1.1WHATISTHESOCIALCONTRACTTHEORY?

Thesocialcontract,whichbrings
intoexistenceawellorderedsociety"stateofstates",issaidtobeofthreekeyelements.
Thefirstelementisanimageryofhowasocietywillbelikewithnolaws,underthestate
ofnature. Thesecond,Individuals'attempttoescapefromsuchbrutalitybringsabout
thesecondelement,whichisrecognizingthe"state"tohavethepowertobringabout
orderandstabilitytoasociety;recognizingthesovereignpower. Thethirdandfinal
peopleunderthesocialcontracttorespectandobeythelaiddownlawsbythestate 1.
However,JohnRawlsextendtheidealsocialcontracttheoryintowellordersocieties,
this will be discussed subsequently. 2.WHAT IS JOHN RAWLSS IDEA OF THE
SOCIALCONTRACT?2.1imageryofhowasocietywillbelikewithnolaws,under
thestateofnature. Rawls inthisrespectconnotes his stateofnature,asanoriginal
position the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the
traditionaltheoryofthesocialcontract.2Thisoriginalpositionisnot,ofcourse,thought
ofasanactualhistoricalstateofaffairs,muchlessasaprimitiveconditionofculture.It
isunderstoodasapurelyhypotheticalsituationcharacterizedsoastoleadtoacertain
conception of justice. Therefore Rawlss State of nature is composed of one that
constitutesanoriginalposition,whereby,theessentialfeaturesofthissituationisthatno
oneknowshisplaceinsociety,hisclasspositionorsocialstatus,nordoesanyoneknow
hisfortuneinthedistributionofnaturalassetsandabilities,hisintelligence,strength,and
thelike.Rawlsevenpresupposesthat,thepartiesdonotknowtheirconceptionsofthe
goodortheirspecialpsychologicalpropensities.TheimagerycreatedbyRawlsinhis
1 <Ukessays.com /essays/philosophy/social-contract-and-immanuel-kant-philosophyessay.php> accessed on 21st June 2015
2 John Rawls A Theory of Justice, (published in 1971 by Harvard University Press) p.33

perceptionofthestateofnatureissomeoughtsimilartoLockesstateofnaturebut
however this will be attributed in comparison subsequently. Rawls characterized this
original position to constitute an original agreement whose principle objects are the
principlesofjusticeforthebasicstructureofsociety(originalposition).Theyarethe
principlesthatfreeandrationalpersonsconcernedtofurthertheirowninterestswould
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
associationTheseprinciplesaretoregulateallfurtheragreements;theyspecifythekinds
ofsocialcooperationthatcanbeenteredintoandtheformsofgovernmentthatcanbe
established.ThiswayofregardingtheprinciplesofjusticeIshallcalljusticeasfairness.
Itisunderstoodasapurelyhypotheticalsituationcharacterizedsoastoleadtoacertain
conceptionofjustice.Howthenaretheseprinciplesofjusticeselected?Rawlsgivesa
ratherfigurativedescriptiontostatethattheseindividualsareunderaveilofignorance
construedliterally,toensurethat,nooneisadvantagedordisadvantagedinthechoiceof
principlesbytheoutcomeorthecontingenciesofsocialcircumstances 3.Sinceallare
similarlysituatedandnooneisabletodesignprinciplestofavorhisparticularcondition,
theprinciplesofjusticearetheresultofafairagreementorbargain.Thisthenmaybe
attributedtoLockesformationofsocietiesandcommunities.2.2Individuals'attemptto
escapefromsuchbrutalitybringsaboutthesecondelement,whichisrecognizingthe
"state"tohavethepowertobringaboutorderandstabilitytoasociety;sovereignty.In
this respect Rawls states that Then, having chosen a conception of justice, we can
supposethattheyaretochooseaconstitutionandalegislaturetoenactlaws,andsoon,
allinaccordancewiththeprinciples ofjusticeinitiallyagreedupon.Rawlsdoesnot
3 Ibidn2p16

describeindividualsasbeinginastateofbrutalityasHobbescontractarianapproach
divulges,butratherundertheveilofignoranceindividualsareabletochooseprinciples
ofjusticeandfairnessstillintheiroriginalpositionundertheoriginalagreementorinitial
agreement.4OnefeaturealsolaboredbyRawlsistheaspectthatthepartiesintheinitial
position are thought of as rational beings that are mutually disinterested, they are
conceivedasnottakinginterestinoneanothersinterestscontrarytoHobbesanalogy.
2.3ThefinallyRawlsssocialcontractapproachin,theobligationofthepeopleunderthe
socialcontracttorespectandobeythelaiddownlawsbythestate.Incomparisontothe
finalissuesRawlsarticulatesthat, assumingthattheoriginalpositiondoesdeterminea
setofprinciples(thatis,thataparticularconceptionofjusticewouldbechosen),itwill
thenbetruethatwheneversocialinstitutionssatisfytheseprinciplesthoseengagedin
themcansaytooneanotherthattheyarecooperatingontermstowhichtheywouldagree
iftheywerefreeandequalpersonswhoserelationswithrespecttooneanotherwerefair.
Theindividualswouldthenobeytheseprinciplesbytheiragreementsasmeetingthe
stipulations which they would acknowledge in an initial situation, referred to as the
originalstateorthestatusquo.Rawlsscontractarianattemptisfocusedontheinitial
approachtojusticeandfairnessasopposedtoaformationofgovernmentoracommon
wealthattributedbyhispredecessorsonthesame 3.DOESRAWLSSADJOURN
HIMSELFTOTHENOTIONOFHISPREVIOUSDOGMAS? JohnRawlsborrowed
hissocialcontractanalogyfromLocke5intermsontheformationofsocietiesRousseau 6
4 supra n2
5 Locke,John.TwoTreatisesonGovernment.(London:PrintedforR.Butler,etc.,1821Bartleby.com,2010)
<www.bartleby.com/169/>accessedJune22nd2015

66DiscourseontheOriginandBasisofInequalityAmongMen(Discourssurl'origineetlesfondementsdel'ingalitparmiles
hommes),1754

whenitcametoindividualsbeingtheirownsovereignandhavingindividualrightsand
thereforevoteonallmatters.OutofthethreeproponentsRawlssdidnotjuststophis
socialcontractanalogyasconstitutingjusticeandfairnessfromhispreviousdiscourseon
theTheoryofjustice.RawlsborrowedImmanuelKantsPerpetualPeace,7inadvocating
of not one centralized worldstate but rather he advocates alliance of many
independent,wellorderedmembernationsreferredtoaspeoples 8.Rawlsfurthercalls
suchanallianceasocietyofpeoples.ThereforewecancomfortablestatethatRawls
doesnotadjournhimselfontheanalogyoftheSocialContractitisinthispartofthe
essaythatthisextensionissyphoned. ThisTheoryofjusticeproposedbyRawlsand
previouslydiscussed,wasoriginallyonlyappliedonthedomesticlevel.Howeverinhis
subsequentbookonTheLawofPeopleheprogressesthesocialcontracttheorybyfirstly,
3.1HISEXPLANATIONOFTHEUSEOFPEOPLESINSTEADOFSTATESRawls
explainswhyheuses'peoples'andnotstates.AccordingtoRawls,liberalpeoplesare
those that have key characteristics; a reasonably just constitutional democratic
government that serves their fundamental interests; unity along shared "common
sympathies;andamoralnature.9Asaresult,peoplearerationalandreasonable.Similar
tostates,peoplearerationalbecausetheypursuetheirowninterests.However,unlike
states,peopleareconstrainedbytheirsenseofwhatis peopleareconstrainedbytheir
senseofwhatisreasonable,whichRawlsdefinesastheconcernforreciprocityandthe
interestsofother.Itisthissenseofwhatisreasonablethatisessentialintheformationof

7 Immanuel Kants Second Thesis in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, (1784) in, Perpetual Peace and
other essays on Politics, History, and Morals. Trans. Ted Humphrey. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., Inc., 1988), p. 30

8 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 29-30, 36.
9 Ibidn7

ajustsocietyatthedomesticleveland,thus,itisasequallyimportantthecreationofthe
LawofPeoplescommonlyreferredtoasInternationallaw.10
3.2HISEXTENSIONOFTHEORIGINALPOSITION(op)TOANOTHERLEVEL
Rawlsextendstheoriginalpositiontoanotherleveltoillustratehowliberaldemocratic
peoplescouldcreatetheLawofPeoples.InthisversionoftheOP,thepartiesinvolved
are rational representatives of liberal peoples that are guided by the two domestic
principlesofjustice.Inaddition,theveilofignoranceisintactsotheyknownothingof
theirlevelofeconomicdevelopment,populationandterritorysize,naturalresources,
etc.11AccordingtoRawls,thedeliberationsinthesecondoriginalpositionwouldproduce
theLawofthePeoples.Thenewlawwouldconsistofeightprinciplesofjusticethat
guidetheinteractionbetweenliberalpeoples:peoplesarefreeandindependent;must
observetreatiesandundertakings;areequalandarepartiestotheagreementsthatbind
them;toobserveadutyofnonintervention;havetherightofselfdefensebutnottostart
war;mustobservehumanrights;andpeopleshaveadutytoassistotherpeoplesliving
underunfavorableconditionsthatpreventtheirhavingliberalordecentstate 12.Thesesets
ofprinciplesaretheunderlyingprinciplesthatwillprovideaframeworkfortherelations
ofbetween liberal peoples andtheir states.3.3WHETHER THIS LAWS OF PEOPLE
CANBEEXTENDEDTONONLIBERALPEOPLES,Rawlsstatesthatifanonliberal
peoplesbasicinstitutionsmeetcertainconditions,thentheywouldconsultapproveand
accept the Law of Peoples and become included in the Society of Peoples. 13 Rawls
10 ibidn8
11 supra
12 ibidn10
13 supra

definesnonliberalpeoplesthatwarrantsuchanextensionandmeettheconditionsas
decentpeoples. Decentpeoples,accordingtoRawls,respectaminimalsetofbasic
humanrights,includingrightstolife,liberty,andformalequality;theyarenonaggressive
withrespecttootherpeoples;theyliveundersomethingliketheruleoflaw;theyhavea
decentconsultationhierarchyinwhichtheinterestsofallgroupsarerepresented;and
theyviewallpersonsasmoralcitizens. 14However,theyarenotliberalsocietiesbecause
theyprivilegeaparticularcomprehensivedoctrine,religiousorpolitical,andperceived
opponentstothisdoctrinearenotaccordedthesamerightsasadherents.3.4PASTTHE
IDEALTHEORYINTOWELLORDEREDSOCIETIES Rawlsshiftstohisnonideal
theoryanddetermineshowwellorderedsocietiesshouldactinregardstosocietiesthat
arenotwellordered.Here,hesuggeststhataswellasliberalanddecentpeoples,there
areoutlawstates,burdenedsocieties,andbenevolentabsolutisms.Thesethreetypesof
societieseitherarenoncompliantwiththeLawofPeoplesand/orconsistofunfavorable
conditionsthathinderthemfrombecomingeitherliberalordecent.First,outlawstates
arethosethatregimesthatbelievethatthewarisalegitimatemeansofadvancingtheir
interests.Next,Rawlsdefinesburnedsocietiesassocietieswhosehistorical,socialand
economiccircumstancesmaketheirachievingawellorderedregime,whetherliberalor
decent, difficult if not impossible.15 Finally, benevolent absolutist societies respects
humanrightsbutallowitscitizensameaningfulrolethepoliticalarena.Inparlance
withthepreviouslystatedconclusionRawlsalsocommensuratetosaythatTheLawsof
thepeopleactsaguidetothethreesocieties.InconclusionthereforeRawlsextendedthe
14 Law of Peoples, 5. Greg Hakos, Rawls and Cosmopolitanism: Peoples, Persons, and Human Rights.
Federal Governance: A Graduate Journal of Theory and Politics. 1:3 (2004) <http://cnfs.queensu.ca/
federalgovernance/index.html>

15 Ibidn12

traditional Social contract theory, initially not to the formation of government but
howevertojusticeasfairnessthenheprogresseditevenfurtherfromthedomesticsphere
intotheInternationalsphere,whichhereferstoaslawofPeople.