Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Contents
1AC............................................................................................................................. 1
INHERENCY/ IMPACT................................................................................................... 2
PERFORMANCE...................................................................................................... 10
SOLVENCY/ MORE IMPACTS................................................................................11
1AC
INHERENCY/ IMPACT
The year 1492. Christopher Columbus, while looking for India
falls on a contintent inhabited by 90 million people. The people
greeted Columbus with gifts, and Colombus returned the gifts
with rape, genocide, and enslavement. Walter 2005
Before 1492, the Americas were not on anybodys map, not even on the map of the
people inhabiting Anhuac (the territory of the Aztecs) and Tawantinsuyu (the
territory of the Incas). The Spanish and Portuguese, as the sole and diverse
European occupants in the sixteenth century, named the entire continent that was
under their control and possession . It may be hard to understand today that the
Incas and the Aztecs did not live in America or, even less, Latin America. Until the
early sixteenth century, America was not on anybodys map simply because the
word and the concept of a fourth continent had not yet been invented . The
mass of land and the people were there, but they had named their own places: Tawantinsuyu in the Andes, Anhuac in what is today the valley of Mexico,
and Abya-Yala in what is today Panama. The extension of what became America was unknown to them. People in Europe, in Asia, and in Africa had no
idea of the landmass soon to be called the Indias Occidentales and then America, or of all the people inhabiting it who would be called Indians.
America came, literally, out of the blue sky that Amerigo Vespucci was looking at
when he realized that the stars he was seeing from what is now southern Brazil were not the same stars he had seen in his familiar Mediterranean.
What is really confusing in this story is that once America was named as such in the
sixteenth century and Latin America named as such in the nineteenth, it appeared
as if they had been there forever. America, then, was never a continent
waiting to be discovered. Rather, America as we know it was an
invention forged in the process of European colonial history and the
consolidation and expansion of the Western world view and institutions.
The
narratives that described the events as discovery were told not by the inhabi- tants of Anhuac or Tawantinsuyu, but by Europeans themselves. It would
be four hundred and fifty years until a shift in the geography of knowledge would turn around what Europeans saw as a discov- ery and see it as an
invention. The conceptual frame that made possible this shift in the geography of knowledge, from discovery to invention, came from the Creoles
consciousness, in the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking world. Of course, we should briefly note that Indigenous and Afro frames of mind in continental
South America had not yet inter- vened in these public debates from their own broken histories. The idea of America and subsequently of Latin and
Anglo America was an issue in the minds of European and Creoles of European descent. Indians and Creoles of African descent (men and women) were
left out of the conversation. Afro-Caribbeans had been working toward a similar and complementary shift in the geography of knowledge, but in English
and French. For Creoles of Afro descent, the European arrival in the islands that today we call Caribbean was not of primary concern: African slaves were
brought to the conti- nent that was already called America many decades after it was dis- covered or invented. In the Indian genealogy of thought,
Mexican historian
and philosopher Edmundo OGorman strongly and convincingly argued many years
ago that the invention of America implied the appropriation and integration of the
continent into the Euro-Christian imaginary.2 The Spanish and Portuguese, as the sole and diverse European foreign
whether America was an existing continent discovered or a non-existing entity that was invented was not a question.
intruders in the sixteenth century, claimed for themselves a continent and renamed it at the same time as they began a process of territorial organization
Europeans were confronting a New World, the continent was renamed America after Amerigo Vespucci himself, with a slight change to the ending to
different paradigms . The line that distinguishes the two paradigms is the line of the
shift in the geo-politics of knowledge; changing the terms and not only the content
of the conversation. The first presupposes the triumphant European and imperial
4
perspective on world history, an achievement that was described as modernity ,
while the second reflects the critical perspective of those who have been placed
behind , who are expected to follow the ascending progress of a history to which
they have the feeling of not belonging. Colonization of being is nothing else
than producing the idea that certain people do not belong to history
that they are non-beings . Thus, lurking beneath the European story of discovery
are the histories, experiences, and silenced conceptual narratives of those who
were disqualified as human beings , as historical actors, and as capable of
thinking and understanding. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the
wretched of the earth (as Frantz Fanon labeled colonized beings) were Indians and African slaves. That is why missionaries and men
of letters appointed themselves to write the histories they thought Incas and Aztecs did not have, and to write the grammar of Kechua/Kichua and Nahuatl
with Latin as the model. Africans were simply left out of the picture of conversion and taken as pure labor force. Toward the end of the seventeenth
century, a new social group surfaced, and when they surfaced they were already outside of history: the Creoles of Spanish and Portuguese descent.
Although their marginalization was far from the extremes to which Indians and Africans were subjected, the Creoles, between the limits of humanity
(Indians and Africans) and humanity proper (Europeans), were also left out of history.The geo-political configuration of scales that measured the nature of
human beings in terms of an idea of history that Western Christians assumed to be the total and true one for every inhabitant of the planet led to the
establishment of a colonial matrix of power, to leave certain people out of history in order to justify violence in the name of Christianization, civilization,
and, more recently, development and market democracy. Such a geo-political configuration created a divide between a minority of people who dwell in
and embrace the Christian, civilizing, or devel- oping missions and a majority who are the outcasts and become the targets of those missions. Max Weber
has been credited, after Hegel, with having concep- tualized modernity as the direction of history that had Europe as a model and a goal. More recently,
two entangled concepts, modernity and coloniality, work together as two sides of the same reality to shape the idea of America in the sixteenth century
and of Latin America in the nineteenth? Modernity has been a term in use for the past thirty or forty years. In spite of differences in opinions and
definitions, there are some basic agreements about its meaning. From the European perspective, modernity refers to a period in world history that has
been traced back either to the European Renaissance and the discovery of America (this view is common among scholars from the South of Europe,
Italy, Spain, and Portugal), or to the European Enlightenment (this view is held by scholars and intel- lectuals and assumed by the media in Anglo-Saxon
countries England, Germany, and Holland and one Latin country, France). On the other side of the colonial difference, scholars and intellectu- als in the
ex-Spanish and ex-Portuguese colonies in South America have been advancing the idea that the achievements of modernity go hand in hand with the
violence of coloniality. The difference, to reiterate, lies in which side of each local history is told. OGormans invention of America theory was a turning
point that put on the table a perspective that was absent and not recognized from the existing European and imperial narratives. Lets agree that
OGorman made visible a dimension of history that was occluded by the partial discovery narratives, and lets also agree that it is an example of how
things may look from the varied experiences of coloniality.
5
colonial matrix of power that includes the renaming of the lands appropriated
and of the people inhabiting them, insofar as the diverse ethnic groups and civilizations in Tawantinsuyu and Anhuac, as well
as those from Africa, were reduced to Indians and Blacks.The idea of America and of Latin America could, of course, be accounted for within the
philosophical framework of European modernity, even if that account is offered by Creoles of European descent dwelling in the colonies and embracing the
Spanish or Portuguese view of events. What counts, however, is that the need for telling the part of the story that was not told requires a shift in the
is
linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. For instance, one of the central questions
addressed by political economists was how to increase the wealth of nations. Different prescriptions
were recommended by different political economists; namely, some were free-traders and
others neomercantilist. In spite of their policy discrepancies, they all believed in national
development and in the inevitable progress of the nation-state through the rational
organization of society. The main bone of contention was how to ensure more wealth for a nation-state.
According to Immanuel Wallerstein,
This tension between a basically protectionist versus a free trade stance became one of the major themes of
policy-making in the various states of the world-system in the nineteenth century. It often was the most
significant issue that divided the principal political forces of particular states. It was clear by then that a central
ideological theme of the capitalist world-economy was that every state could, and indeed eventually probably
would, reach a high level of national income and that conscious, rational action would make it so. This fit very
well with the underlying Enlightenment theme of inevitable progress and the teleological view of human history
that it incarnated. (1992a, 517)
Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American
periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the
Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were
linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of
labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which
Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they
defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class
reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were
no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the independence revolutions of the first half
of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as
6
well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where
Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is
[Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, "THE HARSH REALITIES OF ACTING BLACK: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY
DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE" pages 81-83]
The process of signifyin engaged in by the Louisville is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional
evidence; their goal is to challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge. debaters In other
words,
those with social power within the debate community are able
8
of philosophers to contribute to identify and struggle against.Postcolonial thinkers
have undertaken not only to analyze this phenomenon, but also to devise strategies
for effectively combating and hopefully eradicating colonialisms most damaging
aspect the taking possession and control of its victims minds. My purpose
in this paper is to contribute, qua philosopher, to both of these undertakings. I begin
by trying to clarify the nature of the colonization of the mind and its epistemic
underpinnings and the typical reactions to it. Next, I examine examples of these
reactions with their corresponding analyses and strategies. The assumptions
underlying them reveal certain inherent paradoxes, which call into question the
possibility of a full decolonization of mind. I conclude by suggesting an alternative
strategy and a series of means to implement it. What is colonization of the mind?
In this section, the range of phenomena that fall under the label colonization of the
mind is extended beyond its usual application and briefly toured; the main features
of the phenomenon are described; its epistemic characteristics are analyzed; and
the typical instinctive reactions to mind colonization are considered. 1.1 The
metaphor colonization of the mind highlights the following characteristics of the
phenomenon under scrutiny here: (a) the intervention of an external source the
colonizer in the mental sphere of a subject or group of subjects the colonized;
(b) this intervention affects central aspects of the minds structure, mode of
operation, and contents; (c) its effects are long-lasting and not easily removable; (d)
there is a marked asymmetry of power between the parties involved; (e) the parties
can be aware or unaware of their role of colonizer or colonized; and (f) both can
participate in the process voluntarily or involuntarily. These characteristics are
shared by a variety of processes of mind colonization,regardless of whether they
occur in socio-political situations that are literally categorized as colonial.
Therefore, colonization of the mind may take place through the transmission of
mental habits and contents by means of social systems other than the colonial
structure. For example, via the family, traditions, cultural practices, religion,
science, language, fashion, ideology, political regimentation, the media, education,
etc.Consider education, for instance. The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire has
analyzed a typically mind-colonizing educational paradigm, which he
suggestively dubbed the banking model. In this paradigm, a commodity
(knowledge) is deposited by those who have it (the teachers) in the minds of those
(the pupils) who dont have it; the task of both is basicallypassive: the formers, to
transmit and the latters to absorb knowledge. i1.2The banking model displays the
characteristic epistemic nature of mind colonization: What grants the colonizer (in
this case the teacher) the right to intervene in the pupils mind, thereby colonizing
it, is the fact that the former possesses and the latter lacks knowledge. This is a
commodity that everybody is presumed to desire by virtue of its epistemic
properties, namely truth and universality, whence its applicability and utility derive.
Analogously, parents have the experience their children lack, customs and
traditions embody proven methods of survival in natural and social environments,
religion grants transcendental validity to human behavior, language provides
reliable tools for mental operations such as identification, conceptualization,
classification, and inference, science supplies the basis of technologies that work,
and ideologies, of policies that are presumed to work. The expressions in italics refer
to epistemic warrants that yield epistemic legitimacy and thereby endow teacher,
family, tradition, religion, language, science or ideology each with its brand of
epistemic authority. Notice thatin most of these cases those who perform the
9
colonizing are either not aware of the nature of their action or of the epistemic and
other damaging consequences of their action. ii Quite on the contrary, they believe they are
helping the colonized, by providing them with better beliefs and patterns of action
that improve their ability to cope successfully with the environment. Furthermore,they are
also unaware of the fact that for the most part their minds have themselves been
colonized by others, whose agents they become by attributing to them the
same epistemic authority they rely upon vis--vis those they colonize. In
order for any of these sources of authority to become, in turn, an effective vehicle of
mind colonization, it must, in addition, obtain the support of power structures
capable,by a variety of means, of transmuting epistemic authority into social
authority and so to ensure its enforcement.These means range from semiotic
displays of authority, through overrating some sources of epistemic authority and
devaluating others, up to appealing to overt and covert forms of
discrimination, making use of socio-economic rewarding or punishment,
and sheer violent coercion. Nevertheless, however powerful the pressure of its
authority
means, social
alone, without an epistemic authority counterpart,
isnt sufficient, for it cannot per se generate the authority necessary for succeeding
in the colonization of minds. Success in this endeavor cannot be achieved by
coercion and fear alone, for it consists in inducing a set of beliefs in the colonized
mind via some sort of inferential, persuasive process a process that is cognitive in
nature. Its basic constituent is the implicit acceptance by the colonized of a
rule of inference that automatically grants superiority to the colonizers
epistemic warrants or reasons when they clash with those of the
colonized. By virtue of this rule,when comparing the colonizers and his own
grounds for holding a specific belief, the colonized will usually tend to prefer the
formers reasons and consequently adopt the colonizers belief. In other
words,colonization of the mind is achieved when the colonized adopts the
colonizers epistemic principle of invidious comparison. iiiThis means his implicit
acceptance of the colonizers asymmetric distinction between a primitive mind
that of the colonized and a superior or civilized one that of the colonizer.It is
this acceptance that establishes a sort of implicit agreement between
colonized and colonizer which justifies the recurring inference by both to the
effect that, in any matter involving cognitive abilities, the formers performance
must be presumed to be inferior to the latter. 1.3 Of course, not always the
colonization of mind is successful and yields acceptance and resignation by the
colonized,although its rate of success can be considered typical, in so far as it has
been surprisingly high throughout history. iv Another typical reaction of the
colonized to the colonization of mind drive of the colonizer, characteristic of the
relatively recent decolonization movement, is characterized by all out rejection
and resistance. These two types of reaction are not the only ones, but they
deserve special attention because, though on the face of it contrary to each other,
they are widespread and equally instinctive or natural. Prima facie, the two
reactions are indeed radically opposed.v While the former acknowledges the
10
epistemic superiority of the colonizer and adopts it as a principle of colonized belief
formation, the latterdenies the alleged asymmetry, argues that it is groundless
because based on an invidious comparison procedure that is necessarily
biased, and therefore refuses to ad opt the presumption of epistemic
inferiority of the colonized. While the former assumes the compatibility of
adopting the colonizers conceptual framework with the preservation of the
colonized identity,the latter stresses the incompatibility between these two
attitudes, arguing that the adopted or adaptedcolonizers mind ultimately expels
the original mind of the colonized, and thereby obliterates the latters true or
authentic identity. As far as the political consequences are concerned, while the
resigned acceptance reaction does not recognize in the adoption of the
colonizers beliefs and forms of thinking one of the ways through which
colonizers enhance their control over colonized behavior,the resistance
reaction denounces it as a means of acquiring control over the will of the
colonized, thus becoming a powerful tool of oppression, which must be
combated
Allen has not only enabled us to see how narrowQuijanos conception of genderis in terms of the
organization of the economyand of collective author- ity, but she has also revealed that
the production of knowledge is gendered , as is the very conception of reality at
every level. Allen supported the question- ing of biology in the construction of gender differences and
introduces the important idea of gender roles being chosen and dreamt. Allen also showed us that the
and Sigals work complements Allens, particularly in understanding the presence of sodomy and male
homosexuality in colonial and precolonial America.
11
12
PERFORMANCE
I'm angry. I'm angry for being condemned to death by strangers saying,
"You deserve to die" and "AIDS is the cure." Fury erupts when a Republican woman wearing
thousands of dollars of garments and jewelry minces by the police lines shaking her head, chuckling and wagging
her finger at us like we are recalcitrant children making absurd demands and throwing a temper tantrum when they
Angry while Joseph agonizes over $8,000 a year for AZT which
might keep him alive a little longer and which does make him sicker than the
disease he is diagnosed with. Angry as I listen to a man tell me that after
changing his will five times he's running out of people to leave things to. All of his best friends are
dead. Angry when I stand in a sea of quilt panels, or go to a candlelight march or
attend yet another memorial service. I will not march silently with a
aren't met.
f[uck]ing candle and I want to take that goddamned quilt and wrap myself in it and furiously rent
curse every god religion ever created. I refuse to accept a
creation that cuts people down in the third decade of their life. It is cruel and vile and
meaningless and everything I have in me rails against the absurdity and I
raise my face to the clouds and a ragged laugh that sounds more demonic
than joyous erupts from my throat and tears stream down my face and if this
disease doesn't kill me, I may just die of frustration. My feet pound the streets and Peter's hands
it and my hair and
are chained to a pharmaceutical company's reception desk while the receptionist looks on in horror and Eric's body
lies rotting in a Brooklyn cemetery and I'll never hear his flute resounding off the walls of the meeting house again.
And I see the old people in Tompkins Square Park huddled in their long wool coats in June to keep out the cold they
perceive is there and to cling to whatever little life has left to offer them, and I think, ah, they understand. And I'm
reminded of the people who strip and stand before a mirror each night before they go to bed and search their
bodies for any mark that might not have been there yesterday. A mark that this scourge has visited them. And
I'm angry when the newspapers call us "victims" and sound alarms that
"it" might soon spread to the "general population." And I want to scream
"Who the f[uck] am I?" And I want to scream at New York Hospital with its
yellow plastic bags marked "isolation linen," "ropainfecciosa" and its orderlies in latex
gloves and surgical masks skirt the bed as if its occupant will suddenly
leap out and douse them with blood and semen giving them toothe plague.
And I'm angry at straight people who sit smugly wrapped in their selfprotective coat of
who upon spotting my "Silence = Death" button begin chanting "Faggots gonna die"
and I
wonder, who taught them this? Enveloped in fury and fear, I remain silent while my
button mocks me every step of the way.
a television program on the quilt gives profiles of the dead and the
list begins with a baby, a teenage girl who got a blood transfusion, an
elderly Baptist minister and his wife and when they finally show a gay
man, he'sdescribed assomeone who knowingly infected teenage male
prostitutes with the virus
13
14
makes explicit in the erotic exhibitionism of the Red Night trilogy obviously
Testament God punishing acts contra natura with plagues. While Burroughs makes no reference to this cultural
backlash in Cities--the Red Night plagues prefigure and can be only coincidentally connected with AIDS and its
social fallout--his portrayal of homosexuality painfully emphasizes how culture's message about toxicity is inscribed
on the gay male body. When the Red Night trilogy moves into the Age of AIDS, with Dead Roads (1983),
Survival. The condition of bare life. The mythology of differential fitness. The continuity of property and properties.
But survival is more than this.Survival,as it emerges as a key word in the theory and poetics of Audre Lorde
15
of inquiry, providing a repertoire of critical insights, gained from
discerning what approach to a political and economic framework we
can afford from one moment to the next. Survival is an
afterlife; by continuing to exist we challenge the processes that somehow
failed to kill us this time. Survival is a performance, a set of aesthetic
invocations that produce belief and resonance. Survival is a poetic
intervention into the simplistic conclusion of the political narrative: we
were never meant to survive. The we that was never meant to survive is
a challenge to the gospel of individualism. The content of that we is at stake because
survival redefines who we are. For those of us who constitute the collection of people addressed by Audre Lordes A
Litany for Survival, the meanings of our lives have been slandered within an economy that uses
narratives of racial inferiority, gender determinism, and sexual subjectivity to devalue our bodies, our
breathing, our time.If we are survivors, who we are is the question of survival, and whether we survive
depends on the generation of a set of relationships that prioritizes who we are to each other through our queer acts
of loving the possible collectivity represented in each of our bodies.2Survival
survival
bisexuals, and transgendered people talk back, whether using the tools of the master or the vernacular on the
streets , their voices, singularly or collectively, do not exist in some vacuous wasteland of discursivity. As symbolic
16
JOHNSON 2K6 [Patrick E., professor of African American studies and performance
studies at Northwestern University, Quare Studies or (almost) everything I know
about Queer Studies I learned from my grandmother in Black Queer Studies: A
Critical Anthology
Theories of performance, as opposed to theories of performativity, also take
into account the context and historical moment of performance. We need
to account for the temporal and spatial specificity of performance not only
to frame its existence, but also to name the ways in which it signifies. Such an analysis would
acknowledge the discursivity of subjects and would also unfix the discursively constituted subject as always already
a pawn of power. Although many queer theorists appropriate Foucault to substantiate the imperialism of power ,
17
AFF ANSWER
Switch Side having a predictable is the only way to ensure
teams take both sides of an argument and learn multiple
perspectives about the topic they force overly generic
debatesThats key to critical thinking
Harrigan
Additionally, there are social benefits to thbbe practice of requiring students to
debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical
tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument
relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of
the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that
arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when
compared to all available alternatives. Each and every student, whether in debate
or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the
decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially
unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomesof each
choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which
is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian
food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many
other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of
action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of
unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being
decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although
the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be
'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced,
the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the
continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public
(Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence ofdebate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but
ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more
likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable
losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions
that will require incisive solutions.
18
times, no race, simply the healthy, mature norm of human existence as opposed to
all those other groups of people who are somehow off-white, off-track, more or less
deviant. Whiteness, the racial norm in Western industrial societies, is at one and the
same time the exemplar of human being and the unmarked selfsame over against
the racially marked other(s).2 This understanding of whiteness emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s as
race scholars in the USA and the UK began to treat white identity as an epistemic object, in contrast to many earlier
race theorists who studied non-whites primarily.3 By taking whiteness as an object of study, these scholars
problematized the status of the white race as an unmarked norm and exposed the racism implicit in its having that
status. Thus, it seemed, these new race theorists had discovered a potentially very powerful tool for dismantling
racism. Revealing the ways in which whiteness functions as a racial norm, they began to denaturalize it and thereby
rob it of some of its power to order thought and practice. Their scholarship was and is, deliberately and
unapologetically, deeply engaged political activism. Feminist sociologist Ruth Frankenberg articulates this
confluence of theory and practice well when she writes: Naming whiteness and white people helps dislodge the
claims of both to rightful dominance (Frankenberg, 1993: 234). While readers of the work of Michel Foucault may
well be struck by the deep affinities between Foucaultian genealogy, counter-memory, and counter-attack on the
one hand and Whiteness Studies denaturalization of heretofore largely unquestioned racial categories on the other,
surprisingly most writers in the Whiteness Studies movement seem all but unaware of Foucaults analytics of
Taking subjectivity seriously in this way thwarts the very project it intends to
quicken and undermines the constitutive goods of teaching . How so? For a start, without
normative benchmarks, anything goes. By treating all voices and views as equally
valid, Carmen Luke (herself a feminist) argues, the feminist teacher risks a dangerous sameness:
Views and voices from everywhere and every body potentially are views and voices
from nowhere and no body (Luke, 1996: 291). If anything goes, then changing learners
perceptions becomes a matter of chance and if the teacher has a role at all, it is to play stagehand
to happenstance. Here teaching would seem to be thoroughly luck-dependent, leaving the
teacher without resources to establish the enabling conditions for fulfilling the definitive ends of her practice (cf
Pendlebury 1995).
19
20
well as civil society #s junior partners, to the dance of social death for hundreds of
years, but few have wanted to learn the steps. They have been, and remain today# even
in the most anti-racist movements, like the prison abolition movement # invested
elsewhere. This is not to say that all oppositional political desire today is pro-White,
but it is to say that it is almost always anti-Black which is to say it will not
dance with death. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more
dangerous to the U.S. Not because it raises the specter of some alternative polity
(like socialism, or community control of existing resources) but because its condition of
possibility as well as its gesture of resistance functions as a negative dialectic: a politics
of refusal and a refusal to affirm , a program of complete disorder. One mus t embrace
its disorder, its in coherence and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one's
politics are to be underwritten by a desire to take this country down. If this is not the
desire which underwrites one #s politics then through what strategy of legitimation is
the word #prison # being linked t o the word #abolition #? Wh at ar e this movement
#s lines ofpolitical a ccountabilit y? There #s nothing foreign, frightening, or even
unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced,
and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself: no one, for
example, has ever been known to say #gee-whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little
sooner, or maybe not come at all. # But few so-called radicals desire to be embraced,
and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness # and the state of politica
l movements in A merica to day is ma rked by t his very N egrophobogenisis: #geewhiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. # Perhaps
there #s something more terrifying about the joy of Black, then there is about the joy of
sex (unless one is talking sex wit h a Negr o). Perhaps coalitions today p refer to
remain in- orgasmic in the face of civilsociety # with hegemony as a handy
prophylactic, just in case. But if, through this stasis, or paralysis , they tr y to do t he
work of prison a bolit ion # that work will fail; because it is always work from a
position of coherence (i.e. the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence, the Black
subject, or prison slave. In this way, social formations on the Left remain blind to the
contradictions of coalitions bet ween worker s and s laves. T hey remain coalitions
opera ting with in the logic of civil society; and function less as revolutionary promises
and more as crowding out scenarios of Black antagonisms # they simply feed our
frustration. Whereas the positionality of the worker # be s/he a factory worker
demanding a monetary wage or an immigrant or White woman demanding a social
wage # gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the
Black subject # be s/he a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting # gestures toward
the disconfiguration of civil society: from the coherence of civil society, t he Black
subject beckons with the in coherence of civil war.
21
capitalist
institutions to sustain themselves by manufacturing legitimacy through strategic communication as a
decision-making (one variant of Habermas "colonization of the lifeworld" thesis; see Habermas 1981, p. 376-373). Habermas sees the emergent capacity of
development that profoundly transforms the Marxist political dynamic. By colonizing terms and spaces of public dialogue with instrumental, strategically-motivated reasoning,
have quite desirable social consequences, it also presumes a fairly homogeneous social context in which values are shared and
enforced collectively. Thus, it is no wonder that western anthropologists and ethnographers, for whom adulthood is manifested by
the exercise of independent ethical judgment, so frequently denounce tribal cultures or other collectivist ethics as childlike. By
contrast, our culture constructs some, but not all, selves to be the servants of others. Thus, some Is are defined as your
servant, some as your master. The struggle for the self becomes not a true mirroring of self-in-other, but rather a hierarchallyinspired series of distortions, where some serve without ever being served, some master without ever being mastered, and almost
everyone hides from this vernacular domination by clinging to the legally official definition of I as meaning your equal. In such
make its own decisions with self-love and self-confidence. What links child abuse the mistreatment of [*142] women, and racism is
the massive external intrusion into psyche that dominating powers impose to keep the self from ever fully seeing itself.n52 Because
the selfs power resides in another, little
allows scholars
in turn to fight more on a local turf these external resources thus, the opposition of social
constructivists
22
modernization sociology or, more generically, that of political scientists
against economists, are local conflicts waged by the proxy of more
universal symbols. In writing about issue or advocacy networks, epistemic
communities, and the power of ideas to influence policies, political
scientists therefore have been theorizing practices in which they were
increasingly involved. Human rights and democracy have been the twin
issues around which a major transformation of policy research and
advocacy took place in the 1980s: increasingly placing emphasis on values
and ideals as compared to technical problem solving, this transformation
has permitted the valorization of political commitment cum intellectual
skill beyond the campus perimeter . An activist ethos acquired in the
movements of the 1960s and 1970s became progressively functional to a new
articulation between foreign policy goals and their transnational implementation. At
the same time the administrative and entrepreneurial skills which came to be
associated with the conduct of academic research (e.g. Jacoby 1987) ualities easily
in the wider context of value-oriented, principled expertise . The role of social and
political scientists in the constitution of the techno-scientific skill base of
issue networks is the concrete historical and social background against
which the development of a scientific discourse on transnational activism
and the idealist theories of policy change associated with it must be
matched. I rati this perspective, it becomes possible to read the concepts
and the logic informing theories about the political consequences of ideas
as abstract redescriptions of an emerging academic activism. By
substituting the logic of ideas with the logic of social practices, however,
these theories also misrepresent their real object. An anonymous power
of ideas is thus substituted for the socially determined power of
professional idea brokers and committed academics. The methodological
choice of taking ideas
advice, help, clarification, etc. throughout the session. # 3 Appropriate assessment and feedback: The role play
provided immediate opportunities to provide students with feedback on their ideas. Like Levy, I tended not to
correct misinformation. However, I did reward students by pointing out when a particularly good point was being
made. I also recorded the meeting so that students could listen to the discussion later and I posted the various draft
declarations of human rights on the subject website. # 4 Clear goals and intellectual challenge: When devising the
role play I was forced to articulate the learning outcomes I hoped to achieve more clearly than I had done when
preparing regular lectures. This may have been related to the high-risk nature of this teaching method and my
A particular
advantage of this teaching method is that it posed an intellectual
challenge to students, regardless of their level of competence in the
subject
worry that students would not take it seriously if they could not see the point of it.
23
In sum, the essential argument of Orientalism is that a pervasive and endemic Western discourse of Orientalism has constructed
"the Orient," a representation that Said.
24
frames the entire script of his own text. Texts, in the loose sense of
anything conveniently fashioned with words, become the meter for Said's
poetic performance. The historical backdrop is hastily arranged, not
systematically researched, to authorize the staging of his argument. The
past becomes the whiggishly drawn rationale for pursuing a present
grievance. As the historian Robert Berkhofer suggests, Said "uses many
voices to exemplify the stereotyped view, but he makes no attempt to
show how the new self/other relationship ought to be represented. Said's
book does not practice what it preaches multiculturally."29i Said's
method, Berkhofer continues, is to "quote past persons and paraphrase
them to reveal their viewpoints as stereotyped and hegemonic."
Napoleon's savants, Renan's racism, and Flaubert's flirtations serve to
accentuate the complicity of modern-day social scientists who support
Israel. Orientalism is a prime example of a historical study with one voice
and one viewpoint. Some critics have argued in rhetorical defense of Said
that he should not be held accountable for providing an alternative. The
voice of dissent, the critique (of Orientalism or any other hegemonic
discourse) does not need to propose an alternative for the critique to be
effective and valid," claim Ashcroft and Ahluwalia.29= Saree Makdisi
suggests that Said's goal in Orientalism is "to specify the constructedness
of reality" rather than to "unmask and dispel" the illusion of Orientalist
discourse.=93 Timothy Brennan argues that Said's aim is not to describe
the "brute reality" of a real Orient but rather to point out the "relative
indifference" of Western intellectuals to that reality.=94 Certainly no
author is under an invisible hand of presumption to solve a problem he or
she wishes to expose. Yet, it is curious that Said would not want to
suggest an alternative, to directly engage the issue of how the "real"
Orient could be represented. He reacts forcefully to American literary
critics of the "left" who fail to specify the ideas, values, and engagement
being urged.=95 If, as Said, insists "politics is something more than liking
or disliking some intellectual orthodoxy now holding sway over a
department of literature,"=9'6 then why would he not follow through with
what this "something more" might be for the discourse he calls
Orientalism? As Abdallah Laroui eloquently asks, " Having become concerned
with an essentially political problem, the Arab intelligentsia must inevitably reach
the stage where it passes from diagnosis of the situation to prescription of
remedial action.
25
bisexuals, and transgendered people talk back, whether using the tools of the master or the vernacular on the
streets , their voices, singularly or collectively, do not exist in some vacuous wasteland of discursivity. As symbolic
i
ii
iii
iv
v.