REPUBLIC V.

CA

this was opposed by the government.

131 SCRA 532

HELD:
There is no accretion if by man-made causes.
FACTS:

Hilario v. City of Manila [GR No. L-19570 April 27, 1967]

Subject land was 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. It was
owned by Benedicto del Rio. After his death, it was acquired by Santos
del Rio. Private oppositors sought permission and obtained the same to
construct duck houses. They violated agreement by consructing residential
houses. Santos then sought to register the land which was opposed. The
oppositors was able to obtain sales application on the land. The director of
Lands alleged that since a portion of the land is submerged in water 4 to 5
months, then it forms part of the public domain.

HELD:
According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or
pools is the covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth
regular, common, natural, which occurs almost or most of the time during the
year.
Laguna de Bay is a lake and that part around it which becomes covered
with water 4 to 5 months a year, not due to tidal action, but due to rains cannot
be considered as part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay nor as a foreshore
land. Property not being so, the land is registrable.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO

108 SCRA 335

FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove)
which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of
land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public domain.
The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said land formed part of
the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case

because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this refers
to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by
accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the pubic domain when they
are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and the
legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration
that any said land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such declaration is
made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership.
REPUBLIC V. CA
132 SCRA 514

FACTS:
Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond.
They are the registered owners of parcel of lot bordering on the Bocaue
and Meycauyan rivers. The lower and appellate court allowed registration but

Jun28
Bengzon JP (J): 8 concur
Facts: Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land around
49 hectares in area (Barrio Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal). Upon his death this
property was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of
title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs father, the Hilario estate was
bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.3 To prevent its entry into
the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the
northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern
side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose. However, in 1937, a great
and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the
neighboring barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the
northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating
from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the
eastern side of this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed
site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant
within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel
and sand from the nearby areas along the River. The operations eventually
extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a claim for damages
was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator
of Dr. Hilarios estate. The US Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to
herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its operations.
On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages
against the defendants City Engineer of Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the
Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the
plant. Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were
respectively allowed to join the litigation as intervenors; as per issue of fees and
penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March 1954,
defendants filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor
Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have fenced off the disputed
area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of
Public Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations
but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit. On 13 May 1954, plaintiff
amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of
Manila, the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new
Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his claim to one purely
for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public
Works, solidarily, in the amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken
since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until defendants stop their
operations. On 21 December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision,
ordering the City of Manila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in
solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand extracted from the
plaintiffs land, plus costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to
reimburse intervenor Calalang of P36.80 representing gravel fees illegally
collected. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this decision and
they all sought a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower
court resolved the motions to reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5
portion of the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the case against the
Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without
prejudice to Hilario taking action against proper party in such claim. Hilario and
Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the lower court
denied. Hence, the appeal.
The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered
another judgment to the effect that the City of Manila and the Director of Public
Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from extracting
materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the
strip of land question declared not part of public domain and confirmed as part
of Hilarios private property. No Costs.
12. Ordinary and extraordinary flood
There are two types of floods in the area during the rainy season. One is the socalled ordinary flood, when the river is swollen but the flowing water is kept
within the confines of the primary and secondary banks.
This occurs annually, about three to four times during the period. Then there is
the extraordinary flood, when the waters overflow beyond the said banks, and
even inundate the surrounding areas. However, this flood does not happen
regularly. From 1947 to 1955, there were only three such floods.
13. Movement of the river, west bank, from 1945-1955
From 1945 to 1949, the west bank of the River extended westward up to the
secondary bank line; from 1950 to 1952, this bank had moved, with the River,
to the east, its lateral borders running along a line just 20 meters west of the
camachile tree; and from 1953 to 1955, the extremities of the west bank further
receded eastward beyond the camachile tree, until they lay just about 20 meters
east of said tree.
14. Floodings not accidental as they are annual; Government v. Colegio de
San Jose does not apply

