which
she conducts scholarship. Thus my invocation, in the title of the present
essay, of Cavells notion that philosophy becomes the education of grownups is meant to associate the aesthetics of reading Cavells work with the
more general experience of education as it continues into maturity, regardless of discipline.5
Cavells writing is especially pertinent to an audience interested in the
aesthetics of education, because he has both argued and exemplified (in his
own writing) how, as he finds in Thoreau, reading is a variation of writing,
where they meet in meditation and achieve accounts of their opportunities;
and writing is a variation of reading, since to write is to cast words together
that you did not make, so as to give or take readings.6 Since Cavells work
perpetually occupies that space of meditation, owing to its fundamental
awareness of itself as enacting the interplay of writing and reading, the
112LaRocca
continued theorizing what remains of perennial interest to some readers of
Cavells work: the occasional, but still prominent, instances when his work
is in some form or another neglected or awkwardly esteemedas we find
in moments of misreading, as well as nonreading or disengagement. As famous and influential as Cavells work appears to be (again, the evidence
of myriad monographs, anthologies, articles, and conferences on his work
attests to this fact), it can often seem as if those features of acclaim hide a pernicious and counterintuitive fact: that scholars, perhaps especially scholars
who should benefit from his work, do not seek to deeply engage it or wed
themselves to it professionally. As a form of intellectual history, then, I propose to spend a little timein the wake of Eldridge and Rhies workin the
midst of some ideas and texts that illuminate features of Cavells reception
in academic scholarship, more particularly, in philosophy.
Eldridge and Rhie suggest that part of the work of reframing Cavells
writing is intimately caught up with a therapeutic uncovering of the resistances that have led to the repression of his voice and work in the past. The
two taskstaking up the critical past so as to engage productively with interests and work that lie, so far, aslant of Cavells, and reanimating his work
for the futuremust go hand in hand.9 Eldridge and Rhie direct their introductory remarks to the sources of resistance that inhabit literary studies,
and it seems highly plausible to count these as the same points of resistance
among some philosophers.10 Two qualities, or we might say presumptions,
of Cavells work that may have generated the allergic reaction that Eldridge and Rhie diagnose are highly pertinent to what follows in the present
investigation: (1) Cavells appeal to ordinary language is entered precisely
when the very existence of any we is in doubt, and claims to what we say
are by their very nature vulnerable, naked, and exposed (subject to rebuke,
indifference, or any other number of ways such claims might misfire); and
(2) humanism pervades Cavells writing.11 As Eldridge and Rhie suggest,
and I think reasonably encourage, it is incumbent upon Cavells readers to
critically explore what it would mean to achieve a new or transformed we
... consisting of new or transformed subjects, who have entered into this
new we from the resources of their own subjectivities.12 And in so doing,
one imagines, readers will be in a position to appreciate Cavells sense that
there is nothing more uncanny than the human, and therefore nothing
more worthy of our dedicated attention.13 In conversation Cavell has defined the primary paradox of his work as the conflict between his deeply
democratic impulse and his writing style. The paradox, to be sure, depends
on the assessment that Cavellhis voice, a presence that promotes his allegiances to humanismcomplicates the reception of his work in philosophy
and other fields in the humanities.
Eldridge and Rhies project is so helpful and illuminating precisely because it makes evident the two issues that have shadowed Cavells work
114LaRocca
for any reader of Cavell is to write about him with ones own voice. The
impulse to paraphrase Cavells voice is understandable: his philosophical
acumen and personal volubility are intoxicating, entrancing. Some cannot
help, it seems, but wish to adopt his voicesuch as it is possible, such as
they canas a way of managing troubled hopes for exceptional expression.
Living with the fear that one has no voice, or not a consistent voice for philosophical prose, Cavells distinctive style is an easy mark for paraphrase.
The risk of paraphrase when writing about Cavell is coupled with a further complication: (4) the art of quotation. How much quotation from Cavell
is enough when one risks losing touch with the seam between ones own
voice and Cavells? Bringing Cavell quotations into ones written work, it
sometimes seems, threatens ones own chances for distinctive expressionas
if his prose and the voice it containsis always potent enough to overpower
even ones best efforts at vital composition. After a few quotations one may
become hypnotized by Cavells presence on the page and soon enough give
over to paraphrase and other forms of rehearsing his texts and arguments.
Furthermore, the extensiveness of Cavells writingits diversity of subjects
that are yet bound up with a unity and clarity of purposemake it highly
tempting to simply quote Cavell as a way of explaining Cavell. Cavell, it often seems, is his own best interpreter, and thus may be confidently invoked
to convey authority and insight. Indeed, in the last decade or so Cavell has,
when invited, undertaken significant labor to preface, conclude, or otherwise respond to many books and anthologies on his work. Is this a form of
authorizing that lends credibility to the new scholarshipa kind of consecration by its subject? Or does Cavell agree to write as part of some wish
to engage a community of scholars he finds himself desiring to be a part of,
however belatedly it emerges? Or does Cavell write preludes and codas to
guide the inheritance of his work, to control the interpretations presented by
his r eadersas if all can be said as long as he has something to say about it?
The art of quotation coupled with the practice of paraphrase leads to a
further issue, and the penultimate one I will enumeratenamely, (5) the
degree to which one can be taught without getting lost in the lesson.16 This
is a much more diffuse issue and lies at the heart of many theories of influence, such as we find in Harold Blooms work; indeed, Bloom refracts our
present concern when he writes: The critic of Emerson is little better off
than the biographer, since Emerson, again like Nietzsche and remarkably
akin to Freud, anticipates his critics and does their work for them. Emerson
resembles his own hero, Montaigne, in that you cannot combat him without
being contaminated by him.17 With Cavell the rewards one gains in reading
his workincluding the satisfaction of responses to perennial philosophical
conundrumsalso seem to invite contamination or court a certain disorientation. A reader can get lost in Cavells prosehappily, to be sure, but
then also and often anxiously. Having learned things from Cavell, one wants
116LaRocca
is supported or hampered. Naoko Saitos The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson and her coedited volume with Paul
Standish, Stanley Cavell and the Education of Grown-ups, may go some way toward addressing Fischers own lament. Still, even in the wake of such work
on educational and pedagogical matters, Fischers concern may persist, as
he writes:
Complicating the use of Cavell in the classroom, his writing is still
under-anthologized, partly because his contributions to different disciplines remain unassimilated, partly because each of his essays is intertwined with his work as a whole, not to mention the writers he
draws on. Sampling him in an English department course on Shakespeare, for example, potentially puts the class in touch with unfamiliar figures such as Wittgenstein, much as introducing Cavell in a philosophy course can bring along American movies. Instead of adding
to a course, the excerpt from Cavell (thoroughly studied) thus risks
eclipsing it, one weeks assignment becoming the whole course.20
The very last pointabout eclipsingshows how the issue of teaching
Cavell in the classroom, noted above as (6), is intimately bound up with
earlier issues, especially (3) paraphrase, (4) quotation, and (5) orientation
within the text.
The foregoing taxonomy describes attributes of one kind of reader, but
there is another kind that is just as interesting: not the reader who finds
Cavells work overwhelming but, as it were, the reader who finds it underwhelming. This latter kind of reader, one who may in a certain sense be deaf
to Cavells particular tone, or dismissive of his methods and intellectual references, should not himself be dismissed as misguided or ignorant. As much as
I am intrigued by the issues stated above (1 through 6) and the impact they
might have on a scholars life, I am also interested in the occasions when
Cavells work is inaudible or otherwise unavailable to intelligent, highly
competent, celebrated readers and critics. What accounts for this seemingly
radical divide? Anecdotal, but salient, evidence suggests that the reception of
Cavells work is split into two primary modes of engagement: radical devotion (including reading and referencing his work; perhaps being hypnotized
by the sound of his voice) and radical dismissal (remaining unable to have
an ear for his prose and project). Having already devoted time to the former
side of the divergence (again, 1 through 6 above), for the next few pages I
explore the latter phenomenon with an emphasis on Cavells expertise on
Emersonin particular, how his contributions to Emerson scholarship have
been received among philosophers. I aim to provide a small cross-section of
instances in which Cavells work is read by philosopherstwo of them, we
might say, who cite his work but do not engage it, and two of them who, in
writing monographs on his work, deem it necessary to address the nature of
his writing and its potential for intelligibility and pertinence.
118LaRocca
course of many years in many disparate texts, his consternation is legitimate,
not a consequence of curricular paranoia. Cavell is no conspiracy theorist.
The worry, as it might best be described, is not just that Emerson has been
deprived a deserved place in the conversation of philosophy, but that there is
something peculiarand tellingin the fact that he has been deprived such
a place. Cavell does not have to argue for Emersons membership card; merely writing about Emerson, as Cavell does, contributes to this habilitation.
Cavell instead inquires after what it is or might be about Emerson that so
upsets or offends or confuses the professionals of philosophymoments of
intellectual allergy that in themselves should be of interest to philosophers.
Much of the secondary literature on Emerson is written from departments
of English, literary studies, American studies, comparative literature, history, education, and, increasingly, political theory. Those who write about Emerson from these places, as if I were speaking of certain embassies of thought
with their own perceived but undefined and undeclared boundaries, often
make reference to Cavells work. In an effort to achieve a fair assessment
of who is writing mainstream academic studies of Emerson, I attempted to
select a representative sample of work. In a review of fifteen fairly recent
books on Emersonincluding eight monographs, three anthologies of secondary essays, and three compendiums of Emersons workonly one of the
thirty-five authors was cited as a professor of philosophy.23 A similar ratio is
found in The Oxford Handbook of Transcendentalism, where among forty-three
contributors, only one teaches in a department of philosophy.24 One of the
two philosophers in the sample, Stephen L. Esquith, in an essay that aims
toward an Emersonian theory of democratic citizenship, finds room only
to footnote a reference to Cavells Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The
Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism.25 Cavells name is not mentioned in
the essay, and there is no explanation in the note why Cavells book should
be consulted on the point under discussion. Such a silence seems peculiar
after reading Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, where the question of
democratic citizenship is among the most honed and nuanced that we have.
Had I selected books on similar subjects that were written by professors
of philosophy, ipso facto the paucity of philosophers in this demographic
would diminish. But are there such books? Certainly there are philosophers
writing about Cavell and Emerson whose works should be cited, many of
them collected in edited volumes noted above, such as Stanley Cavell, Contending with Stanley Cavell, Reading Cavell, and Stanley Cavell and the Claim
to Community.26 I think these anthologies give us the best evidence and intimation of how writing about Cavells Emerson can look from within a
community of philosophers. And there are an ever increasing number of
exceptional single-author books by philosophers writing about Cavell, including Russell Goodmans American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition;
Stephen Mulhalls Stanley Cavell: Philosophys Recounting of the Ordinary; Si-
120LaRocca
Emerson tends, in large measure, to be done by scholars who do not identify
themselves as philosophers.30
In an issue of the journal Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, the philosopher Vincent Colapietro writes approvingly of Hugo Mnsterberg, encouraging American philosophers to make use of his writing as they would
work by William James, Josiah Royce, and George Santayanaall familiar,
now canonical, names in philosophy.31 Yet Colapietro creates a surprising
categorical wedge when in the same essay he adduces film theorists such
as Sergei Eisenstein, Andr Bazin, Christian Metz, Siegfried Kracauer, Roland Barthes, and . . . Stanley Cavell.32 Why is Cavell part of the second
list, and not part of the genealogy of the first? Why isnt Cavell listed as a
philosopher who writes about film instead of as a film theorist? Is that a difference Cavell makes possible or makes interesting for us; or is it a difference
that contributes to his miscategorization and misreading? The distinction
may be of interest only to those with patience for the politics and rhetoric
that divides philosophers from one another, and one academic discipline
from anotherdivisions that are often as vigorously defended as they are
vaguely defined. Should we then understand this move of overt inclusion
(viz., Eisenstein, Bazin, Metz, ... Cavell) as simultaneously a move of (unintended?) exclusionof dismissal? It might make sense to think of Cavell
as a film theorist when reading The World Viewed, Pursuits of Happiness, or
Contesting Tears, yet isnt that workas defined by its philosophical preoccupations as its filmic onessufficient to restrain an impulse to see Cavell
primarily as a film theorist? After all, what sort of film theorist could produce Must We Mean What We Say? and The Claim of Reason? Or what kind of
philosophical authority does a film theorist have when writing about the Bible, Kant, Shakespeare, Emerson, and Wittgenstein? Thinking of Cavell first
as a film theorist creates what might be counted as an unwarranted habit
of denying him a philosophical voice. To depersonalize the critiquetaking
the weight off Colapietrowe can simply ask if the resistance or denial is
part of an unarticulated disciplinary convention in philosophy, a silence that
in turn makes it impossible to identify or amend.
Colapietros article, with endnotes as long as the essay, offers one such
note to Cavell. In it he cites Cavell as a notable exception to the habit
of American philosophers who omit any sustained considerations of film.33
Observe how in his endnote Colapietro positions, or repositions, Cavell as a
philosopher. Colapietro is pointing out the novelty of this American philosopher who writes on film, as opposed to, say, so-called continental philosophers who write about film apparently without the subject matter posing a
problem for their status as philosophers. Yet does Colapietros emphasis on
American turn this moment of acknowledgment into a moment of apology? He writesin an endnote: But even counting Cavell as someone who
in some measure and manner truly represents American philosophy makes
122LaRocca
philosophersnotably Stanley Cavellare cognizant of the connection between the central figure of literary transcendentalism and the
philosopher of the will to power and the transvaluation of values,
they have not pursued this rich and revealing clue to some of the major and many of the minor themes in Nietzsches philosophy.35
Stack does not pause on Cavells status in the academythat Cavell is an
American philosopher goes by without any self-consciousness or disciplinary defensiveness. What does emerge, however, is that Cavell is mentionedalone, apparently without matchas being the one American
philosopher who does see in Nietzsches work lines of consanguinity with
Emerson. Readers who are familiar with Cavells early and extensive development of the influence of Emerson on Nietzsche will recognize the nature
of Stacks understatement: Cavell is much more than cognizant of the relationship. A similar understatement appears in Colapietros qualified endnote, where he finds Cavell in some measure representative and somewhat exceptional.
Stacks endnoteone of only two on Cavell in the entire nearly fourhundred-page booklike Colapietros endnote, pushes Stacks assessment
of Cavell to the side, making it an aside. Yet unlike Esquiths quick bibliographical reference to Conditions, Stack writes three pages on Cavells work
in the miniature, compressed space that defines endnotes. But why is this
extensive series of remarks hidden away? Why does Stack find that he has
so much to say about Cavell, and yet not the initiative or desire to include
those remarks in the flow of his chapter? Does writing about Cavell seem
to him a diversion from his argument? Stacks thesis in this book is that
Emersons influence on Nietzsche is still largely unknown or, if recognized,
disavowed. Intriguingly, it is precisely in support of his thesis that Stack
mentions Cavellas having touched upon the association between Emerson and Nietzsche in a perceptive way.36 The connotations of touching
upon a topic are clear enoughin terms of being superficial or of passing
interest or without much extended considerationand gravely misapplied
to Cavells seminal work on the topic. So why is Cavells perceptive way
of addressing and advancing the topic not welcomed into the main text?
In Stacks seventy-line endnote there seems to be a crucial admission that
Cavell has some insightful things to say about Emerson and Nietzsche.37
Yet much of what Stack admits in his note seems mentioned primarily as
an opportunity to demonstrate his own theses and theories about the two
nineteenth-century writers. More than once Stack writes that Cavell parallels my own independent perception of the same phenomenon.38 It would
appear that Stacks appraisal of Cavellas an American philosopher who is
cognizant of the influence of Emerson on Nietzsche and who has done
a great deal to rejuvenate Emerson as a thinker who ought to be taken seriouslyshould make Cavell an exceptional, perhaps the only, voice suited
to complement Stacks lengthy argument. Granted, Stack does not set out
124LaRocca
and if we are to account for a knowledge of Cavells work, it will be done
fittinglyin some fashion of acknowledgmentthat is, neither as apology
nor as praise. The puzzle or paradox of inheriting Cavells work, like that of
inheriting Emersons, is knowing how to find or sense when our reading lies
between apology and praisethat is, in the space of acknowledgment. However, this acknowledgment is not something attributed to Cavells writing
but to ones own reading of it. The acknowledgment dawns precisely when
reading begins: we recognize Cavell sufficiently to recognize ourselves
in other words, when the claims of this particular human subject suddenly
connect to the claims of the human community; when Cavells prominently
personal style sounds like it can join a conversation of other voices.
Cavell has addressed how the quality of Emersons writing is tied to
his fate in philosophy. I wonder whether we ought to consider the quality
and the fate of Cavells writing as sharing in this history and anthropology
of inheritance. What Cavell says here of Emerson we might read in sympathetic disbelief as perceptibly self-reflexiveif unfortunate, and as yet
without explanation:
It is the sort of outbreak that seems to explain straight off why Emerson is the writer about whom it is characteristically insisted, continuing
in the 1980s as in the 1840s, by admirers as much as by detractors, that
he is not a philosopher, accompanied (proven?) by the repetitive finding of his prose to be a fog (sometimes intensified as metaphysical) or
a mist (sometimes tempered as golden). The mystery is that anyone
would, under that description of his prose, take the trouble to deny
that he is a philosopher.43
Cavell has certainly had less trouble earning name recognitionand accoladesas a philosopher than Emerson, but the question of Emersons writing as a fog or a mist seems to parallel familiar accusations of Cavells
writings as a place where one loses ones orientationfor good or ill, as
noted above in (5). In Cavells case, his voice is repeatedly cited as contributing to the difficulty of navigating his proseas if the person or the
personal were an encumbrance to satisfying and intelligible philosophical
writing instead of a cause for its manifestation. Why is a reader not guided
by Cavells voice instead of thrown off by it?
If Cavells work is sometimes invoked in order to be shelved, perhaps
we should not only ask what is going on in philosophy that his work
would not be taken up in straightforward ways, but also what is going on
in Cavells writing that makes such an integration and appropriation difficult? As Russell Goodman notes above, it seems that Cavell is well known
but not yet or not often enough well read. Are the writers who are provoked to write in response to his work able to find their way not just in their
prose but in the profession?
126LaRocca
c oncepts of voice, style, and personal manner has tended to confine
the discussion of Cavells writing within a series of sterile controversies. ... Thus one fate of his writing is to raise issues and controversies about itself that obscure precisely the original issues that the
writing was intended to raise.48
It is difficult to adjudicate whether Goulds is an apt description of someone
whose philosophical writing has betrayed itself or of a community that has
betrayed someones philosophical writing. In this way, explaining Cavells
philosophy to others as Mulhall and Gould aim to do is complicated by the
burden of having to explainor, depending on the audience, to defend or
defeatcertain prevailing habits of reading his work; or as Stewart suggested above, degeneration in reading habits and aptitudes more generally. Tuition in this respect is akin to a reeducation in reading, where certain sounds
that have been perennially muted or drowned out or otherwise unheard
come back into an audible sonic register.
If Mulhall and Gould, both philosophers, begin this way, should we infer
that writing about Cavell requires more from us than writing about some
other philosopher? Does such writing, first of all, require a justification for
heeding Cavells voiceperhaps dangerously, as a prelude or a coda to ones
own? Does Cavells writing impel or compel a more explicitly confessional,
autobiographical, or personal manner as part of that response? Is it this
question of style, not content, that most often repels, confuses, or incites?
Has style become content or, as Cavell has asked: What does it betoken
about the relation of philosophy and literature that a piece of writing can be
seen to consist of what is for all the world a philosophical essay preceding,
even turning into, a fictional taleas it happens, a fictional confession from
a prison cell?49 In this light, writing about Cavell is more aptly seen as writing about oneselfwhere the act of criticism becomes self-critical, where the
moments of vision are realized as revisionseeing, or seeing anewperhaps something familiar but as yet unseen. Philosophy in this key is critical,
autobiographical, and fictional. If this holds, then we share the trauma of
seeing our words and thoughts, as Emerson says, come back to us with
a certain alienated majesty.50 This discovery, however, is not one of relief,
but shame. It is not that Cavell has thought our thoughts, or thought all
thoughts that can be thought, but that he has thought them thoughtfullyas
if with his whole body, as if admitting in his writing that he has a bodyand
so a history, a personal history. This may be why writing about Cavell poses
the risk that more is getting said than one wants to sayor wishes others to
know. The only way to counter the risk is to admit that such confessions are
being made and that a writer should try, as Cavell has said, to take responsibility for every one of her sentences.
Can contemporary professional philosophy recognize its ancient origins
in spiritual exercises, as described for example by Pierre Hadot, where phi-
128LaRocca
escribes losing touch with this attention to difference as a cost of Richard
d
Rortys project, something achieved at the expense of giving up the question of the question of philosophy, of what it is, if anything, that calls for
philosophy now, in favor of an idea that we are, or should be, past interest
in the distinctions between philosophy and other modes of thought or of the
presentation of thought.55 It is clear that, for Cavell, getting past an interest
in such distinctions has a deleterious effect on our chances for recognizing
our interest in what defines our motives to undertake philosophy as a mode
of expression that calls its identity and inheritance into question. Yet to preserve our interest in distinctions and criteriawhat counts as philosophy
and whyreturns us to the very issues that have complicated the reading of
Cavells prose. Since the sound of writing makes all the difference, readers
must learn to hear the sound.56 The difficulty of hearing it in Cavells work
may, of itself, constitute one of its achievements.
In a forum for the journal Philosophical Investigations in which Cavell was
invited along with several others to offer remarks on his experiences reading Wittgenstein, he exposes the stakes of forcing disciplinary boundaries
in philosophynot because such a preoccupation is wasteful or embarrassing or at odds with the spirit of meaningful investigation, but because, in
palpable ways, it threatens to dispossess readers of their relation to, and use
of or for, philosophy. In other words, achieving a clear definition of what
philosophy is does not engender a safe domain where philosophy takes
place; rather, it deprives philosophy of its sanguinity with the world it aims
to serve and inhabitthe space that both inspires it and sustains it, even if
often with difficulty.
That the claim to philosophy has become inherently questionable is
part of my conviction about philosophy. So it will, as recently, fall
to me to be asked, for example, whether Walter Benjamin is to be
considered a philosopher. To get past the in a sense yes and in a
sense no response, I note that Benjamin is alive to the question of
whether I am in possession of my own experience, or instead follow
dictations laid down by profession or by fashion or by some more
private identification. . . .
So what? Am I prepared to conclude that Benjamin is a philosopher
if Wittgenstein is one? I am much more interested in whether the way
I have arrived at the conjunction has created philosophy in me.57
The fate of a work lies with its audiencewhether it can find one, and keep
one, and perhaps nurture one. And if it is understood that asking questions an
audience cannot or does not want to hear endangers a works viability, we can
either neglect the work or lean in closer to see what in the work solicits these
reactions. In one view the very thing that Cavells work makes possible for
philosophy is keeping alive the question of an ongoing inquiry into the nature
of philosophical investigation itself. Unlike the scenario Wittgenstein imag-
Notes
I wish to thank an anonymous reader for the journal for helpful remarks on an earlier
version of this essay.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
One typographical usage note: in the original quotation from Cavell (1979)
philosophy becomes the education of grownupshe doesnt use a hyphen
in grownups. However, in all of Cavells subsequent work that references the
term, and in all the secondary literature by others, the hyphen is present. Thus, I
use the hyphen throughout the essay, save the times when I directly quote from
the 1979 source.
Stanley Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2010), 304.
The quotations in this line are selected from Russell Goodman, ed., Contending
with Stanley Cavell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 17576, except the
term charmed, which is drawn from personal conversation with Cavell.
Among other occasions, Cavell commented on the nature of belatedness (as
it pertains to his work and its reception) at the conferences Stanley Cavell and
Literary Criticism (University of Edinburgh, 2008) and Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies (Harvard University, 2010).
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 125; Cavell mentions his account more
recently in Little Did I Know, 9.
Stanley Cavell, The Philosopher in American Life (Toward Thoreau and Emerson), Emersons Transcendental Etudes, ed. David Justin Hodge (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2003), 49.
Richard Eldridge, ed., Stanley Cavell (Contemporary Philosophers in Focus) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Richard Eldridge and Bernie Rhie, eds., Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of Skepticism (New York: Continuum, 2011).
130LaRocca
9. Ibid., 3.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 45.
12. Ibid., 4.
13. Ibid., 6. See Stanley Cavell, The Uncanniness of the Ordinary, In Quest of the
Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), 154.
14. Eldridge and Rhie, Stanley Cavell, 7.
15. Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), 36n31.
16. For more on quotation and paraphrase in Cavells work, see my Reading Cavell
Reading, in Stanley Cavell, Literature, and Film: The Idea of America, eds. Andrew
Taylor and ine Kelly (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2641.
17. Harold Bloom, Mr. America, Estimating Emerson: An Anthology of Criticism from
Carlyle to Cavell, ed. David LaRocca (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 502.
18. Michael Fischer, Using Stanley Cavell, Philosophy and Literature 32, no. 1 (2008):
199.
19. Ibid., 203.
20. Ibid.
21. Stanley Cavell, The Senses of Walden (An Expanded Edition) (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1992), 3233, 123.
22. For example, see page 14 of Cavells In Quest of the Ordinary.
23. For brevity I note only the single-author monographs, in chronological order:
Pamela J. Schirmeister, Less Legible Meanings: Between Poetry and Philosophy in the
Work of Emerson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Gustaaf Van
Cromphout, Emersons Ethics (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999);
Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, and American Literary Modernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); T. S. McMillin, Our
Preposterous Use of Literature: Emerson and the Nature of Reading (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Sam McGuire Worley, Emerson, Thoreau, and the Role
of the Cultural Critic (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Michael
Magee, Emancipating Pragmatism: Emerson, Jazz, and Experimental Writing (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Robert D. Richardson, First We Read,
Then We Write: Emerson on the Creative Process (Iowa City: University of Iowa
Press, 2009); and Branka Arsi, On Leaving: A Reading in Emerson (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
24. Joel Myerson, Sandra Harbert Petrulionis, and Laura Dassow Walls, eds., The
Oxford Handbook of Transcendentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
25. See Stephen L. Esquiths essay Power, Poise, and Place: Toward an Emersonian
Theory of Democratic Citizenship, in The Emerson Dilemma: Essays on Emerson
and Social Reform, ed. T. Gregory Garvey (Athens: University Press of Georgia,
2001).
26. Eldridge, Stanley Cavell; Goodman, Contending with Stanley Cavell; Alice Crary
and Sanford Shieh, eds., Reading Cavell (New York: Routledge, 2006); and Andrew Norris, ed., The Claim to Community: Essays on Stanley Cavell and Political
Philosophy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006). The Eldridge, Goodman, and Crary-Shieh volumes are reviewed by Michael Fischer in Using Stanley Cavell cited above.
27. Russell Goodman, American Philosophy and the Romantic Tradition (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophys Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Simon
Critchley, Very Little, Almost Nothing (New York: Routledge, 1997); and Espen
Hammer, Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2002).
28. Paul Grimstad and Branka Arsic, The Other Emerson (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2010); Naoko Saito, The Gleam of Light: Moral Perfectionism and