Evidence shows that the River floods with annual regularity during the rainy
season. These floods can hardly be called accidental. The Colegio de San Jose
case is not exactly in point. What was mainly considered there was Article 74 of
the Law of Waters relating to lakes, ponds and pools. In the present case, none of
these is involved.
15. Movement of the river not due to excavation and extraction of materials
The excavations and extractions of materials, even from the American period,
have been made only on the strip of land west of the River. Under the
following-the nature-of-things argument advanced by plaintiff, the River
should have moved westward, where the level of the ground had been lowered.
But the movement has been in the opposite direction instead. Therefore, it
cannot be attributed to defendants operations. Moreover, Hilarios own
evidence indicates that the movement eastward was all due to natural causes.
The movement eastward of the channel by as much as 31 meters, from 1950 to
1953, was due to two typhoons which caused the erosion of the east bank and
the depositing of materials on the west side which increased its level from as
much as .93 to 2 meters.
16. River of different width; claim of unnatural widening unfounded
Reliance is made on the finding by the lower court that in 1943, the river was
only 60 meters wide, whereas in 1950, it was already 140 meters wide. Such
area sampled shows only the width of the River near the southwestern boundary
of the Hilario estate. It does not indicate how wide it was in the other parts,
especially up north.
17. Extraction confined on the banks of the river and not beyond limits of
the west bank to invade his private estate; Hilario cannot recover damages
from defendants
From 1947 to the early part of 1949, the defendants conducted their operations
only in the New Accretion Area along a narrow longitudinal zone contiguous to
the watercourse then. This zone, City Engineer Manila, is about 1 km. long and
extends northward up to pt. 50.35. However, no extractions nor excavations
were undertaken west of this zone, i.e., above the temporary bank line. This
line is located east of the secondary bank line, the lateral extremity of the west
bank then. In the latter part of 1949, plaintiff prohibited the defendants from
extracting along the New Accretion Area and constructed a fence across the
same. This forced the defendants to go southeast of the Excavated Area. From
1954 to 1955, defendants area of operation was still farther east of the New
Accretion Area. They were. working within a confined area along the west
waterline, the northern and western boundaries of which were 20 meters away
east from the camachile tree. It appears sufficiently established, therefore, that
defendants have not gone beyond the receding western extremities of the west
riverbank. They have confined their extraction of gravel and sand only from
which the banks of the River, which constitute part of the public domain
wherein they had the right to operate. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient
evidence that defendants have gone beyond the limits of the west bank, as
previously established, and have invaded his private estate. He cannot, therefore,
recover from
them.
18. Plaintiff not denied of property without just compensation
The Court does not declare that the entire channel, i.e., all that space between
the secondary bank line and the primary bank line, has permanently become
part of the riverbed. What is held is that at the time the defendants made their
extractions, the excavations were within the confines of the riverbanks then. All
that space to the west of said receding line would still be part of plaintiffs
property and also whatever portion adjoining the river is, at present, no longer
reached by the non-inundating ordinary floods. Further, it is not correct to say
that plaintiff would be deprived of his property without any compensation at all.
Under Article 370 of the old Civil Code, the abandoned bed of the old river
belongs to the riparian owners either fully or in part with the other riparian
owners. And had the change occurred under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
plaintiff would even be entitled to all of the old bed in proportion to the area he
has lost.
19. Defendants did not unjustly profit at plaintiffs expense as they are not
responsible for the shifting of the river
Defendants cannot be accused of unjustly profiting at plaintiffs expense. They
were not responsible for the shifting of the river. It was due to natural causes for
which no one can be blamed. Further, defendants were extracting from public
property then, under proper authorization. The government, through the
defendants, may have been enriched by chance, but not unjustly.

Heirs of Antonio Factura which was the subject of judgment by compromise in

view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the
heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of
1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they
are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square
meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax
declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in
question against Jagualing. RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave
to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over the land
in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not
susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and
subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on
Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the
premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?
HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that
the property of Eduave actually existed and was identified prior to the branching
off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of
the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or
isolated by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such
separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that
formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded
or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual
and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did
not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof;
or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private
respondents, they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner.

This preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the owners of the land
located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the
best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no
specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian
owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the
torrens system must itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the
required period and their possession cannot be considered in good faith since by
their admission they have recognized Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus
the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin.
However such accretion may be lost to third parties thru prescription.
JAGUALING V. CA | EDUAVE, 194 SCRA 607

SANTOS v. BERNABE

FACTS:

If two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed and the owners of the
things are in good faith, OR if the mixture occurs accidentally and cannot be
separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things
mixed or comingled.

Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later
increased in size due to erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing
asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent
squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs.

FACTS:

giving Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who deposited
1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3Php per cavan.

Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Bernabe.
At the same time, Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay.
The share of Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be separated.

SIARI VALLEY ESTATE INC. V. FILEMON LUCASAN

If the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it
will lose his share.
Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case against Bernabe to
recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse.
So Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it.
Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice and 31
kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were
delivered to Tiongson.

Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had
already proceeded with the attachment, so Santos files a complaint. He says that
Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay; he says that by asking for the
attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the cavans of rice all
belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

FACTS:
Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven
from its lands to that of Lucasans. Lucasan however argued that although there
was commixtion of cattle, Siari already retrieved its animals. The CFI of
Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his share in the
commixtion

Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own.
HELD: YES
HELD:
No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately.

Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing animals were taken
by Lucasan or his men, on 2 occasions however, his men drove away 30 heads
of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe that the others must have also been driven
away applying by analogy the principle that one who stole a part of the stolen
money must have taken also the larger sum lost by the offended party.

The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those belonging to
Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by
will of one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things
cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the
mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the
things mixed or comingled.

Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that if the commingling of 2 things is
made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share thus since
Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share in the commixtion.

> The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321 heads that had been entrusted to
his care to Siari; pay damages for the 400 heads he sold since 1946; ordered to
allow Siari to round up all the buffaloes that may be found on its cattle ranch
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took the
proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby