CIVIL LAW

2015 BAR EXAMINATIONS

I.

Effect and Application of Laws (Civil Code).. 5

Include: Conflict of Laws (Private International Law)..... 6
II. Human Relations (Arts. 19-22, Civil Code). 30
PERSONS
I. Persons and Personality (Civil Code)..30
II. Marriage (Family Code)33
III. Legal Separation (Family Code)..57
IV. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Family Code)..59
V. Property Relations of the Spouses (Family Code)..59
VI. The Family..76
VII. Paternity and Filiation (Family Code).78
VIII. Adoption....89
A. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8552)91
B. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8043)..95
IX. Support (Family Code)95
X. Parental Authority (Family Code)..97
Include: Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610)...101
XI. Emancipation (Arts. 234 and 236, Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6809 which
lowered the age of majority)..101
XII. Summary Judicial Proceedings in Family Law Cases.101
XIII. Retroactivity of the Family Code (Art. 256)..101
XIV. Funerals (Arts. 305-310, Civil Code)...101
XV. Use of Surnames..101
XVI. Absence (Art. 43, Civil Code; Art. 41, Family Code)..102
XVII. Civil Registrar102
PROPERTY
I. Characteristics..104
II. Classification..104
III. Ownership...108
IV. Accession.....112
V. Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title to or
Interest in Real Property..119
VI. Co-ownership.121
VII. Possession...127
VIII. Usufruct..130
IX. Easements133
X. Nuisance140
XI. Modes of Acquiring Ownership.143
PRESCRIPTION
I. Definition..154
II. No prescription applicable..154
III. Prescription or limitation of actions.154

OBLIGATIONS
I. Definition..156
II. Elements of an Obligation.156
III. Different Kinds of Prestations...156
IV. Classification of Obligations156
V. Sources of Obligations.160
VI. Nature and Effect of Obligations..165
VII. Kinds of Civil Obligations..168
VIII. Joint and Solidary Obligation..169
IX. Extinguishment of Obligations..173
CONTRACTS
I. Essential Requisites..182
II. Kinds of Contracts..184
III. Formality..185
IV. Defective Contracts186
V. Effect of Contracts..186
SALES
I. Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale...188
II. Parties to a Contract of Sale.190
III. Subject Matter...190
IV. Obligations of the Seller to Transfer Ownership..190
V. Price.191
VI. Formation of Contract of Sale.192
VII. Transfer of Ownership195
VIII. Risk of Loss198
IX. Documents of Title.199
X. Remedies of an Unpaid Seller.199
XI. Performance of Contract200
XII. Warranties..200
XIII. Breach of Contract203
XIV. Extinguishment of the Sale.203
XV. The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957)...205
XVI. The Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726) .206
SUCCESSION
I. General Provisions.206
II. Testamentary Succession.207
III. Legal or Intestate Succession.232
IV. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession..245
PARTNERSHIP
I. Contract of Partnership..248
II. Rights and Obligations of Partnership.250
III. Rights and Obligations of Partners Among Themselves.250
IV. Obligations of Partnership/Partners to Third Persons..252
V. Dissolution..253
VI. Limited Partnership.255

AGENCY
I. Definition of Agency..255
II. Powers256
III. Express vs. Implied Agency..256
IV. Agency by Estoppel256
V. General vs. Special Agency256
VI. Agency Couched in General Terms.256
VII. Agency Requiring Special Power of Attorney.257
VIII. Agency by Operation of Law.259
IX. Rights and Obligations of Principal259
X. Irrevocable Agency261
XI. Modes of Extinguishment..261
COMPROMISE
I. Definition..261
II. Void Compromise261
III. Effect261
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
I. Loan..262
II. Deposit268
III. Guaranty and Suretyship..269
IV. Pledge..271
V. Real Mortgage274
Include: Act 3135, as amended by R.A. No. 4118.282
VI. Antichresis..289
VII. Chattel Mortgage.291
Include: Act 1508299
VIII. Quasi-contracts..307
IX. Concurrence and Preference of Credits..310
LEASE
I. Lease of Things.310
II. Lease of Work or Services.310
III. Lease of Rural and Urban Lands..311
IV. Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee..313
V. Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands..318
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
I. Torrens System319
II. Regalian Doctrine...338
III. Citizenship Requirement..338
IV. Original Registration339
V. Subsequent Registration343
VI. Non-registrable Properties..345
VII. Dealings with Unregistered Lands.....346
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Book I--Torts
I. Principles..349

II. Classification of Torts.........353

III. The Tortfeasor..353
IV. Act or Omission and its Modalities.353
V. Proximate Cause.....357
VI. Legal Injury.....358
VII. Intentional Torts.358
VIII. Negligence.358
IX. Special Liability in Particular Activities.361
X. Strict Liability361
Book II--Damages
I. General Considerations..363
II. Actual and Compensatory Damages..366
III. Moral Damages.367
IV. Nominal Damages...370
V. Temperate or Moderate Damages..372
VI. Liquidated Damages.372
VII. Exemplary or Corrective Damages.372
VIII. Damages in Case of Death..373
IX. Graduation of Damages..374
X. Miscellaneous Rules..374

I.

Effect and Application of Laws (Civil Code)

I.

How would you compare the Civil Law system in its governance and trend with that of
the Common Law system? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As regards "governance":
Governance in Civil Law is codal, statutory and written law. It is additionally derived from case
law. Common law is basically derived from case law.
As regards "trend":
Civil law is now tending to rely more and more on decisions of the courts explaining the laws.
Common law is now codifying laws more and more. So they are now merging towards similar
systems.
ADDITIONAL ANSWERS:
Common law refers to the traditional part of the law as distinct from legislation: it refers to
the universal part of law as distinct from particular local customs (Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 7).
On the other hand, civil law is understood to be that branch of law governing the relationship
of persons in respect of their personal and private interests as distinguished from both public and
international laws.
In common law countries, the traditional responsibility has for the most part been with the
Judges; in civil law countries, the task is primarily reposed on the lawmakers. Contemporary
practices, however, so indicate a trend towards centralizing that function to professional groups
that may, indeed, see the gradual assimilation in time of both systems. (Vitug, Civil Law and
Jurisprudence. p. XX]
In Civil Law, the statutes theoretically take precedence over court decisions interpreting
them; while in Common Law, the court decisions resolving specific cases are regarded as law
rather than the statutes themselves which are, at the start, merely embodiments of case law. Civil
Law is code law or written law, while Common Law is case law. Civil Law adopts the deductive
method - from the general to the particular, while the Common Law uses the inductive approach from the particular to the general. Common Law relies on equity. Civil Law anchors itself on the
letter of the law. The civilists are for the judge-proof law even as the Common Law is judge-made
law. Civil Law judges are merely supposed to apply laws and not interpret them.
II.

1) Are decisions of the Court Of Appeals considered laws?

2) What are the binding effects of an obiter dictum and a dissenting opinion?
3) How can a decision of the Supreme Court be set aside? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1) a) No. but decisions of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for inferior courts on
points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a ruling of the Court of Appeals may
become a doctrine. (Miranda v. Imperial 77 Phil. 1066).

b) No. Decisions of the Court of Appeals merely have persuasive, and therefore no mandatory
effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers a point of law still undecided may
still serve as judicial guide and it is possible that the same maybe raised to the status of doctrine, if
after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis, the Supreme Court should find that it
has merits and qualities sufficient for its consideration as a rule of jurisprudence (Civil Code,
Paras).
2) None. Obiter dictum and opinions are not necessary to the determination of a case. They
are not binding and cannot have the force of official precedents. It is as if the Court were turning
aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects: a dissenting opinion affirms or
overrules a claim, right or obligation. It neither disposes nor awards anything it merely expresses
the view of the dissenter. (Civil Code, Paras)
3) A decision of a division of the Supreme Court may be set aside by the Supreme Court sitting
en banc, a Supreme Court decision may be set aside by a contrary ruling of the Supreme Court itself
or by a corrective legislative act of Congress, although said laws cannot adversely affect those
favored prior to the Supreme Court decision. (Civil Code, Paras).

III. After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Luzon
provinces, the executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to enact a
special law appropriating PI billion for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for the
provinces. In view of the urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its
effeclivity clause that it shall take effect upon approval and after completion of
publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1. 1990, signed into law by the
President on July 3. 1990, and published in such newspaper of general circulation on July
7. 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.
(a) As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient observance or
compliance with the requirements for a valid publication? Explain your answer.
(b) When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.
(c) Can the executive branch start releasing and disbursing funds appropriated by the
said law the day following its approval? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of publication for
its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2. Civil Code)
(b) The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and the last
condition was complied with on July 10. 1990. Hence, the law became effective on that date.
(c) No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1. 1990 and approved
by the President on July 3. 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not yet complete at the
time.
Include: Conflict of Laws (Private International Law)
I.

Give at least two reasons why a court may assume jurisdiction over a conflict of laws
case. (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Statute theory. There is a domestic law authorizing the local court to assume jurisdiction.
2) Comity theory. The local court assumes jurisdiction based on the principle of comity or

courtesy.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Public Order. To maintain peace and order, disputes that disturb the peace of the forum
should be settled by the courts of the forum even though the application of a foreign law is
necessary for the purpose.
2. Humanitarian Principle. An aggrieved party should not be left without remedy in a forum
even though the application of a foreign law by the courts of the forum is unavoidable in order to
extend relief.
II. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
[a] The doctrine of processual presumption allows the court of the forum to presume
that the foreign law applicable to the case is the same as the local or domestic law.
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. If the foreign law necessary to resolve an issue is not proven as a fact, the court of the
forum may presume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum.
III. On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein he gave
nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United States,
passed the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and became a
naturalized American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of New York do not
recognize holographic wills or compulsory heirs.
[a] Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines?
Why or why not? (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes may be admitted to probate in the Philippines
because there is no public policy violated by such probate. The only issue at probate is the due
execution of the will which includes the formal validity of the will. As regards formal validity, the
only issue the court will resolve at probate is whether or not the will was executed in accordance
with the form prescribed by the law observed by the testator in the execution of his will. For
purposes of probate in the Philippines, an alien testator may observe the law of the place where
the will was executed (Article 17, NCC), or the formalities of the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities of the law of his own country, or in accordance with the
Philippine Civil Code (Art. 816, NCC).Since Dr. Fuentes executed his will in accordance with

Philippine law, the Philippine court shall apply the New Civil Code in determining the formal
validity of the holographic will. The subsequent change in the citizenship of Dr. Fuentes did not
affect the law governing the validity of his will. Under the New Civil Code, which was the law used
by Dr. Fuentes, the law in force at the time of execution of the will shall govern the formal validity
of the will (Article 795, NCC).
[b] Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist that he
be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Jay cannot insist because under New York law he is not a compulsory heir entitled to a
legitime.
The national law of the testator determines who his heirs are, the order that they succeed,
how much their successional rights are, and whether or not a testamentary disposition in his will is
valid (Article 16, NCC). Since, Dr. Fuentes was a US citizen, the laws of New York determines who
his heirs are. And since New York law does not recognize the concept of compulsory heirs, Jay is not
a compulsory heir of Dr. Fuentes entitled to a legitime.
IV. Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State
Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in
Manila. On the first year of the spouses tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita filed
an annulment case against Emmanuel before a Philippine court on the ground of her
husbands sterility at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
[a] Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. As applied to foreign nationals with respect to family relations
and status of persons, the nationality principle set forth in Article 15 of the Civil Code will govern
the relations of Emmanuel and Margarita. Since they are American citizens, the governing law as
to the ground for annulment is not Kenyan law which Margarita invokes in support of sterility as
such ground; but should be U.S. law, which is the national law of both Emmanuel and Margarita
as recognized under Philippine law. Hence, the Philippine court will not give due course to the
case based on Kenyan law. The nationality principle as expressed in the application of national
law of foreign nationals by Philippine courts is established by precedents (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,
174 SCRA 653 [1989], Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 [2001], Llorente v. Court of Appeals 345
SCRA 92 [2000], and Bayot v. Court of Appeals 570 SCRA 472 [2008]).
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The forum has jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of marriage solemnized
elsewhere but only when the party bringing the action is domiciled in the forum. In this case,
none of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in the Philippines. They are here as officials of the
US Embassy whose stay in the country is merely temporary, lasting only during their fixed tour of
duty. Fence, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the action.

[b] Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in Kenya,
they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their marriage be
annulled on the ground of Emmanuels sterility? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled under Philippine law. Sterility is not a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled in the Philippines.
The Philippine court shall have jurisdiction over the action to annul the marriage not only
because the parties are residents of the Philippines but because they are Filipino citizens. The
Philippine court, however, shall apply the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated in
determining its formal validity (Article 26, FC; Article 17, NCC).
Since the marriage was celebrated in Kenya in accordance with Kenyan law, the formal
validity of such marriage is governed by Kenyan law and any issue as to the formal validity of that
marriage shall be determined by applying Kenyan law and not Philippine law.
However, while Kenyan law governs the formal validity of the marriage, the legal capacity of the
Filipino parties to the marriage is governed not by Kenyan law but by Philippine law (Article 15,
NCC). Sterility of a party as a ground for the annulment of marriage is not a matter of form but a
matter of legal capacity. Hence, the Philippine court must apply Philippine law in determining the
status of the marriage on the ground of absence or defect in the legal capacity of the Filipino
parties. Since sterility does not constitute absence or defect in the legal capacity of the parties
under Philippine law, there is no ground to avoid or annul the marriage. Hence, the Philippine
court has to deny the petition.
V.

[a] If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, file a petition for change of
name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)
(2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
New York law shall apply. The petition for change of name filed in New York does not
concern the legal capacity or status of the petitioner. Moreover, it does not affect the Registry of any
other country including the country of birth of the petitioner. Whatever judgment is rendered in
that petition will have effect only in New York. The New York court cannot, for instance, order the
Civil Registrar in the Philippines to change its records. The judgment of the New York Court
allowing a change in the name of the Petitioner will be limited to the records of the petitioner in
New York and the use of the new name in all her transactions in New York. Since the records and
processes in New York are the only ones affected the New York Court will apply New York law in
resolving the petition.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Philippine law shall apply (Art. 15, NCC). Status, conditions, family rights and duties are
governed by Philippine laws as to Filipinos even though sojourning abroad.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If Ligaya, a Filipino, files a petition for change of name with the District Court of New York,
the laws of New York will govern since change of name is not one of those covered by the principles
of nationality.
[b] If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for change of
name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain (2%) (2009 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Philippine law will apply. The petition for change of name in the Philippines will affect only
the records of the petitioner and his transactions in the Philippines. The Philippine court can never
acquire jurisdiction over the custodian in the US of the records of the petitioner. Moreover, change
of name has nothing to do with the legal capacity or status of the alien. Since Philippine records and
transactions are the only ones affected, the Philippine court may effect the change only in
accordance with the laws governing those records and transactions. That the law cannot be but
Philippine law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
U.S. Law shall apply as it is his national law. This is pursuant to the application of lex patriae
or the nationality principle, by which his legal status is governed by national law, the matter of
change of name being included in legal status. The Supreme Court has reiterated in several cases,
that the lex patriae as provided in Article 15 of the Civil Code is applicable to foreign nationals in
determining their legal status (supra).
VI. Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%)
1. Roberta, a Filipino, 17 years of age, without the knowledge of his parents, can
acquire a house in Australia because Australian Laws allow aliens to acquire
property from the age of 16. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. Since Australian Law allows aliens to acquire property from the age of 16, Roberta
may validly own a house in Australia, following the principle of lex rei sitae enshrined in Article 16,
NCC which states: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Moreover, even assuming that legal capacity of Roberta in entering the
contract in Australia is governed by Philippine law under Article 15, NCC, the contract of sale is not
void but merely voidable under the NCC. Hence, even under Philippine law, she will acquire
ownership over the property she bought until the contract is annulled.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

FALSE. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad (Art. 15,
NCC). The age of majority under Philippine law is 18 years (Rep. Act No. 6809); hence, Roberta,
being only 17 years old, has no legal capacity to acquire and own land.
VII. In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In
1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the
same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988.
They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu
married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the
Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
a) Discuss the effect of the divorce obtained by Sonnyand Lulu in Canada. (2%) (2005
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The divorce obtained by Sonny in Canada was not valid because he and his wife were both
Filipino citizens. Divorce between a Filipino couple is not valid under Philippine law even though
they are living abroad. (Art. 15, Civil Code)
VIII.

Distinguish briefly but clearly between:

Domiciliary theory and nationality theory of personal law. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Domiciliary Theory posits that the personal status and rights of a person are governed by the
law of his domicile or the place of his habitual residence. The Nationality Theory, on the other
hand, postulates that it is the law of the persons nationality that governs such status and rights.
IX. Dr. ALX is a scientist honored for work related to the human genome project. Among his
pioneering efforts concern stem cell research for the cure of Alzheimer's disease. Under
corporate sponsorship, he helped develop a microbe that ate and digested oil spills in
the sea.
Now he leads a college team for cancer research in MSS State. The team has
experimented on a mouse whose body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor. Called
oncomouse, it is a life-form useful for medical research and it is a novel creation. Its
body cells do not naturally occur in nature but are the product of man's intellect,
industry' and ingenuity. However, there is a doubt whether local property laws and
ethics would allow rights of exclusive ownership on any life-form. Dr. ALX needs your
advice: (1) whether the reciprocity principle in private international law could be
applied in our jurisdiction; and (2) whether there are legal and ethical reasons that
could frustrate his claim of exclusive ownership over the life-form called "oncomouse
in Manila? What will be your advice to him? (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER TO (1):
(1) The reciprocity principle in private international law may be applied in our jurisdiction.
Section 3 of R.A. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code, provides for reciprocity, as follows: "Any

person who is a national, or who is domiciled, or has a real and effective industrial establishment
in a country which is a party to any convention, treaty or agreement relating to intellectual
property rights or the repression of unfair competition, to which the Philippines is also a party, or
extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the Philippines by law, shall be entitled to benefits to the
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in
addition to the rights to which any owner of an intellectual property right is otherwise entitled by
this Act. (n) To illustrate: the Philippines may refrain from imposing a requirement of local
incorporation or establishment of a local domicile for the protection of industrial property rights
of foreign nationals (citizens of Canada, Switzerland, U.S.) if the countries of said foreign nationals
refrain from imposing said requirement on Filipino citizens.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO (1):
(1) Reciprocity principle cannot be applied in our jurisdiction because the Philippines is a
party to the TRIPS agreement and the WTO. The principle involved is the most-favored nation
clause which is the principle of non-discrimination. The protection afforded to intellectual
property protection in the Philippines also applies to other members of the WTO. Thus, it is not
really reciprocity principle in private international law that applies, but the most-favored nation
clause under public international law.

SUGGESTED ANSWER TO (2):

(2) There is no legal reason why oncomouse" cannot be protected under the law. Among those
excluded from patent protection are plant varieties or animal breeds, or essentially biological
process for the production of plants and animals" (Section 22.4 Intellectual Property Code, R.A. No.
8293). The oncomouse" in the problem is not an essentially biological process for the production
of animals. It is a real invention because its body cells do not naturally occur in nature but are the
product of mans ingenuity, intellect and industry.

The breeding of oncomouse has novelty, inventive step and industrial application. These are
the three requisites of patentability. (Sec. 29, IPC)
There are no ethical reasons why Dr. ADX and his college team cannot be given exclusive
ownership over their invention. The use of such genetically modified mouse, useful for cancer
research, outweighs considerations for animal rights.
There are no legal and ethical reasons that would frustrate Dr. ALXs claim of exclusive
ownership over "oncomouse". Animals are property capable of being appropriated and owned. In
fact, one can own pet dogs or cats, or any other animal. If wild animals are capable of being owned,
with more reason animals technologically enhanced or corrupted by mans invention or industry
are susceptible to exclusive ownership by the inventor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO (2):
The oncomouse is a higher life form which does not fall within the definition of the term
invention". Neither may it fall within the ambit of the term manufacture which usually implies a
non-living mechanistic product.
The oncomouse is better regarded as a discovery" which is the common patrimony of man.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO (2):

The oncomouse is a non-patentable invention. Hence, cannot be owned exclusively by its
inventor. It is a method for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practiced on said bodies are not patentable under Sec. 22 of the IPC.
X. In a class suit for damages, plaintiffs claimed they suffered Injuries from torture during
martial law. The suit was filed upon President EM's arrival on exile in HI, a U.S. state.
The court in HI awarded plaintiffs the equivalent of PI00 billion under the U.S. law on
alien tort claims. On appeal, EMs Estate raised the issue of prescription. It argued that
since said U.S. law is silent on the matter, the court should apply: (1) HIs law setting a
two-year limitation on tort claims: or (2) the Philippine law which appears to require
that claims for personal injury arising from martial law be brought within one year.
Plaintiffs countered that provisions of the most analogous federal statute, the
Torture Victims Protection Act, should be applied. It sets ten years as the period of
prescription. Moreover, they argued that equity could toll the statute of limitations. For
it appeared that EM had procured Constitutional amendments granting himself and
those acting under his direction immunity from suit during his tenure.
In this case, has prescription set in or not? Considering the differences in the cited
laws, which prescriptive period should be applied: one year under Philippine law, two
years under HIs law, ten years under U.S. federal law, or none of the above? Explain.
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The US Court will apply US law, the law of the forum. In determining the applicable
prescriptive period. While US law is silent on this matter, the US Court will not apply Philippine
law in determining the prescriptive period. It is generally affirmed as a principle in private
international law that procedural law is one of the exceptions to the application of foreign law by
the forum. Since prescription is a matter of procedural law even in Philippine jurisprudence,
(Cadalin v. POEA/ NLRC/Brown and Root International, 238 SCRA 721 [1994]), the US Court will
apply either HI or Federal law in determining the applicable prescriptive period and not Philippine
law. The Restatement of American law affirms this principle.
XI. PH and LV are HK Chinese. Their parents are now Filipino citizens who live in Manila.
While still students in MNS State, they got married although they are first cousins. It
appears that both in HK and in MNS State first cousins could marry legally.
They plan to reside and set up business in the Philippines. But they have been
informed, however, that the marriage of first cousins here is considered void from the
beginning by reason of Public policy. They are in a dilemma. They dont want to break
Philippine law, much less their marriage vow. They seek your advice on whether their
civil status will be adversely affected by Philippine domestic law? What is your advice?
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
My advice is as follows:

The civil status of PH and LV will not be adversely affected by Philippine law because they
are nationals of Hong Kong and not Filipino citizens.
Being foreigners, their status, conditions and legal capacity in the Philippines are governed
by the law of Hong Kong, the country of which they are citizens. Since their marriage is valid
under Hong Kong law, it shall be valid and respected in the Philippines.
XII. A Filipino couple, Mr. And Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claire's
orphanage In New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they
have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died In an accident at sea, followed to the
grave a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of bank
deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.?
May she also inherit from BM. Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YV can inherit from BM, Jr. the succession to the estate of BM, Jr. is governed by Philippine
law because he was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Article 1039 of the Civil
Code, the capacity of the heir to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent and not by
the national law of the heir. Hence, whether or not YV can inherit from BM, Jr. is determined by
Philippine law. Under Philippine law, the adopted inherits from the adopter as a legitimate child of
the adopter.
YV, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter, BM, Sr., because
he is not a legal heir of BM, Sr. The legal fiction of adoption exists only between the adopted and
the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]). Neither may he inherit from BM, Sr. by
representing BM, Jr. because in representation, the representative must be a legal heir not only of
the person he is representing but also of the decedent from whom the represented was supposed
to inherit (Article 973, Civil Code).
XIII. BONI and ANNE met while working overseas. They became sweethearts and got
engaged to be married on New Years Eve aboard a cruise ship in the Caribbean. They
took the proper license to many in New York City, where there is a Filipino consulate.
But as planned the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the Norwegianregistered vessel in a private suite among selected friends.
Back in Manila, Anne discovered that Boni had been married in Bacolod City 5 years
earlier but divorced in Oslo only last year. His first wife was also a Filipina but now
based in Sweden. Boni himself is a resident of Norway where he and Anne plan to live
permanently.
Anne retains your services to advise her on whether her marriage to Boni is valid
under Philippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances?
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Boni is still a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine Law (Art. 15
Civil Code). Under Philippine-Law, his marriage to Anne is void because of a prior existing

marriage which was not dissolved by the divorce decreed in Oslo. Divorce obtained abroad by a
Filipino is not recognized.
If Boni was no longer a Filipino citizen, the divorce is valid. Hence, his marriage to Anne is
valid if celebrated in accordance with the law of the place where it was celebrated. Since the
marriage was celebrated aboard a vessel of Norwegian registry, Norwegian law applies. If the Ship
Captain has authority to solemnize the marriage aboard his ship, the marriage is valid and shall be
recognized in the Philippines.
As to the second question, if Boni is still a Filipino, Anne can file an action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to him.
XIV. In his lifetime, a Pakistani citizen, ADIL, married three times under Pakistani law.
When he died an old widower, he left behind six children, two sisters, three homes, and
an estate worth at least 30 million pesos in the Philippines. He was born in Lahore but
last resided in Cebu City, where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest
children now live and work. Two of his oldest children are farmers in Sulu, while the two
middle-aged children are employees in Zamboanga City. Finding that the deceased left
no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City. Two other siblings objected, arguing that it should be in Jolo before a
Sharia court since his lands are in Sulu. But Adils sisters in Pakistan want the
proceedings held in Lahore before a Pakistani court.
Which court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue for the intestate proceedings?
The law of which country shall govern succession to his estate? (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In so far as the properties of the decedent located in the Philippines are concerned, they are
governed by Philippine law (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Philippine law, the proper venue for the
settlement of the estate is the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death. Since the decedent
last resided in Cebu City, that is the proper venue for the intestate settlement of his estate.
However, the successional rights to the estate of ADEL are governed by Pakistani law,
his national law, under Article 16 of the Civil Code.
XV. It is said that equity follows the law What do you understand by this phrase, and what
are its basic implications? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Equity follows the law means that courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules
of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. (Arsenal v. IAC, 143 SCRA 40[1986].
Equity is applied only in the absence of but never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor Phil. v. CA
216 SCRA 236 [1992]).
XVI. Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while both were taking up
post-graduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul
their marriage. Jane filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the
ground of the latters sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage in England. The

English court decreed the marriage annulled. Returning to the Philippines, Gene asked
you whether or not he would now be free to marry his former girlfriend. What would
your legal advice be? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His marriage to Jane if valid according to
the forms and solemnities of British law, is valid here (Article 17, 1st par., NCC). However, since
Gene and Jane are still Filipinos, although living in England, the dissolution of their marriage is still
governed by Philippine law (Article 15, NCC). Since, sterility is not one of the grounds for the
annulment of a marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, the annulment of Gene's marriage to
Jane on that ground is not valid in the Philippines (Article 17, par., NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Gene is free to marry his girlfriend because his marriage was validly annulled in
England. The issue of whether or not a marriage is voidable, including the grounds therefor, is
governed by the law of the place where the marriage was solemnized (lex loci celebrationis). Hence,
even if sterility is not a ground to annul the marriage under Philippine law, the marriage is
nevertheless voidable because sterility makes the marriage voidable under English law. Therefore,
annulment of the marriage in England is valid in the Philippines.
XVII. Miss Universe, from Finland, came to the Philippines on a tourist visa. While in this
country, she fell in love with and married a Filipino doctor. Her tourist visa having been
expired and after the maximum extension allowed therefor, the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) is presently demanding that she immediately leave the country
but she refuses to do so, claiming that she is already a Filipino citizen by her marriage to
a Filipino citizen. Can the BID still order the deportation of Miss Universe? Explain. 5%
(2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the BID can order the deportation of Miss Universe. The marriage of an alien woman to
a Filipino does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. She must first prove in an appropriate
proceeding that she does not have any disqualification for Philippine citizenship. (Yung Uan Chu v.
Republic of the Philippines, 159 SCRA 593 [1988]). Since Miss Universe is still a foreigner, despite her
marriage to a Filipino doctor, she can be deported upon expiry of her allowable stay in the
Philippines.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Bureau of Immigration cannot order her deportation. An alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino if she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines. (Mo Ya Lim v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 [1971]), (Sec.
4, Naturalization Law). All that she has to do is prove in the deportation proceeding the fact of her
marriage and that she is not disqualified to become a Filipino citizen.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It depends. If she is disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may be deported. If she is not
disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may not be deported. An alien woman who marries a
Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen only when she proves that she is not disqualified to
become one. The marriage of Miss Universe to the Filipino doctor did not automatically make her a
Filipino citizen. She still has to prove that she is not disqualified to become a citizen.
XVIII. Felipe and Felisa, Doth Filipino citizens, were married in Malolos, Bulacan on June 1,
1950.In 1960, Felipe went to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1975. In 1980,
he obtained a divorce from Felisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. The divorce
decree became final under California law. Coming back to the Philippines in 1982, Felipe
married Segundina, a Filipino citizen. In 2001, Felipe, then domiciled in Los Angeles,
California, died, leaving one child by Felisa, and another one by Segundina. He left a will
which was executed in Manila, under which he left his estate to Segundina and his two
children and nothing to Felisa.
Segundina files a petition for the probate of Felipes will. Felisa questions the
intrinsic validity of the will, arguing that her marriage to Felipe subsisted despite the
divorce obtained by Felipe because said divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. For
this reason, she claims that the properties left by Felipe are their conjugal properties and
that Segundina has no successional rights.
A. Is the divorce secured by Felipe in California recognizable and valid in the
Philippines? How does it affect Felipes marriage to Felisa? Explain. (2%)
B. What law governs the formalities of the will? Explain. (1%)
C. Will Philippine law govern the intrinsic validity of the will? Explain. (2%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. (1) The divorce secured by Felipe in California is recognizable and valid in the Philippines
because he was no longer a Filipino at the time he secured it. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid according to their national
law(Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,139 SCRA 139 [1985]); Qurta v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998];
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,345 SCRA 592 [2000]).
(2) With respect to Felipe the divorce is valid, but with respect to Felisa it is not. The divorce
will not capacitate Felisa to remarry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos at the time of their
marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No. 134 series of 1993, Felisa is allowed to remarry because the
injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also obtains in her case.
B. The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines may observe the formalities
prescribed in:
1) the law of the country of which he is a citizen under Article 817 of the New Civil code, or
2) the law of the Philippines being the law of the place of execution under Article 17 of the
New Civil Code.
C. Philippine law will not govern the instrinsic validity of the will. Article 16 of the New Civil
Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration. California law will govern the intrinsic
validity of the will.

XIX. Felipe is a Filipino citizen. When he went to Sydney for vacation, he met a former
business associate, who proposed to him a transaction which took him to Moscow.
Felipe brokered a contract between Sydney Coals Corp. (Coals), an Australian firm, and
Moscow Energy Corp. (Energy), a Russian firm, tor Coals to supply coal to Energy on a
monthly basis for three years. Both these Firms were not doing, and still do not do,
business in the Philippines. Felipe shuttled between Sydney and Moscow to close the
contract. He also executed in Sydney a commission contract with Coals and in Moscow
with Energy, under which contracts he was guaranteed commissions by both Firms
based on a percentage of deliveries for the three-year period, payable in Sydney and in
Moscow, respectively, through deposits in accounts that he opened in the two cities.
Both firms paid Felipe his commission for four months, after which they stopped paying
him. Felipe learned from his contacts, who are residents of Sydney and Moscow, that the
two Firms talked to each other and decided to cut him off. He now files suit in Manila
against both Coals and Energy for specific performance.
A. Define or explain the principle of ulex loci contractus.' (2%)
B. Define or explain the rule of uforum non conveniens." (3%)
C. Should the Philippine court assume jurisdiction over the case? Explain. (5%) (2002
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Lex loci contractus may be understood in two senses, as follows:
(1) It is the law of the place where contracts, wills, and other public instruments are
executed and governs their forms and solemnities, pursuant to the First paragraph,
Article 17 of the New Civil Code; or
(2) It is the proper law of the contract; i.e., the system of Saw intended to govern the entire
contract, including its essential requisites, indicating the Saw of the place with which
the contract has its closest connection or where the main elements of the contract con
verge. As illustrated by Zaiamea v. Court of Appeals (228 SCRA 23 [1893]), it is the Saw
of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are nationals and
residents of, and where the defendant airline company maintained its office.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a general rule, the law of the place where a
contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and
interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was
made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the
making and the place of performance are the same (United Airline v. CA, G.R. No. 124110, April 20,
2001).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. Forum non conveniens means that a court has discretionary authority to decline
jurisdiction over a cause of action when it is of the view that the action may be justly and effectively
adjudicated elsewhere.
C. No, the Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case of Felipe. Firstly, under
the rule of forum non conveniens, the Philippine court is not a convenient forum as all the

incidents of the case occurred outside the Philippines. Neither are both Coals and Energy doing
business inside the Philippines. Secondly, the contracts were not perfected in the Philippines.
Under the principle of lex loci contractus, the law of the place where the contract is made shall
apply. Lastly, the Philippine court has no power to determine the facts surrounding the execution of
said contracts. And even if a proper decision could be reached, such would have no binding effect
on Coals and Energy as the court was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the said corporations.
(Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, 343 SCRA 1,13- 14[2000])
XX. Alex was born a Filipino but was a naturalized Canadian citizen at the time of his death
on December 25, 1998. He left behind a last will and testament in which he bequeathed
all his properties, real and personal, in the Philippines to his acknowledged illegitimate
Filipina daughter and nothing to his two legitimate Filipino sons. The sons sought the
annulment of the last will and testament on the ground that it deprived them of their
legitimes but the daughter was able to prove that there were no compulsory heirs or
legitimes under Canadian law. Who should prevail? Why? (5%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The daughter should prevail because Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that intestate
and testamentary succession shall be governed by the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration.
XXI.

Juan is a Filipino citizen residing in Tokyo. Japan. State what laws govern:
1. His capacity to contract marriage in Japan. [1%]
2. His successional rights as regards his deceased Filipino father's property in Texas,
U.SA [1%]
3. The extrinsic validity of the last will and testament which Juan executed while
sojourning in Switzerland. [2%]
4. The intrinsic validity of said will. [1%] (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Juan's capacity to contract marriage la governed by Philippine law - i.e., the Family Code pursuant to Art. 15, Civil Code, which provides that our laws relating to, among others, legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
2. By way of exception to the general rule of lex rei sitae prescribed by the first paragraph of
Art. 16, Civil Code, a person's successional rights are governed by the national law of the decedent
(2nd par., Art. 16). Since Juan's deceased father was a Filipino citizen, Philippine law governs Juan's
successional rights.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
2. Juan's successional rights are governed by Philippine law, pursuant to Article 1039 and the
second paragraph of Article 16, both of the Civil Code. Article 1039, Civil Code, provides that
capacity to succeed shall be governed by the law of the nation" of the decedent, i.e. his national
law. Article 16 provides in paragraph two that the amount of successional rights, order of
succession, and intrinsic validity of testamentary succession shall be governed by the national
law" of the decedent who is identified as a Filipino in the present problem.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. The extrinsic validity of Juan's will is governed by (a) Swiss law, it being the law where the
will was made (Art. 17, 1st par. Civil Code), or (b) Philippine law, by implication from the provisions
of Art. 816, Civil Code, which allows even an alien who is abroad to make a will in conformity with
our Civil Code.
4. The intrinsic validity of his will is governed by Philippine law, it being his national law.
(Art. 16, Civil Code)
XXII. Francis Albert, a citizen and resident of New Jersey. U.S.A., under whose law he was
still a minor, being only 20 years of age, was hired by ABC Corporation of Manila to serve
for two years as its chief computer programmer. But after serving for only four months,
he resigned to join XYZ Corporation, which enticed him by offering more advantageous
terms. His first employer sues him in Manila for damages arising from the breach of his
contract of employment. He sets up his minority as a defense and asks for annulment of
the contract on that ground. The plaintiff disputes this by alleging that since the contract
was executed in the Philippines under whose law the age of majority is 18 years, he was
no longer a minor at the time of perfection of the contract.
1.
2.

Will the suit prosper? (3%)

Suppose XYZ Corporation is impleaded as a codefendant, what would be the basis
of its liability, if any? [2%] (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The suit will not prosper under Article 15, Civil Code. New Jersey law governs Francis
Albert's capacity to act, being his personal law from the standpoint of both his nationality and his
domicile. He was, therefore, a minor at the time he entered into the contract.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. The suit will not prosper. Being a U.S. national, Albert's capacity to enter into a contract is
determined by the law of the State of which he is a national, under which he is still a minor. This is
in connection with Article 15 of the Civil Code which embodies the said nationality principle of lex
patriae. While this principle intended to apply to Filipino citizens under that provision, the
Supreme Court in Recto v. Harden is of the view that the status or capacity of foreigners is to be
determined on the basis of the same provision or principle, i.e., by U.S. law in the present problem.
Plaintiffs argument does not hold true, because status or capacity is not determined by lex
loci contractus but by lex patriae.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
1. Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Since the contract of employment was executed in Manila, Philippine law should govern.
Being over 18 years old and no longer a minor according to Philippine Law, Francis Albert can be

sued. Thus, the suit of ABC Corporation against him for damages will prosper.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. XYZ Corporation, having enticed Francis Albert to break his contract with the plaintiff, may
be held liable for damages under Art. 1314, Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
2. The basis of liability of XYZ Corporation would be Article 28 of the Civil Code which states
that:
Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises or in labor through
the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
ANOTHER ANSWER:
2. No liability arises. The statement of the problem does not in any way suggest intent, malice,
or even knowledge, on the part of XYZ Corporation as to the contractual relations between Albert
and ABC Corporation.
In 1977, Mario and Clara, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. Three years
later, they went to the United States of America and established their residence in San Francisco,
California. In 1987, the couple applied for, and were granted, U.S. citizenship. In 1989, Mario,
claiming to have been abandoned by Clara, was able to secure a decree of divorce in Reno, Nevada.
U.S.A.
XXIII. In 1990, Mario returned to the Philippines and married Juana who knew well Mario's
past life.
(a) Is the marriage between Mario and Juana valid?
(b) Would the renvoi doctrine have any relevance to the case? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes. In relation to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Conflict of Laws provides that the recognition of
an absolute divorce granted in another State rests on the citizenship of the parties at the time the
divorce was granted (Paras, PhiL Conflict of Laws. p. 259). Applied in this case, the divorce decree
issued to Clara and Mario will be recognized as valid here considering that at the time the foreign
decree was granted, both Clara and Mario are citizens of the U.S_A., a country which grants/allows
absolute divorce. Since the marriage between Mario and Clara has been validly terminated, Mario
and Juana can freely marry each other.
(b) No. The renvoi doctrine is relevant in cases where one country applies the domiciliary
theory and the other the nationality theory, and the issue involved is which of the laws of the two
countries should apply to determine the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, or,
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Such issue is not involved in this case.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes. "Renvoi" - which means "referring back" is relevant because here, we are applying U.S.
law to Mario, being already its citizen, although the formalities of the second marriage will be
governed by Philippine law under the principle of lex loci celebrationis.
XXIV. While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a
parcel of land situated in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.
1. What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale? Explain
your answer and give its legal basis. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Art. .16 par. 1, NCC, real property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated. Since the property is situated in the Philippines, Philippine law applies. The rule of lex rei
sitae in Article 16 prevails over lex loci contractus in Article 17 of the NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Afghanistan law governs the formal requirements of the contract since the execution is in
Afghanistan. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. However, if the contract was executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in Afghanistan, Philippine law shall apply.
2. What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land? Explain your answer
and give its legal basis. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Japanese law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land being his personal law on
the basis of an interpretation of Art. 15. NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) Since capacity to contract is governed by the personal law of an individual, the Japanese
seller's capacity should be governed either by his national law (Japanese law) or by the law of his
domicile, depending upon whether Japan follows the nationality or domiciliary theory of personal
law for its citizens.
b) Philippine law governs the capacity of the Japanese owner in selling the land. While as a
general rule capacity of persons is governed by the law of his nationality, capacity concerning
transactions involving property is an exception. Under Article 16 of the NCC, the capacity of
persons in transactions involving title to property is governed by the law of the country where the
property is situated. Since the property is in the Philippines, Philippine law governs the capacity of
the seller.
3. What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land? Explain your answer
and give its legal basis. (1995 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Philippine law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land. In addition to the principle
of lex rei sitae given above. Article 15 of the NCC specifically provides that Philippine laws relating
to legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines no matter where they are.
XXV. Michelle, the French daughter of Penreich, a German national, died In Spain leaving
real properties in the Philippines as well as valuable personal properties in Germany.
1. What law determines who shall succeed the deceased? Explain your answer and
give its legal basis.
2. What law regulates the distribution of the real properties in the Philippines?
Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
3. What law governs the distribution of the personal properties in Germany? Explain
your answer and give its legal basis. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that the estate of the decedent is being settled in the Philippines:
1. The national law of the decedent (French law) shall govern in determining who will succeed
to his estate. The legal basis is Art. 16 par. 2, NCC.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. French law shall govern the distribution of his real properties in the Philippines except
when the real property is land which may be transmitted to a foreigner only by hereditary
succession.
2. The distribution of the real properties in the Philippines shall be governed by French law.
The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).

The distribution of the personal properties in Germany shall be governed by French law.
The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).
3.

XXVI. In Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) what is:

1) Cognovit?
2) A borrowing statute?
3) Characterization? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
1) a) Cognovit is a confession of judgment whereby a portion of the complaint is confessed by
the defendant who denies the rest thereof (.Philippine law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.) (Ocampo v.
Florenciano, L-M 13553, 2/23/50).
b) Cognovit is a statement of confession". Oftentimes, it is referred to as a power of attorney"
or simply as a power", it is the written authority of the debtor and his direction to the clerk of the
district court, or justice of the peace to enter Judgment against the debtor as stated therein. (Words

and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).

c) Cognovit is a plea in an action which acknowledges that the defendant did undertake and
promise as the plaintiff in its declaration has alleged, and that it cannot deny that it owes and
unjustly detains from the plaintiff the sum claimed by him in his declaration, and consents that
judgment be entered against the defendant for a certain sum. (Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115166).
d) Cognovit is a note authorizing a lawyer for confession of judgment by defendant.
2) Borrowing Statute" - Laws of the state or jurisdiction used by another slate in deciding
conflicts questioned involved in the choice of law (Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 1979).
3) a) Characterization" is otherwise called classification or qualification." It is the process
of assigning a disputed question to its correct legal category (Private International Law, Salonga).
b) Characterization" is a process in determining under what category a certain set of facts or
rules fall. (Paras, Conflict of Laws, p. 94, 1984 ed.)
XXVII.
1) What is the doctrine of forum non conveniens?
2) What is a long arm statute"? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(1) a) Forum non conveniens is a principle in Private International Law that where the ends of
justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere, then
jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to relief to be sought in another forum.
(Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, p. 254; 1982 ed.).
b) Where in a broad sense the ends of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be
more suitably tried elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to
relief to be sought in another forum. (Handbook on Private International Law, Aruego).
c) Forum non conveniens means simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute. (Salonga.
Private International Law, p. 51, 1967 ed.)
d) Forum non conveniens is a doctrine whereby a court of law having full jurisdiction over a
case brought in a proper venue or district declines to determine the case on its merits because
justice would be better served by the trial over the case in another jurisdiction. (Webster's
Dictionary)
(2) a) Long arm statute is a legislative act which provides for personal Jurisdiction, via
substituted service or process, over persons or corporations which are non-residents of the state
and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by agent or communicate with persons in the
state for limited purposes, in actions which concern claims relating to performance of execution of
those purposes [Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979).
b)
Long arm statute refers simply to authorized substituted service.
XXVIII. Able, a corporation domiciled in State A, but, doing business in the Philippines, hired
Eric, a Filipino engineer, for its project in State B. In the contract of employment
executed by the parties in State B, it was stipulated that the contract could be terminated
at the company's will, which stipulation is allowed in State B. When Eric was summarily

dismissed by Able, he sued Able for damages in the Philippines.

Will the Philippine court apply the contractual stipulation? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Using the significant relationships theory", there are contacts significant to the
Philippines. Among these are that the place of business is the Philippines, the employee concerned
is a Filipino and the suit was filed in the Philippines, thereby justifying the application of Philippine
law. In the American Airlines case the Court held that when what is involved is paramount state
interest such as the protection of the rights of Filipino laborers, the court can disregard choice of
forum and choice of law. Therefore the Philippine Court should not apply the stipulation in
question.
b) No. Lex fori should be applied because the suit is filed in Philippine courts and Eric was
hired in the Philippines. The Philippine Constitution affords full protection to labor and the
stipulation as to summary dismissal runs counter to our fundamental and statutory laws.
XXIX. A, a Filipino, executed a will in Kuwait while there as a contract worker. Assume that
under the laws of Kuwait, It is enough that the testator affix his signature in the presence
of two witnesses and that the will need not be acknowledged before a notary public.
May the will be probated in the Philippines? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Civil Code, the formality of the execution of a will is
governed by the law of the place of execution. If the will was executed with the formalities
prescribed by the laws of Kuwait and valid there as such, the will is valid and may be probated in
the Philippines.
XXX. X and Y entered into a contract in Australia, whereby it was agreed that X would build
a commercial building for Y in the Philippines, and in payment for the construction, Y
will transfer and convey his cattle ranch located in the United States in favor of X.
What law would govern:
a) The validity of the contract?
b) The performance of the contract?
c) The consideration of the contract? (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The validity of the contract will be governed by Australian law, because the validity refers
to the element of the making of the contract in this case:
(Optional Addendum: . . . unless the parties agreed to be bound by another law".)
(b)
The performance will be governed by the law of the Philippines where the contract
is to be performed.

(c)
is located.

The consideration will be governed by the law of the United States where the ranch

(Optional Addendum: In the foregoing cases, when the foreign law would apply, the absence
of proof of that foreign law would render Philippine law applicable under the eclectic theory".)
XXXI.
A. The Japan Air Lines (JAL), a foreigner corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila a contract of employment with Maritess Guapa under
which the latter was hired as a stewardess on the aircraft plying the Manila-JapanManila route. The contrast specifically provides that (1) the duration of the contract
shall be two (2) years, (2) notwithstanding the above duration, JAL may terminate the
agreement at any time by giving her notice in writing ten (10) days iri advance, and (3)
the contract shall be construed as governed under and by the laws of Japan and only the
court in Tokyo, Japan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising from or
relating to the contract.
JAL dismissed Maritess on the fourth month of her employment without giving her
due notice. Maritess then filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement,
backwages and damages. The lawyer of JAL contends that neither the Labor Arbiter nor
any other agency or court in the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case in view of the
above provision (3) of the contract which Maritess voluntarily signed. The contract is
the law between her and JAL.
Decide the issue.
B. Where under a States own conflicts rule that domestic law of another State should
apply, may the courts of the former nevertheless refuse to apply the latter? If so, under
what circumstance? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Labor Legislations are generally intended as expressions of public policy on employeremployee relations. The contract therefore, between Japan Air Lines (JAL) and Maritess may apply
only to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with Philippine labor laws intended
particularly to protect employees.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Maritess without complying with Philippine Labor
law would be invalid and any stipulation in the contract to the contrary is considered void. Since
the law of the forum in this case is the Philippine law, the issues should be resolved in accordance
with Philippine law.
B. The third paragraph of Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Accordingly, a states own conflict of laws rule may, exceptionally be inapplicable, given

public policy considerations by the law of the forum.

Going into the specific provisions of the contract in question, I would rule as follows:
1. The duration of the contract is not opposed to Philippine law and it can therefore be valid
as stipulated;
2. The second provision to the effect that notwithstanding duration, Japan Air Lines (JAL)
may terminate her employment is invalid, being inconsistent with our Labor laws;
3. That the contract shall be construed as governed under and by the laws of Japan and only
the courts of Tokyo, Japan shall have jurisdiction, is invalid as clearly opposed to the
aforecited third paragraph of Arts. 17 and 1700 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractuals. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws
on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages,
working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
When a contract has a foreign element such as in the factual setting stated in the problem
where one of the parties is a foreign corporation, the contract can be sustained as valid particularly
the stipulation expressing that the contract is governed by the laws of the foreign country. Given
this generally accepted principle of international law, the contract between Maritess and JAL is
valid and it should therefore be enforced.
XXXII. Jacob, a Swiss national, married Lourdes, a Filipina, in Berne, Switzerland. Three
years later, the couple decided to reside in the Philippines. Jacob subsequently acquired
several properties in the Philippines with the money he inherited from his parents.
Forty years later, Jacob died intestate, and is survived by several legitimate children and
duly recognized illegitimate daughter Jane, all residing in the Philippines.
(a) Suppose that Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit, can Jane,
who is a recognized illegitimate child, inherit part of the properties of Jacob under
Philippine law?
(b) Assuming that Jacob executed a will leaving certain properties to Jane as her
legitime in accordance with the law of succession in the Philippines, will such
testamentary disposition be valid? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes. As stated in the problem, Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit.
Hence, Jane cannot inherit the property of Jacob under Philippine law.
B. The testamentary disposition will not be valid if it would contravene Swill law; otherwise,
the disposition would be valid. Unless the Swiss law is proved, it would be presumed to be the
same as that of Philippine law under the doctrine of processual presumption.
XXXIII.
(1) If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, what law will govern if the
will is executed in the Philippines? What law will govern if the will is executed in
another country? Explain your answers.

(2) If a will is executed by a foreigner, for instance, a Japanese, residing in the

Philippines, what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? And what
law will govern if the will is executed in Japan, or some other country, for instance,
the U.S. A.? Explain your answers. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) a. If the testator who is a Filipino citizen executes his will in the Philippines, Philippine law will
govern the formalities,
b. If said Filipino testator executes his will in another country, the law of the country where he
may be or Philippine law will govern the formalities. (Article 815, Civil Code)
2) a. If the testator is a foreigner residing in the Philippines and he executes his will in the
Philippines, the law of the country of which he is a citizen or Philippine law will govern the
formalities.
b. If the testator is a foreigner and executes his will in a foreign country, the law of his place of
residence or the law of the country of which he is a citizen or the law of the place of execution, or
Philippine law will govern the formalities (Articles 17, 816, 817, Civil Code)
POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL ANSWERS:
a. In the case of a Filipino citizen, Philippine law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
b. In the case of a foreigner, his national law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
XXXIV. Robert and Evelyn, both Filipinos, met in Los Angeles, California. They agreed to get
married on June 10, 1989. On June 7, 1989, Robert flew to New York due to an urgent
business matter but intended to return to Los Angeles on June 9, 1989, in time for the
wedding. The business emergency of Robert, however, lasted longer than he expected so
that he failed to return to Los Angeles as planned. In order not to postpone the wedding,
Robert immediately called his brother Val who was also residing at Los Angeles to stand
as his proxy at the wedding, which the latter did. Is the marriage of Robert and Evelyn
valid in the Philippines? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the marriage was performed in accordance with the laws of California and valid there, then
the marriage is likewise valid in the Philippines.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the problem does not state the California law on marriage by proxy, the presumption in
Private International Law is that the California law is the same as the Philippine law. Therefore, the
marriage would be void.
XXXV. While X, an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, was vacationing in Cebu City,

he was requested to solemnize the marriage of Serge and Joan in the residence of Serges
parents. X could not refuse the request of both the parents of the couple because they
were his relatives. On the day set for the wedding, there were so many visitors at the
residence of Serges parents so that X decided to solemnize the marriage at the kiosk of
the public plaza located nearby. Is the marriage of Serge and Joan valid? Give your
reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because the requirement that the marriage be solemnized in a public place is not an
essential requisite of the law.
XXXVI.
(a) Pursuant to private international law or conflict of laws, to what law is real property
as well as personal property subject? Are there any exceptions to the rule? If there
are, name them,
(b) What are the four aspects of succession which are governed by the national law of
the decedent if he is a foreigner?
(c) A, a citizen of California, U.S.A. but domiciled in the Philippines, died testate in
Manila, survived by two acknowledged natural children, B and G. In his will, he left
more than P500,000.00 to B and only P3,000.00 to C. It is admitted that under the
Civil Code of California, the domiciliary law of the decedent shall govern questions
involving the validity of testamentary provisions. C, who is contesting the validity of
the disposition in favor of B now contends that the Philippine laws with respect to
succession are applicable. Is this Correct? Give your reasons. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated (Art. 16, par. 1, CC). There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. They are:
(1) under the second paragraph of Art. 16, which declares that, testamentary and intestate
succession, both with respect to the order of succession, the amount of succes- sional rights and
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the decedent; and (2) under No. 2 Art. 124, which declares that if the husband is a foreigner and the wife is
a Filipino, their property relations shall be governed by the husbands national law, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to immovable property.
(b)
The four aspects of succession which are governed by the national law of the
decedent if he is a foreigner are: first, the order of succession; second, the amount of successional
rights; third, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions; and fourth, the capacity to succeed.
(Arts. 16, par. 2, 1039, CC; see Beilis vs. Beilis, 20 SCRA 358.)
(c)
Yes, this is correct. The doctrine of renvoi is applicable in the instant case. Although
the Civil Code in Art. 16 states that the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be
regulated by the decedents national law, nevertheless, the Civil Code of California declares that
the decedents domiciliary law shall govern. Hence, the question shall be referred back to the
decedents domicile. In other words, the laws of the Philippines with respect to succession shall
govern. Consequently, in the partition of the estate, C shall be given a share which must not be less
than his legitime. (Aznar vs; Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).

XXXVII.
Alma, a Filipino citizen went to the United States on a tourist visa. Wanting to
legalize her stay and obtain permanent employment, she married John, an American
citizen, for a fee, with the understanding that after a year, John would divorce her. As
agreed upon the two obtained a divorce in Reno, Nevada.
(a) Suppose that after the divorce Alma consults you on the question of how she can
now marry her childhood sweetheart Rene, in the Philippines preferably, or if that
cannot be done, in some other country where Alma and Rene are prepared to go so
that they can be joined in wedlock and live the life they had dreamed about. What
advice will you give Alma. Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is valid, then the divorce obtained by them
is void because of Article 15 of the Civil Code, Hence a marriage between Alma and Rene in the
Philippines or elsewhere will be bigamous. The advice to Alma, therefore, is for her not to marry
Rene.
b.
Since Alma became an American citizen and presumably she had that citizenship at the
time of the divorce, if the divorce is valid under the American law or the law of her nationality at
that time, then she would be released from her marriage with John. Alma and Rene can contract a
valid marriage when she comes back to the Philippines.
II. Human Relations (Arts. 19-22, Civil Code)
I.

Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective buyer,
Ray. Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a fair price of
P2 Million. Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the property. Later,
another couple, Bemie and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower price of PI.5 Million.
But Ray insisted on buying the house of Biong and Linda for sentimental reason. Ray
prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the couple and a managers check of P2 Million.
After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the deed of sale. However, Linda was not
able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return she refused to sign the document
saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the deed of sale and for
moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
x
x
x
(2) Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong and Linda? Can he also recover
damages from the spouses? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and Biong for the return of the 2 million pesos he
paid for the property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if it can be proven that they were
in bad faith in backing out from the contract, as this is an act contrary to morals and good customs
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected, Ray may file a counterclaim against
Linda and Biong for specific performance or rescission, with damages in either case. Linda has
breached the obligation created by the contract when she filed an action for nullification of sale.
On account of Lindas bad faith or fraud, Ray may ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code.
PERSONS
I.

Persons and Personality (Civil Code)

I.

Dr. Lopez, a 70-year old widower, and his son Roberto both died in a fire that gutted their
home while they were sleeping in their air-conditioned rooms. Robertos wife, Marilyn,
and their two children were spared because they were in the province at the time. Dr.
Lopez left an estate worth P20M and a life insurance policy in the amount of P1M with his
three children --- one of whom is Roberto --- as beneficiaries.
Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husbands share in the estate
left by Dr. Lopez, and her husbands share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopezs life insurance
policy. Rule on the validity of Marilyns claims with reasons. (4%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the Estate of Dr. Lopez:
Marilyn is not entitled to a share in the estate of Dr. Lopez. For purposes of succession, Dr.
Lopez and his son Roberto are presumed to have died at the same time, there being no evidence
to prove otherwise, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other (Article 43,
NCC). Hence, Roberto inherited nothing from his father that Marilyn would in turn inherit from
Roberto. The children of Roberto, however, will succeed their grandfather, Dr. Lopez, in
representation of their father Roberto and together will receive 1/3 of the estate of Dr. Lopez
since their father Roberto was one of the three children of Dr. Lopez. Marilyn cannot represent
her husband Roberto because the right is not given by law to a surviving spouse.
As to the proceeds of the insurance on the life of Dr. Lopez:
Since succession is not involved as regards the insurance is not involved as regular the
insurance contract, the provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 131, Sec. 3, [jj] [5]) on survivorship
shall apply. Under Rules, Dr. Lopez, who was 70 years old, is presumed to have died ahead of
Roberto, who is presumably between the ages of 15 and 60. Having survived the insured,
Robertos right as a beneficiary became vested upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died
after Dr. upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died after Dr. Lopez, his right to receive the
insurance proceeds became part of his hereditary estate, which in turn was inherited in equal
shares by his legal heirs, namely, his spouse and children. Therefore, Robertos children and his
spouse are entitled to Robertos one-third share in the insurance proceeds.
II. At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named
her unborn child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give birth, she and
her boyfriend Pietro, the father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resort in
Bataan where they were vacationing. The military gave chase and after one week, they
were found in an abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked with bolos.

Marian and the baby she delivered were both found dead, with the babys umbilical cord
already cut. Pietro survived.
a) Can Marians baby be the beneficiary of the insurance taken on the life of the
mother? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An unborn child may be designated as the beneficiary in the insurance policy of the mother.
An unborn child shall be considered a person for purposes favorable to it provided it is born later
in accordance with the Civil Code. There is no doubt that the designation of the unborn child as a
beneficiary is favorable to the child.
b) Between Marian and the baby, who is presumed to have died ahead? (1%) (2008
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the baby was not alive when completely delivered from the mothers womb, it was not
born as a person, then the question of who between two persons survived will not be an issue.
Since the baby had an intrauterine life of more than 7 months, it would be considered born if it was
alive, at the time of its complete delivery from the mothers womb. We can gather from the facts
that the baby was completely delivered. But whether or not it was alive has to be proven by
evidence.
If the baby was alive when completely delivered from the mothers womb, then it was born as
a person and the question of who survived as between the baby and the mother shall be resolved
by the provisions of the Rules of Court on survivorship. This is because the question has nothing to
do with succession. Obviously, the resolution of the question is needed just for the implementation
of an insurance contract. Under Rule 13, Sec. 3, (jj), (5) as between the baby who was under 15
years old and Marian who was 18 years old, Marian is presumed to have survived.
In both cases, therefore, the baby never acquired any right under the insurance policy. The
proceeds of the insurance will then go to the estate of Marian.
c) Will Pietro, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the
proceeds of the life insurance on the life of Marian? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the baby did not acquire any right under the insurance contract, there is nothing for
Pietro to inherit.
III. Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children. Rose and Patrick. One summer, her
mother-in-law, aged 70, took the two children, then aged 10 and 12, with her on a boat
trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the three were
never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her
mother- in-laws estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that
the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in representation of
their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action prosper? (2%) (2000

Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the three
are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights from one to
another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch as there is
no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time and there
could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children not having inherited from their
grandmother, Cristy has no right to share in her mother-in-laws estate. She cannot share in her
own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother-in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue
involved is not succession.
IV. Jaime, who is 65, and his son, Willy, who is 25, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as
to who died first. Jaimes only surviving heir is his wife, Julia, who is also Willys mother.
Willy's surviving heirs are his mother, Julia and his wife, Wilma.
1. In the settlement of Jaimes estate, can Wilma successfully claim that her late
husband, Willy had a hereditary share since he was much younger than his father
and, therefore, should be presumed to have survived longer? [3%]
2. Suppose Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife, Julia, and his son, Willy, as
the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that one-half of the proceeds
should belong to Willys estate? [2%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy had a hereditary share in his father's
estate. Under Art. 43, Civil Code, two persons who are celled to succeed each other" are presumed
to have died at the same time, in the absence of proof as to which of them died first. This
presumption of simultaneous death applies in cases involving the question of succession as
between the two who died, who in this case are mutual heirs, being father and son.
2. Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that one-half of the
proceeds should belong to Willys estate, under Sec. 3 (jj) par. 5 Rule 131, Rules of Court, as the
dispute does not involve succession. Under this presumption, the person between the ages of 15
and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at the time of their deaths.
The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as
beneficiary.
II. Marriage (Family Code)
I.

True or False.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, when a foreign spouse divorces his/her Filipino
spouse, the latter may re-marry by proving only that the foreign spouse has obtained a

divorce against her or him abroad. (1%) (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False.
In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the SC held that for a Filipino spouse to have
capacity to contract a subsequent marriage, it must also be proven that the foreign divorce
obtained by the foreigner spouse gives such foreigner spouse capacity to remarry.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
True.
Art. 26 (2) (FC), clearly provides that the decree of divorce obtained abroad by the
foreigner spouse is sufficient to capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry.
II. In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to
the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but
the Mayors secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the
required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to
look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.
When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed
him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were
waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract,
gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayors office.' She then gave copies of
the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already
married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.
[a] Is the marriage of Michael and Anna valid, voidable, or void? Explain your answer.
(3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage is void because the formal requisite of marriage ceremony was absent (Art. 3,
F.C. 209, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is void because an essential requisite was absent: consent of the parties freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer (Art. 2, FC).
III. Harry married Wilma, a very wealthy woman. Barely five (5) years into the marriage,
Wilma fell in love with Joseph. Thus, Wilma went to a small country in Europe, became a
naturalized citizen of that country, divorced j Harry, and married Joseph. A year
thereafter, Wilma and Joseph returned and established permanent residence in the
Philippines.
[a] Is the divorce obtained by Wilma from Harry-recognized in the Philippines?
Explain your answer. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to Wilma, the divorce obtained by her is recognized as valid in the Philippines because
she is now a foreigner. Philippine personal laws do not apply to a foreigner. However, recognition
of the divorce as regards Harry will depend on the applicability to his case of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. If it is applicable, divorce is recognized as to him and,
therefore, he can remarry. However, if it is not applicable, divorce is not recognized as to him and,
consequently, he cannot remarry.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the divorce obtained by Wilma is recognized as valid in the Philippines. At the time she
got the divorce, she was already a foreign national having been naturalized as a citizen of that
small country in Europe. Based on precedents established by the Supreme Court (Bayot v. CA,
570SCRA 472 [2008]), divorce obtained by a foreigner is recognized in the Philippines if validly
obtained in' accordance with his or her national law.
[b] If Harry hires you as his lawyer, what legal recourse would you advise him to
take? Why? (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will advise Harry to:
(1) dissolve and liquidate his property relations with Wilma; and
(2) if he will remarry, file a petition for the recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment of divorce (Rule 39, Rules of Court).
[c]

Harry tells you that he has fallen in love with another woman, Elizabeth, and
wants to marry her because, after all, Wilma is already married to Joseph. Can
Harry legally marry Elizabeth? Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can validly marry Elizabeth, applying the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in
Republic v. Obrecido (427 SCRA 114 [2005]).
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, for the Filipino spouse to have
capacity to remarry, the law expressly requires the spouse who obtained the divorce to be a
foreigner at the time of the marriage. Applying this requirement to the case of Harry, it would seem
that he is not given the capacity to remarry. This is because Wilma was a Filipino at the time of her
marriage to Harry.
In Republic v. Obrecido, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a Filipino spouse is given the
capacity to remarry even though the spouse who obtained the divorce was a Filipino at the time of
the marriage, if the latter was already a foreigner when the divorce was obtained abroad.
According to the Court, to rule otherwise will violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
IV. Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State
Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in

Manila. On the first year of the spouses tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita filed
an annulment case against Emmanuel before a Philippine court on the ground of her
husbands sterility at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
x
x
x
[c] Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in Kenya,
they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their marriage be
annulled on the ground of Emmanuels sterility? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled under Philippine law. Sterility is not a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled in the Philippines.
The Philippine court shall have jurisdiction over the action to annul the marriage not only
because the parties are residents of the Philippines but because they are Filipino citizens. The
Philippine court, however, shall apply the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated in
determining its formal validity (Article 26,FC; Article 17, NCC).
Since the marriage was celebrated in Kenya in accordance with Kenyan law, the formal validity
of such marriage is governed by Kenyan law and any issue as to the formal validity of that marriage
shall be determined by applying Kenyan law and not Philippine law.
However, while Kenyan law governs the formal validity of the marriage, the legal capacity of the
Filipino parties to the marriage is governed not by Kenyan law but by Philippine law (Article 15,
NCC). Sterility of a party as a ground for the annulment of marriage is not a matter of form but a
matter of legal capacity. Hence, the Philippine court must apply Philippine law in determining the
status of the marriage on the ground of absence or defect in the legal capacity of the Filipino parties.
Since sterility does not constitute absence or defect in the legal capacity of the parties under
Philippine law, there is no ground to avoid or annul the marriage. Hence, the Philippine court has to
deny the petition.
V. Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers on
board a commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten(10) years earlier
and had never been heard of ever since. Believing that her husband had died, Ana
married Adolf Cruz Staedtler, a divorced German national born of a German father and a
Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required to submit the required
certificate of capacity to marry from the German Embassy in Manila, Adolf stated in the
application for marriage license that he was a Filipino citizen. With the marriage license
stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a ceremony officiated by the
Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu, Batangas, as the local parish
priest refused to solemnize marriages except in his church. Is the marriage valid?
Explain fully. (5%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The issue hinges on whether or not the missing husband was dead or alive at the time of the
second marriage.

If the missing husband was in fact dead at the time the second marriage was celebrated, the
second marriage was valid. Actual death of a spouse dissolves the marriage ipso facto whether or
not the surviving spouse had knowledge of such fact. A declaration of presumptive death even if
obtained will not make the marriage voidable because presumptive death will not prevail over the
fact of death.
If the missing husband was in fact alive when the second marriage was celebrated, the second
marriage was void ab initio because of a prior subsisting marriage. Had Ana obtained a declaration
of presumptive death, the second marriage would have been voidable.
In both cases, the fact that the German misrepresented his citizenship to avoid having to
present his Certificate of Legal Capacity, or the holding of the ceremony outside the church or
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer, are all irregularities which do not
affect the validity of the marriage.
VI. Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye, 16
years old, they started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. When Faye reached 18 years of age, her parents forcibly took her back and
arranged for her marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the marriage,
Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work. During their
marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, Laica. When Faye was 25 years old, Brad
discovered her continued liaison with Roderick and in one of their heated arguments,
Faye shot Brad to death. She lost no time in marrying her true love Roderick, without a
marriage license, claiming that they have been continuously cohabiting for more than
5 years.
a)

Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye valid? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage was void because there was no marriage license. Their marriage was not
exempt from the requisite of a marriage license because Roderick and Faye have not been
cohabiting for at least 5 continuous years before the celebration of their marriage. Their lovers
tryata and brief visitations did not amount to cohabitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court held
that for the marriage to be exempt from a license, there should be no impediment for them to marry
each other during the entire 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye could not have cohabited
for 5 continuous years without impediment because Faye was then legally married to Brad.
VII. Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unmarried. His
first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 30 years old. His second,
with Carla, produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His 1 third, with Donna, bore him two
daughters: Vina and Wilma.
His fourth, with Elena, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from
a previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they
informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they
consider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the
midwife who attended to Sandys birth. All the children, including Amy, now live with
Andrew in his house.
x
x
x

d)

Can Jon and Jane legally marry? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jon and Jane can legally marry because they are not related to each other. Jane is not a
daughter of Andrew.
VIII. Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%) (2007 Bar Question)
x
x
x
4. The day after John and Marsha got married, John told her that he was impotent.
Marsha continued to live with John for 2 years. Marsha is now estopped from filing
an annulment case against John.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Marsha is not estopped from filing an annulment case against John on the ground of
his impotence, because she learned of his impotence after the celebration of the marriage and not
before. Physical incapability to consummate the marriage is a valid ground for the annulment of
marriage if such incapacity was existing at the time of the marriage, continues and appears to be
incurable. The marriage may be annulled on this ground within five years from its celebration (Art.
45 [5], Family Code).
IX. Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%) (2007 Bar Question)
x
x
x
5. Amor gave birth to Thelma when she was 15 years old. Thereafter, Amor met David
and they got married when she was 20 years old. David had a son, Julian, with his
ex-girlfriend Sandra. Julian and Thelma can get married.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Julian and Thelma can get married. Marriages between stepbrothers and stepsisters are
not among the marriages prohibited under the Family Code.
X. Gigi and Ric, Catholics, got married when they were 18 years old. Their marriage was
solemnized on August 2, 1989 by Rics uncle, a Baptist Minister, in Calamba, Laguna. He
overlooked the fact that his license to solemnize marriage expired the month before and
that the parties do not belong to his congregation. After 5 years of married life and
blessed with 2 children, the spouses developed irreconcilable differences, so they parted
ways.
While separated, Ric fell in love with Juliet, a 16 year-old sophomore in a local
college and a Seventh-Day Adventist. They decided to get married with the consent of
Juliets parents. She presented to him a birth certificate showing she is 18 years old. Ric
never doubted her age much less the authenticity of her birth certificate. They got
married in a Catholic church in Manila a year after, Juliet gave birth to twins, Aissa and
Aretha.
(1) What is the status of marriage between Gigi and Ric valid, voidable or void?

Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Gigi and Ric is void because a minister has no authority to solemnize a
marriage between contracting parties who were both not members of the ministers religious sect.
Under the Family Code, a minister or a priest has authority to solemnize a marriage but only if one
or both contracting parties are members of the religious sect of the priest or minister. Since neither
Ric nor Gigi was a member of the Baptist Church because both of them were Catholic, the Baptist
Minister did not have authority to solemnize their marriage.
Ric and Gigi cannot claim that they believed in good faith and that the Baptist Minister had the
authority to solemnize the marriage and invoke Article 35 (2) of the Family Code to make the
marriage valid. The provision of the Family Code applies only to a mistake of fact, and not to a
mistake of law. Hence, the fact that the Ministers license was expired will not affect the validity of
the marriage if Ric or Gigi believed in good faith that the Minister had a valid license. That would be
a mistake of fact. However, believing that the Minister had authority to solemnize the marriage
even if none of the contracting parties was a member of the Ministers religious sect is a mistake of
law. This is because the law expressly provides that the Minister has authority only if one or both
contracting parties are members of the Ministers religious sect. A mistake of law does not excuse
from non-compliance therewith.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Ric and Gigi is valid. Assuming that the parents of Ric and Gigi did not
give their consent to the marriage, the marriage would have been voidable. However, it was
ratified when Ric and Gigi continued cohabiting for 2 years after they attained the age of 21. It must
be noted that they had 5 years of married life or until they were 23 years old.
The fact that neither Ric nor Gigi was a Baptist would be just a mere irregularity in the
authority of the Baptist Minister to solemnize the marriage. Hence, it would have no adverse effect
on the validity thereof. Also, the fact that the license of the Baptist Minister was expired will not
have any effect on the validity of the marriage because Ric and Gigi can be presumed to have
believed in good faith that the Minister had a valid license.
(2)
What is the status of the marriage between Ric and Juliet - valid, voidable or
void? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Ric and Juliet is void because Juliet was below 18 years of age. Under
the Family Code, the requisite age for legal capacity to contract marriage is 18 years old and a
marriage by a party who is below 18 years old is void under all circumstances. Hence, even though
Juliets parents have given their consent to the marriage and even though Ric believed in good faith
that she was 18 years old, the marriage is void.
(3)
Suppose Ric himself procured the falsified birth certificate to persuade Juliet
to marry him despite her minority and assured her that everything is in order. He did not
divulge to her his prior marriage with Gigi. What action, if any, can Juliet take against him?
Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Juliet may file an action to declare her marriage to Ric null and void on the ground that she
was not of marrying age. (b) She may also file a criminal case against Ric for bigamy because he
contracted the marriage with her without a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage to
Gigi. (c) She may also file a criminal case for falsification, perjury, or illegal marriage as the case
may be. (d) In case the facts and the evidence will warrant, she may also file a criminal case for
seduction. In all these cases, Juliet may recover damages.
(4)
If you were the counsel for Gigi, what action/s will you take to enforce and
protect her interests? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for Gigi, I will file an action for the declaration of nullity of Gigis marriage to Ric
on the ground of absence of authority of the Baptist Minister to solemnize the marriage between
Ric and Gigi who were both non-members of the Baptist Church.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for Gigi, and on the basis of the legal presumption that her marriage to Ric is valid,
I will file the following actions: (1) Legal separation on the grounds of subsequent bigamous
marriage and sexual infidelity, (2) Receivership of the conjugal or community property, (3)
Judicial separation of property, (4) Petition for sole administration of the conjugal or community
property, (5) Action for damages for abuse of right, and (6) Action to declare the marriage of Ric
and Juliet as null and void and to recover her share in her community of property with Ric,
consisting of the portion shared by Ric in whatever property was commonly or jointly acquired by
Ric and Juliet.
XI. Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Arnell on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that after 2 months of their marriage,
Amell showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and went abroad. He returned to
the Philippines after 3 years but did not even get in touch with her. Worse, they met
several times in social functions but he snubbed her. When she got sick, he did not visit
her even if he knew of her confinement in the hospital. Meanwhile, Amell met an
accident which disabled him from reporting for work and earning a living to support
himself.
Will Gemmas suit prosper? Explain. 5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gemmas suit will not prosper. The acts of Amell complained about do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove the commission of those acts or the
existence of his abnormal behavior. It must be shown that those acts or that behavior was a
manifestation of a serious mental disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to
perform the essential duties of married life. It must also be shown that such psychological
incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior, was existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. In this case, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a serious mental

disorder, that his behavior was a manifestation of that disorder, and that such disorder prevented
him from complying with his duties as a married person.
XII. Marvin, a Filipino, and Shelley, an American, both residents of California, decided to get
married in their local parish. Two years after their marriage, Shelley obtained a divorce
in California. While in Boracay, Marvin met Manel, a Filipina, who was vacationing there.
Marvin fell in love with her. After a brief courtship and complying with all the
requirements, they got married in Hongkong to avoid publicity, it being Marvins second
marriage. Is his marriage to Manel valid? Explain. 5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the marriage of Marvin and Manel is valid. While Marvin was previously married to
Shelley, the divorce from Marvin obtained by Shelley in California capacitated Marvin to contract
the subsequent marriage to Manel under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code which
provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
XIII. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall be void.
Choose the spouse listed below who is psychologically incapacitated. Explain. 2.5%
(2006 Bar Question)
a)
nagger
b)
Gay or lesbian
c)
Congenital sexual pervert
d)
Gambler
e)
Alcoholic
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The gay or lesbian is psychologically incapacitated. Being gay or lesbian is a mental disorder
which prevents the afflicted person from performing the essential duties of married life. He or she
will not be able to perform his or her duty of sexual consortium with his or her spouse due to his or
her sexual preference for a person of the same sex. However, the law requires that the disorder or
state of being gay or lesbian incapacitating such person must be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
XIV. In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In
1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the
same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988.
They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu
married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the
Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
x
x
x
b)
Explain the status of the marriage between Sonny and Auring. (2%) (2005 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the divorce obtained by Sonny was void, his marriage to Auring is necessarily void ab
initio because of his subsisting marriage to Lulu. (Art. 41, Family Code)
c) Explain the status of the marriage between Lulu and Tirso. (2%) (2005 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Lulu and Tirso is also void ab initio because Lulu is still validly
married to Sonny.
XV. BONI and ANNE met while working overseas. They became sweethearts and got engaged
to be married on New Years Eve aboard a cruise ship in the Caribbean. They took the
proper license to many in New York City, where there is a Filipino consulate. But as
planned the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the Norwegianregistered vessel in a private suite among selected friends.
Back in Manila, Anne discovered that Boni had been married in Bacolod City 5 years
earlier but divorced in Oslo only last year. His first wife was also a Filipina but now
based in Sweden. Boni himself is a resident of Norway where he and Anne plan to live
permanently.
Anne retains your services to advise her on whether her marriage to Boni is valid
under Philippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances?
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Boni is still a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine Law (Art. 15
Civil Code). Under Philippine-Law, his marriage to Anne is void because of a prior existing
marriage which was not dissolved by the divorce decreed in Oslo. Divorce obtained abroad by a
Filipino is not recognized.
If Boni was no longer a Filipino citizen, the divorce is valid. Hence, his marriage to Anne is
valid if celebrated in accordance with the law of the place where it was celebrated. Since the
marriage was celebrated aboard a vessel of Norwegian registry, Norwegian law applies. If the Ship
Captain has authority to solemnize the marriage aboard his ship, the marriage is valid and shall be
recognized in the Philippines.
As to the second question, if Boni is still a Filipino, Anne can file an action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to him.
XVI. Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while both were taking up
post-graduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul
their marriage. Jane filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the
ground of the latters sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage in England. The
English court decreed the marriage annulled. Returning to the Philippines, Gene asked
you whether or not he would now be free to marry his former girlfriend. What would

your legal advice be? (2003 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His marriage to Jane if valid according to
the forms and solemnities of British law, is valid here (Article 17, 1st par., NCC). However, since
Gene and Jane are still Filipinos, although living in England, the dissolution of their marriage is still
governed by Philippine law (Article 15, NCC). Since, sterility is not one of the grounds for the
annulment of a marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, the annulment of Gene's marriage to
Jane on that ground is not valid in the Philippines (Article 17, par., NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Gene is free to marry his girlfriend because his marriage was validly annulled in
England. The issue of whether or not a marriage is voidable, including the grounds therefor, is
governed by the law of the place where the marriage was solemnized (lex loci celebrationis). Hence,
even if sterility is not a ground to annul the marriage under Philippine law, the marriage is
nevertheless voidable because sterility makes the marriage voidable under English law. Therefore,
annulment of the marriage in England is valid in the Philippines.
XVII. Which of the following remedies, i.e., (a) declaration of nullity of marriage, (b)
annulment of marriage, (c) legal separation, and or (d) separation of property, can an
aggrieved spouse avail himself/herself of(i) If the wife discovers after the marriage that her husband has AIDS"
(ii) If the wife goes (to) abroad to work as a nurse and refuses to come home after the
expiration of her three-year contract there.
(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife has been a prostitute
before they got married.
(iv) If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop
notwithstanding advice from relatives and friends.
(v) If the husband beats up his wife every time he comes home drunk. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(i) Since AIDS is a serious and incurable sexually- transmissible disease, the wife may file an
action for annulment of the marriage on this ground whether such fact was concealed or not from
the wife, provided that the disease was present at the time of the marriage. The marriage is
voidable even though the husband was not aware that he had the disease at the time of marriage.
(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) months from the expiration of her contract,
she is presumed to have abandoned the husband and he may file an action for judicial separation of
property. If the refusal continues for more than one year from the expiration of her contract, the
husband may file the action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the
ground of abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she leaves the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The intention not to return cannot be
presumed during the 3-year period of her contract.

(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife was a prostitute before they got
married, he has no remedy. No misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or
chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground for an action for the annulment of marriage (Article
46 FC).
(iv) The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husbands sexual infidelity is a ground
for legal separation (Article 55, FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of property
for failure of her husband to comply with his marital duty of fidelity (Article 135(4), 101, FC).
(v) The wife may file an action for legal separation on the ground of repeated physical violence
on her person (Article 55(1), FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of property for
failure of the husband to comply with his marital duty of mutual respect (Article 135(4), Article
101, FC). She may also file an action for declaration of nullity of the marriage if the husbands
behavior constitutes psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration of marriage.
XVIII. On May 1, 1375, Facundo married Petra, by whom he had a son Sotero. Petra died on
July 1, 1996, while Facundo died on January 1, 2002. Before his demise, Facundo had
married, on July 1, 2000, Querica. Having lived together as husband and wife since July 1,
1990, Facundo and Querica did not secure a marriage license but executed the requisite
affidavit for the purpose.
To ensure that his inheritance rights are not adversely affected by his fathers second
marriage, Sotero now brings a suit to seek a declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
Facundo and Querica, grounded on the absence of a valid marriage license. Querica
contends that there was no need for a marriage license in view of her having lived
continuously with Facundo for five years before their marriage and that Sotero has no
legal personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage since Facundo is now
deceased.
A. Is the marriage of Facundo and Querica valid, despite the absence of a marriage
license? Explain. (2%)
B. Does Sotero have the personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
especially now that Facundo is already deceased? Explain. (3%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage with Querica is void. The exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license under Art. 34, Family Code, requires that the man and woman must have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other
during those five years. The cohabitation of Facundo and Querica for six years from 1990 to July 1,
1996 when Petra died was one with a legal impediment hence, not in compliance with the
requirement of law. On the other hand, the cohabitation thereafter until the marriage on July 1,
2000, although free from legal impediment, did not meet the 5-year cohabitation requirement.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
The marriage of Facundo and Querica is VALID. The second marriage was
solemnized on July 1, 2000 when the Family Code was already effective. The Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. Under the Family Code, no marriage license is required if the parties have
been cohabiting for the period of five years and there is no legal impediment. There must be no

legal impediment ONLY AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE, and not the
whole five- year period. This is clearly the intent of the code framers (see Minutes of the 150 th joint
Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on August 9, 1986). Also, in Manzano v. Sanchez, AM
No. MT-00-129, March 8, 2001, the Supreme Court said that, as one of the requisites for the
exception to apply, there must be no legal impediment at the time of the marriage. The Supreme
Court did not say that the legal impediment must exist all throughout the five-year period.
This is different from the case of Nihat v. Bayadog, (328 SCRA 122 [2000]). In the said case,
the situation occurred during the regime of the New Civil Code where Article 76 thereof clearly
provides that during the five-year cohabitation, the parties must be unmarried. This is not so
anymore in the Family Code. The change in Family Code is significant. If the second marriage
occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code, the answer would be that the marriage is void.
B.
A void marriage may be questioned by any interested Party in any proceeding
where the resolution of the issue is material. Being a compulsory heir, Sotero has the personality to
question the validity of the marriage of Facundo and Querica. Otherwise, his participation in the
estate of Facundo would be affected. (Niria v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 [2000]).
XIX.
A. Give a brief definition or explanation of the term psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. (2%)
B. If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind or the
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be
considered indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain. (2%)
C. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for
legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (1%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Psychological incapacity is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the
incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of love,
respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must be characterized by
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes must be clinically Identified or
examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20[1995])
B. In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court held that
being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality may be
indicia of psychological Incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder. However,
the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality is a ground
for annulment of marriage.
C.
In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they:
(1) will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity (Art. 36, Family Code);
(2) will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art 55, FC); and
(3) will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art. 45 and 46, FC).
XX. What is the status of the following marriages and why?

(a) A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent. (2%)
(b) A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice. (2%)
(c) A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid.
(2%)
(d) A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong kong before a notaiy public. (2%)
(e) A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction.
(2%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective. Being
below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their parents. The
consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its validity.
(b) Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice, because
such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisitei.e., the marriage license-and
does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or
administrative liability of the party responsible therefor.
(c) By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art. 38, par.
(1), Family Code], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in this
case, Spaindoes not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said Code
which accords validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x xx and valid there as
such.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(c) The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article which
marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in Spain where
it was celebrated.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(c) By reason of Art. 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos
wherever they are, the marriage is void.
(d) It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong kong Law, the
marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong kong will be
invalid in the Philippines.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(d) If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to solemnize
marriage, then the marriage is valid.
(e) Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage but
said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such authority.
However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to solemnize a marriage, it
would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside of

his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemnize this particular
marriage (Art. 35, par. 2, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(e) The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority
even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is
valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage will
nevertheless be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere
irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his
court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article 7
of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to
solemnize marriages only within the courts jurisdiction.
XXI. Ben and Eva were both Filipino citizens at the time of their marriage in 1967. When
their marriage turned sour, Ben went to a small country in Europe, got himself
naturalized there, and then divorced Eva in accordance with the law of that country.
Later, he returned to the Philippines with his new wife. Eva now wants to know what
action or actions she can file against Ben. She also wants to know if she can likewise
marry again. What advice can you give her? (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Considering that Art. 26(2nd par.) contemplates a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino, who had such respective nationalities at the time of their marriage, the divorce in Europe
will not capacitate the Filipino wife to remarry. The advice we can give her is either to file a
petition for legal separation, on the ground of sexual infidelity and of contracting a bigamous
marriage abroad, or to file a petition to dissolve the conjugal partnership or absolute community of
property as the case maybe.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Eva may file an action for legal separation on the grounds of sexual infidelity of her
husband and the contracting by her husband of a bigamous marriage abroad.
She may remarry. While a strict interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code would
capacitate a Filipino spouse to remarry only when the other spouse was a foreigner at the time of
the marriage, the DOJ has issued an opinion (Opinion 134 s. of 1993) that the same injustice sought
to be cured by Article 26 is present in the case of spouses who were both Filipino at the time of the
marriage but one became an alien subsequently. Said injustice is the anomaly of Eva remaining
married to her husband who is no longer married to her. Hence, said Opinion makes Article 26
applicable to her case and the divorce obtained abroad by her former Filipino husband would
capacitate her to remarry. To contract a subsequent marriage, all she needs to do is present to the
civil registrar the decree of divorce when she applies for a marriage license under Article 13 of the
Family Code.

XXII. Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all, (a) for
a declaration of nullity of marriage, (b) for an annulment of the marriage contract, and
(c) for legal separation between the spouses? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Declaration of nullity of marriage:
1. The drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage;
2. It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and incurable;
3. The case must be filed before August 1, 1998. Because if they got married before August
3, 1998, it must be filed before August 1, 1998.
(b) Annulment of the Marriage Contract:
1. The drug addiction must be concealed;
2. It must exist at the time of marriage:
3. There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug addiction;
4. The case is filed within five (5) years from discovery.
(c) Legal Separation:
1. There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction:
2. The action must be filed within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause.
3. Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.
XXIII. Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible,
serious and incurable. Her boyfriend Joseph was aware of her condition and yet married
her. After two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that she would
probably never be able to bear him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his
marriage with Yvette annulled. Yvette opposes the suit contending that Joseph is
estopped from seeking annulment of their marriage since he knew even before their
marriage that she was afflicted with HIV virus.
Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage with Yvette prosper? Discuss
fully. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Joseph knew that Yvette was HIV positive at the time of the marriage. He is, therefore, not
an injured party. The FC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an injured party. [Art. 47 (5).
FC)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action for annulment can prosper because the prescriptive period of five (5) years has
riot yet lapsed. [Art. 45 (6), FC]
XXIV. Isidro and Irma. Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were passengers of Flight No. 317 of
Oriental Airlines. The plane they boarded was of Philippine registry. While en route from
Manila to Greece some passengers hijacked the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the
cockpit and ordered him to fly instead to Libya. During the hijacking Isidro suffered a

heart attack and was on the verge of death. Since Irma was already eight months
pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded to the hijackers to allow the assistant pilot to solemnize
her marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro expired. As the plane landed in
Libya Irma gave birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after complete delivery.
Back in the Philippines Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The parents of
Isidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro void ab
initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of
their son; (b) there was no marriage license: (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority
to perform the marriage: and, (d) the solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of
marriage with the proper civil registrar.
1. Resolve each of the contentions ([a] to (d)) raised by the parents of Isidro. Discuss
fully. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)

The fact that the parents of Isidro and of Irma did not give their consent to the
marriage did not make the marriage void ab initio. The marriage is merely voidable
under Art 45 of the FG.

(b)

Absence of marriage license did not make the marriage void ab initio. Since the
marriage was solemnized in articulo mortis, it was exempt from the license
requirement under Art. 31 of the FC.

(c)

On the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and in behalf of the airplane
chief who was under disability, and by reason of the extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances of the case (i.e. hostage situation), the marriage was solemnized by an
authorized officer under Art. 7(3) and Art. 31, of the FC.

(d)

Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the affidavit of marriage did not affect the
validity of the marriage. It is merely an irregularity which may subject the solemnizing
officer to sanctions.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Considering that the solemnizing officer has no authority to perform the marriage because
under Art. 7 the law authorizes only the airplane chief, the marriage is void, hence, a, c, and d are
immaterial.
XXV.
1) The complete publication of the Family Code was made on August 4. 1987. On
September 4, 1987, Junior Cruz and Gemma Reyes were married before a municipal
mayor. Was the marriage valid?
2) Suppose the couple got married on September 1, 1994 at the Manila Hotel before
the Philippine Consul General to Hongkong who was on vacation in Manila. The
couple executed an affidavit consenting to the celebration, of the marriage at the
Manila Hotel. Is the marriage valid? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1)
a) Yes, the marriage is valid. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. At the
time of the marriage on September 4, 1987, municipal mayors were empowered to solemnize
marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.
2)
a) The marriage is not valid. Consuls and vice- consuls are empowered to solemnize
marriages between Philippine citizens abroad in the consular office of the foreign country to which
they were assigned and have no power to solemnize marriage on Philippine soil.
b) A Philippine consul is authorized by law to solemnize marriages abroad between
Filipino citizens. He has no authority to solemnize a marriage in the Philippines. Consequently, the marriage in question is void, unless either or both of the contracting parties
believed in good faith that the consul general had authority to solemnize their marriage in
which case the marriage is valid.
XXVI. A and B, both 18 years old, were sweethearts studying in Manila. On August 3. 1988,
while in first year college, they eloped. They stayed in the house of a mutual friend in
town X. where they were able to obtain a marriage license. On August 30, 1988, their
marriage was solemnized by the town mayor of X in his office. Thereafter, they returned
to Manila and continued to live separately in their respective boarding houses,
concealing from their parents, who were living in the province what they had done. In
1992, after graduation from college. A and B decided to break their relation and parted
ways. Both went home to their respective towns to live and work.
1) Was the marriage of A and B solemnized on August 30, 1988 by the town mayor of
X in his office a valid marriage? Explain your answer. (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage of A and B is void because the solemnizing officer had no legal authority to
solemnize the marriage. But if either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so, the marriage is voidable because the marriage between the
parties, both below 21 years of age, was solemnized without the consent of the parents. (Art. 35.
par. (2) and Art. 45 par. (1). Family Code)
2)
Can either or both of them contract marriage with another person without
committing bigamy? Explain your answer. (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Either or both of the parties cannot contract marriage in the Philippines with another person
without committing bigamy, unless there is compliance with the requirements of Article 52 Family
Code, namely: there must be a judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of their childrens presumptive
legitimate which shall be recorded in the appropriate Civil Registry and Registry of Property,
otherwise the same shall not affect third persons and the subsequent marriage shall be null and
void. (Arts. 52 and 53. Family Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they can. The subsequent marriage contracted by one of the parties will not give rise to
bigamy even in the absence of a court declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The subsistence of

a prior valid marriage is an indispensable element of the crime of bigamy. The prior court
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is required by the Family Code only for the purpose of
the validity of the subsequent marriage, not as an element of the crime of bigamy.
XXVII. Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a Catholic priest in Lourdes Church,
Quezon City in 1976. Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he slumped at the
altar soon after the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never had a steady Job because he
was drunk most of the time. Finally, he could not get employed at all because of
drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who had to earn a living to support herself and her
child begotten with Luis. In 1986, Maria filed a petition in the church matrimonial court
in Quezon City to annul her marriage with Luis on the ground of psychological incapacity
to comply with his marital obligation. Her petition was granted by the church
matrimonial court.
1) Can Maria now get married legally to another man under Philippine laws after her
marriage to Luis was annulled by the church matrimonial court? Explain.
2) What must Maria do to enable her to get married lawfully to another man under
Philippine laws? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) No, Maria cannot validly contract a subsequent marriage without a court declaration of
nullity of the first marriage. The law does not recognize the church declaration of nullity of
a marriage.
2) To enable Maria to get married lawfully to another man, she must obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage under Article 36 Family Code.
XXVIII. In 1989, Maris, a Filipino citizen, married her boss Johnson, an American citizen, in
Tokyo in a wedding ceremony celebrated according to Japanese laws. One year later,
Johnson returned to his native Nevada, and he validly obtained in that state an absolute
divorce from his wife Maris.
After Maris received the final judgment of divorce, she married her childhood
sweetheart Pedro, also a Filipino citizen, in a religious ceremony in Cebu City celebrated
according to the formalities of Philippine law. Pedro later left for the United States and
became naturalized as an American citizen. Maris followed Pedro to the United States,
and after a serious quarrel, Maris filed a suit and obtained a divorce decree issued by the
court in the state of Maryland.
Maris then returned to the Philippines and in a civil ceremony celebrated in Cebu
City according to the formalities of Philippine law, she married her former classmate
Vincent likewise a Filipino citizen.
a) Was the marriage of Maris and Johnson valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.
b) Was the marriage of Maris and Pedro valid when celebrated? Is their marriage still
valid existing now? Reasons.
c) Was the marriage of Maris and Vincent valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.

d) At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Maris? Reasons. (1992 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The marriage of Marts and Johnson was valid when celebrated because all marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines (Tokyo) in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they are solemnized (Japan), and valid there as such, are also valid in the Philippines.
Their marriage no longer validly subsists, because it has been dissolved by the absolute divorce
validly obtained by Johnson which capacitated Maris to remarry (Art. 26. Family Code).
(b) The marriage of Maris and Pedro was valid when celebrated because the divorce validly
obtained by Johnson in Manila capacitated Maris to marry Pedro.
The marriage of Maris and Pedro is still validly existing, because the marriage has not been
validly dissolved by the Maryland divorce (Art. 26, Family Code).
(c) The marriage of Maris and Vincent is void ab initio because it is a bigamous marriage
contracted by Maris during the subsistence of her marriage with Pedro (Art. 25 and 41, Family
Code).
The marriage of Maris and Vincent does not validly exist because Article 26 does not apply.
Pedro was not a foreigner at the time of his marriage with marts and the divorce abroad (in
Maryland) was initiated and obtained not by the alien spouse, but by the Filipino spouse. Hence, the
Maryland divorce did not capacitate Maris to marry Vincent.
(d) At this point in time, Pedro is still the lawful husband of Maris because their valid marriage
has not been dissolved by any valid cause (Art. 26, Family Code).
XXIX.

x
x
x
B. Do the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State bar Congress from
enacting a law allowing divorce in the Philippines? (1991 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the supporting provision, does not amount to a
prohibition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only meant to help the marriage
endure, to strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since Section 2 of Article XV
provides:
Sec. 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State
Since marriage is inviolable, it cannot be dissolved by an absolute divorce.

XXX.
A. One of the grounds for annulment of marriage is that either party, at the time of their
marriage was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease, found to be serious and
appears incurable. Two (2) years after their marriage .which took place on 10
October 1988. Bethel discovered that her husband James has a sexually-transmissible
disease which he contracted even prior to their marriage although James did not
know it himself until he was examined two (2)years later when a child was already
born to them. Bethel sues James for annulment of their marriage. James opposes the
annulment on the ground that he did not even know that he had such a disease so
that there was no fraud or bad faith on his part.
Decide.
B. Suppose that both parties at the time of their marriage were similarly afflicted with
sexually-transmissible diseases, serious and incurable, and both knew of their
respective infirmities, can Bethel or James sue for annulment of their marriage?
(1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The marriage can be annulled, because good faith is not a defense when the ground is
based upon sexually- transmissible disease on the part of either party.
B. Yes, the marriage can still be annulled because the fact that both of them are afflicted
with sexually-transmissible diseases does not efface or nullity the ground.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. No, the marriage can no longer be annulled, because the fact that both were afflicted and
that both knew of their respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that ground.
XXXI. In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married Ophelia with
whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990, he
married Shirley and abandoned Ophelia. During their union, James and Ophelia
acquired a residential lot worth P300.000.00.
Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his marriage with Shirley be declared
null and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since his marriage to Ophelia was
contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the former is not binding
upon him, the same being void ab initio; he further claims that his marriage to Shirley is
valid and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the time he married her.
(a) Is the contention of James correct? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. His marriage to Ophelia is void ab initio because of his subsisting prior marriage to Mary.
His marriage to Shirley, after Marys death, is valid and binding.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. The contention of James is not correct.
Art. 40, Family Code, provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It can be said, therefore, that the marriage of James to Shirley is void since his
previous marriage to Ophelia, although itself void, had not yet been judicially declared void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. The contention of James is not correct. He cannot set up as a defense his own criminal act or
wrongdoing.
XXXII. The marriage of H and W was annulled by the competent court. Upon finality of the
judgment of nullity, H began looking for his prospective second mate. He fell in love with
a sexy woman S who wanted to be married as soon as possible, i.e., after a few months of
courtship. As a young lawyer, you were consulted by H.
(a) How soon can H be joined in lawful wedlock to his girlfriend S? Under existing laws,
are there certain requisites that must be complied with before he can remarry?
What advice would you give H? (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again after complying with the provisions of
Article 52 of the Family Code, namely, there must be a partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes, which should be recorded
in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. H should be so advised.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The following are the requisites prescribed by law and the advice to H is to comply with
them, namely:
(1) If either spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of

(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)

the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of

the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted
the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
law;
The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession;
If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
The judgment of annulment of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall
he recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registers of property. (Articles 53, 52. 43,

44. Family Code).

XXXIII. B and G, age 20 and 19, respectively, and both single, eloped and got married to each
other without parental consent in the case of G. a teenaged student of an exclusive
college for girls. Three years later, her parents wanted to seek judicial annulment on
that ground. You were consulted and asked to prepare the proper complaint. What
advice would you give G's parents? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of the Family Code, and no longer the
parents because G is already 22 years of age.
XXXIV.
(1) Paul, a 17-year old Filipino and a permanent resident in the United States,
married Jean, a 16-year old American in Las Vegas, Nevada. The parents of both gave their
consent to the marriage. The marriage is valid in Nevada. Is it also valid in the Philippines?
Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage is not valid. Under the Family Code, the law requires that the contracting
parties are at least eighteen (18) years of age.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the marriage took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, the marriage will be valid
since under the provisions of the Civil Code a marriage valid in the place of celebration is valid in
the Philippines except bigamous, polygamous, and incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. The minimum age under the old law was sixteen (16) for the male and fourteen (14) for
the female.
(2) Cesar and Baby contracted marriage on June 15, 1983. A year later, Baby bore a
child, X The following year, the couple acquired a car and a residential lot in Metro Manila.
On September 1, 1988, the marriage was declared void from the beginning by a competent
court because Cesar was below 16 years of age at the time of the marriage. Sometime in
December, 1988, Cesar met Rosa with whom he fell in love. Cesar married Rosa on January
15, 1989. On September 1, 1989, Rosa gave birth prematurely to a child, Y. Is the marriage
of Cesar and Rosa valid? What is the status of the child Y? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If there was a liquidation of the properties of the first marriage and the presumptive legitime
of X was duly delivered, the second marriage is valid. If there was no such compliance, then the
marriage is void. The child is legitimate since Y was born a full year after the termination of the
first marriage and during the second marriage.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

A. The Family Code requires the registration of the judgment of nullity, the partition of the
properties and the delivery of the legitimes to be made with the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property. It further provides that failure to comply with the said requirement shall
render the marriage null and void. If there was such a recording, the marriage is valid. Otherwise,
the marriage is void. Nevertheless, child Y is a legitimate child because it was born during the
marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
B. Since the problem does not state that there was compliance with the requirements as to
recording of judgment of nullity and the liquidation and delivery of the presumptive legitime of the
child X, the marriage of Cesar and Rosa is void. However, the child Y" is legitimate because it was
born during the marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
XXXV. Alma, a Filipino citizen went to the United States on a tourist visa. Wanting to legalize
her stay and obtain permanent employment, she married John, an American citizen, for
a fee, with the understanding that after a year, John would divorce her. As agreed upon
the two obtained a divorce in Reno, Nevada.
(a) Suppose that after the divorce Alma consults you on the question of how she can
now marry her childhood sweetheart Rene, in the Philippines preferably, or if that cannot
be done, in some other country where Alma and Rene are prepared to go so that they can be
joined in wedlock and live the life they had dreamed about. What advice will you give Alma.
Explain.
(b) Suppose on the other hand that Alma and John decided to give their marriage a
try. They had seven years of marriage. Alma eventually became an American citizen, but the
marriage soured, and ended up in a divorce, just the same.
This time Alma wants a marriage for keeps, so she comes back to the Philippines to
Rene who, ever faithful, has waited for seven long years. Can she and Rene contract a valid
marriage? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(First Assumption)
a. Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is valid, then the divorce obtained by them is
void because of Article 15 of the Civil Code, Hence a marriage between Alma and Rene in the
Philippines or elsewhere will be bigamous. The advice to Alma, therefore, is for her not to marry
Rene.
b. Since Alma became an American citizen and presumably she had that citizenship at the time
of the divorce, if the divorce is valid under the American law or the law of her nationality at that
time, then she would be released from her marriage with John. Alma and Rene can contract a valid
marriage when she comes back to the Philippines.
(Second Assumption)
a. Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is fictitious, there having been no real intent
to enter into the marriage, and there having been no consent at all since Almas intention was
merely to legalize her stay and obtain permanent employment, the marriage between Alma and
John is void. On this premise, my advice to Alma would be that she can now marry her childhood
sweetheart Rene in the Philippines or in any other country for that matter.

b. Assuming, upon the other hand, that Alma and John did intend to marry and give their
marriage a try, and Alma eventually became an American citizen, the divorce would be valid.
Hence, she and Rene can contract a valid marriage upon her return to the Philippines
XXXVI. Lina married Hugo in a church ceremony. Hugo discovered that five years before,
Lina married Sixto in a civil ceremony. Lina however, did not know at the time she
married Sixto that the latter was already married. Upon learning that Sixto was already
married Lina immediately left Sixto and since then had not seen nor heard from him.
Lina, however, did not take any step to have her marriage with Sixto annuled before she
married Hugo.
Could Hugo successfully sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina?
Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Hugo cannot sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina. The marriage of
Lina with Sixto was void, so the marriage of Hugo with Lina is valid. There was no need for a prior
court action to declare the marriage with Sixto as void (Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, because the marriage of Hugo with Lina is not valid, for the reason that there was no
prior judicial declaration that the marriage with Sixto is void. Such judicial declaration is required
by law (Wiegel vs. Sempio Dy 143 SCRA 49 9 L

III. Legal Separation (Family Code)

I.

Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%)
x
x
x
2. If a man commits several acts of sexual infidelity, particularly in 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, the prescriptive period to file for legal separation runs from 2002. (2007 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The five-year prescriptive period for filing legal separation runs from the occurrence
of each act of sexual infidelity. Hence, the prescriptive period for the sexual infidelity committed in
2002 runs from 2002; for the sexual infidelity committed in 2003, the prescriptive period runs
from 2003 and so on. The action for legal separation for the last act of sexual infidelity in 2005 will
prescribe in 2010.
II. Saul, a married man, had an adulterous relation with Tessie. In one of the trysts, Sauls
wife, Cecile, caught them in flagrante. Armed with a gun, Cecile shot Saul in a fit of
extreme jealousy, nearly killing him. Four (4) years after the incident, Saul filed an
action for legal separation against Cecille on the ground that she attempted to kill him.

(1) If you were Sauls counsel, how will you argue his case? 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the counsel for Saul, I would argue that attempt by one spouse against the life of the
other is a valid ground for legal separation and that there is no need for conviction in a criminal
case.
(2) If you were the lawyer of Cecile, what will be your defense? 2.5% (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Cecile, I will interpose the defense that the attempt on his life was
without criminal intent but was impelled solely by passion and obfuscation. This is the reason why
under the Revised Penal Code, even killing him when caught in the act would be justified. To be a
ground for legal separation, the attempt must be intentional and wrongful.
(3) If you were the judge, how will you decide the case? 5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As judge, I will deny the petition. A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the
aggrieved spouse. Since Saul was unfaithful and was in fact caught in flagrante by his wife, he is not
an aggrieved spouse entitled to the relief. He who comes to court must come with clean hands.
And even assuming that the attempt on his life by the wife is a ground for legal separation, he is
still not entitled to the relief because of his infidelity. The law does not allow legal separation if
both parties have given ground for legal separation.
III. Which of the following remedies, i.e., (a) declaration of nullity of marriage, (b)
annulment of marriage, (c) legal separation, and or (d) separation of property, can an
aggrieved spouse avail himself/herself ofx
x
x
(ii) If the wife goes (to) abroad to work as a nurse and refuses to come home after the
expiration of her three-year contract there.
x
x
x
(iv) If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop
notwithstanding advice from relatives and friends.
(v) If the husband beats up his wife every time he comes home drunk. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) months from the expiration of her contract,
she is presumed to have abandoned the husband and he may file an action for judicial separation of
property. If the refusal continues for more than one year from the expiration of her contract, the
husband may file the action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the
ground of abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she leaves the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The intention not to return cannot be

presumed during the 3-year period of her contract.

(iv) The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husbands sexual infidelity is a ground
for legal separation (Article 55, FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of property
for failure of her husband to comply with his marital duty of fidelity (Article 135(4), 101, FC).
(v) The wife may file an action for legal separation on the ground of repeated physical violence
on her person (Article 55(1), FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of property for
failure of the husband to comply with his marital duty of mutual respect (Article 135(4), Article
101, FC). She may also file an action for declaration of nullity of the marriage if the husbands
behavior constitutes psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration of marriage.
IV. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only
during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for
legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (1%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they:
x
x
x
(2) will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art 55, FC); and
V. Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all, x x x (c)
for legal separation between the spouses? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
x
x
x
Legal Separation:
1. There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction:
2. The action must be filed within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause.
3. Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.

(c)

VI. Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5, 1988.
In 1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted Into Islam,
Ariel married Mystica. Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1. 1992
when Ariel returned to the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for legal
separation on February 5. 1994.
1) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation?
2) Has the action prescribed? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) a) Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is a ground for legal
separation unless upon returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to cohabit with Ariel
which is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case, there is condonation.
b) Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines
or abroad is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code. Whether
the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted into Islam, is immaterial.

2) No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse must file the action within
five (5) years from the occurrence or the cause. The subsequent marriage of Ariel could not
have occurred earlier than 1990, the time he went to Saudi Arabia. Hence, Rosa has until
1995 to bring the action under the Family Code.
VII. Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1, 1982. A few days after the marriage,
Corona discovered that Cadio was a homosexual. As homosexuality was not a ground for
legal separation under the Civil Code, there was nothing that Corona could do but bear
with her problem. The couple, however, stated to live separately. With the enactment of
the Family Code, Corona decided to be legally separated from Cadio based on the new
ground of homosexuality. Corona brought her action for legal separation on September
15, 1988. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper because the cause arose only on August 3, 1988, the effectivity
of the Family Code, and the action had not yet prescribed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The offense of homosexuality as a continuing offense can be a ground
for legal separation. The prescriptive period of five years will apply only when the offense has a
fixed period of time and, therefore, the date of its occurrence can be computed.
IV. Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife (Family Code)
V. Property Relations of the Spouses (Family Code)
I. G filed on July 8, 2000 a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to B. During
the pendency of the case, the couple entered into a compromise agreement to dissolve
their absolute community of property. B ceded his right to their house and lot and all his
shares in two business firms to G and their two children, aged 18 and 19.
B also opened a bank account in the amount of P3 million in the name of the two
children to answer for their educational expenses until they finish their college degrees.
For her part, G undertook to shoulder the day-to-day living expenses and upkeep of
the children. The Court approved the spouses agreement on September 8, 2000.
A. Suppose the business firms suffered reverses, rendering G unable to support
herself and the children. Can G still ask for support pendente lite from B? Explain.
(3%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, G can still ask for support from B because during the pendency of the action, the marriage
between them is considered still subsisting (Article 68, Family Code). Being considered still married
to each other, B and G still have the obligation to support each other. The compromise agreement
cannot operate to waive future support when needed (Article 2035, Civil Code).

After the compromise agreement was approved by the court and the properties of the
marriage were distributed, there remained no more common properties of B and G. While Article
198 of the Family Code appears ' to limit the source of support to the common properties of the
said marriage in case of the pendency of an action to declare the nullity of marriage, Article 94 and
Article 121 indicate otherwise. Under the said Articles, the spouses remain personally and
solidarily liable with their separate properties for support even though, for whatever reason, there
are no more community or partnership properties left.
The judgment based on the compromise dissolving the property relations of B and G does
not bar G from asking support pendente lite. The dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses did not terminate the obligation between them to support each other. The declaration of
the nullity of their marriage is what terminates the right of G to be supported by B as his spouse.
II. G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which bore no
offspring, was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. At the time of
the dissolution of the marriage, the couple possessed the following properties:

a house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the purchase
price (representing down payment) of which he paid; one third (1/3) was paid by G
on February 14, 1990 out of a cash gift given to her by her parents on her
graduation on April 6, 1989; and the balance was paid out of the spouses joint
income; and
an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987.

A. Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage was declared void ab initio in 2001, no Absolute Community or Conjugal
Partnership was ever established between B and G. Their property relation is governed by a
special co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code because they were capacitated to
marry each other. Under that Article 147, wages and salaries of the former spouses earned during
their cohabitation shall be owned by them in equal shares while properties acquired thru their
work or industry shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions. Care and
maintenance of the family is recognized as a valuable contribution. In the absence of proof as to the
value of their respective contributions, they shall share equally.
If ownership over the house and lot was acquired by B on August 3,1988 at the time he
bought it on installment before he got married, he shall remain owner of the house and lot but he
must reimburse G for all the amounts she advanced to pay the purchase price and for her one-half
share in the last payment from their joint income. In such case, the house and lot were not acquired
during their cohabitation, hence, are not co-owned by B and G.
But if the ownership of the house and lot was acquired during the cohabitation, the house and
lot will be owned as follows:
1)

1/3 of the house and lot is owned by B. He is an undivided co-owner to that extent for his
contribution in its acquisition in the form of the down payment he made before the
celebration of the marriage. The money he used to pay the down payment was not

earned during the cohabitation, hence, it is his exclusive property.

2)

1 / 3 of the house and lot is owned by G. She is an undivided co-owner to the extent for
her contribution in its acquisition when she paid 1/ 3 of the purchase price using the gift
from her parents. Although the gift was acquired by G during her cohabitation with B, it
is her exclusive property. It did not consist of wage or salary or fruit of her work or
industry

3)

1/3 of the house is co-owned by B and G because the payment came from their co-owned
funds, i.e., their joint income during their cohabitation which is shared by them equally in
the absence of any proof to the contrary.

After summing up their respective shares, B and G are undivided co-owners of the house
and lot in equal shares.
As to the apartment, it is owned exclusively by B because he acquired it before their
cohabitation. Even if he acquired it during their cohabitation it will still be his exclusive property
because it did not come from his wage or salary, or from his work or industry. It was acquired
gratuitously from his uncle.
B.
If G and B had married on July 3, 1987 and their marriage was dissolved in 2007,
who owns the properties? Explain. (5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The answer is the same as in letter A. Since the parties to the marriage which was later
declared void ab initio were capacitated to marry each other, the applicable law under the New
Civil Code was Article 144. This Article is substantially the same as Article 147 of the Family
Code. Hence, the determination of ownership will remain the same as in question A. And even
assuming that the two provisions are not the same, Article 147 of the Family Code is still the law
that will govern the property relations of B and G because under Article 256, the Family Code
has retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under
the New Civil Code or other laws. Applying Article 147 retroactively to the case of G and B will
not impair any vested right. Until the declaration of nullity of the marriage under the Family
Code, B and G have not as yet acquired any vested right over the properties acquired during
their cohabitation.
III. In 1997, B and G started living together without the benefit of marriage. The
relationship produced one offspring, Venus. The couple acquired a residential lot in
Paranaque. After four (4) years or in 2001, G having completed her 4- year college
degree as a fulltime student, she and B contracted marriage without a license.
The marriage of B and G was, two years later, declared null and void due to the
absence of a marriage license.
A. If you were the judge who declared the nullity of the marriage, to whom would you
award the lot? Explain briefly. (3%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Since the marriage was null and void, no Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership was
established between B and G. Their properties are governed by the special co-ownership
provision of Article 147 of the Family Code because both B and G were capacitated to marry each
other. The said Article provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
under a void marriage: (1) their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares; and
(2) property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In co-ownership, the parties are co-owners if they contributed something
of value in the acquisition of the property. Their share is in proportion to their respective
contributions. In an ordinary co- ownership the care and maintenance of the family is not
recognized as a valuable contribution for the acquisition of a property. In the Article 147 special
co-ownerships, however, care and maintenance is recognized as a valuable contribution which will
entitle the contributor to half of the property acquired.
Having been acquired during their cohabitation, the residential lot is presumed acquired
through their joint work and industry under Article 147, hence, B and G are co-owners of the said
property in equal shares.
Article 147 also provides that when a party to the void marriage was in bad faith, he forfeits his
share in the co-ownership in favor of the common children or descendants. In default of children or
descendants, the forfeited share shall belong to the innocent party. In the foregoing problem, there
is no showing that one party was in bad faith. Hence, both shall be presumed in good faith and no
forfeiture shall take place.
IV. In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to
the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but
the Mayors secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the
required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to
look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.
When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed
him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were
waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract,
gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayors office.' She then gave copies of
the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already
married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.
x
x
x
[c] What property regime governs the properties acquired by the couple?
Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage being void, the property relationship that governed their union is special coownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. This is on the assumption that there was no
impediment for them to validly marry each other.
V. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[b] If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a spouse in an adulterous

marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains. (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. In an adulterous relationship, the salary of a married partner belongs to the absolute
community, or conjugal partnership, of such married partner with his or her lawful spouse. Under
Article 148 of the Family Code, the property relations between married partner and his/ her
paramour is governed by ordinary co-ownership where the partners become co-owners only when
they contributed to the acquisition of the property. The paramour is deemed to have not
contributed in the earning of the salary of the married partner.
VI. Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Bias to construct a house on a lot which he
(Bias) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation of the house,
Adam hit a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old Banco de las Islas
Filipinas. Using a detonation device, Adam was able to open the vault containing old
notes and coins which were in circulation during the Spanish era. While the notes and
coins are no longer legal tender, they were valued at P 100 million because of their
historical value and the coins silver and nickel content. The following filed legal claims
over the notes and coins:
i) Adam, as finder;
ii) Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;
iii) Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault;
and
iv) The Philippine Government because of their historical value.
x
x
x
b)
Assuming that either or both Adam and Bias are adjudged as owners, will the
notes and coins be deemed part of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains with their respective spouses? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The hidden treasure will be part of the absolute community or conjugal property, of the
respective marriages (Arts. 91, 93 and 106, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It is not hidden treasure and therefore, not part, if the absolute or conjugal partnership of
the spouses. But the finder of the lost movable, then his reward equivalent to one-tenth of the
value of the vaults contents, will form part of the conjugal partnership. If the government wantsto
acquire the notes and coins, it must expropriate them for public use as museum pieces and pay
just compensation.
VII. Ernesto, an overseas Filipino worker, was coming home to the Philippines after working
for so many years in the Middle East. He had save P100,000 in his savings account in
Manila which he intended to use to start a business in his home country. On his flight
home, Ernesto had a fatal heart attack. He left behind his widowed mother, his commonlaw wife and their twin sons. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives and no other
properties except the money in his savings account. Who are the heirs entitled to inherit
from him and how much should each receive? (3%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the 100,000 peso savings came from wages and salaries that Ernesto earned during the
time that he was cohabiting with his common law wife, and there was no impediment for them to
marry each other. The P100,000 shall be owned by them in equal shares under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Therefore, one half thereof, of P50,000, shall belong to the common law wife as her
share in the co-ownership, while the other half of P50,000 shall be the share of Ernesto that will be
inherited by his mother, and two illegitimate children. The mother will get P25,000 while the two
illegitimate children will get P12,500 each. The common law wife is not a legal heir of Ernesto
because they were not legally married.
If there was an impediment for Ernesto and his common law wife to marry each other, the
P100,000 will be owned by Ernesto alone, the common law wife not having contributed to its
acquisition (Art. 148, Family Code) it shall be inherited by his mother who will get P50,000, and his
two illegitimate sons who will get 25,000 each.
VIII. Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%) (2007 Bar Question)
x
x
x
3. An individual, while single, purchases a house and lot in 1990, and borrows money
in 1992 to repair it. In 1995, such individual gets married while the debt is still
being paid. After the marriage, the debt is still the responsibility of such individual.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The absolute community of property is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of either spouse
in so far as the same redounded to the benefit of the family (Art. 94[7], Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. The debt is already the responsibility of the community property, because the property
already constitutes absolute community of property under Art. 91 of the Family Code which took
effect in 1988 while the house and lot here involved was purchased in 1990. There is no indication
that the spouse who bought the property had legitimate descendants by a former marriage, which
would exclude the house and lot from the community property, (Art. 92[3], Family Code). If the
spouses established a conjugal partnership, the property belongs to the individual spouse if full
ownership was vested before the marriage. (Art. 118, Family Code).
IX. Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective buyer,
Ray. Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a fair price of
P2 Million. Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the property. Later,
another couple, Bemie and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower price of PI.5 Million.
But Ray insisted on buying the house of Biong and Linda for sentimental reason. Ray
prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the couple and a managers check of P2 Million.
After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the deed of sale. However, Linda was not
able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return she refused to sign the document
saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the deed of sale and for
moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
(1) Will the suit prosper? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. The sale was void because Linda did not give her written consent to the
sale. In Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002), the Supreme Court has ruled that the sale of
conjugal property is void if both spouses have not given their written consent to it and even if the
spouse who did not sign the Deed of Sale participated in the negotiation of the contract. In Abalos v.
Macatangay, 439 SCRA 649(2004),the Supreme Court even held that for the sale to be valid, the
signatures of the spouses to signify their written consent must be on the same document. In this
case, Linda, although she was the one who negotiated the sale, did not give her written consent to
the sale. Hence, the sale is void. However, Linda will not be entitled to damages because Ray is not
in any way in bad faith.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will not prosper because the contract of sale has already been perfected and partly
consummated. The contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the buyer and
seller on to the thing to be sold and on the price thereof. In this case, Linda had a meeting of minds
with Ray when they agreed that the property will be sold for 2 million pesos at the conclusion of
her negotiations with him, while Biong had a meeting of minds with Ray when he signed the Deed
of Sale and accepted the 2 million-peso payment by Ray. Linda is estopped from questioning the
validity of the contract she herself negotiated with Ray.
X. Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament leaving his estate valued at P12
Million to his common-law wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and his
half-sister Michelle.
(1) Was Dons testamentary disposition of his estate in accordance with the law on
succession? Whether you agree or not, explain your answer. 2.5% (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the testamentary disposition is in accordance with the law on succession. Don was not
survived by any compulsory heir. Hence, he could will his entire estate to anybody of his choice
including a total stranger. His institution of his common-law wife to his entire estate is valid. The
disposition is not in consideration of an adulterous relationship because both of them were not
married to anyone at the time of his making of the will and at the time of his death. Relationship
between two unmarried persons is not adulterous. The law does not prohibit testamentary
dispositions in favor of a common law spouse. What the law prohibits are donations in favor of
common law spouses under the Family Code. Such provision does not include a disposition mortis
causa such as a testamentary institution.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 1028 of the New Civil Code provides that prohibitions concerning donations inter vivos
shall apply to testamentary dispositions. Article 87 of the Family Code provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses during the marriage shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage."
Accordingly, Dons testamentary disposition in favor of his common law wife Roshelle is void

because it is prohibited by law.

XI. Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10. 1990. Prior
thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in the Register of
Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential
house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In 1995, they decided to change
their property relations to the regime of complete separation of property. Mila
consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative business. The spouses then signed a
private document dissolving their conjugal partnership and agreeing on a complete
separation of property.
Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion in Baguio City, and a 5-hectare agricultural
land in Oriental Mindoro, which he registered exclusively in his name.
In the year 2000, Milas business venture failed, and her creditors sued her for
P10,000,000.00. After obtaining a favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute on
the spouses' house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Gabby's mansion and
agricultural land.
a) Discuss the status of the first and the amended marriage settlements. (2%) (2005 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The first marriage settlement was valid because it was in writing, signed by the parties and
executed before the celebration of the marriage.
2) The subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification of their marriage
settlement. To be valid, the modification must be executed before the celebration of the marriage.
The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a dissolution of their conjugal partnership
and a separation of their properties because it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an
agreement by the parties to dissolve their conjugal partnership and to separate their properties
during the marriage has to be approved by the court.
b) Discuss the effect/s of the said settlements on the properties acquired by the
spouses. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage settlement was binding between the parties, conjugal partnership of
gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
all properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, jointly or by either one of them,
through their work or industry are conjugal. Therefore, the residential house and lot, and the
condominium unit are conjugal having been jointly acquired by the couple during the marriage.
Inasmuch as the subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation
of property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the parties. Therefore, the
mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired by one of the spouses
during the marriage.
c) What properties may be held answerable for Milas obligations? Explain. (2%) (2005

Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the creditors, because it was
not registered with the local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. To bind third
parties, the Family Code requires registration of the marriage settlement not only with the proper
registers of deeds but also with the local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. Hence,
if the rules on conjugal partnership will prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute community
will be applied instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without the consent
of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal partnership and absolute
community. The partnership or community is liable for debts contracted by one spouse but only
to the extent that it benefited the family. Therefore, if the debts contracted by Mila redounded to
the benefit of the family, all the conjugal partnership properties are liable to pay them but only to
the extent the family was benefited. The separate properties of Mila may be held answerable for
Milas debts and obligations that did not redound to the benefit of the family.
XII. As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the
corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety
Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan,
and the bank obtained a Judgment against it and Victorino, jointly and severally. To
enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership of
Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed by the
husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband alone is
chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was contracted for the benefit of the
family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was to
guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for the benefit of
the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement to be
chargeable against the partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the
benefit was a direct result of such agreement. [Ayola Investment v. Ching. 286 SCRA 272)
XIII. On April 5, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage
settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990, when
Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the sale void or
voidable? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law applicable.
Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse without the consent of the
other is void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only if
such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in 1980, the

law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the NCC, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v. Aldon, 100 SCRA 628 and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v.
Malobonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2 September 1999, the sale executed by the husband without the
consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested right on the voidable
nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence. Article 124 of the Family Code
which makes the sale void does not apply.
XIV. For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-President, and Susan, an entertainer,
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were
capacitated to many each other. Since Tonys salary was more than enough for their
needs, Susan stopped working and merely kept house". During that period, Tony was
able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years. Tony and
Susan decided to separate.
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as coowners in equal shares. Under Article
147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their cohabitation
are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or
her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2%) (2000 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to
the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of
one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate
contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his
exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house said
lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
XV. In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975,
Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of riceland, with the title being placed
jointly in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and
lot) which was placed in her name alone as the buyer. In 1981, Mauricio died, and Carol
promptly filed an action against Erlinda to recover both the riceland and the house and

lot, claiming them to be conjugal property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she
and the late Mauricio were co- owners of the riceland; and with respect to the house and
lot. She claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had
actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case? [5%] (1998
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Carol's action to recover both the riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are
conjugal property, in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that
her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148,
Family Code, despite the fact that the husband's death took place prior to the effectivity of said law.
However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in view of
the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common In proportion to their respective contributions.
Moreover, if one of the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the
riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the riceland nor the exclusive
owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauricio's. And since his share accrues to the
conjugal partnership with Carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda.
(Art. 144, Civil Code).
XVI. In 1970, Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975,
Bob Inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a
two- room bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth
P800.000.00 while the house, when finished cost P600.000.00. In 1989, Bob died,
survived only by his wife, Issa and his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of
both assets remained at the same proportion:
1.
State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal
but exclusive property of her deceased son. [3%]
2.
Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? [2%] (1998
Bar Question)
The original name printed in the question appears as "Issa". However, it was corrected to read as
Sofia, which correction was announced in all the examination rooms.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Since Bob and Sofia got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code
(Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied as regards the property of
the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 1.19, Civil
Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and the wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil

Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having
acquired the same by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civil Code). However, the house constructed
from his own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal property
and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of reverse accession provided for in
Art. 158, Civil Code.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
1. Sofia, being her deceased son's legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985,
986 and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but belong to
the hereditary estate of Bob, the value of the land being more than the cost of the improvement
(Art. 120, Family Code).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way
back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or after
August 3, 1988 (effectivity date of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the marriage
was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation
that governs them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)
ANOTHER ANSWER:
2. If Bob died before August 3. 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the
answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be
deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used in constructing it. The
husband's estate would be entitled to a reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal
partnership funds.
XVII. Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is
not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his
salary earnings during that period the amount of P200.000.00 presently deposited in a
bank. A house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount
by the couple. Of the P500,000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the
property, P200,000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda
owned by Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine,
the sum of P500,000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P 100,000.00, being used by the
common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give
them your legal advice on the following:
(a) How under the law, should the bank deposit of P200,000.00, the house and lot
valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P 100,000.00 be allocated to them?
(b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
together all the time, i.e. since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? (1997 Bar

Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Art. 147 of the Family Code provides In part that when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them In
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules of co- ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their Joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Thus:
1) the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be divided equally
between Luis and Rizza.
2) the house and lot valued at P500,000.00 having been acquired by both of them
through work or industry shall be divided between them in proportion to their
respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis
gets 2/5 while Rizza gets 3/5 of P500,000.00.
3) the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having
been donated to her by her parents.
(b)
The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been
celebrated 20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, under which the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and Income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of I he marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art.
142, Civil Code).
Thus:

1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200.000.00 and the
house and lot valued at P500.000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis and
Rizza.
2) However, the car worth P 100.000.00 donated to Rizza by her parents shall be
considered to her own paraphernal property, having been acquired by lucrative title
(par.2, Art. 148, Civil Code).

XVIII. On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-ycar old businessman, married Karla, a winsome
lass of 18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin and Karla
entered into an antenuptial contract the day before their marriage stipulating that
conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage
Kevins estate was worth 50 Million while Karlas was valued at 2 Million.
A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left no will,
no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives: his

brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.

1.
2.

What property regime governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla? Explain.
Determine the value of the estate of Kevin. (1995 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and without the
participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage settlement is invalid
applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides .that a minor who according to law may contract marriage
may also enter into marriage settlements but they shall be valid only if the person who may give
consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement. (Karla was still a minor at the time the
marriage settlement was executed in September 1988 because the law, R.A. 6809, reducing the age
of majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The marriage settlement being void, the
property regime governing the marriage is, therefore, absolute community of property, under Art.
75 of the FC.
2. All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became
community property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since Kevin
owned 50 Million and Karla, 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52 Million constituted their
community properly. Upon the death of Kevin, the community was dissolved and half of the 52
Million or 26 Million is his share in the community. This 26 Million therefore is his estate.
XIX. Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive drinking of her husband,
Alberto. Paulita, out of her own endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she was
able to register under her name with the addendum widow." She also acquired stocks in
a listed corporation registered in her name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to Rafael, who
first examined the original of the transfer certificate of title.
1) Has Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock acquired by Paulita?
2) Can Alberto recover the land from Rafael? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)
a) Yes. The Family Code provides that all property acquired during the marriage, whether
the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be absolute community property unless the contrary is proved, despite the
fact that those shares were registered only in her name. Alberto's right to claim his share will only
arise, however, at dissolution.
b)
The presumption is still that the shares of stock are owned Ln common. Hence, they
will form part of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership depending on what the
property regime is.
c)
Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by onerous title during the marriage,
these are part of the conjugal or absolute community property as the case may be (depending on
whether the marriage was celebrated prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code). Her
physical separation from her husband did not dissolve the community of property. Hence, the
husband has a right to share in the shares of stock.

(2)
a) Under a community of property, whether absolute or relative, the disposition of
property belonging to such community is void if done by Just one spouse without the consent of the
other or authority of the proper court. However, the land was registered in the name of Paulita as
widow". Hence, the buyer has the right to rely upon what appears in the record of the Register of
Deeds and should, consequently, bie protected. Alberto cannot recover the land from Rafael but
would have the right of recourse against his wife.
b)
The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during the
marriage and through Paulitas industry despite the registration being only in the name of Paulita.
The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of Alberto is void.
However, since the land is registered in the name of Paulita as widow, there is nothing in the title
which would raise a suspicion for Rafael to make inquiry. He, therefore, is an innocent purchaser
for value from whom the land may no longer be recovered.
c)
No. Rafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith who, upon relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquires rights which are to be protected by the courts.
Under the established principles of land registration law, the presumption is that the
transferee of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of the property he purchased.
(See Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467). Moreover, the person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. {Director of Lands v.
Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606). No strong considerations of public policy have been presented which
would lead the Court to reverse the established and sound doctrine that the buyer in good faith of
p registered parcel of land does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search for any
hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what he
purchased. (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 271)
d)
The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during the
marriage and through Paulitas Industry despite registration only in the name of Paulita. The land
being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of Alberto is void.
XX. In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a widow thirty
(30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined earnings a
parcel of riceland.
After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived together with Mabel, a maiden sixteen (16)
years of age. While living together, Rico was a salaried employee and Mabel kept house
for Rico and did full-time household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel
of coconut land was acquired by Rico from his savings.
After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and
married Letty, a single woman twenty-six (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico
and Letty. Letty bought a mango orchard out of her own personal earnings.
a) Who would own the riceland, and what property regime governs the ownership?
Explain.
b) Who would own the coconut land, and what property regime governs the
ownership? Explain.
c) Who would own the mango orchard, and what property regime governs the

ownership? Explain. (1992 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The regime is that of co-ownership
(Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph).
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Ricos marriage to Letty. the half interest of Rico in the
riceland will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
(b)
Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The regime is a sole/single
proprietorship (Art. 148, Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, and not Art. 147 Family Code.
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Rico's marriage to Letty, the coconut land of Rico will
then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
(c)
Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The regime is the Absolute Community of
Property (Arts. 75, 90 and 91, Family Code).
XXI. Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry each
other before the last day of the 1991 Bar Examinations. They agreed to execute a
Marriage Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her own handwriting.
They agreed on the following:
(1) a conjugal partnership of gains;
(2) each donates to the other fifty percent (50%) of his/her present property;
(3) Rowena shall administer the conjugal partnership property; and
(4) neither may bring an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Both signed the agreement in the presence of two (2) witnesses. They
did not. however, acknowledge it before a notary public.
(a)As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in the
registry of property? If not, what steps must be taken to make it registrable?
(b) Are the stipulations valid?
(c) If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above stipulations
are likewise valid, does it now follow that said Marriage Settlement is valid and
enforceable? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Yes, it is valid as to form, because it is in writing. No. it cannot be registered in the
registry of property because it is not a public document. To make it registrable, it must be
reformed and has to be notarized.
B.
Stipulations (1) and (3) are valid because they are not contrary to law. Stipulation
(4) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their respective
present properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
C.
No, on September 15, 1991, the marriage settlement is not yet valid and
enforceable until the celebration of the marriage, to take place before the last day of the 1991 bar
Examinations.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
Yes, it is valid as between the parties but not as against third persons. No, because
it is not a public document. To make it registrable, it must be reformed and has to be notarized.
B.
It depends. As between the parties, stipulations (1) and (3) are valid because they
are not contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid
up to 1/5 of their respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
XXII.

(1)
What properties are excluded from the regime of absolute community of
property between spouses? (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits
as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or
grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part
of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by
a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
(2) When should the property relations of the spouses be mandatorily governed by the
regime of complete separation of property? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without complying with the
requirement that the community or conjugal property be liquidated judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
XXIII. Spouses Martin and Tecla bought a parcel of land on installment. At the time the
total sale price was paid, Martin had left the conjugal abode and was cohabiting with
Tina. Notwithstanding such separation, Tecla religiously paid the installments as they
fell due out of her earnings from a small sari-sari store. After the "total purchase price
had been paid, Martin had the property titled in the name of Martin married to Tina.
Tecla died and her two children by Martin demanded partition of the property and their
mothers share. Martin and Tina refused, claiming that the property belonged to their
conjugal partnership. No proof was presented that Martin married Tina during or
after the death of Tecla.
To whom does the property titled in the name of Martin married to Tina belong?
How would the property be divided among Martin, the two children of Martin and Tecla
and Tina? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The property is conjugal property.- 1/2 belongs to Martin and the other half of Tecla. However,
1/2 belonging to Tecla will be divided among Martin and the two children, each of them getting 1/3
of that 1/2.
VI. The Family
I.

In 1991, Victor established judicially out of conjugal property, a family home in Manila
worth P200,000.00 and extrajudicially a second family home in Tagaytay worth
P50,000.00. Victor leased the family home in Manila to a foreigner. Victor and his family
transferred to another house of his in Pasig.
Can the two family homes be the subject of execution on a judgment against Victors
wife for non-payment of the purchase in 1992 of household appliances? (1994 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two (2) so-called family homes can be the subject of execution. Neither of the abodes are
considered family homes because for purposes of availing the benefits under the Family Code,
there can only be one (1) family home which is defined as the dwelling house where the husband
and the wife and their family actually reside" and the land on which it is situated. (Arts. 152 and
161, Family Code)
II.

A. How does the 1987 Constitution strengthen the family as an institution?

B. Do the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State bar Congress from enacting a
law allowing divorce in the Philippines? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Section I, Article XV, further provides that:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
(Note: The Committee recommends that a citation of either one of the provisions be
credited as a complete answer).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

B. No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the supporting provision, does not amount to a
prohibition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only meant to help the marriage
endure, to strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B. Yes, Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since Section 2 of Article XV
provides:
Sec. 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State
Since marriage is inviolable, it cannot be dissolved by an absolute divorce.
III. In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married Ophelia with
whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990, he
married Shirley and abandoned Ophelia. During their union, James and Ophelia
acquired a residential lot worth P300.000.00.
Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his marriage with Shirley be declared
null and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since his marriage to Ophelia was
contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the former is not binding
upon him, the same being void ab initio; he further claims that his marriage to Shirley is
valid and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the time he married her.
x
x
x
(b) What property regime governed the union of James and Ophelia?
(c) Is the estate of Mary entitled to a share in the residential lot acquired by James and
Ophelia? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. The provisions of Art 148 of the Family Code, shall govern:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
C. It should be distinguished when the property was acquired.
If it was acquired before Marys death, the estate of Mary is entitled to 1/2 of the share of
James.
If it was acquired after Mary's death, there will be no share at all for the estate of Mary.
IV. What is Family Home and when is it deemed constituted? Who are the beneficiaries
thereof? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Family Home is the dwelling house where the husband, the wife, and their family
including the unmarried head of the family reside and the land on which it is situated.
The Family Home is deemed constituted on a house .and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence.
The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon,
the head of the family for legal support.
V. Manny and Nita, husband and wife, decided to separate by mutual agreement. They had
a contract prepared, signed it and had it notarized, providing for their separation and
for the extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets. They likewise agreed to live
separately and that if either spouse should find a more compatible partner, the other
would raise no objection and would refrain from taking any judicial action against the
other.
Determine the validity of each of the provisions of the agreement. Explain briefly.
(1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The provision for their separation is void.

The provision for the extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets is void.
The agreement to live separately is void.
The agreement that should either spouse find a more compatible partner, the other would
raise no objection and would refrain from taking any judicial action against the other is
void.

The aforementioned stipulations are all void because they are contrary to law, morals, good
custom, public order and public policy. The specific provision of law is Article 221 of the Civil Code.
VII. Paternity and Filiation (Family Code)
I.

Spouses B and G begot two offsprings. Albeit they had serious personality differences,
the spouses continued to live under one roof. B begot a son by another woman. G also
begot a daughter by another man.
A. If G gives the surname of B to her daughter by another man, what can B do to
protect their legitimate childrens interests? Explain. (5%) (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B can impugn the status of Gs daughter by another man as his legitimate daughter on the
ground that for biological reason he could not have been the father of the child, a fact that may be
proven by the DNA test. Having been born during the marriage between B and G, Gs daughter by
another man is presumed as the child of B under Article 164 of the Family Code. In the same action

to impugn, B can pray for the correction of the status of the said daughter in her record of birth.
B. If B acquiesces to the use of his surname by Gs daughter by another man, what
is/are the consequence/s? Explain. (5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If B acquiesces and does not file the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child within the
prescriptive period for doing so in Article 170 of the Family Code, Gs daughter by another man
shall be conclusively presumed as the legitimate daughter of B by G.
II. Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby
via in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorettes pre-natal expenses
as well as those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2
million and, in return, she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of
P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
x
x
x
D.
Is the child entitled to support and inheritance from Gigolo? Explain. (2.5%)
(2010 Bar Question)
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Gigolo voluntarily recognized the child as his illegitimate child in accordance with Article
175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, the child is entitled to support and inheritance
from Gigolo.
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because Gigolo is the natural and biological parent of the baby.
III. In 1997, B and G started living together without the benefit of marriage. The
relationship produced one offspring, Venus. The couple acquired a residential lot in
Paranaque. After four (4) years or in 2001, G having completed her 4- year college
degree as a fulltime student, she and B contracted marriage without a license.
The marriage of B and G was, two years later, declared null and void due to the
absence of a marriage license.
x
x
x
B. Is Venus legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated? Explain briefly. (3%) (2010 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Venus is illegitimate. She was conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Thus, she is
considered illegitimate (.Article 165, Family Code). While Venus was legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of her parents, such legitimation was rendered ineffective when the said marriage was
later on declared null and void due to absence of a marriage license.

Under Article 178 of the Family Code, legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
The inclusion of the underscored portion in the Article necessarily implies that the Articles
application is limited to voidable marriages. It follows that when the subsequent marriage is null
and void, the legitimation must also be null and void. In the present problem, the marriage
between B and G was not voidable but void. Hence, Venus has remained an illegitimate child.
IV. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[e] A dead child can be legitimated. (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. To be legitimated, the law does not require a child to be alive at the time of the
marriage of his/her parents (Article 177, FC). Furthermore, Art. 181 of the Family Code which
states that [Th]e legitimation of children who died before the celebration of marriage will benefit
their descendants, does not preclude instances where such legitimation will benefit no one but
the childs ascendants, or other relatives.
V. In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to
the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but
the Mayors secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the
required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to
look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.
When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed
him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were
waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract,
gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayors office.' She then gave copies of
the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already
married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.
x
x
x
[b] What is the status of the three children of Michael and Anna? Explain your
answer. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The children are illegitimate, having been born outside a valid marriage.
VI. Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to the
spouses Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The childrens birth certificates were duly
signed by Conrado, showing them to be the couples legitimate children.
Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging Alberto
and Baldomero as his illegitimate children with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving
substantial properties. In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero
intervened claiming shares as the deceaseds illegitimate children. The legitimate family
of Edilberto opposed the claim.

Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain. (4%)
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Alberto and Baldomero are not entitled to share in Edilbertos estate. They are not related
at all to Edilberto. They were born during the marriage of Conrado and Clarita, hence, are
considered legitimate children of the said spouses. This status is conferred on them at birth by law.
Under Philippine law, a person cannot have more than one natural filiation. The legitimate
filiation of a person can be changed only if the legitimate father will successfully impugn such
status.
In the problem, therefore, the filiation of Alberto and Baldomero as the legitimate children of
Conrado cannot be changed by their recognition by Edilberto as his illegitimate children. Before
they can be conferred the status of Edilbertos illegitimate children, Conrado must first impugn
their legitimacy. Since Conrado has not initiated any action to impugn their legitimacy, they
continue to be the legitimate children of Conrado. They cannot be the illegitimate children of
Edilberto at the same time. Not being the illegitimate children of Edilberto, they have no right to
inherit from him.
VII. Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye, 16
years old, they started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. When Faye reached 18 years of age, her parents forcibly took her back and
arranged for her marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the marriage,
Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work. During their
marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, Laica. When Faye was 25 years old, Brad
discovered her continued liaison with Roderick and in one of their heated arguments,
Faye shot Brad to death. She lost no time in marrying her true love Roderick, without a
marriage license, claiming that they have been continuously cohabiting for more than
5 years.
x
x
x
b) What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Having been born during the marriage of Faye and Brad, she is presumed to be the
legitimate child of Faye and Brad. This presumption had become conclusive because the period of
time to impugn her filiation had already prescribed.
c) Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground that based on
DNA results, Roderick is her biological father? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, she cannot impugn her own filiation. The law does not allow a child to impugn his or
her own filiation. In the problem, Laicas legitimate filiation was accorded to her by operation of law
which may be impugned only by Brad, or his heirs in the cases provided by law within the
prescriptive period.

d) Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? (1%) (2008
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, she cannot be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents. In the first
place she is not, under the law, the child of Roderick. In the second place, her biological parents
could not have validly married each other at the time she was conceived and born simply
because Faye was still married to Roderick at that time. Under Article 177 of the Family Code,
only children conceived or born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the child were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, may be legitimated.
VIII. Gianna was born to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Giannas birth were not
married to each other. While - Andy was single at that time, Aimee was still in the
process of securing a judicial declaration of nullity on her marriage to her ex-husband.
Giannas birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy and Aimee, registered the
status of Gianna as legitimate, her surname carrying that of Andys, and that her
parents were married to each other.
a) Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Giannas birth certificate be
successfully maintained to:
i) Change her status from legitimate to illegitimate (1%); and x x x (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A judicial action cannot be maintained to change the status of Gianna from legitimate to
illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee. While it is true that Gianna is the biological daughter of Andy
and Aimee conceived and born without marriage between them. Gianna is presumed, under the law
as the legitimate child of Aimee and her husband. This filiation may be impugned only by the
husband. To correct the status of Gianna in her birth certificate form legitimate child of Andy and
Aimee to illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee will amount to indirectly impugning her filiation as
the child of Aimees husband. This is not allowed unless brought by Aimees husband in a proper
action. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IV (i):
It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna was born while Aimee
was living with her ex-husband. Neither does it show who filed the judicial action to correct the
entries.
If the problem is intended only for the purpose of determining whether factual changes are
in order, then the answers are:
(i)
A change from legitimate to illegitimate is proper upon proof of lack of marriage
between Andy and Aimee.
x
x
x
c) Assuming that Aimee is successful in declaring her former marriage void, and Andy
and Aimee subsequently married each other, would Gianna be legitimated? (1%)

(2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Gianna will not be legitimated. While the court may have declared the marriage void ab
initio and, therefore, no marriage took place in the eyes of the law, Gianna will still not be
legitimated. This is because at the time she was conceived and born her biological parents could not
have validly married each other. For their marriage to be valid, the court must first declare the first
marriage null and void. In the problem, Gianna was conceived and born before the court has
decreed the nullity of her mothers previous marriage.
IX. Ed and Beth have been married for 20 years without children. Desirous to have a baby,
they consulted Dr. Jun Canlas, a prominent medical specialist on human fertility. He
advised Beth to undergo artificial insemination. It was found that Eds sperm count was
inadequate to induce pregnancy. Hence, the couple looked for a willing donor. Andy, the
brother of Ed, readily consented to donate his sperm. After a series of tests, Andys
sperm was medically introduced into Beths ovary. She became pregnant and 9 months
later, gave birth to a baby boy named Alvin.
(1) Who is the father of Alvin? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and born during the marriage of his
mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the marriage of the mother to her husband is
presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband (Concepcion v. Almonte, 468 SCRA 438 [2005].
While it is true that there was no written consent by the husband to the artificial insemination,
absence of such consent may only give the husband a ground to impugn the legitimacy of the child
but will not prevent the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child of the husband at the
time of its birth.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ed is the father of Alvin if he gave his written consent to the artificial insemination of his
wife. Otherwise, the child is the illegitimate child of Andy. Under the Family Code, children
conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of
a donor or both are legitimate children of the husband and the wife, provided that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by both of
them before the birth of the child.
(2) What are the requirements, if any, in order for Ed to establish his paternity over
Alvin? 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To establish Eds paternity over Alvin, only two requirements must concur: (1) the fact that
Ed and the mother of Alvin are validly married, and (2) the fact that Alvin was conceived or born
during the subsistence of such marriage.

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

To establish Eds paternity over Alvin, two requirements must obtain: (1) both spouses
authorized or ratified the insemination in a written document executed and signed by them before
the birth of the child; and (2) the instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with the birth
certificate of the child.
X. In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In
1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the
same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988.
They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu
married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the
Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
x
x
x
d) Explain the respective filiation of James, John and Verna. (2%) (2005 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
James and John are the illegitimate children of Sonny and Auring because they were
conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Verna is an illegitimate child of Lulu and Tirso having
been conceived and bom to the invalid marriage of Lulu and Tirso. Verna cannot be presumed as
the legitimate child of Sonny because of the supervening marriage that was celebrated between
Lulu and Tirso even though such marriage is void ab initio.
The case of Liyao v. Liyao is not applicable because in that case the wife begot a child by
another man during her marriage to her estranged husband but no marriage was celebrated
between the wife and the father of the child. The child in that case was presumed to be the
legitimate child of the estranged husband.
XI. Steve was married to Linda, with whom he had a daughter, Tintin. Steve fathered a son
with Dina, his secretary of 20 years, whom Dina named Joey, born on September 20,
1981. Joeys birth certificate did not indicate the father's name. Steve died on August 13,
1993, while Linda died on December 3, 1993, leaving their legitimate daughter, Tintin, as
sole heir. On May 16, 1994, Dina filed a case on behalf of Joey, praying that the latter be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Steve and that Joey be given his share in
Steve's estate, which is now being solely held by Tintin. Tintin put up the defense that an
action for recognition shall only be filed during the lifetime of the presumed parents and
that the exceptions under Article 285 of the Civil Code do not apply to him since the said
article has been repealed by the Family Code. In any case, according to Tintin, Joeys
birth certificate does not show that Steve is his father.
a)
Does Joey have a cause of action against Tintin for recognition and partition?
Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin. While the Family Code has repealed the
provisions of the New Civil Code on proof of filiation, said repeal did not impair vested rights. Joey
was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an illegitimate child, he had acquired, at birth, the right to
prove his filiation in accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code in force at that time.

Under the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child may file an action to compel his recognition even
after the death of the putative father when the father died during the minority of the child. While
the Family Code has repealed this provision, it will not operate to prejudice Joey who has already
acquired a vested right thereto.
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Family Code governs the capacity of his heirs to inherit, since Steve died in 1993. The
Family Code requires that because the illegitimate child has no documentary proof of his filiation,
the action to establish his filiation must be brought during the lifetime of his alleged father, whose
death occurred in 1993.
Hence, the illegitimate child Joey has no cause of action.
b) Are the defenses set up by Tintin tenable? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The defenses of Tintin are not tenable. The fact that Joey's birth certificate does not show
that Steve was his father is of no moment. The law does not require such mention. Besides, the
New Civil Code provides that when the father did not sign the birth certificate, his name should not
be disclosed therein. While it is true that capacity to inherit is determined at the time of the death
of the decedent and that filiation is an element of capacity to inherit, filiation is determined not at
the time of the death of the decedent but at the time of the birth of the child who is born with a
status. Such status may subsequently change such as in legitimation, but legitimation is deemed to
retroact to the time of birth. In the same manner, recognition when given voluntarily by the father,
or decreed by the court, retroacts to the time of the childs birth.
c) Supposing that Joey died during the pendency of the action, should the action be
dismissed? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Joey filed the action and died when the New Civil Code was still in force, his action
would be dismissed because the action was not transmissible to the heirs of the illegitimate child
(Conde v. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249 [1909])). But if the action was filed after effectivity of the Family
Code, and Joey died during the pendency of the action for recognition, it should not be dismissed.
Under the present Family Code, an action commenced by a legitimate child to claim his legitimate
filiation is not extinguished by his death. The Family Code makes this provision applicable to the
action for recognition filed by an illegitimate child. Joey has the right to invoke this provision
because it does not impair any vested rights. (Art. 175, Family Code)
XII. RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other had been living together
without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of
ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be legitimated?
Reason. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
ZMN was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM because at the time he was

conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each other. Under the Family Code children
conceived and bom outside ofwedlock of parents who, at thetime of the formers conception, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other are legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of the parents.
XIII.
(a) Two (2) months after the death of her husband who was shot by unknown
criminal elements on his way home from office, Rose married her childhood boyfriend, and
seven (7) months after said marriage, she delivered a baby. In the absence of any evidence
from Rose as to who is her childs father, what status does the law give to said child?
Explain. (2%)
(b) Nestor is the illegitimate son of Dr. Perez. When Dr. Perez died, Nestor intervened
in the settlement of his fathers estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son of said
deceased, but the legitimate family of Dr. Perez is denying Nestors claim. What evidence or
evidences should Nestor present so that he may receive his rightful share in his fathers
estate? (3%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The child is legitimate of the second marriage under Article 168(2) of the Family Code
which provides that a child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be
bora within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(b)
To be able to inherit, the illegitimate filiation of Nestor must have been admitted by his
father in any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register, (2) a final
judgment, (3) a public document signed by the father, or (4) a private handwritten document
signed by the father (Article 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code).
XIV. Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by his son Braulio. Abrahams
older son Carlos died on 14 February 1990.
Danilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos, intervenes in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of Abraham in representation of Carlos. Danilo was
legally adopted on 17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the latters wife.
1.
2.

Under the Family Code, how may an illegitimate filiation be proved? Explain.
As lawyer for Danilo, do you have to prove Danilos illegitimate filiation? Explain.
(1995 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 and Art, 175 of the FC, the filiation of illegitimate
children may be established in the same way and by the same evidence as legitimate children. Art.
172 provides that the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1)
the open and Continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child: or (2) any other means

allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

2. No. Since Danilo has already been adopted by Carlos, he ceased to be an illegitimate child.
An adopted child acquires all the rights of a legitimate child under Art. 189 of the FC.
XV. B and G (college students, both single and not disqualified to marry each other) had a
romantic affair. G was seven months in the family way as of the graduation of B. Right
after graduation B went home to Cebu City. Unknown to G, B had a commitment to C (his
childhood sweetheart) to marry her after getting his college degree. Two weeks after B
marriage in Cebu City. G gave birth to a son E in Metro Manila.
After ten years of married life in Cebu, B became a widower by the sudden death of C
in a plane crash. Out of the union of B and C, two children, X and Y, were born. Unknown
to C, while on weekend trips to Manila during the last 5 years of their marriage, B
invariably visited G and lived at her residence and as a result of which, they renewed
their relationship. A baby girl F was born to B and G two years before the death of C.
Bringing his family later to Manila, B finally married G. Recently, G died.
What are the rights of Bs four children: X and Y of his first marriage: and E and F. his
children with G? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the facts stated, X and Y are legitimate children of B and G. E is the legitimate children
of B and G. E is the legitimated child of B & G. F is the illegitimate child of B and A. As legitimate
children of B and C, X and Y have the following rights:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of
the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants. and in proper cases, their
brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of the Family Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code. (Article 174, Family Code). E is the legitimated child of B and G. Under Art. 177 of the Family
Code, only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated. E will have the same rights as X and Y. F is the illegitimate child of B and G. F has the
right to use the surname of G, her mother, and is entitled to support as well as the legitime
consisting of 1/2 of that of each of X, Y and E. (Article 176, Family Code)
XVI. The marriage of H and W was annulled by the competent court. Upon finality of the
judgment of nullity, H began looking for his prospective second mate. He fell in love with
a sexy woman S who wanted to be married as soon as possible, i.e., after a few months of
courtship. As a young lawyer, you were consulted by H.
x

(b) Suppose that children were born from the union of H and W, what would be the
status of said children? Explain your answer.
(c) If the subsequent marriage of H to S was contracted before compliance with the
statutory condition for its validity, what are the rights of the children of the first
marriage (i.e., of H and W) and of the children of the subsequent marriage (of H and
S)? (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The children born from the union of H and W would be legitimate children if conceived or
born before the decree of annulment of the marriage (under Art. 45 of the Family Code) has
become final and executory (Art. 54, Family Code).
(c) The children of the first marriage shall be considered legitimate children if conceived or
born before the judgment of annulment of the marriage of H and W has become final and executory.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage shall likewise be legitimate even if the
marriage of H and S be null and void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 52 of the
Family Code (Article 53, Family Code).
As legitimate children, they have the following rights:
(1)
To bear the surnames of the father and the mother in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2)
To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their
brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3)
To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by the
Civil Code (Article 174, Family Code).
XVII. Cesar and Baby contracted marriage on June 15, 1983. A year later, Baby bore a child,
X The following year, the couple acquired a car and a residential lot in Metro Manila.
On September 1, 1988, the marriage was declared void from the beginning by a
competent court because Cesar was below 16 years of age at the time of the marriage.
Sometime in December, 1988, Cesar met Rosa with whom he fell in love. Gesar married
Rosa on January 15, 1989. On September 1, 1989, Rosa gave birth prematurely to a child,
Y. Is the marriage of Cesar and Rosa valid? What is the status of the child Y? Give your
reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If there was a liquidation of the properties of the first marriage and the presumptive legitime
of X was duly delivered, the second marriage is valid. If there was no such compliance, then the
marriage is void. The child is legitimate since Y was born a full year after the termination of the
first marriage and during the second marriage.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
A. The Family Code requires the registration of the judgment of nullity, the partition of the
properties and the delivery of the legitimes to be made with the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property. It further provides that failure to comply with the said requirement shall
render the marriage null and void. If there was such a recording, the marriage is valid. Otherwise,
the marriage is void. Nevertheless, child Y is a legitimate child because it was born during the
marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
B. Since the problem does not state that there was compliance with the requirements as to
recording of judgment of nullity and the liquidation and delivery of the presumptive legitime of the
child X, the marriage of Cesar and Rosa is void. However, the child Y" is legitimate because it was
born during the marriage of Cesar and Rosa.

XVIII. What are the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because
of:
(a)
the physical incapacity of the. husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b)
the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Art. 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization
or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence.
VIII. Adoption
I.

A German couple filed a petition for adoption of a minor Filipino child with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which
allowed aliens to adopt. Before the petition could be heard, the Family Code, which
repealed the Child and Youth Welfare Code, came into effect. Consequently, the Solicitor
General filed a motion to dismiss the petition, on the ground that the Family Code
prohibits aliens from adopting. If you were the judge, how will you rule on the motion?
(5%) (2001 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss the petition for adoption should be denied. The law that should govern
the action is the law in force at the time of filing of the petition. At that time, it was the Child and
Youth Welfare Code that was in effect, not the Family Code. Petitioners have already acquired a
vested right on their qualification to adopt which cannot be taken away by the Family Code.
(Republic v. Miller G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA
356)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion has to be granted. The new law shall govern their qualification to adopt and
under the new law, the German couple is disqualified from adopting. They cannot claim that they
have already acquired a vested right because adoption is not a right but a mere privilege. No one
acquires a vested right on a privilege.
[Note: If the examinee based his answer on the current law, RA 8552, his answer should be
considered correct. This question is based on the repealed provision of the Family Code on
Adoption.]

II. In 1980 spouses Felisa and George, both Filipino citizens, migrated to the United States.
Six years later they became American citizens. In 1989 they jointly filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon seeking to adopt Gilda, the 10-year old daughter of
Helen, Felisa's younger sister. The government opposed the petition on the ground that
Felisa and George Were disqualified since they were already American citizens.
1. How will you resolve the petition? Explain
2. Will your answer be the same if George were a natural-born American citizen?
Explain.
3. Will your answer be the same if Felisa were the illegitimate parent of Gilda?
Explain.
4. Going back to the basic facts, suppose Felisa acquired her American citizenship
during the pendency of the petition for adoption, will your answer be the same as
in Question No. 1? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The petition should be denied because George is not qualified to adopt. As husband and
wife, they have to adopt jointly under Article 185 of the Family Code. Their case does not fall in any
of the exceptions where a spouse may adopt alone. In Republic v. Toledano, (233 SCRA 9), the Court
ruled that both spouses must be qualified to adopt when required by law to adopt jointly. Being
aliens, Felisa and George are, as a rule, disqualified to adopt under Art. 184 of the FC. While Felisa
falls in one of the exceptions to this rule, being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity, George does not. He does not seek to adopt his relative by consanguinity, or a
legitimate child of his spouse and neither is his spouse a Filipino. One of the spouses being
disqualified to adopt, the petition has to be denied.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the adopters are former Filipino citizens and the child sought to be adopted is a relative
by consanguinity of one of them, and since the rule of joint adoption by spouses is duly complied
with, the petition should be granted.
2. The answer will be the same if George were a natural-born American. He will still not fall in
any of the exceptions to the disqualification of aliens.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, my answer will be different because in that case, while Felisa is qualified to adopt, the
petition for joint adoption cannot be granted. It should be converted into a petition only by Felisa.
It cannot be granted as a joint petition but can be granted as an individual petition.
3. No, the answer will be different. In such a case. Felisa may adopt alone. Her case falls under
the exception to the rule in Art. 185 requiring husband and wife to adopt jointly, because she seeks
to adopt her own illegitimate child. She is .qiialified to adopt alone under Art. 184 because she is a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Hence, the court may decree
the adoption of Gilda by Felisa.
4. Yes, the answer will be the same as in No. 1. The adopter must be qualified to adopt not
only on the date of filing of the case, but also on the date of judgment.

III. Felix, a Filipino doctor of medicine, married Monique, an Italian nurse, in 1985. It was
later discovered that Monique cannot bear a child so that the couple decided to adopt
one. Can they jointly adopt Marie, the 19-year old niece of Monique? Explain. (1989 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the child to be adopted is an Italian citizen, the joint adoption cannot be effected. Had
the child been a relative by consanguinity of the Filipino spouse, the adoption would have been
valid under the Philippine law.
A. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (R.A. No. 8552)
I.

Spouses Rex and Lea bore two children now aged 14 and 8. During the subsistence of
their marriage, Rex begot a child by another woman. He is now 10 years of age.
On Leas discovery of Rexs fathering a child by another woman, she filed a petition
for legal separation which was granted.
Rex now wants to adopt his illegitimate child.
A. Whose consent is needed for Rexs adoption of his illegitimate child? (2.5%) (2010
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The consent of the 14-year-old legitimate child, of the 10-year-old illegitimate child, and of the
biological mother of the illegitimate child are needed for the adoption. (Section 7 and 9, RA 8552).
The consent of Lea is no longer required because there was already a final decree of legal
separation.
B. If there was no legal separation, can Rex still adopt his illegitimate child? Explain.
(2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can still adopt his illegitimate child but with the consent of his spouse, of his 14-year-old
legitimate child, of the illegitimate child, and of the biological mother of the illegitimate child
(Section 7 and 9, RA 8552).
II. Eighteen-year old Filipina Patrice had a daughter out of wedlock whom she named
Laurie. At 26, Patrice married American citizen John who brought her to live with him
in the United States of America. John at once signified his willingness to adopt Laurie.
Can John file the petition for adoption? If yes, what are the requirements? If no, why?
(5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, John cannot file the petition to adopt alone. Philippine law requires husband and wife to
adopt jointly except in certain situations enumerated in the law. The case of John does not fall in
any of the exceptions. (R.A. 8552).
III. Rafael, a wealthy bachelor, filed a petition for the adoption of Dolly, a one-year old
foundling who had a severe heart ailment. During the pendency of the adoption
proceedings, Rafael died of natural causes. The Office of the Solicitor General files a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the case can no longer proceed
because of the petitioners death.
[a] Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on the stage of the proceedings when Rafael died. If he died after all the
requirements under the law have been complied with and the case is already submitted for
resolution, the court may grant the petition and issue a decree of adoption despite the death of the
adopter (Section 13, RA 8552). Otherwise, the death of the petitioner shall have the effect of
terminating the proceedings.
[b] Will your answer be the same if it was Dolly who died during the pendency of the
adoption proceedings? Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, if it was Dolly who died, the case should be dismissed. Her death terminates the
proceedings (Art. 13, Domestic Adoption Law).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If all the requirements under the law have already been complied with and the
case is already submitted for resolution, the death of the adoptee should not abate the
proceedings. The court should issue the decree of adoption if it will be for the best interest of the
adoptee. While RA 8552 provides only for the case where it is the petitioner who dies before the
decree is issued, it is with more compelling reason that the decree should allowed in case it is the
adoptee who dies because adoption is primarily for his benefit.
IV. Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unmarried. His
first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 30 years old. His second,
with Carla, produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His 1 third, with Donna, bore him two
daughters: Vina and Wilma.
His fourth, with Elena, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from
a previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they
informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they
consider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the
midwife who attended to Sandys birth. All the children, including Amy, now live with
Andrew in his house.
a) Is there any legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To the legal
adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there is no legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew. While a person of
age may not be adopted, Amy falls within two exceptions: (1) she is an illegitimate child and she
is being adopted by her illegitimate father to improve her status; and (2) even on the assumption
that she is not an illegitimate child of Andrew, she may still be adopted, although of legal age,
because she has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his own child since
minority. In fact, she has been living with him until now.
There is a legal obstacle to the adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena. Andrew and Elena
cannot adopt jointly because they are not married.
V. In 1984, Eva, a Filipina, went to work as a nurse in the USA. There she met and fell in
love with Paul, an American citizen, and they got married in 1985. Eva acquired
American citizenship in 1987. During their sojourn in the Philippines in 1990, they filed
a joint petition for the adoption of Vicky, a 7-year-old daughter of Evas sister. The
government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on the
ground that the petitioners, being both foreigners, are disqualified to adopt Vicky.
a)

Is the government's opposition tenable? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the position of the government is tenable. Foreigners are disqualified to adopt
unless they fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. Eva and Paul are both foreigners.
Eva falls in one of the exceptions. She is qualified to adopt because she is a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to adopt
because he does not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, they cannot adopt jointly. When husband
and wife are adopting jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt in their own right. Eva
cannot, alone by herself, adopt her niece because husband and wife must adopt jointly unless they
fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. They cannot adopt separately because they do
not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and Paul cannot adept
Vicky in the Philippines. (Domestic Adoption Law [RA 8552])
b] Would your answer be the same if they sought to adopt Eva's illegitimate
daughter? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer would be different. Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate daughter, because
she falls in one of the exceptions that allow foreigners to adopt. She is a former Filipino citizen
adopting her relative by consanguinity. Eva can adopt separately her illegitimate child because her
case is also an exception to the rule that husband and wife should adopt jointly.
c) Supposing that they filed the petition to adopt Vicky in the year 2000, will your
answer be the same? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, my answer will be the same. The new Law on Domestic Adoption allows a foreigner to
adopt in the Philippines if he has been residing in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the
filing of the petition unless the law waives that residency requirement. Paul and Eva have not
resided in the Philippines for the last 3 years. However, Eva will qualify for waiver because she
was a former Filipino citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity within the 4th degree.
Unfortunately Paul will not qualify to adopt because he does not fall in any of the instances for
waiver to apply. They cannot adopt jointly because one of them is not qualified. Neither may Eva
adopt alone because she does not fall in any of the exceptions that allow husband and wife to adopt
separately.
VI. Lina, a former Filipina who became an American citizen shortly after her marriage to an
American husband, would like to adopt in the Philippines, jointly with her husband, one
of her minor brothers. Assuming that all the required consents have been obtained,
could the contemplated joint adoption in the Philippines prosper? Explain. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Lina and her American husband can jointly adopt a minor brother of Lina because she
and her husband are both qualified to adopt. Lina, as a former Filipino citizen, can adopt her minor
brother under Sec. 7(b)(i) of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), or under Art. 184(3)(a) of
the Family Code. The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7[b] of RA 8552. The Supreme Court
has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly, each one of
them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right (Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 [1994I]).
However, the American husband must comply with the requirements of the law including the
residency requirement of three (3) years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed.
VII. Sometime In 1990, Sarah, born a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and
her American husband, Tom, filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the
adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina. Can the petition be granted? (5%)
(2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing In the Philippines for at least 3 years prior
to the effectivity of RA 8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted
because the American husband is not qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refiled upon the
effectivity of RA8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition
being still pending with the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the
exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the
Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah,
an alien. Is qualified to adopt under Section 7(b)(1) of the Act for being a former Filipino citizen
who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an alien, is not
qualified because he is neither a former Filipino citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not
being qualified to adopt, their petition has to be denied. However, if they have been residents of the
Philippines three years prior to the effectivity of the Act and continues to reside here until the

decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the nephew of Sarah under Section 7(b)
thereof, and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectivity of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the
Family Code is the law applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the
exceptions where one of them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided by the Supreme
Court, when husband and wife must adopt jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While
Sarah is qualified to adopt under Article 184(3)(a) for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity, Tom is not. He is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is he
married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, the petition must be denied.
B. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 8043)
I.

Hans Herber, a German national, and his Filipino wife, Rhoda, are permanent residents
of Canada. They desire so much to adopt Magno, an 8-year old orphaned boy and a
baptismal godson of Rhoda. Since the accidental death of Magno's parents in 2004, he has
been staying with his aunt who, however, could hardly afford to feed her own family.
Unfortunately. Hans and Rhoda cannot come to the Philippines to adopt Magno although
they possess all the qualifications as adoptive parents.
Is there a possibility for them to adopt Magno? How should they go about it? (5%)
(2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under R.A. 8043 establishing the rules for inter-country adoption of Filipino children, the
spouses may file an application to adopt a Filipino child with the Inter-country Adoption Board
(ICAB) after they have been determined eligible and fit to adopt by the State Welfare Agency or a
licensed adoption agency in Canada. The Canadian agency will forward the required supporting
documents to the ICAB for matching with a Filipino child. The spouses, after filing a petition with
the ICAB, shall be issued the Placement Authority and when all the travel documents of the child
who is declared legally eligible for adoption as determined by the ICAB, are ready the adoptive
parents or any one of them shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines for adoption in the
court of the foreigners country.
IX. Support (Family Code)
I. G filed on July 8, 2000 a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to B. During
the pendency of the case, the couple entered into a compromise agreement to dissolve
their absolute community of property. B ceded his right to their house and lot and all his
shares in two business firms to G and their two children, aged 18 and 19.
B also opened a bank account in the amount of P3 million in the name of the two
children to answer for their educational expenses until they finish their college degrees.
For her part, G undertook to shoulder the day-to-day living expenses and upkeep of

the children. The Court approved the spouses agreement on September 8, 2000.
A. Suppose the business firms suffered reverses, rendering G unable to support
herself and the children. Can G still ask for support pendente lite from B? Explain.
(3%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, G can still ask for support from B because during the pendency of the action, the marriage
between them is considered still subsisting (Article 68, Family Code). Being considered still married
to each other, B and G still have the obligation to support each other. The compromise agreement
cannot operate to waive future support when needed (Article 2035, Civil Code).
After the compromise agreement was approved by the court and the properties of the marriage
were distributed, there remained no more common properties of B and G. While Article 198 of the
Family Code appears ' to limit the source of support to the common properties of the said marriage
in case of the pendency of an action to declare the nullity of marriage, Article 94 and Article 121
indicate otherwise. Under the said Articles, the spouses remain personally and solidarily liable with
their separate properties for support even though, for whatever reason, there are no more
community or partnership properties left.
The judgment based on the compromise dissolving the property relations of B and G does not
bar G from asking support pendente lite. The dissolution of the property relations of the spouses did
not terminate the obligation between them to support each other. The declaration of the nullity of
their marriage is what terminates the right of G to be supported by B as his spouse.
B. Suppose in late 2004 the two children had squandered the P3 million fund for their
education before they could obtain their college degrees, can they ask for more
support from B? Explain. (3%) (2010 Bar Question)
Yes, the two children can still ask for support for schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority until they shall have finished or completed their
education (Article 194, Paragraph 2, Family Code; Javier v. Lucero, 94 Phil. 634 [1954]). Their having
squandered the money given to them for their education will not deprive them of their right to
complete an education, or to extinguish the obligation of the parents to ensure the future of their
children.
II. Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby
via in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorettes pre-natal expenses
as well as those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2
million and, in return, she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of
P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
x
x
x
D. Is the child entitled to support and inheritance from Gigolo? Explain. (2.5%) (2010
Bar Question)
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If Gigolo voluntarily recognized the child as his illegitimate child in accordance with Article
175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, the child is entitled to support and inheritance
from Gigolo.
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because Gigolo is the natural and biological parent of the baby.
III. Despite several relationships with different women, Andrew remained unmarried. His
first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy, now 30 years old. His second,
with Carla, produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His 1 third, with Donna, bore him two
daughters: Vina and Wilma.
His fourth, with Elena, bore him no children although Elena has a daughter Jane, from
a previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they
informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they
consider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the
midwife who attended to Sandys birth. All the children, including Amy, now live with
Andrew in his house.
x
x
x
b) In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to claim support from Amy, Jon, Ryan,
Vina, Wilma and Sandy assuming that all of them have the means to support him?
(1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Andrew can claim support from them all, except from Sandy, who is not his child, legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted.
c) Can Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma and Sandy legally claim support from each
other? (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma can ask support from each other because they are halfblood brothers and sisters, and Vina and Wilma are full-blood sisters (Art.195 [5], Family Code), but
not Sandy who is not related to any of them.
X. Parental Authority (Family Code)
I.

Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby
via in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorettes pre-natal expenses
as well as those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2
million and, in return, she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of
P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
A. What legal action can you file on behalf of Majorette? Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar

Question)
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As her lawyer, I can file a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Majorette to recover
custody of her child. Since she is the mother of the child that was born out of wedlock, she has
exclusive parental authority and custody over the child. Gigolo, therefore, has no right to have
custody of the child and his refusal to give up custody will constitute illegal detention for which
habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action to regain custody will not prosper. In the first place Majorette cannot regain
custody of the baby. As surrogate mother she merely carries the child in her womb for its
development. The child is the child of the natural parents - Gigolo and his partner. The agreement
between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.
x
x
x
C. Who of the two can exercise parental authority over the child? Explain. (2.5%)
(2010 Bar Question)
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Majorette, the mother, can exercise parental authority. Since the child was born out of
wedlock, the child is illegitimate and the mother has the exclusive parental authority and custody
over the child.
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gigolo can exercise parental authority over the child. Majorette has no blood relation to the
child. She is just a carrier of the child.
II. On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to school
a car, a gift from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go on a field
trip, his teacher requested him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4) of his
classmates because the van rented by the school was too crowded. On the way to a
museum which the students were scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a wrong maneuver,
causing a collision with a jeepney. One of his classmates died. He and the three (3)
others were badly injured.
A. Who is liable for the death of Rozannos classmate and the injuries suffered by
Rozanno and his 3 other classmates? Explain. (2%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a minor,
Article 218 of the Family Code applies. Pursuant to Article 218, the school, its administrators and
teachers shall be liable for the acts of the minor Rozanno because of the special parental authority
and responsibility that they exercise over him. This authority applies to all authorized activities,

whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. The field trip, on which
occasion Rozanno drove the car, was an authorized activity, and, thus, covered by the provision.
Furthermore, the parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable pursuant to Article 219 (FC), and
principally liable under Article 221 (FC), if they were negligent.
III. Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old
girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital
and other medical expenses in delivering the child by I caesarean section; moral,
claiming that Rodolfo promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in
fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
x
x
x
[c] When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she prefers to live
with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files an action
for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Ronas choice as custodial parent, will
the court grant Rodolfos petition? Why or why not? (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the parental authority
has the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone has parental authority over the
illegitimate child. This is true even if the illegitimate father has recognized the child and even
though he is giving support for the child. To acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo should first
deprive Nanette of parental authority if there is a ground under the law, and in a proper court
proceeding. In the same action, the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it is for her best
interest.
IV. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
(1) Explain the rationale of this provision. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rationale of the provision is that a child below 7 years old needs the love and care which
only its mother can give. The welfare of the child is given the highest priority and the interest of
the child prevails over procedural rules.
(2) Give at least 3 examples of compelling reasons which justify the taking away from
the mothers custody of her child under 7 years of age. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following have been considered as compelling reasons to deprive a mother of custody:
(1) neglect, (2) abandonment, (3) unemployment, (4) immorality (Espiritu v. CA, 242 SCRA 362
[1995D, (5) alcoholism, (6) drug addiction, (7) maltreatment, (8) insanity, (9) highly
communicable serious disease, (10) grave physical handicap, (11) serious and credible threat by
the child to harm himself if separated from his mother (Luna v. CA, 137 SCRA 7 [19851).
V. Distinguish briefly but clearly between:
Substitute parental authority and special parental authority. (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In substitute parental authority, the parents lose their parental authority in favor of the
substitute who acquires it to the exclusion of the parents.
In special parental authority, the parents or anyone exercising parental authority does not
lose parental authority. Those who are charged with special parental authority exercise such
authority only during the time that the child is in their custody or supervision.
Substitute parental authority displaces parental authority while special parental authority
concurs with parental authority.
VI. In 1975, Carol begot a daughter Bing, out of wedlock. When Bing was ten years old. Carol
gave her consent for Bings legal adoption by Norma and Manuel, which was granted by
the court in 1990. In 1991, Carol learned that Norma and Manuel were engaged in a callgirl-ring that catered to tourists. Some of the girls lived with Norma and Manuel. Carol
got Bing back, who in the first place wanted to return to her natural mother.
1) Who has a better right to the custody of Bing, Carol or Norma?
2) Aside from taking physical custody of Bing, what legal actions can Carol take to
protect Bing? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)
a) It depends on whether or not Bing was at least 18 years old at the time Carol
asserts the prerogative to take custody of Bing. If she was at least 18 years old, then she is no
longer under parental authority and neither Carol nor Norma can assert the prerogative to take
custody. However, if she was less than 18 years old, then Norma has a better right since the
adoption by Norma of Bing terminates the parental authority of Carol over Bing.

b) The natural mother, Carol, should have the better right in light of the principle that
the childs welfare is the paramount consideration in custody rights. Obviously, Bings continued
stay in her adopting parents house; where interaction with the call 1 girls is inevitable, would be
detrimental to her moral and spiritual development. This could be the reason for Bings expressed
desire to return to her natural mother. It should be noted, however, that Bing is no longer a minor,
being 19 years of age now. It is doubtful that a court can still resolve the question of custody over
one who is sui juris and not otherwise incapacitated.
2)
a) On the assumption that Bing is still a minor or otherwise incapacitated, Carol
may petition the proper court for resolution or rescission of the decree of adoption on the ground
that the adopting parents have exposed, or are exposing, the child to corrupt influence,
tantamount to giving her corrupting orders or examples. She can also ask for the revesting in her
of parental authority over Bing. If, however, Bing is already 19 years of age and therefore no
longer a minor, it is not Carol but Bing herself who can petition the court for Judicial rescission of
the adoption, provided she can show a ground for disinheritance of an ascendant.

b)
Carol may file an action to deprive Norma of parental authority under Article 231 of
the Family Code or file an action for the rescission of the adoption under in relation to Article 231
(2) of the Family Code

Include: Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610)

I.

Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby
via in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorettes pre-natal expenses
as well as those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2
million and, in return, she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of
P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
x
x
x
B. Can Gigolo demand from Majorette the return of the P2 million if he returns the
baby? Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, he cannot. Both he and Majorette are guilty of violating the provision of the Anti-Child
Abuse Law (RA7610) on child trafficking. Being in pari delicto, the parties shall be left where they
are and Gigolo cannot demand the return of what he paid.
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.
XI. Emancipation (Arts. 234 and 236, Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6809 which
lowered the age of majority)
XII. Summary Judicial Proceedings in Family Law Cases
XIII. Retroactivity of the Family Code (Art. 256)
XIV. Funerals (Arts. 305-310, Civil Code)
XV. Use of Surnames
I.

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old
girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital
and other medical expenses in delivering the child by I caesarean section; moral,
claiming that Rodolfo promised to j marry her, representing that he was single when, in
fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
x
x
x
[b] Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can he
compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him that right
simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname of the

mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the illegitimate child is
given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when the latter has recognized the
former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to the illegitimate child, Rodolfo cannot
compel Rona, if already of age, to use his surname against her will. If Rona is still a minor, to use
the surname of Rodolfo will require the consent of Ronas mother who has sole parental authority
over her.
II. May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, an illegitimate child who is adopted by his natural father may carry the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no law allowing
or prohibiting such child from doing so. What is not prohibited is allowed. Likewise, the use of the
surname of the mother, even of legitimate children is in accord with Filipino customs and
traditions and will serve the best interest of the child who will not be confused by wondering why
he has no middle name. (In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 120051).
XVI. Absence (Art. 43, Civil Code; Art. 41, Family Code)
XVII. Civil Registrar
I.

Gianna was born to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Giannas birth were not married
to each other. While - Andy was single at that time, Aimee was still in the process of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity on her marriage to her ex-husband. Giannas
birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy and Aimee, registered the status of
Gianna as legitimate, her surname carrying that of Andys, and that her parents were
married to each other.
a) Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Giannas birth certificate
be successfully maintained to:
x
x
x
ii) Change her surname from that of Andys to Aimees maiden surname? (1%)
(2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A judicial action to change the surname of Gianna from the surname of Andy to the maiden
surname of Aimee is also not allowed. Gianna, being presumed to be the legitimate child of Aimees
husband is required by law to be registered under the surname of Aimees husband.
While it is true that Giannas registered surname is erroneous, a judicial action for correction of
entry to change the surname of Gianna to that of Aimees maiden surname will also be erroneous. A
judicial action to correct an entry in the birth certificate is allowed to correct an error and not to
commit another error.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IV (ii):
It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna was born while Aimee was
living with her ex-husband. Neither does it show who filed the judicial action to correct the entries.

If the problem is intended only for the purpose of determining whether factual changes are in
order, then the answers are:
x
x
x
(ii) If the child is considered illegitimate, then she should follow the surname of her mother.
b) Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brought for the
purpose of making the above corrections? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
Under R.A. 9048, only typographical errors are allowed to be corrected administratively. The
change of status from legitimate to illegitimate is not a typographical error and even assuming that
it is, its administrative correction is not allowed under R.A. 9048. Typographical errors involving
status, age, citizenship, and gender are expressly excluded from what may be corrected
administratively.
The change of the surname is also not allowed administratively. R.A. 9048 provides for an
administrative procedure for change of first name only and not for change of surname.
II. Zirxthoussousdelos Santos filed a petition for change of name with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong City under the administrative proceeding provided in
Republic Act No. 9048. He alleged that his first name sounds ridiculous and is extremely
difficult to spell and pronounce. After complying with the requirements of the law, the
Civil Registrar granted his petition and changed his first name Zirxthoussous to Jesus."
His full name now reads Jesus delos Santos.
Jesus delos Santos moved to General Santos City to work in a multi-national
company. There, he fell in love and married Mary Grace delos Santos. She requested him
to have his first name changed because his new name Jesus delos Santos" is the same as
that of her father who abandoned her family and became a notorious drug lord. She
wanted to forget him. Hence, Jesus filed another petition with the Office' of the Local
Civil Registrar to change his first name to Roberto. He claimed that the change is
warranted because it will eradicate all vestiges of the infamy of Mary Grace's father.
Will the petition for change of name of Jesus delos Santos to Roberto delos Santos
under Republic Act No. 9048 prosper? Explain. 10% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition will not prosper. Under RA 9048, the extrajudicial correction of entry or
change of first name may be availed of only once.
III. What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed or corrected without a judicial order?
2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only clerical or typographical errors may be corrected, and only the first name or nickname
may be changed, without judicial order under RA 9048.

IV. Celso Lim would like to correct an allegedly wrong entry in the birth certificate of one of
his sons, Celso Jr., describing the latter as a Chinese national and not as a Filipino.
Among the evidence Celso Lim had are his own birth certificate describing him as a
Filipino, the birth certificate of his other children, all describing them as Filipinos and a
court decision describing his father (Celso, Jr.s grandfather) as a Filipino.
(a) What action must Celso Lim take to ensure the effective correction of the allegedly
wrong entry in his sons birth certificate?
(b) Who should be made parties to such action or proceeding? (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Celso must file a petition in an adversary proceeding to correct the erroneous entry.
In the case of Republic v. Valencia, (L-32181, March 5, 1986), it was ruled that not only clerical
errors can be the subject-matter of the petition, but even the controversial entries can be corrected.
b.
Under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, he should notify the Civil Registrar and all the
persons affected or who have an interest in the subject matter of the petition, including the Solicitor
General.
PROPERTY
I.

Characteristics

II. Classification
I.

Manila Petroleum Co. owned and operated a petroleum operation facility off the coast of
Manila. The facility was located on a floating platform made of wood and metal, upon
which was permanently attached the heavy equipment for the petroleum operations and
living quarters of the crew. The floating platform likewise contained a garden area,
where trees, plants and flowers were planted. The platform was tethered to a ship, the
MV 101, which was anchored to the seabed.
(a) Is the platform movable or immovable property? (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The platform is an immovable property under Article 415 (9), NCC which provides that docks
and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed
place on a river, lake or coast. Since the floating platform is a petroleum operation facility, it is
intended to remain permanently where it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which is
anchored to the seabed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The platform is a movable property because it is attached to a movable property, i.e. the vessel
which was merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the vessel is merely anchored to the
seabed only shows that it is not intended to remain at a fixed place; hence, it remains a movable
property. If the intention was to make the platform stay permanently where it was moored, it

would not have, been simply tethered to a vessel but itself anchored to the seabed.
(b) Are the equipment and living quarters movable or immovable property? (2007 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable property under Article 415 (3)
NCC, classifies as an immovable everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object. Both the equipment and the living quarters are permanently attached to the platform
which is also an immovable.
The equipment can also be classified as an immovable property under Article 415 (5) NCC
because such equipment are machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. It is
logically, assumed that the petroleum industry may be carried on' in a building or on a piece of
land and the platform is analogous to a building.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The equipment and living quarters of the crew are movable properties since they are attached
to a platform which is also movable property, because it is simply attached to a vessel is likewise
a movable property since it was merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the vessel is merely
anchored on the sea- bed only shows that it is not intended to remain at a fixed place; hence, it
remains a movable property.
(c) Are the trees, plants and flowers immovable or movable property? Please briefly
give the reason for your answers. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are immovable
property under Article 415 (2) NCC which classifies as an immovable property trees, plants and
growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable. The
garden forms an integral part of an immovable, the petroleum operation facility.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are movable property
because they are not permanently attached to the land and do not form an integral part of an
immovable. The platform is not an immovable property for the same reason already given in the
Alternative Answer to Item (a) above.
II. X constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from Y. Later, X executed a chattel
mortgage over said house in favor of Z as security for a loan obtained from the latter.
Still later, X acquired ownership of the land where his house was constructed, after
which he mortgaged both house and land in favor of a bank, which mortgage was
annotated on the Torrens Certificate of Title. When X failed to pay his loan to the bank,
the latter, being the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage and

acquired Xs house and lot. Learning of the proceedings conducted by the bank, Z is now
demanding that the bank reconvey to him Xs house or pay Xs loan to him plus interests.
Is Zs demand against the bank valid and sustainable? Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand is not valid. A building is immovable or real property whether it is erected by the
owner of the land, by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated as a movable by the parties
to a chattel mortgage but such is binding only between them and not on third parties (Evangelista
v. Alto Surety Co., Inc. 103 Phil. 401 [1958]). In this case, since the bank is not a party to the chattel
mortgage, it is not bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the chattel mortgage does not exist.
Moreover, the chattel mortgage is void because it was not registered. Assuming that it is valid, it
does not bind the Bank because it was not annotated on the title of the land mortgaged to the bank.
Z cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to X, because the Bank was not privy
to such loan transaction.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand against the bank is not valid. His demand that the bank reconvey to him Xs
house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a personal right against
X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as movable property is void insofar
as third persons, such as the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the Bank already had a real
right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated at the back of the Torrens title. The
bank later became the owner in the foreclosure sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for Xs loan plus interest. There is no privity of contract
between Z and the bank.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an innocent mortgagee in good faith or a
mortgagee in bad faith. In the former case, Zs demand is not valid. In the latter case, Zs demand
against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Under the Torrens system of land registration, every person dealing with registered land
may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige him
to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to determine the condition of the title. He is not
bound by anything not annotated or reflected in the certificate. If he proceeds to buy the land or
accept it as a collateral relying on the certificate, he is considered a buyer ora mortgagee in good
faith. On this ground, the Bank acquires a clean title to the land and the house.
However, a bank is not an ordinary mortgagee. Unlike private individuals, a bank is
expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings. The ascertainment of the
condition of a property offered as collateral for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part
of its operation. The bank should have conducted further inquiry regarding the house standing
on the land considering that it was already standing there before X acquired title to the land. The
bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, Z's demand against the
Bank is valid and sustainable.

III. Pedro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan. In 1973, he
mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan of P
100,000.00. For Pedro's failure to pay the loan, the PNB foreclosed on the mortgage in
1980, and the land was sold at public auction to PNB for being the highest bidder. PNB
secured title thereto in 1987.
In the meanwhile, Pedro, who was still in possession of the land, constructed a
warehouse on the property. In 1988, the PNB sold the land to Pablo. The Deed of Sale was
amended in 1989 to include the warehouse.
Pedro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a complaint to annul the amended
Deed of Sale before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where he resides, against
both the PNB and Pablo. The PNB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper
venue contending that the warehouse is real property under Article 415(1) of the Civil
Code and therefore the action should have instead been filed in Malolos, Bulacan. Pedro
claims otherwise. The question arose as to whether the warehouse should be considered
as real or as personal property.
If consulted, what would your legal advice be? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil is an immovable by nature under
Art. 415 (1), and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the same, which is what the
purpose of the complaint to annul the amended Deed of Sale amounts to, should be the place where
the property is located, or the RTC of Bulacan.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
1. Buildings are always immovable property, and even in the Instances where the parties to a
contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise
does it change its character as immovable property. A building is an immovable even if not erected
by the owner of the land. The only criterion is union or incorporation with the soil. [Ladera vs.
Hodges (CA) 48 O.G. 4374) (Reyes and Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Vol. 2. p.7)
2. The warehouse built by Pedro on the mortgaged property is real property within the
context of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. Although it was built by Pedro after the foreclosure
sale without the knowledge and consent of the new owner which makes him a builder in bad faith,
this does not alter the character of the warehouse as a real property by incorporation. It is a
structure which cannot be removed without causing injury to the land. So, my advice to Pedro is to
file the case with the RTC of Bulacan, the situs of the property.
(Note: If the examinee does not mention that the structure was built by a builder in bad
faith, it should be given full credit).
IV. Salvador, a timber concessionaire, built on his lot a warehouse where he processes and
stores his timber for shipment. Adjoining the warehouse is a furniture factory qwned by
NARRAMIX of which Salvador is a majority stockholder. NARRAMIX leased space in the
warehouse where it placed its furniture-making machinery.

1. How would you classify the furniture-making machinery as property under the
Civil Code? Explain.
2. Suppose the lease contract between Salvador and NARRAMIX stipulates that at the
end of the lease the machinery shall become the property of the lessor, will your
answer be the same? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The furniture-making machinery is movable property because it was not installed by the
owner of the tenement. To become immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC, the machinery must
be installed by the owner of the tenement.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends on the circumstances of the case. If the machinery was attached in a fixed manner,
in such a way that it cannot be separated from the tenement without breaking the material or
causing deterioration thereof, it is Immovable property [Art. 415 (3), NCC]. However, if the
machinery can be transported from place to place without impairment of the tenement to which
they were fixed, then it is movable property. [Art. 416 (4), NCC]
2. It is immovable property. When there is a provision in the lease contract making the lessor,
at the end of the lease, owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, the said machinery is
considered to have been installed by the lessor through the lessee who acted merely as his agent.
Having been installed by the owner of the tenement; the machinery became immovable under Art.
415 of the NCC. (Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709)
III. Ownership
I.

Multiple choice.
O, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold and other
treasures at the adjoining vacant Lot B belonging to spouses X & Y, excavated in Lot B
where she succeeded in unearthing gold and precious stones. How will the treasures
found by O be divided? (1%) (2010 Bar Question)
1.
2.
3.
4.

100% to O as finder
50% to O and 50% to the spouses X and Y
50% to O and 50% to the state
None of the above

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 4. None of the above.
The general rule is that the treasure shall belong to the spouses X and Y, the owners of Lot B.
Under Article 438 (NCC), the exception is that when the discovery of a hidden treasure is made on
the property of another and by chance, one-half thereof shall belong to the owner of the land and
the other one-half is allowed to the finder. In the problem, the finding of the treasure was not by
chance because O knew that the treasure was in Lot B. While a trespasser is also not entitled to any
share, and there is no indication in the problem whether or not O was a trespasser, O is not

entitled to a share because the finding was not by chance.

II. Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Bias to construct a house on a lot which he
(Bias) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation of the house,
Adam hit a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old Banco de las Islas
Filipinas. Using a detonation device, Adam was able to open the vault containing old
notes and coins which were in circulation during the Spanish era. While the notes and
coins are no longer legal tender, they were valued at P 100 million because of their
historical value and the coins silver and nickel content. The following filed legal claims
over the notes and coins:
i) Adam, as finder;
ii) Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;
iii) Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault;
and
iv) The Philippine Government because of their historical value.
a) Who owns the notes and coins? (4%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Hidden treasure is money jewelry or other precious objects the ownership of which does
not appear (Art. 439, CC). The vault of the Banco de las Islas Filipinas has been buried for about a
century and the Bank of the Philippine Islands cannot succeed by inheritance to the property of
Banco de las Islas Filipinas. The ownership of the vault, together with the notes and coins can now
"legally be considered as hidden treasure because its ownership is no longer apparent. The
contractor, Adams is not a trespasser and therefore entitled to one-half of the hidden treasure and
Bias as owner of the property, is entitled the other half (Art. 438, CC). Since the notes and , coins
have historical value, the government may acquire them at their just price which in turn will be
divided equally between Adam and Bias (Art. 438, par. 3, CC).
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Banco de las Islas Filipinas is the owner of the vault. The finder and owner of the land
cannot share; in the notes and coins, because they are not buried treasure under the law, as the
ownership is known. Although under Art. 720 of the Civil Code the finder shall be given a reward of
one-tenth of the price of the thing found, as a lost movable, on the principle of quasi-contract.
However, the notes and coins may have become res nullius considering that Banco de las Islas
Filipinas is longer a juridical person and has apparently given up looking for them and Adam, the
first one to take possession with intent to possess shall become the sole owner.
III. Marcelino, a treasure hunter as Just a hobby, has found a map which appears to indicate
the location of hidden treasure. He has an idea of the land where the treasure might
possibly be found. Upon inquiry, Marcelino learns that the owner of the land, Leopoldo,
is a permanent resident of Canada. Nobody, however, could give him Leopoldo's exact
address. Ultimately, anyway, he enters the land and conducts a search. He succeeds.
Leopoldo, learning of Marcelino's "find", seeks to recover the treasure from
Marcelino but the latter is not willing to part with it. Falling to reach an agreement,
Leopoldo sues Marcelino for the recovery of the property. Marcelino contests the action.

How would you decide the case? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would decide in favor of Marcelino since he is considered a finder by chance of the hidden
treasure, hence, he is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the hidden treasure. While Marcelino may have
had the intention to look for the hidden treasure, still he is a finder by chance since it is enough that
he tried to look for it. By chance in the law does not mean sheer luck such that the finder should
have no intention at all to look for the treasure. By chance means good luck, implying that one who
intentionally looks for the treasure is embraced in the provision. The reason is that it is extremely
difficult to find hidden treasure without looking for it deliberately.
Marcelino is not a trespasser since there is no prohibition for him to enter the premises,
hence, he is entitled to half of the treasure.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
1. Marcelino did not find the treasure by chance because he had a map, he knew the location
of the hidden treasure and he intentionally looked for the treasure, hence, he is not entitled to any
part of the treasure.
2. Marcelino appears to be a trespasser and although there may be a question of whether he
found it by chance or not, as he has found the hidden treasure by means of a treasure map, he will
not be entitled to a finder's share. The hidden treasure shall belong to the owner.
3. The main rule is that hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building or other
property on which it is found. If it is found by chance by a third person and he is not a trespasser,
he is entitled to one-half (1/2). If he is a trespasser, he loses everything.
IV.

1. Tim came into possession of an old map showing where a purported cache of gold
bullion was hidden. Without any authority from the government Tim conducted a relentless
search and finally found the treasure buried in a new river bed formerly part of a parcel of
land owned by spouses Tirso and Tessie. The old river which used to cut through the land of
spouses Ursula and Urbito changed its course through natural causes. To whom shall the
treasure belong? Explain.
2. Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without executing any
antenuptial agreement. One year after their marriage, Tirso while supervising the clearing
of Tessies inherited land upon the latters request, accidentally found the treasure not in the
new river bed but on the property of Tessie. To whom shall the treasure belong? Explain.
(1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. The treasure was found in a property of public dominion, the new river bed. Since Tim did
not have authority from the government and, therefore, was a trespasser, he is not entitled to the
one-half share allotted to a finder of hidden treasure. All of it will go to the State. In addition, under
Art. 438 of the NCC, in order that the finder be entitled to the 1/2 share, the treasure must be found
by chance, that is by sheer luck. In this case, since Tim found the treasure not by chance but

because he relentlessly searched for it, he is not entitled to any share in the hidden treasure.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The law grants a one-half share to a finder of hidden treasure provided he is not a trespasser
and the finding is by chance. It is submitted that Tim is not a trespasser despite his not getting
authority from the government, because the new river bed where he found the treasure is property
for public use (Art. 420 NCC), to which the public has legitimate access. The question, therefore,
boils down to whether or not the finding was by chance in view of the fact that Tim conducted a
relentless search" before finding the treasure. The strict or literal view holds that deliberate or
intentional search precludes entitlement to the one-half share allotted by law to the finder since
the phrase by chance" means by accident", meaning an unexpected discovery. The liberal view,
however, would sustain Tim's right to the allocated share interpreting the phrase in question as
meaning by a stroke of good fortune", which does not rule out deliberate or intentional search. It
is submitted that the liberal view should prevail since in practical reality, hidden treasure is hardly
ever found without conscious effort to find it, and the strict view would tend to render the codal
provision in question illusory.
2. Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, their
property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of the Civil Code, the
share of the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or the proprietor belongs to the
conjugal partnership of gains. The one-half share pertaining to Tessie as owner of the land, and the
one-half share pertaining to Tirso as finder of the treasure, belong to the conjugal partnership of
gains.
V. In 1937, A obtained a loan of P20.000.00 from the National City Bank of New York, an
American-owned bank doing business in the Philippines. To guarantee payment of his
obligation, A constituted a real estate mortgage on his 30-hectare parcel of agricultural
land. In 1939, before he could pay his obligation, A died intestate leaving three children.
B, a son by a first marriage, and C and D, daughters by a second marriage. In 1940, the
bank foreclosed the mortgage for non-payment of the principal obligation. As the only
bidder at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the bank bought the properly and was later
issued a certificate of sale. The war supervened in 1941 without the bank having been
able to obtain actual possession of the property which remained with As three children
who appropriated for themselves the income from it. In 1948, B bought the properly
from the bank using the money he received as backpay from the U. S. Government, and
utilized the same in agri-business. In 1960, as B's business flourished. C and D sued B for
partition and accounting of the income of the properly, claiming that as heirs of their
father they were co-owners thereof and offering to reimburse B for whatever he had
paid in purchasing (he properly from the bank.
In brief, how will you answer the complaint of C and D, if you were engaged by B as
his counsel? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel of B, I shall answer the complaint as follows: When B bought the property, it was
not by a right of redemption since the period therefore had already expired. Hence, B bought the
property in an independent unconditional sale. C and D are not co-owners with B of the property.
Therefore, the suit of C and D cannot prosper.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
As counsel of B, I shall answer the complaint as follows: From the facts described, it would
appear that the Certificate of sale has not been registered. The one-year period of redemption
begins to run from registration. In this case, it has not yet even commenced. Under the Rules of
Court, the properly may be released by the Judgment debtor or his successor in interest. (Sec. 29,
Rule 27). It has been held that this includes a joint owner. (Ref. Magno vs. Ciola. 61 Phil. 80).
IV. Accession
I.

Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the sea. The
land had been brought under the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano and his
family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river brought silt and sediment from
its source up in the mountains and forests so that gradually the land owned by Marciano
increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this additional area,
where he and his two married children live. On this same area, Ulpiano and his family
planted peanuts, mongo, beans and vegetables. Ulpiano also regular paid taxes on the
land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.
When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land he ordered Ulpiano to
demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the
harvest. Marciano claims that under the civil code, the alluvium belongs to him as a
registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his right is
enforceable against the whole world.
[a]

Is Marciano correct? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marciano's contention is correct. Since the accretion was deposited on his land by the action
of the waters of the river and he did not construct any structure to increase the deposition of soil ad
silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. His real right of ownership is enforceable against
the whole word including Ulpiano and his two married children. Although Marciano's land is
registered the 3 hectares land deposited through accretion was not automatically registered. As
unregistered land, it is subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons.
Although Ulpiano and his children live in the 3 hectare unregistered land owned by
Marciano, they are farmworkers; therefore they are possessors not in the concept of owners but in
the concept of more holders. Even if they possessed the land for more than 30 years, they cannot
become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitive prescription, because the law
requires possession in the concept of owner. Payment of taxes and tax declaration are not enough
to make their possession one in the concept of owner. They must repudiate the possession in the
concept of holder by executing unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to custer of Marciano,
known to Marciano and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then would his
possession become adverse.

[b]
What rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain (3%) (2009
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although Ulpiano is a possessor in bad faith, because he knew he does not own the land, he
will lose the three huts he built in bad faith and make an accounting of the fruits he has gathered, he
has the right to deduct from the value of the fruits the expenses for production, gathering and
preservation of the fruits (Article 443, NCC).
He may also ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are charges on the
land owned by Marciano. This obligation is based on a quasi-contract (Article 2175, NCC).
II. Alex died without a will, leaving only an undeveloped and untitled lot in Taguig City. He
is survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife told the children that she is waiving her
hare in the property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son who was about to get married, to
construct his house on 1/4 of the lot without however obtaining the consent of his
siblings. After settlement of Alexs estate and partition among the heirs, it was
discovered that Bobbys house was constructed on the portion allocated to his sister,
Cathy. Cathy asked Bobby to demolish his house and vacate the portion allotted to her. In
lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from Cathy the lot portion on which his
house was constructed. At that time, the house was valued at P300,000 while the portion
of the lot on which the house was constructed was valued at P350,000.
a) Can Cathy lawfully ask for demolition of Bobbys house? (3%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Cathy can ask for the demolition of Bobbys house on the portion allotted to Cathy in
the partition. The lot is presumed to be community property as it was acquired during the
marriage. Upon Alexs death there was created a co-ownership by operation of law among the
widow and four children. (Art. 1078, CC) Bobbys share is only an undivided interest of 1/10 of the
entire lot. The widows share in the co-ownership is 6/10 of the entire lot, 1/2 of the lot being her
share in the community property and 1/5 of Alexs share in the other half, because she has the
same share as one of the four children. She has the financial majority or majority interest of the coownership.
Bobbys act of building on of the lot is an act requiring the unanimous consent of all the
co-owners since it is an act of alteration. Bobby only had the ideal share of 1/10 of the entire lot,
and when he built his house on of the lot, he was arrogating unto himself the right to partition
the poverty and taking more than what he legally owns. The consent given by the widow to Bobbys
act of building his house was legally insufficient. As a matter of right, Cathy can ask for the
demolition of the house and the payment of damages.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Art. 448 of the New Civil Code is applicable by analogy (Concepcion Fernandez del Campo v.
Abeisa, 160 SCRA 379 [1988]). Pursuant thereto, Cathy is given two options: (1) to appropriate the
house that Bobby built, upon payment of indemnity; or (2) to compel Bobby to buy the land,

considering that its value is not considerably higher than the value of the house. At this stage she is
not given the option to demand demolition of the house. However, if she has chosen to sell the land
to Bobby and the latter does not or cannot buy the land, she can demand the demolition of the
house.
III. The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks of the
Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and as the water
recedes, soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on Jessicas and Jennys
properties. This pattern of the river swelling, receding and depositing soil and other
materials being deposited on the neighbors properties have gone on for many years.
Knowing this pattern, Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters from her
property line and extending towards the river, so that when the water recedes, soil
and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After several years, the area
between Jessicas property line to the concrete barrier was completely filled with soil,
effectively increasing Jessicas property by 2 meters. Jennys property, where no
barrier was constructed, also increased by one meter along the side of the river.
a) Can Jessica and Jenny legally claim ownership over the additional 2 meters and
one meter, respectively, of land deposited along their properties? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jenny can legally claim ownership of the lands by right of accession (accretion) under
Article 457 of the Civil Code. The lands came into being over the years through the gradual
deposition of soil and silt by the natural action of the waters of the river.
Jessica cannot claim the two meter-wide strip of land added to her land. Jessica constructed
the cement j barrier two meters in front of her property towards the river not to protect her land
from the destructive forces of the water but to trap the alluvium. In order that the riparian owner
may be entitled to the alluvium the deposition must occur naturally without the intervention of the
riparian owner (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514[1984]).
x
x
x
c) Assume the two properties are on a cliff adjoining the shore of Laguna Lake.
Jessica and Jenny ha hotel built on the properties. They had the earth and rocks
excavated from the properties dumped on the adjoining shore, giving rise to a new
patch of dry land. Can they validly lay claim to the patch of land? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jessica and Jenny cannot validly lay claim to the price of dry land that resulted from the
dumping of rocks and earth materials excavated from their properties because it is a reclamation
without authority. The land is part of the lakeshore, if not the lakebed, which is inalienable land of
the public domain.
IV. Andres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. His land, however, has
gradually diminished in area due to the current of the river, while the registered land of
Mario on the opposite bank has gradually increased in area by 200-square meters.

(a) Who has the better right over the 200-square meter area that has been added to
Mario's registered land, Mario or Andres?
(b) May a third person acquire said 200-square meter land by prescription? (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Mario has a better right over the 200 square meters increase in area by reason of accretion,
applying Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which provides that to the owners of lands adjoining
the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters.
Andres cannot claim that the increase in Marios land is his own, because such is an accretion
and not a result of the sudden detachment of a known portion of his land and its attachment to
Mario's land, a process called avulsion. He can no longer claim ownership of the portion of his
registered land which was gradually and naturally eroded due to the current of the river, because
he had lost it by operation of law. That portion of the land has become part of the public domain.
b.
Yes, a third party may acquire, by prescription the 200 square meters, increase in area,
because it is not included in the Torrens Title of the riparian owner. Hence, this does not involve
the imprescriptibility conferred by Section 47, P.D. No. 1529. The fact that the riparian land is
registered does not automatically make the accretion thereto a registered land. (Grande v. CA, 115
Phil. 521 [1962]; Jagualing v. CA, 194 SCRA 607 [1991]).
V. Mike built a house on his lot in Pasay City. Two years later, a survey disclosed that a
portion of the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Jose, to the extent of 40
square meters. Jose claims that Mike is a builder in bad faith because he should know
the boundaries of his lot, and demands that tire portion of the house which encroached
on his land should be destroyed or removed. Mike replies that he is a builder in good
faith and offers to buy the land occupied by the building instead.
1) Is Mike a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why? (3%)
2) Whose preference should be followed? Why? (2%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes, Mike is a builder in good faith. There is no showing that when he built his house, he
knew that a portion thereof encroached on Jose's lot. Unless one is versed in the science of
surveying, he cannot determine the precise boundaries or location, of his property by merely
examining his title. In the absence of contrary proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was
done in good faith [Technogas Phils, v. CA, 268 SCRA 5, 15 (1997)].
2) None of the preferences shall be followed. The preference of Mike cannot prevail because
under Article 448 of the Civil Code, it is the owner of the land who has the option or choice, not the
builder. On the other hand, the option belongs to Jose, he cannot demand that the portion of the
house encroaching on his land be destroyed or removed because this is not one of the options
given by law to the owner of the land. The owner may choose between the appropriation of what
was built after payment of indemnity, or to compel the builder to pay for the land if the value of the
land is not considerably more than that of the building. Otherwise, the builder shall pay rent for the

portion of the land encroached.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1) Mike cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he built his house without first
determining the comers and boundaries of his lot to make sure that his construction was within
the perimeter of his property. He could have done this with the help of a geodetic engineer as an
ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do under the circumstances.
2) Joses preference should be followed. He may have the building removed at the expense of
Mike, appropriate the building as his own, oblige Mike to buy the land and ask for damages in
addition to any of the three options. (Articles 449, 450, 451, CC)
VI. For many years, the Rio Grande river deposited soil along its bank, beside the titled land
of Jose. In time, such deposit reached an area of one thousand square meters. With the
permission of Jose, Vicente cultivated the said area. Ten years later, a big flood occurred
in the river and transferred the 1000 square meters to the opposite bank, beside the
land of Agustin. The land transferred is now contested by Jose and Agustin as riparian
owners and by Vicente who claims ownership by prescription. Who should prevail?
Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jose should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion, belongs by right of accretion to
Jose, the riparian owner (Art. 457 CC). When, as given in the problem, the very same area was
transferred" by flood waters to the opposite bank, it became an avulsion and ownership thereof is
retained by Jose who has two years to remove it (Ant. 459, CC). Vicente's claim based on
prescription is baseless since his possession was by mere tolerance of Jose and, therefore, did not
adversely affect Joses possession and ownership (Art. 537, CC). Inasmuch as his possession is
merely that of a holder, he cannot acquire the disputed area by prescription.
VII. Demetrio knew that a piece of land bordering the beach belonged to Ernesto. However,
since the latter was studying in Europe and no one was taking care of the land, Demetrio
occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with tables and benches which he
rented out to people who want to have a picnic by the beach. When Ernesto returned, he
demanded the return of the land. Demetrio agreed to do so after he has removed the
nipa sheds. Ernesto refused to let Demetrio remove the nipa sheds on the ground that
these already belonged to him by right of accession. Who is correct? (3%) (2000 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ernesto is correct. Demetrio is a builder in bad faith because he knew beforehand that the
land belonged to Ernesto. Under Article 449 of the New Civil Code, one who builds on the land of
another loses what is built without right to indemnity. Ernesto becomes the owner of the nipa
sheds by right of accession. Hence. Ernesto is well within his right in refusing to allow the removal
of the nipa sheds.
VIII. In good faith, Pedro constructed a five-door commercial building on the land of Pablo
who was also in good faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he opted to

appropriate the building by paying Pedro the cost thereof. However, Pedro insists that
he should be paid the current market value of the building, which was much higher
because of inflation.
1) Who is correct, Pedro or Pablo? (1%)
2) In the meantime that Pedro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of the
building. Pedro or Pablo? (1%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Pablo is correct. Under Article 448 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 546, the
builder in good faith is entitled to a refund of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him, or
the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason of the improvement, at the
option of the landowner. The builder is entitled to a refund of the expenses he incurred, and not to
the market value of the improvement.
The case of Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407, is not applicable to the problem. In the Pecson case,
the builder was the owner of the land who later lost the property at a public sale due to nonpayment of taxes. The Court held that Article 448 does not apply to the case where the owner of
the land is the builder but who later lost the land; not being applicable, the Indemnity that should
be paid to the buyer must be the fair market value of the building and not just the cost of
construction thereof. The Court opined in that case that to do otherwise would unjustly enrich the
new owner of the land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pedro is correct. In Pecson v. CA, it was held that Article 546 of the New Civil Code does not
specifically state how the value of useful improvements should be determined in fixing the amount
of Indemnity that the owner of the land should pay to the builder in good faith. Since the objective
of the law is to adjust the rights of the parties in such manner as "to administer complete justice to
both of them in such a way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not
belong to him", the Court ruled that the basis of reimbursement should be the fair market value of
the building.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2) Pablo is entitled to the rentals of the building. As the owner of the land, Pablo is also the
owner of the building being an accession thereto. However. Pedro who is entitled to retain the
building is also entitled to retain the rentals. He, however, shall apply the rentals to the indemnity
payable to him after deducting reasonable cost of repair and maintenance.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pablo is entitled to the rentals. Pedro became a possessor in bad faith from the time he
learned that the land belongs to Pablo. As such, he loses his right to the building, including the
fruits thereof, except the right of retention.
IX. Felix cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to sugar cane, believing it to be his own.
When the crop was eight months old, and harvestable after two more months, a resurvey

of the land showed that it really belonged to Fred. What are the options available to
Fred? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the pending crops planted by Felix in good faith, Fred has the option of allowing Felix to
continue the cultivation and to harvest the crops, or to continue the cultivation and harvest the
crops himself. In the latter option, however, Felix shall have the right to a part of the expenses of
cultivation and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of possession. (Art. 545
NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since sugarcane is not a perennial crop, Felix is considered a sower in good faith. Being so.
Art 448 applies. The options available to Fred are: (a) to appropriate the crop after paying Felix the
indemnity under Art. 546, or (b) to require Felix to pay rent.
X.

(a)
Because of confusion as to the boundaries of the adjoining lots that they
bought from the same subdivision company, X constructed a house on the adjoining lot of Y
in the honest belief that it is the land that he bought from the subdivision company. What
are the respective rights of X and Y with respect to Xs house? (3%).
(b)
Suppose X was in good faith but Y knew that X was constructing on his (Ys)
land but simply kept quiet about it, thinking perhaps that he could get Xs house later. What
are the respective rights of the parties over Xs house in this case? (2%) (1999 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The rights of Y, as owner of the lot, and of X, as builder of a house thereon, are governed by
Art. 448 of the Civil Code which grants to Y the right to choose between two remedies: (a)
appropriate the house by indemnifying X for its value plus whatever necessary expenses the latter
may have incurred for the preservation of the land, or (b) compel X to buy the land if the price of
the land is not considerably more than the value of the house. If it is, then X cannot be obliged to
buy the land but he shall pay reasonable rent, and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms of the lease.
(b) Since the lot owner Y is deemed to be in bad faith (Art. 453), X as the party in good faith
may (a) remove the house and demand indemnification for damages suffered by him, or (b)
demand payment of the value of the house plus reparation for damages (Art. 447, in relation to Art.
454). Y continues as owner of the lot and becomes, under the second option, owner of the house as
well, after he pays the sums demanded.
XI. A owns a parcel of residential land worth P500.000.00 Unknown to A, a residential
house costing P 100.000.00 is built on the entire parcel by B who claims ownership of
the land. Answer all the following questions based on the premise that B is a builder in
good faith and A is a landowner in good faith.
a) May A acquire the house built by B? If so, how?
b) If the land increased in value to P500.000.00 by reason of the building of the house

thereon, what amount should be paid by A in order to acquire the house from B?
c) Assuming that the cost of the house wasP900.000.00 and not P 100,000.00, may A
require B to buy the land?
d) If B voluntarily buys the land as desired by A, under what circumstances may A
nevertheless be entitled to have the house removed?
e) In what situation may a forced lease" arise between A and B, and what terms and
conditions would govern the lease?
Give reasons for your answers. (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, A may acquire the house build by B by paying indemnity to B. Article 448 of the Civil
Code provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 545 of the Civil Code.
(b) A should pay B the sum of P50,000. Article 548 of the Civil Code provides that useful
expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses
or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. The
increase in value amounts to P50,000.00.
(c) Yes, A may require B to buy the land. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the owner
of the land on which anything has been built in good faith shall have the right to oblige the one
who built to pay the price of the land if its value is not considerably more than that of the building.
(d) If B agrees to buy land but fails to pay, A can have the house removed (Depra vs.Dumlao,
136 SCRA 475).
(e) Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the builder cannot be obliged to buy the land if
its value is considerably more than that of the building. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court fix the terms
thereof.
XII. Miguel, Carlos and Lino are neighbors. Miguel owned a piece of registered land which
both Carlos and Lino wanted to buy. Miguel sold the land to Carlos. The sale was not
registered upon the request of Miguel. Later on, the same property was sold by Miguel to
Lino. Miguel told Carlos about the second sale. Carlos immediately tried to see Lino to
discuss the matter and inform him of the previous sale to him (Carlos) of the same
property but Lino refused to see Carlos. Thereupon Carlos annotated in the Registry of
Property his adverse claim on the property. A week later, Lino registered the sale on his
favor and had a new transfer certificate of title issued in his name. However, the adverse
claim of Carlos was duly annotated in the title. Notwithstanding, Lino took possession of
the property and built a small bungalow thereon.
x
x
x
(b)To whom would the bungalow built by Lino on the property belong? Explain. (1987
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The bungalow built by Lino belongs to Carlos. Lino is a builder in bad faith. Article 449
provides that he who builds in bad faith on the land of another loses what it built without right to
indemnity
V. Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title to or
Interest in Real Property
I.

Juan and his sister Juana inherited from their mother two parcels of farmland with
exactly the same areas. For convenience, the Torrens certificates of title covering both
lots were placed in Juans name alone. In 1996, Juan sold to an innocent purchaser one
parcel in its entirety without the knowledge and consent of Juana, and wrongfully kept
for himself the entire price paid.
1. What rights of action, if any, does Juana have against and/or the buyer? (3%)
2. Since the two lots have the same area, suppose Juana files a complaint to have
herself declared sole owner of the entire remaining second lot, contending that her
brother had forfeited his share thereof by wrongfully disposing of her undivided
share in the first lot, will the suit prosper? (2%) (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. When, for convenience, the Torrens title to the two parcels of land were placed in Juan's
name alone, there was created an implied trust (a resulting trust) for the benefit of Juana with Juan
as trustee of one-half undivided or ideal portion of each of the two lots. Therefore, Juana can file an
action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the two parcels which he partly
held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of her
share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral shock and wounded
feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage fey way of example for the common good, and
attorneys fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good faith,
relying on the transfer certificate of title showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
1. Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, Juana can file an action for quieting of title as there is a
cloud in the title to the subject real property. Second, Juana can also file an action for damages
against Juan, because the settled rule is that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property
who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages
against those who caused or employed the same. Third, since Juana had the right to her share in
the property by way of inheritance, she can demand the partition of the thing owned in common,
under Article 494 of the Civil Code, and ask that the title to the remaining property be declared as
exclusively hers.
However, since the farmland was sold to an innocent purchaser for value, then Juana has no
cause of action against the buyer consistent with the established rule that the rights of an innocent

purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the
seller in securing his title. (Eduorte vs. CA, 253 SCRA 391)
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
1. Juana has the right of action to recover (a) her one-half share in the proceeds of the sale
with legal interest thereof, and (b) such damages as she may be able to prove as having been
suffered by her, which may include actual or compensatory damages as well as moral and
exemplary damages due to the breach of trust and bad faith (Imperial vs. CA, 259 SCRA65). Of
course, if the buyer knew of the co-ownership over the lot he was buying, Juana can seek (c)
reconvenyance of her one-half share instead but she must implead the buyer as codefendant and
allege his bad faith in purchasing the entire lot. Finally, consistent with the ruling in Imperial vs.
CA, Juana may seek instead (d) a declaration that she is now the sole owner of the entire remaining
lot on the theory that Juan has forfeited his one-half share therein.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
1. Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the two
parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or compensatory
damage for the loss of her share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral
shock and wounded feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage by way of example for the
common good, and attorney's fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good
faith, relying on the transfer certificate showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. Juana's suit to have herself declared as sole owner of the entire remaining area will not
prosper because while Juan's act in selling the other lot was wrongful, it did not have the legal
effect of forfeiting his share In the remaining lot. However, Juana can file an action against Juan for
partition or termination of the co-ownership with a prayer that the lot sold be adjudicated to Juan,
and the remaining lot be adjudicated and reconveyed to her.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
2. The suit will prosper, applying the ruling in Imperial vs. CA cited above. Both law and
equity authorize such a result, said the Supreme Court.
Strictly speaking, Juana's contention that her brother had forfeited his share in the second lot is
incorrect. Even if the two lots have the same area, it does not follow that they have the same value.
Since the sale of the first lot on the Torrens title in the name of Juan was valid, all that Juana may
recover is the value of her undivided interest therein, plus damages. In addition, she can ask for
partition or reconveyance of her undivided interest in the second lot, without prejudice to any
agreement between them that in lieu of the payment of the value of Juana's share in the first lot
and damages, the second lot be reconveyed to her.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
2. The suit will not prosper, since Juan's wrongful act of pocketing the entire proceeds of the

sale of the first lot is not a ground for divesting him of his rights as a co- owner of the second lot.
Indeed, such wrongdoing by Juan does not constitute, for the benefit of Juana, any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under Art. 712, Civil Code.
VI. Co-ownership
I.

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[d]
The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property in
lieu of the performance of his obligation to contribute to taxes and expenses for the
preservation of the property constitutes dacion en pago. (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Under the Civil Code, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned property in
lieu of paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation of the co-owned
property. In effect, there is dacion en pago because the co-owner is discharging his monetary
obligation by paying it with his non-monetary interest in the co-owned property. The fact the he is
giving up his entire interest simply means that he is accepting the value of his interest as equivalent
to his share in the taxes and expenses of preservation.
II. Alex died without a will, leaving only an undeveloped and untitled lot in Taguig City. He
is survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife told the children that she is waiving her
hare in the property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son who was about to get married, to
construct his house on 1/4 of the lot without however obtaining the consent of his
siblings. After settlement of Alexs estate and partition among the heirs, it was
discovered that Bobbys house was constructed on the portion allocated to his sister,
Cathy. Cathy asked Bobby to demolish his house and vacate the portion allotted to her. In
lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from Cathy the lot portion on which his
house was constructed. At that time, the house was valued at P300,000 while the portion
of the lot on which the house was constructed was valued at P350,000.
x
x
x
b) Can Bobby legally insist on purchasing the land? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Bobby cannot legally insist on purchasing the land. The rules on building, planting and
sowing are not applicable to co-ownership. The rules applicable to co-ownership are acts of
alteration or acts of ownership on one hand and acts of mere administration on the other. Even if
it were applicable, Bobby acted in bad faith and hence, demolition is one of the three options open
to an owner. It is the owner of the land, not the builder, planter or sower who has the options,
even if both acted in bad faith or good faith.
III. John and Paula, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization after their marriage. During their marriage the couple acquired
substantial landholdings in London and in Makati. Paula bore John three children, Peter,
Paul and Mary. In one of their trips to London, the couple executed a joint will
appointing each other as their heirs and providing that upon the death of the survivor
between them the entire estate would go to Peter 'and Paul only but the two could not

dispose of nor divide the London estate as long as they live. John and Paula died
tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in 2005. Peter and Paul filed a petition
for probate of their parents will before a Makati Regional Trial Court.
x
x
x
c) Is the testamentary prohibition against the division of the London estate valid?
(2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The testamentary prohibition against the division by Peter and Paul of the London estate
for as long as they live, is not valid. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that a donor or
testator may prohibit partition for a period which may not exceed twenty (20) years.
IV. Antonio, Bart, and Carlos are brothers. They purchased from their parents specific
portions of a parcel of land as evidenced by three separate deeds of sale, each deed
referring to a particular lot in metes and bounds. When the deeds were presented for
registration, the Register of Deeds could not issue separate certificates of title due to the
absence of a subdivision plan. The new title had to be issued, therefore, in the names of
the brothers as co-owners of the entire property. The situation has not changed up to
now, but each of the brothers has been receiving rentals exclusively from the lot actually
purchased by him. Antonio sells his lot to a third person, with notice to his brothers. To
enable the buyer to secure a new title in his name, the deed of sale was made to refer to
an undivided interest in the property of the seller (Antonio), with the metes and bounds
of the lot sold being stated. Bart and Carlos reacted by signifying their exercise of their
right of redemption as co-owners. Antonio, in his behalf and in behalf of his buyer,
contends that they are no longer co-owners, although the title covering the property has
remained in their names as such.
May Bart and Carlos still redeem the lot sold by Antonio? Explain. (5%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, they may not redeem because there was no co- ownership among Antonio, Bart and
Carlos to start with. Their parents already partitioned the land in selling separate portions to
them. The situation is the same as in the case Si v. Court of Appeals (342 SCRA 653 [2000]).
V. Senen and Peter are brothers. Senen migrated to Canada early while still a teenager.
Peter stayed on in Bulacan to take care of their widowed mother and continued to work
on the family farm even after her death. Returning to the country some thirty years after
he had left, Senen seeks a partition of the farm to get his share as the only co-heir of
Peter. Refer interposes his opposition, contending that acquisitive prescription has
already set in and that estoppel lies to bar the action for partition, citing his continuous
possession of the property for at least 10 years, for almost 30 years in fact. It is
undisputed that Refer has never openly claimed sole ownership of the property. If he
ever had the intention to do so, Senen was completely ignorant of it. Will Senens action
proper? Explain. (5%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Senen's action will prosper. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that no prescription
shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Peter has never renounced the co-ownership
nor notified Senen of his having repudiated the same.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Senens action will prosper. This is a case of implied trust. (Art 1441, NCC). For purposes of
prescription, one has to have possession under the concept of an owner (Art 540, NCC). There is
no such concept here. Peter was a co-owner, he never claimed sole ownership of the property. He
is therefore estopped under Art. 1431, NCC.
VI. Ambrosio died, leaving his three daughters, Belen, Rosario and Sylvia a hacienda which
was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. Due to the failure of the daughters to
pay the bank, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the hacienda was sold to it as the
highest bidder. Six months later, Sylvia won the grand prize at the lotto and used part of
it to redeem the hacienda from the bank. Thereafter, she took possession of the hacienda
and refused to share its fruits with her sisters, contending that it was owned exclusively
by her, having bought it from the bank with her own money. Is she correct or not? (3%)
(2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sylvia is not correct. The 3 daughters are the co-owners of the hacienda being the only heirs of
Ambrosio. When the property was foreclosed, the right of redemption belongs also to the 3
daughters. When Sylvia redeemed the entire property before the lapse of the redemption period,
she also exercised the right of redemption of her co-owners on their behalf. As such she is holding
the shares of her two sisters in the property, and all the fruits corresponding thereto, in trust for
them. Redemption by one co-owner Inures to the benefit of all (Adille v. CA, 157 SCRA 455). Sylvia,
however, is entitled to be reimbursed the shares of her two sisters in the redemption price.
VII. In 1955, Ramon and his sister Rosario inherited a parcel of land in Albay from their
parents. Since Rosario was gainfully employed in Manila, she left Ramon alone to possess
and cultivate the land. However. Ramon never shared the harvest with Rosario and was
even able to sell one- half of the land in 1985 by claiming to be the sole heir of his
parents. Having reached retirement age in 1990 Rosario returned to the province and
upon learning what had transpired, demanded that the remaining half of the land be
given to her as her share. Ramon opposed, asserting that he has already acquired
ownership of the land by prescription, and that Rosario is barred by laches from
demanding partition and reconveyance. Decide the conflicting claims. (5%) (2000 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ramon is wrong on both counts: prescription and laches. His possession as co-owner did not
give rise to acquisitive prescription. Possession by a co-owner is deemed not adverse to the other
co-owners but is, on the contrary, deemed beneficial to them (Pangan u. CA, 166 SCRA 375).
Ramons possession will become adverse only when he has repudiated the co-ownership and such
repudiation was made known to Rosario. Assuming that the sale in 1985 where Ramon claimed he

was the sole heir of his parents amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the prescriptive
period began to run only from that time. Not more than 30 years having lapsed since then, the
claim of Rosario has not as yet prescribed. The claim of laches is not also meritorious. Until the
repudiation of the co-ownership was made known to the other co-owners, no right has been
violated for the said co-owners to vindicate. Mere delay in vindicating the right, standing alone,
does not constitute laches.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ramon has acquired the land by acquisitive prescription, and because of laches on the part of
Rosario. Ramons possession of the land was adverse because he asserted sole ownership thereof
and never shared the harvest therefrom. His adverse possession having been continuous and
uninterrupted for more than 30 years, Ramon has acquired the land by prescription. Rosario is
also guilty of laches not having asserted her right to the harvest for more than 40 years.
VIII. A, B and C are the co-owners in equal shares of a residential house and lot. During
their co-ownership, the following acts were respectively done by the co-owners:
1. A undertook the repair of the foundation of the house, then tilting to one side, to
prevent the house from collapsing.
2. B and C mortgaged the house and lot to secure a loan.
3. B engaged a contractor to build a concrete fence all around the lot.
4. C built a beautiful grotto in the garden.
5. A and C sold the land to X for a very good price.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Is A's sole decision to repair the foundation of the house binding on B and C? May A
require B and C to contribute their 2/3 share of the expense? Reasons.
What is the legal effect of the mortgage contract executed by B and C? Reasons.
Is Bs sole decision to build the fence binding upon A and C? May B require A and C
to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
Is Cs sole decision to build the grotto binding upon A and B? May C require A and B
to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
What are the legal effects of the contract of sale executed by A. C and X? Reasons.
(1992 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes. As sole decision to repair the foundation is binding upon B and C must contribute 2/3
of the expense. Each co-owner has the right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to
the expense of preservation of the thing (the house) owned in common in proportion to
their respective interests (Arts. 485 and 488, Civil Code).
(b) The mortgage shall not bind the 1/3 right and interest of A and shall be deemed to cover
only the rights and interests of B and C in the house and lot. The mortgage shall be limited
to the portion (2/3) which may be allocated to B and C in the partition (Art. 493, Civil Code).
(c) Bs sole decision to build the concrete fence is not binding upon A and C. Expenses to
improve the thing owned in common must be decided upon by a majority of the co- owners
who represent the controlling interest (Arts. 489 and 492, Civil Code).
(d) Cs sole decision to build the grotto is not binding upon A and B who cannot be required to
contribute to the expenses for the embellishment of the thing owned in common if not

decided upon by the majority of the co-owners who represent the controlling interest (Arts.
489 and 492, Civil Code).
(e) The sale to X shall not bind the 1/3 share of B and shall be deemed to cover only the 2/3
share of A and C in the land (Art. 493, Civil Code). B shall have the right to redeem the 2/3
share sold to X by A and C since X is a third person (Art. 1620, Civil Code).
IX. X was the owner of a 10,000 square meter property. X married Y and out of their union,
A, B and C were born. After the death of Y, X married Z and they begot as children, D, E
and F. After the death of X, the children of the first and second marriages executed an
extrajudicial partition of the aforestated property on May 1, 1970. D, E and F were given
a one thousand square meter portion of the property. They were minors at the time of
the execution of the document. D was 17 years old, E was 14 and F was 12; and they were
made to believe by A, B and C that unless they sign the document they will not get any
share. Z was not present then. In January 1974, D, E and F filed an action in court to
nullify the suit alleging they discovered the fraud only in 1973.
(a) Can the minority of D, E and F be a basis to nullify the partition? Explain your

answer.

(b) How about fraud? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, minority can be a basis to nullify the partition because D, E and F were not
properly represented by their parents or guardians at the time they contracted the extrajudicial
partition. (Articles 1327, 1391, Civil Code).
(b)
In the case of fraud, when through insidious words or machinations of one party
the other is induced to enter into the contract without which he would not have agreed to, the
action still prosper because under Art. 1391 of the Civil Code, in case of fraud, the action for
annulment may be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.

X.

(a) Distinguish co-ownership from partnership.

(b) Is the lease of the entire community property in co- ownership an act of administration

or an act of ownership or alteration? Explain, in relation to the need of consent of the coowners.
(c) Since 1935, Janice possessed alone a parcel of land which she co-owned with Lenny. In
1970, with the knowledge of Lenny, Janice obtained a torrens title over the land in her
own name alone. On August 1, 1988, Lenny brought an action against Janice for
reconveyance of her share. Janice set up the defense of laches. Will the defense prosper?
Reasons. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Co-ownership is distinguished from an ordinary partnership in the following ways:
(1)
(2)

As to creation: Whereas co-ownership may be created by law, contract, succession,

fortuitous event, or occupancy, partnership is always created by contract.
As to purpose: Whereas the purpose of co-ownership is the common enjoyment of the thing

(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

or right owned in common, the purpose of a partnership is to obtain profits.

As to personality: Whereas a co-ownership has no juridical personality which is separate
and distinct from that of the owners, a partnership has.
As to duration: Whereas an agreement not to divide the community property for more than
ten years is not allowed by law such an agreement would be perfectly valid in the case of
partnerships. This is so, because under the law, there is no limitation upon the duration of
partnerships.
As to power of members: Whereas a co-owner has no power to represent the co-ownership
unless there is an agreement to that effect, a partner has the power to represent the
partnership, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
As to effect of disposition of shares: If a co-owner transfers his share to a third person, the
latter becomes automatically a co-owner, but if a partner transfers his share to a third
person, the latter does not become a partner, unless agreed upon by all of the partners.
As to division of profits: Whereas in co-ownership the division of the benefits and charges is
fixed by law, in a partnership the division of profits arid losses may be subject to the
agreement of the partners.
As to effect of death: Whereas the death of a coowner has no effect upon the existence of the
co-ownership, the death of a partner shall result in. the dissolution of the partnership.

(b) Lease of personal property is a mere act of administration, and, therefore, requires the

resolution of the majority of the co-owners. However, lease of real property may be an act of
administration or an act of alteration de-pending upon the circumstances of each particular case.

If the lease is recorded in the Registry of Property, whatever may be the duration thereof, it is
an act of ownership, and therefore, requires the unanimous consent of all the co- owners, since
under the law, a special power of attorney is required (See Art. 1647, CC). (2) If the lease is not
recorded in the Registry of Property, but the duration thereof is more than one year, it is also an act
of ownership, and therefore, requires the unanimous consent of all the co-owners, since, again,
under the law, a special power of attorney is required (See Art. 1878 No. 8, CC). (3) If the lease,
however, is not recorded in the Registry of Property and the duration thereof is only one year or
less, it is an act of administration, and therefore, merely requires the resolution of the majority of
the co-owners.
(c) It is submitted that the defense of laches will prosper. As held by the Supreme Court in
several notable decisions, in order that the doctrine of laches or stale demands can be applied,
the following elements must concur: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made arid for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having
had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred (Miguel vs.
Catalino, 26 SCRA 234). All ot these elements are present in the instant case. As a matter of fact,
the doctrine was applied to a case wherein co-heir and another were able, through fraud, to
register a tract of land in their names. According to the Supreme Court, the action for
reconveyance brought by the other co-heirs more than twenty years later is now barred not only
by extinctive prescription but also by laches. (Fabian vs. Fabian, 22 SCRA 231).

Committees Recommendation Re: (a):

It is recommended that a mention of three distinctions should merit a full credit for this

question.
VII. Possession
I.

Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert, Bert, in turn, acquired the
property by forging Carlos signature in a deed of sale over the property. Carlo had been
in possession of the property for 8 years, declared it for tax purposes, and religiously
paid all taxes due on the property. Anthony is not aware of the defect in Berts title, but
has been in actual physical possession of the property from the time he bought it from
Bert, who had never been in possession. Anthony has since then been in possession of the
property for one year.
x
x
x
b) If Carlo is able to legally recover his property, can he require Anthony to account for
all the fruits he has harvested from the property while in possession? (2%) (2008
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Anthony is a possessor in good faith, Anthony cannot be made to account for the fruits
he gathered before he was served with summons. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits received before the possession was legally interrupted by the service of summons (Art. 544,
CC). After Anthony was served with summons, he became a possessor in bad faith and a builder,
planter, sower in bad faith. He can also be made to account for the fruits but he may deduct
expenses for production gathering and preservation of the fruits (Art. 1 443, CC).
c) If there are standing crops on the property when Carlo recovers possession, can
Carlo appropriate them? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The value of the standing crops must be prorated depending upon the period of possession
and the period of growing and producing the fruits. Anthony is entitled to a part of the net harvest
and a part of the expenses of cultivation in proportion to his period of possession. Carlo may
appropriate the respective parts subject to prorating the respective periods of possession.
However, Carlo may allow Anthony to gather these growing fruits as an indemnity for the expenses
of cultivation. If Anthony refuses to accept this concession, he shall lose the right to indemnity
under Art. 443 (Art. 545, par. 3, CC).
II. Distinguish the following concepts:
(a)

Occupation v. possession. (5%) (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Occupation can take place only with respect to property without an owner while
possession can refer to all kinds of property, whether with owner or without an owner. Occupation
itself, when proper, confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines [1999 ed.], vol. II, p.
489).

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, NCC). Things appropriable
by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the object of hunting and fishing,
hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by occupation (Art. 713, NCC). However,
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, NCC).
On the other hand, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, as
provided in Article 523 of the New Civil Code. Possession can be in the concept of an owner or in
the concept of a holder (Art. 525, NCC).
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Occupation is a mode of acquiring dominion by the seizure of corporeal things which have
no owner, with the intention of acquiring the ownership thereof. It is an original mode of acquiring
ownership upon seizure of a res nullius by the occupant who has the intention to become the
owner thereof.
Possession, on the other hand, is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession
may be the real right of possession or jus possessionis or it can be merely the right to possess or jus
possidendi, which are among the basic rights of ownership. If the real right of possession is
possession in the concept of owner, but subject to certain limitations, it may ripen into full
ownership of the thing or property right through acquisitive prescription depending on whether it
is a case of ordinary or extraordinary prescription and whether the property is movable or
immovable.
III. Using a falsified managers check, Justine, as the buyer, was able to take delivery of a
second hand car which she had just bought from United Car Sales, Inc. The sale was
registered with the Land Transportation Office. A week later, the seller learned that the
check had been dishonored, but by that time, Justine was nowhere to be seen. It turned
out that Justine had sold the car to Jerico, the present possessor who knew nothing
about the falsified check. In a suit by United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for recovery of
the car, plaintiff alleges it had been unlawfully deprived of its property through fraud
and should, consequently, be allowed to recover it without having to reimburse the
defendant for the price the latter had paid. Should the suit prosper? (5%) (1998 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car. However, since Jerico was not guilty of
any fraud and appears to be an Innocent purchaser for value, he should be reimbursed for the
price he paid. This is without prejudice to United Car Sales, Inc. right of action against Justine. As
between two innocent parties, the party causing the Injury should suffer the loss. Therefore,
United Car Sales, Inc. should suffer the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act of estafa should be deemed to come within
the meaning of unlawful deprivation under Art. 559, Civil Code, as without it plaintiff would not
have parted with the possession of its car.

ANOTHER ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and Jerico is a buyer in good faith.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is delivered by the seller to the buyer without
reservation of ownership, the ownership is transferred to the buyer. Therefore in the suit of United
Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for the recovery of the car, the plaintiff should not be allowed to
recover the car without reimbursing the defendant for the price that the latter paid. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 184 SCRA 614, April 26, 1990)
IV. Distinguish between "possession" and "occupation" as these terms are commonly used
in Book II and Book III of the Civil Code. (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Possession is a real right, while occupation is one oi the original modes of acquiring
ownership and other real rights. Possession, the holding of a thing or the exercise of a right, does
not in itself constitute ownership. Whereas, occupation is a mode of acquiring ownership. There
can be possession without ownership.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right (Art. 532, CC). It can refer to all
kinds of property whether with or without an owner while occupation can take place only with
respect to property without an owner (Articles 531 & 713). Occupation in itself, when proper,
confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership.
V. Rita owned a valuable painting which was stolen from her house. The theft was duly
reported to the authorities. A year after, Rita saw the painting hanging in the office of
Mario. When queried, Mario said that he bought the painting in a gallery auction. The
painting was positively identified as the one stolen from the house of Rita.
(a) Could Rita recover the painting? If so, would Mario be entitled to reimbursement

of the amount he paid for the painting? Explain.

(b) Supposing Mario bought the painting from a friend, would your answer be the

same? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Yes, Rita could recover the paintings but Mario is not entitled to reimbursement because a
gallery auction is a public sale (Article 559).
b. Yes, insofar as recovery of the painting is concerned. Rita can recover it. No, as regards
reimbursement, because the painting was not bought at a public sale as provided under Article
559 of the Civil Code. Mario is entitled to reimbursement.

VIII. Usufruct
I. Distinguish usufruct from commodatum and state whether these may be constituted
over consumable goods. [2%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Usufruct is a right given to a person (usufructuary) to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance. (Art. 562, Civil Code)
On the other hand, commodatum is a contract by which one of the parties (bailor) delivers to
another (bailee) something not consumable so that the latter may use it for a certain time and
return it.
In usufruct, the usufructuary gets the right to the use and to the fruits of the same, while in
commodatum, the bailee only acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits.
Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing. (Art. 564, Civil
Code). It may even be constituted over consumables like money (Altman v. Veloso, 52 Phil. 545).
On the other hand, in commodatum, consumable goods maybe subject thereof only when the
purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
(Art. 1936, Civil Code)
ANOTHER ANSWER:
There are several points of distinction between usufruct and commodatum. Usufruct is
constituted by law, by contract, by testamentary succession, or by prescription (Art. 1933, Civil
Code). Usufruct creates a real right to the fruits of another's property, while commodatum creates
only a purely personal right to use another's property, and requires a stipulation to enable the
bailee to make use of the fruits (Arts. 1939 & 1940, Civil Code). Usufruct may be onerous while
commodatum is always or essentially gratuitous (Arts. 1933 &: 1935, Civil Code). The contract
constituting usufruct is consensual, while commodatum is a real contract (perfected only by
delivery of the subject matter thereof). However, both involve the enjoyment by a person of the
property of another, differing only as to the extent and scope of such enjoyment (jus fruendi in one
and jus utendi in the other); both may have as subject matter either an immovable or a movable;
and, both may be constituted over consumable goods (Arts. 574 & 1936, Civil Code).
A consumable thing may be the subject-matter of an abnormal usufruct but in a normal
usufruct, the subject- matter maybe used only for exhibition. A commodatum of a consumable
thing may be only for the purpose of exhibiting, not consuming it.
II. On 1 January 1980, Minerva, the owner of a building granted Petronila a usufruct over
the property until 01 June 1998 when Manuel, a son of Petronila, would have reached
his 30th birthday. Manuel, however, died on 1 June 1990 when he was only 26 years old.
Minerva notified Petronila that the usufruct had been extinguished by the death of
Manuel and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the
former.

Petronila refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her favor
would expire only on 1 June 1998 when Manuel would have reached his 30th birthday
and that the death of Manuel before his 30th birthday did not extinguish the usufruct.
Whose contention should be accepted? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Petronila's contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the Civil Code, a usufruct granted for
the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall subsist for the number
of years specified even if the third person should die unless there is an express stipulation in the
contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar, there is no express stipulation that the
consideration for the usufruct is the existence of Petronila's son. Thus, the general rule and not the
exception should apply in this case.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
This is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Manuel until he reaches 30 yrs.
of age, with Petronila serving only as a conduit, holding the property in trust for his benefit. The
death of Manuel at the age of 26, therefore, terminated the usufruct.
III.
1. What is easement? Distinguish easement from usufruct.
2. Can there be (a) an easement over a usufruct? (b) a usufruct over an easement? (c) an
easement over another easement? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. An EASEMENT or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner. (Art. 613, NCC)
USUFRUCT gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (Art. 562, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner in which case it is called real or predial easement, or for
the benefit of a community or group of persons in which case it is known as a personal easement.
The distinctions between usufruct and easement are:
a) Usufruct includes all uses of the property and for all purposes, including jus fruendi.
Easement is limited to a specific use.
b) Usufruct may be constituted on immovable or movable property. Easement may be
constituted only on an immovable property.
c) Easement is not extinguished by the death of the owner of the dominant estate while
usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention appears.

d) An easement contemplates two (2) estates belonging to two (2) different owners; a
usufruct contemplates only one property (real or personal) whereby the usufructuary uses and
enjoys the property as well as its fruits, while another owns the naked title during the period of the
usufruct.
e) A usufruct may be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches, while an
easement cannot be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches.
NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that any two (2) distinctions should be given
full credit.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. (a) There can be no easement over a usufruct. Since an there is a degree of regularity to
indicate continuity of easement may be constituted only on a corporeal immovable property, no
easement may be constituted on a usufruct which is not a corporeal right
(b) There can be no usufruct over an easement. While a usufruct maybe created over a right,
such right must have an existence of its own independent of the property. A servitude cannot be
the object of a usufruct because it has no existence independent of the property to which It
attaches.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
There cannot be a usufruct over an easement since an easement presupposes two (2)
tenements belonging to different persons and the right attaches to the tenement and not to the
owner. While a usufruct gives the usufructuary a right to use, right to enjoy, right to the fruits, and
right to possess, an easement gives only a limited use of the servient estate.
However, a usufruct can be constituted over a property that has in its favor an easement
or one burdened with servitude. The usufructuary will exercise the easement during the period of
usufruct.
(c) There can be no easement over another easement for the same reason as in (a). An
easement, although it is a real right over an immovable, is not a corporeal right. There is a Roman
maxim which says that: There can be no servitude over another servitude.
IV. What is USUFRUCT? How is usufruct extinguished? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Usufruct is
extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;

(7) By prescription.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:

An enumeration of four (4) should be given full credit
IX. Easements
I.

Franz was the owner of Lot E which was surrounded by four (4) lots one of which - Lot C
- he also owned. He promised Ava that if she bought Lot E, he would give her a right of
way in Lot C.
Convinced, Ava bought Lot E and, as promised, Franz gave her a right of way in Lot C.
Ava cultivated Lot E and used the right of way granted by Franz.
Ava later found gainful employment abroad. On her return after more than 10 years,
the right of way was no longer available to her because Franz had in the meantime sold
Lot C to Julia who had it fenced.
A. Does Ava have a right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way?

Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of the right of way, for the
following reasons:
1)

An easement of right of way is a real right which attaches to, and is inseparable from,
the estate to which it belongs.

2)

The sale of the property includes the easement or servitude, even if the deed of sale is
silent on the matter.

3)

The vendee of the property in which a servitude or easement exists cannot close or put
up obstructions thereon to prevent the dominant estate from using it.

4)

Avas working abroad for more than ten (10) years should not be construed as nonuser, because it cannot be implied from the facts that she or those whom she left behind
to cultivate the lot no longer use the right of way.

Note:
Since a right of way is a discontinuous easement, the period of 10 years of non-user
shall be computed from the day it ceased to be used under Art. 6341(2) CC.
5) Renunciation or waiver of an easement must be specific, clear, express and made in a

public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the New Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way. A voluntary
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement

or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Also, like in any other contract, an
easement is generally effective between parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law (Unisource Commercial v. Chung, 593 SCRA 530 [2009]).
B. Assuming Ava opts to demand a right of way from any of the owners of Lots A, B,
and D, can she do that? Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way on any of the remaining lots of Franz more
so after Franz sold Lot C to Julia. The essential elements of a legal right of way under Article 649
and 650 of the New Civil Code are complied with.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way from the other lots. The law provides that
whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition is surrounded by other estates of
the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity
(Art. 652, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. There was merely a promise to Ava that a right of way shall be granted to her in Lot C if
Ava purchased Lot E. The promise was not reduced into writing (Obra v. Baldria, 529 SCRA 621
[2007]). Hence, it was not or could not have been registered as to warn buyers of Lot C about the
existence of the easement on the property. Not having been annotated on the TCT to Lot C, the
buyer acquired Lot C free from such right of way granted to Ava.
II. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[c] Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner of
the dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the servient
estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. (2009
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. In negative easements, acquisitive prescription runs from the moment the owner of
the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of
the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement (Art. 621,
NCC).
III. Don was the owner of an agricultural land with no access to a public road. He had been
passing through the land of Ernie with the latter's acquiescence for over 20 years.
Subsequently, Don subdivided his property into 20 residential lots and sold them to
different persons. Ernie blocked the pathway and refused to let the buyers pass through
his land.
a) Did Don acquire an easement of right of way? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Don did not acquire an easement of right of way. His passage through Ernies land was
by mere acquiescence or tolerance. He cannot claim to have acquired the easement of right of way
by prescription, because this easement is discontinuous although apparent. Only continuous and
apparent easements can be acquired by prescription of 10 years of uninterrupted use and
enjoyment.
b) Could Ernie close the pathway and refuse to let the buyers pass? Give reasons. (2%)

(2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As there is no right of way existing in favor of Don's land, Ernie could close the pathway. The
lot buyers may request Don to establish a right of way as voluntary easement by entering into a
contract with Ernie, or file action to constitute a legal easement by proving compliance with the
four requisites for creating a legal easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the new
Civil code.
c)

What are the rights of the lot buyers, if any? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The lot buyers have the right to:
1. ask for a constitution of legal easement of right of way;
2. require Don to provide for a right of way. Under Sec. 29 of PD 957, the owner or
developer of a subdivision without access to any existing road must secure a right of way;
3. Formally complain to the Housing and land Use of Regulatory Board regarding Dons
failure to comply with PD 957 specifically.
(a)
failure to provide for a right of way
(b)
failure to convert the land from agricultural to residential under
agrarian law
(c)
failure to secure a license to sell
4. commence criminal prosecution for violation of the penal provisions of PD 957, Sec. 39
IV. Lauro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. Hernando owns an
adjacent land devoted to his piggery business, which is two (2) meters higher in
elevation. Although Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery, it
is inadequate to contain the waste water containing pig manure, and it often overflows
and inundates Lauros plantation. This has increased the acidity of the soil in the
plantation, causing the trees to wither and die. Lauro sues for damages caused to his
plantation. Hernando invokes his right to the benefit of a natural easement in favor of
his higher estate, which imposes upon the lower estate of Lauro the obligation to receive
the waters descending from the higher estate. Is Hernando correct? (5%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Hernando is wrong. It is true that Lauros land is burdened with the natural easement to
accept or receive the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends from a
higher estate to a lower estate. However, Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his
piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to Lauro's land. Hernando has, thus,
interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. Under Art. 697 NCC,
abatement of a nuisance does not preclude recovery of damages by Lauro even for the past
existence of a nuisance. The claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191(4] NCC.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Hernando is not correct Article 637 of the New Civil Code provides that the owner of the
higher estate cannot make works which will increase the burden on the servient estate. (Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 330 SCRA 145 [2000]). The owner of the higher estate may be compelled to
pay damages to the owner of the lower estate.
V. Emma bought a parcel of land from Equitable-PCI Bank, which acquired the same from
Felisa, the original owner. Thereafter, Emma discovered that Felisa had granted a right
of way over the land in favor of the land of Georgina, which had no outlet to a public
highway, but the easement was not annotated when the servient estate was registered
under the Torrens system. Emma then filed a complaint for cancellation of the right of
way, on the ground that it had been extinguished by such failure to annotate. How would
you decide the controversy? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way must fall. The failure to annotate
the easement upon the title of the servient estate is not among the grounds for extinguishing an
easement under Art. 631 of the Civil Code. Under Article 617, easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong. Once it attaches, it can only be extinguished
under Art. 631, and they exist even if they are not stated or annotated as an encumbrance on the
Torrens title of the servient estate, (n Tolentino 326, 1987 ed.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Section 44, FD No. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant
to a decree of registration, and every subsequent innocent purchaser for value, shall hold the same
free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions.
Under Act 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, and Section 4, Act 3621, an easement if not
registered shall remain and shall be held to pass with the land until cutoff or extinguished by the
registration of the servient estate. However, this provision has been suppressed in Section 44, PD
No. 1529. In other words, the registration of the servient estate did not operate to cut-off or
extinguish the right of way. Therefore, the complaint for the cancellation of the right of way should
be dismissed.
VI. The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a
right of way through a portion of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the
market. He has chosen a point where he will pass through a housing project of Romulo.
The latter wants him to pass another way which is one kilometer longer. Who should
prevail? (5%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least
prejudice prevails over the criterion of shortest distance. Since the route chosen by Federico will
prejudice the housing project of Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass
another way even though it will be longer.
VII. Distinguish between:
1. Continuous and discontinuous easements; [2%J
2. Apparent and non-apparent easements; and [2%]
3. Positive and negative easements. (1%) (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Continuous easements are those the use of which is or maybe incessant, without the
Intervention of any act of man, while discontinuous easements are those which are used at
Intervals and depend upon the acts of man. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
2. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same, while non- apparent easements are
those which show no external indication of their existence. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
3. Positive easements are those which impose upon the owner of the servient estate the
obligation of allowing something to be done or of doing it himself, while negative easements are
those which prohibit the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could
lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (Art. 615, Civil Code)

VIII.
1. What is easement? Distinguish easement from usufruct.
2. Can there be (a) an easement over a usufruct? (b) a usufruct over an easement? (c) an
easement over another easement? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. An EASEMENT or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner. (Art. 613, NCC)
USUFRUCT gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (Art. 562, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner in which case it is called real or predial easement, or for
the benefit of a community or group of persons in which case it is known as a personal easement.
The distinctions between usufruct and easement are:

a) Usufruct includes all uses of the property and for all purposes, including jus fruendi.
Easement is limited to a specific use.
b) Usufruct may be constituted on immovable or movable property. Easement may be
constituted only on an immovable property.
c) Easement is not extinguished by the death of the owner of the dominant estate while
usufruct is extinguished by the death of the usufructuary unless a contrary intention appears.
d) An easement contemplates two (2) estates belonging to two (2) different owners; a
usufruct contemplates only one property (real or personal) whereby the usufructuary uses and
enjoys the property as well as its fruits, while another owns the naked title during the period of the
usufruct.
e) A usufruct may be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches, while an
easement cannot be alienated separately from the property to which it attaches.
NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that any two (2) distinctions should be given
full credit.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. (a) There can be no easement over a usufruct. Since an there is a degree of regularity to indicate
continuity of easement may be constituted only on a corporeal immovable property, no easement
may be constituted on a usufruct which is not a corporeal right
(b)
There can be no usufruct over an easement. While a usufruct maybe created over a right,
such right must have an existence of its own independent of the property. A servitude cannot be
the object of a usufruct because it has no existence independent of the property to which It
attaches.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
There cannot be a usufruct over an easement since an easement presupposes two (2)
tenements belonging to different persons and the right attaches to the tenement and not to the
owner. While a usufruct gives the usufructuary a right to use, right to enjoy, right to the fruits, and
right to possess, an easement gives only a limited use of the servient estate.
However, a usufruct can be constituted over a property that has in its favor an easement
or one burdened with servitude. The usufructuary will exercise the easement during the period of
usufruct.
(c) There can be no easement over another easement for the same reason as in (a). An
easement, although it is a real right over an immovable, is not a corporeal right. There is a Roman
maxim which says that: There can be no servitude over another servitude.
IX. Tomas Encamacions 3,000 square meter parcel of land, where he has a plant nursery, is
located just behind Aniceta Magsinos two hectare parcel land. To enable Tomas to have
access to the highway, Aniceta agreed to grant him a road right of way a meter wide
through which he could pass. Through the years Tomas business flourished which
enabled him to buy another portion which enlarged the area of his plant nursery. But he
was still landlocked. He could not bring in and out of his plant nursery a jeep or delivery
panel much less a truck that he needed to transport his seedlings. He now asked Aniceta
to grant him a wider portion of her property, the price of which he was willing to pay, to

enable him to construct a road to have access to his plant nursery. Aniceta refused
claiming that she had already allowed him a previous road right of way.
Is Tomas entitled to the easement he now demands from Aniceta? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Art. 651 of the Civil Code provides that the width of the easement must be sufficient to meet
the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly change from time to time. It is the need of
the dominant estate which determines the width of the passage. These needs may vary from time
to time. As Tomas' business grows, the need for use of modem conveyances requires widening of
the easement.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The facts show that the need for a wider right of way arose from the increased production
owing to the acquisition by Tomas of an additional area. Under Art. 626 of the Civil Code, the
easement can be used only for the immovable originally contemplated. Hence, the increase in
width is justified and should have been granted.
X.
(a) How are easements acquired?
(b) In acquiring easement by prescription, how shallthe period of possession be computed?
(c) About fifteen years ago, Adelaida constructed a house on her lot at Quezon City

adjoining a lot owned by Bernie. She provided it'with several windows overlooking
Bernies lot half a meter away from the boundary line. A month ago, Bernie brought an
action against Adelaida for the closure of the windows alleging that they violate the law
on distances.
1. Has Adelaida acquired an easement of light and view by prescription?
2. Will the action of Bernie prosper?
3. If the action will not prosper, will that not be tantamount to saying that Adelaida
has already acquired an easement of light and view? (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years (Art. 620, CC), while continuous nonapparent easements and
discontinuous easements whether apparent or nonapparent, can only be acquired by virtue of a
title (Art. 622, CC).
(b) In order that an easement may be acquired by prescription, the time of possession shall be
computed thus: In positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate, or
the person who may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient
estate; and in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate
forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient estate,
from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. (Art. 621, CC.)
(c) (1) Adelaida has not acquired an easement of light and view by prescription after ten
years. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, there was no formal prohibition as required
by law. This should have been done by means of an instrument acknowledged before a notary

public wherein she should have prohibited Bernie from obstructing his light and view. She did not.
In the second place, she did not observe the legal requirement that there should be a distance of at
least two meters between the window's and Bernies lot, since the view is direct. According to the
Civil Code, non-observance of this distance does not give rise to prescription.
(2) The action will not prosper because more than ten years has already elapsed from the time
of the opening of the windows. Bernies right of action has already prescribed.
(3) This is not tantamount to saying that Adelaida has already acquired an easement of light
and view. Under the Civil Code, nobody can prevent Bernie from obstructing Adelaidas light and
view' by constructing a building on his lot or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to the windows
of Adelaida.
X. Nuisance
I.

A drug lord and his family reside in a small bungalow where they sell shabu and other
prohibited drugs. When the police found the illegal trade, they immediately demolished
the house because according to them, it was a nuisance per se that should be abated. Can
this demolition be sustained? Explain. 5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the demolition cannot be sustained. The house cannot be considered as nuisance per se.
To be considered per se, the act, occupation, or structure must be a nuisance at all times and under
any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Since the demolished house was not a
nuisance during the times that it was not being used for selling drugs, it cannot be considered as
nuisance per se. Moreover, in the abatement of a nuisance, whether judicially or extra-judicially,
the abatement should not inflict unnecessary damage or injury. In this case, what may be
considered as nuisance per se is not the structure of the house but the use of the house for the
selling of shabu. However, the demolition of the house is not necessary to abate the sale of shabu
in that community. To demolish the house is an unnecessary damage and injury
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The selling of shabu is not only a public nuisance but a grave threat to the welfare of the
community. As such it can be enjoined and all instruments thereof destroyed by the law enforcers.
The sale of the shabu in that community is facilitated by the house which hides the pernicious
activity from the law enforcers. This being the case, the house may be considered as an instrument
of the crime and the law enforcers are justified in demolishing the house in the exercise of the
police powers of the State.
II. State with reason whether each of the following is a nuisance, and if so, give its
classification, whether public or private.
a) A squatters hut (1%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
According to Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality;or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body

of water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

A nuisance may be either public or private. Under Article 685, a public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number or persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger of damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance, on the other
hand, is one that violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons.
A squatter's hut, being an illegal construction, constitutes a public nuisance per se, if it
poses problems of health and sanitation. (City of Manila v. Garcia. 19 SCRA 41[1967J). If the
squatters hut is built on a private land and hinders or impairs the owner's use of his or her own
property, then it would constitute a private nuisance.
b) A swimming pool (1%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A swimming pool is not a nuisance and is an exception to the attractive nuisance doctrine
(Hidalgo v. Guillermo, 91 Phil. 488 [1952]). It generally does not cause an injury, harm or prejudice
to an individual or the public (Article 694, par. 1).
c)

A house of prostitution (1%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A house of prostitution is a public nuisance because it shocks or disregards the decency or
morality of the community. (Article 694 par. 3, Civil Code)
d) A noisy or dangerous factory in a private land (1%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A noisy or dangerous factory even if built in a private land may be considered a nuisance if it
offends the senses of the owners of the adjacent property or poses a danger to their safety (Article
694, par. 1, Civil Code). This kind of nuisance may be classified as a public nuisance if it affects and
annoys those who come within its sphere.
e)

Uncollected garbage (1%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Uncollected garbage can be injurious to health and even the environment. It is thus,
considered a public nuisance.
III. Lauro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. Hernando owns an
adjacent land devoted to his piggery business, which is two (2) meters higher in
elevation. Although Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery, it
is inadequate to contain the waste water containing pig manure, and it often overflows

and inundates Lauros plantation. This has increased the acidity of the soil in the
plantation, causing the trees to wither and die. Lauro sues for damages caused to his
plantation. Hernando invokes his right to the benefit of a natural easement in favor of
his higher estate, which imposes upon the lower estate of Lauro the obligation to receive
the waters descending from the higher estate. Is Hernando correct? (5%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Hernando is wrong. It is true that Lauros land is burdened with the natural easement to
accept or receive the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends from a
higher estate to a lower estate. However, Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his
piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to Lauro's land. Hernando has, thus,
interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. Under Art. 697 NCC,
abatement of a nuisance does not preclude recovery of damages by Lauro even for the past
existence of a nuisance. The claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191(4] NCC.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Hernando is not correct Article 637 of the New Civil Code provides that the owner of the
higher estate cannot make works which will increase the burden on the servient estate. (Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 330 SCRA 145 [2000]). The owner of the higher estate may be compelled to
pay damages to the owner of the lower estate.

XI. Modes of Acquiring Ownership

I.

Multiple choice.
A executed a Deed of Donation in favor of B, a bachelor, covering a parcel of land
valued at PI million. B was, however, out of the country at the time. For the donation to
be valid, (1%) (2010 Bar Question)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

B may e-mail A accepting the donation.

The donation may be accepted by Bs father with whom he lives.
B can accept the donation anytime convenient to him.
Bs mother who has a general power of attorney may accept the donation for him.
None of the above is sufficient to make Bs acceptance valid.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 5. None of the above is sufficient to make Bs acceptance valid.
Since the donation covered an immovable property, the donation and the acceptance must
be in a public document. An e-mail is not a public document. Hence, No. 1 is false.
No. 2 and No. 4 are both false. The acceptance by the donees father alone or mother alone,
even though in a public document, is not sufficient because the father and the mother did not have a
special power of attorney for the purpose. Under Article 745 (NCC), the done must accept the4

donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power of attorney for the
purpose; otherwise, the donation shall be void.
No. 3 is also false. B cannot accept the donation anytime at his convenience. Under Article
749 NCC, the done may accept the donation only during the lifetime of the donor.
II. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[e] A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos. (2009 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. A person cannot dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos, i.e., an act to take
effect during his lifetime. Before his death there is no corpse to dispose. But he is allowed to do so
through an act mortis causa, i.e., an act to take effect upon his death.
III. Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Bias to construct a house on a lot which he
(Bias) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation of the house,
Adam hit a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old Banco de las Islas
Filipinas. Using a detonation device, Adam was able to open the vault containing old
notes and coins which were in circulation during the Spanish era. While the notes and
coins are no longer legal tender, they were valued at P 100 million because of their
historical value and the coins silver and nickel content. The following filed legal claims
over the notes and coins:
i) Adam, as finder;
ii) Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;
iii) Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault;
and
iv) The Philippine Government because of their historical value.
a) Who owns the notes and coins? (4%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Hidden treasure is money jewelry or other precious objects the ownership of which does
not appear (Art. 439, CC). The vault of the Banco de las Islas Filipinas has been buried for about a
century and the Bank of the Philippine Islands cannot succeed by inheritance to the property of
Banco de las Islas Filipinas. The ownership of the vault, together with the notes and coins can now
legally be considered as hidden treasure because its ownership is no longer apparent. The
contractor, Adams is not a trespasser and therefore entitled to one-half of the hidden treasure and
Bias as owner of the property, is entitled the other half (Art. 438, CC). Since the notes and , coins
have historical value, the government may acquire them at their just price which in turn will be
divided equally between Adam and Bias (Art. 438, par. 3, CC).
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Banco de las Islas Filipinas is the owner of the vault. The finder and owner of the
land cannot share in the notes and coins, because they are not buried treasure under the law, as the

ownership is known. Although under Art. 720 of the Civil Code the finder shall be given a reward of
one-tenth of the price of the thing found, as a lost movable, on the principle of quasi-contract.
However, the notes and coins may have become res nullius considering that Banco de
las Islas Filipinas is longer a juridical person and has apparently given up looking for them and
Adam, the first one to take possession with intent to possess shall become the sole owner.
IV. Distinguish the following concepts:
(a)

Occupation v. possession. (5%) (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Occupation can take place only with respect to property without an owner while
possession can refer to all kinds of property, whether with owner or without an owner. Occupation
itself, when proper, confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines [1999 ed.], vol. II, p.
489).
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, NCC). Things appropriable
by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the object of hunting and fishing,
hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by occupation (Art. 713, NCC). However,
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, NCC).
On the other hand, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, as
provided in Article 523 of the New Civil Code. Possession can be in the concept of an owner or in
the concept of a holder (Art. 525, NCC).
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Occupation is a mode of acquiring dominion by the seizure of corporeal things which have
no owner, with the intention of acquiring the ownership thereof. It is an original mode of acquiring
ownership upon seizure of a res nullius by the occupant who has the intention to become the
owner thereof.
Possession, on the other hand, is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Possession
may be the real right of possession or jus possessionis or it can be merely the right to possess or jus
possidendi, which are among the basic rights of ownership. If the real right of possession is
possession in the concept of owner, but subject to certain limitations, it may ripen into full
ownership of the thing or property right through acquisitive prescription depending on whether it
is a case of ordinary or extraordinary prescription and whether the property is movable or
immovable.
(b)

Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation v. illegal and impossible

conditions in an onerous donation. (5%) (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation are considered as not written. Such
conditions shall, therefore, be disregarded but the donation remains valid (Article 727, NCC).
On the other hand, illegal and impossible conditions imposed in an onerous donation shall
annul the donation (Article 1183, NCC). This is so, because onerous donations are governed by the
law on contracts (Article 733, NCC).
V. In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso
painting reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In
1990, Brad and Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met
Angie and fell in love. Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his
will bequeathed the painting to Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brads death,
Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a remembrance of him. Angie refused and
claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to her. Is Angie correct? Why or
why not? (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting was not given or donated by Jennifer to Brad.
She merely placed it in his bedroom. Hence, she is still the owner of the painting. Not being the
owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeathed the same to Angie (Art. 930, NCC).
Even assuming that the painting was impliedly given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation
is nevertheless void for not being in writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more than 5,000
pesos. Under Article 748, NCC the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000
pesos must be in writing, otherwise the donation is void. The donation being void, Jennifer
remained the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said
painting in favor of Angie in his will.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Angie is correct. Even assuming that there was a void donation because the donation was
not in writing, Brad, who was in uninterrupted possession of the Picasso painting from 1989 to
1995, lasting for six (6) years prior to his death, Brad has already acquired ownership of the
painting through acquisitive prescription. Under Article 1132 of the New Civil Code, Ownership of
movables prescribes through continuous possession for four (4) years in good faith and for eight
(8) years without need of any other conditions. A void donation may be the basis of possession in
the concept of owner and of just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
VI. Spouses Alfredo and Racquel were active members of a religious congregation. They
donated a parcel of land in favor to that congregation in a duly notarized Deed of
Donation, subject to the condition that the Minister shall construct thereon a place of
worship within 1 year from the acceptance of the donation, in an affidavit he executed in
behalf of the congregation, the Minister accepted the donation. The Deed of Donation
was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
However, instead of constructing a place of worship, the Minister constructed a
bungalow on the property he used as his residence. Disappointed with the Minister, the
spouses revoked the donation and demanded that he vacate the premises immediately.
But the Minister refused to leave, claiming that aside from using the bungalow as his
residence, he is also using it as a place of worship on special occasions. Under the

circumstances, can Alfredo and Racquel evict the Minister and recover possession of the
property?
If you were the couples counsel, what action will you take to protect the interests of
your clients? 5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for the couple, I may file an action for reconveyance of the property on the ground
that the donation was not perfected. It was not perfected because although it was made in a public
document and was accepted by the donee in a separate public document, the donee failed to notify
the donor of such acceptance in an authentic form before the donation was revoked under Article
749 of the Civil Code. Such notification was necessary for the donation to become valid and
binding.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that the donation is valid on the ground that it was an onerous donation, and
therefore, the law on contracts applied even as to its form, I may file an action for the revocation of
the donation under Article 764 of the Civil Code for noncompliance with the condition imposed on
the donation. In donating the land, the intension of the couple was for the land to become the site
of a church, or place of worship, for their congregation. This is why the couple have imposed, as a
condition of the donation, the construction thereon of a church, or a place of worship, within 1 year
from the acceptance of the donation. The construction of a residential bungalow which is used as a
place of worship but only on special occasions is not a substantial compliance with such condition.
Hence, the donation may be revoked for failure to comply with the condition.
Upon the filing of the case, I will file a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds for
annotation on the TCT to ensure against the transfer of the land to an innocent purchaser for value.
VII. In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel of land to Central University on condition that the
latter must establish a medical college on the land to be named after him. In the year
2000, the heirs of Dr. Alba filed an action to annul the donation and for the reconveyance
of the property donated to them for the failure, after 50 years, of the University to
establish on the property a medical school named after their father. The University
opposed the action on the ground of prescription and also because it had not used the
property for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the opposition
of the University to the action of Dr. Albas heirs be sustained? Explain. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation may be revoked. The non-establishment of the medical college on the
donated property was a resolutory condition imposed on the donation by the donor. Although the
Deed of Donation did not fix the time for the establishment of the medical college, the failure of the
donee to establish the medical college after fifty (50) years from the making of the donation
should be considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation may now be
revoked. While the general rule is that in case the period is not fixed in the agreement of the
parties, the period must be fixed first by the court before the obligation may be demanded, the
period of fifty (50) years was more than enough time for the donee to comply with the condition.
Hence, in this case, there is no more need for the court to fix the period because such procedure

would serve no other purpose but to delay compliance with the condition. (Central Philippine
University V.CA, 246 SCRA 511).
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation may not as yet be revoked. The establishment of a medical college is not a
resolutory or suspensive condition but a charge, obligation, ora mode". The non- compliance
with the charge or mode will give the donor the right to revoke the donation within four (4) years
from the time the charge was supposed to have been complied with, or to enforce the charge by
specific performance within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued. Inasmuch as
the time to establish the medical college has not been fixed in the Deed of Donation, the donee is
not yet in default in his obligation until the period is fixed by order of the court under Article 1197
of the New Civil Code. Since the period has not been fixed as yet, the donee is not yet in default, and
therefore the donor has no cause of action to revoke the donation. (Dissenting opinion of Davide,
CJ, Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511 [1995])
VIII. May a person donate something that does not belong to him? Explain. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As a general rule, a person cannot donate something which he cannot dispose of at the time
of the donation (Article 751, New Civil Code).
IX. Anastacia purchased a house and lot on Installments at a housing project in Quezon City.
Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed of
donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles. California,
donating the house and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of
donation to the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia left unpaid
installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid these so that the donation in her favor
can be registered in the project owner's office. Two months later, Anastacia died, leaving
her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to annul the donation on the
ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation or in a separate
public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one because she
had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied. Who is
correct? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable. For
such donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the donation and the
acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that Amandas acceptance was
made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention that the donation is onerous and.
therefore, need not comply with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is not
onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase
price or the arrears in real estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts
voluntarily. For a donation to be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee.
In the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation not
being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation is onerous only as to the portion of
the property corresponding to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda.
The portion in excess thereof is not onerous. The onerous portion is governed by the rules
on contracts which do not require the acceptance by the donee to be in any form. The onerous
part, therefore, is valid. The portion which is not onerous must comply with Article 749 of the New
Civil Code which requires the donation and the acceptance thereof to be in a public instrument in
order to be valid. The acceptance not being in a public instrument, the part which is not onerous is
void and Rosa may recover it from Amanda.
X. Elated that her sister who had been married for five years was pregnant for the first
time, Alma donated P100,000.00 to the unborn child. Unfortunately, the baby died one
hour after delivery. May Alma recover the P100,000.00 that she had donated to said baby
before it was born considering that the baby died? Stated otherwise, is the donation valid
and binding? Explain. (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation is valid and binding, being an act favorable to the unborn child, but only if the
baby had an intra-uterine life of not less than seven months and provided there was due acceptance of
the donation by the proper person representing said child. If the child had less than seven months of
intra-uterine life, it is not deemed born since it died less than 24 hours following its delivery, in which
case the donation never became effective since the donee never became a person, birth being
determinative of personality.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Even if the baby had an intra-uterine life of more than seven months and the donation was
properly accepted, it would be void for not having conformed with the proper form. In order to be
valid, the donation and acceptance of personal property exceeding five thousand pesos should be
in writing. (Article 748, par. 3)
XI. On July 27, 1997, Pedro mailed in Manila a letter to his brother, Jose, a resident of Iloilo
City, offering to donate a vintage sports car which the latter had long been wanting to
buy from the former. On August 5, 1997, Jose called Pedro by cellular phone to thank
him for his generosity and to inform him that he was sending by mail his letter of acceptance. Pedro never received that letter because it was never mailed. On August 14, 1997,
Pedro received a telegram from Iloilo informing him that Jose had been killed in a road
accident the day before (August 13, 1997)
1.
2.

Is there a perfected donation? [2%]

Will your answer be the same if Jose did mail his acceptance letter but it was
received by Pedro in Manila days after Joses death? [3%] (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
None. There is no perfected donation. Under Article 748 of the Civil Code, the donation
of a movable may be made orally or in writing. If the value of the personal property donated

exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Assuming
that the value of the thing donated, a vintage sports car, exceeds P5.000.00, then the donation and
the acceptance must be in writing. In this instance, the acceptance of Jose was not in writing,
therefore, the donation is void. Upon the other hand, assuming that the sports car costs less than
P5.000.00, then the donation may be oral, but still, the simultaneous delivery of the car is needed
and there being none, the donation was never perfected.
2.
Yes, the answer is the same. If Jose's mail containing his acceptance of the donation was
received by Pedro after the former's death, then the donation is still void because under Article
734 of the Civil Code, the donation is perfected the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee. The death of Jose before Pedro could receive the acceptance indicates that the donation
was never perfected. Under Article 746 acceptance must be made during the lifetime of both the
donor and the donee.

XII. Ernesto donated in a public instrument a parcel of land to Demetrio, who accepted it in
the same document. It Is there declared that the donation shall take effect immediately,
with the donee having the right to take possession of the land and receive its fruits but
not to dispose of the land while Ernesto is alive as well as for ten years following his
death. Moreover, Ernesto also reserved in the same deed his right to sell the property
should he decide to dispose of it at any time - a right which he did not exercise at all.
After his death, Ernestos heirs seasonably brought an action to recover the property,
alleging that the donation was void as it did not comply with the formalities of a will.
Will the suit prosper? [5%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the suit will prosper as the donation did not comply with the formalities of a will. In this
instance, the fact that the donor did not intend to transfer ownership or possession of the donated
property to the donee until the donor's death, would result in a donation mortis causa and in this
kind of disposition, the formalities of a will should be complied with, otherwise, the donation is
void. In this instance, donation mortis causa embodied only in a public instrument without the
formalities of a will could not have transferred ownership of disputed property to another.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
One of the essential distinctions between a donation inter vivos and a donation mortis
causa is that while the former is irrevocable, the latter is revocable. In the problem given, all the
clauses or conditions mentioned in the deed of donation, except one, are consistent with the rule
of Irrevocability and would have sustained the view that the donation is inter vivos and therefore
valid. The lone exception is the clause which reserves the donor's right to sell the property at any
time before his death. Such a reservation has been held to render the donation revocable and,
therefore, becomes a donation mortis causa (Puig vs. Penaflorida, 15 SCRA 276, at p. 286). That
the right was not exercised is immaterial; its reservation was an implied recognition of the
donor's power to nullify the donation anytime he wished to do so. Consequently, it should have
been embodied in a last will and testament. The suit for nullity will thus prosper.
XIII. Distinguish between "possession" and "occupation" as these terms are commonly
used in Book II and Book III of the Civil Code. (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Possession is a real right, while occupation is one of the original modes of acquiring
ownership and other real rights. Possession, the holding of a thing or the exercise of a right, does
not in itself constitute ownership. Whereas, occupation is a mode of acquiring ownership. There
can be possession without ownership.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right (Art. 532, CC). It can refer to all
kinds of property whether with or without an owner while occupation can take place only with
respect to property without an owner (Articles 531 & 713). Occupation in itself, when proper,
confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership.
XIV. Are the effects of illegal and immoral conditions on simple donations the same as
those effects that would follow when such conditions are imposed on donations con
causa onerosa? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, they don't have the same effect. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and
remuneratory donations shall be considered as not imposed. Hence the donation is valid. The
donation will be considered as simple or pure. The condition or mode is merely an accessory
disposition, and its nullity does not affect the donation, unless it clearly appears that the donor
would not have made the donation without the mode or condition.
Donations con causa onerosa is governed by law on obligations and contracts, under which an
impossible or illicit condition annuls the obligation dependent upon the condition where the
condition is positive and suspensive. If the impossible or illicit condition is negative, it is simply
considered as not written, and the obligation is converted into a pure and simple one. However, in
order that an illegal condition may annul a contract, the impossibility must exist at the time of the
creation of the obligation; a supervening impossibility does not affect the existence of the
obligation.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
No. In simple or pure donation, only the illegal or impossible condition is considered not
written but the donation remains valid and becomes free from conditions. The condition or mode
being a mere accessory disposition, its nullity does not affect the donation unless it clearly appears
that the donor would not have made the donation without the mode or condition. On the other
hand, onerous donation is governed by the rules on contracts. Under Article 1183, impossible or
illegal conditions shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. In these cases, both the
obligation and the condition are void.
XV. On January 2, 1986, A executed a deed of donation inter vivos of a parcel of land to Dr. B
who had earlier constructed thereon a building in which researches on the dreaded
disease AIDS were being conducted. The deed, acknowledged before a notary public, was
handed over by A to Dr. B who received it. A few days after, A flew to Davao City.
Unfortunately, the airplane he was riding crashed on landing killing him. Two days after
the unfortunate accident. Dr. B, upon advice of a lawyer, executed a deed acknowledged
before a notary public accepting the donation.

Is the donation effective? Explain your answer. (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the donation is not effective. The law requires that the separate acceptance of the donee
of an immovable must be done in a public document during the lifetime of the donor (Art. 746 &
749, Civil Code) In this case, B executed the deed of acceptance before a notary public after the
donor had already died.
XVI. Spouses Michael and Linda donated a 3-hectare residential land to the City of Baguio
on the condition that the city government would build thereon a public park with a
boxing arena, the construction of which shall commence within six (6) months from the
date the parties ratify the donation. The donee accepted the donation and the title to the
property was transferred in its name. Five years elapsed but the public park with the
boxing arena was never started. Considering the failure of the donee to comply with the
condition of the donation, the donor-spouses sold the property to Ferdinand who then
sued to recover the land from the city government.
Will the suit prosper? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ferdinand has no right to recover the land. It is true that the donation was revocable because
of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation was revoked, it remained valid.
Hence, Spouses Michael and Linda had no right to sell the land to Ferdinand. One cannot give what
he does not have. What the donors should have done first was to have the donation annulled or
revoked. And after that was done, they could validly have disposed of the land in favor of
Ferdinand.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. Until the contract of donation has been resolved or rescinded under Article 1191 of the
Civil Code or revoked under Art. 764 of the Civil Code, the donation stands effective and valid.
Accordingly, the sale made by the donor to Ferdinand cannot be said to have conveyed title to
Ferdinand, who, thereby, has no cause of action for recovery of the land acting for and in his behalf.
B. The donation is onerous. And being onerous, what applies is the law on contracts, and not
the law on donation (De Luna us. Abrigo, 81 SCRA 150). Accordingly, the prescriptive period for the
filing of such an action would be the ordinary prescriptive period for contacts which may either be
six or ten depending upon whether it is verbal or written. The filing of the case five years later is
within the prescriptive period and, therefore, the action can prosper.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The law on donation lays down a special prescriptive period in the case of breach of
condition, which is four years from non-compliance thereof (Article 764 Civil Code). Since the
action has prescribed, the suit will not prosper.
XVII. B donated to M a parcel of land in 1980. B made the deed of donation, entitled
Donation Inter Vivos," in a public instrument and M accepted the donation in the same

document. It was provided in the deed that the land donated shall be immediately
delivered to M and that M shall have the right to enjoy the fruits fully. The deed also
provided that B was reserving the right to dispose of said land during his (Bs) lifetime,
and that M shall not register the deed of donation until after Bs death. Upon Bs death,
W, Bs widow and sole heir, filed an action for the recovery of the donated land,
contending that the donation made by B is a donation mortis causa and not a donation
inter vivos. Will said action prosper? Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action will proper. The donation is a donation mortis causa because the reservation
is to dispose of all the property donated and, therefore, the donation is revocable at will.
Accordingly, the donation requires the execution of a valid will, either notarial or holographic.
(Arts 755, 728 Civil Code)
XVIII.

(a) What is meant by "law as a mode of acquiring ownership? What are the different
instances under the Civil Code whereby there is an acquisition of ownership by operation of
law? State at least three.
(b) A donated to X a parcel of land in 1975. The donation was made in a public
instrument, while the acceptance made by X w-as embodied in the same public instrument.
The Deed of Donation was entitled "Donation Inter Vivos. There is however a provision in
the deed to the effect that, although the land donated shall be delivered immediately to X
upon the perfection of the donation with full right to enjoy all of the fruits thereof, "title
shall pass to the donee only upon the donors death. Upon the death of A, his widow and
only heir, B. brought an action for the recovery of the property on the ground that the
donation is a donation mortis causa and not a donation inter vivos. Will the action prosper?
Give your reasons. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) When the Civil Code speaks of law as a distinct mode of acquiring ownership, it refers to
those instances where the law, independently of the other modes of acquiring ownership,
automatically and directly vests the ownership of the thing in a certain individual once the prescribed requisites or conditions are present or complied with. Examples of this are:
(1)
Land which belongs exclusively to either of the spouses where a building is
constructed with conjugal funds. Here, the ownership of the land is vested automatically in the
conjugal partnership once the condition that its value has been reimbursed to the owner has
been complied with (Art. 158, par. 2, CC.)
(2)
Hidden treasure which a stranger discovers by chance on anothers property. Here,
one-half of the treasure belongs by right of occupation to the stranger, while the other half
belongs by operation of law to the proprietor. (Art. 438, par. 2, CC.)
(3)
Abandoned beds, when a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse
private lands. The former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in
proportion to the area lost by each. (Art. 58, P.D. No. 1067.)
(4)
Fruits naturally falling from a tree upon adjacent land. Here, the ownership of the
fruits is vested automatically in the owner of the adjacent land. (Art. 681, CC.)
(b) Yes, the action will prosper. In Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, and Howard vs. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that in order that a donation will be considered a disposition

post mortem, it should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:

(1)
Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership, full or
naked, and control the property while alive;
(2)
That before his death the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the property conveyed;
(3)
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
It is clear from the facts stated in the problem that the donation reveals the first characteristic.
Hence, it is a disposition, post mortem. Therefore, in order that the donation can take effect it is
essential that it must be made in a will executed in accordance with all of the formalities prescribed by law (Art. 728, CC). Since this requisite has not been complied with, the donation in the
instant case is void or inexistent.
Committees Recommendations Re: (a) and (b)
(a) It is recommended that the following be likewise considered as instances whereby there
is acquisition of ownership by operation of law:
(1) The acquisition of property in co-ownership under a marriage governed by the absolute
community regime.
(2) Estoppel under article 1434 of the Civil Code which provides that:
When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it,
and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of
law to the buyer or grantee; and
(3) Registration of land under Act 496 where the applicant is not the real owner.
(b) It is recommended that the mention of the first characteristic of the three mentioned
above, should merit a full credit for this question.

PRESCRIPTION
I.

Definition

II. No prescription applicable

III. Prescription or limitation of actions
I.

Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert, Bert, in turn, acquired the
property by forging Carlos signature in a deed of sale over the property. Carlo had been
in possession of the property for 8 years, declared it for tax purposes, and religiously
paid all taxes due on the property. Anthony is not aware of the defect in Berts title, but
has been in actual physical possession of the property from the time he bought it from
Bert, who had never been in possession. Anthony has since then been in possession of the
property for one year.

a) Can Anthony acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription? How

many more years does he have to possess it to acquire ownership? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Anthony can acquire ownership of the property by ordinary acquisitive prescription
which requires just title and good faith (Art. 1117, cc). There was just title because a deed of sale
was issued in his favor even though it was forged, which fact he was not aware of. He needs to
possess the land in good faith and in the concept of owner for a total of ten years in order to acquire
ownership.
Since Anthony possessed the land for only one year, he has not completed the ten-year
period. Even if Anthony tacks the 8-year period of possession by Carlo who in the deed of sale is
supposed to be his grantor or predecessor in interest (Article 1138 [I], CC), the period is still short
of ten years.
II. Write "TRUE' if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%)
x
x
x
3. If a man commits several acts of sexual infidelity, particularly in 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, the prescriptive period to file for legal separation runs from 2002. (2007 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The five-year prescriptive period for filing legal separation runs from the occurrence
of each act of sexual infidelity. Hence, the prescriptive period for the sexual infidelity committed in
2002 runs from 2002; for the sexual infidelity committed in 2003, the prescriptive period runs
from 2003 and so on. The action for legal separation for the last act of sexual infidelity in 2005 will
prescribe in 2010.
III. In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso
painting reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In
1990, Brad and Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met
Angie and fell in love. Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his
will bequeathed the painting to Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brads death,
Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a remembrance of him. Angie refused and
claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to her. Is Angie correct? Why or
why not? (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting was not given or donated by Jennifer to Brad.
She merely placed it in his bedroom. Hence, she is still the owner of the painting. Not being the
owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeathed the same to Angie (Art. 930, NCC).
Even assuming that the painting was impliedly given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation
is nevertheless void for not being in writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more than 5,000
pesos. Under Article 748, NCC the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000
pesos must be in writing, otherwise the donation is void. The donation being void, Jennifer

remained the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said
painting in favor of Angie in his will.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Angie is correct. Even assuming that there was a void donation because the donation was
not in writing, Brad, who was in uninterrupted possession of the Picasso painting from 1989 to
1995, lasting for six (6) years prior to his death, Brad has already acquired ownership of the
painting through acquisitive prescription. Under Article 1132 of the New Civil Code, Ownership of
movables prescribes through continuous possession for four (4) years in good faith and for eight
(8) years without need of any other conditions. A void donation may be the basis of possession in
the concept of owner and of just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
IV. In I960, an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner O to M, a family friend,
as collateral for a loan. O acted through his attorney-in-fact, son S. who was duly
authorized by way of a special power of attorney, wherein O declared that he was the
absolute owner of the land, that the tax declarations/receipts were all issued in his
name, and that he has been in open, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of
owner.
As O was unable to pay back the loan plus interest for the past five (5) years, M had to
foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon issuance
of the sheriffs final deed of sale and registration in January, 1966, the mortgage
property was turned over to Ms possession and control. M has since then developed the
said property. In 1967, O died, survived by sons S and P.
In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary of his father O, son P filed a suit to
annul the mortgage deed and subsequent sale of the property, etc. on the ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in question was conjugal in nature actually
belonging, at the time of the mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share went
to their sons (S and P) and to O.
(a) Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription? Explain your answer.
(b) After the issuance of the sheriffs final deed of sale in 1966 in this case, assuming

that M applied for registration under the Torrens System and was issued a Torrens
Title to the said property in question, would that added fact have any significant
effect on your conclusion? State your reason. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by prescription because the wife had
only ten (10) years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of
the mortgage deed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO (a):
First Alternative Answer:
(a) The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a voidable contract since it involves a
conjugal partnership property. The action to annul the same instituted in 1977, or eleven years
after the execution of the sheriffs final sale, has obviously prescribed because:

1.
An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four (4)
years from the date of discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an action to recover
ownership, it must be reckoned from the date of execution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessors office for the purpose of
transferring the tax declaration, this being unregistered land (Bael v. Intermediate Appellate
Court G. R. L- 74423 Jan.30. 1989 169 SCRA 617).
2.
If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it would have
prescribed just the same because more than 10 years have already elapsed since the date of the
execution of the sale.

Second Alternative Answer:

(a) The action to recover has been barred by acquisitive prescription lii favor of M considering
that M has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10) years with a just title.
(b) If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more S and P could not recover because
if at all their remedies would be:
1.
A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can be availed of within one
(1) year from the entry thereof, but only upon the basis of actual fraud." There is no showing
that M committed actual fraud in securing his title to the land; or
2.
An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of the title in their favor.
Again, this remedy is available within four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud but
not later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of the title in the name of M.

OBLIGATIONS
I.

Definition

II. Elements of an Obligation

III. Different Kinds of Prestations
IV. Classification of Obligations
I.

Distinguish briefly but clearly between:

Civil obligation and natural obligation. (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Civil obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do and not to do. It gives the creditor the
legal right to compel by an action in court the performance of such obligation.
A natural obligation is based on equity and natural law. There is no legal right to compel
performance thereof but if the debtor voluntarily pays it, he cannot recover what was paid.
II. Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will pass the bar examinations.
When his grandson passed the said examinations, Pedro refused to give the car on the
ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he correct or not? (2%) (2000
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it does not
depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it would be valid because it
depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of the debtor (the donor).
III. In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and lot which is being rented by
another person, if Eva passes the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed said
examinations.
Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot to another before Eva passed the
1998 bar examinations, is such sale valid? Why? (2%)
(b) Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said house and lot, is she entitled to
the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations?
Why? (3%) (1999 Bar Question)
(a)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the sale to the other person is valid as a sale with a resolutory condition because
what operates as a suspensive condition for Eva operates a resolutory condition for the buyer.
(a)

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, the sale to the other person is valid. However, the buyer acquired the property subject to
a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence, upon Evas passing the
Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated and Eva acquired ownership of the property.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale to another person before Eva could buy it from Manuel is valid, as the contract
between Manuel and Eva is a mere promise to sell and Eva has not acquired a real right over the
land assuming that there is a price stipulated in the contract for the contract to be considered a
sale and there was delivery or tradition of the thing sold.
(b) No, she is not entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel because at the time they accrued
and were collected, Eva was not yet the owner of the property.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Assuming that Eva is the one entitled to buy the house and lot, she is not entitled to the
rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the bar examinations. Whether it is a contract of sale
or a contract to sell, reciprocal prestations are deemed imposed A for the seller to deliver the
object sold and for the buyer to pay the price. Before the happening of the condition, the fruits of
the thing and the interests on the money are deemed to have been mutually compensated under
Article 1187.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Under Art. 1164, there is no obligation on the part of Manuel to deliver the fruits (rentals) of
the thing until the obligation to deliver the thing arises. As the suspensive condition has not been
fulfilled, the obligation to sell does not arise.
IV. In two separate documents signed by him, Juan Valentino "obligated" himself each to
Marla and to Perla, thus
'To Marla, my true love, I obligate myself to give you my one and only horse
when I feel like it."
- and
To Perla, my true sweetheart, I obligate myself to pay you the P500.00 I owe you
when I feel like it."
Months passed but Juan never bothered to make good his promises. Maria and Perla
came to consult you on whether or not they could recover on the basis of the foregoing
settings.
What would your legal advice be? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan for the latter to make good his promise.
[This is because a promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to recover especially
when she has not suffered damages resulting from such promise. A promise does not create an
obligation on the part of Juan because it is not something which arises from a contract, law, quasicontracts or quasi-delicts (Art. 1157)]. Under Art. 1182, Juan's promise to Maria is void because a
conditional obligation depends upon the sole will of the obligor.
As regards Perla, the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the promise to
pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when his means
permits him to do so, and is deemed to be one with an indefinite period under Art. 1180. Hence the
amount is recoverable after Perla asks the court to set the period as provided by Art. 1197, par. 2.
V. In a deed of sale of a realty, it was stipulated that the buyer would construct a
commercial building on the lot while the seller would construct a private passageway
bordering the lot. The building was eventually finished but the seller failed to complete
the passageway as some of the squatters, who were already known to be there at the
time they entered into the contract, refused to vacate the premises. In fact, prior to its
execution, the seller filed ejectment cases against the squatters.
The buyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. The defense is
that the obligation to construct the passageway should be with a period which,
incidentally, had not been fixed by them, hence, the need for fixing a judicial period.
Will the action for specific performance of the buyer against the seller prosper? (1991
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art. 1197 of the
Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties
themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court may be asked to fix it taking into
consideration the probable contemplation of the parties. Before the period is fixed, an action for
specific performance is premature.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It has been held in Borromeo vs. CA (47 SCRA 69) that the Supreme Court allowed the
simultaneous filing of action to fix the probable contemplated period of the parties where none is
fixed in the agreement, if this would avoid multiplicity of suits. In addition, technicalities must be
subordinated to substantial justice.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action for specific performance will not prosper. The filing of the ejectment suit by the
seller was precisely in compliance with his obligations and should not, therefore, be faulted if no
decision has yet been reached by the Court on the matter.
VI. How is a civil obligation distinguished from a natural obligation? Give an example of a
natural obligation. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of
what has been delivered on rendered by reason thereof.
Example of a natural obligation (one example out of any of the following):
1. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the
obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or
the value of the service he has rendered.
2. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor a third person pays a debt
which the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed,
but the debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot recover
what he has paid.
3. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the
contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact
that he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price
thus returned.
4. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one* years of age, who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money
or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to
recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
5. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily
performs the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the
payment of the value of the service he has rendered.

When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the
value of the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate
of the deceased, the payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the payer.
7. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts
of the deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with, a clause in the defective will, the
payment is effective and irrevocable.
6.

VII.

(a) Define alternative and facultative obligations.

(b) Define joint and solidary obligations. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Alternative obligations refer to those juridical relations which comprehend several objects
or prestations which are due, but the payment or performance of one of them would be sufficient.
On the other hand, facultative obligations refer to those juridical relations where only one object or
prestation has been agreed upon by the parties to the obligation, but the obligor may deliver or
render another in substitution.
(b) When there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and

the same Obligation, such obligation may be either joint (obligacion mancomunada) or solidary
(obligacion solidaria). A joint obligation may be defined as an obligation where there is a
concurrence of several creditors or several debtors, or of several creditors and debtors by virtue
which each of the creditors has a right to demand, while each of debtors is bound to render
compliance with his proportionate part of the prestation which constitutes the object of the
obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of only a
proportionate part of the credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of only a
proportionate part of the debt. A solidary obligation, on the other hand, may be defined as an
obligation where there is a concurrence of several creditors, or several debtors, or of several
creditors and debtors, by virtue which each of the creditors has a right to demand, while each of the
debtors is bound to render entire compliance with the prestation which constitutes the object of
the obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of the entire
credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of the entire debt. (See Art. 1207, CC; 3
Castan, 7th Ed., pp. 65-66.)
V. Sources of Obligations
I.

What are obligations without an agreement? Give five examples of situations giving rise
to this type of obligation. (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Obligations without an agreement are obligations that do not arise from contract such as
those arising from:
1. delicts;
2. quasi-delicts;
3. solution indebiti;
4. negotiorumgestio; and

5.

all other obligations arising from law.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Obligations without an agreement refer to the juridical relation of quasi-contract which
arise from certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (Art. 2142, NCC)
First example of an obligation without an agreement is a case of negotiorum gestio, whereby
one who voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of
another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination
of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is
in a position to do so (Art. 2144, NCC).
Second example, a case of solutio indebiti may also give rise to an obligation without an
agreement. This refers to the obligation to return which arises when something is received when
there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake (Art. 2154, NCC).
Third example, is when without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is
given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it
appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid (Art. 2164, NCC).
Fourth example, is when through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes
seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract,
he shall be liable to pay for the services of the physician or other person aiding him, unless the
service has been rendered out or pure generosity (Art. 2167, NCC).
Fifth instance of an obligation without an agreement is when the person obliged to
support an orphan or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the
latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father or
mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him (Art. 2166, NCC).
II. DPO went to a store to buy a pack of cigarettes worth P225.00 only. He gave the vendor,
RRA, a P500-peso bill. The vendor gave him the pack plus P375.00 change. Was there a
discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount given? What would be DPOs duty, if
any, in case of an excess in the amount of change given by the vendor? How is this
situational relationship between DPO and RRA denominated? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was error in the amount of change given by RRA. This is a case of solutio indebiti in
that DPO received something that is not due him. He has the obligation to return the P100.00;
otherwise, he will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of RRA. (Art. 2154, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

DPO has the duty to return to RRA the excess P100 as trustee under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which provides: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. There is, in this case, an implied or constructive trust in favor of RRA.
III. Armando owns, a row of residential apartments in San Juan, Metro Manila, which he
rents out to tenants. On 1 April 1991 he left for the United States without appointing any
administrator to manage his apartments such that uncollected rentals accumulated for
three (3) years. Amparo, a niece of Armando, concerned with the Interest of her uncle,
took it upon herself to administer the property. As a consequence, she incurred
expenses in collecting the rents and in some instances even spent for necessary repairs
to preserve the property.
1. What juridical relation between Amparo and Armando, if any, has resulted from
Amparos unilateral act of assuming the administration of Armandos apartments?
Explain.
2. What rights and obligations, if any, does Amparo have under the circumstances?
Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Negotiorum gestio existed between Amparo and Armando. She voluntarily took charge of
the agency or management of the business or property of her uncle without any power from her
uncle whose property was neglected. She is called the gestor negotiorum or officious manager. (Art.
2144, NCC)
2. It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations and
two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152, NCC, would entitle the examinee to full credit.

Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good
father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by
the owner of the property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties, he
shall be liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter
toward the owner of the business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless management
was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon:
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith.
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save the property or business from
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events

(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;

(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the

management.
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business produces the
effects of an express agency, even if the business may not have been successful.
Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly ratified, the
owner of the property business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for
obligations Incurred In his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the necessary
and useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of
his duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when, the management had for its purpose
the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may have been derived.
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has been no imminent
and manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of
the preceding article, provided:
(1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the owner.
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into
with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of
action between the owner and third persons.. These provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business.
(NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations
and any two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152. NCC would entitle thfe examinee to
full credit.)
IV. In September, 1972, upon declaration of martial rule in the Philippines, A, together with
his wife and children, disappeared from his residence along A. Mabini Street. Ermita,
Manila. B. his immediate neighbor, noticing that mysterious disappearance of A and his
family, closed the doors and windows of his house to prevent it from being burglarized.
Years passed without B hearing from A and his family. B continued taking care of A's
house, even causing minor repairs to be done at his house to preserve it. In 1976, when
business began to perk up in the area, an enterprising man, C, approached B and
proposed that they build stores at the ground floor of the house and convert its second
floor into a pension house. B agreed to Cs proposal and together they spent for the
construction of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the second floor into a
pension house. While construction was going on, fire occurred at a nearby house. The
houses at the entire block, including A's, were burned. After the EDSA revolution in
February 1986. A and his family returned from the United States where they took refuge
in 1972. Upon learning of what happened to his house. A sued B for damages. B pleaded
as a defense that he merely look charge of his house under the principle of negotiorum
gestio. He was not liable as the burning of the house is a fortuitous event.
Is B liable to A for damages under the foregoing circumstances? (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, B is not liable for damages, because he is a gestor in negotiorum gestio (Art. 2144, Civil
Code).
Furthermore, B is not liable to A because Article 2147 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
B did not undertake risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon:
a) he has not preferred his own interest to that of the owner:
b) he has not failed to return the property or business after demand by the owner; and
c) he has not assumed the management in bad faith.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
He would be liable under Art.2147 (1) of the Civil Code, because he used the property for an
operation which the operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he exposed the house to
increased risk, namely the operation of a pension house on the second floor and stores on the first
floor.
V. In fear of reprisals from lawless elements besieging his barangay, X abandoned his
fishpond, fled to Manila and left for Europe. Seeking that the fish in the fishpond were
ready for harvest, Y, who is in the business of managing fishponds on a commission
basis, took possession of the property, harvested the fish and sold the entire harvest to Z.
Thereafter, Y borrowed money from W and used the money to buy new supplies of
fish fry and to prepare the fishpond for the next crop.
What is the Juridical relation between X and Y during Xs absence?
Upon the return of X to the barangay, what are the obligations of Y to X as regards
the contract with Z?
c) Upon Xs return, what are the obligations of X as regards Ys contract with W?
d) What legal effects will result If X expressly ratifies Ys management and what
would be the obligations of X in favor of Y?(1992 Bar Question)
a)
b)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of negotiorum gestio". Y Is the gestor"

or officious manager" and X is the owner" (Art. 2144, Civil Code).

(b) Y must render an account of his operations and deliver to X the price he received for the
sale of the harvested fish (Art. 2145, Civil Code).
(c) X must pay the loan obtained by Y from W because X must answer for obligations
contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner (Art. 2150, Civil Code).
(d) Express ratification by X provides the effects of an express agency and X is liable to pay the

commissions habitually received by the gestor as manager (Art. 2149, Civil Code).
VI. Nature and Effect of Obligations

I.

Juliet offered to sell her house and lot, together with all the furniture and appliances
therein, to Dehlma. Before agreeing to purchase the property, Dehlma went to the
Register of Deeds to verify Juliets title. She discovered that while the property was
registered in Juliets name under the Land Registration Act, as amended by the Property
Registration Decree, it was mortgaged to Elaine to secure a debt of P80,000. Wanting to
buy the property, Dehlma told Juliet to redeem the property from Elaine, and gave her an
advance payment to be used for purposes of releasing the mortgage on the property.
When the mortgage was released, Juliet executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds, and a new TCT was
issued in Dehlmas name. Dehlma immediately took possession over the house and lot
and the movables therein Thereafter, Dehlma went to the Assessors Office to get a new
tax declaration under her name. She was surprised to find out that the property was
already declared for tax purposes in the name of XYZ Bank which had foreclosed the
mortgage on the property before it was sold to her. XYZ Bank was also the purchaser in
the foreclosure sale of the property. At that time the property was still unregistered but
XYZ Bank registered the Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in the day book of the Register of
Deeds under Act. 3344 and obtained a tax declaration in its name.
x
x
x
c) Who owns the movables inside the house? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Unless there is a contrary stipulation in the absolute deed of sale, Dehlma owns the movables
covered by the Deed of Sale and her ownership is perfected by the execution and delivery of public
document of sale. The delivery of the absolute deed of sale is a symbolical delivery of the house and
lot, including the contents of the house. This is an obligation to deliver a specific thing, which
includes the delivery of the specific thing itself and all of its accessions and accessories even though
they may not have been mentioned (Art. 1166, CC).
II. AB Corp. entered into a contract with XY Corp. whereby the former agreed to construct
the research and laboratory facilities of the latter. Under the terms of the contract, AB
Corp. agreed to complete the facility in 18 months, at the total contract price of P10
million. XY Corp. paid 50% of the total contract price, the balance to be paid upon
completion of the work. The work started immediately, but AB Corp. later experienced
work slippage because of labor unrest in his company. AB Corp.s employees claimed
that they are not being paid on time; hence, the work slowdown. As of the 17th month,
work was only 45% completed. AB Corp. asked for extension of time, claiming that its
labor problems is a case of fortuitous event, but this was denied by XY Corp. When it
became certain that the construction could not be finished on time, XY Corp. sent
written notice canceling the contract, and requiring AB Corp. to immediately vacate the
premises.
a) Can the labor unrest be considered a fortuitous event? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corp. from complying with its
obligation of constructing the research and laboratory facilities of XY Corp. The labor unrest, which
may even be attributed in large part to AB Corp. itself, is not the direct cause of non- compliance by
AB Corp. It is independent of its obligation. It is similar to the failure of a DBP borrower to pay her

loan just because her plantation suffered losses due to the cadang-cadang disease. It does not
excuse compliance with the obligation (DBP vs. Vda. de Moll, 43 SCRA 82 [1972])
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
The labor unrest in this case is not a fortuitous event. The requisites of fortuitous event are:
(1) the event must be independent of human will or at least of the debtors will; (2) the event could
not be foreseen, or if foreseen, is inevitable; (3) the event must have rendered impossible debtors
compliance of the obligation in a proper manner; and (4) the debtor must not be guilty of
concurrent negligence (Lasam v Smith, 45 Phils. 657 [1924]). All the requisites are absent in this
case. AB Corp. could have anticipated the labor unrest which was caused by delays in paying the
laborers wages. The company could have hired additional laborers to make up for the work
slowdown.
x
x
x
c) Must AB Corp. return the 50% downpayment? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, under the principle of quantum meruit, AC Corp. has the right to retain payment
corresponding to his percentage of accomplishment less the amount of damages suffered by XY
Corp. because of the delay or default.
III. Mr. ZY lost P100,000 in a card game called Russian poker, but he had no more cash to
pay in full the winner at the time session ended. He promised to pay PX, the winner, two
weeks thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two months, so PX filed in
court a suit to collect the amount of P50.000 that he won but remained unpaid. Will the
collection suit against ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn a suit against PX to recover
the P 100,000 that her husband lost? Reason. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The suit by PX to collect the balance of what he won from ZY will not prosper. Under
Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the winner for the
collection of what he has won in a game of chance. Although poker may depend in part on
ability, it is fundamentally a game of chance.
2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or community property, the wife of ZY could
sue to recover it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code provides that losses in
gambling or betting are borne exclusively by the loser-spc-use. Hence, conjugal or
community funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the money were exclusive
property of ZY, his wife may also sue to recover it under Article 2016 of the Civil Code if
she and the family needed the money for support.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO (2):
2) Mrs. ZY cannot file a suit to recover what her husband lost. Art 2014 of the Civil Code
provides that any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the winner, with
legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost. This means that only he can file the

suit. Mrs. ZY cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in the absolute community
property or conjugal partnership of gains, because under Art. 117(7) of the Family Code,
losses are borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. Therefore, these cannot be charged
against absolute community property or conjugal partnership of gains. This being so,
Mrs. ZY has no interest in law to prosecute and recover as she has no legal standing in
court to do so.
IV. Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the obligation
demandable in each case?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;

If the debtor promises to pay when he likes;
If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer;
If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die within
one year. (2003 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the debtor
binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so (Article 1180, NCC). When the creditor
knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the
period, and when the definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes
demandable (Article 1197, NCC).
(b) The obligation to pay when he likes is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is
subject to the sole will of the debtor and, therefore, the conditional obligation is void. (Article 1182,
NCC).
(c) The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, *.e. the future and uncertain
event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the
will of the debtor but also on other factors outside the debtor's control.
(d)
The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative
suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does not
die within one year (Article 1185, NCC).

V. Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for cleaning. The jewelry shop
undertook to return the ring by February 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the
Jewelry shop informed Kristina that the job was not yet finished. They asked her to
return five days later. On February 6. 1999, Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring,
but she was Informed that the same was stolen by a thief who entered the shop the night
before. Kristina filed an action for damages against the jewelry shop which put up the
defense of force majeure. Will the action prosper or not? (5%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. Since the defendant was already in default not having delivered the
ring when delivery was demanded by plaintiff at due date, the defendant is liable for the loss of the
thing and even when the loss was due to force majeure.

VI. Distinguish between the effects of suspensive and resolutory conditions upon an
obligation. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is evident that a resolutory condition affects the obligation to which it is attached in a
manner which is diametrically opposed to that of a suspensive condition. If the suspensive
condition is fulfilled, the obligation arises or becomes effective if the resolutory condition is
fulfilled, the obligation is extinguished. If the first is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is created; if
the second is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is consolidated. In other words, in the first, rights
are not yet acquired, but there is a hope or expectancy that they will soon be acquired; in the
second, rights are already acquired, but subject to the threat of extinction (8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1,
p. 311.)
VII. Kinds of Civil Obligations
I.

How is a civil obligation distinguished from a natural obligation? Give an example of a

natural obligation. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations, not
being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the retention of
what has been delivered on rendered by reason thereof.
Example of a natural obligation (one example out of any of the following):
1. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the
obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value
of the service he has rendered.
2. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor a third person pays a debt
which the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, but the
debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot recover what he has paid.
3. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract
voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been
benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.
4. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one* years of age, who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers
a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the
obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
5. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily
performs the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment of
the value of the service he has rendered.
6. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the value
of the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the deceased,
the payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the payer.
7. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the

deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with, a clause in the defective will, the payment is effective
and irrevocable.
II. What do you understand by ESTOPPEL? What are the different kinds of estoppel?
Explain. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Civil Code enumerates only two (2) kinds of estoppel: estoppel in pais or, by conduct and
estoppel by deed. Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his act, representation, oral
admission or by his silence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the other realize an
act on such belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are precluded
from asserting as against the other party any right or title in derogation of the deed or any fact
asserted therein.
ALTERNATIVE EXTENDED ANSWER:
The Civil Code gives two (2) kinds of estoppel, namely: estoppel in pais and estoppel by deed;
and jurisprudence gives a third, namely: estoppel by laches.
Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his act, representation, oral admission or by
his silence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the other realize an act on such
belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are precluded
from asserting as against the other party by which any right or title in derogation of the deed or
any fact asserted therein.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time giving rise to the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
VIII. Joint and Solidary Obligation
I.

A, B, C, D, and E made themselves solidarily indebted to X for the amount of P50,000.00.

When X demanded payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the following grounds:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

B is only 16 years old

C has already been condoned by X.
D is insolvent.
E was given by X an extension of 6 months without the consent of the other four codebtors.

State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on his obligation to pay X, if
such defenses are found to be true. (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)

A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only for Bs share of P10,000.00. A solidary

debtor may avail himself of any defense which personally belongs to a solidary codebtor, but only
as to the share of that co-debtor.
(b) A may avail of the condonation by X of C's share of P10.000.00. A solidary debtor may, in
actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the
obligation and of those which are personal to him or pertain to his own share. With respect to
those which personally belong to others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of
the debt for which the latter are responsible. (Article 1222, NCC).
(c) A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D as a defense. Applying the principle of
mutual guaranty among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the payment of Ds share and of all the
other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail of the defense of Ds insolvency.
(d) The extension of six (6) months given by X to E may be availed of by A as a partial defense
but only for the share of E. There is no novation of the obligation but only an act of liberality
granted to E alone.

II. Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one year.
After one semester, three of them returned to their home country and the fourth
transferred to a boarding house. Thelma discovered that they left unpaid telephone bills
in the total amount of P80.000.00. The lease contract provided that the lessees shall pay
for the telephone services in the leased premises. Thelma demanded that the fourth
student pay the entire amount of the unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is willing to
pay only one fourth of it. Who is correct? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation
requires solidarity (Art. 1207, CC). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any way,
stipulate solidarity.
III. Joey, Jovy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P300.000.00 which
has fallen due. The creditor has, however, condoned Jojos entire share in the debt. Since
Jovy has become insolvent, the creditor makes a demand on Joey to pay the debt.
1.
2.

How much, if any, may Joey be compelled to pay? [2%]

To what extent, if at all, can Jojo be compelled by Joey to contribute to such
payment? (3%) (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in view of the
remission of Jojo's share by the creditor. (Art. 1219, Civil Code)
2. Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50,000. Art. 1217, par. 3, Civil Code provides,
"When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the
debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the
debt of each."

Since the Insolvent debtor's share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are only two
remaining debtors - namely Joey and Jojo - these two shall share equally the burden of
reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute P50,000.00.
IV. In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed with Y as solidary co-maker a
promissory note in favor of A for the sum of P200.000.00. The loan was payable at
P20,000.00 with interest monthly within the first week of each month beginning July
1988 until maturity in April 1989 To secure the payment of the loan, X put up as security
a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla sedan. Because of failure of X and Y to pay
the principal amount of the loan, the car was extrajudicially foreclosed. A acquired the
car at As highest bid of PI20.000.00 during the auction sale.
After several fruitless letters of demand against X and Y, A sued Y alone for the
discovery of P80.000.00 constituting the deficiency.
Y resisted the suit raising the following defenses:
That Y should not be liable at all because X was not sued together with Y.
That the obligation has been paid completely by As acquisition of the car through
dacion en pago" or payment by cession.
c) That Y should not be held liable for the deficiency of P80.000.00 because he was
not a co-mortgagor in the chattel mortgage of the car, which contract was executed
by X alone as owner and mortgagor.
d) That assuming that Y is liable, he should only pay the proportionate sum of
P40.000.00.
a)
b)

Decide each defense with reasons. (1992 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) This first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The creditor may

proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude further
demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully paid.

(b) The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel mortgage is only given as a
security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary co-maker is not
relieved of further liability on the promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage.
(c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the extrajudicial demand against

the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial demand against the surety. A suretyship may
co-exist with a mortgage.
(d) The fourth defense of Y is untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since Y incurred a
solidary obligation with X.

(Arts. 1207. 1216, 1252 and 2047 Civil Code; Bicol Savings and Loan Associates vs. Guinhawa
188 SCRA 642)
V.
x
x
x
(b) Define joint and solidary obligations.

(c) A, B, and C borrowed P12,000 from X. This debt is evidenced by a promissory note

wherein the three bound themselves to pay the debt jointly and severally. However,
according to the note, A can be compelled to pay only on June 15, 1962, B can be
compelled to pay only on June 15, 1964, while C can be compelled to pay only on June
15, 1966. On June 15, 1962, X made a demand upon A to pay the entire indebtedness
but the latter aid only P4,000.00. Subsequently, because of As refusal to pay the
balance, X brought an action against him for collection of the amount. Will such an
action prosper? Reasons. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) When there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same Obligation, such obligation may be either joint (obligacion mancomunada) or solidary
(obligacion solidaria). A joint obligation may be defined as an obligation where there is a
concurrence of several creditors or several debtors, or of several creditors and debtors by virtue
which each of the creditors has a right t6 demand, while each of debtors is bound to render
compliance with his proportionate part of the prestation which constitutes the object of the
obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of only a
proportionate part of the credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of only a
proportionate part of the debt. A solidary obligation, on the other hand, may be defined as an
obligation where there is a concurrence of several creditors, or several debtors, or of several
creditors and debtors, by virtue which each of the creditors has a right to demand, while each of the
debtors is bound to render entire compliance with the prestation which constitutes the object of
the obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of the entire
credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of the entire debt. (See Art. 1207, CC; 3
Castan, 7th Ed., pp. 65-66.)
(c) For the present, the action will not prosper. It is of course true that the obligation here is
solidary and that its solidary character is not destroyed by the fact that the debtors are bound by
different periods for payment is expressly provided for in Art. 1211 of the Civil Code. However, in
solidary obligations of this type, the right of the creditor is limited to the recovery of the amount
owed by the debtor whose obligation has already matured, leaving in suspense his right to recover
the shares corresponding to the other debtors whose obligations have not yet matured. This
restriction upon the creditors right does not destroy the solidary character of the obligation,
because ultimately, he can still compel one and the same debtor, if that is his wish, to pay the entire
obligation; Therefore, in the instant case, X shall have to wait for June 15, 1964, when Bs obligation
shall have matured, and for June 15, 1966, when Cs obligation shall have also matured. On June 15,
1966, he can collect P4,000 from either A or B. On June 15, 1966, he can again collect another
P4,000 from either A or B or C. (See Ynchaustivs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978.)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It now being 1988, the action can no longer prosper because it has already prescribed. Actions
upon written contracts prescribe in 10 years.
VI. M/S Philippines, operated by United Shipping Lines, loaded in Japan for shipment to
Manila 50 crates of pipes consigned to Standard Blooming Mills. The shipment was
insured against marine risks with Marine Insurance Company. Enroute, the ship caught
fire resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The insurance company paid the
consignee and thereafter sought recovery and reimbursement from the United Shipping

Lines as subrogee unto the rights of the insured. Evidence was presented establishing
the fact that from the time the goods were stored in the ships hatch, no regular
inspection was made during the voyage such that the fire must have started 24 hours
before it was noticed.
Could the insurance company claim reimbursement of the amount it had paid its
insured from the United Shipping Lines? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under Article 2207, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person who violated the contract when the insurer pays or indemnifies the
insured for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of. There
being a breach of contract of carriage in view of total loss of the cargo insured, Marine Insurance
Company may claim reimbursement of the amount paid the insured from the United Shipping
Lines.
IX. Extinguishment of Obligations
I.

Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of
five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan from the same
bank in the amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah
issued in favor of the bank in post-dated checks, each in the amount of P100,000.00 to
cover the twelve monthly installment payments. On the third, fourth and fifth months,
the corresponding checks bounced.
The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceed to deduct the amount
of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Sarah's deposit after notice to her that this is a
form of compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explain. (4%) (2009 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No the bank is not correct, while the Bank is correct about the applicability of
compensation, it was not correct as to the amount compensated.
A bank deposit is a contract of loan, where the depositor is the creditor and the bank the
debtor. Since Sarah is also the debtor of the bank with respect to the loan, both are mutually
principal debtors and creditors of each other. Both obligations are due, demandable and liquidated
but only up to the extent of P300,000 (covering the unpaid third, fourth and fifth monthly
installments). The entire one million was not yet due because the loan has no acceleration clause in
case of default. And since there is no retention or controversy commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor, then all the requisites of legal compensation are present
but only up to the amount of P300,000. The bank, therefore, may deduct P300,000 pesos from
Sarah's bank deposit by way of compensation.
II. Eduardo was granted a loan by XYZ Bank for the purpose of improving a building which
XYZ leased from him. Eduardo, executed the promissory note (PN) in favor of the bank,
with his friend Recardo as cosignatory. In the PN, they both acknowledged that they are
individually and collectively liable and waived the need for prior demand. To secure

the PN, Recardo executed a real estate mortgage on his own property. When Eduardo
defaulted on the PN, XYZ stopped payment of rentals on the building on the ground that
legal compensation had set in. Since there was still a balance due on the PN after
applying the rentals, XYZ foreclosed the real estate mortgage over Recardos property.
Recardo opposed the foreclosure on the ground that he is only a co-signatory; that no
demand was made upon him for payment, and assuming he is liable, his liability should
not go beyond half the balance of the loan. Further, Recardo said that when the bank
invoked compensation between the rentals and the amount of the loan, it amounted to a
new contract or novation, and had the effect of extinguishing the security since he did not
give his consent (as owner of the property under the real estate mortgage) thereto.
a)

Can XYZ Bank validly assert legal compensation? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

XYZ Bank may validly assert the partial compensation of both debts, but it should be facultative
compensation because not all of the five requisites of legal compensation are present (Article 1279,
N.C.C.). The payment of the rentals by XYZ bank is not yet due, but the principal obligation of loan
where both Eduardo and Recardo are bound to pay the entire loan, is due and demandable without
need of demand. XYZ Bank may declare its obligation to pay rentals as already due and demand
payment from any of the two debtors.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Legal compensation can be validly asserted between the bank, Eduardo and Recardo. This is a
case of facultative obligation, thus, the bank can assert partial compensation. Banks have an
inherent right to set off where both obligations are due and demandable (Art. 1279, CC)
x
x
x
c) Does Recardo have basis under the Civil Code for claiming that the original contract
was novated? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
One of the three kinds of novation is applicable. There is no objective novation, whether express
or implied, because there is no change in the object or principal conditions of the obligation. There
is no substitution of debtors, either. Compensation is considered as abbreviated or simplified
payment and since Recardo bound himself solidarily with Eduardo, any facultative compensation
which occurs does not result in partial legal subrogation. Neither Eduardo nor Recardo is a third
person interested in the obligation under Art 1302, CC.
III. AB Corp. entered into a contract with XY Corp. whereby the former agreed to construct
the research and laboratory facilities of the latter. Under the terms of the contract, AB
Corp. agreed to complete the facility in 18 months, at the total contract price of P10
million. XY Corp. paid 50% of the total contract price, the balance to be paid upon
completion of the work. The work started immediately, but AB Corp. later experienced
work slippage because of labor unrest in his company. AB Corp.s employees claimed
that they are not being paid on time; hence, the work slowdown. As of the 17th month,
work was only 45% completed. AB Corp. asked for extension of time, claiming that its
labor problems is a case of fortuitous event, but this was denied by XY Corp. When it

became certain that the construction could not be finished on time, XY Corp. sent
written notice canceling the contract, and requiring AB Corp. to immediately vacate the
premises.
x
x
x
b) Can XY Corp. unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract? (2%) (2008
Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. XY Corp cannot unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract because there is need for a
judicial action of rescission. The provisions of Art. 1191 of the Civil Code providing for rescission in
reciprocal obligations can only be invoked judicially (Escueta v. Pando, 76 Phil. 256 [1946]; Republic
v. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, 84 Phil. 820 [1949]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, XY Corp. may unilaterally cancel the obligation but this is subject to the risk that the
cancellation of the reciprocal obligation being challenged in court and if AB Corp. succeeds, then
XY Corp. will be declared in default and be liable for damages (U.P. v. de los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102
[1970]).
IV. TX filed a suit for ejectment against BD for nonpayment of condominium rentals amount
to P150,000. During the pendency of the case, BD offered and TX accepted the full
amount due as rentals from BD, who then filed a motion to dismiss the ejectment suit on
the ground that the action is already extinguished.
Is BDs contention correct? Why or why not? Reason. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
BDs contention is not correct. TX can still maintain the suit for ejectment. The acceptance
by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears even during the pendency of the
ejectment case does not constitute a waiver or abandonment of the ejectment case. (Spouses
Clutario v. CA, 216 SCRA 341 [1992]).
V. On July 1, 1998. Brian leased an office space in a building for a period of five years at a
rental rate of PI.000.00 a month. The contract of lease contained the proviso that in case
of inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the monthly rental will automatically
be increased or decreased depending on the devaluation or inflation of the peso to the
dollar." Starting March 1, 2001, the lessor increased the rental to P2.000.00 a month, on
the ground of inflation proven by the fact that the exchange rate of the Philippine peso to
the dollar had increased from P25.00=$1.00 to P50.00=$1.00. Brian refused to pay the
increased rate and an action for unlawful detainer was filed against him. Will the action
prosper? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will not prosper. Extraordinary inflation or deflation is defined
as the sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. It does not necessarily refer to the

exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. Whether or not there exists an extraordinary Inflation or
deflation is for the courts to decide. There being no showing that the purchasing power of the peso
had been reduced tremendously, there could be no inflation that would justify the increase in the
amount of rental to be paid. Hence, Brian could refuse to pay the increased rate.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. The existence of inflation or deflation requires an official
declaration by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will prosper. It is a given fact in the problem, that there was
inflation, which caused the exchange rate to double. Since the contract itself authorizes the
increase in rental in the event of an inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the doubling of
the monthly rent is reasonable and is therefore a valid act under the very terms of the contract.
Brian's refusal to pay is thus a ground for ejectment.
VI. The sugar cane planters of Batangas entered into a long term milling contract with the
Central Azucarera de Don Pedro Inc. Ten years later, the Central assigned its rights to the
said milling contract to a Taiwanese group which would take over the operations of the
sugar mill. The planters filed an action to annul the said assignment on the ground that
the Taiwanese group was not registered with the Board of Investments. Will the action
prosper or not? Explain briefly. (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
(Note: The question presupposes knowledge and requires the application of the provisions
of the Omnibus investment Code, which properly belongs to Commercial law)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper not on the ground invoked but on the ground that the farmers have
not given their consent to the assignment. The milling contract imposes reciprocal obligations on
the parties. The sugar central has the obligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers while the
latter have the obligation to deliver their sugar cane to the sugar central. As to the obligation to
mill the sugar cane, the sugar central is a debtor of the farmers. In assigning its rights under the
contract, the sugar central will also transfer to the Taiwanese its obligation to the sugar cane of the
farmers. This will amount to a novation of the contract by substituting the debtor with a third
party. Under Article 1293 of the Civil Code, such substitution cannot take effect without the
consent of the creditor. The farmers, who are creditors as far as the obligation to mill their sugar
cane is concerned, may annul such assignment for not having given their consent thereto.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The assignment is valid because there is absolute freedom to transfer the credit and the
creditor need not get the consent of the debtor. He only needs to notify him.
VII. Arturo borrowed P500.000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300.000.00, his father
died. When the administrator of his fathers estate requested payment of the balance of
P200.000.00, Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father as evidenced
by a notation at the back of his check payment for the P300.000.00 reading: In full

payment of the loan". Will this be a valid defense in an action for collection? (3%) (2000
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation in full payment of the loan" was written by Arturo's father, there
was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case, the notation
is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. The condonation being implied, it
need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effective. The defense of full payment will,
therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself, it merely proves his intention
in making that payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam u. CA, G.R. No. 104726, 11
February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation
may be inferred. There being no condonation at all, the defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo's father, it amounted to an express condonation of the
balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd paragraph
of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the
acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article 748. There being no
acceptance in writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation to pay the balance
subsists. The defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by
Arturo's father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
VIII.

Define compensation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation, and distinguish it

from payment. [2%]
2. X, who has a savings deposit with Y Bank in the sum of P1,000,000.00 incurs a loan
obligation with the said Bank in the sum of P800,000.00 which has become due.
When X tries to withdraw his deposit. Y Bank allows only P200,000.00 to be
withdrawn, less service charges, claiming that compensation has extinguished its
obligation under the savings account to the concurrent amount of Xs debt. X
contends that compensation is improper when one of the debts, as here, arises from
a contract of deposit. Assuming that the promissory note signed by X to evidence the
loan does not provide for compensation between said loan and his savings deposit,
who is correct? [3%] (1998 Bar Question)
1.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount, the obligations of those
persons who in their own right are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other (Tolentino,
1991 ed., p. 365, citing 2 Castan 560 and Francia vs. LAC, 162 SCRA 753). It involves the
simultaneous balancing of two obligations in order to extinguish them to the extent in which the
amount of one is covered by that of the other. (De Leon, 1992 ed., p. 221, citing 6 Manresa 401).

Payment means not only delivery of money but also performance of an obligation (Article
1232, Civil Code). In payment, capacity to dispose of the thing paid and capacity to receive payment
are required for debtor and creditor, respectively: in compensation, such capacity is not necessary,

because the compensation operates bylaw and not by the act of the parties. In payment, the
performance must be complete; while in compensation there may be partial extinguishment of an
obligation (Tolentino, supra)
2. Y bank is correct. Art. 1287, Civil Code, does not apply. All the requisites of Art. 1279, Civil
Code are present. In the case of Gullas vs. PNB (62 Phil. 519), the Supreme Court held: The Civil
Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and deposit. These portions of
Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally
creditor and debtor of each other. In this connection, it has been held that the relation existing
between a depositor and a bank is that of creditor and debtor, x xx As a general rule, a bank has a
right of set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a
depositor." Hence, compensation took place between the mutual obligations of X and Y bank.

IX. In 1983 PHILCREDIT extended loans to Rivett-Strom Machineries. Inc. (RIVETT-STROM),

consisting of US$10 Million for the cost of machineries imported and directly paid by
PHILCREDIT, and 5 Million in cash payable in installments over a period of ten (10) years
on the basis of computed at the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the Philippine
peso at the time of payment.
RIVETT-STROM made payments on both loans which if based on the rate of exchange
in 1983 would have fully settled the loans.
PHILCREDIT contends that the payments on both loans should be based on the rate
of exchange existing at the time of payment, which rate of exchange has been
consistently increasing, and for which reason there would still be a considerable balance
on each loan.
Is the contention of PHILCREDIT correct? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As regards the loan consisting of dollars, the contention of PHILCREDIT is correct. It has to be
paid in Philippine currency computed on the basis of the exchange rate at the time of payment of
each installment, as held in Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337. As regards the P5 Million loan in Philippine
pesos, PHILCREDIT is wrong. The payment thereof cannot be measured by the peso-dollar
exchange rate. That will be violative of the Uniform Currency Act (R.A. 529) which prohibits the
payment of an obligation which, although to be paid in Philippine currency, is measured by a
foreign currency. (Palanca v. CA, 238 SCRA 593).
X. In 1978, Bobby borrowed P 1,000,000.00 from Chito payable in two years. The loan,
which was evidenced by a promissory note, was secured by a mortgage on real property.
No action was filed by Chito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage. But in 1991,
Bobby, without receiving any amount from Chito, executed another promissory note
which was worded exactly as the 1978 promissory note, except for the date thereof,
which was the date of its execution.
1)
2)

Can Chito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994?

Can Chito foreclose the real estate mortgage if Bobby fails to make good his
obligation under the 1991 promissory note? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes, Chito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994. Although the 1978
promissory note for PI million payable two years later or in 1980 became a natural obligation after
the lapse of ten (10) years, such natural obligation can be a valid consideration of a novated
promissory note dated in 1991 and payable two years later, or in 1993.

All the elements of an implied real novation are present:

a) an old valid obligation;
b) a new valid obligation;
c) capacity of the parties;
d) animus novandi or intention to novate; and
e) The old and the new obligation should be incompatible with each other on all material
points (Article 1292). The two promissory notes cannot stand together, hence, the period
of prescription of ten (10) years has not yet lapsed.
2) No. The mortgage being an accessory contract prescribed with the loan. The novation of the
loan, however, did not expressly include the mortgage, hence, the mortgage is extinguished under
Article 1296 of the NCC. The contract has been extinguished by the novation or extinction of the
principal obligation insofar as third parties are concerned.

XI. Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed to deliver the antique Mercedes
Benz car Dino had purchased from Ben, which wasby agreementdue for delivery on
December 31. 1993. Ben, in his answer to Dino's complaint, said Dino's claim has no
basis for the suit, because as the car was being driven to be delivered to Dino on January
1. 1994, a reckless truck driver had rammed into the Mercedes Benz. The trial court
dismissed Dino's complaint, saying Ben's obligation had, indeed, been extinguished by
force majeure.
Is the trial court correct? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No. Article 1262, New Civil Code provides, An obligation which consists in the delivery of a
determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the
debtor, and before he has incurred in delay.
b) The judgment of the trial court is incorrect. Loss of the thing due by fortuitous events or
force majeure is a valid defense for a debtor only when the debtor has not incurred delay.
Extinguishment of liability for fortuitous event requires that the debtor has not yet incurred any
delay. In the present case, the debtor was in delay when the car was destroyed on January 1, 1993
since it was due for delivery on December 31, 1993. (Art. 1262 Civil Code)
c) It depends whether or not Ben, the seller, was already in default at the time of the accident
because a demand for him to deliver on due date was not complied with by him. That fact not
having been given in the problem, the trial court erred in dismissing Dino's complaint. Reason:
There is default making him responsible for fortuitous events including the assumption of risk or
loss.

If on the other hand Ben was not in default as no demand has been sent to him prior to the
accident, then we must distinguish whether the price has been paid or not. If it has been paid, the
suit for damages should prosper but only to enable the buyer to recover the price paid. It should
be noted that Ben, the seller, must bear the loss on the principle of res peril domino. He cannot be
held answerable for damages as the loss of the car was not imputable to his fault or fraud. In any
case, he can recover the value of the car from the party whose negligence caused the accident. If no
price has been paid at all, the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaint.
XII. In 1971, Able Construction, Inc. entered into a contract with Tropical Home Developers,
Inc. whereby the former would build for the latter the houses within its subdivision. The
cost of each house, labor and materials included, was P 100,000.00. Four hundred units
were to be constructed within five years. In 1973, Able found that it could no longer
continue with the job due to the Increase in the price of oil and its derivatives and the
concomitant worldwide spiralling of prices of all commodities, including basic raw
materials required for the construction of the houses. The cost of development had risen
to unanticipated levels and to such a degree that the conditions and factors which
formed the original basis of the contract had been totally changed. Able brought suit
against Tropical Homes praying that the Court relieve it of its obligation.
Is Able Construction entitled to the relief sought? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Able Construction, Inc. is entitled to the relief sought under Article 1267, Civil Code.
The law provides: When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part."
XIII. What is dation in payment and how is it distinguished from assignment of property?
(1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dation in payment is a special form of payment whereby property is alienated to the creditor
in satisfaction of a debt in money.
Assignment of property, or payment by cession, is a special form of payment whereby the
debtor cedes or assigns his property to his creditors so that the proceeds thereof will be applied in
payment of his debts.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In dation in payment whereby property is given by the debtor to the creditor in payment of a
debt in money, there is only one creditor. In assignment of property, there are several creditors.
In the former, the debtor may be solvent. In the latter, there may be partial insolvency.
In the former, particular property is ceded. In the latter, all the property of the debtor is
ceded.
In the former, the particular obligation is extinguished in whole or in part as agreed upon. In

the latter, it releases the debtor from the net proceeds only, unless otherwise agreed or intended.
XIV.

(a) Under the Civil Code, what are the different special forms of payments?
(b) What are the special requisites of consignation in order that it shall produce the

effect of payment?

(c) A treasury warrant payable to Rosenne and indorsed by Boni was cashed at the

Philippine National Bank. The warrant was subsequently dishonored by the

Philippine Treasury. The Bank then applied the deposit of Boni to the payment of
the amount paid for the warrant. Is the action of the Bank in accordance with law?
Reasons. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under the Civil Code, there are actually four special forms of payment. They are (1)
application of payment (Arts. 1252-1254); (2) dation in payment (Art. 1245); (3) payment by
cession (Art. 1255); and (4) tender of payment and consignation (Arts. 1256-1261). Strictly
speaking, however, application of payment, by its very nature, is not a special form of payment.
(b) In order that consignation shall produce the effect of payment, it is not only essential

that it must conform with all of the requisites of payment, but it is also essential that certain
special requirements prescribed by law must be complied with. The debtor must show:
(1) That there is a debt due;
(2) That the consignation has been made either because the creditor to whom tender of
payment was made refused to accept the payment without just cause, or because any
of the cause stated by law for effective consignation without previous tender of
payment exists (Art. 1256, CC);
(3) The previous notice of the consignation had been given to the persons interested in
the fulfillment of the obligation (Art. 1256, CC);
(4) That the thing or amount due had been placed at the disposal of judicial authority (Art.
1258, par. 1, CC); and
(5) That after the consignation had been made, the persons interested in the fulfillment of
the obligation had been notified thereof (Art. 1258, par. 2, CC).
(c) Yes, the action of the Bank is in accordance with law. The facts stated in the above problem
are exactly the same as those in the case of Gullas vs. National Bank, 62 Phil. 519, where the
Supreme Court held that a bank has a right of set-off of the deposit in its hands for the payment of
any indebtedness to it on the part of the depositor. When-a person deposits his money at a bank,
whether such deposit is fixed, savings or current, a relationship of creditor and debtor is
established between the depositor and bank. It is, therefore, evident that all of the requisites for
compensation are present in this case.

Committees Recommendation Re: (a):

The committee recommends that if application for payment is not mentioned by the
examinee, full credit must likewise be given.
XV. Suppose that under an obligation imposed by a final judgment, the liability of the
judgment debtor is to pay the amount of P6,000.00 but both the judgment debtor and
the judgment creditor subsequently entered into a contract reducing the liability of the
former to only P4,000.00, is there an implied novation which will have the effect of

extinguishing the judgment obligation and creating a modified obligatory relation?

Reasons. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There is no implied novation in this case. We see no valid objection to the judgment debtor
and the judgment creditor in entering into an agreement regarding the monetary obligation of the
former under the judgment referred to. The payment by the judgment debtor of the lesser amount
of P4,000, accepted by the creditor without any protest or objection and acknowledged by the
latter as in full satisfaction of the money judgment, completely extinguished the judgment debt
and released the debtor from his pecuniary liability. Novation results in two stipulationsone to
extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is
that novation effects a substitution or modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of one obligation by the creation of another. In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or
modified obligation arose out of the payment by judgment debtor of the reduced amount of
P4,000 to the creditor. Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates thjit the same be so declared
in unequivocal terms clearly and unmistakably shown by the ex-, press agreement of the parties or
by acts of equivalent importor that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between
the two obligations. (Sandico vs. Piguing, 42SCRA 322.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
(1) There remains an obligation on the basis of the facts given. There is no showing in the facts

that the P4,000 has been paid so it created a modified obligatory obligation no longer based
on the judgment but based on the novatory agreement.

(2) There is no implied novation. Instead there has been a partial remission in the amount of

P2,000 leaving P4,000 still enforceable under the judgment.

(3) It can amount to a compromise. A final judgment which has not yet been fully satisfied may

be the subject of a compromise. The compromise partakes the nature of a novation. Article
204; provides that:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.
(Gatchalian vs. Arlegui 75 SCRA 234; Dormitorio vs. Fernandez 72 SCRA 388)
CONTRACTS
I.

Essential Requisites

I.

Lolita was employed in a finance company. Because she could not account for the funds
entrusted to her, she was charged with estafa and ordered arrested. In order to secure
her release from jail, her parents executed a promissory note to pay the finance
company the amount allegedly misappropriated by their daughter. The finance company
then executed an affidavit of desistance which led to the withdrawal of the information
against Lolita and her release from jail. The parents failed to comply with their

promissory note and the finance company sued them for specific performance. Will the
action prosper or not? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The promissory note executed by Lolitas parents is valid and
binding, the consideration being the extinguishment of Lolitas civil liability and not the stifling of
the criminal prosecution.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper because the consideration for the promissory note was the nonprosecution of the criminal case for estafa. This cannot be done anymore because the information
has already been filed in court and to do it is illegal. That the consideration for the promissory'
note is the stifling of the criminal prosecution is evident from the execution by the finance
company of the affidavit of desistance immediately after the execution by Lolitas parents of the
promissory note. The consideration being illegal, the promissory' note is invalid and may not be
enforced by court action.
II. Merle offered to sell her automobile to Violy for P60,000.00. After inspecting the
automobile, Violy offered to buy it for P50,000.00. This offer was accepted by Merle. The
next day, Merle offered to deliver the automobile, but Violy being short of funds, secured
postponement of the delivery, promising to pay the price upon arrival of the steamer,
Helena. The steamer however never arrived because it was wrecked by a typhoon and
sank somewhere off the Coast of Samar.
(1) Is there a perfected contract in this case? Why?
(2) Is the promise to pay made by Violy conditional or with a term? Why?
(3) Can Merle compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the automobile?
Why? (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Yes, there is a perfected contract because there is already a concurrence between the offer
and the acceptance with respect to the object and the cause which shall constitute the contract.
Such concurrence is manifested by the acceptance made by Merle of the offer made by Violy.
(2) I submit that the promise to pay made by Violy is not conditional, but with a term. The

promise is to pay the P50,000 upon arrival in this port of the steamer, Helena* not if the steamer
Helena shall arrive in this port. Hence, the promise is with regard to the date of arrival and not with
regard to the fact of arrival.
(3) Yes, Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the automobile. She
will, however, have to wait for the date when the steamer, Helena, would have arrived were it not
for the shipwreck. After all, there is already a perfected contract lesser amount of P4,000, accepted
by the creditor without any protest or objection and acknowledged by the latter as in full
satisfaction of the money judgment, completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the
debtor from his pecuniary liability.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:

(2) The promise to pay is subject to a term. When there is a pre-existing obligation and the
condition affects only the time of payment such condition can be considered as a period. In
other words, the parties must be deemed to have contemplated a period.
(3) Yes Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the automobile but only
after the parties would have fixed the period. Failing in that, the courts may be asked to fix the
period. Article 1180 provides that:

When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the provisions of article
1197.
II. Kinds of Contracts
I.

Marvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very reasonable price of
P900,000.00, giving the latter 10 days within which to accept or reject the offer. On the
fifth day, before Carlos could make up his mind, Marvin withdrew his offer.
a) What is the effect of the withdrawal of Marvin's offer? (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The withdrawal of Marvins offer is valid because there was no consideration paid for the
option. An option is a separate contract from the contract which is the subject of the offer, and if
not supported by ajpty consideration, the option contract is not deemed perfected. Thus, Marvin
may withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance of the offer.
b) Will your answer be the same if Carlos paid Marvin P10,000.00 as consideration for

that option? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Carlos paid P10,000.00 as consideration for that option, Marvin cannot withdraw the offer
prior to expiration of the option period. The option is a separate contract and if founded on
consideration is a perfected option contract and must be respected by Marvin.
c)

Supposing that Carlos accepted the offer before Marvin could communicate his
withdrawal thereof? Discuss the legal consequences. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Carlos has already accepted the offer and such acceptance has been communicated to
Marvin before Marvin communicates the withdrawal, the acceptance creates a perfected
construction contract, even if no consideration was as yet paid for the option. If Marvin does not
perform his obligations under the perfected contract of construction, he shall be liable for all
consequences arising from the breach thereof based on any of the available remedies which may
be instituted by Carlos, such as specific performance, or rescission with damages in both cases.
II. Distinguish briefly but clearly between:

Inexistent contracts and annullable contracts. (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In inexistent contracts, one or more requisites of a valid contract are absent. In anullable
contracts, all the elements of a contract are present except that the consent of one of the
contracting parties was vitiated or one of them has no capacity to give consent.
Inexistent contracts are considered as not having been entered into and, therefore, void ab
initio. They do not create any obligation and cannot be ratified or validated, as there is no
agreement to ratify or validate. On the other hand, annullable or voidable contracts are valid until
invalidated by the court but may be ratified.
III. Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket.
Was there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In the
affirmative, what was it? Explain. (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of
her close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they entered into
was the nominate contract of Agency. Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the
contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of service in the absence of a relation of
principal and agent between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
IV. Distinguish consensual from real contracts and name at least four (4) kinds of real
contracts under the present law. (3%) (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Consensual contracts are those which are perfected by mere consent (Art. 1315, Civil Code).
Real contracts are those which are perfected by the delivery of the object of the obligation. (Art.
1316, Civil Code)
Examples of real contracts are deposit, pledge, commodatum and simple loan (mutuum).
III. Formality
I.

Suppose that in an oral contract, which by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the execution thereof, one of the contracting parties has already complied
within the year with the obligations imposed upon him by said contract, can the other
party avoid fulfillment of those incumbent upon him by invoking the Statute of Frauds?
(1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he cannot. This is so, because the Statute of Frauds aims to prevent and not to protect
fraud. It is well- settled that when the law declares that an agreement which by its terms is not to
be performed within a year from the making thereof is unenforceable by action, unless the same*
or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by
his agent, it refers only to an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed on either side
within a year from the execution thereof. Hence, one which has already been fully performed on
one side within a year is taken out of the operation of the statute. (Phil. Nat. Bank vs. Phil.
Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857; Shoemaker vs. La Tondena, 68 Phil. 24.)
IV. Defective Contracts
V. Effect of Contracts
I.

DON, an American businessman, secured parental consent for the employment of five
minors to play certain roles in two movies he was producing at home in Makati. They
worked at odd hours of the day and night, but always accompanied by parents or other
adults. The producer paid the children talent fees at rates better than adult wages.
But the social worker, DEB, reported to OSWD that these children often missed going
to school. They sometimes drank wine, aside from being exposed to drugs. In some
scenes, they were filmed naked or in revealing costumes. In his defense. DON contended
all these were part of artistic freedom and cultural creativity. None of the parents
complained, said DON. He also said they signed a contract containing a waiver of their
right to file any complaint in any office or tribunal concerning the working conditions of
their children acting in the movies.
Is the waiver valid and binding? Why or why not? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The waiver is not valid. Although the contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, they may not do so if such are
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code). The
parents waiver to file a complaint concerning the working conditions detrimental to the moral
well-being of their children acting in the movies is in violation of the Family Code and Labor laws.
Thus, the waiver is invalid and not binding.
The Child Labor Law is a mandatory and prohibitory law and the rights of the child cannot
be waived as it is contrary to law and public policy.
II. Printado is engaged in the printing business. Suplico supplies printing paper to Printado
pursuant to an order agreement under which Suplico binds himself to deliver the same
volume of paper every month for a period of 18 months, with Printado in turn agreeing
to pay within 60 days after each delivery. Suplico has been faithfully delivering under the
order agreement for 10 months but thereafter stopped doing so, because Printado has
not made any payment at all. Printado has also a standing contract with publisher
Publico for the printing of 10,000 volumes of school textbooks. Suplico was aware of said

printing contract. After printing 1,000 volumes, Printado also fails to perform under its
printing contract with Publico. Suplico sues Printado for the value of the unpaid
deliveries under their order agreement. At the same time Publico sues Printado for
damages for breach of contract with respect to their own printing agreement. In the suit
filed by Suplico, Printado counters that: (a) Suplico cannot demand payment for
deliveries made under their order agreement until Suplico has completed performance
under said contract; (b) Suplico should pay damages for breach of contract; and (c)
Suplico should be liable for Printados breach of his contract with Publico because the
order agreement between Suplico and Printado was for the benefit of Publico. Are the
contentions of Printado tenable? Explain your answer as to each contention. (5%) (2002
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contentions of Printado are untenable.
Printado having failed to pay for the printing paper covered by the delivery invoices on
time, Suplico has the right to cease making further delivery. And the latter did not violate the order
agreement (Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of Appeals, (333 SCRA 170, G.R. No. 115117,
June 8, 2000).
Suplico cannot be held liable for damages, for breach of contract, as it was not he who
violated the order agreement, but Printado.
Suplico cannot be held liable for Printado's breach of contract with Publico. He is not a party
to the agreement entered into by and between Printado and Publico. Theirs is not a stipulation
pour autrui. [Aforesaid] Such contracts do could not affect third persons like Suplico because of the
basic civil law principle of relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can only bind the
parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of
such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. (Integrated Packaging Corporation v. CA,
supra.)
III. Roland, a basketball star, was under contract for one year to play-for-play exclusively for
Lady Love. Inc. However, even before the basketball season could open, he was offered a
more attractive pay plus fringes benefits by Sweet Taste, Inc. Roland accepted the offer
and transferred to Sweet Taste. Lady Love sues Roland and Sweet Taste for breach of
contract. Defendants claim that the restriction to play for Lady Love alone is void, hence,
unenforceable, as it constitutes an undue interference with the right of Roland to enter
into contracts and the impairment of his freedom to play and enjoy basketball.
Can Roland be bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love or can he
disregard the same? Is he liable at all? How about Sweet Taste? Is it liable to Lady Love?
(1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Roland is bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love and he cannot disregard the
same, under the principles of obligatoriness of contracts. Obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the parties.

Yes, Roland is liable under the contract as far as Lady Love is concerned.
He is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code since he contravened the tenor of
his obligation. Not being a contracting party. Sweet Taste is not bound by the contract but it can be
held liable under Art. 1314. The basis of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is founded on
quasi-delict, assuming that Sweet Taste knew of the contract. Article 1314 of the Civil Code
provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It is assumed that Lady Love knew of the contract.
Neither Roland nor Sweet Taste would be liable, because the restriction in the contract is
violative of Article 1306 as being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
IV. A is the lessee of an apartment owned by Y. A allowed his married but employed
daughter B, whose husband works in Kuwait, to occupy it. The relationship between Y
and A soured. Since he has no reason at all to eject A, Y, in connivance with the City
Engineer, secured from the latter an order for the demolition of the building. A
immediately filed an action in the Regional Trial Court to annul the order and to enjoin
its enforcement. Y and A were able to forge a compromise agreement under which A
agreed to a twenty percent (20%) increase in the monthly rentals. They further agreed
that the lease will expire two (2) years later and that in the event that Y would sell the
property, either A or his daughter B shall have the right of first refusal. * The
Compromise Agreement was approved by the court. Six (6) months before the expiration
of the lease, A died. Y sold the property to the Visorro Realty Corp. without notifying B. B
then filed an action to rescind the sale in favor of the corporation and to compel Y to sell
the property to her since under the Compromise Agreement, she was given the right of
first refusal which, she maintains, is a stipulation pour atrui under Article 1311 of the
Civil Code.
Is she correct? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B is not correct. Her action cannot prosper. Article 1311 requires that the third person
intended to be benefited must communicate his acceptance to the obligor before the revocation.
There is no showing that B manifested her acceptance to Y at any time before the death of A and
before the sale. Hence, B cannot enforce any right under the alleged stipulation pour atrui.
SALES
I.

Definition and Essential Requisites of a Contract of Sale

I.

Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective buyer,
Ray. Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a fair price of
P2 Million. Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the property. Later,

another couple, Bemie and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower price of PI.5 Million.
But Ray insisted on buying the house of Biong and Linda for sentimental reason. Ray
prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the couple and a managers check of P2 Million.
After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the deed of sale. However, Linda was not
able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return she refused to sign the document
saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the deed of sale and for
moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
(1) Will the suit prosper? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. The sale was void because Linda did not give her written consent to the
sale. In Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002), the Supreme Court has ruled that the sale of
conjugal property is void if both spouses have not given their written consent to it and even if the
spouse who did not sign the Deed of Sale participated in the negotiation of the contract. In Abalos v.
Macatangay, 439 SCRA 649 (2004), the Supreme Court even held that for the sale to be valid, the
signatures of the spouses to signify their written consent must be on the same document. In this
case, Linda, although she was the one who negotiated the sale, did not give her written consent to
the sale. Hence, the sale is void. However, Linda will not be entitled to damages because Ray is not
in any way in bad faith.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will not prosper because the contract of sale has already been perfected and partly
consummated. The contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the buyer and
seller on to the thing to be sold and on the price thereof. In this case, Linda had a meeting of minds
with Ray when they agreed that the property will be sold for 2 million pesos at the conclusion of
her negotiations with him, while Biong had a meeting of minds with Ray when he signed the Deed
of Sale and accepted the 2 million-peso payment by Ray. Linda is estopped from questioning the
validity of the contract she herself negotiated with Ray.
(2) Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong and Linda? Can he also recover
damages from the spouses? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and Biong for the return of the 2 million pesos he
paid for the property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if it can be proven that they were
in bad faith in backing out from the contract, as this is an act contrary to morals and good customs
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected, Ray may file a counterclaim against
Linda and Biong for specific performance or rescission, with damages in either case. Linda has
breached the obligation created by the contract when she filed an action for nullification of sale.
On account of Lindas bad faith or fraud, Ray may ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code.

II. Distinguish between a contract of real estate mortgage and a contract of sale with right of
repurchase. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Real estate mortgage is an accessory contract. A contract of sale with right of repurchase is
2.
3.
4.
5.

a principal contract.
Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of title. A contract of sale involves a conditional
transfer of title.
Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of possession. A contract of sale involves a
conditional transfer of possession.
In a real estate mortgage the creditor has no rights to the fruits. In a contract of sale, the
vendee is entitled to the fruits.
In a real estate mortgage, upon default the creditor is not the owner. In a contract of sale,
upon consolidation, the vendee is the owner.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:

Any three (3) of the foregoing distinctions should be given full credit.
II. Parties to a Contract of Sale
III. Subject Matter
IV. Obligations of the Seller to Transfer Ownership
I.

JV, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to PP. But the deed of sale was not registered. One
year later, JV sold the parcel again to RR, who succeeded to register the deed and to
obtain a transfer certificate of title over the property in his own name.
Who has a better right over the parcel of land, RR or PP? Why? Explain the legal
basis for your answer. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on whether or not RR is an innocent purchaser for value.
Under the Torrens System, a deed or instrument operated only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make the registration. It is the
registration of the deed or the instrument that is the operative act that conveys or affects the
land. (Sec. 51, P.D. No. 1529).
In cases of double sale of titled land, it is a well-settled rule that the buyer who first registers
the sale in good faith acquires a better right to the land. (Art. 1544, Civil Code).
Persons dealing with property covered by Torrens title are not required to go beyond what
appears on its face. (Orquiola v. CA386, SCRA301, [2002]; Domingo v. Roces 401 SCRA 197,
[2003]). Thus, absent any showing that RR knew about, or ought to have known the prior sale of
the land to PP or that he acted in bad faith, and being first to register the sale, RR acquired a good
and a clean title to the property as against PP.

II. On June 15, 1995, Jesus sold a parcel of registered land to Jaime. On June 30. 1995, he
sold the same land to Jose. Who has a better right if:
a) the first sale is registered ahead of the second sale, with knowledge of the latter.
Why? (3%)
b) the second sale is registered ahead of the first sale, with knowledge of the latter?
Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The first buyer has the better right if his sale was first to be registered, even though the first
buyer knew of the second sale. The fact that he knew of the second sale at the time of his
registration does not make him as acting in bad faith because the sale to him was ahead in time,
hence, has a priority in right. What creates bad faith in the case of double sale of land is knowledge
of a previous sale.
b) The first buyer is still to be preferred, where the second sale is registered ahead of the first
sale but with knowledge of the latter. This is because the second buyer, who at the time he
registered his sale knew that the property had already been sold to someone else, acted in bad
faith. (Article 1544, C.C.)
III. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, to whom shall the
ownership be transferred? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be an inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
IV. Miguel, Carlos and Lino are neighbors. Miguel owned a piece of registered land which
both Carlos and Lino wanted to buy. Miguel sold the land to Carlos. The sale was not
registered upon the request of Miguel. Later on, the same property was sold by Miguel to
Lino. Miguel told Carlos about the second sale. Carlos immediately tried to see Lino to
discuss the matter and inform him of the previous sale to him (Carlos) of the same
property but Lino refused to see Carlos. Thereupon Carlos annotated in the Registry of
Property his adverse claim on the property. A week later, Lino registered the sale on his
favor and had a new transfer certificate of title issued in his name. However, the adverse
claim of Carlos was duly annotated in the title. Notwithstanding, Lino took possession of
the property and built a small bungalow thereon.

(a) Who is the rightful owner of the property? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In double sales, under Article 1544 the land sold belongs to the first registrant in good faith.
If none, it belongs to the first possessor in good faith. If none it belongs to the person with the
oldest title, provided there is good faith. Carlos, who has the oldest title, is therefore the rightful
owner of the property, because there was no registration in good faith by Lino.
V. Price
VI. Formation of Contract of Sale
I.

On July 14, 2004, Pedro executed in favor of Juan a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 6245. It appears in the Deed of Sale that Pedro received from
Juan P120,000.00 as purchase price. However, Pedro retained the owners duplicate of
said title. Thereafter, Juan, as lessor, and Pedro, as lessee, executed a contract of lease
over the property for a period of one (1) year with a monthly rental of P1,000.00. Pedro,
as lessee, was also obligated to pay the realty taxes on the property during the period of
lease. Subsequently, Pedro filed a complaint against Juan for the reformation of the Deed
of Absolute Sale, alleging that the transaction covered by the deed was an equitable
mortgage. In his verified answer to the complaint, Juan alleged that the property was
sold to him under the Deed of Absolute Sale, and interposed counterclaims to recover
possession of the property and to compel Pedro to turn over to him the owner's
duplicate of title.
Resolve the case with reasons. (6%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An equitable mortgage arises from a transaction, regardless of its form, which results into a
security, or an offer or attempt to pledge land as security for a debt or liability. Its essence is the
intent of the parties to create a mortgage, lien or charge on the property sufficiently described or
identified to secure an obligation, which intent must be clearly established in order that such a
mortgage may exist.
Defendant's defense that he acquired the land through an Absolute Deed of Sale and not
through pacto de retro is untenable. The presumption of equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of
the Civil Code, equally applies to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale (Article 1604, NCC).
The facts and circumstances that Pedro retained possession of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of the
Certificate of Title; that he remained in possession of the land as lessee; that he bound himself to
pay the realty taxes during the period of lease, are matters collectively and strongly indicating that
the Deed of Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage. In case of doubt, the Deed of Sale should be
considered as a loan with mortgage, because this juridical relation involves a lesser transmission
of rights and interests.
If the transaction is proven to be an equitable mortgage, Pedro's prayer for reformation of
the instrument should be granted in accordance with Article 1605 of the Civil Code. Thus, in case
of non-payment, he may foreclose the mortgage and consolidate his ownership of the land. In that
event, Juan's counterclaim to recover possession of the land and to compel Pedro to surrender the
Owners Duplicate Copy of the title becomes a consequential right.

II. Arturo gave Richard a receipt which states:

Receipt
Received from Richard as down payment
For my 1995 Toyota Corolla with
plate No. XYZ-1 23 .............................. P50.000.00
Balance payable: 12/30/01 ............ P50 000.00
September 15, 2001.
(Sgd.) Arturo
Does this receipt evidence a contract to sell? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is a contract of sale because the seller did not reserve ownership until he was fully paid.
III. State the basic difference (only in their legal effects)
(a)

other;

Between a contract to sell, on the one hand, and a contract of sale, on the

(b)
Between a conditional sale, on the one hand, and an absolute sale, on the
other hand. (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred to the buyer upon delivery of the
object to him while in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller until the purchase price
is fully paid. In a contract to sell, delivery of the object does not confer ownership upon the buyer.
In a contract of sale, there is only one contract executed between the seller and the buyer, while in
a contract to sell, there are two contracts, first the contract to sell (which is a conditional or
preparatory sale) and a second, the final deed of sale or the principal contract which is executed
after full payment of the purchase price.
(b)
A conditional sale is one where the vendor is granted the right to unilaterally
rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the
prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title to the property is not reserved to the
vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to rescind the contract based on the fulfillment or
non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition.

IV. On 20 December 1970, Juliet, a widow, borrowed from Romeo P4.000.00 and, as security
therefore, she executed a deed of mortgage over one of her two (2) registered lots which
has a market value of P4 5,000.00. The document and the certificate of title of the
property were delivered to Romeo.
On 2 June 1971, Juliet obtained an additional sum of P3,000.00 from Romeo. On this
date, however, Romeo caused the preparation of a deed of absolute sale of the above
property, to which Juliet affixed her signature without first reading the document. The

consideration indicated is P7.000.00. She thought that this document was similar to the
first she signed. When she reached home, her son X, after reading the duplicate copy of
the deed, informed her that what she signed was not a mortgage but a deed of absolute
sale. On the following day, 3 June 1971, Juliet, accompanied by X, went back to Romeo
and demanded the reformation it, Romeo prepared and signed a document wherein, as
vendee in the deed of sale above mentioned, he obligated and bound himself to resell the
land to Juliet or her heirs and successors for the same consideration as reflected in the
deed of sale (P7.000.00) within a period of two (2) years, or until 3 June 1973. It is
further stated therein that should the Vendor (Juliet) fail to exercise her right to redeem
within the said period, the conveyance shall be deemed absolute and irrevocable.
Romeo did not take possession of the property. He did not pay the taxes thereon.
Juliet died in January 1973 without having repurchased the property. Her only
surviving heir, her son X, failed to repurchase the property on or before 3 June 1973. in
1975, Romeo sold the property to Y for P50.000.00. Upon learning of the sale, X filed an
action for the nullification of the sale and for the recovery of the property on the ground
that the so-called deed of absolute sale executed by his mother was merely an equitable
mortgage, taking into account the inadequacy of the price and the failure of Romeo to
take possession of the property and to pay the taxes thereon. Romeo and Y maintain that
there was a valid absolute sale and that the document signed by the former-on 3 June
1973 was merely a promise to sell.
If you were the Judge, would you uphold the theory f X?
If you decide in favor of Romeo and Y, would you uphold the validity of the
promise to sell? (1991 Bar Question)
(a)
(b)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will not uphold the theory of X for the nullification of the sale and for the recovery
of the property on the ground that the so-called sale was only an equitable mortgage. An equitable
mortgage may arise only if, in truth, the sale was one with the right of repurchase. The facts of the
case state that the right to repurchase was granted after the absolute deed of sale was executed.
Following the rule in Cruzo vs. Carriaga (174 SCRA 330), a deed of repurchase executed
independently of the deed of sale where the two stipulations are found in two instruments instead
of one document, the right of repurchase would amount only to one option granted by the buyer to
the seller. Since the contract cannot be upheld as a contract of sale with the right to repurchase,
Art. 1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage will not apply. The rule could have been different
if both deeds were executed on the same occasion or date, in which case, Cinder the ruling in
spouses Claravall v. CA (190 SCRA 439), the contract may still be sustained as an equitable
mortgage, given the circumstances expressed in Art. 1602. The reserved right to repurchase is then
deemed an original intention.
A.

B.
If I were to decide in favor of Romeo and Y. I would not uphold the validity of the
promise to sell, so as to enforce it by an action for specific performance. The promise to sell would
only amount to a mere offer and, therefore, it is not enforceable unless it was sought to be
exercised before a withdrawal or denial thereof.

Even assuming the facts given at the end of the case, there would have been no separate
consideration for such promise to sell. The contract would at most amount to an option which
again may not be the basis for an action for specific performance.

V. X came across an advertisement in the Manila Daily Bulletin about the rush sale of
three slightly used TOYOTA cars, Model 1989 for only P200,000 each. Finding the price
to be very cheap and in order to be sure that he gets one unit ahead of the others, X
immediately phoned the advertiser Y and place an order for one car. Y accepted the
order and promised to deliver the ordered unit on July 15, 1989. On the said date,
however, Y did not deliver the unit. X brings an action to compel Y to deliver the
unit. Will such action prosper? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract in this case has been perfected. However, the contract is unenforceable under
the statute of frauds. The action will prosper if there is no objection to the oral evidence, which
amounts to a waiver of the statute of frauds.
VI.

(b) One-half of a parcel of land belonging to A and B was sold by X to Y for the amount of

PI ,500.00. The sale was executed verbally. One year later, A and B sold the entire
land to X. Is the sale executed verbally by X to Y valid and binding? Reasons.
(c) Distinguish between a contract of sale and a contract to sell. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The sale, although not contained in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless
valid and binding for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale qf real estate
produces legal effects between the parties. In the premises, Art. 1434 or the Civil Code, which
declares that when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and
later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer
or grantee, is applicable. (Bucton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499.)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO (b):

1) The contract of sale is valid and enforceable in view of the payment of the price of P1,500
But there is no showing the problem that there was delivery of the land. Accordingly, Article 1434
does not apply. However, Y can compel under Article 1357 to observe the proper form of a deed of
sale involving real property and simultaneously compel specific performance to deliver.
2) The verbal sale of land is unenforceable since there is no statement in the problem that the
agreed price of P1,500 was paid, nor was the land delivered. Being, Article 1434 will not apply
since it is predicated on a valid or enforceable contract of sale.
(c) The two may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
(1) In the first, title passes to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold, whereas in the

second, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until full
payment of the price.
(2) In the first, nonpayment is a negative resolutory condition, whereas in the second, full

payment is a positive suspensive condition.

(3) In the first, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the Contract

is resolved or rescinded, whereas in the second, title remains in the vendor, and when he
seeks to eject the vendee because of noncompliance by such vendee with the suspensive
condition stipulated, he is enforcing the contract and not resolving the same. (Santos vs.
Santos, CA, 47 Off. Gaz; 6372.)
VII. Transfer of Ownership
I.

May a person sell something that does not belong to him? Explain. (2003 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, a person may sell something which does not belong to him. For the sale to be valid, the
law does not require the seller to be the owner of the property at the time of the sale. (Article 1434,
NCC). If the seller cannot transfer ownership over the thing sold at the time of delivery because he
was not the owner thereof, he shall be liable for breach of contract.
II. A granted B the exclusive right to sell his brand of Maong pants in Isabela, the price for
his merchandise payable within 60 days from delivery, and promising B a commission of
20% on all sales. After the delivery of the merchandise to B but before he could sell any
of them, BOs store in Isabela was completely burned without his fault, together with all
of As pants. Must B pay A for his lost pants? Why? (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract between A and B is a sale not an agency to sell because the price is payable by
B upon 60 days from delivery even if B is unable to resell it. If B were an agent, he is not bound to
pay the price if he is unable to resell it.
As a buyer, ownership passed to B upon delivery and, under Art. 1504 of the Civil Code, the
thing perishes for the owner. Hence, B must still pay the price.
III. Using a falsified managers check, Justine, as the buyer, was able to take delivery of a
second hand car which she had just bought from United Car Sales, Inc. The sale was
registered with the Land Transportation Office. A week later, the seller learned that the
check had been dishonored, but by that time, Justine was nowhere to be seen. It turned
out that Justine had sold the car to Jerico, the present possessor who knew nothing
about the falsified check. In a suit by United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for recovery of
the car, plaintiff alleges it had been unlawfully deprived of its property through fraud
and should, consequently, be allowed to recover it without having to reimburse the
defendant for the price the latter had paid. Should the suit prosper? (5%) (1998 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car. However, since Jerico was not guilty of
any fraud and appears to be an Innocent purchaser for value, he should be reimbursed for the
price he paid. This is without prejudice to United Car Sales, Inc. right of action against Justine. As
between two innocent parties, the party causing the Injury should suffer the loss. Therefore,

United Car Sales, Inc. should suffer the loss.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act of estafa should be deemed to come within
the meaning of unlawful deprivation under Art. 559, Civil Code, as without it plaintiff would not
have parted with the possession of its car.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and Jerico is a buyer in good faith.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is delivered by the seller to the buyer without
reservation of ownership, the ownership is transferred to the buyer. Therefore in the suit of United
Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for the recovery of the car, the plaintiff should not be allowed to
recover the car without reimbursing the defendant for the price that the latter paid. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos.184 SCRA 614, April 26, 1990)
IV. In a 20-year lease contract over a building, the lessee is expressly granted a right of first
refusal should the lessor decide to sell both the land and building. However, the lessor
sold the property to a third person who knew about the lease and in fact agreed t respect
it. Consequently, the lessee brings an action against both the lessor-seller and the buyer
(a) to rescind the sale and (b) to compel specific performance of his right of first refusal
in the sense that the lessor should be ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale infavor
of the lessee at the same price. The defendants contend that the plaintiff can neither
seek rescission of the sale nor compel specific performance of a mere" right of first
refusal. Decide the case. [5%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action filed by the lessee, for both rescission of the offending sale and specific
performance of the right of first refusal which was violated, should prosper. The ruling in
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc. (264 SCRA 483), a case with similar
facts, sustains both rights of action because the buyer in the subsequent sale knew the existence of
right of first refusal, hence in bad faith.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
The action to rescind the sale and to compel the right to first refusal will not prosper. (Ang
Yu Asuncion vs. CA, 238 SCRA 602). The Court ruled in a unanimous en banc decision that the right
of first refusal is not founded upon contract but on a quasi-delictual relationship covered by the
principles of human relations and unjust enrichment (Art. 19, et seq. Civil Code). Hence the only
action that will prosper according to the Supreme Court is an "action for damages in a proper
forum for the purpose."
V. Peter Co, a trader from Manila, has dealt business with Allied Commodities in Hongkong
for five years. All through the years. Peter Go accumulated an indebtedness of
P500,000.00 with Allied Commodities. Upon demand by its agent in Manila, Peter Co paid

Allied Commodities by check the amount owed. Upon deposit in the payees account in
Manila, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. For and in consideration of
PI.00, Allied Commodities assigned the credit to Hadji Butu who brought suit against
Peter Co in the RTC of Manila for recovery of the amount owed. Peter Co moved to
dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that Hadji Butu was not a real party in
interest and. therefore, without legal capacity to sue and that he had not agreed to a
subrogation of creditor.
Will Peter Cos defense of absence of agreement to a subrogation of creditor prosper?
(1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Cos defense will not prosper. This is not a case of subrogation, but an assignment of
credit. Assignment of credit is the process of transferring the right of the assignor to the assignee.
The assignment may be done either gratuitously or onerously, in which case, the assignment has
an effect similar to that of a sale (Nyco Sales Corp.v.BA Finance Corp. G.R. No.71694, Aug. 16, 1991
200 SCRA 637). As a result of the assignment, the plaintiff acquired all the rights of the assignor
including the right to sue in his own name as the legal assignee. In assignment, the debtors
consent is not essential for the validity of the assignment (Art. 1624; 1475, CC; Rodriguez v. CA, et
al, G. R No. 84220. March 25, 1992 207 SCRA 553).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the defense of Peter Co will not prosper. Hadji Butu validly acquired his right by an
assignment of credit under Article 1624 of the Civil Code. However, the provisions on the contract
of sale (Article 1475 Civil Code) will apply, and the transaction is covered by the Statute of Frauds.
(Art. 1403 par. (2) Civil Code)
VI. Pablo sold his car to Alfonso who issued a postdated check in full payment therefor.
Before the maturity of the check, Alfonso sold the car to Gregorio who later sold it to
Gabriel. When presented for payment, the check issued by Alfonso was dishonored by
the drawee bank for the reason that he, Alfonso, had already closed his account even
before he issued his check.
Pablo sued to recover the car from Gabriel alleging that he (Pablo) had been
unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Alfonsos deception.
Will the suit prosper? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The suit will not prosper because Pablo was not unlawfully deprived of the car although
he was unlawfully deprived of the price. The perfection of the sale and the delivery of the car was
enough to allow Alfonso to have a right of ownership over the car, which can be lawfully
transferred to Gregorio. Art. 559 applies only to a person who is in possession in good faith of the
property, and not to the owner thereof. Alfonso, in the problem, was the owner, and, hence, Gabriel
acquired the title to the car.

Non-payment of the price in a contract of sale does not render ineffective the obligation to
deliver.
The obligation to deliver a thing is different from the obligation to pay its price.
EDCA Publishing Co. v. Santos (1990)
VIII. Risk of Loss
I.

D sold a second-hand car to E for P150,000.00 The agreement between D and E was that
half of the purchase price, or P75,000.00, shall be paid upon delivery of the car to E and
the balance of P75,000.00 shall be paid in five equal monthly installments of P15,000.00
each. The car was delivered to E, and E paid the amount of P75,000.00 to D. Less than one
month thereafter, the car was stolen from Es garage with no fault on Es part and was
never recovered. Is E legally bound to pay the said unpaid balance of P75,000.00?
Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, E is legally bound to pay the balance of P75,000.00. The ownership of the car sold was
acquired by E from the moment it was delivered to him. Having acquired ownership, E bears the
risk of the loss of the thing under the doctrine of res perit domino. (Articles 1496, 1497, Civil Code).
IX. Documents of Title
X. Remedies of an Unpaid Seller
I.

Priscilla purchased a condominium unit in Makati City from the Citiland Corporation for
a price of P10 Million, payable P3 Million down and the balance with interest thereon at
14% per annum payable in sixty (60) equal monthly installments of P 198,333.33. They
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in which it is stipulated that should the vendee fail
to pay three (3) successive installments, the sale shall be deemed automatically
rescinded without the necessity of judicial action and all payments made by the vendee
shall be forfeited in favor of the vendor by way of rental for the use and occupancy of the
unit and as liquidated damages. For 46 months, Priscilla paid the monthly installments
religiously, but on the 47th and 48th months, she failed to pay. On the 49th month, she
tried to pay the installments due but the vendor refused to receive the payments
tendered by her. The following month, the vendor sent her a notice that it was
rescinding the Deed of Conditional Sale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic
rescission, and demanded that she vacate the premises. She replied that the contract
cannot be rescinded without judicial demand or notarial act pursuant to Article 1592 of
the Civil Code.
a)
b)

Is Article 1592 applicable? (3%)

Can the vendor rescind the contract? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 1592 of the Civil Code does not apply to a conditional sale. In Valarao v. CA, 304
SCRA 155, the Supreme Court held that Article 1592 applies only to a contract of sale and not to a
a)

Deed of Conditional Sale where the seller has reserved title to the property until full payment of the
purchase price. The law applicable is the Maceda Law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, the vendor cannot rescind the contract under the circumstances. Under the Maceda
Law, which is the law applicable, the seller on Installment may not rescind the contract till after the
lapse of the mandatory grace period of 30 days for every one year of Installment payments, and
only after 30 days from notice of cancellation or demand, for rescission by a notarial act. In this
case, the refusal of the seller to accept payment from the buyer on the 49th month was not justified
because the buyer was entitled to 60 days grace period and the payment was tendered within that
period. Moreover, the notice of rescission served by the seller on the buyer was not effective
because the notice was not by a notarial act. Besides, the seller may still pay within 30 days from
such notarial notice before rescission may be effected. All these requirements for a valid rescission
were not complied with by the seller. Hence, the rescission is invalid.
II. What are the so-called Maceda and Recto laws in connection with sales on
installments? Give the most important features of each law. (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Maceda Law (R.A. 655) is applicable to sales of immovable property on installments. The
most important features are (Rillo v. CA, 247 SCRA 461):
After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer is entitled to a
mandatory grace period of one month for every year of installment payments made, to pay the
unpaid installments without interest.
(1)

If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value
equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years of installments,
an additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) of the total
payments made.
In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the buyer a
grace period of not less than 60 days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the
expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt
by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act.
(2)

The Recto Law (Art. 1484) refers to sale of movables payable in installments and limiting the
right of seller, in case of default by the buyer, to one of three remedies:
(a) exact fulfillment;
(b)cancel the sale if two or more installments have not been paid;
(c) foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold, also in case

of default of two or more

installments, with no further action against the purchaser.

XI. Performance of Contract
I.

X sold a parcel of land to Y on 01 January 2002, payment and delivery to be made on 01

February 2002. It was stipulated that if payment were not to be made by Y on 01

February 2002, the sale between the parties would automatically be rescinded. Y failed
to pay on 01 February 2002, but offered to pay three days later, which payment X
refused to accept, claiming that their contract of sale had already been rescinded. Is X's
contention correct? Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, X is not correct. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been
stipulated, as in this case, that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission
of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period,
as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by
a notarial act (Article 1592, New Civil Code). Since no demand for rescission was made on Y, either
judicially or by a notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept the payment offered by Y three (3) days
after the expiration of the period.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
This is a contract to sell and not a contract of absolute sale, since as there has been no
delivery of the land. Article 1592 of the New Civil Code is not applicable. Instead, Article 1595 of
the New Civil Code applies. The seller has two alternative remedies: (1) specific performance, or
(2) rescission or resolution under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. In both remedies, damages
are due because of default.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the contract was automatically rescinded upon Ys failure to pay on 01 February 2002.
By the express terms of the contract, there is no need for X to make a demand in order for
rescission to take place. (Article 1191, New Civil Code; Suria v. IAC, 151 SCRA 661 [1987]; U.P. v. de
los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 [1970]).
II. Bert offers to buy Simeons property under the following terms and conditions: P1
million purchase price, 10% option money, the balance payable in cash upon the
clearance of the property of all illegal occupants. The option money is promptly paid and
Simeon clears the property of all illegal occupants in no time at all. However, when Bert
tenders payment of the balance and asks Simeon for the deed of absolute sale, Simeon
suddenly has a change of heart, claiming that the deal is disadvantageous to him as he
has found out that the property can fetch three times the agreed purchase price. Bert
seeks specific performance but Simeon contends that he has merely given Bert an option
to buy and nothing more, and offers to return the option money which Bert refuses to
accept.
Explain the nature of an option contract. (2%)
Will Berts action for specific performance prosper? Explain. (4%)
May Simeon justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the deal is
financially disadvantageous to him? Explain. (4%) (2002 Bar Question)
A.
B.
C.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. An option contract is one granting a privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at a
determined price. It must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (Art. 1479 and

1482, NCC)
B. Berts action for specific performance will prosper because there was a binding agreement
of sale, not just an option contract. The sale was perfected upon acceptance by Simeon of 10% of
the agreed price. This 3mount is in reality earnest money which, under Art. 1482, shall be
considered a3 part of the price arid as proof of the perfection of the contract. (Topacio v. CA, 211
SCRA 291[1992j; Villongco Realty v. Bormaheco, 65 SCRA 352 [1975]).
C. Simeon cannot justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the deal is
financially disadvantageous to him. Having made a bad bargain is not a legal ground for pulling out
of a binding contract of sale, in the absence of some actionable wrong by the other party (Vales v.
Villa, 35 Phil. 769 [1916]), and no such wrong has been committed by Bert.

III. LT applied with BPI to purchase a house and lot in Quezon City, one of its acquired
assets. The amount offered was P1,000,000.00 payable, as follows: P200,000.00 down
payment, the balance of P800.000.00 payable within 90 days from June 1, 1985. BPI
accepted the offer, whereupon LT drew a check for P200,000.00 in favor of BPI which
the latter thereafter deposited in its account. On September 5, 1985, LT wrote BPI
requesting extension until October 10, 1985, within which to pay the balance, to which
BPI agreed. On October 5, 1985, due to the expected delay in the remittance of the
needed amount by his financier from the United States, LT wrote BPI requesting a last
extension until October 30, 1985. within which to pay the balance. BPI denied LTs
request because another had offered to buy the same property for P1,500,000.00,
cancelled its agreement with LT and offered to return to him the amount of P200,200.00
that LT had paid to it. On October 20, 1985, upon receipt of the amount of P800,000.00
from his US financier, LT offered to pay the amount by tendering a cashiers check
therefor but which BPI refused to accept. LT then filed a complaint against BPI in the
RTC for specific performance and deposited in court the amount of P800,000.00.
Is BPI legally correct in cancelling its contract with LT? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
BPI is not correct in cancelling the contract with LT. In Lina Topacio v. Court of Appeals and
BPI Investment (G. R. No. 102606, July 3. 1993, 211 SCRA 291), the Supreme Court held that the
earnest money is part of the purchase price and is proof of the perfection of the contract. Secondly,
notarial or judicial rescission under Art. 1592 and 1991 of the Civil Code is necessary (Taguba v.
de Leon, 132 SCRA 722).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
BPI is correct in cancelling its contract with LT but BPI must do so by way of judicial
rescission under Article 1191 Civil Code. The law requires a judicial action, and mere notice of
rescission is insufficient if it is resisted. The law also provides that slight breach is not a ground for
rescission (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian Phil. Co., 47 Phils. 821). Delay in the fulfillment of the
obligation (Art. 1169, Civil Code) is a ground to rescind, only if time is of the essence. Otherwise,
the court may refuse the rescission if there is a just cause for the fixing of a period.
IV.

(a) A sold to B a house and lot for P50,000.00 payable 30 days after the execution of the

deed of sale. It was expressly agreed in the deed that the sale would ipso facto be of
no effect upon the buyers failure to pay as' agreed. B failed to pay on maturity, and A
sued to declare the contract of no force and effect. If B tendered payment before the
action was filed, but subsequent to the stipulated date of payment, would the action
prosper? Why? (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action would not prosper in such a case. According to the law, in the sale of
immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price at
the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay,
even after the expiration of the period, so long as no demand for the rescission of the contract has
been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant
him a new term. (Art. 1592, CC.) Here, at the time B tendered payment of the purchase price, there
was still no demand made upon him by A for the payment of said purchase price either judicially
or by notarial act.
XII. Warranties
XIII. Breach of Contract
XIV. Extinguishment of the Sale
I.

Dux leased his house to Iris for a period of 2 years, at the rate of P25,000.00 monthly,
payable annually in advance. The contract stipulated that it may be renewed for another
2-year period upon mutual agreement of the parties. The contract also granted Iris the
right of first refusal to purchase the property at any time during the lease, if Dux decides
to sell the property at the same price that the property is offered for sale to a third party.
Twenty-three months after execution of the lease contract, Dux sold the house to his
mother for P2 million. Iris claimed that the sale was a breach of her right of first refusal.
Dux said there was no breach because the property was sold to his mother who is not a
third party. Iris filed an action to rescind the sale and to compel Dux to sell the property
to her at the same price. Alternatively, she asked the court to extend the lease for
another 2 years on the same terms.
a) Can Iris seek rescission of the sale of the property to Duxs mother? (3%) (2008 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Iris can seek rescission because pursuant to Equatorial Realty Co. v. Mayfair Theater (264
SCRA 483 [1996]) rescission is a relief allowed for the protection of one of the contracting parties
and even third persons from all injury and damage the contract of sale may causes or the
protection of some incompatible and preferred right.
II. Adela and Beth are co-owners of a parcel of land. Beth sold her undivided share of the
property to Xandro, who promptly notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter a
copy of the deed of absolute sale. When Xandro presented the deed for registration, the
register of deeds also notified Adela of the sale, enclosing a copy of the deed with the
notice. However, Adela ignored the notices. A year later, Xandro filed a petition for the

partition of the property. Upon receipt of summons, Adela immediately tendered the
requisite amount for the redemption. Xandro contends that Adela lost her right of
redemption after the expiration of 30 days from her receipt of the notice of the sale
given by him. May Adela still exercise her right of redemption? Explain. (5%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED MAIN ANSWER:
Yes, Adela may still exercise her right of redemption notwithstanding the lapse of more
than 30 days from notice of the sale given to her because Article 1623 of the New Civil Code
requires that the notice in writing of the sale must come from the prospective vendor or vendor as
the case may be. In this case, the notice of the sale was given by the vendee and the Register of
Deeds. The period of 30 days never tolled. She can still avail of that right.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE MAIN ANSWER:
Adela can no longer exercise her right of redemption. As co-owner, she had only 30 days
from the time she received written notice of the sale which in this case took the form of a copy of
the deed of sale being given to her (Conejero v. CA, 16 SCRA 775 [196SJ). The law does not
prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the
redemptioner (Etcuban v. CA, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]). So long as the redemptioner was informed in
writing, he has no cause to complain (Distrito v. CA, 197 SCRA 606, 609 [1991]). In fact in Distrito, a
written notice was held unnecessary where the co-owner had actual knowledge of the sale, having
acted as middleman and being present when the vendor signed the deed of sale.
III. Betty and Lydia were co-owners of a parcel of land. Last January 31, 2001, when she paid
her real estate tax, Betty discovered that Lydia had sold her share to Emma on November
10, 2000. The following day, Betty offered to redeem her share from Emma, but the latter
replied that Betty's right to redeem has already prescribed. Is Emma correct or not?
Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Emma, the buyer, is not correct. Betty can still enforce her right of legal redemption as a coowner. Article 1623 of the Civil Code gives a co-owner 30 days from written notice of the sale by
the vendor to exercise his right of legal redemption. In the present problem, the 30-day period for
the exercise by Betty of her right of redemption had not even begun to run because no notice in
writing of the sale appears to have been given to her by Lydia.
IV. On January 2, 1980, A and B entered into a contract whereby A sold to B a parcel of land
for and in consideration of P 10,000.00, A reserving to himself the right to repurchase
the same. Because they were friends, no period was agreed upon for the repurchase of
the property.
Until when must A exercise his right of repurchase?
If A fails to redeem the property within the allowable period, what would you
advise B to do for his better protection? (1993 Bar Question)
1)
2)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A can exercise his right of repurchase within four (4) years from the date of the contract
(Art. 1606, Civil Code).
1)

2) I would advise B to file an action for consolidation of title and obtain a judicial order of
consolidation which must be recorded in the Registry of Property (Art. 1607, Civil Code).

V. X offered to buy the house and lot of Y for P300,000. Since X had only P200,000 in
cash at the time, he proposed to pay the balance of P100,000 in four (4) equal monthly
installments. As the title to the property was to be immediately transferred to the buyer,
X, to secure the payment of the balance of purchase price, proposed to constitute a first
mortgage on the property in favor of Y. Y agreed to the proposal so that on April 15,
1987, the contract of sale in favor of X was executed and on the same date (April 15,
1987), X constituted the said first mortgage. When the first installment became due.
X defaulted in the payment thereof. Y now brings an action to rescind the contract of
sale, which X opposed. How would you decide the conflict? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Either of the following answers should be given full credit:
A.
Y cannot rescind. The relationship is no longer that of buyer and seller because
the sale was already perfected and consummated. The relationship is already that of mortgagor
and mortgagee. Rescission is not a principal action retaliatory in character but a subsidiary one
available only in the absence of any other legal remedy. Foreclosure is not only a legal but a
contractual remedy. The debtor must pay and, in case of breach, the mortgagee may foreclose.

Y can rescind. Specific performance and rescission are alternative remedies in

breach of reciprocal obligations. The contract is only partly consummated. The price is not fully
paid. The mortgage is an accessory contract of guarantee arid can be waived by the creditor who
can avail of his remedies in the principal contract.
B.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
C.
Considering that the default covers only P25,000.00 and the sum of P2OO,OOO.0O
has already been paid, there is only, a slight or casual breach negating the right of the seller to
rescind the contract of sale.
D.
Rescission is available provided that the vendor give the vendee the 60-day period
as required by the Maceda Law or the Realty Installment Buyers Law.

XV. The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree (P.D. 957)
I.

Bernie bought on installment a residential subdivision lot from DEVLAND. After having
faithfully paid the installments for 48 months. Bernie discovered that DEVLAND had
failed to develop the subdivision in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications within the time frame in the plan. He thus wrote a letter to DEVLAND
informing it that he was stopping payment. Consequently, DEVLAND cancelled the sale
and wrote Bernie, informing him that his payments are forfeited in its favor.

a)

Was the action of DEVLAND proper? Explain (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that the land is a residential subdivision project under P.D. No. 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), DEVLANDs action is not proper because
under Section 23 of said Decree, no installment payment shall be forfeited to the owner or
developer when the buyer, after due notice, desists from further payment due to the failure of the
owner-developer to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans and within the time
limit for complying with the same.
b) Discuss the rights of Bernie under the circumstances. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the same Section of the Decree, Bernie may, at his option, be reimbursed the total
amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests at the legal rate.
He may also ask the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to apply penal sanctions against
DEVLAND consisting of payment of administrative fine of not more than P20.000.00 and/or
imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
c) Supposing DEVLAND had fully developed the subdivision but Bernie failed to pay

further installments after 4 years due to business reverses. Discuss the rights and
obligations of the parties. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law). DEVLAND has the right to cancel the contract but it has
to refund Bernie the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to 50% of
the total payments made.
ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Bernie has the right to pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments within
the grace period granted him by R.A 6552 equivalent to one-month for every year of installment
payments, or four months in this case. After the lapse of four months DEVLAND may cancel the
contract after thirty days from and after Bernie receives a notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission of the contract by notarial act. (Sec. 4, R.A. 6552) Bernie also has the right to sell or
assign his rights before the cancellation of the contract (Sec. 5)
XVI. The Condominium Act (R.A. No. 4726)
I.

The Ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake occurred
which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number of
condominium units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the
condominium units affected, legally sue for partition by sale of the whole project?
Explain. (4%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Edwin may legally sue for partition by sale of the whole condominium project under
the following conditions: (a) the damage or destruction caused by the earthquake has rendered
one-half () or more of the units therein untenantable, and (b) that the condominium owners
holding an aggregate of more than thirty (30%) percent interest of the common areas are opposed
to the restoration of the condominium project (Section 8[b], Republic Act No. 4726 Condominium
Act).
SUCCESSION
I.
I.

General Provisions
(a) For purposes of succession, when is death deemed to occur or take place?
(b) May succession be conferred by contracts or acts inter vivos? Illustrate. (1991 Bar

Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Death as a fact is deemed to occur when it actually takes place. Death is presumed to take
place in the circumstances under Arts. 390-391 of the Civil Code. The time of death is presumed to
be at the expiration of the 10-year period as prescribed by Article 390 and at the moment of
disappearance under Article 391.
B. Under Art. 84 of the Family Code amending Art, 130 of the Civil Code, contractual

succession is no longer possible since the law now requires that donations of future property be
governed by the provisions on the testamentary succession and formalities of wills.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
In the case of Coronado vs. CA (191 SCRA81), it was ruled that no property passes under
a will without its being probated, but may under Article 1058 of the Civil Code of 1898, be
sustained as a partition by an act inter vivos (Many- Oy vs. CA 144 SCRA 33).
And in the case of Chavez vs. LAC (191 SCJRA 211), it was ruled that while the law prohibits
contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case
expressly authorized by law. A person has two options in making a partition of his estate: either by
an act inter vivos or by will. If the partition is by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; if by an act inter vivos, such
partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided the legitime is
not prejudiced.
Where several sisters execute deeds of sale over their 1/6 undivided share of the
paraphernal property of their mother, in favor of another sister, with their mother not
only giving her authority thereto but even signing said deeds, there is a valid partition
inter vivos between the mother and her children which cannot be revoked by the mother.
Said deeds of sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance.

It would be unjust for the mother to revoke the sales to a son and to execute a simulated
sale in favor of a daughter who already benefited by the partition."
II. Testamentary Succession
I.

Multiple choice.

A executed a 5-page notarial will before a notary public and three witnesses. All of them
signed each and every page of the will.
One of the witnesses was B, the father of one of the legatees to the will. What is the effect
of B being a witness to the will? (1%) (2010 Bar Question)
The will is invalidated
The will is valid and effective
The legacy given to Bs child is not valid
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
2.
3.

No. 3. The legacy given to Bs child is not valid.

The validity of the will is not affected by the legacy in favor of the son of an attesting witness
to the will. However, the said legacy is void under Article 823 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. The will is valid and effective.
Under Article 823 (NCC), the legacy given in favor of the son of an instrumental witness to a
will has no effect on the validity of the will. Hence, the will is valid and effective.
II. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[b] In reserva troncal, all reservatarios (reservees) inherit as a class and in equal
shares regardless pf their proximity in degree to the prepositus (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Not all of the relatives within the third degree will inherit as reservatario, and not all of
those who are entitled to inherit will inherit in equal shares. The applicable laws of intestate
succession will determine who among the relatives will inherit as reservatarios and what shares
they will take, i.e., the direct line excludes the collateral, the descending direct line excludes the
ascending, the nearer excludes the more remote, the nephews and nieces exclude the uncles and
the aunts, and half blood relatives inherit half the share of full- blood relatives.
III. On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein he gave
nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United States,
passed the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and became a
naturalized American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of New York do not
recognize holographic wills or compulsory heirs.

[a]
Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines?
Why or why not? (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes may be admitted to probate in the Philippines
because there is no public policy violated by such probate. The only issue at probate is the due
execution of the will which includes the formal validity of the will. As regards formal validity, the
only issue the court will resolve at probate is whether or not the will was executed in accordance
with the form prescribed by the law observed by the testator in the execution of his will. For
purposes of probate in the Philippines, an alien testator may observe the law of the place where
the will was executed (Article 17, NCC), or the formalities of the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities of the law of his own country, or in accordance with the
Philippine Civil Code (Art. 816, NCC).Since Dr. Fuentes executed his will in accordance with
Philippine law, the Philippine court shall apply the New Civil Code in determining the formal
validity of the holographic will. The subsequent change in the citizenship of Dr. Fuentes did not
affect the law governing the validity of his will. Under the New Civil Code, which was the law used
by Dr. Fuentes, the law in force at the time of execution of the will shall govern the formal validity
of the will (Article 795, NCC).
[b] Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist that he
be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Jay cannot insist because under New York law he is not a compulsory heir entitled to a
legitime.
The national law of the testator determines who his heirs are, the order that they succeed,
how much their successional rights are, and whether or not a testamentary disposition in his will is
valid (Article 16, NCC). Since, Dr. Fuentes was a US citizen, the laws of New York determines who
his heirs are. And since New York law does not recognize the concept of compulsory heirs, Jay is not
a compulsory heir of Dr. Fuentes entitled to a legitime.
IV. Arthur executed a will which contained only: (i) a provision disinheriting his daughter
Bernice for running off with a married man, and (ii) a provision disposing of his share
in the family house and lot in favor of his other children Connie and Dora. He did not
make any provisions in favor of his wife Erica, because as the will stated, she would
anyway get V* of the house and lot as her conjugal share. The will was very brief and
straightforward and both the above provisions were contained in page 1, which
Arthur and his instrumental witness, signed at the bottom. Page 2 contained the
attestation clause and the signatures, at the bottom thereof, of the 3 instrumental
witnesses which included Lambert, the driver of Arthur; Yoly, the family cook, and
Attorney Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the will. There was a 3rd page, but this only
contained the notarial acknowledgement. The attestation clause stated the will was
signed on the same occasion by Arthur and his instrumental witnesses who all signed
in the presence of each other, and the notary public who notarized the will. There are
no marginal signatures or pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages. Upon his death,
it was discovered that apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1 million account

deposited with ABC Bank.

a) Was Erica preterited? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Erica was not preterited under Art. 854 of the New Civil Code because she was not
related in the direct line. Moreover, since there is an intestate portion in [Arthur's estate from
which Erica will inherit as an intestate heir, she was not totally excluded or omitted from the heritance of Arthur. To be preterited, the heir who must be a compulsory heir in the direct line
should be totally excluded from the inheritance, i.e., the heir will not receive anything by will, or by
intestacy, and has not received any advance by way of donation inter vivos.
Even assuming that Erica was preterited, her preterition will not have any effect on the
provisions of the will. The effect of preterition is simply to annul the institution of an heir made in
the will. Legacies and devises are respected unless they are inofficious. In the problem, since the
will contains nothing but a devise, there is no institution that will be annulled even on the
assumption that there was preterition.
b) What other defects of the will, if any, can cause denial of probate? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are no other defects of the will that can cause denial of probate. Art. 805 of the Civil
Code provides that the will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator, and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The driver, the
cook and the lawyer who prepared the will are credible witnesses. The testator and the
instrumental] witnesses of the will, shall also sign, each and every page, of the will proper, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.
It has been held, however, that the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation
clause, and that if a will consists of two sheets, the first of which contains the testamentary
dispositions, and is signed at the bottom by the testator and the three witnesses, and the second
sheet contains the attestation clause, as in this case, signed by 3 witnesses, marginal signatures and
paging are not necessary. After all, the object of the law is to avoid substitution of any of the sheets
of the will. (Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 [1919]; In Re: Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil 807 [1924]).
c) Was the disinheritance valid? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The fact that the daughter disinherited ran off with a married man is a valid ground for
disinheritance under the Civil Code. One ground for disinheritance of a descendant is when the
descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life (Art. 919 [7], CC]. Running away with a
married man leads to a dishonorable or disgraceful life.
d) How should the house and lot, and the cash be distributed? (1%) (2008 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
On the assumption that the House and Lot and the Cash were all conjugal property, the
distribution will be as follows:
House and Lot
One half of the house shall be the conjugal share of Erica. The other half is the conjugal
share of Arthur which was inherited by Erica, Connie and Dora in equal shares. Hence, Erica, Connie
and Dora will be undivided co-owners of the house and lot with Erica getting 2/3 share thereof and
Connie and Dora with 1/6 share each.
Cash
The one million cash shall be divided in the same manner. thereof or 500,000 shall be
the conjugal share of Erica while 500,000 shall be the share of Arthur. This amount shall be divided
in 3 equal shares, or 166,666.66 per share. Erica will get 166,666.66 as her share, while Dora and
Connie will get 166,666.66 each as their inheritance. The one million cash will be distributed as
follows:
Erica --------------666,666.66
Dora ---------------166,666.66
Connie ------------ 166,666.66
V. John and Paula, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization after their marriage. During their marriage the couple acquired
substantial landholdings in London and in Makati. Paula bore John three children, Peter,
Paul and Mary. In one of their trips to London, the couple executed a joint will
appointing each other as their heirs and providing that upon the death of the survivor
between them the entire estate would go to Peter 'and Paul only but the two could not
dispose of nor divide the London estate as long as they live. John and Paula died
tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in 2005. Peter and Paul filed a petition
for probate of their parents will before a Makati Regional Trial Court.
a) Should the will be admitted to probate? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the will cannot be admitted to probate. Joint wills are void under the New Civil
Code. And even if the joint will executed by Filipinos abroad where valid where it was executed, the
joint will is still not valid in the Philippines.
b) Are the testamentary dispositions valid? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If a will is void, all testamentary dispositions contained in that will are also void. Hence, all
testamentary provisions contained in the void joint will are also void.
c) Is the testamentary prohibition against the division of the London estate valid?
(2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The testamentary prohibition against the division by Peter and Paul of the London estate
for as long as they live, is not valid. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that a donor or
testator may prohibit partition for a period which may not exceed twenty (20) years.
VI. Raymond, single, named his sister Ruffa in his will as I a devisee of a parcel of land
which he owned. The will I imposed upon Ruffa the obligation of preserving the land and
transferring it, upon her death, to her illegitimate daughter Scarlet who was then only
one year old. Raymond later died, leaving behind his widowed mother, Ruffa and
Scarlet.
a) Is the condition imposed upon Ruffa to preserve the property and to transmit it
upon her death to Scarlet, valid? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
When an obligation to preserve and transmit the property to Scarlet was imposed on Ruffa,
the testato Raymond intended to create a fideicommissary substitution where Ruffa is the
fiduciary and Scarlet is the fideicommissary. Having complied with the requirements of Articles
863 and 869 (N.C.C.) the fideicommissary substitution is valid.
b) If Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, who inherits the property? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, the fideicommissary substitution is rendered null or ineffective
under Article 863 (N.C.C.). And applying Article 868 (N.C.C.), the fideicommissary clause is
disregarded without prejudice to the validity of the institution of the fiduciary. In such case Ruffa
shall inherit the devise free from the condition.
c) If Ruffa predeceases Raymond, can Scarlet inherit the property directly from
Raymond? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In fideicommissary substitution, the intention of the testator is to make the second heir his
ultimate heir. The right of the second heir is simply postpone by the delivery of the inheritance to
the first heir for him to enjoy the usufruct over the inheritance. Hence, when the first heir
predeceased the testator, the first heir did not qualify to inherit and the right of the second heir to
receive the inheritance will no longer be delayed provided the second heir is qualified to inherit at
the time of the testators death. In fideicommissary substitution, the first and the second heirs
inherit from the testator, hence, both should be qualified to inherit from the testator at the time of
his death.
In the problem, when Ruffa predeceased Raymond, she did not qualify to receive the
inheritance to enjoy its usufruct, hence, the right of Scarlet to receive the inheritance upon the
death of the testator will no longer be delayed. However, Scarlet is not qualified to inherit from
Raymond because she is barred by Article 992 of the New Civil Code being an illegitimate child of
Raymonds legitimate father. The devise will therefore be ineffective and the property will be
disposed of by intestacy.

VII. Stevie was born blind. He went to school for the blind, and learned to read in Braille
language. He speaks English fluently. Can he:
a) Make a will? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Stevie may make a notarial will. A blind man is not expressly prohibited from executing a
will. In fact, Article 808 of the NCC provides for additional formality when the testator is blind.
Stevie, however, may not make a holographic will in Braille because the writing in Braille is not a
handwriting. A holographic will to be valid must be written entirely, signed, and dated by the
testator in his own handwriting.
b) Act as a witness to a will? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A blind man is disqualified by law to be a witness to a notarial will.
c) In either of the above instances, must the will be read to him? (1%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In case Stevie executes a notarial will, it has to be read to him twice. First by one of the
instrumental witnesses, and second by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged.
VIII. Clara, thinking of her mortality, drafted a will and asked Roberta, Hannah, Luisa and
Benjamin to be witnesses. During the day of the signing of her will, Clara fell down the
stairs and broke both her arms. Coming from the hospital, Clara insisted on signing her
will by thumb mark and said that she can sign her full name later. While the will was
being signed, Roberta experienced a stomach ache and kept going to the restroom for
long periods of time. Hannah, while waiting for her turn to sign the will, was reading the
7lh Harry Potter book on the couch, beside the table on which everyone was signing.
Benjamin, aside from witnessing the will, also offered to notarize it. A week after, Clara
was run over by a drunk driver while crossing the street in Greenbelt. May the will of
Clara be admitted to probate? Give your reasons briefly. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Probate should be denied. The requirement that the testator and at least three (3)
witnesses must all sign in the presence of one another was not complied with. Benjamin who
notarized the will is disqualified as a witness, hence, he cannot be counted as one of the three
witnesses (Cruz v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31 [1973]). The testatrix and the other witnesses signed the
will not in the presence of Roberta because she was in the restroom for extended periods of time.
Inside the restroom, Roberta could not have possibly seen the testatrix and the other witnesses
sign the will by merely casting her eyes in the proper direction (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541
[1906]; Nera v. Rimando, 18 Phil. 451 [1914]). Therefore, the testatrix signed her will in the
presence of only two witnesses, and only two witnesses signed the will in the presence of the

testatrix and of one another.

It is to be noted, however, that a thumbmark intended by the testator to be his signature in
executing his last will and testament is valid (Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil. 848 [1936]; Matias v.
Salud, L-104 Phils. 1046, 23 June [1958]). The problem, however, states that Clara said that she
can sign her full name later; Hence, she did not consider her thumb-mark as her complete
signature, and intended further action on her part. The testatrix and the other witness signed the
will in the presence of Hannah, because she was aware of her function and role as witness and was
in a position to see the testatrix and the other witness sign by merely casting her eyes in the
proper direction.
IX. In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso
painting reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In
1990, Brad and Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met
Angie and fell in love. Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his
will bequeathed the painting to Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brads death,
Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a remembrance of him. Angie refused and
claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to her. Is Angie correct? Why or
why not? (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting was not given or donated by Jennifer to Brad.
She merely placed it in his bedroom. Hence, she is still the owner of the painting. Not being the
owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeathed the same to Angie (Art. 930, NCC).
Even assuming that the painting was impliedly given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation
is nevertheless void for not being in writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more than 5,000
pesos. Under Article 748, NCC the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000
pesos must be in writing, otherwise the donation is void. The donation being void, Jennifer
remained the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said
painting in favor of Angie in his will.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Angie is correct. Even assuming that there was a void donation because the donation was
not in writing, Brad, who was in uninterrupted possession of the Picasso painting from 1989 to
1995, lasting for six (6) years prior to his death, Brad has already acquired ownership of the
painting through acquisitive prescription. Under Article 1132 of the New Civil Code, Ownership of
movables prescribes through continuous possession for four (4) years in good faith and for eight
(8) years without need of any other conditions. A void donation may be the basis of possession in
the concept of owner and of just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
X. Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament leaving his estate valued at P12
Million to his common-law wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and his
half-sister Michelle.
(1)
Was Dons testamentary disposition of his estate in accordance with the law on
succession? Whether you agree or not, explain your answer. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the testamentary disposition is in accordance with the law on succession. Don was not
survived by any compulsory heir. Hence, he could will his entire estate to anybody of his choice
including a total stranger. His institution of his common-law wife to his entire estate is valid. The
disposition is not in consideration of an adulterous relationship because both of them were not
married to anyone at the time of his making of the will and at the time of his death. Relationship
between two unmarried persons is not adulterous. The law does not prohibit testamentary
dispositions in favor of a common law spouse. What the law prohibits are donations in favor of
common law spouses under the Family Code. Such provision does not include a disposition mortis
causa such as a testamentary institution.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 1028 of the New Civil Code provides that prohibitions concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary dispositions. Article 87 of the Family Code provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses during the marriage shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage."
Accordingly, Dons testamentary disposition in favor of his common law wife Roshelle is
void because it is prohibited by law.
XI. In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In
1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the
same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988.
They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu
married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the
Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
x
x
x
c) Who are the heirs of Sonny? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The heirs of Sonny are his wife Lulu, and his 2 illegitimate children James and John. The
void remarriage of Lulu to Tirso did not incapacitate her to succeed Sonny.
XII. Emil, the testator, has three legitimate children. Tom, Henry and Warlito; a wife named
Adette; parents named Pepe and Pilar; an illegitimate child, Ramon; brother, Mark: and a
sister, Nanette. Since his wife Adette is well-off, he wants to leave to his illegitimate child
as much of his estate as he can legally do. His estate has an aggregate net amount of
P1,200,000.00, and all the above-named relatives are still living. Emil now comes to you
for advice in making a will.
How will you distribute his estate according to his wishes without violating the law
on testamentary succession? (5%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In his will, Emil should give his compulsory heirs just their respective legitimes and give all of
the free portion to his illegitimate child in addition to the said child's legitime. He should divide his
estate in his will as follows:

TOM ..
P200,000.00 (legitime)
Henry
200,000.00 (legitime)
Warlito .
200,000.00 (legitime)
Adette ..
200,000.00 (legitime)
Ramon 400,000.00 (P100,000 as legitime,
And P 300,000.00 as free
Portion
_______________
.. P 1,200,000.00
XIII. Mr. XT and Mrs. YT have been married for 20 years. Suppose the wife, YT, died
childless, survived only by her husband, XT. What would be the share of XT from her
estate as inheritance? Why? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the Civil Code, the widow or widower is a legal and compulsory heir of the deceased
spouse. If the widow is the only surviving heir, there being no legitimate ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she gets the entire estate.
XIV. Mr. Reyes executed a will completely valid as to form. A week later, however, he
executed another will which expressly revoked his first will, following which he tore his
first will to pieces. Upon the death of Mr. Reyes, his second will was presented for
probate by his heirs, but it was denied probate due to formal defects. Assuming that a
copy of the first will is available, may it now be admitted to probate and given effect?
Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the first will may be admitted to probate and given effect. When the testator tore the
first will, he was under the mistaken belief that the second will was perfectly valid and he would
not have destroyed the first will had he known that the second will is not valid. The revocation by
destruction therefore is dependent on the validity of the second will. Since it turned out that the
second will was invalid, the tearing of the first will did not produce the effect of revocation. This is
known as the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (Molo v. Molo, 90 Phil 37).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the first will cannot be admitted to probate. While it is true that the first will was not
successfully revoked by the second will because the second will was later denied probate, the first
will was, nevertheless, revoked when the testator destroyed it after executing the second invalid
will. (Diaz v. De Leon, 43 Phil. 413 [1922]).
XV. Luis was survived by two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his parents, and
two brothers. He left an estate of P1 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of Luis, how
much is the legitime of each, and how much is the free portion of his estate, if any? (2003
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two illegitimate children. The
parents are excluded by the legitimate children, while the brothers are not compulsory heirs at all.
Their respective legitimes are:
The legitime of the two (2) legitimate children is one- half (1/2) of the estate (P500,000.00)
to be divided between them equally, or P250,000.00 each.
(1)

(2) The legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half (1/2 the legitime of each legitimate child
or P125,000.00.

Since the total legitimes of the compulsory heirs is P750.000.00, the balance of
P250,000.00 is the free portion.
XVI. Felipe and Felisa, Doth Filipino citizens, were married in Malolos, Bulacan on June 1,
1950.In 1960, Felipe went to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1975. In 1980,
he obtained a divorce from Felisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. The divorce
decree became final under California law. Coming back to the Philippines in 1982, Felipe
married Segundina, a Filipino citizen. In 2001, Felipe, then domiciled in Los Angeles,
California, died, leaving one child by Felisa, and another one by Segundina. He left a will
which was executed in Manila, under which he left his estate to Segundina and his two
children and nothing to Felisa.
Segundina files a petition for the probate of Felipes will. Felisaquestions the intrinsic
validity of the will, arguing that her marriage to Felipe subsisted despite the divorce
obtained by Felipe because said divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. For this
reason, she claims that the properties left by Felipe are their conjugal properties and
that Segundina has no successional rights.
A. Is the divorce secured by Felipe in California recognizable and valid in the
Philippines? How does it affect Felipes marriage to Felisa? Explain. (2%)
B. What law governs the formalities of the will? Explain. (1%)
C. Will Philippine law govern the intrinsic validity of the will? Explain. (2%) (2002 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. (1) The divorce secured by Felipein California is recognizable and valid in the Philippines
because he was no longer a Filipino at the time he secured it. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid according to their
national law (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,139 SCRA 139 [1985]); Qurta v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
406 [1998]; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 [2000]).
(2)
With respect to Felipe the divorce is valid, but with respect to Felisa it is not. The
divorce will not capacitate Felisa to remarry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos at the time
of their marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No. 134 series of 1993, Felisa is allowed to remarry
because the injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also obtains in her case.
B.

The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines may observe the formalities

prescribed in:
1)

the law of the country of which he is a citizen under Article 817 of the New

Civil code, or

2)
the law of the Philippines being the law of the place of execution under
Article 17 of the New Civil Code.

C. Philippine law will not govern the instrinsic validity of the will. Article 16 of the New Civil
Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration. California law will govern the intrinsic
validity of the will.
XVII. By virtue of a Codicil appended to his will, Theodore devised to Divino a tract of sugar
land, with the obligation on the part of Divino or his heirs to deliver to Botina a specified
volume of sugar per harvest during Betinas lifetime. It is also stated in the Codicil that in
the event the obligation is not fulfilled, Botina should immediately seize the property
from Divino or the latters heirs and turn it over to Theodoro's compulsory heirs. Divino
failed to fulfill the obligation under the Codicil. Botina brings kilt against Divino for the
reversion of the tract of land.
A.
B.
C.

Distinguish between modal institution and substitution of heirs. (3%)

Distinguish between simple and fideicommissary substitution of heirs. (2%)
Does Botina have a cause of action against Divino? Explain. (5%) (2002 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A modal institution is the institution of an heir made for a certain purpose or cause (Arts.
871 and 882, NCC). Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. (Art 857, NCC).
B. In a simple substitution of heirs, the testator designates one or more persons to substitute
the heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should
be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. In a fideicommissary substitution, the testator institutes
a first heir and charges him to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the Inheritance to a
second heir. In a simple substitution, only one heir inherits. In a fideicommissary substitution, both
the first and second heirs inherit. (Art 859 and 863, NCC)
C. Botina has a cause of action against Divino. This is a case of a testamentary disposition
subject to a mode and the will itself provides for the consequence if the mode is not complied with.
To enforce the mode, the will itself gives Botina the right to compel the return of the property to
the heirs of Theodore. (Rabadilla v. Coscolueila, 334 SCRA 522 [2000] GR113725, 29 June 2000).

XVIII. Because her eldest son Juan had been pestering her for capital to start a business,
Josefa gave him P100,000.00. Five years later, Josefa died, leaving a last will and
testament in which she instituted only her four younger children as her sole heirs. At the
time of her death, her only property left was P900.000.00 in a bank. Juan opposed the
will on the ground of preterition. How should Josefa's estate be divided among her heirs?
State briefly the reason(s) for your answer. (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

There was no preterition of the oldest son because the testatrix donated 100,000 pesos to
him. This donation is considered an advance on the sons inheritance. There being no preterition,
the institutions in the will shall be respected but the legitime of the oldest son has to be completed
if he received less.
After collating the donation of P100.000 to the remaining property of P900.000, the estate of
the testatrix is P100.000. Of this amount, one-half or P P500.000, is the legitime of the legitimate
children and it follows that the legitime of one legitimate child is P100.000. The legitime, therefore,
of the oldest son is P100,000. However, since the donation given him was P100.000, he has already
received in full his legitime and he will not receive anything anymore from the decedent. The
remaining P900.000, therefore, shall go to the four younger children by institution in the will, to be
divided equally among them. Each will receive P 225,000.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Assuming that the donation is valid as to form and substance, Juan cannot invoke preterition
because he actually had received a donation inter vivos from the testatrix (IHTolentino 188,1992
ed.). He would only have a right to a completion of his legitime under Art. 906 of the Civil Code. The
estate should be divided equally among the five children who will each receive P225,000.00
because the total hereditary estate, after collating the donation to Juan (Art. 1061, CC), would be PI
million. In the actual distribution of the net estate, Juan gets nothing while his siblings will get
P225.000.00 each.
XIX. Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor, executed a Joint Will in Boston,
Massachusetts when they were residing in said city. The law of Massachusetts allows the
execution of joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died. Can the said will be probated in
the Philippines for the settlement of her estate? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar as the estate of Eleanor is
concerned. While the Civil Code prohibits the execution of joint wills here and abroad, such
prohibition applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will which is valid where executed is valid in
the Philippines but only with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819, it is void with respect to
Manuel whose joint will remains void in the Philippines despite being valid where executed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated in the Philippines, even though valid where executed, because
it is prohibited under Article 818 of the Civil Code and declared void under Article 819. The
prohibition should apply even to the American wife because the joint will is offensive to public
policy. Moreover, it is a single juridical act which cannot be valid as to one testator and void as to
the other.
XX. In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits his daughter Wilma because she
is disrespectful towards me and raises her voice talking to me", 2) omits entirely his
spouse Elvira, 3) leaves a legacy of P100.000.00 to his mistress Rosa and P50,000.00 to
his driver Ernie and 4) institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will you distribute
his estate of P1,000,000.00? (5%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was ineffective because the ground relied upon by the testator
does not constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. Hence, the
testamentary provisions in the will shall be annulled but only to the extent that her legitime was
impaired. The total omission of Elvira does not constitute preterition because she is not a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Only- compulsory heirs in the direct line may be the subject of
preterition. Not having been preterited, she will be entitled only to her legitime. The legacy in
favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with
the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of 100,000 pesos. The legacy of
50,000 pesos in favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having exceeded the free portion. Hence, he
shall be entitled to receive it. The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion, shall
be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be distributed as follows:
Baldo ---------------------- 450,000
Wilma --------------------- 250.000
Elvira --------------------- 250,000
Ernie ----------------------- 50,000
_____________
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was effective because disrespect of, and raising of voice to, her
father constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. She is, therefore, not
entitled to inherit anything. Her inheritance will go to the other legal heirs. The total omission of
Elvira is not preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. She will receive
only her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration
of her adulterous, relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy.
Ernie will receive the legacy in his favor because it is not inofficious. The institution of Baldo,
which applies only to the free portion, will be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto shall be
distributed as follows:
Heir
LegitimeLegacy Institution
Baldo 500,000 200,000
700.000
Elvira 250,000
Ernie 50.000 50,000
TOTAL 750,000

TOTAL
250.000

50,000 200,000

1.000.000

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Same answer as the first Alternative Answer except as to distribution. Justice Jurado solved
this problem differently. In his opinion, the legitime of the heir who was disinherited is distributed
among the other compulsory heirs in proportion to their respective legitimes, while his share in
the intestate portion, if any, is distributed among the other legal heirs by accretion under Article
1018 of the NCC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. In sum the distribution shall be
as follows:

Heir

Legitime Distribution
of Wilmas Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo
250.0000 125,000
200,000
575,000
Wilma (250,000)
TOTAL 500,000

250,000

50,000 200,000

1,000,000

XXI. What do you understand by presumptive legitime, in what case or cases must the
parent deliver such legitime to the children, and what are the legal effects in each case if
the parent fails to do so? (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Presumptive legitime is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken from Act
2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate children of the
equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property. As used in the Family
Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the equivalent of the legitimate childrens legitimes
assuming that the spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.
Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the spouses
when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when the conjugal
partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal separation. Failure of the
parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their subsequent marriage null and void
under Article 53 of the Family Code.
XXII.

Mr. Cruz, widower, has three legitimate children, A, B and C. He executed a Will
instituting as his heirs to his estate of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos his two
children A and B, and his friend F. Upon his death, how should Mr. Cruzs estate be
divided? Explain. (3%)
(b) In the preceding question, suppose Mr. Cruz instituted his two children A and B as
his heirs in his Will, but gave a legacy of P100,000.00 to his friend F. How should
the estate of Mr. Cruz be divided upon his death? Explain. (2%) (1999 Bar Question)
(a)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Assuming that the institution of A, B and F were to the entire estate, there was
preterition of C since C is a compulsory heir in the direct line. The preterition will result in the total
annulment of the institution of heirs. Therefore, the institution of A, B and F will be set aside and
Mr. Cruzs estate will be divided, as in intestacy, equally among A, B and C as follows: A P333,333.33; B - P333,333.33; and C - P333,333.33.
(b)
On the same assumption as letter (a), there was preterition of C. Therefore, the
institution of A and B is annulled but the legacy of P 100,000.00 to F shall be respected for not
being inofficious. Therefore, the remainder of P900,000.00 will be divided equally among A, B and
C.

XXIII.
(a) Mr. Palma, widower, has three daughters D, D-land D-2. He executes a Will
disinheriting D because she married a man he did not like, and instituting
daughters D-1 and D-2 as his heirs to his entire estate of P 1,000,000.00. Upon Mr.
Palma's death, how should his estate be divided? Explain. (5%)
(b) Mr. Luna died, leaving an estate of Ten Million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos. His widow
gave birth to a child four months after Mr. Lunas death, but the child died five
hours after birth. Two days after the childs death, the widow of Mr. Luna also died
because she had suffered from difficult childbirth. The estate of Mr. Luna is now
being claimed by his parents, and the parents of his widow. Who is entitled to Mr.
Lunas estate and why? (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) This is a case of ineffective disinheritance because marrying a man that the father did not
approve of is not a ground for disinheriting D. Therefore, the institution of D-l and D-2 shall be
annulled insofar as it prejudices the legitime of D, and the institution of D-1 and D- 2 shall only
apply on the free portion in the amount of P500.000.00. Therefore, D, D-l and D-2 will get their
legitimes of P500,000.00 divided into three equal parts and D-l and D-2 will get a reduced
testamentary disposition of P250,000.00 each. Hence, the shares will be:
D
P166,666.66
D-l
P166.666.66 + P250,000.00
D-2
P166,666.66 + P250.000.00
(b) Half of the estate of Mr. Luna will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna as their inheritance from
Mrs. Luna, while the other half will be inherited by the parents of Mr. Luna as the reservatarios of
the reserved property inherited by Mrs. Luna from her child.
When Mr. Luna died, his heirs were his wife and the unborn child. The unborn child inherited
because the inheritance was favorable to it and it was born alive later though it lived only for five
hours. Mrs. Luna inherited half of the 10 Million estate while the unborn child inherited the other
half. When the child died, it was survived by its mother, Mrs. Luna. As the only heir, Mrs. Luna
inherited, by operation of law, the estate of the child consisting of its 5 Million inheritance from Mr.
Luna. In the hands of Mrs. Luna, what she inherited from her child was subject to reserve troncal
for the benefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who belong
to the family of Mr. Luna, the line where the property came from.
When Mrs. Luna died, she was survived by her parents as her only heirs. Her parents will
inherit her estate consisting of the 5 Million she inherited from Mr. Luna. The other 5 Million she
inherited from her child will be delivered to the parents of Mr. Luna as beneficiaries of the reserved
property. In sum, 5 Million Pesos of Mr. Lunas estate will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna, while the
other 5 Million Pesos will go to the parents of Mr. Luna as reservatarios.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the father. In
which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and the widow as legal
heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by operation of law to the mother, which
shall be subject to reserve troncal. Under Art. 891, the reserva is in favor of relatives belonging to
the paternal line and who are within 3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr. Luna are entitled

to the reserved portion which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child. The 5M inherited by
Mrs. Luna from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the father. In
which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and the widow as legal
heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by operation of law to the mother, which
shall be subject to reserve troncal. Under Art. 891, the reserva is in favor of relatives belonging to
the paternal line and who are within 3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr. Luna are entitled
to the reserved portion which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child. The 5M inherited by
Mrs. Luna from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
However, if the child had intra-uterine life of less than 7 months, half of the estate of Mr. Luna,
or 5M, will be inherited by the widow (Mrs. Luna), while the other half, or 5M, will be inherited by
the parents of Mr. Luna. Upon the death of Mrs. Luna, her estate of 5M will be inherited by her own
parents.
XXIV. Johnny, with no known living relatives, executed a notarial will giving all his estate to
his sweetheart. One day. he had a serious altercation with his sweetheart. A few days
later, hewas introduced to a charming lady who later became a dear friend. Soon after,
he executed a holographic will expressly revoking the notarial will and so designating
his new friend as sole heir. One day when he was clearing up his desk. Johnny mistakenly
burned, along with other papers, the only copy of his holographic will. His business
associate, Eduardo, knew well the contents of the will which was shown to him by Johnny
the day it was executed. A few days after the burning incident, Johnny died. Both wills
were sought to be probated in two separate petitions.
Will either or both petitions prosper? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The probate of the notarial will will prosper. The holographic will cannot be admitted to
probate because a holographic will can only be probated upon evidence of the will itself unless
there is a photographic copy. But since the holographic will was lost and there was no other copy,
it cannot be probated and therefore the notarial will will be admitted to probate because there is
no revoking will.
ADDITIONAL ANSWERS:
1.
In the case of Gan vs. Yap (104 Phil 509), the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen or
read such will. The will itself must be p resented otherwise it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. Moreover, in order that a will may be
revoked by a subsequent will, it Is necessary that the latter will be valid and executed with the
formalities required for the making of a will. The latter should possess all the requisites of a valid
will whether it be ordinary or a holographic will, and should be probated in order that the
revocatory clause thereof may produce effect. In the case at bar, since the holographic will itself
cannot be presented, it cannot therefore be probated. Since it cannot be probated, it cannot revoke
the notarial will previously written by the decedent.

On the basis of the Rules of Court, Rule 76, Sec. 6. provides that no will shall be
proved as a lost or destroyed will unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least
two (2) credible witnesses. Hence, if we abide strictly by the two-witness rule to prove a lost or
destroyed will, the holographic will which Johnny allegedly mistakenly burned, cannot be
probated, since there is only one witness. Eduardo, who can be called to testify as to the existence
of the will. If the holographic will, which purportedly, revoked the earlier notarial will cannot be
proved because of the absence of the required witness, then the petition for the probate of the
notarial will should prosper.
2.

XXV. Isidro and Irma. Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were passengers of Flight No. 317 of
Oriental Airlines. The plane they boarded was of Philippine registry. While en route from
Manila to Greece some passengers hijacked the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the
cockpit and ordered him to fly instead to Libya. During the hijacking Isidro suffered a
heart attack and was on the verge of death. Since Irma was already eight months
pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded to the hijackers to allow the assistant pilot to solemnize
her marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro expired. As the plane landed in
Libya Irma gave birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after complete delivery.
Back in the Philippines Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The parents of
Isidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro void ab
initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of
their son; (b) there was no marriage license: (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority
to perform the marriage: and, (d) the solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of
marriage with the proper civil registrar.
x
x
x
2. Does Irma have any successional rights at all? Discuss fully. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Irma succeeded to the estate of Isidro as his surviving spouse to the estate of her legitimate
child. When Isidro died, he was succeeded by his surviving wife Irma, and his legitimate unborn
child. They divided the estate equally between them, the child excluding the parents of Isidro. An
unborn child is considered born for all purposes favorable to it provided it is born later. The child
was considered born because, having an intra-uterine life of more than seven months, it lived for a
few minutes after its complete delivery. It was legitimate because it was born within the valid
marriage of the parents. Succession is favorable to it. When the child died, Irma inherited the share
of the child. However, the share of the child in the hands of Irma is subject to reserve troncal for the
benefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who belong to the
line of Isidro.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the marriage is void. Irma has no successional rights with respect to Isidro but she would
have successional rights with respect to the child.
XXVI. On his deathbed. Vicente was executing a will. In the room were Carissa, Carmela,
Comelio and Atty. Cimpo, a notary public. Suddenly, there was a street brawl which
caught Comelios attention, prompting him to look out the window. Comelio did not see
Vicente sign a will. Is the will valid? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes. The will is valid. The law does not require a witness to actually see the testator
sign the will. It is sufficient if the witness could have seen the act of signing had he chosen to do so
by casting his eyes to the proper direction.

Yes, the will is valid. Applying the test of position", although Comelio did not
actually see Vicente sign the will, Comelio was in the proper position to see Vicente sign if Comelio
so wished.
b)

XXVII. A, a Filipino, executed a will in Kuwait while there as a contract worker. Assume that
under the laws of Kuwait, It is enough that the testator affix his signature in the presence
of two witnesses and that the will need not be acknowledged before a notary public.
May the will be probated in the Philippines? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Under Articles 16 and 17 of the Civil Code, the formality of the execution of a will is
governed by the law of the place of execution. If the will was executed with the formalities
prescribed by the laws of Kuwait and valid there as such, the will is valid and may be probated in
the Philippines.
XXVIII. Maria, to spite her husband Jorge, whom she suspected was having an affair with
another woman, executed a will, unknown to him, bequeathing all the properties she
inherited from her parents, to her sister Miguela. Upon her death, the will was presented
for probate. Jorge opposed probate of the will on the ground that the will was executed
by his wife without his knowledge, much less consent, and that it deprived him of his
legitime. After all, he had given her no cause for disinheritance, added Jorge in his
opposition.
How will you rule on Jorges opposition to the probate of Marias will, if you were the
Judge? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained in part and denied in
part. Jorges omission as spouse of Maria is not preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Hence, Art. 854 of the Civil Code does not apply, and the institution of Miguela as heir is valid, but
only to the extent of the free portion of one- hay. Jorge is still entitled to one-half of the estate as
his legitime. (Art. 1001, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
a) As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained in part and denied in
part. This is a case of ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918 of the Civil Code, because the
omission of the compulsory heir Jorge by Maria was intentional. Consequently, the institution of
Miguela as heir is void only insofar as the legitime of Jorge is prejudiced. Accordingly. Jorge is entitled to his legitime of one-half of the estate, and Miguela gets the other half.

b)
As Judge. I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained. This is a
case of preterition under Article 854 Civil Code. The result of the omission of Jorge as compulsory
heir having the same right equivalent to a legitimate child in the direct line" is that total intestacy
will arise, and Jorge will inherit the entire estate.
c) As Judge, I shall rule as follows: the opposition should be denied since it is predicated upon
causes not recognized by law as grounds for disallowance of a will, to wit:
1) that the will was made without his knowledge.
2) that the will was made without his consent; and
3) that it has the effect of depriving him of his legitime, which is a ground that goes
into the intrinsic validity of the will and need not be resolved during the probate
proceedings. However, the opposition may be entertained for the purpose of
securing to the husband his right to the legitime on the theory that the will
constitutes an ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918 of the Civil Code.

As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorge is entitled to receive his legitime from the
estate of his wife. He was not disinherited in the will even assuming that he gave ground for
disinheritance, hence, he is still entitled to his legitime. Jorge, however, cannot receive anything
from the free portion. He cannot claim preterition as he is not a compulsory heir in the direct line.
There being no preterition, the institution of the sister was valid and the only right of Jorge is to
claim his legitime.
d)

XXIX.
x

(c) Is there any law which allows the delivery to compulsory heirs of their presumptive

legitimes during the lifetime of their parents? If so, in what instances? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, under Arts. 51 and 52 of the New Family Code, in case of legal separation, annulment of
marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and the automatic termination of a subsequent
marriage by the reappearance of the absent spouse, the common or community property of the
spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property
or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement, judicially approved, had' already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement
of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or
absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,

the same shall not affect third persons.

XXX. Jacob, a Swiss national, married Lourdes, a Filipina, in Berne, Switzerland. Three
years later, the couple decided to reside in the Philippines. Jacob subsequently acquired
several properties in the Philippines with the money he inherited from his parents.
Forty years later, Jacob died intestate, and is survived by several legitimate children and
duly recognized illegitimate daughter Jane, all residing in the Philippines.
(a)
Suppose that Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit, can
Jane, who is a recognized illegitimate child, inherit part of the properties of Jacob under
Philippine law?
(b)
Assuming that Jacob executed a will leaving certain properties to Jane as her
legitime in accordance with the law of succession in the Philippines, will such testamentary
disposition be valid? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes. As stated in the problem, Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit.
Hence, Jane cannot inherit the property of Jacob under Philippine law.
B. The testamentary disposition will not be valid if it would contravene Swill law; otherwise,
the disposition would be valid. Unless the Swiss law is proved, it would be presumed to be the same
as that of Philippine law under the doctrine of processual presumption.
XXXI. H died leaving a last will and testament wherein it is stated that he was legally
married to W by whom he had two legitimate children A and B. H devised to his said
forced heirs the entire estate except the free portion which he gave to X who was living
with him at the time of his death.
In said will he explained that he had been estranged from his wife W for more than
20 years and he has been living with X as man and wife since his separation from his
legitimate family.
In the probate proceedings, X asked for the issuance of letters testamentary in
accordance with the will wherein she is named sole executor. This was opposed by and
her children.
(a) Should the will be admitted in said probate proceedings?

(b) Is the said devise to X valid?

(c) Was it proper for the trial court to consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
said will? Explain your answers. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the will may be probated if executed according to the formalities prescribed by law.
(b)
The institution giving X the free portion is not valid, because the prohibitions under
Art. 739 of the Civil Code on donations also apply to testamentary dispositions (Article 1028, Civil
Code). Among donations which are considered void are those made between persons who were

guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.

As a general rule, the will should be admitted in probate proceedings if all the necessary
requirements for its extrinsic validity have been met, and the court should not consider the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. However, the exception arises when the will in effect
contains only one testamentary disposition. In effect, the only testamentary disposition under the
will is the giving of the free portion to X, since legitimes are provided by law. Hence, the trial court
may consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. (Nuguid v. Nuguid, et al. No. L23445, June 23, 196$, 17 SCRA; Nepomuceno v. CA. L-62952, 9 October 1985, 139 SCRA 206).
(c)

XXXII.
(1) If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino citizen, what law will govern if the
will is executed in the Philippines? What law will govern if the will is executed in
another country? Explain your answers.
(2) If a will is executed by a foreigner, for instance, a Japanese, residing in the
Philippines, what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? And what
law will govern if the will is executed in Japan, or some other country, for instance,
the U.S. A.? Explain your answers. (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) a. If the testator who is a Filipino citizen executes his will in the Philippines, Philippine law
will govern the formalities,
b. If said Filipino testator executes his will in another country, the law of the country where he
may be or Philippine law will govern the formalities. (Article 815, Civil Code)
2) a. If the testator is a foreigner residing in the Philippines and he executes his will in the
Philippines, the law of the country of which he is a citizen or Philippine law will govern the
formalities.
b. If the testator is a foreigner and executes his will in a foreign country, the law of his place of
residence or the law of the country of which he is a citizen or the law of the place of execution, or
Philippine law will govern the formalities (Articles 17, 816, 817, Civil Code)
POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL ANSWERS:
a. In the case of a Filipino citizen, Philippine law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
b. In the case of a foreigner, his national law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
XXXIII.
(1)

What are the characteristics of a will? (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A will is
1.
Personal
2.
Unilateral
3.
Formal or Solemn
4.
Ambulatory or revocable
5.
Individual, not joint

6.
7.

Free and voluntary

Mortis causa

RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:

Since this is not a codal provision, it is recommended that an answer of three (3) be given full
credit.
(2)
X, a Spanish citizen and a resident of Los Angeles, California, executed a will
in Tokyo. Japan. May such will be probated in the Philippines? May his estate located in
the Philippines be distributed in conformity with the provisions of the said will? Give
your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Yes, it may be made according to the formalities of Spanish law, California law, Japanese
law, or Philippine law.
B. Yes, provided that the provisions conform to the order of succession and the amount of
successional rights as regulated by Spanish law.

XXXIV.
(1) The probate of the will of Nicandro is contested on the ground that the notary public
before whom the will, was acknowledged was also one of the three instrumental witnesses.
If you were the probate judge, how would you decide the contest? Give your reasons. (1989
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The will is void. The acknowledging officer cannot serve as attesting witness at the same time.
In effect there are only two witnesses since the notary cannot swear before himself.
(2) Jose and Ana are husband and wife. On January 10, 1980, Jose learned that Ana was

having illicit relations with Juan. In fact, Jose personally saw his wife and Juan leaving a
motel on one occasion. Despite all the evidence he had at hand, Jose did not bring any action
for legal separation against Ana. Instead, Jose simply prepared a will wherein he
disinherited Ana for her acts of infidelity. The validity of the disinheritance was questioned
by Ana upon Joses death. If you were the judge, how would you resolve this question? Give
your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance is valid. Under the Civil Code, the legal ground for disinheriting a spouse
is that the spouse has given cause for legal separation. Therefore, a final judgment is not needed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance is not valid. The facts indicate that there was condonation by Jose of
Anas illicit relationship with Juan since they appear to have continued to live together.

XXXV.

In probate proceedings, what are the only questions which a probate court
can determine?
(b)
A presented for probate a will purporting to be the last will and testament of
his deceased wife. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition. Sixteen months
later, the brothers and sisters of the deceased discovered that the will was a forgery. Can A
now be prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery? Give your reasons. (1988 Bar
Question)
(a)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under our law, there are only three possible questions which can be determined by the
probate court. They are:
(1)
Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and
testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of identity.
(2)
Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due execution.
(3)
Whether or not the testator had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity.

Consequently, the probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions.
(b) A can no longer be prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery. This is so because,
according to the last paragraph of Art. 838 of the Civil Code, subject to the right of appeal the
allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive
as to its due execution. Since sixteen months have already elapsed from the allowance of the will to
the time when the forgery was discovered, there is now no possible remedy of impugning the
validity of the will. Even a petition to set aside a judgment or order of a Court of First Instance on
the ground of fraud in accordance with Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is no longer
possible because more than six months from the time of the promulgation of the judgment or order
have already elapsed. (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215.)

Committees Recommendation Re: (a)

It is recommended that a mention of numbers (2) or (3) should merit a full credit for this
question.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO (b):
The criminal action can still prosper because the question of probate is a civil law matter while
the question of forgery is a penal matter. That does not preclude the determination of guilt of the
forger because the two are founded on different legal bases. Besides, in a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required while in civil cases, only preponderance of evidence is
required.
XXXVI.

(a) What is preterition? What are its requisites? What is its effect?
(b) What are the different limitations imposed by law upon fideicommissary

substitutions?

(c) Who are compulsory heirs? (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Preterition or pretermission, as it is sometimes called may be defined as the omission in the
testators will of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator (Art. 854, CC). Stated in
another way, it consists in the omission in the testators will of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, or of anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited (Neri vs. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185; Nuguid
vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449). Its requisites are:
(1)
The heir omitted must be a compulsory heir in the direct line;
(2)
The omission must be total and complete; and
(3)
The omitted heir must survive the testator.
The effect is to annul entirely the institution of heirs but legacies and devises shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. (Art. 854, CC.)
(b) There are four limitations. They are:
(1) The substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted (Art.

863, CC).

(2) The fiduciary and the fideicommissary must be living at the time of the death of the

testator (Ibid).

(3) The substitution must not burden the legitime of compulsory heirs (Art. 864, CC).
(4) The substitution must be made expressly (Art. 865, par. 1, CC.)
(c) In general, compulsory heirs are those for whom the law has reserved a portion of the

testators estate which is known as the legitime.

In particular, the following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respects to their
legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in numbers 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in numbers 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the classes mentioned shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by the Civil Code. (Art. 887, CC.)
Committees Recommendation Re: (c)
It is recommended that an enumeration of numbers one to five without the mention of the
additional last three paragraphs should merit full credit for this question.

XXXVII.
x
x
x
(b) Suppose that the beneficiary in a will is the wife of the minister of the gospel who
rendered aid to the testator during the latters last illness, would she be disqualified
from inheriting from the testator? Explain. (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
We believe that the wife of the minister would not be disqualified from inheriting from the
testator. Under No. 2 of Art. 1027 of the Civil Code, the law extends the disqualification of priests
and ministers of the gospel to their relatives within the fourth degree as well as to the church,
order, chapter, community, organization or institution to which they may belong. The spouse is not
included. Consequently, such spouse is not disqualified. Otherwise, we would be reading into the
law what is not found there. Besides, capacity to succeed is the general rule, while incapacity to
succeed is the exception. Hence, the rules on incapacity must always be strictly construed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the testamentary disposition was actually intended to favor the Minister as a disqualified
person and was ostensibly made thru an intermediary, namely, the wife, then the Minister is
considered disqualified as the real and intended heir.
XXXVIII.
Lilia and Nelia are relatives, Lilia being the grandniece of Nelia. They had a
common ancestor, Bonong, father of Nelia and great-grandfather of Lilia. Bonong had a
sister, Rosa, who donated gratuitously a parcel of land to her niece.
Mely, sister of Nelia and grandmother of Lilia. Mely died intestate, leaving
aforementioned parcel of land, survived by her husband Jose and their two children,
Rico and Nina. Bonong died intestate survived by his legitimate grandchildren, Rico and
Nina. In the adjudication of his estate, the portion pertaining to Mely, who had
predeceased her father, went to her two legitimate children, Rico and Nina. Rico died
instestate, single, and without any issue, leaving his share in the inheritance to his
father, Jose, subject to a reserva troncal duly annotated on the title. Thereafter Nina died
intestate and her rights and interests were inherited by her only legitimate child, Lilia.
Thereafter, Jose died intestate survived by his only descendant, Lilia. Nelia, aunt of Rico,
would like to lay claim as reservatario to a portion of the one-half pro indiviso share of
the property inherited by Jose from his son Rico.
How should the estate of Jose, including the property subject to reserva troncal be
adjudicated? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista is Jose and the
reservatarios are Lilia (a niece) and Nelia (an aunt), both of them being relatives within the 3rd
degree of Rico (the prepositus) and belonging to the maternal line represented by Mely.
Accordingly, Nelia as reservatario cannot claim any portion of the pro-indiviso share of the
property inherited by Jose from Rico. Lilia alone should inherit because in reserva troncal, the
successional rights of relatives who are reservatarios are determined by the rules of intestate

succession. In intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude uncles and aunts. Hence, Lilia the niece,
excludes Nelia, the aunt, from the reservable property (De Papa vs. Camacho 144 SCRA 281).
The rest of Joses estate, not subject to reserva, will be inherited by his granddaughter Lilia as
sole intestate heir.
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista and the
reservatarios are Lilia and Nelia, both of them being relatives within the 3rd degree computed
from Rico and belonging to the maternal line* represented by Mely. Under the doctrine of reserva
integral all the reservatarios in the nearest degree will inherit in equal shares the reservable
portion of the pro-indiviso share of the property inherited by Jose from Rico. The properties transmitted to Jose by Rico are the following:
Firstly, the property which Rico obtained from Mely consisted of his share in Melys interest
as donee of Rosas land. The interest acquired by Rico was 1/3, because 1/3 thereof was inherited
by Jose and 1/3 by Nina. So the property that was obtained by Jose from Rico is the latters 1/3
interest of the land.
In the case of Bonongs estate, the share of Mely was 1/2 and Nelias was the other half. Out of
Melys share, 1/2 belonged to Rico and the other half belonged to Nina, both inheriting by right of
representation.
Summarizing the reservable estate is the 1/3 share of Rico in Rosas land which was donated
to Mely, and the 1/2 interest of Rico in Melys share of the estate of Bonong. These reservable
properties should be divided equally between Nelia and Lilia (Article 891).
III. Legal or Intestate Succession
I.

The spouses Peter and Paula had three (3) children. Paula later obtained a judgment of
nullity of marriage. Their absolute community of property having been dissolved, they
delivered PI million to each of their 3 children as their presumptive legitimes.
Peter later re-married and had two (2) children by his second wife Marie. Peter and
Marie, having successfully engaged in business, acquired real properties. Peter later
died intestate.
A. Who are Peters legal heirs and how will his estate be divided among them? (5%)

(2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The legal heirs of Peter are his children by the first and second marriages and his surviving
second wife.
Their shares in the estate of Peter will depend, however, on the cause of the nullity of the first
marriage. If the nullity of the first marriage was psychological incapacity of one or both spouses,
the three children of that void marriage are legitimate and all of the legal heirs shall share the
estate of Peter in equal shares. If the judgment of nullity was for other causes, the three children
are illegitimate and the estate shall be distributed such that an illegitimate child of the first
marriage shall receive half the share of a legitimate child of the second marriage, and the second

wife will inherit a share equal to that of a legitimate child. In no case may the two legitimate
children of the second marriage receive a share less than one-half of the estate which is their
legitime. When the estate is not sufficient to pay all the legitimes of the compulsory heirs, the
legitime of the spouse is preferred and the illegitimate children will suffer the reduction.
Computation:
A.
If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:
3 children by first marriage ------------------ 1/6th of the estate for each
2 children by second marriage -------------- 1/6th of the estate for each
Surviving second spouse --------------------- 1/6th of the estate
B.

If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity

2 legitimate children --------------------------- 1/4 of the estate for each of second marriage
Surviving second spouse ---------------------1/4 of the estate
3 illegitimate children -------------------------- 1/12 of estate for each of first marriage
Note: The legitime of an illegitimate child is supposed to be Yu the legitime of a legitimate
child or 1/ 8th of the estate. But the estate will not be sufficient to pay the said legitimes of the
3 illegitimate children, because only Y* of the estate is left after paying the legitime of the
surviving spouse which is preferred. Hence, the remaining Y* of the estate shall be divided
among the 3 illegitimate children.
B. What is the effect of the receipt by Peters 3 children by his first marriage of their
presumptive legitimes on their right to inherit following Peters death? (5%) (2010
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the distribution of Peters estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime received by the
three children of the first marriage shall be collated to Peters estate and shall be imputed as an
advance on their respective inheritance from Peter. Only half of the presumptive legitime is
collated to the estate of Peter because the other half shall be collated to the estate of his first wife.
II. Dr. Lopez, a 70-year old widower, and his son Roberto both died in a fire that gutted their
home while they were sleeping in their air-conditioned rooms. Robertos wife, Marilyn,
and their two children were spared because they were in the province at the time. Dr.
Lopez left an estate worth P20M and a life insurance policy in the amount of P1M with his
three children --- one of whom is Roberto --- as beneficiaries.
Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husbands share in the estate
left by Dr. Lopez, and her husbands share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopezs life insurance
policy. Rule on the validity of Marilyns claims with reasons. (4%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the Estate of Dr. Lopez:

Marilyn is not entitled to a share in the estate of Dr. Lopez. For purposes of succession, Dr.
Lopez and his son Roberto are presumed to have died at the same time, there being no
evidence to prove otherwise, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other
(Article 43, NCC). Hence, Roberto inherited nothing from his father that Marilyn would in turn
inherit from Roberto. The children of Roberto, however, will succeed their grandfather, Dr.
Lopez, in representation of their father Roberto and together will receive 1/3 of the estate of
Dr. Lopez since their father Roberto was one of the three children of Dr. Lopez. Marilyn cannot
represent her husband Roberto because the right is not given by law to a surviving spouse.
As to the proceeds of the insurance on the life of Dr. Lopez:
Since succession is not involved as regards the insurance is not involved as regular the
insurance contract, the provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 131, Sec. 3, [jj] [5]) on
survivorship shall apply. Under Rules, Dr. Lopez, who was 70 years old, is presumed to have
died ahead of Roberto, who is presumably between the ages of 15 and 60. Having survived the
insured, Robertos right as a beneficiary became vested upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When
Roberto died after Dr. upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died after Dr. Lopez, his right
to receive the insurance proceeds became part of his hereditary estate, which in turn was
inherited in equal shares by his legal heirs, namely, his spouse and children. Therefore,
Robertos children and his spouse are entitled to Robertos one-third share in the insurance
proceeds.
III. Ramon Mayaman died intestate, leaving a net estate of P10,000,000.00. Determine how
much each heir will receive : from the estate:
[a] If Ramon is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers, and
one nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Having died intestate, the estate of Ramon shall be inherited by his wife and his full and halfblood siblings or their respective representatives. In intestacy, if the wife concurs with no one
but the siblings of the husband, all of them are the intestate heirs of the deceased husband. The
wife will receive half of the intestate estate, while the siblings or their respective
representatives, will inherit the other half to be divided among them equally. If some siblings are
of the full-blood and the others of the half blood, a half blood sibling will receive half the share of
a full-blood sibling.
1. The wife of Ramon will, therefore, receive one half of the estate or the amount of

P5,000.000.00,

2. The three (3) full-blood brothers, will, therefore, receive PI,000,000.00 each.
3. The nephew will receive PI,000,000.00 by right of representation.
4. The two (2) half-brothers will receive P500,000.00 each.

[b] If Ramon is survived by his wife, a half-sister, and three nephews (sons of a
deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The wife will receive one half of the estate or P5,000,000.00. The other half shall be
inherited by (1) the full-blood brother, represented by his 3 children, and (2) the half- sister.
They will divide that other half between them such that the share of the half-sister is just half the
share of the full-blood brother. The share of the full-blood brother shall in turn be inherited by
the three (3) nephews in equal shares by right of representation.
Therefore, the three (3) nephews will receive P1,111,111.10 each and the half-sister will
receive the sum of PI,666,666.60.
IV. At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named
her unborn child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give birth, she and
her boyfriend Pietro, the father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resort in
Bataan where they were vacationing. The military gave chase and after one week, they
were found in an abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked with bolos.
Marian and the baby she delivered were both found dead, with the babys umbilical cord
already cut. Pietro survived.
x
x
x
c) Will Pietro, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the
proceeds of the life insurance on the life of Marian? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the baby did not acquire any right under the insurance contract, there is nothing for
Pietro to inherit.
V. Ernesto, an overseas Filipino worker, was coming home to the Philippines after working
for so many years in the Middle East. He had save P100,000 in his savings account in
Manila which he intended to use to start a business in his home country. On his flight
home, Ernesto had a fatal heart attack. He left behind his widowed mother, his commonlaw wife and their twin sons. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives and no other
properties except the money in his savings account. Who are the heirs entitled to inherit
from him and how much should each receive? (3%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the 100,000 peso savings came from wages and salaries that Ernesto earned during the
time that he was cohabiting with his common law wife, and there was no impediment for them to
marry each other. The P100,000 shall be owned by them in equal shares under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Therefore, one half thereof, of P50,000, shall belong to the common law wife as her
share in the co-ownership, while the other half of P50,000 shall be the share of Ernesto that will be
inherited by his mother, and two illegitimate children. The mother will get P25,000 while the two
illegitimate children will get P12,500 each. The common law wife is not a legal heir of Ernesto
because they were not legally married.
If there was an impediment for Ernesto and his common law wife to marry each other, the
P100,000 will be owned by Ernesto alone, the common law wife not having contributed to its
acquisition (Art. 148, Family Code) it shall be inherited by his mother who will get P50,000, and his
two illegitimate sons who will get 25,000 each.

VI. For purposes of this question, assume all formalities and procedural requirements have
been complied with.
In 1970, Ramon and Dessa got married. Prior to their marriage, Ramon had a child,
Anna. In 1971 and 1972, Ramon and Dessa legally adopted Cherry and Michelle,
respectively. In 1973, Dessa died while giving birth to Larry. Anna had a child, Lia. Anna
never married. Cherry, on the other hand, legally adopted Shelly. Larry had twins, Hans
and Gretel, with his girlfriend, Fiona. In 2005, Anna, Larry, and Cherry died in a car
accident. In 2007, Ramon died. Who may inherit from Ramon and who may not? Give
your reasons briefly. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following may inherit from Ramon:
1. Michelle, as an adopted child Ramon, will inherit as a legitimate child of Ramon. As an
adopted child, Michelle has all the rights of a legitimate child (Section 18, Domestic
Adoption Law).
2. Lia will inherit in representation of Anna. Although Lia is an illegitimate child, she is not
barred by Article 992, because her mother Anna is herself illegitimate. She will represent
Anna as regards Annas legitime under Art. 902, NCC and as regards Annas intestate
share under Article 990, NCC.
The following may not inherit from Ramon:
1. Shelly, being an adopted child, cannot represent Cherry. This is because adoption creates
a personal legal relation only between the adopter and the adopted. The law on
representation requires the representative to be a legal heir of the person he is
representing and also of the person from whom the person being represented was
supposed to inherit. While Shelly is a legal heir of Cherry, Shelly is not a legal heir of
Ramon. Adoption created a purely personal legal relation only between Cherry and Shelly.
2. Hans and Gretel are barred from inheriting from Ramon under Article 992 of the New
Civil Code. Being illegitimate children, they cannot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate relatives of their father or mother. Since Ramon is a legitimate relative of
Larry, the illegitimate twin children of Larry are barred from inheriting ab intestato from
Ramon.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The problem expressly mentioned the dates of the adoption of Cherry and Michelle as 1971
and 1972. During that time, adoption was governed by the New Civil Code. Under the New Civil
Code, husband and wife were allowed to adopt separately or not jointly with the other spouse.
And since the problem does not specifically and categorically state, it is possible to construe the
use of the word respectively in the problem as indicative of the situation that Cherry was
adopted by Ramon alone and Michelle was adopted by Dessa alone. In such a case of separate
adoption the alternative answer to the problem will be as follows:
Only Lia will inherit from Ramon in representation of Ramons illegitimate daughter Anna.
Although Lia is an illegitimate child, she is not barred from inheriting from Ramon because her
mother Anna is herself illegitimate.

Shelly cannot inherit in representation of Cherry because Shelly is just an adopted child of
Cherry. In representation, the representative must not only be a legal heir of the person he is
representing but also of the decedent from from whom the represented person is supposed to
inherit. In the case of Shelly, while she is a legal heir of Cherry by virtue of her adoption, she is not
a legal heir of Ramon. Adoption creates a personal legal relation only between the adopting parent
and the adopted child (Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406 [1965]).
Michelle cannot inherit from Ramon, because she was adopted not by Ramon but by Dessa. In
the eyes of the law she is not related to Ramon at all. Hence, she is not a legal heir of Ramon.
Hans and Gretel are not entitled to inherit from Ramon, because they are barred by Article
992 NCC. Being illegitimate children of Larry, they cannot inherit from the legitimate relatives of
their father Larry. Ramon is a legitimate relative, of Larry the legitimate father.
VII. Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament leaving his estate valued at P12
Million to his common-law wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and his
half-sister Michelle.
x
x
x
(2)
If Don failed to execute a will during his lifetime, as his lawyer, how will you
distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Don failed to execute a will, he died intestate and his estate was inherited by his intestate
heirs. His intestate heirs are Ronie and Michelle. However, Ronie will receive double the share of
Michelle because Michelle was a half-blood sister while Ronnie was a full-blood brother. Ronie
will receive 8 million pesos, while Michelle will receive 4 million pesos.
(3)
Assuming he died intestate survived by his brother Ronie, his half-sister
Michelle, and his legitimate son Jayson. How will you distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5%
(2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from Don as his compulsory heir in the direct descending line. Jayson
will exclude the collateral relatives Ronie and Michelle. In intestate succession, the direct line
excludes the collateral line.
(4)
Assuming further he died intestate, survived by his father Juan, his brother
Ronie, his half-sister Michelle, and his legitimate son Jayson, how will you distribute his
estate? Explain. 1.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from his father Don. In intestate succession, the direct line excludes
the collateral line. But among those in the direct line, the descending excludes the ascending.
Hence, the father Juan and Jayson, who are in the direct line, exclude the brother Ronie and the
sister Michelle who are both in the collateral line. However the son Jayson, who is in the
descending line, excludes the father Juan who is in the ascending line.

VIII.
(a) Luis was survived by two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his parents,
and two brothers. He left an estate of P1 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of
Luis, how much is the legitime of each, and how much is the free portion of his estate,
if any?
(b) Suppose Luis, in the preceding question (a), died intestate. Who are his intestate
heirs, and how much is the share of each in his estate? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
x
x
x
The intestate heirs are the two (2) legitimate children and the two (2) illegitimate children.
In intestacy the estate of the decedent is divided among the legitimate and illegitimate children
such that the share of each illegitimate child is one- half the share of each legitimate child.
(b)

Their shares are:

For each legitimate child - P333.333.33
For each illegitimate child - P166.666.66
(Article 983, New Civil Code; Article 176, Family Code)
IX. Eugenio died without issue, leaving several parcels of land in Bataan. He was survived by
Antonio, his legitimate brother; Martina, the only daughter of his predeceased sister
Mercedes; and five legitimate children of Joaquin, another predeceased brother. Shortly
after Eugenios death, Antonio also died, leaving three legitimate children. Subsequently.
Martina, the children of Joaquin and the children of Antonio executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Eugenio, dividing it among themselves. The succeeding year, a
petition to annul the extrajudicial settlement was filed by Antero, an illegitimate son of
Antonio, who claims he is entitled to share in the estate of Eugenio. The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that Antero is barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code
from inheriting from the legitimate brother of his father. How will you resolve the
motion? (5%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Article 992 does not apply. Antero is not claiming
any inheritance from Eugenio. He is claiming his share in the inheritance of his father consisting of
his fathers share in the inheritance of Eugenio (Dela Merced v. Dela Merced, G.R. No. 126707, 25
February 1999).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If Antero was not acknowledged by Antonio, the motion to dismiss should be
granted because Antero is not a legal heir of Antonio. If Antero was acknowledged, the motion
should be denied because Article992 is not applicable. This is because Antero is claiming his
inheritance from his illegitimate father, not from Eugenio.
X.
(a)

Mr. and Mrs. Cruz, who are childless, met with a serious motor vehicle

accident with Mr. Cruz at the wheel and Mrs. Cruz seated beside him, resulting in the
instant death of Mr. Cruz. Mrs. Cruz was still alive when help came but she also died on the
way to the hospital. The couple acquired properties-worth One Million (P1,000,000.00)
Pesos during their marriage, which are being claimed by the parents of both spouses in
equal shares. Is the claim of both sets of parents valid and why? (3%)
(b) Suppose in the preceding question, both Mr. and Mrs. Cruz were already dead
when help came, so that nobody could say who died ahead of the other, would you answer
be the same to the question as to who are entitled to the properties of the deceased couple?
(2%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
No, the claim of both parents is not valid. When Mr. Cruz died, he was succeeded by
his wife and his parents as his intestate heirs who will share his estate equally. His estate was 0.5
Million pesos which is his half share in the absolute community amounting to 1 Million Pesos. His
wife, will, therefore, inherit 0.25 Million Pesos and his parents will inherit 0.25 Million Pesos.

When Mrs. Cruz died, she was succeeded by her parents as her intestate heirs. They will
inherit all of her estate consisting of her 0.5 Million half share in the absolute community and her
0.25 Million inheritance from her husband, or a total of 0.750 Million Pesos.
In sum, the parents of Mr. Cruz will inherit 250,000 Pesos while the parents of Mrs. Cruz will
inherit 750,000 Pesos.
This being a case of succession, in the absence of proof as to the time of death of
each of the spouses, it is presumed they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from
one to the other is deemed to have taken place. Therefore, each of them is deemed to have an
estate valued at P500,000.00, or one-half of their conjugal property of P1 million. Their respective
parents will thus inherit the entire P1 Million in equal shares, or P500,000.00 per set of parents.
(b)

XI. Tessie died survived by her husband Mario, and two nieces. Michelle and Jorelle, who
are the legitimate children of an elder sister who had predeceased her. The only
property she left behind was a house and lot worth two million pesos, which Tessie and
her husband had acquired with the use of Marios savings from his income as a doctor.
How much of the property or its value, if any, may Michelle and Jorelle claim as their
hereditary shares? [5%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides, Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Tessie's gross estate consists of a house and lot acquired during her marriage, making it
part of the community property. Thus, one-half of the said property would have to be set aside as
Mario's conjugal share from the community property. The other half, amounting to one million
pesos, is her conjugal share (net estate), and should be distributed to her intestate heirs. Applying
the above provision of law, Michelle and Jorelle, Tessie's nieces, are entitled to one-half of her
conjugal share worth one million pesos, or 500,000 pesos, while the other one-half amounting to
P500.000 will go to Mario, Tessie's surviving spouse. Michelle and Jorelle are then entitled to

P250.000 pesos each as their hereditary share.

XII. Enrique died, leaving a net hereditary estate of PI.2 million. He is survived by his widow,
three legitimate children, two legitimate grandchildren sired by a legitimate child who
predeceased him, and two recognized illegitimate children. Distribute the estate in
intestacy. [5%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the theory of Concurrence, the shares are as follows:
A (legitimate child) = P200.000
B (legitimate child) = P200.000
C (legitimate child) = P200.000
D (legitimate child) = 0 (predeceased]
E (legitimate child of D) = P100.000 - by right of representation
F (legitimate child of D) P100.000 - by right of representation
G (illegitimate child) * PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
H (illegitimate child) = PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
W (Widow) = P200,000 - same share as legitimate child
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under the theory of Exclusion the free portion (P300,000), is distributed only among the
legitimate children and is given to them in addition to their legitime. All other intestate heirs are
entitled only to their respective legitimes. The distribution is as follows:
Legitime
A (Legitimate child)
B (Legitimate child)
C (Legitimate child)
D (Legitimate child)
E (Legitimate child of D)
F (Legitimate Child of D)
G (Illegitimate Child)
H (Illegitimate Child)
W (Widow)

Free Portion
P150,000 + P 75,000
P150,000 + P150,000
P150,000 + P 75,000
0
+
0
P 75,000 + P 35,500
P 75,000 + P 37,500
P 75,000 +
0
P 75,000 +
0
P 150,000 + ,,, 0

Total
= P225,000
= P225,000
= P225,000
=
0
= P 112,000
= P 112,500
= P 75,000
= P 75,000
= P 150,000

XIII. "T" died intestate on 1 September 1997. He was survived by M (his mother), W (his
widow), A and B (his legitimate children), C (his grandson, being the legitimate son of B),
D (his other grandson, being the son of E who was a legitimate son of, and who
predeceased, T), and F (his grandson, being the son of G, a legitimate son who
repudiated the inheritance from 'T'). His distributable net estate Is P120,000.00.
How should this amount be shared in intestacy among the surviving heirs? (1997 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The legal heirs are A, B, D, and W. C is excluded by B who is still alive. D inherits in
representation of E who predeceased. F is excluded because of the repudiation of G. the

predecessor. M is excluded by the legitimate children of T. The answer may be premised on two
theories: the Theory of Exclusion and the Theory of Concurrence.
Under the Theory of Exclusion the legitimes of the heirs are accorded them and the free
portion will be given exclusively to the legitimate descendants. Hence under the Exclusion Theory:
A will get P20.000.00, and P 13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
B will get P 20,000.00, and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
D will get P20.000.00. and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
W, the widow is limited to the legitime of P20,000.00
Under the Theory of Concurrence, in addition to their legitimes, the heirs of A, B. D and W will
be given equal shares in the free portions:
A: P20.000.00 plus PI0.000.00 (1 /4of the free portion) B: P20.000.00plus PI0.000.00 (1/4 of
the free portion) C: P20,000.00 plus P10,000.00 (1 /4 of the free portion) W: P20,000.00 plus
P10,000.00(1/4 of the free portion)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Shares in intestacy
T - decedent

Estate: PI20,000.00

Survived by:
M - Mother .................................. .................None
W - Widow ....................................................P 30,000.00
A - Son ............................................................P 30.000.00
B - Son ............................................................P 30.000.00
C - Grandson (son of B) ...........................None
D - Grandson (son of E who
predeceased T)............................P 30,000.00
F - Grandson (son of G who
repudiated the inheritance
fromT*) .........................................None
1) The

mother (M) cannot inherit from T because under Art. 985 the ascendants shall inherit
in default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased.
2) The widow's share is P30.000.00 because under Art. 996 it states that if the widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.
3) C has no share because his father is still alive hence succession by representation shall not
apply (Art. 975).
4) D inherits P30.000 which is the share of his father E who predeceased T by virtue of Art.
981 on the right of representation.

5) F has no share because his father G repudiated the inheritance. Under Article 977 heirs
who repudiate their share may not be represented.

XIV. "X". the decedent, was survived by W (his widow). A (his son). B (a granddaughter,
being the daughter of A) and C and D (the two acknowledged illegitimate children of the
decedent). "X' died this year (1997) leaving a net estate of P180,000.00. All were willing
to succeed, except A who repudiated the inheritance from his father, and they seek your
legal advice on how much each can expect to receive as their respective shares in the
distribution of the estate.
Give your answer. (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The heirs are B, W. C and D. A inherits nothing because of his renunciation. B inherits a
legitime of P90.000.00 as the nearest and only legitimate descendant, inheriting in his own right
not by representation because of As renunciation. W gets a legitime equivalent to one-half (1 /2)
that of B amounting to P45.000. C and D each gets a legitime equivalent to one- half (1/2) that of B
amounting to P45.000.00 each. But since the total exceeds the entire estate, their legitimes would
have to be reduced correspondingly to P22.500.00 each (Art. 895. CO). The total of all of these
amounts to P180.000.00.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
ESTATE : P180,000.00
W- (widow gets 1/2 share)
A- (son who repudiated his
inheritance)
B - (Granddaughter)
C - (Acknowledged
illegitimate child)
D - (Acknowledged
Illegitimate child)

P90.000.00

(Art. 998,'

None
None

(Art. 977)

P45.000.00

(An.998)

P45.000.00

(Art. 998)

The acknowledged illegitimate child gets 1/2 of the share of each legitimate child.
XV. On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-ycar old businessman, married Karla, a winsome lass
of 18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin and Karla
entered into an antenuptial contract the day before their marriage stipulating that
conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage
Kevins estate was worth 50 Million while Karlas was valued at 2 Million.
A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left no will,
no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives: his
brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.
x
x
x
3. Determine the value of the estate of Kevin.

4. Who are Kevins heirs?

5. How much is each of Kevins heirs entitled to inherit? (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became community
property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since Kevin owned 50 Million
and Karla, 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52 Million constituted their community properly.
Upon the death of Kevin, the community was dissolved and half of the 52 Million or 26 Million is his
share in the community. This 26 Million therefore is his estate.
4. Karla and Luis are the intestate heirs of Kevin.
5. They are entitled to share the estate equally under Article 1001 of the NCC. Therefore,
Karla gets 13 Million and Luis gets 13 Million.
XVI. Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by his son Braulio. Abrahams
older son Carlos died on 14 February 1990.
Danilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos, intervenes in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of Abraham in representation of Carlos. Danilo was
legally adopted on 17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the latters wife.
x
x
x
3. Can Danilo inherit from Abraham in representation of his father Carlos? Explain.
(1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. he cannot. Danilo cannot represent Carlos as the latters adopted child in the
inheritance of Abraham because adoption did not make Danilo a legitimate grandchild of Abraham.
Adoption is personal between Carlos and Danilo. He cannot also represent Carlos as the latters
illegitimate child because in such case he is barred by Art. 992 of the NCC from inheriting from his
illegitimate grandfather Abraham.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
An adopted childs successional rights do not include the right to represent his deceased
adopter in the inheritance of the latters legitimate parent, in view of Art. 973 which provides that
in order that representation may take place, the representative must himself be capable of
succeeding the decedent. Adoption by itself did not render Danilo an heir of 'the adopters
legitimate parent. Neither does his being a grandchild of Abraham render him an heir of the latter
because as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who was a legitimate child of Abraham, Danilo is
incapable of succeeding Abraham under Art. 992 of the Code.
XVII. A is the acknowledged natural child of B who died when A was already 22 years old.
When Bs full blood brother, C, died he (C) was survived by his widow and four children
of his other brother, D. Claiming that he is entitled to inherit from his fathers brother, C.
A brought suit to obtain his share in the estate of C.
Will his action prosper? (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action of A will not prosper. On the premise that B, C and D are legitimate brothers, as
an illegitimate child of B, A cannot inherit in intestacy from C who is a legitimate brother of B. Only
the wife of C in her own right and the legitimate relatives of C (i.e. the children of D as Cs legitimate
nephews inheriting as collateral relatives) can inherit in intestacy. (Arts. 992, 1001. 1005 and 975,
Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action of A will not prosper. Being an illegitimate, he is barred by Article 992 of the Civil
Code from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father.
XVIII. When does the right of representation take place? (1988 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The right of representation shall take place in the following cases:
(1) In testamentary succession:
(a)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line dies before the testator

survived by his children or descendants (Art. 856, CC).

(b)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to succeed
from the testator and he has children or descendants. (Arts. 856, 1035, CC).
(c)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is disinherited and he has
children or descendants. (Art. 923, CC).
(2) In intestate succession:
(a)
In case a legal heir in the direct descending line dies before the decedent survived

by his children or descendant (Arts. 98lj 982, CC), or in the absence of other heirs who can
exclude them from the succession, a brother or sister dies before the decedent survived by his
or her own children. (Arts. 972, 975, CC).
(b)
In case a legal heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to succeed from the
decedent and he has children or descendants (Art. 1035, CC) or in the absence of other heirs
who can exclude them from the succession, a brother or sister is incapacitated to succeed from
the decedent and he or she has children. (Arts. 972, 975, 1035, CC).
XIX. Angel died intestate leaving considerable properties accumulated during 25 years of
marriage. He is survived by his widow, a legally adopted son, the child of a deceased
legitimate daughter, two illegitimate children duly recognized by Angel before his death
and his ailing 93-year old mother who has wholly dependent on him.
How would you distribute the estate indicating by fractions the portions of the
following who claim to be entitled to inherit:
(a)
the widow?
(b)
the adopted son?
(c)
the child of the deceased legitimate daughter?
(d)
the two recognized illegitimate children?
(e)
the mother? (1987 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
b.
c.
d.

the widow 1/4

the adopted son - 1/4
the child of the deceased legitimate daughter 1/4
the two recognized illegitimate children - v/e must distinguish:

Assuming that the two recognized illegitimate children are natural children, then each of
them will get 1/8.
Upon the other hand, if they are recognized spurious children then each of them will get 2/5
of 1/4 of the estate. The remaining 1/5 of 1/4 will be distributed as follows:
Under the theory of concurrence, that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally among the widow,
the adopted son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
Under the theory of exclusion that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally between the adopted
son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
e. the mother - will get nothing.

IV. Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

I.

True or False.
X, a widower, died leaving a will stating that the house and lot where he lived cannot
be partitioned for as long as the youngest of his four children desires to stay there. As
coheirs and co-owners, the other three may demand partition anytime. (1%) (2010 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE.
The other three co-heirs may not at any time demand the partition of the house and lot since it
was expressly provided by the decedent in his will that the same cannot be partitioned while his
youngest child desires to stay there. Article 1083of the New Civil Code allows a decedent to
prohibit, by will, the partition of a property in his estate for a period not longer than 20 years no
matter what his reason may be. Hence, the three co-heirs cannot' demand its partition at anytime
but only after 20 years from the death of their father. Even if the deceased parent did not leave a
will, if the house and lot constituted their family home, Article 159 of the Family Code prohibits its
partition for a period often (10) yeans, or for long as there is a minor beneficiary living in the family
home.
II. Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to the
spouses Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The childrens birth certificates were duly
signed by Conrado, showing them to be the couples legitimate children.
Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging Alberto
and Baldomero as his illegitimate children with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving

substantial properties. In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero

intervened claiming shares as the deceaseds illegitimate children. The legitimate family
of Edilberto opposed the claim.
Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain. (4%)
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Alberto and Baldomero are not entitled to share in Edilbertos estate. They are not related
at all to Edilberto. They were born during the marriage of Conrado and Clarita, hence, are
considered legitimate children of the said spouses. This status is conferred on them at birth by law.
Under Philippine law, a person cannot have more than one natural filiation. The legitimate
filiation of a person can be changed only if the legitimate father will successfully impugn such
status.
In the problem, therefore, the filiation of Alberto and Baldomero as the legitimate children of
Conrado cannot be changed by their recognition by Edilberto as his illegitimate children. Before
they can be conferred the status of Edilbertos illegitimate children, Conrado must first impugn
their legitimacy. Since Conrado has not initiated any action to impugn their legitimacy, they
continue to be the legitimate children of Conrado. They cannot be the illegitimate children of
Edilberto at the same time. Not being the illegitimate children of Edilberto, they have no right to
inherit from him.
III. Alex died without a will, leaving only an undeveloped and untitled lot in Taguig City. He
is survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife told the children that she is waiving her
hare in the property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son who was about to get married, to
construct his house on 1/4 of the lot without however obtaining the consent of his
siblings. After settlement of Alexs estate and partition among the heirs, it was
discovered that Bobbys house was constructed on the portion allocated to his sister,
Cathy. Cathy asked Bobby to demolish his house and vacate the portion allotted to her. In
lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from Cathy the lot portion on which his
house was constructed. At that time, the house was valued at P300,000 while the portion
of the lot on which the house was constructed was valued at P350,000.
a) Can Cathy lawfully ask for demolition of Bobbys house? (3%) (2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Cathy can ask for the demolition of Bobbys I house on the portion allotted to Cathy
in the partition. The lot is presumed to be community property as it was acquired during the
marriage. Upon Alexs death there I was created a co-ownership by operation of law among the
widow and four children. (Art. 1078, CC) Bobbys share is only an undivided interest of 1/10 of the
entire lot. The widows share in the co-ownership is 6/10 of the entire lot, 1/2 of the lot being her
share in the community property and 1/5 of Alexs share in the other half, because she has the
same share as one of the four children. She has the financial majority or majority interest of the coownership.

Bobbys act of building on of the lot is an act requiring the unanimous consent of all the
co-owners since it is an act of alteration. Bobby only had the ideal share of 1/10 of the entire lot,
and when he built his house on of the lot, he was arrogating unto himself the right to partition
the poverty and taking more than what he legally owns. The consent given by the widow to Bobbys
act of building his house was legally insufficient. As a matter of right, Cathy can ask for the
demolition of the house and the payment of damages.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Art. 448 of the New Civil Code is applicable by analogy (Concepcion Fernandez del Campo v.
Abeisa, 160 SCRA 379 [1988]). Pursuant thereto, Cathy is given two options: (1) to appropriate the
house that Bobby built, upon payment of indemnity; or (2) to compel Bobby to buy the land,
considering that its value is not considerably higher than the value of the house. At this stage she is
not given the option to demand demolition of the house. However, if she has chosen to sell the land
to Bobby and the latter does not or cannot buy the land, she can demand the demolition of the
house.
IV. A Filipino couple, Mr. And Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St. Claire's
orphanage In New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they
have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died In an accident at sea, followed to the
grave a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of bank
deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.?
May she also inherit from BM. Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YV can inherit from BM, Jr. the succession to the estate of BM, Jr. is governed by Philippine
law because he was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Article 1039 of the Civil
Code, the capacity of the heir to succeed is governed by the national law of the decedent and not by
the national law of the heir. Hence, whether or not YV can inherit from BM, Jr. is determined by
Philippine law. Under Philippine law, the adopted inherits from the adopter as a legitimate child of
the adopter.
YV, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter, BM, Sr., because
he is not a legal heir of BM, Sr. The legal fiction of adoption exists only between the adopted and
the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]). Neither may he inherit from BM, Sr. by
representing BM, Jr. because in representation, the representative must be a legal heir not only of
the person he is representing but also of the decedent from whom the represented was supposed
to inherit (Article 973, Civil Code).
V. Joaquin Reyes bought from Julio Cruz a residential lot of 300 square meters in Quezon
City for which Joaquin paid Julio the amount of P300,000.00. When the deed was about to
be prepared Joaquin told Julio that it be drawn in the name of Joaquina Roxas, his
acknowledged natural child. Thus, the deed was so prepared and executed by Julio.
Joaquina then built a house on the lot where she, her husband and children resided.
Upon Joaquins death, his legitimate children sought to recover possession and
ownership of the lot, claiming that Joaquina Roxas was but a trustee of their father.
Will the action against Joaquina Roxas prosper? (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because there is a presumed donation in favor of Joaquina under Art. 1448 of the Civil
Code (De los Santos v. Reyes. 27 January 1992. 206 SCRA 437). However, the donation should be
collated to the hereditary estate and the legitime of the other heirs should be preserved.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the action against Joaquina Roxas will prosper, but only to the extent of the aliquot
hereditary rights of the legitimate children as heirs. Joaquina will be entitled to retain her own
share as an illegitimate child. (Arts. 1440 and 1453. Civil Code; Art. 176, F. C.)
PARTNERSHIP
I.

Contract of Partnership

I.

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[c] An oral partnership is valid. (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract, hence, it is valid even though not in writing.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. An oral contract of partnership is valid even though not in writing. However, if it
involves contribution of an immovable property or a real right, an oral contract of partnership is
void. In such a case, the contract of partnership to be valid, must be in a public instrument (Art.
1771, NCC), and the inventory of said property signed by the parties must be attached to said
public instrument (Art. 1773, NCC.).
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract, hence, it is valid even though not in writing. The
oral contract of partnership is also valid even if an immovable property or real right is
contributed thereto. While the law in such a case, requires the partnership to be in a public
document, the law does not expressly declare the contract void if not executed in the required
form (Article 1409[7], NCC). And there being nothing in the law from which it can be inferred
that the said requirement is prohibitory or mandatory (Article 5, NCC), the said oral contract of
partnership must also be valid. The interested party may simply require the contract to be made
into a public document in order to comply with the required form (Article 1357, NCC). The
purpose of the law in requiring a public document is simply to notify the public about the
contribution.
II.

2) Can two corporations organize a general partnership under the Civil Code of the

3)

Philippines?
Can a corporation and an individual form a general partnership? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2) a) No. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation were to
become a partner, co-partners would have the power to make the corporation party to transactions
in an irregular manner since the partners are not agents subject to the control of the Board of
Directors. But a corporation may enter into a Joint venture with another corporation as long as the
nature of the venture is in line with the business authorized by its charter. (Thdson & Co., Inc. v.
Bolano, 95 Phil. 106).
b) As a general rule a corporation may not form a general partnership with another
corporation or an Individual because a corporation may not be bound by persons who are neither
directors nor officers of the corporation.

However, a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or an

individual provided the following conditions are met:
1) The Articles of Incorporation of the corporation expressly allows the corporation to enter
into partnerships;
2) The Articles of Partnership must provide that all partners will manage the partnership,
and they shall be jointly and severally liable; and
3) In case of a foreign corporation, it must be licensed to do business in the Philippines.
c) No. A corporation may not be a general partner because the principle of mutual agency in

general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the corporation will violate the
corporation law principle that only the board of directors may bind the corporation.
3) No, for the same reasons given in the Answer to Number 2 above.
III.

(a) Distinguish co-ownership from partnership. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Co-ownership is distinguished from an ordinary partnership in the following ways:
(1) As to creation: Whereas co-ownership may be created by law, contract, succession,
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

(6)

fortuitous event, or occupancy, partnership is always created by contract.

As to purpose: Whereas the purpose of co-ownership is the common enjoyment of the
thing or right owned in common, the purpose of a partnership is to obtain profits.
As to personality: Whereas a co-ownership has no juridical personality which is separate
and distinct from that of the owners, a partnership has.
As to duration: Whereas an agreement not to divide the community property for more
than ten years is not allowed by law such an agreement would be perfectly valid in the
case of partnerships. This is so, because under the law, there is no limitation upon the
duration of partnerships.
As to power of members: Whereas a co-owner has no power to represent the coownership unless there is an agreement to that effect, a partner has the power to
represent the partnership, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
As to effect of disposition of shares: If a co-owner transfers his share to a third person, the

latter becomes automatically a co-owner, but if a partner transfers his share to a third
person, the latter does not become a partner, unless agreed upon by all of the partners.
(7) As to division of profits: Whereas in co-ownership the division of the benefits and charges
is fixed by law, in a partnership the division of profits arid losses may be subject to the
agreement of the partners.
(8) As to effect of death: Whereas the death of a co-owner has no effect upon the existence of
the co-ownership, the death of a partner shall result in. the dissolution of the partnership.
Committees Recommendation Re: (a):
It is recommended that a mention of three distinctions should merit a full credit for this
question.
II. Rights and Obligations of Partnership
III. Rights and Obligations of Partners Among Themselves
I.

A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the

restaurant had gone past break-even stage and started to gamer considerable profits, C
died. A and B continued the business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact
opened a branch of the restaurant, incurring obligations in the process. Creditors started
demanding for the payment of their obligations.
A. Who are liable for the settlement of the partnerships obligations? Explain? (3%)
(2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. When any partner dies and the business is
continued without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate, the surviving
partners are held liable for continuing the business despite the death of C (Articles 1841, 1785,
par. 2, and 1833 of the New Civil Code).
II. Joe and Rudy formed a partnership to operate a car repair shop in Quezon City. Joe
provided the capital while Rudy contributed his labor and industry. On one side of their
shop, Joe opened and operated a coffee shop, while on the other side, Rudy put up a car
accessories store. May they engage in such separate businesses? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Joe, the capitalist partner, may engage in the restaurant business because it is not the same
kind of business the partnership is engaged in. On the other hand, Rudy may not engage in any
other business unless their partnership expressly permits him to do so because as an industrial
partner he has to devote his full time to the business of the partnership (Art. 1789, CC).
III. Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having contributed
equal amounts to the capital, they also agree on equal distribution of whatever net profit
is realized per fiscal period. After two years of operation, however, Una conveys her

whole interest in the partnership to Justine, without the knowledge and consent of Dielle
and Kaflo.
1.
2.

Is the partnership dissolved? [2%]

What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she desire to participate in the
management of the partnership and in the distribution of a net profit of
P360.000.00 which was realized after her purchase of Unas interest? [3%] (1998
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. No, a conveyance by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself
dissolve the partnership in the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
2. Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs. She may, however, receive the net profits to which Una would have
otherwise been entitled. In this case, P120,000 (Art. 1813, Civil Code)

IV. W, X, Y and Z organized a general partnership with W and X as industrial partners and Y
and Z as capitalist partners. Y contributed P50.000.00 and Z contributed P20.000.00 to
the common fund. By a unanimous vote of the partners, W and X were appointed
managing partners, without any specification of their respective powers and duties.
A applied for the position of Secretary and B applied for the position of Accountant of
the partnership.
The hiring of A was decided upon by W and X, but was opposed by Y and Z.
The hiring of B was decided upon by W and Z, but was opposed by X and Y.
Who of the applicants should be hired by the partnership? Explain and give your
reasons. (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the hiring of A prevails because it is an act of
administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners, W and X.
B cannot be hired, because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partner, the
deadlock must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case, the
opposition of X and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling interest (Art. 1801, Civil Code).
V. X used his savings from his salaries amounting to a little more than P2,000 as capital in
establishing a restaurant. Y gave the amount of P4,000 to X as financial assistance
with the understanding that Y would be entitled to 22% of the annual profits derived
from the operation of the restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years, Y filed a case
demanding his share in the said profits. X denied that there was a partnership and
raised the issue of prescription as Y did not assert his rights anytime within ten (10)
years from the start of the operation of the restaurant. Is Y a partner of X in the
business? Why? What is the nature of the right to demand ones share in the profits of a
partnership? Does this right prescribe? (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and an intent to divide
profits. It is founded upon an express trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Y is not a partner because the amount is extended in the form of a financial assistance
arid therefore it is a loan, and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a partnership. The
right is founded upon a contract of loan whereby the borrower is bound to pay principal and
interest like all ordinary obligations. Yes, his right prescribes in six or ten years depending
upon whether the contract is oral or written.
IV. Obligations of Partnership/Partners to Third Persons
I.

A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the

restaurant had gone past break-even stage and started to gamer considerable profits, C
died. A and B continued the business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact
opened a branch of the restaurant, incurring obligations in the process. Creditors started
demanding for the payment of their obligations.
x
x
x
B. What are the creditors recourse/s? Explain. (3%) (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Creditors can file the appropriate actions, for instance, an action for the collection of sum of
money against the partnership at will and if there are no sufficient funds, the creditors may go
after the private properties of Aand B (Article 1816,New Civil Code). Creditors may also sue the
estate of C. The estate is not excused from the liabilities of the partnership even if C is dead
already but only up to the time that he remained a partner (Article 1829, 1835, par. 2; NCC,
Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, 47 Phil. 464 [1925]). However, the liability of Cs individual
property shall be subject first to the payment of his separate debts (Article 1835,New Civil Code).
II. A, B and C formed a partnership for the purpose of contracting with the Government in
the construction of one of its bridges. On June 30, 1992, after completion of the project,
the bridge was turned over by the partners to the Government. On August 30, 1992, D. a
supplier of materials used in the project sued A for collection of the indebtedness to him.
A moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that it was the ABC
partnership that is liable for the debt. D replied that ABC partnership was dissolved
upon completion of the project for which purpose the partnership was formed.
Will you dismiss the complaint against B if you were the judge? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As Judge. I would not dismiss the complaint against A because A is still liable as a general
partner for his pro rata share of 1/3 (Art. 1816, C. C.). Dissolution of a partnership caused by the
termination of the particular undertaking specified in the agreement does not extinguish
obligations, which must be liquidated during the winding up" of the partnership affairs (Articles

1829 and 1830, par. 1-a, Civil Code).

V. Dissolution
I.

A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the

restaurant had gone past break-even stage and started to gamer considerable profits, C
died. A and B continued the business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact
opened a branch of the restaurant, incurring obligations in the process. Creditors started
demanding for the payment of their obligations.
A. Who are liable for the settlement of the partnerships obligations? Explain? (3%)
(2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. When any partner dies and the business is
continued without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate, the surviving
partners are held liable for continuing the business despite the death of C (Articles 1841, 1785,
par. 2, and 1833 of the New Civil Code).
B. What are the creditors recourse/s? Explain. (3%) (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Creditors can file the appropriate actions, for instance, an action for the collection of sum of
money against the partnership at will and if there are no sufficient funds, the creditors may go
after the private properties of A and B (Article 1816, New Civil Code). Creditors may also sue the
estate of C. The estate is not excused from the liabilities of the partnership even if C is dead
already but only up to the time that he remained a partner (Article 1829, 1835, par. 2; NCC,
Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, 47 Phil. 464 [1925]). However, the liability of Cs individual
property shall be subject first to the payment of his separate debts (Article 1835, New Civil Code).
II. Stating briefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the
death
x
x
x
(b) of a partner terminate the partnership? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The death of a partner will terminate the partnership, by express provision of par. 5,
Art. 1830 of the Civil Code.
III. Pauline, Patricia and Priscilla formed a business partnership for the purpose of engaging
in neon advertising for a term of five (5) years. Pauline subsequently assigned to Philip
her interest in the partnership. When Patricia and Priscilla learned of the assignment,
they decided to dissolve the partnership before the expiration of its term as they had an
unproductive business relationship with Philip in the past. On the other hand, unaware
of the move of Patricia and Priscilla but sensing their negative reaction to his acquisition
of Paulines interest, Philip simultaneously petitioned for the dissolution of the
partnership.

1. Is the dissolution done by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline or

Philip valid? Explain.

2. Does Philip have any right to petition for the dissolution of the partnership before
the expiration of its specified term? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Under Art. 1830 (1) (c) of the NCC, the dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla is valid and did
not violate the contract of partnership even though Pauline and Philip did not consent thereto. The
consent of Pauline is not necessary because she had already assigned her interest to Philip, The
consent of Philip is not also necessary because the assignment to him of Paulines interest did not
make him a partner, under Art. 1813 of the NCC.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Interpreting Art. 1830 (1) (c) to mean that if one of the partners had assigned his interest on
the partnership to another the remaining partners may not dissolve the partnership, the
dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline or Philip is not valid.
No, Philip has no right to petition for dissolution because he does not have the standing of
a partner (Art. 1813 NCC).
2.

IV. A, B and C formed a partnership for the purpose of contracting with the Government in
the construction of one of its bridges. On June 30, 1992, after completion of the project,
the bridge was turned over by the partners to the Government. On August 30, 1992, D. a
supplier of materials used in the project sued A for collection of the indebtedness to him.
A moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that it was the ABC
partnership that is liable for the debt. D replied that ABC partnership was dissolved
upon completion of the project for which purpose the partnership was formed.
Will you dismiss the complaint against B if you were the judge? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As Judge. I would not dismiss the complaint against A because A is still liable as a general
partner for his pro rata share of 1/3 (Art. 1816, C. C.). Dissolution of a partnership caused by the
termination of the particular undertaking specified in the agreement does not extinguish
obligations, which must be liquidated during the winding up" of the partnership affairs (Articles
1829 and 1830, par. 1-a, Civil Code).
V. Tomas, Rene and Jose entered into a partnership under the firm name Manila Lumber.
Subsequently, upon mutual agreement, Tomas withdrew from the partnership and the
partnership was dissolved. However, the remaining partners, Rene and Jose, did not
terminate the business of Manila Lumber. Instead of winding up the business of the
partnership and liquidating its assets, Rene and Jose continued the business in the name
of Manila Lumber apparently without objection from Tomas. The withdrawal of Tomas
from the partnership was not published in the newspapers.
Could Tomas be held liable for any obligation or indebtedness Rene and Jose might
incur while doing business in the name of Manila Lumber after his withdrawal from

the partnership? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Tomas can be held liable under the doctrine of estoppel. But as regards the parties among
themselves, only Rene and Jose are liable. Tomas cannot be held liable since there was no proper
notification or publication.
In the event that Tomas is made to pay the liability to third person, he has the right to seek
reimbursement from Rene and Jose (Articles 1837 to 1840; Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
VI. Limited Partnership
I.

Can a husband and wife form a limited partnership to engage in real estate business, with
the wife being a limited partner? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes. The Civil Code prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a universal partnership.
Since a limited partnership is not a universal partnership, a husband and wife may validly form
one.
b) Yes. While spouses cannot enter into a universal partnership, they can enter into a limited
partnership or be members thereof (CIR v. Suter, et al., 27 SCRA 152).

AGENCY
I.

Definition of Agency

I.

Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket.
Was there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In. the
affirmative, what was it? Explain. (2003 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of
her close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they entered into
was the nominate contract of Agency. Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the
contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of service in the absence of a relation of
principal and agent between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
II. A foreign manufacturer of computers and a Philippine distributor entered into a
contract whereby the distributor agreed to order 1,000 units of the manufacturers

computers every month and to resell them In the Philippines at the manufacturers
suggested prices plus 10%. All unsold units at the end of the year shall be bought back
by the manufacturer at the same price they were ordered. The manufacturer shall hold
the distributor free and harmless from any claim for defects in the units. Is the
agreement one for sale or agency? (5%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract is one of agency not sale. The notion of sale is negated by the following indicia;
(1) the price is fixed by the manufacturer with the 10% mark-up constituting the commission; (2)
the manufacturer reacquires the unsold units at exactly the same price; and (3) warranty for the
units was borne by the manufacturer. The foregoing Indicia negate sale because they indicate that
ownership over the units was never intended to transfer to the distributor.
II. Powers
I.

X appoints Y as his agent to sell his products in Cebu City. Can Y appoint a sub-agent and
if he does, what are the effects of such appointment? (5%) (1999 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the agent may appoint a substitute or subagent if the principal has not prohibited him
from doing so, but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
(1) when he was not given the power to appoint one;
(2) when he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person
appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.
III. Express vs. Implied Agency
IV. Agency by Estoppel
V. General vs. Special Agency
VI. Agency Couched in General Terms
I.

A as principal appointed B is his agent granting him general and unlimited management
over A's properties, stating that A withholds no power from B and that the agent may
execute such acts as he may consider appropriate.
Accordingly, B leased A's parcel of land in Manila to C for four (4) years at P60.000.00
per year, payable annually in advance.
B leased another parcel of land of A in Caloocan City to D without a fixed term at
P3,000.00 per month payable monthly.
B sold to E a third parcel of land belonging to A located in Quezon City for three (3)
times the price that was listed in the inventory by A to B.
All those contracts were executed by B while A was confined due to illness in the
Makati Medical Center.

Rule on the validity and binding effect of each of the above contracts upon A the
principal. Explain your answers. (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The agency couched in general terms comprised only acts of administration (Art. 1877, Civil
Code). The lease contract on the Manila parcel is not valid, not enforceable and not binding upon A.
For B to lease the property to C, for more than one (1) year, A must provide B with a special power
of attorney (Art. 1878, Civil Code).
The lease of the Caloocan City property to D is valid and binding upon A. Since the lease is
without a fixed term, it is understood to be from month to month, since the rental is payable
monthly (Art. 1687, Civil Code).
The sale of the Quezon City parcel to E is not valid and not binding upon A. B needed a special
power of attorney to validly sell the land (Arts. 1877 and 1878. Civil Code). The sale of the land at a
very good price does not cure the defect of the contract arising from lack of authority.
VII. Agency Requiring Special Power of Attorney
I.

X was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. As she was abroad,
she advised her sister Y via overseas call to sell the land and sign a contract of sale on her
behalf.
Y thus sold the land to B1 on March 31, 2001 and executed a deed of absolute sale on
behalf of X. B1 fully paid the purchase price.
B2, unaware of the sale of the land to B1, signified to Y his interest to buy it but asked
Y for her authority from X. Without informing X that she had sold the land to B1, Y sought
X for a written authority to sell.
X e-mailed Y an authority to sell the land. Y thereafter sold the land on May 1, 2001 to
B2 on monthly installment basis for two years, the first installment to be paid at the end
of May 2001. Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the land? Explain. (5%)
(2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B-2 has a better title. This is not a case of double sale since the first sale was void. The law
provides that when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the
authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void (Article 1874,New Civil
Code). The property was sold by Y to B1 without any written authority from the owner X. Hence,
the sale to B1 was void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under the facts, B-1 has a better right to the land. Given the fact that the Deed of Sale in favor
of B-1 and B- 2 are not inscribed in the Registry of Deeds, the case is governed by Article 1544 of
the New Civil Code which provides that in case of double sales of an immovable property, the

ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession and in the absence
thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In a case, the Supreme Court has held that in a sale of real estate the execution of a notarial
document of sale is tantamount to delivery of the possession of the property sold. Ownership of the
land therefore pertains to the lmt buyer. It may also be mentioned that under Act 3344 no
instruments or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying, or extinguishing right to
real property not registered under Act 496 shall be valid between the parties. Thus, the Deed of
Sale of B-2 has no binding effect on B-1.
II.

(b) In 1950, A executed a power of attorney authorizing B to sell a parcel of lancl

consisting of more than 14 hectares. A died in 1954. In 1956, his four childen sold
more than 12 hectares of the land to C. In 1957, B sold. 8 hectares of the same land to
D. It appears that C did not register the sale executed by the children. D, who was not
aware of the previous sale, registered the sale executed by B, whose authority to sell
was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title.

(1) What was the effect of the death of A upon Bs authority to sell the land?
(2) Assuming that B still had the authority to sell the landwho has a better right over

the said land, C or D? (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) While the death of the principal in 1954 ended the authority of the agent to sell the land, it
has not been shown that he was aware of his principal s demise. Hence, the act of such agent is
valid and shall be fully effective with respect to third persons which may have contracted with him
in good faith in conformity with Art. 1931 of the Civil Code. (Buason vs. Panuyas, 105 Phil. 795,
Herrera vs. Luy, 110 Phil. 1020.)
(2) As the case at bar is a case of double sale of registered land he who recorded the sale in
good faith has a better right in conformity with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code. Since D was not aware
of the previous sale, he had to rely on the face of the certificate of title of the registered owner.
Hence, he now has a better right to the land. (Buason vs. Panuyas, supra.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
(1) The agency is terminated upon the death of either the principal or agent. Exceptionally, a
transaction entered into by the agent with a third person where both had acted in good faith is
valid. Article 1930 of the Civil Code provides that:
The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the principal, if it
has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the agent, or in the interest of
a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his favor.
and Article 1931 provides that:
Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any
other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to

third persons who may have contracted with him in good faith.
VIII. Agency by Operation of Law
IX. Rights and Obligations of Principal
I.

CX executed a special power of attorney authorizing DY to secure a loan from any bank
and to mortgage his property covered by the owners certificate of title. In securing a
loan from Mbank, DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the transaction with
said bank.
Is CX liable for the bank loan? Why or why not? Justify your answer. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
CX is liable for the bank loan, because he authorized the mortgage on his property to
secure the loan contracted by DY. If DY later defaults and fails to pay the loan, CX is liable to pay.
However, his liability is limited to the extent of the value of the said property.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX is not personally liable to the bank loan because it was contracted by DY in his personal
capacity. Only the property of CX is liable. Hence, while CX has authorized the mortgage on his
property to secure the loan of DY, the bank cannot sue CX to collect the loan in case DY defaults
thereon. The bank can only foreclose the property of CX. And if the proceeds of the foreclosure are
not sufficient to pay the loan in full, the bank cannot run after CX for the deficiency.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While as a general rule the principal is not liable for the contract entered into by his agent
in case the agent acted in his own name without disclosing his principal, such rule does not apply if
the contract involves a thing belonging to the principal. In such case, the principal is liable under
Article 1SS3 of the Civil Code. The contract is deemed made on his behalf (Syjuco v. Syjuco 40 Phil.
634 [1920]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX would not be liable for the bank loan. CXs property would also not be liable on the
mortgage. Since DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the transaction with the bank, DY
in effect acted in his own name. In the case of Rural Bank of Bombon v. CA, 212 SCRA, (1992), the
Supreme Court, under the same facts, ruled that in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on
real property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed
in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough merely that
the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not acted in the name of the
principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes himself as
acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set
his own hand and seal to the mortgage. There is no principle of law by which a person can
become liable on a real estate mortgage which she never executed in person or by attorney in
fact".

II. As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission, in addition to his regular

commission, after he sold 20 units of refrigerators to a customer, HT Hotel. The
customer, however, failed to pay for the units sold. ALs principal, DRB1, demanded
from AL payment for the customers accountability. AL objected, on the ground that his
job was only to sell and not to collect payment for units bought by the customer.
Is ALs objection valid? Can DRBI collect from him or not? Reason. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, ALs objection is not valid and DRBI can collect from AL. Since AL accepted a guarantee
commission, in addition to his regular commission, he agreed to bear the risk of collection and to
pay the principal the proceeds of the sale on the same terms agreed upon with the purchaser
(Article 1907, Civil Code)
III. Prime Realty Corporation appointed Nestor the exclusive agent in the sale of lots of its
newly developed subdivision. Prime Realty told Nestor that he could not collect or
receive payments from the buyers. Nestor was able to sell ten lots to Jesus and to collect
the downpayments for said lots. He did not turn over the collections to Prime Realty.
Who shall bear the loss for Nestor's defalcation, Prime Realty or Jesus? (1994 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The general rule is that a person dealing with an agent must inquire into the authority of
that agent. In the present case, if Jesus did not inquire into that authority, he is liable for the loss
due to Nestors defalcation unless Article 1900, Civil Code governs, in which case the developer
corporation bears the loss.
Art. 1900 Civil Code provides: So far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to
have been performed within the scope of the agents authority, if such act is within the terms of the
power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his authority
according to an understanding between the principal and the agent.
However, if Jesus made due inquiry and he was not Informed by the principal Prime Realty of
the limits of Nestors authority. Prime Realty shall bear the loss.
b) Considering that Prime Realty Corporation only told" Nestor that he could not receive or
collect payments, it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written authority or power of
attorney. In this case, insofar as Jesus, who is a third person, is concerned, Nestors acts of
collecting payments is deemed to have been performed within the scope of his authority (Article
1900, Civil Code). Hence, the principal is liable.

However, if Jesus was aware of the limitation of Nestor's power as an agent, and Prime Realty
Corporation does not ratify the sale contract, then Jesus shall be liable (Article 1898, Civil Code).
X. Irrevocable Agency
I.

Richard sold a large parcel of land in Cebu to Leo for P100 million payable in annual
installments over a period of ten years, but title will remain with Richard until the

purchase price is fully paid. To enable Leo to pay the price, Richard gave him a power-ofattorney authorizing him to subdivide the land, sell the individual lots, and deliver the
proceeds to Richard, to be applied to the purchase price. Five years later, Richard
revoked the power of attorney and took over the sale of the subdivision lots himself. Is
the revocation valid or not? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The revocation is not valid. The power of attorney given to the buyer is irrevocable because
it is coupled with an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the obligation of the buyer to pay
the price of the land (Article 1927, CC). In other words, a bilateral contract (contract to buy and sell
the land) is dependent on the agency.
XI. Modes of Extinguishment
I.

Stating briefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the
death x
x
x
(c) of an agent end an agency? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The death of an agent extinguishes the agency, by express provision of par. 3, Art 1919
of the Civil Code.
COMPROMISE
I.

Definition

II. Void Compromise

I.

TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[d] A clause in an arbitration contract granting one of the parties the power to choose
more arbitrators than the other renders the arbitration contract void. (2009 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. The Civil Code provides that Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose more
arbitrators than the other is void and of no effect (Art. 2045, NCC).
III. Effect
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
I.

Loan

I.

Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of
five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan from the same
bank in the amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah
issued in favor of the bank in post-dated checks, each in the amount of P100,000.00 to
cover the twelve monthly installment payments. On the third, fourth and fifth months,
the corresponding checks bounced.
The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceed to deduct the amount
of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Sarah's deposit after notice to her that this is a
form of compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explain. (4%) (2009 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No the bank is not correct, while the Bank is correct about the applicability of
compensation, it was not correct as to the amount compensated.
A bank deposit is a contract of loan, where the depositor is the creditor and the bank the
debtor. Since Sarah is also the debtor of the bank with respect to the loan, both are mutually
principal debtors and creditors of each other. Both obligations are due, demandable and liquidated
but only up to the extent of P300,000 (covering the unpaid third, fourth and fifth monthly
installments). The entire one million was not yet due because the loan has no acceleration clause in
case of default. And since there is no retention or controversy commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor, then all the requisites of legal compensation are present
but only up to the amount of P300,000. The bank, therefore, may deduct P300,000 pesos from
Sarah's bank deposit by way of compensation.
II. Felipe borrowed $100 from Gustavo in 1998, when the Phil P - US$ exchange rate was
P56 - US$1. On March 1, 2008, Felipe tendered to Gustavo a cashiers check in the
amount of P4,135 in payment of his US$100 debt, based on the Phil P - US$ exchange rate
at that time. Gustavo accepted the check, but forgot to deposit it until Sept. 12, 2008. His
bank refused to accept the check because it had become stale. Gustavo now wants Felipe
to pay him in cash the amount of P5,600. Claiming that the previous payment was not in
legal tender, and that there has been extraordinary deflation since 1998, and therefore,
Felipe should pay him the value of the debt at the time it was incurred. Felipe refused to
pay him again, claiming that Gustavo is estopped from raising the issue of legal tender,
having accepted the check in March, and that it was Gustavos negligence in not
depositing the check immediately that caused the check to become stale.
a) Can Gustavo now raise the issue that the cashiers check is not legal tender? (2%)
(2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Gustavo is guilty of estoppel by laches. He led Felipe to believe he could pay
by cashiers check, and Felipe relied that such cashiers check would be encashed thus
extinguishing his obligation. Because of Gustavos inaction of more than six months the check
became stale and Felipe will prejudiced if he will be required to pay $100 at the exchange rate of
P56 to $ 1.00. The exchange should be the rate at the time of payment.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. The cashiers check is not legal tender until it is encashed. (Art. 1249,CC). the cashiers
check by itself is not legal tender. (Cuaycong v. Ruiz, 86 Phil. 170 [1950]; Belisario v. Natividad, 60
Phil. 156 [1934]).
b) Can Felipe validly refuse to pay Gustavo again? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, if the payment is valid. Since the bank considered the cashiers check as being stale for
not having been encashed on time, then the cashiers check may be issued again. At any rate, nonpayment of the amount to Gustavo would constitute unjust enrichment.
c) Can Felipe compel Gustavo to receive US$100 instead? (1%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Felipe can compel Gustavo to pay US $ 100 instead. Under the prior law, RA 529, as
amended by R.A. 4100, payment can only be in Philippine currency as it would be against public
policy, null and void and of no effect. However, under RA 8183, payment maybe made in the
currency agreed upon by the parties, and the rate of exchange to be followed is at the time of
payment. [C.F. Sharp & Co. Inc vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 381 SCRA 314 [2002]).
III. Multiple choice: Choose the right answer. (2% each)
1.

The parties to a bailment are the:

a) bailor;
b) bailee;
c) comodatario;
d) all of the above;
e) letters a and b (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e (letters a & b)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
d (all of the above)
IV. Before he left for Riyadh to work as a mechanic, Pedro left his Adventure van with Tito,
with the understanding that the latter could use it for one year for his personal or family
use while Pedro works in Riyadh. He did not tell Tito that the brakes of the van were
faulty. Tito had the van tuned up and the brakes repaired. He spent a total amount of PI
5.000.00. After using the vehicle for two weeks. Tito discovered that it consumed too
much fuel. To make up for the expenses, he leased it to Annabelle. Two months later.
Pedro returned to the Philippines and asked Tito to return the van. Unfortunately, while

being driven by Tito, the van was accidentally damaged by a cargo truck without his
fault.
a) Who shall bear the P15,000.00 spent for the repair of the van? Explain. (2%) (2005

Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract between Pedro and Tito is one of commodatum. Of the P15.000.00 spent, Pedro,
the bailor, shall bear the expenses for the repair of the faulty brakes, they being extraordinary
expenses incurred due to the non-disclosure by the bailor of the defect or fault; Tito, on the other
hand, shall shoulder that part of the P15,000.00 spent for the tune-up, said expense being ordinary
for the use and preservation of the van.
b) Who shall bear the costs for the vans fuel, oil and other materials while it was with

Tito? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The costs for the fuel and other materials are considered ordinary expenses, and
consequently Tito, the bailee, shall shoulder them. (Art. 1941, Civil Code)
c) Does Pedro have the right to retrieve the van even before the lapse of one year?

Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Pedro cannot demand the return of the van until after the expiration of the one-year
period stipulated. However, if in the meantime he should have urgent need of the van, he may
demand its return or temporary use.
d) Who shall bear the expenses for the accidental damage caused by the cargo truck,
granting that the truck driver and truck owner are insolvent? Explain. (2%) (2005
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Both Tito and Pedro shall bear equally the costs of the extraordinary expenses, having been
incurred on the occasion of actual use of the van by Tito, the bailee, even though he acted without
fault. (Art. 1949(2), Civil Code)
V. Distinguish briefly but clearly between:
Mutuum and commodatum. (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In mutuum, the object borrowed must be a consumable thing the ownership of which is
transferred to the borrower who incurs the obligation to return the same consumable to the lender
in an equal amount, and of the same kind and quality. In commodatum, the object borrowed is
usually a non-consumable thing the ownership of which is not transferred to the borrower who
incurs the obligation to return the very thing to the lender.

VI. The parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest rate is 12% and
it can be increased if there is a law that would authorize the increase of interest rates.
Suppose OB, the lender, would increase by 5% the rate of interest to be paid by TY, the
borrower, without a law authorizing such increase, would OBs action be just and valid?
Why? Has TY a remedy against the imposition of the rate increase? Explain. (5%) (2004
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
OBs action is not just and valid. The debtor cannot be required to pay the increase in
interest there being no law authorizing it, as stipulated in the contract. Increasing the rate in the
absence of such law violates the principle of mutuality of contracts.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if there was a law authorizing the increase in interest rate, the stipulation is still void
because there is no corresponding stipulation to decrease the interest due when the law reduces
the rate of interest.
VII. Carlos sues Dino for (a) collection on a promissory note for a loan, with no agreement on
interest, on which Dino defaulted, and (b) damages caused by Dino on his (Carlos)
priceless Michaelangelo painting on which Dino accidentally spilled acid while
transporting it. The court finds Dino liable on the promissory note and awards damages
to Carlos for the damaged painting, with interests for both awards. What rates of interest
may the court impose with respect to both awards? Explain. (5%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the collection of money or promissory note, it being a forbearance of
money, the legal rate of interest for having defaulted on the payment of 12% will apply. With
respect to the damages to the painting, it is 6% from the time of the final demand up to the time of
finality of the decision and 12% of the total amount from finality of judgment until judgment credit
is fully paid. The court considers the latter as a forbearance of money. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
v. CA, 234 SCRA 78 [1994]; Art 2210 and 2211, CC)
VIII. Samuel borrowed P300.000.00 housing loan from the bank at 18% per annum
interest. However, the promissory note contained a proviso that the bank reserves the
right to increase interest within the limits allowed by law." By virtue of such proviso,
over the objections of Samuel, the bank increased the interest rate periodically until it
reached 48% per annum. Finally. Samuel filed an action questioning the right of the bank
to increase the interest rate up to 48%. The bank raised the defense that the Central
Bank of the Philippines had already suspended the Usury Law. Will the action prosper or
not? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. While it is true that the interest ceilings set by the Usury Law are

no longer in force, it has been held that PD No. 1684 and CB Circular No. 905 merely allow
contracting parties to stipulate freely on any adjustment in the interest rate on a loan or
forbearance of money but do not authorize a unilateral increase of the interest rate by one party
without the others consent (PNB v. CA, 238 SCRA 20 [1994]]). To say otherwise will violate the
principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code. To be valid, therefore, any
change of interest must be mutually agreed upon by the parties (Dizon v. Magsaysay, 57 SCRA 250
[1974]). In the present problem, the debtor not having given his consent to the increase in interest,
the increase is void.
IX. Distinguish usufruct from commodatum and state whether these may be constituted
over consumable goods. [2%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Usufruct is a right given to a person (usufructuary) to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance. (Art. 562, Civil Code)
On the other hand, commodatum is a contract by which one of the parties (bailor) delivers to
another (bailee) something not consumable so that the latter may use it for a certain time and
return it.
In usufruct, the usufructuary gets the right to the use and to the fruits of the same, while in
commodatum, the bailee only acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits.
Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing. (Art. 564, Civil
Code). It may even be constituted over consumables like money (Altman v. Veloso, 52 Phil. 545).
On the other hand, in commodatum, consumable goods maybe subject thereof only when the
purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
(Art. 1936, Civil Code)
ANOTHER ANSWER:
There are several points of distinction between usufruct and commodatum. Usufruct is
constituted by law, by contract, by testamentary succession, or by prescription (Art. 1933, Civil
Code). Usufruct creates a real right to the fruits of another's property, while commodatum creates
only a purely personal right to use another's property, and requires a stipulation to enable the
bailee to make use of the fruits (Arts. 1939 & 1940, Civil Code). Usufruct may be onerous while
commodatum is always or essentially gratuitous (Arts. 1933 &: 1935, Civil Code). The contract
constituting usufruct is consensual, while commodatum is a real contract (perfected only by
delivery of the subject matter thereof). However, both involve the enjoyment by a person of the
property of another, differing only as to the extent and scope of such enjoyment [jus fruendi in one
and jus utendi in the other); both may have as subject matter either an immovable or a movable;
and, both may be constituted over consumable goods (Arts. 574 & 1936, Civil Code).
A consumable thing may be the subject-matter of an abnormal usufruct but in a normal
usufruct, the subject- matter maybe used only for exhibition. A commodatum of a consumable
thing may be only for the purpose of exhibiting, not consuming it.
X. In order to secure a bank loan, XYZ Corporation surrendered its deposit certificate, with
a maturity date of 01 September 1997 to the bank. The corporation defaulted on the due

repayment of the loan, prompting the bank to encash the deposit certificate. XYZ
Corporation questioned the above action taken by the bank as being a case of pactum
commissorium. The bank disagrees.
What is your opinion? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
We submit that there is no pactum commissorium here. Deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions are governed by the provisions on simple loans (Art. 1980, Civil Code). The
relationship between the depositor and a bank is one of creditor and debtor. Basically this is a
matter of compensation as all the elements of compensation are present in this case [BPI vs. CA,
232 SCRA 302).
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
Where the security for the debt is also money deposited in a bank, it is not illegal for the
creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtor's overdue obligation. (Chu vs. CA,
et al., G.R. 78519. September 26, 1989).
XI. A, upon request, loaned his passenger Jeepney to B to enable B to bring his sick wife from
Paniqui. Tarlac to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila for treatment. On the way
back to Paniqui, after leaving his wife at the hospital, people stopped the passenger
jeepney. B stopped for them and allowed them to ride on board, accepting payment from
them just as in the case of ordinary passenger jeepneys plying their route. As B was
crossing Bamban, there was an onrush of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo. The jeep that was
loaned to him was wrecked.
1) What do you call the contract that was entered into by A and B with respect to the

passenger jeepney that was loaned by A to B to transport the latters sick wife to
Manila?
2) Is B obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney?
3) Is B liable to A for the loss of the jeepney? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)

The contract is called commodatum. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)

2)

No, B is not obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney because commodatum is
essentially gratuitous. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)

3)

Yes, because B devoted the thing to a purpose different from that for which it has been
loaned (Art. 1942, par. 2, Civil Code)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, because an obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be
extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has
incurred in delay. (Art. 1262, Civil Code)

II. Deposit
I.

Multiple choice: Choose the right answer. (2% each)

x
x
x
2. A deposit made in compliance with a legal obligation is:
a) an extrajudicial deposit;
b) a voluntary deposit;
c) a necessary deposit;
d) a deposit with a warehouseman;
e) letters a and b (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c (necessary deposit)
II. X and Y staged a daring bank robbery in Manila at 10:30 A.M. in the morning of a regular
business day, and escaped with their loot of two (2) bags, each bag containing
P50.000.00.
During their flight to elude the police. X and Y entered the nearby locked house of A,
then working in his Quezon City office. From A's house. X and Y stole a box containing
cash totalling P50.000.00 which box A had been keeping in deposit for his friend B.
In their hurry, X and Y left in A's bedroom one (1) of the bags which they had taken
from the bank.
With X and Y now at large and nowhere to be found, the bag containing P50.000.00 is
now claimed by B, by the Mayor of Manila, and by the bank.
B claims that the depository, A, by force majeure had obtained the bag of money in
place of the box of money deposited by B.
The Mayor of Manila, on the other hand, claims that the bag of money should be
deposited with the Office of the Mayor as required of the finder by the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The bank resists the claims of B and the Mayor of Manila.
To whom should A deliver the bag of money? Decide with reasons. (1992 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B would have no right to claim the money. Article 1990 of the Civil Code is not applicable. The
law refers to another thing received in substitution of the object deposited and is predicated upon
something exchanged.
The Mayor of Manila cannot invoke. Article 719 of the Civil Code which requires the finder to
deposit the thing with the Mayor only when the previous possessor is unknown.

In this case, a must return the bag of money to the bank as the previous possessor and known
owner (Arts. 719 and 1990 Civil Code).
III. Ana rented a safety deposit box at the Alto Bank, paid the rental fee and was given the
key. Ana put her jewelry and gold coins in the box. Days after, three armed men gained
entry into the Alto Bank, opening its vault and several safety deposit boxes, including
Anas and emptied them of their contents.
Could Ana hold the Alto Bank liable for the loss of the contents of her deposit box?
Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because under Article 1990 of the Civil Code, if the depository by force majeure loses the
thing and receives money or another thing in its place, he shall deliver the sum or other thing to be
depositor. There being no showing that there was anything received in place of the things
deposited the Alto Bank is not liable for the contents of the safety box.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Alto Bank is not liable because the contract is not a deposit but a rental of the safety
deposit box. Hence, the Alto Bank is not liable for the loss of the contents of the box.
III. Guaranty and Suretyship
I.

Define, Enumerate or Explain. (2% each)

What is the difference between guaranty and suretyship? (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Guaranty and Suretyship distinguished:
1) The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.
2) In guaranty, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor cannot pay; whereas, in

suretyship, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor does not pay.

3) In guaranty, the guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion; whereas, in suretyship

the surety is not so entitled.

4) Liability in guaranty depends upon an independent agreement to pay the obligations of
the principal if he fails to do so; whereas, in suretyship, the surety assumes liability as a
regular party.
5) The Guarantor insures the solvency of the principal debtor; whereas, the surety insures
the debt.
6) In a guaranty, the guarantor is subsidiarily liable; whereas, in a Suretyship, the surety
binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor. (Art. 2047, Civil Code)
II. TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x
x
x
[d] An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding. (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. An oral contract of guaranty, being a special promise to answer for the debt of
another, is unenforceable unless in writing (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC).
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding. While the contract is valid,
however, it is unenforceable because it is not in writing. Being a special promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, the Statute of Frauds requires it to be in writing to be
enforceable (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC). The validity of a contract should be distinguished from its
enforceability.
III. In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on a surety agreement, the defense
of laches was raised as the claim was filed more than seven years from the maturity of
the obligation. However, the action was brought within the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by law wherein actions based on written contracts can be instituted.
a)
b)

Will the defense prosper? Reason. (3%)

What are the essential elements of laches? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not give facts from which laches may be
inferred. Mere delay in filing an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches [Agra v. PNB, 309
SCRA 509).
b) The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
IV. AB sold to CD a motor vehicle for and in consideration of P120,000.00, to be paid in
twelve monthly equal installments of P10,000.00, each installment being due and
payable on the 15th day of each month starting January 1997.
To secure the promissory note, CD (a) executed a chattel mortgage on the subject
motor vehicle, and (b) furnished a surety bond Issued by Philamlife. CD failed to pay
more than two (2) Installments
AB went after the surety but he was only able to obtain three-fourths (3/4) of the
total amount still due and owing from CD. AB seeks your advice on how he might. If at all,
recover the deficiency.
How would you counsel AB? (1997 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can recover the deficiency. The action of AB to go after the surety bond cannot be
taken to mean a waiver of his right to demand payment for the whole debt. The amount received
from the surety is only payment pro tanto, and an action may be maintained for a deficiency debt.
IV. Pledge
I.

Ozamis Paper Corporation secured loans from ABC Universal Bank in the aggregate
principal amount of P100 M, evidenced by several promissory notes, and secured by a
continuing guaranty of its principal stockholder Menandro Marquez; a pledge of
Marquezs shares in the corporation valued at P45 M; and a real estate mortgage over
certain parcels of land owned by Marquez.
The corporation defaulted and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the real estate
mortgage. The bank, which was the sole bidder for P75 M, won the award.
x
x
x
3. Can the bank foreclose on the pledged shares of Marquez and recover the deficiency
from the corporation? (2010 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the bank forecloses the pledge, it cannot recover the deficiency because the foreclosure
extinguishes the principal obligation, whether or not the proceeds from the foreclosure are equal to
the amount of the principal obligation.
II. Rosario obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from Jennifer, and pledge her diamond ring. The
contract signed by the parties stipulated and if Rosario is unable to redeem the ring on
due date, she will execute a document in favor of Jennifer providing that the ring shall
automatically be considered full payment of the loan.
[a]

Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract is valid because Rosario has to execute a document in favor of Jennifer to
transfer the ownership of the pledged ring to the latter. The contract does not amount to a pactum
commissorium because it does not provide for the automatic appropriation by the pledge of the
thing pledged in case of default by the pledgor.
[b] Will your answer to [a] be the same if the contract stipulates that upon failure of
Rosario to redeem the ring on due date, Jennifer may immediately sell the ring and
appropriate the entire proceeds thereof for herself as full payment of the? Reasons.
(3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer will be different. While the contract of pledge is valid, the stipulation
authorizing the pledge to immediately sell the thing pledged is void under Article 2088 of the new
Civil Code which provides that: the creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge

or mortgage, or dispose of them x xx. Jennifer cannot immediately sell by herself the thing pledge.
It must be foreclosed by selling it at a public auction in accordance with the procedure under Article
2112 of the New Civil Code.
III. ABC loaned to MNO P40.000 for which the latter pledged 400 shares of stock in XYZ Inc.
It was agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with 10% yearly interest within
four years, the pledgee is authorized to foreclose on the shares of stock. As required,
MNO delivered possession of the shares to ABC with the understanding that the shares
would be returned to MNO upon the payment of the loan. However, the loan was not
paid on time.
A month after 4 years, may the shares of stock pledged be deemed owned by ABC or
not? Reason. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The shares of stock cannot be deemed owned by ABC upon default of MNO. They have to
be foreclosed. Under Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot appropriate the things
given by way of pledge. And even if the parties have stipulated that ABC becomes the owner of the
shares in case MNO defaults on the loan, such stipulation is void for being a pactum
commissorium.
IV. Distinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. (2%) (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor, while in a contract of
pledge possession belongs to the debtor.
A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract.
A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind third
persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing description of the
thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons.
V. In 1982, Steve borrowed P400.000.00 from Danny, collateralized by a pledge of shares of
stock of Concepcion Corporation worth P800.000.00. In 1983, because of the economic
crisis, the value of the shares pledged fell to only P 100,000.00. Can Danny demand that
Steve surrender the other shares worth P700.000.00? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Bilateral contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a subsidiary
contract, and Steve is still indebted to Danny for the amount of P400.000.00 despite the fall in the
value of the stocks pledged.
a)

No. Dannys right as pledgee is to sell the pledged shares at a public sale and keep the
proceeds as collateral for the loan. There is no showing that the fall in the value of the pledged
property was attributable to the pledgers fault or fraud. On the contrary, the economic crisis was
b)

the culprit. Had the pledgee been deceived as to the substance or quality of the pledged shares of
stock, he would have had the right to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate
payment of the obligation. This is not the case here.
VI. What do you understand by ANTICHRESIS? How is it distinguished from pledge and
mortgage? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Antichresis is a contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest if owing and
thereafter to the principal.
Pledge is an accessory and real contract whereby the debtor delivers to the creditor movable
property as security for the performance of a principal obligation upon the fulfilment of which the
thing pledged shall be returned to the debtor.
A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract whereby the debtor guarantees the
performance of the principal obligation by subjecting real property or real right as security for the
performance of such obligation.
ALTERNATIVE EXTENDED ANSWER:
By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits .of an
immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing*
and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Antichresis distinguished from pledge:
1. Antichresis is consensual, pledge is a real contract.
2. Antichresis involves real property, pledge involves personal property.
3. In antichresis, the principal and the interest must be provided in writing for validity. In
pledge, the date and description of the pledge must be in a public instrument to affect
third persons.
Antichresis distinguished from mortgage:
1. In antichresis the fruits that are applied to .the interest and thereafter to the principal. In
mortgage the fruits are not applied to the principal obligation.
2. In antichresis, the creditor is in possession. In mortgage, the debtor is in possession.
3. The principal and interest must be in writing tor validity. In mortgage, registration is
required to bind third persons.
4. In antichresis, the creditor pays the taxes. In mortgage, taxes are not imposed on the
creditor.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinctions for each should be given full
credit.
VII. A diamond ring and a female cow were pledged to secure a loan in the amount of
P100,000. The pledge appeared in a public instrument. A month later, the cow gave
birth. When the amount of the loan was not paid upon its maturity date, the pledged

caused to be sold at a public auction the ring, the cow and the cows offspring and the
amount of P150,000. as realized. The pledgor, upon learning of the sale, demanded from
the pledgee the excess in the price over and above the amount of the principal
obligation, claiming that he is entitled to the excess and that the offspring was not
included in the pledge. The pledgee refused to comply with the demand. How would you
decide this conflict? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Debtor/pledgor is not entitled to the excess unless the contrary is agreed upon. The offspring
shall pertain to the pledgor but is subject to the pledge if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
V. Real Mortgage
I.

X obtained a P10 M loan from BBB Banking Corporation. The loan is secured by REM on
his vacation house in Tagaytay City. The original Deed of REM for the P10 M was duly
registered. The Deed of REM also provides that The mortgagor also agrees that this
mortgage will secure the payment of additional loans or credit accommodations that may
be granted by the mortgagee Subsequently, because he needed more funds, he
obtained another P5 M loan. On due dates of both loans, X failed to pay the P5 M but fully
paid the P10 M. BBB Banking Corporation instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings.
a) Will the extrajudicial foreclosure prosper considering that the additional P5 M was
not covered by the registration?
b) What is the meaning of a dragnet clause in a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage? Under
what circumstances will be dragnet clause applicable? (2012 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes. X executed a REM containing a blanket mortgage clause. Mortgages given to secure
future advancements are valid and legal contracts, and the amounts names as consideration in said
contracts do not limit the amount for which the mortgage may stand as security if from the four
corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness.
b) Generally, a dragnet clause is a clause in a deed of REM stating that the mortgage secures all
the loans and advances that the mortgagor may at any time owe to the mortgagee. The word
dragnet is a reference to a net drawn through a river or across ground to trap fish or game. It is
also known in American jurisprudence as a blanket mortgage clause or an anaconda clause. A
mortgage with a dragnet clause enables the parties to provide continuous dealings, the nature or
extent of which may not be known or anticipated at the time, and they avoid the expense and
inconvenience of executing a new security on each new transaction. It operates as a convenience
and accommodation to the borrower as it makes available additional funds to him without his
having to execute additional security documents, thereby saving time, travel, costs of extra legal
services, recording fees, etc.
The dragnet clause may not apply to other loans extended by the mortgagee to the mortgagor
for which other securities were given. In the case of Prudential Bank v. Alviar, the Supreme Court
adopted the reliance on the security test to the effect that when the mortgagor takes another
loan [from the mortgagee] for which another security was given, it could not be inferred that such

loan was made in reliance solely on the original security with the dragnet clause, but rather, on
the new security given. This means that the existence of the new security must be respected and
the foreclosure of the old security should only be for the other loans not separately collateralized
and for any amount not covered by the new security for the new loan.
II. X, at Ys request, executed a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on his (Xs) land to secure Ys
loan from Z. Z successfully foreclosed the REM when Y defaulted on the loan but half of
Ys obligation remained unpaid. May Z sue X to enforce his right to the deficiency? (2011
Bar Question)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Yes, but solidarily with Y.

Yes, since Xs is deemed to warrant that his land would cover the whole obligation.
No, since it is the buyer at the auction sale who should answer for the deficiency.
No, because X is not Zs debtor.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d. No, because X is not Zs debtor.
III. Eduardo was granted a loan by XYZ Bank for the purpose of improving a building which
XYZ leased from him. Eduardo, executed the promissory note (PN) in favor of the bank,
with his friend Recardo as cosignatory. In the PN, they both acknowledged that they are
individually and collectively liable and waived the need for prior demand. To secure
the PN, Recardo executed a real estate mortgage on his own property. When Eduardo
defaulted on the PN, XYZ stopped payment of rentals on the building on the ground that
legal compensation had set in. Since there was still a balance due on the PN after
applying the rentals, XYZ foreclosed the real estate mortgage over Recardos property.
Recardo opposed the foreclosure on the ground that he is only a co-signatory; that no
demand was made upon him for payment, and assuming he is liable, his liability should
not go beyond half the balance of the loan. Further, Recardo said that when the bank
invoked compensation between the rentals and the amount of the loan, it amounted to a
new contract or novation, and had the effect of extinguishing the security since he did not
give his consent (as owner of the property under the real estate mortgage) thereto.
x
x
x
b) Can Recardos property be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the loan? (2%)
(2008 Bar Question)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because there was no prior demand on Ricardo, depriving him of the right to reasonably
block the foreclosure by payment. The waiver of prior demand in the PN is against public policy
and violates the right to due process. Without demand, there is no default and the foreclosure is
null and void. Since the mortgage, insofar as Ricardo is concerned is not violated, a requirement
under Act 3135 for a valid foreclosure of real estate mortgage is absent.
In the case of DBP vs. Licuanan (516 SCRA 644 [2007]), it was held that: the issue of whether
demand was made before the foreclosure was effected is essential. If demand was made and duly
received by the respondents and the latter still did not pay, then they were already in default and
foreclosure was proper. However, if demand was not made, then the loans had not yet become due

and demandable. This meant that respondents had not defaulted in their payment and the
foreclosure was premature.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. Although the principal obligation of loan is due and demandable without need of
further demand the foreclosure of the accessory contract of real estate mortgage, there is a need of
notice and demand.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Yes. Recardos property can be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the loan. He is admittedly
individually and collectively liable. His liability is solidary. He and Eduardo have waived notice
for a prior demand as provided in the promissory note.
IV. Industry Bank, which has a net worth of P1 Billion, extended a loan to celestial
Properties Inc. amounting to P270 M. the loan was secured by a mortgage over a vast
commercial lot in the Fort Bonifacio Global City, appraised at P350 M. After audit, the
BSP gave notice that the loan to Celestial Properties exceeded the single borrowers limit
of 25% of the banks net worth under a recent BSP Circular. In light of other previous
similar violations of the credit limit requirement, the BSP advised Industry Bank to
reduce the amount of the loan to Celestial Properties under pain of severe sanctions.
When Industry Bank informed Celestial Properties that it intended to reduce the loan by
P50 M, Celestial Properties counter-proposal, and referred the matter to you as counsel.
How would you advise Industry Bank to proceed, with its best interest in mind? (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I shall advise Industry Bank that the mortgage is indivisible. Therefore, Celestial Properties
cannot ask for a partial release of the mortgage so long as the loan has not been completely paid.
V. To secure a loan obtained from a rural bank, Purita assigned her leasehold rights over a
stall in the public market in favor of the bank. The deed of assignment provides that in
case of default in the payment of the loan, the bank shall have the right to sell Purita's
rights over the market stall as her attorney-in-fact, and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of the loan.
1)
2)

Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a cession? Why? (3%)

Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage, does the provision giving the bank the
power to sell Puritas rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why? (2%)
(2001 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The assignment was a mortgage, not a cession, of the leasehold rights. A cession would have
transferred ownership to the bank. However, the grant of authority to the bank to sell the leasehold
rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that a mere
encumbrance was constituted. There would have been no need for such authority had there been a
cession.

2) No, the clause in question is not a pactum commissorium. It is pactum commissorium when
default in the payment of the loan automatically vests ownership of the encumbered property in
the bank. In the problem given, the bank does not automatically become owner of the property
upon default of the mortgagor. The bank has to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the
indebtedness.
VI. Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise Co. and paid the price in
full. He moved into the unit, but somehow he was not given the Condominium Certificate
of Title covering the property. Unknown to him. High Rise Co. subsequently mortgaged
the entire condominium building to Metrobank as security for a loan of P500 million.
High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the
foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the building, being the highest bidder. When Cesar
learned about this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was
concerned. The bank put up the defense that it relied on the condominium certificates of
title presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was a mortgagee and buyer
in good faith. Is this defense tenable or not? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Metrobanks defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent purchaser for value acquires a
good and a clean title to the property. However, it is settled that one who closes his eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an innocent purchaser for value. In the present
problem the bank is expected, as a matter of standard operating procedure, to have conducted an
ocular inspection, of the promises before granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow
this procedure, otherwise, it should have discovered that the condominium unit in question was
occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to make further inquiry. Under the
circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
VII.
(a)

X borrowed money from Y and gave a piece of land as security by way of mortgage. It
was expressly agreed between the parties in the mortgage contract that upon nonpayment of the debt on time by X, the mortgaged land would already belong to Y. If X
defaulted in paying, would Y now become the owner of the mortgaged land? Why?
(3%)

(b)

Suppose in the preceding question, the agreement between X and Y was that if X
failed to pay the mortgage debt on time, the debt shall be paid with the land
mortgaged by X to Y. Would your answer be the same as in the preceding question?
Explain. (3%) (1999 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No, Y would not become the owner of the land. The stipulation is in the nature of pactum
commissorium which is prohibited by law. The property should be sold at public auction and the
proceeds thereof applied to the indebtedness. Any excess shall be given to the mortgagor.
(b) No, the answer would not be the same. This is a valid stipulation and does not constitute
pactum commissorium. In pactum commissorium, the acquisition is automatic without need of any
further action. In the instant problem another act is required to be performed, namely, the

conveyance of the property as payment (dacion en pago).

VIII. Various buyers of lots in a subdivision brought actions to compel either or both the
developer and the bank to release and deliver free and clear the titles to their respective
lots.
The problem arose because notwithstanding prior sales mostly on installments
made by the developer to buyers, developer had mortgaged the whole subdivision to a
commercial bank. The mortgage was duly executed and registered with the appropriate
governmental agencies. However, as the lot buyers were completely unaware of the
mortgage lien of the bank, they religiously paid the installments due under their sale
contracts.
As the developer failed to pay its loan, the mortgage was foreclosed and the whole
subdivision was acquired by the bank as the highest bidder.
a) May the bank dispossess prior purchasers of individual lots or, alternatively,
require them to pay again for the paid lots? Discuss.
b) What are the rights of the bank vis--vis those buyers with remaining unpaid
installments? Discuss. (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No. The bank may not dispossess the prior purchasers of the individual lots, much less
require them to pay for the paid lots. The bank has to respect the rights of the prior purchasers of
the individual lots. The purchasers have the option to pay the installments of the mortgagee.
b) The bank has to respect the rights of the buyers with remaining unpaid installments. The
purchaser has the option to pay the installments to the mortgagee who should apply the payments
to the mortgage indebtedness.
IX. Borrower obtained a loan against the security of a mortgage on a parcel of land. While
the mortgage was subsisting, borrower leased for 50 years the mortgaged property to
Land development Company (LDC). The mortgagee was duly advised of the lease.
Thereafter, LDC constructed on the mortgaged property an office condominium.
Borrower defaulted on his loan and mortgagee foreclosed the mortgage. At the
foreclosure sale, the mortgagee was awarded the property as the highest bidder. The
corresponding Certificate of Sale was executed and after the lapse of 1 year, title was
consolidated in the name of the mortgagee.
Mortgagee then applied with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession not only
over the land but also the condominium building. The mortgagee contended that the
mortgage included all accessions, improvements and accessories found on the
mortgaged property.
LDC countered that it had built on the mortgaged property with the prior knowledge
of mortgagee which had received formal notice of the lease.

a) How would you resolve the dispute between the mortgagee and LDC?
b) Is the mortgagee entitled to the lease rentals due from LDC under the lease
agreement? (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The mortgagee has a better right than LDC. The mortgage extends to the improvements
introduced on the land, with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law,
whether the estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or passes into the hands of a third
person. The notice given by LDC to the mortgagee was not enough to remove the building from
coverage of the mortgage considering that the building was built after the mortgaged was
constituted and the notice was only as regards the lease and not as to the construction of the
building. Since the mortgagee was informed of the lease and did not object to it, the mortgagee
became bound by the terms of the lease when it acquired the property as the highest bidder. Hence,
the mortgagee steps into the shoes of the mortgagor and acquires the rights of the lessor under
Article 1678 of the Civil Code. This provision gives the lessor the right to appropriate the
condominium building but after paying the lessee half of the value of the building at that time.
Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvement even
though the land will suffer damage thereby.
b) The lease rentals belong to the mortgagor. However, the mortgage extends to rentals not yet
received when the obligation becomes due and the mortgagee may ran after the said rentals for the
payment of the mortgage debt.
X. Debtor purchased a parcel of land from a realty company payable in 5 yearly
installments. Under the contract of sale, title to the lot would be transferred upon full
payment of the purchase price.
But even before full payment, debtor constructed a house on the lot. Sometime
thereafter, debtor mortgaged the house to secure his obligation arising from the issuance
of a bond needed in the conduct of his business. The mortgage was duly registered with
the proper chattel mortgage registry.
5 years later after completing payment of the purchase price, debtor obtained title to
the lot. And even as the chattel mortgage on the house was still subsisting, debtor
mortgaged to a bank the lot and improvement thereon to secure a loan. This real estate
mortgage was duly registered and annotated at the bank of the title.
Due to business reverses, debtor failed to pay his creditors. The chattel mortgage was
foreclosed when the debtor failed to reimburse the surety company for payments made
on the bond. In the foreclosure sale, the surety company was awarded the house as the
highest bidder.
Only after the foreclosure sale did the surety company learn of the real estate
mortgage in favor of the lending investor on the lot and the improvement thereon.
Immediately, it filed a complaint praying for the exclusion of the house from the real
estate mortgage. It was submitted that as the chattel mortgage was executed and
registered ahead, it was superior to the real estate mortgage.

On the suggestion that a chattel mortgage on a housea real propertywas a nullity,

the surety company countered that when the chattel mortgage was executed, debtor was
not yet the owner of the lot on which the house was built. Accordingly, the house was a
personal property and a proper subject of a chattel mortgage.
a) Discuss the validity of the position taken by the surety company.
b) Who has a better claim to the house, the surety company or the lending investor?
Explain.
c) Would the position of the surety company be bolstered by the fact that it acquired
title in a foreclosure sale conducted by the Provincial Sheriff. Explain. (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The house is always a real property even though it was constructed on a land not belonging
to the builder. However, the parties may treat it as personal property and constitute a chattel
mortgage thereon. Such mortgage shall be valid and binding but only on the parties. It will not bind
or affect third parties.
b) The lending investor has a better claim to the house. The real estate mortgage covering the
house and lot was duly registered and binds the parties and third persons. On the other hand, the
chattel mortgage on the house securing the credit of the surety company did not affect the rights of
third parties such as the lending investor despite registration of the chattel mortgage.
c) No. The chattel mortgage over the house which was foreclosed did not affect the rights of
third parties like the lending investor. Since third parties are not bound by the chattel mortgage,
they are not also bound by any enforcement of its provisions. The foreclosure of such chattel
mortgage did not bolster or add anything to the position of the surety company.
XI.

(1) Distinguish between a contract of real estate mortgage and a contract of sale with

right of repurchase. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Real estate mortgage is an accessory contract. A contract of sale with right of repurchase is

a principal contract.

2. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of title. A contract of sale involves a conditional

transfer of title.

3. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of possession. A contract of sale involves a

conditional transfer of possession.

4. In a real estate mortgage the creditor has no rights to the fruits. In a contract of sale, the

vendee is entitled to the fruits.

5. In a real estate mortgage, upon default the creditor is not the owner. In a contract of sale,

upon consolidation, the vendee is the owner.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
Any three (3) of the foregoing distinctions should be given full credit.
(2) Does an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage affecting registered land under the

Torrens System prescribe? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Even if the property given as collateral is covered by a Torrens Title, the right to foreclose a
real estate mortgage thereon prescribes. This is really an action to enforce collection of the loan.
XII. What do you understand by ANTICHRESIS? How is it distinguished from pledge and
mortgage? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Antichresis is a contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest if owing and
thereafter to the principal.
Pledge is an accessory and real contract whereby the debtor delivers to the creditor movable
property as security for the performance of a principal obligation upon the fulfilment of which the
thing pledged shall be returned to the debtor.
A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract whereby the debtor guarantees the
performance of the principal obligation by subjecting real property or real right as security for the
performance of such obligation.
ALTERNATIVE EXTENDED ANSWER:
By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits .of an
immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing*
and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Antichresis distinguished from pledge:
1. Antichresis is consensual, pledge is a real contract.
2. Antichresis involves real property, pledge involves personal property.
3. In antichresis, the principal and the interest must be provided in writing for validity. In
pledge, the date and description of the pledge must be in a public instrument to affect
third persons.
Antichresis distinguished from mortgage:
1. In antichresis the fruits that are applied to .the interest and thereafter to the principal. In
mortgage the fruits are not applied to the principal obligation.
2. In antichresis, the creditor is in possession. In mortgage, the debtor is in possession.
3. The principal and interest must be in writing tor validity. In mortgage, registration is
required to bind third persons.
4. In antichresis, the creditor pays the taxes. In mortgage, taxes are not imposed on the
creditor.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinctions for each should be given full
credit.

XIII. Union Corporation was declared insolvent by order of the court. All creditors of
Union were asked to file their claims and attend a meeting to elect the assignee in
insolvency. Merchant Finance Corporation (MFC) has a claim for P500,000, which is
secured by a mortgage on a piece of land worth P1 M. MFC seeks your advice as counsel
whether it should participate in the foregoing proceedings.
What advice would you give MFC? (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would advise MFC that, having a contractual mortgage (the value of the mortgaged property
being well over the secured obligation), it should refrain from participating in the proceedings and
instead pursue its preferential right to foreclose the mortgage.
XIV. A, as guarantor, executed a real estate mortgage in the amount of P50,000.00 to
secure payment of the indebtedness of XYZ Transit Co. for the purchase of two GM trucks
with a total value of P152,000.00. XYZ Transit Co. paid BMC Motors Co., the seller of the
trucks, the sum of P92,000.00, thus leaving a balance of P60,000.00. The obligation
guaranteed is further secured by a deed of chattel mortgage on the trucks executed by
XYZ Transit Co., in favor of BMC Motors Co. To collect the balance of P60,000.00, BMC
Motors Co. later filed an action against XYZ Transit Co. with CFI, Manila to foreclose the
chattel mortgage. The suit resulted in the sale of the trucks at public auction in the
amount of P50,000.00.
A, the real estate mortgagor, filed an action for the cancellation of the real estate
mortgage above-mentioned.
Will the action prosper? Give reasons. (1978 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. As action for the cancellation of the real estate mortgage will prosper. The rule is to the
effect that the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, bars further recovery by the
vendor of any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary is void. As real estate
mortgage is invalid, being a flagrant circumvention of the prohibition of the law.
Include: Act 3135, as amended by R.A. No. 4118
I.

DMP Corporation (DMP) obtained a loan of P20 M from National Bank (NB) secured by a
real estate mortgage over a 63,380-square meter land situated in Cabanatuan City. Due
to the Asian Economic Crisis, DMP experienced liquidity problems disenabling it from
paying its loan on time. For that reason, NB sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
said mortgage by filing a petition for sale on June 30, 2003. On September 4, 2003, the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction, which was eventually awarded to NB as
the highest bidder. That same day, the Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale in favor of NB.
On October 21, 2003, DMP filed a Petition for Rehabilitation before the RTC. Pursuant
to this, a Stay Order was issued by the RTC on October 27, 2003.

On the other hand, NB caused the recording of the Sheriffs certificate of Sale on
December 3, 2003 with the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City. NB executed an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and had the same annotated on the title of DMP.
Consequently, the Register of Deeds cancelled DMPs title and issued a new title in the
name of NB on December 10, 2003.
NB also filed on March 17, 2004 an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession before the RTC of Cabanatuan City. After hearing, the RTC issued on
September 6, 2004 an Order directing the Issuance of the Writ of Possession, which was
issued on October 4, 2004.
DMP claims that all subsequent actions pertaining to the Cabanatuan property should
have been held in abeyance after the Stay Order was issued by the rehabilitation court. Is
DMP correct? (2014 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. DMP is not correct. Since the foreclosure of the mortgage and the issuance of the
certificate of sale in favor of the mortgagee were done prior to the appointment of a Rehabilitation
Receiver and the issuance of the Stay Order, all the actions taken with respect to the foreclosed
mortgaged property which were subsequent to the issuance of the Stay Order were not affected by
the Stay Order. Thus, after the redemption period expired without the mortgagor redeeming the
foreclosed property, the mortgagee becomes the absolute owner of the property and it was within
its right to ask for consolidation of title and the issuance of new title in its favor. The writ of
possession procured by the mortgagee despite the subsequent issuance of Stay Order in the
rehabilitation proceeding instituted is also valid.
II. X defaulted in his loan with Y. Y instituted extra-judicial foreclosure of the property
subject to a real estate mortgage that secured the loan. X has 1 year within which to
redeem the property. After the foreclosure, X filed an action questioning the validity of
the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. Which statement is most accurate? (2012 Bar Question)
a) The 1 year period within which to redeem will be interrupted by the filing of an
action questioning the validity of the foreclosure;
b) The 1 year period will not be interrupted by the filing of the action;
c) The 1 year period will be extended for another year because of the filing of an
action questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale;
d) If the action which questions the validity of the foreclosure prospers, the period
will be interrupted.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The 1 year period will not be interrupted by the filing of the action.
III. What is the effect if the proceeds in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is not sufficient to
pay for the obligation? (2012 Bar Question)
a) The mortgagee can claim for deficiency judgment from the debtor;
b) The mortgagee can claim for deficiency judgment from the mortgagor even though
it is a third party mortgage;

c) The mortgagee has no more recourse or claim against the debtor;

d) The mortgagee cannot claim for deficiency judgment from the debtor because its
an extrajudicial foreclosure.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The mortgagee can claim for deficiency judgment from the debtor.
IV. X mortgaged her residential house and lot in favor of ABC Bank. X defaulted in her loan
and so the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage on the residential house. Y then
bought the residential house and lot before the expiration of the redemption period. Can
Y now take possession of the property? (2012 Bar Question)
a) No, because it is still covered by the redemption period and the purchaser is not yet
entitled as a matter of right to take possession of the property;
b) Yes, the purchaser is now entitled to the possession of the house;
c) No, because there is a need to talk to X to leave the house;
d) No, because Y was not the one who foreclosed the mortgage on the property.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, because it is still covered by the redemption period and the purchaser is not yet entitled
as a matter of right to take possession of the property
V. Which phrase best completes the statementWhen a debt is secured by a real estate
mortgage, upon default of the debtor: (2012 Bar Question)
a) The only remedy of the creditor is to foreclose the real estate mortgage;
b) Another remedy is filing an action for collection and then foreclose if collection is
not enough;
c) The creditor can foreclose the mortgage and demand collection for any deficiency;
d) None of the above.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The creditor can foreclose the mortgage and demand collection for any deficiency.
VI. X obtained a loan for P50 M from SSS Bank. The collateral is his vacation house in Baguio
City under a real estate mortgage. X needed more funds for his business so he again
borrowed another P10 M, this time from BBB Bank, another bank, using the same
collateral. The loan secured from SSS Bank fell due and X defaulted.
a) If SSS Bank forecloses the real estate mortgage, what rights, if any, are left with BBB
Bank as mortgagee also?
b) If the value of the Baguio property is less than the amount of loan, what would be
the recourse of SSS bank? BBB Bank?
c) If the value of the property is more that the amount of the loan, who will benefit
from the excess value of the property?

d) If X defaulted with its loan in favor of BBB Bank but fully paid his loan with SSS
Bank, can BBB foreclose the real mortgage executed in its favor?
e) Does X have any legal remedy after the foreclosure in the event that later on he has
the money to pay for the loan?
f) If SSS Bank and BBB Bank abandoned their rights under the real estate mortgage, is
there any legal recourse available to them? (2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) BBB Bank, as junior mortgagee, would have a right to redeem the foreclosed property,
together with X, his successors in interest, any judicial or judgment creditor of X, or any other
person or entity having a lien on the vacation house subsequent to the real estate mortgage in favor
of SSS Bank.
b) In case of a deficiency, SSS Bank could file suit to claim for the deficiency. BBB Bank could
file an ordinary action to collect its loan from X. if it does so, it would be deemed to have waived it
mortgage lien. If the judgment in the action to collect is favorable to BBB Bank, and it becomes final
and executor, BBB Bank could enforce the said judgment by execution. It could even levy execution
on the same mortgaged property, but it would not have priority over the latter.
c) If the value of the property is more than the amount of the loan, the excess could benefit and
be claimed by BBB Bank, any judicial or judgment creditor of X, any other junior mortgagee, and X.
d) If X defaulted in respect of his loan from BBB Bank but fully paid his loan from SSS Bank,
BBB Bank could now foreclose the mortgaged property as it would be the only remaining
mortgagee of the same.
e) Yes, X could redeem the property within 1 year from the date of registration of the sheriffs
certificate of foreclosure sale.
f) SSS Bank and BBB Bank could each file an ordinary action to collect its loan from X.
VII. On Xs failure to pay his loan to ABC Bank, the latter foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage
he executed in its favor. The auction sale was set for Dec. 1, 2010 with the notices of sale
published as the law required. The sale was, however, cancelled when Dec. 1, 2010 was
declared a holiday and rescheduled to Jan. 10, 2011 without republication of notice. The
auction sale then proceeded on the new date. Under the circumstance, the auction sale is
(2011 Bar Question)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Rescissible.
Unenforceable.
Void.
Voidable.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c. Void.
VIII. Ozamis Paper Corporation secured loans from ABC Universal Bank in the aggregate
principal amount of P100 M, evidenced by several promissory notes, and secured by a
continuing guaranty of its principal stockholder Menandro Marquez; a pledge of

Marquezs shares in the corporation valued at P45 M; and a real estate mortgage over
certain parcels of land owned by Marquez.
The corporation defaulted and the bank extra-judicially foreclosed on the real estate
mortgage. The bank, which was the sole bidder for P75 M, won the award.
1. Can the bank sue Marquez for the deficiency of P25 M? Explain. (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the bank can sue Marquez for the deficiency of P25 M. in extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage, if the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the
right to sue for the deficiency.
2. If the bank opts to file an action for collection against the corporation, can it
afterwards institute a real action to foreclose the mortgage? Explain. (2010 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the bank can no longer file an action to foreclose the real estate mortgage. When it filed a
collection case, it was deemed to have abandoned the real estate mortgage.
3. Can the bank foreclose on the pledged shares of Marquez and recover the deficiency
from the corporation? (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the bank forecloses the pledge, it cannot recover the deficiency because the foreclosure
extinguishes the principal obligation, whether or not the proceeds from the foreclosure are equal to
the amount of the principal obligation.
IX. On December 4, 2003, RED Corporation executed a real estate mortgage in favor of BLUE
Bank. RED Corporation defaulted in the payment of its loan. Consequently, on June 4,
2004, BLUE Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the property. Being the highest bidder in the
auction sale conducted, the Bank was issued a Certificate of Sale which was registered on
August 4, 2004.
Does RED Corporation still have the right to redeem the property as of September 14,
2007? Reason briefly. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, RED Corporation has lost its right to redeem the property. Juridical persons whose property
is sold pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property until
registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of Deeds, which shall in no case be more than
3 months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier.
X. A real estate mortgage may be foreclosed judicially or extrajudicially. In what instance
may a mortgage extrajudicially foreclose a real estate mortgage? (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A mortgage may extrajudicially foreclose a real estate mortgage when the right to foreclose
extrajudicially has been expressly stipulated in the deed of mortgage or there is a special power in
the real estate mortgage authorizing it.
XI. Primetime Corporation (the Borrower) obtained a P10 M, 5-year term loan from
Universal Bank (the Bank) in 1996. As security for the loan and as required by the Bank,
the Borrower gave the following collateral security in favor of the Bank:
1) A real estate mortgage over the land and building owned by the Borrower and
located in Quezon City;
2) The joint and several promissory note of Mr. Primo Timbol, the President of the
Borrower; and
3) A real estate mortgage over the residential house and lot owned by Mr. Timbol, also
located in Quezon City
Because of business reverses, neither the Borrower nor Mr. Timbol was able to pay
the loan. In June 2001, the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the two real estate mortgages,
with the Bank as the only bidder in the foreclosure sale. On September 16, 2001, the
certificates of sale of the two properties in favor of the Bank were registered with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
10 months later, both the Borrower and Mr. Timbol were able to raise sufficient
funds to redeem their respective properties from the Bank, but the Bank refused to
permit redemption on the ground that the period for redemption had already expired, so
that the Bank now has absolute ownership of both properties. The Borrower and Mr.
Timbol came to you today, September 15, 2002, to find out if the position of the Bank is
correct. What would be your answer? State your reasons. (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) With respect to the real estate mortgage over the land and building owned by the Borrower,
Primetime Corporation, a juridical body, the period of redemption is only 3 months, which period
already expired.
2) As to the real estate mortgage over the residential house and lot owned by Mr. Timbol, the
period of redemption is 1 year from the date of registration of the sale, which period has not yet
expired in this case.
XII. Debtor A issued a promissory note in the amount of P10 M in favor of a commercial
bank Y secured by mortgage of his properties worth P30 M. When A failed to pay his
indebtedness, despite demands made by bank Y, the latter instituted a collection suit to
enforce payment of the P10 M account. Subsequently, bank Y also filed foreclosure
proceedings against A for the security given for the account. If you were the judge, how
would you resolve the two cases? (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The case for collection will be allowed to proceed. But the foreclosure proceedings have to be
dismissed. In instituting a foreclosure proceedings, after filing a collection case involving the same
account or transaction, bank Y is guilty of splitting a cause of action. The loan of P10 M is the
principal obligation while the mortgage securing the same is merely an accessory to said loan
obligation. The collection of the loan and the foreclosure of the mortgage securing said loan
constitute one and the same cause of action. The filing of the collection case bars the subsequent
filing of the foreclosure proceedings.
XIII. Are the right of redemption and the equity of redemption given by law to a
mortgagor the same? Explain. (2%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The equity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. Equity of redemption is
the right of the mortgagor after judgment in a judicial foreclosure to redeem the property by
paying to the court the amount of the judgment debt before the sale or confirmation of the sale. On
the other hand, right of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at an
extra-judicial foreclosure by paying to the buyer in the foreclosure sale the amount paid by the
buyer within one year from such sale.
XIV. X mortgaged his land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory
note. He defaulted in the payment of the loan so that the land was sold at public auction
on January 20, 1960, for P3,500 with the PNB as the highest bidder. On January 20, 1970,
X offered to redeem the property in the amount of P3,500. He enclosed a postal money
order for PI,000 as partial payment and stated that the balance is to be paid in 12
monthly installments. The PNB then discovered that the sheriffs certificate of sale
prepared after the public auction of the land was not registered so that it cause the same
to be registered on January 30, 1970. The PNB refused the offer of X contending that
the offer to redeem was beyond the one-year period provided under Act No. 3135 and
that it was not accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of the entire
repurchase price. In view of the refusal of the PNB, X filed an action to repurchase on
February 20, 1970. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action should prosper. The one (1) year period of redemption is counted from the
registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale hence the action has not yet prescribed. However,
there need not be a tender of the redemption price because the filing of the judicial action to
enforce the right of redemption within the redemption period suffices.
XV. ABC Corporation has been experiencing liquidity problems. Anticipating that it would be
unable to pay maturing obligations, it filed with the SEC a petition for suspension of
payments with a prayer for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver.
During the pendency of the case, ABC Corporation defaulted in the payment of its
debt to XYZ Corporation, a mortgage creditor. Thereupon, XYZ Corporation initiated
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property.
If you were counsel for ABC Corporation, what argument would you raise to resist the
foreclosure? If you were the hearing officer of the SEC, would you permit the foreclosure?
Why? (1984 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Counsel for ABC Corp. should contend that by virtue of the appointment of a rehabilitation
receiver by the SEC the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should not be
permitted since PD 902-A, as amended, provides that all actions for claims against ABC Corp.
pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. It is the intent
of the law to cover not only those actions actually pending at the time of the appointment of the
receiver but those that may be brought subsequent thereto, so long as the distressed corporation
remain under receivership, in order to prevent the dissipation of the assets of the corporation.
b) As the hearing officer of the SEC, I would permit the foreclosure for the following reasons:
1) The extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings does not constitute an action within the meaning of
the Rules of Court; 2) Proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage is not an action for claims
against ABC Corp., but is against the property subject of the mortgage; 3) Applying the law literally,
the foreclosure proceedings were not pending at the time of the appointment of the rehabilitation
receiver. The default by ABC Corp. and the consequent initiation of the foreclosure proceedings
took place after the appointment of the rehabilitation receiver; 4) The extrajudicial foreclosure of
the mortgage is not one pending before any court, tribunal, board or body: and 5) To prevent the
extrajudicial proceedings for foreclosure may result in a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of the obligations of contracts.
VI. Antichresis
I.

Multiple choice: Choose the right answer. (2% each)

x
x
x
3. A contract of antichresis is always:
a) a written contract;
b) a contract with a stipulation that the debt will be paid through receipt of the
fruits of an immovable;
c) involves the payment of interests, if owing;
d) all of the above;
e) letters a and b.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d (all of the above)
II. Olivia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly manage due to a
lingering illness. Since she is indebted to Peter in the amount of P500,000.00, she asks
Peter to manage the plantation and apply the harvest to the payment of her obligation to
him, principal and interest, until her Indebtedness shall have been fully paid. Peter
agrees.
What kind of contract is entered into between Olivia and Peter? Explain.
What specific obligations are imposed by law on Peter as a consequence of their
contract?
3. Does the law require any specific form for the validity of their contract? Explain
4. May Olivia re-Require the plantation before her entire indebtedness shall have
been fully paid? Explain. (1994 Bar Question)
1.
2.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. A contract of antichresis was entered into between Olivia and Peter. Under Article 2132 of
the New Civil Code, by a contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits
of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest,
and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
2. Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and bear the necessary expenses for
preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art. 2135, NCC)

The amount of the principal and interest must be specified in writing, otherwise the
antichresis will be void. (Art. 2134, NCC)
3.

4. No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment of the
immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor. However, it is potestative
on the part of the creditor to do so in order to exempt him from his obligation under Art. 2135,
NCC. The debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment unless Peter compels Olivia to enter again the
enjoyment of the property

III. What do you understand by ANTICHRESIS? How is it distinguished from pledge and
mortgage? (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Antichresis is a contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest if owing and
thereafter to the principal.
Pledge is an accessory and real contract whereby the debtor delivers to the creditor movable
property as security for the performance of a principal obligation upon the fulfilment of which the
thing pledged shall be returned to the debtor.
A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract whereby the debtor guarantees the
performance of the principal obligation by subjecting real property or real right as security for the
performance of such obligation.
ALTERNATIVE EXTENDED ANSWER:
By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits .of an
immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing*
and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Antichresis distinguished from pledge:
1. Antichresis is consensual, pledge is a real contract.
2. Antichresis involves real property, pledge involves personal property.
3. In antichresis, the principal and the interest must be provided in writing for validity. In
pledge, the date and description of the pledge must be in a public instrument to affect
third persons.
Antichresis distinguished from mortgage:

In antichresis the fruits that are applied to .the interest and thereafter to the principal. In
mortgage the fruits are not applied to the principal obligation.
2. In antichresis, the creditor is in possession. In mortgage, the debtor is in possession.
3. The principal and interest must be in writing tor validity. In mortgage, registration is
required to bind third persons.
4. In antichresis, the creditor pays the taxes. In mortgage, taxes are not imposed on the
creditor.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinctions for each should be given full
credit.
1.

VII. Chattel Mortgage

I.

Which phrase best completes the statementA chattel mortgage can be constituted to
secure: (2012 Bar Question)
a)
b)
c)
d)

Obligation both past and future;

Obligation existing at the time the mortgage is constituted;
Future obligations only;
Past obligations only.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Obligation existing at the time the mortgage is constituted.
II. X constituted a chattel mortgage on a car (valued at P1 M) to secure a P500,000 loan. For
the mortgage to be valid, X should have (2011 Bar Question)
a.
b.
c.
d.

The right to mortgage the car to the extent of half its value.
Ownership of the car.
Unqualified free disposal of his car.
Registered the car in his name.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c. Unqualified free disposal of his car.
III. X constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from Y. Later, X executed a chattel
mortgage over said house in favor of Z as security for a loan obtained from the latter.
Still later, X acquired ownership of the land where his house was constructed, after
which he mortgaged both house and land in favor of a bank, which mortgage was
annotated on the Torrens Certificate of Title. When X failed to pay his loan to the bank,
the latter, being the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired Xs house and lot. Learning of the proceedings conducted by the bank, Z is now
demanding that the bank reconvey to him Xs house or pay Xs loan to him plus interests.
Is Zs demand against the bank valid and sustainable? Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand is not valid. A building is immovable or real property whether it is erected by

the owner of the land, by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated as a movable by the
parties to a chattel mortgage but such is binding only between them and not on third parties
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety Co., Inc., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]). In this case, since the bank is not a party
to the chattel mortgage, it is not bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the chattel mortgage
does not exist. Moreover, the chattel mortgage is void because it was not registered. Assuming that
it is valid, it does not bind the Bank because it was not annotated on the title of the land mortgaged
to the bank. Z cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to X, because the Bank
was not privy to such loan transaction.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand against the bank is not valid. His demand that the bank reconvey to him Xs
house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a personal right against
X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as movable property is void insofar as
third persons, such as the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the Bank already had a real
right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated at the back of the Torrens title. The
bank later became the owner in the foreclosure sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for Xs loan plus interest. There is no privity of contract between Z
and the bank.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an innocent mortgagee in good faith or a
mortgagee in bad faith. In the former case, Zs demand is not valid. In the latter case, Zs demand
against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Under the Torrens system of land registration, every person dealing with registered land
may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige him
to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to determine the condition of the title. He is not
bound by anything not annotated or reflected in the certificate. If he proceeds to buy the land or
accept it as a collateral relying on the certificate, he is considered a buyer ora mortgagee in good
faith. On this ground, the Bank acquires a clean title to the land and the house.
However, a bank is not an ordinary mortgagee. Unlike private individuals, a bank is expected
to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings. The ascertainment of the condition of a
property offered as collateral for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its
operation. The bank should have conducted further inquiry regarding the house standing on the
land considering that it was already standing there before X acquired title to the land. The bank
cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, Z's demand against the Bank
is valid and sustainable.
IV. Distinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. (2%) (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor, while in a contract of
pledge possession belongs to the debtor.

A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract.

A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind third
persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing description of the
thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons.
V. Debtor purchased a parcel of land from a realty company payable in 5 yearly
installments. Under the contract of sale, title to the lot would be transferred upon full
payment of the purchase price.
But even before full payment, debtor constructed a house on the lot. Sometime
thereafter, debtor mortgaged the house to secure his obligation arising from the issuance
of a bond needed in the conduct of his business. The mortgage was duly registered with
the proper chattel mortgage registry.
5 years later after completing payment of the purchase price, debtor obtained title to
the lot. And even as the chattel mortgage on the house was still subsisting, debtor
mortgaged to a bank the lot and improvement thereon to secure a loan. This real estate
mortgage was duly registered and annotated at the bank of the title.
Due to business reverses, debtor failed to pay his creditors. The chattel mortgage was
foreclosed when the debtor failed to reimburse the surety company for payments made
on the bond. In the foreclosure sale, the surety company was awarded the house as the
highest bidder.
Only after the foreclosure sale did the surety company learn of the real estate
mortgage in favor of the lending investor on the lot and the improvement thereon.
Immediately, it filed a complaint praying for the exclusion of the house from the real
estate mortgage. It was submitted that as the chattel mortgage was executed and
registered ahead, it was superior to the real estate mortgage.
On the suggestion that a chattel mortgage on a housea real propertywas a nullity,
the surety company countered that when the chattel mortgage was executed, debtor was
not yet the owner of the lot on which the house was built. Accordingly, the house was a
personal property and a proper subject of a chattel mortgage.
a) Discuss the validity of the position taken by the surety company.
b) Who has a better claim to the house, the surety company or the lending investor?
Explain.
c) Would the position of the surety company be bolstered by the fact that it acquired
title in a foreclosure sale conducted by the Provincial Sheriff. Explain. (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The house is always a real property even though it was constructed on a land not belonging
to the builder. However, the parties may treat it as personal property and constitute a chattel
mortgage thereon. Such mortgage shall be valid and binding but only on the parties. It will not bind
or affect third parties.

b) The lending investor has a better claim to the house. The real estate mortgage covering the
house and lot was duly registered and binds the parties and third persons. On the other hand, the
chattel mortgage on the house securing the credit of the surety company did not affect the rights of
third parties such as the lending investor despite registration of the chattel mortgage.
c) No. The chattel mortgage over the house which was foreclosed did not affect the rights of
third parties like the lending investor. Since third parties are not bound by the chattel mortgage,
they are not also bound by any enforcement of its provisions. The foreclosure of such chattel
mortgage did not bolster or add anything to the position of the surety company.
VI. Ritz bought a new car on installments which provided for an acceleration clause in the
event of default. To secure payment of the unpaid installment, as and when due, he
constituted 2 chattel mortgages. i.e., one over his very old car and the other covering the
new car that he had just bought, as aforesaid, on installment. After Ritz defaulted on 3
installments, the seller-mortgagee foreclosed on the old car. The proceeds of the
foreclosure were not enough to satisfy the due obligation; hence, he similarly sought to
foreclose on the new car. Would the seller-mortgagee be legally justified in foreclosing
on this second chattel mortgage? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. the 2 mortgages were executed to secure the payment of the unpaid installments for the
purchase of a new car. When the mortgage on the old car was foreclosed, the seller-mortgagee is
deemed to have renounced all other rights. A foreclosure of additional property, that is, the new car
covered by the second mortgage would be a nullity.
VII. Finding a 24-month payment plan attractive, Anjo purchased a Tamaraw FX from Toyota
Quezon City. He paid a down payment of P100,000, and obtained financing for the
balance from IOU Company. He executed a chattel mortgages over the vehicle in favor of
IOU. When Anjo defaulted, IOU foreclosed the chattel mortgage, and sought to recover the
deficiency.
May IOU still recover the deficiency? Explain. (1996 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
IOU may no longer recover the deficiency. Under Article 1484 of the Civil Code, in a contract of
sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may, among
several options, foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should
the vendees failure to pay cover 2 or more installments. In such case, however, the vendor shall
have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price and any
agreement to the contrary is void. While the given facts did not explicitly state that Anjos failure to
pay covered 2 or more installments, this may safely be presumed because the right of IOU to
foreclose the chattel mortgage under the circumstances is premised on Anjos failure to pay 2 or
more installment. The foreclosure would not have been valid if it were not so.
VIII. Lawrence, a retired air force captain, decided to go into the air transport business. He
purchased an aircraft in cash except for an outstanding balance of P500,000.00. He
incurred an indebtedness of P300.000.00 for repairs with an aircraft repair company.

He also borrowed PI Million from a bank for additional capital and constituted a chattel
mortgage on the aircraft to secure the loan.
While on a test flight the aircraft crashed causing physical injuries to a third party
who was awarded damages of P200.000.00.
Lawrences insurance claim for damage to the aircraft was denied thus leaving him
nothing else but the aircraft which was then valued only at PI Million. Lawrence was
declared insolvent.
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for PI Million, give the order of preference of the
creditors of Lawrence and distribute the amount of PI Million. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for P1 Million, there is no order of preference. The P1
Million will all go to the bank as a chattel mortgagee because a chattel mortgage under Art. 2241
(4) NCC, defeats Art. 2244 (12) and (14). Art. 2241 (3) and (5) are not applicable because the
aircraft is no longer in the possession of the creditor.
IX. A, about to leave the country on a foreign assignment, entrusted to B his brand new car
and its certificate of registration. Falsifying A's signature. B sold A's car to C for
P200.000.00. C then registered the car in his name. To complete the needed amount, C
borrowed P 100,000.00 from the savings and loan association in his office, constituting a
chattel mortgage on the car. For failure of C to pay the amount owed, the savings and
loan association filed in the RTC a complaint for collection with application for issuance
of a writ of replevin to obtain possession of the vehicle so that the chattel mortgage
could be foreclosed. The RTC issued the writ of replevin. The car was then seized from C
and sold by the sheriff at public auction at which the savings and loan association was
the lone bidder. Accordingly, the car was sold to it. A few days later. A arrived from his
foreign assignment. Learning of what happened to his car, A sought to recover possession and ownership of it from the savings and loan association.
Can A recover his car from the savings and loan association? Explain your answer.
(1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under the prevailing rulings of the Supreme Court, A can recover the car from the Savings
and Loan Association provided he pays the price at which the Association bought the car at a
public auction. Under that doctrine, there has been an unlawful deprivation by B of A of his car
and. therefore, A can recover It from any person in possession thereof.. But since it was bought at
a public auction in good faith by the Savings and Loan Association, he must reimburse the
Association at the price for which the car was bought.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. A can recover his car from the Savings and Loan Association. In a Chattel Mortgage, the
mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Furthermore, the person
constituting the mortgage must have the free disposal of the property, and in the absence thereof,

must be legally authorized for the purpose. In the case at bar, these essential requisites did not
apply to the mortgagor B. hence the Chattel Mortgage was not valid.
X. To secure the payment of an earlier loan of P20,000, as well as subsequent loans which
her friend, Noreen, would extend to her, Karen executed in favor of Noreen a chattel
mortgage over her (Karen) care.
Is the mortgage valid? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A chattel mortgage cannot effectively secure after-incurred obligations. While a stipulation to
include after-incurred obligations in a chattel mortgage is itself not invalid, the obligation cannot,
however, be deemed automatically secured by that mortgage until after a new chattel mortgage or
an addendum to the original chattel mortgage is executed to cover the obligation after it has been
actually incurred. Accordingly, unless such supplements are made, the chattel mortgage in the
problem given would be deemed to secure only the loan of P20,000.
XI. Eastern Motors, Inc. (EMI), an automotive dealer, sold a Toyota station wagon to Alran
Tuason, payable in 10 monthly installments. The installments were evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a mortgage on the car. EMI assigned the credit to Island
Finance Corporation (IFC), subject to IFCs right of recourse to EMI if the car buyer
(Tuason) was unable to pay the credit in full. Upon Tuasons default, IFC foreclosed on
the mortgage. Since a deficiency remained, IFC sought to collect the same from EMI.
Is IFC justified in doing so? Reason out your answer. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
IFC is not justified in collecting the deficiency from EMI. An assignee is merely a successor-ininterest of the assignor and, therefore, unless otherwise expressed in the deed of assignment, the
right of recourse stipulated in favor of IFC must be deemed confined only to a case where the car
buyer is unable to pay the credit in full. By foreclosing on the car, the right to the deficiency is lost
and no further amount is thus due from the car buyer.
XII. Benedicto executed a chattel mortagage on a Mercedes-Benz car in favor of Silverio. The
mortgage was duly registered on August 15. Upon the failure of Benedicto to pay the
obligation secured by the chattel mortgage, Silverio filed, on October 3, an action for
replevin to take possession of the mortgaged car. It turned out that as early as August 20,
Leopoldo had already filed an action to recover a sum of money against Benedicto. Even
before the repelvin case of Silverio could be set for trial, Leopoldo caused a levy to be
made on the Mercede-Benz to satisfy the money judgment which a court had awarded on
October 10 against Benedicto in favor of Leopoldo.
Whose claim to the Mercedes-Benz car will prevail, Leopoldos or Silverios? explain.
(1986 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Silverios claim will prevail. His mortgage was duly registered on August 15 or days before
Leopoldo filed his action and months before the judgment levy by him was made. The time when
Silverio sought to enforce the lien is not material; the date of registration of the chattel mortgage is
enough to bind, or make it effective as against, third persons.
XIII. Juan Royo is constructing his family home on a lot in Marikina which he leased from
Fernando Paz. Short of funds to finish the house, Juan borrowed from Traders Royal
Bank the sum of P150,000. By mutual agreement, Juan Royo executed a chattel mortgage
over the residential house in favor of the bank.
Is a chattel mortgage over a residential house constructed on a rented land belonging
to another person valid and enforceable? Explain. (1985 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. The chattel mortgage over a residential house constructed on a rented land
belonging to another person, may be valid and enforceable, or not. If between only the contracting
parties, mortgagor and mortgagee, the chattel mortgage of said building is valid and enforceable,
since the building, though a real property, has been considered a chattel between the parties, and
the validity of the contract between them has been recognized principally upon the principle of
estoppels. However, with respect to third persons, who are not parties to said contract of chattel
mortgage, the building is an immovable property, and the chattel mortgage on the same is, to said
third persons, a complete nullity.
XIV. To secure a loan or P100,000, Mr. Pons executed in favor of Mr. Sy a chattel mortgage
on his house built on a leased property belonging to another. They agreed to consider
said house as a personal property for purposes of the mortgage. In the ensuing
foreclosure sale, the house was sold by the sheriff to Mr. Sy, who in turn sold it to Mr.
Roque. Subsequently, Mr. Manapla filed a complaint and obtained judgment against Mr.
Pons for the sum of P120,000. The same house, formerly owned by Mr. Pons but, as above
stated, acquired by Mr. Sy and sold to Mr. Roque, was levied upon by Mr. Manapla. To
prevent the sale at public auction, Mr. Roque and Mr. Sy filed an action against Mr. Pons
and Mr. Manapla. Will such action prosper? (1982 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action by Mr. Sy and Mr. Roque against Mr. Pons and Mr. Manapla will not prosper,
since plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants herein. Regardless of the validity of a
contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house which is a real property, as between the parties
to said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the
aforementioned contract or their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in the
proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure or said chattel mortgage, is null and void in so far as Mr.
Manapla is concerned, and did not confer upon Mr. Sy, as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in
and to said house, so that he had not transmitted to his assignee, plaintiff Mr. Roque any such right
as against defendant Mr. Manapla. (Piansay, et al. v. David , et al., Oct. 30, 1964; 12 SCRA 228)
XV. W constructs a residential house on a rented land belonging to X. To enable him to
finish the house, W borrows P50,000.00 from Jet Savings bank and mortgages his house
as security.

By mutual agreement, W executes a chattel mortgage on the residential house in

favor of the bank.
Is the chattel mortgage on Ws residential house situated on a rented land
belonging to X valid and enforceable? (1980 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The validity of the chattel mortgage on Ws residential house situated on a rented land
belonging to X may be recognized between the contracting parties, principally upon the principle of
estoppels; thus, the validity of the chattel mortgage in question cannot be assailed by one of the
parties to the contract of mortgage, principally on the doctrine of estoppels. (Navarro v. Pineda, Nov.
30, 1963; 9 SCRA 636)
XVI. Creditor A filed action for recovery of a sum of money against debtor B, and secured a
preliminary attachment on a personal property of B. Subsequently, B executed a deed of
chattel mortgage over the same property in favor of C, who filed a third party claim over
the property attached. A now files a motion for disapproval of the third party claim. C
opposes the motion on the ground that the chattel mortgage being in the nature of a
conditional sale, title passed to him in the meantime and therefore he is entitled to
possession of the property. Decide the motion and opposition. (1979 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As motion for disapproval of Cs third party claim may be sustained, because C was merely a
chattel mortgagee. Chattel mortgage is merely a security for a loan and does not transfer title of the
property mortgaged to the chattel mortgagee. (Serra v. Rodriguez, L-25546, April 22, 1974; 56 SCRA
538).
Cs allegation that the chattel mortgage being in the nature of a conditional sale, cannot be
sustained. The old view that a chattel mortgage is a conditional sale has been expressly repudiated
by the new Civil Code. (Art. 2140, Civil Code; Serra v. Rodriguez, supra)
XVII. To guarantee the payment of his obligation, the defendant A mortgaged to the
plaintiff B his sugar, then stored in a warehouse in San Fernando, Pampanga authorizing
said plaintiff (B) to sell the sugar in case he (A) failed to pay. During the initial days of
martial rule in late 1972, all of As sugar were burned or looted in the warehouse.
Plaintiff B sued defendant A for payment of the obligation.
(1) Will the suit prosper? Explain.
(2) Who shall bear the loss of the mortgaged sugar? Give reasons. (1978 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Yes. Bs suit will prosper. The mortgagee, B, after the loss of the sugar in a warehouse, may
still recover on the obligation of the mortgagor, as an ordinary creditor, he having lost already his
security. (Martinez v. Philippine National Bank, L-4080, Sept. 21, 1953)

(2) Mr. A, the mortgagor, shall bear the loss of the mortgaged sugar. The mortgagee, not being
the owner of the mortgaged sugar, does not suffer the loss. Said goods are to be regarded as lost on
account of the real owner, the mortgagor. (Martinez v. Philippine National Bank, L-4080, Sept. 21,
1953)
XVIII. A, as guarantor, executed a real estate mortgage in the amount of P50,000.00 to
secure payment of the indebtedness of XYZ Transit Co. for the purchase of two GM trucks
with a total value of P152,000.00. XYZ Transit Co. paid BMC Motors Co., the seller of the
trucks, the sum of P92,000.00, thus leaving a balance of P60,000.00. The obligation
guaranteed is further secured by a deed of chattel mortgage on the trucks executed by
XYZ Transit Co., in favor of BMC Motors Co. To collect the balance of P60,000.00, BMC
Motors Co. later filed an action against XYZ Transit Co. with CFI, Manila to foreclose the
chattel mortgage. The suit resulted in the sale of the trucks at public auction in the
amount of P50,000.00.
A, the real estate mortgagor, filed an action for the cancellation of the real estate
mortgage above-mentioned.
Will the action prosper? Give reasons. (1978 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, As action for the cancellation of the real estate mortgage will prosper. The rule is to the
effect that the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, bars further recovery by the
vendor of any unpaid balance of the price. Any agreement to the contrary is void. As real estate
mortgage is invalid, being a flagrant circumvention of the prohibition of the law.
Include: Act 1508
I.

Which phrase best completes the statementThe Deed of Chattel mortgage, if not
registered with the Register of Deeds where debtor resides: (2012 Bar Question)
a) Is not valid, hence not binding between the mortgagor and the mortgagee;
b) Is binding between the mortgagor and the mortgagee but will not affect third party;
c) To be valid between the mortgagor and the mortgagee, it must be coupled with the
delivery of the subject matter of the chattel mortgage;
d) Is as if a non-existent chattel mortgage.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Is binding between the mortgagor and the mortgagee but will not affect third party.
II. Which phrase best completes the statementA chattel mortgage can cover: (2012 Bar
Question)
a)
b)
c)
d)

Only property described in the deed without exception;

Can also cover substituted property;
Properties described in the deed except in case of stock in trade being a substitute;
After acquired property.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Properties described in the deed except in case of stock in trade being a substitute.
III. Which phrase best completes the statementTo bind third parties, a chattel mortgage of
shares of stock must be registered: (2012 Bar Question)
a)
b)
c)
d)

With the Register of Deeds where the debtor resides;

With the Register of Deeds where the principal office of the corporation is;
In the Stock and Transfer Book of the corporation with the Corporate Secretary;
With the Register of Deeds where the debtor resides and the principal office of the
corporation.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) With the Register of Deeds where the debtor resides and the principal office of the
corporation.
IV. Which phrase best completes the statementThe affidavit of good faith in a Deed of
Chattel Mortgage is: (2012 Bar Question)
a) An oath where the parties swear that the mortgage is made for the purpose of
securing the obligations specified and that the obligation is just and valid;
b) An affidavit, the absence of which will vitiate the mortgage between the parties;
c) Necessary only if the chattel being mortgaged are growing crops;
d) A certification from the mortgagor that he is the mortgagor of the chattel.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) An oath where the parties swear that the mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the
obligations specified and that the obligation is just and valid.
V. Armando, a resident of Manila, borrowed P3 M from Bernardo, offering as security his
500 shares of stock worth P1.5 M in Xerxes Corporation, and his 2007 BMW sedan,
valued at P2 M. the mortgage on the shares of stock was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City where Xerxes Corporation has its principal office. The
mortgage on the car was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
Armando executed a single Affidavit of Good Faith, covering both mortgages.
Armando defaulted on the payment of his obligation; thus, Bernardo foreclosed on
the two chattel mortgages. Armando filed suit to nullify the foreclosure and the
mortgages, raising the following issues:
a) The execution of only one Affidavit of Good Faith for both mortgages invalidated the
two mortgages; and (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The execution of only one Affidavit of Good Faith for both mortgages is not a ground to nullify
the said mortgages and the foreclosure thereof. Said mortgages are valid as between immediate
parties, although they cannot bind third parties.
b) The mortgage on the shares of stocks should have been registered in the Office of
the Register Deeds of Manila where he resides, as well as in the stock and transfer
book of Xerxes Corporation.
Rule on the foregoing issues with reasons. (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The mortgage on the shares of stock should be registered in the chattel mortgage registry in the
register of Deeds of Makati City where the corporation has its principal office and also in the
Register of Deeds of Manila where the mortgagor resides. Registration of chattel mortgage in the
stock and transfer book is not required to make the chattel mortgage valid. Registration of dealings
in the stock and transfer book under Section 63 of the Corporation Code applies only to sale or
disposition of shares, and has no application to mortgages and other forms of encumbrances.
c) Assume that Bernardo extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgages, and both the car
and the shared of stock were sold at public auction. If the proceeds from such public
sale should be 1-million short of Armandos total obligation, can Bernardo recover
the deficiency? Why or why not? (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Bernardo can recover the deficiency. Chattels are given as mere security, and not as
payment or pledge.
VI. On January 1, 2008, Al obtained a loan of P10,000 from Bob to be paid on January 30,
2008, secured by a chattel mortgage on a Toyota motor car. On February 1, 2008, Al
obtained another loan of P10,000 from Bob to be paid on February 15, 2008. He secured
this by executing a chattel mortgage on a Honda motorcycle. On the due date of the first
loan Al failed to pay. Bob foreclosed the chattel mortgage but the car was bidded for
P6,000 only. Al also failed to pay the second loan due on February 15, 2008. Bob filed an
action for collection of sum of money. Al filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Bob
should first foreclose the mortgage on the Honda motorcycle before he can file the action
for sum of money. Decide with reasons. (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Bob can file an action for collection of a sum of money without first foreclosing the chattel
mortgage on the motorcycle of Al. Bob has the right to abandon the chattel mortgage and file
instead an action for collection of a sum of money.
VII. Are the right of redemption and the equity of redemption given by law to a mortgagor
the same? Explain. (2%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The equity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. Equity of redemption is
the right of the mortgagor after judgment in a judicial foreclosure to redeem the property by
paying to the court the amount of the judgment debt before the sale or confirmation of the sale. On
the other hand, right of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at an
extra-judicial foreclosure by paying to the buyer in the foreclosure sale the amount paid by the
buyer within one year from such sale.
VIII. On December 1, 1996, Borrower executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the bank to
secure a loan of P3 M. in due time the loan was paid.
On December 1, 1997, Borrower obtained another loan of P2 M which the Bank
granted under the same security as that which secured the first loan.
For the second loan, Borrower merely delivered a promissory note; no new chattel
mortgage agreement was executed as the parties relied on a provision in the 1996
chattel mortgage agreement which included future debts as among the obligations
secured by the mortgage. The provision reads:
In case the MORTGAGOR executes subsequent promissory note or notes either as
renewal, as an extension, or as a new loan, this mortgage shall also stand as security for
the payment of said promissory note or notes without the necessity of executing a new
contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory
note or notes were existing on date hereof.
As borrower failed to pay the second loan, the Bank proceeded to foreclose the
Chattel Mortgage.
Borrower sued the Bank claiming that the mortgage was no longer in force. Borrower
claimed that a fresh chattel mortgage should have been executed when the second loan
was granted.
a) Decide the case and ratiocinate.
b) Supposed the chattel mortgage was not registered, would its validity and
effectiveness be impaired? Explain. (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The foreclosure of the chattel mortgage regarding the second loan is not valid. A chattel
mortgage cannot validly secure after-incurred obligations. The affidavit of good faith required
under the chattel mortgage law expressly provides that the foregoing mortgage is made for
securing the obligation specified in the conditions hereof, and for no other purpose. The afterincurred obligation not being specified in the affidavit, it is not secured by the mortgage.
b) Yes. The chattel mortgage is not valid as against any person, except the mortgagor, his
executors and administrators.
IX. Vini constructed a building on a parcel of land he leased from Andrea. He chattel
mortgaged the land to Felicia. When he could not pay Felicia, Felicia initiated foreclosure
proceedings. Vini claimed that the building he had constructed on the leased land cannot

be validly foreclosed because the building was, by law, an immovable.

Is Vini correct? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Chattel Mortgage is void and cannot be foreclosed because the building is an
immovable and cannot be an object of a chattel mortgage.
a)

b) It depends. If the building was intended and is built of light materials, the chattel mortgage
may be considered as valid as between the parties and it may be considered in respect to them as
movable property, since it can be removed from one place to another. But if the building is of
strong material and is not capable of being removed or transferred without being destroyed, the
chattel mortgage is void and cannot be foreclosed.

If it was the land which Vini chattel mortgaged, such mortgage would be void, or at least
unenforceable, since he was not the owner of the land.
c)

If what was mortgaged as a chattel is the building, the chattel mortgage is valid as between the
parties only, on grounds of estoppel which would preclude the mortgagor from assailing the
contract on the ground that its subject-matter is an immovable. Therefore Vini's defense is
untenable, and Felicia can foreclose the mortgage over the building, observing, however, the
procedure prescribed for the execution of sale of ajudgment debtor's immovable under Rule 39,
Rules of Court, specifically, that the notice of auction sale should be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
d) The problem that Vini mortgaged the land by way of a chattel mortgage is untenable. Land
can only be the subject matter of a real estate mortgage and only an absolute owner of real
property may mortgage a parcel of land. (Article 2085 (2) Civil Code). Hence, there can be no
foreclosure.

But on the assumption that what was mortgaged by way of chattel mortgage was the building
on leased land, then the parties are treating the building as chattel. A building that is not merely
superimposed on the ground is an immovable property and a chattel mortgage on said building is
legally void but the parties cannot be allowed to disavow their contract on account of estoppel by
deed. However, if third parties are involved such chattel mortgage is void and has no effect.
X. To secure the payment of his loan of P200,000, A executed in favor of the Angeles
Banking Corp., in 1 document, a real estate mortgage over 3 lots registered in his name
and a chattel mortgage over his 3 cars and 1 Isuzu cargo truck.
Upon his failure to pay the loan on due date, the bank foreclosed the mortgage on the
3 lots, which were subsequently sold for only P99,000 at the foreclosure sale. Thereafter,
the bank filed an ordinary action for the collection of the deficiency. A contended that the
mortgage contract he executed was indivisible and consequently, the bank had no legal
right to foreclose only the real estate mortgage and leave out the chattel mortgage, and
then sue him for a supposed deficiency judgment.
If you were the Judge, would you sustain the contention of A? (1991 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the Judge, I would dismiss the action as being premature since the proper remedy
would be to complete the foreclosure of the mortgages and only thereafter can there be an action
for collection of any deficiency. In Caltex vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. 74730, 25 August
1989). The remedies on a secured debt, said the court, are either an action to collect or to foreclose
a contract of real security. These remedies are alternative remedies, although an action for any
deficiency is not precluded, subject to certain exception such as those stated in Article 1484 of the
Civil Code, by a foreclosure on the mortgages. While the factual settings in the case of Suria vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (30 June 1987) are not similar to the facts given in the problem, the
Supreme Court implied that foreclosure as a remedy in secured obligations must first be availed of
by a creditor in preference to other remedies that might also be invoked by him.
XI. Zone, who lives in Bulacan, bought a 1988 model Toyota Corolla sedan on July 1, 1989
from Anadelaida, who lives in Quezon City, for P300,000, paying P150,000 as down
payment and promising to pay the balance in 3 equal quarterly installments beginning
October 1, 1989. Anadelaida executed a deed of sale of the vehicle in favor of Zonee and,
to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price, had Zonee execute a deed of chattel
mortgage on the vehicle in Anadelaidas favor.
10 days after the execution of the abovementioned documents, Zonee had the car
transferred and registered in her name. Contemporaneously, Anadelaida had the chattel
mortgage on the car registered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry of the Office of the
Register of Deed of Quezon City.
In September 1989, Zonee sold the sedan to Jimbo without telling the latter that the
car was mortgaged to Anadelaida. When Zonee failed to pay the first installment on
October 1, 1989, Anadelaida went to see Zonee and discovered that the latter had sold
the car to Jimbo.
a) Jimbo refused to give up the car on the ground that the chattel mortgage executed
by Zonee in favor of Anadelaida is not valid because it was executed before the car
was registered in Zonees name, i.e., before Zonee became the registered owner of
the car. Is the said argument meritorious? Explain your answer.
b) Jimbo also argued that even if the chattel mortgage is valid, it cannot affect him
because it was not properly registered with the government offices where it should
be registered. What government office is Jimbo referring to? (1990 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Jimbos argument is not meritorious. Zone became the owner of the property upon delivery;
registration is not essential to vest that ownership in the buyer. The execution of the chattel
mortgage by the buyer in favor of the seller, in fact, can demonstrate the vesting of such ownership
to the mortgagor.
b) Jimbo was referring to the Register of Deeds of Bulacan where Zonee was a resident. The
Chattel Mortgage Law requires the registration to be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
the province where the mortgagor resides and also in which the property is situated as well as the
LTO where the vehicle is registered.

XII. A bought a car from Sigma Motors Co. for P80,000, P40,000 payable upon delivery and
P40,000 one year after such delivery. As security for the payment of such balance, A
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Sigma Motors, which mortgage was recorded in
the proper chattel mortgage registry. After 6 months, A sold the car to B who, unaware of
the registered chattel mortgage on the car, registered the sale and obtained a certificate
of registration in his own name from the Bureau of Land Transportation, which was not
aware of the mortgage either.
Seven months later, Sigma Motors brought a suit to foreclose the chattel mortgage
since A had failed to pay the balance of P40,000. B opposed the suit. May the foreclosure
be legally made? (1981 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Chattel mortgage of a car must be registered not only in the Chattel Mortgage Registry
but also with the Bureau of Land Transportation otherwise it will not affect third persons who were
not aware thereof. B bought the car in good faith and since there was nothing in the BLT records
which showed the existence of any lien on the car, he had the right to assume that such car was free
from any encumbrance. The sale of the car to B would therefore prevail over Sigmas defectively
registered chattel mortgage.
XIII. To secure a debt to Y, X, the owner of Supreme Drugstore, executed a chattel
mortgage covering the goods contained in the drugstore. The deed of chattel mortgage
provides that all goods, stock-in-trade, furniture and fixtures hereafter purchased by
the mortgagor shall be included in and covered by the mortgage.
Upon default by X, Y sought to foreclose the mortgage on the goods then found in the
drugstore, half of which were admittedly acquired after the execution of the chattel
mortgage.
If you were the lawyer of X, what arguments would you advance to defeat the
foreclosure on the after acquired property? If you were the judge, how would you decide?
(1984 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) As the lawyer of X, I would argue that the chattel mortgage is invalid in respect of the after
acquired property, being in contravention of the last paragraph of Section 7 of the Chattel Mortgage
Law which provides:
A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like a
substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the
property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding.
b) The Supreme Court, confronted with the same issue, held in Torres v. Limjap, 5 Phil. 141,
that a similar stipulation in the chattel mortgage extending its effect to after acquired property is
valid and binding, taking into consideration the spirit and intent of the Chattel Mortgage law.

Bearing in mind the primary aim of the lawmaker was to promote business and trade in the
Philippine Islands and to give impetus to the economic development of the country, it could not
have been the intention of the lawmaker to apply the last provision of Sec. 7 to stores open for retail
business, where the goods are constantly sold and substituted with new stocks, such as drug stores,
grocery stores, dry good stores, etc. if such provision were intended to apply to this class of
business, it would be practically impossible to constitute a mortgage on such stores without closing
them, contrary to the very spirit and purpose of the said Act. (Dee Hao Kiam v. Busiang, 56 Phil. 181.)
Note that the mortgage in question expressly provides that future acquisitions of goods to be
added to the original stock mortgaged shall be held as included in the mortgage.
Moreover, X is estopped.
Accordingly, if I were the judge, I would decide in favor of Y.
XIV. Alfonso borrowed P10,000.00 from Bernabe payable in 10 equal monthly
installments of P1,000.00 per month. To secure payment of the loan, Alfonso executed a
chattel mortgage on his sports car. The condition of the mortgage was violated.
a. What right does Bernabe have against Alfonso?
b. How should he enforce that right?
c. The proceeds of the sale after deducting expenses was not sufficient to pay the
mortgage debt. Bernabe now wants to collect the deficiency. Is he correct? Why?
(1976 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Bernabe has the right to:
(i) Exact fulfillment of the obligation; or
(ii) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the car.
b. Should he elect fulfillment of the obligation, he should institute the proper case in court;
cause the chattel to be attached as provided under the Rules of Court, and after a favorable
judgment, have it sold at public auction in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, should he elect to foreclose the mortgage all he has to do is to cause the car
to be sold at public auction pursuant to Sec.14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
Yes. The creditor is entitled to a deficiency judgment in a chattel mortgage contract. Under Sec.
14 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, it can be inferred that if the price of the sale of the thing mortgage
is less than the amount of the principal obligation an action may still be maintained by the creditor
against the debtor for the deficiency. The only exception to this rule is that which is provided for in
Art 1484 (3) of the Civil Code. According to this provision, should the vendee fail to pay two or
more installments, the vendor may foreclose the chattel mortgage, but he shall not have further
action against the vendee to recover any unpaid balance of the price. (Ablaza v. Ignacio, L-11463,
May 23, 1958 and Garrido v. Tuason, L-23768, August 23, 1968)
XV. A borrowed P10,000.00 from X. To secure payment thereof, A executed a chattel
mortgage on his Toyota car. The condition of the mortgage having been breached, (a)
What right does the mortgage have? (b) How should he proceed to enforce that right? (c)

If the proceeds of the sale after deducting expenses are not sufficient to pay the mortgage
debt, is A entitled to collect the deficiency? Reason. (1976 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) He may foreclose the mortgage either judicially or extrajudicially.
(b) Judicial foreclosure should follow the provision of the Rules of Court. Extrajudicial
foreclosure is made in accordance with the Chattel Mortgage Law and is by means of sale at public
auction conducted by a public officer in the municipality where the mortgagor resides or where the
property is situated. Notice of the time, place and purpose of the sale should be given in accordance
with law.
(c) Yes, he may collect the deficiency since the chattel is given only as security and not as
payment of the debt. The provision of the Civil Code barring deficiency judgments in case of pledge
is not applicable to chattel mortgage, which is governed by a special law. Neither is it a sale by
installments. (Garrido v. Tuazon, 24 SCRA 727)
XVI. A executed a chattel mortgage on certain personal properties in favor of B to secure a
debt. The chattel properties were attached by C, knowing that said properties had been
mortgaged to B. As between B and C who has a better right to the properties? Reason.
(1976 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
C has a better right to the properties. The Chattel Mortgage Law expressly provides that an
unregistered chattel mortgage is not valid against any person. Registration is essential for the
validity of the chattel mortgage.
VIII. Quasi-contracts
I.

DPO went to a store to buy a pack of cigarettes worth P225.00 only. He gave the vendor,
RRA, a P500-peso bill. The vendor gave him the pack plus P375.00 change. Was there a
discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount given? What would be DPOs duty, if
any, in case of an excess in the amount of change given by the vendor? How is this
situational relationship between DPO and RRA denominated? Explain. (5%) (2004 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was error in the amount of change given by RRA. This is a case of solutioindebiti in
that DPO received something that is not due him. He has the obligation to return the P100.00;
otherwise, he will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of RRA. (Art. 2154, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
DPO has the duty to return to RRA the excess P100 as trustee under Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which provides: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes. There is, in this case, an implied or constructive trust in favor of RRA.
II. Armando owns, a row of residential apartments in San Juan, Metro Manila, which he
rents out to tenants. On 1 April 1991 he left for the United States without appointing any

administrator to manage his apartments such that uncollected rentals accumulated for
three (3) years. Amparo, a niece of Armando, concerned with the Interest of her uncle,
took it upon herself to administer the property. As a consequence, she incurred
expenses in collecting the rents and in some instances even spent for necessary repairs
to preserve the property.
1. What juridical relation between Amparo and Armando, if any, has resulted from
Amparos unilateral act of assuming the administration of Armandos apartments?
Explain.
2. What rights and obligations, if any, does Amparo have under the circumstances?
Explain. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Negotiorum gestio existed between Amparo and Armando. She voluntarily took charge of
the agency or management of the business or property of her uncle without any power from her
uncle whose property was neglected. She is called the gestor negotiorum or officious manager. (Art.
2144, NCC)

It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations and
two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152, NCC, would entitle the examinee to full credit.
2.

Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good
father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by
the owner of the property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties, he
shall be liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter
toward the owner of the business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless management
was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon:
If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
If he assumed the management in bad faith.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save the property or business from
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to carry on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the
management.
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business produces the
effects of an express agency, even if the business may not have been successful.

Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly ratified, the
owner of the property business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for
obligations Incurred In his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the necessary
and useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of
his duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when, the management had for its purpose
the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may have been derived.
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has been no imminent
and manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is liable as under the first paragraph of
the preceding article, provided:
(1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the owner.
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into
with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of
action between the owner and third persons.. These provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business.
(NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations
and any two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152. NCC would entitle the examinee to full
credit.)
III. In September, 1972, upon declaration of martial rule in the Philippines, A, together with
his wife and children, disappeared from his residence along A. Mabini Street. Ermita,
Manila. B. his immediate neighbor, noticing that mysterious disappearance of A and his
family, closed the doors and windows of his house to prevent it from being burglarized.
Years passed without B hearing from A and his family. B continued taking care of A's
house, even causing minor repairs to be done at his house to preserve it. In 1976, when
business began to perk up in the area, an enterprising man, C, approached B and
proposed that they build stores at the ground floor of the house and convert its second
floor into a pension house. B agreed to Cs proposal and together they spent for the
construction of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the second floor into a
pension house. While construction was going on, fire occurred at a nearby house. The
houses at the entire block, including A's, were burned. After the EDSA revolution in
February 1986. A and his family returned from the United States where they took refuge
in 1972. Upon learning of what happened to his house. A sued B for damages. B pleaded
as a defense that he merely look charge of his house under the principle of negotiorum
gestio. He was not liable as the burning of the house is a fortuitous event.
Is B liable to A for damages under the foregoing circumstances? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, B is not liable for damages, because he is a gestor in negotiorum gestio (Art. 2144, Civil
Code).

Furthermore, B is not liable to A because Article 2147 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
B did not undertake risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon:
a) he has not preferred his own interest to that of the owner:
b) he has not failed to return the property or business after demand by the owner; and
c) he has not assumed the management in bad faith.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
He would be liable under Art.2147 (1) of the Civil Code, because he used the property for an
operation which the operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he exposed the house to
increased risk, namely the operation of a pension house on the second floor and stores on the first
floor.
IV. In fear of reprisals from lawless elements besieging his barangay, X abandoned his
fishpond, fled to Manila and left for Europe. Seeking that the fish in the fishpond were
ready for harvest, Y, who is in the business of managing fishponds on a commission
basis, took possession of the property, harvested the fish and sold the entire harvest to Z.
Thereafter, Y borrowed money from W and used the money to buy new supplies of
fish fry and to prepare the fishpond for the next crop.
a) What is the Juridical relation between X and Y during Xs absence?
b) Upon the return of X to the barangay, what are the obligations of Y to X as regards

the contract with Z?

c) Upon Xs return, what are the obligations of X as regards Ys contract with W?
d) What legal effects will result If X expressly ratifies Ys management and what would
be the obligations of X in favor of Y? (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of negotiorum gestio". Y Is the gestor"

or officious manager" and X is the owner" (Art. 2144, Civil Code).

(b) Y must render an account of his operations and deliver to X the price he received for the

sale of the harvested fish (Art. 2145, Civil Code).

(c) X must pay the loan obtained by Y from W because X must answer for obligations

contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner (Art. 2150, Civil Code).
(d) Express ratification by X provides the effects of an express agency and X is liable to pay the

commissions habitually received by the gestor as manager (Art. 2149, Civil Code).

V. Distinguish an implied contract from a quasi- contract. (1989 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Any of the following answers should be given full credit:
A.

An implied contract requires consent of the parties. A quasi-contract is not predicated on

consent, being a unilateral act.

B.

The basis of an implied contract is the will of the parties. The basis of a quasi-contract is
law to the end that there be no unjust situation.

IX. Concurrence and Preference of Credits

LEASE
I.

Lease of Things

II. Lease of Work or Services

I.

Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket.
Was there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In. the
affirmative, what was it? Explain. (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of
her close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they entered into
was the nominate contract of Agency. Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the
contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of service in the absence of a relation of
principal and agent between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
III. Lease of Rural and Urban Lands
I.

Under a written contract dated December 1, 1989, Victor leased his land to Joel for a
period of five (5) years at a monthly rental of P1,000.00, to be increased to P1,200.00
and P1,500.00 on the third and fifth year, respectively. On January 1, 1991, Joel
subleased the land to Conrad for a period of two (2) years at a monthly rental of
P1,500.00.
On December 31, 1992, Joel assigned the lease to his compadre, Ernie, who acted on
the belief that Joel was the rightful owner and possessor of the said lot Joel has been
faithfully paying the stipulated rentals to Victor. When Victor learned on May 15, 1992
about the sublease and assignment, he sued Joel, Conrad and Ernie for rescission of the
contract of lease and for damages.
a) Will the action prosper? If so, against whom? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action for rescission of the lease will prosper because Joel cannot assign the lease to
Ernie without the consent of Victor. (Art. 1649, Civil Code). But Joel may sublet to Conrad because
there is no express prohibition (Art. 1650, Civil Code; Alipio v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 441

(20001).
Victor can rescind the contract of lease with Joel, and the assignment of the lease to Ernie, on
the ground of violation of law and of contract. The sub-lease to Conrad remained valid for two (2)
years from January 1, 1991, and had not yet lapsed when the action was filed on May 15, 1992.
b) In case of rescission, discuss the rights and obligations of the parties. (2%) (2005

Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In case of rescission, the rights and obligations of the parties should be as follows: At the
time that Victor filed suit on May 15, 1992, the assignment had not yet lapsed. It would lapse on
December 1, 1994, the very same date that the 5-year basic lease would expire. Since the
assignment is void, Victor can get the property back because of the violation of the lease. Both Joel
and Ernie have to surrender possession and are liable for damages. But Conrad has not yet incurred
any liability on the sublease which still subsisted at the time of the filing of the action on May 15,
1992.
Ernie can file a cross-claim against Joel for damages on account of the rescission of the
contract of assignment. Conrad can file a counter-claim against Victor for damages for lack of
causes of action at the time of the filing of the suit.
II. A leased his house to B with a condition that the leased premises shall be used for
residential purposes only. B subleased the house to C who used it as a warehouse for
fabrics. Upon learning this. A demanded that C stop using the house as a warehouse, but
C ignored the demand. A then filed an action for ejectment against C. who raised the
defense that there is no privity of contract between him and A, and that he has not been
remiss in the payment of rent. Will the action prosper? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper. Under Article 1651 of the Civil Code, the sublessee is bound to
the lessor for all acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner
stipulated between the lessor and the lessee.
III.
(a)

May a lessee sublease the property leased without the consent of the lessor, and what
are the respective liabilities of the lessee and sub-lessee to the lessor in case of such
sublease? (3%)

(b)

Under what circumstances would an implied new lease of a tacita reconduccion

arise? (2%) (1999 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, provided that there is no express prohibition against subleasing. Under the law,
when in the contract of lease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the
thing leased without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the
lessor. (Art. 1650)

In case there is a sublease of the premises being leased, the sublessee is bound to the lessor
for all the acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner stipulated
between the lessor and the lessee. (Art. 1651)
The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However,
the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of the rent due from him. (Art. 1652)
As to the lessee, the latter shall still be responsible to the lessor for the rents; bring to the
knowledge of the lessor every usurpation or untoward act which any third person may have
committed or may be openly preparing to carry out upon the thing leased; advise the owner the
need for all repairs; to return the thing leased upon the termination of the lease just as he received
it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time or by ordinary wear and tear or from an
inevitable cause; responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that
it took place without his fault.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion arises if at the end of the contract the
lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor,
and unless a notice to the contrary by either parties has previously been given (Art. 1670). In
short, in order that there may be tacita reconduccion there must be expiration of the contract;
there must be continuation of possession for15 days or more; and there must be no prior demand
to vacate.
(b)

IV. A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. The lease contract did not contain
any express prohibition against the assignment of the leasehold or the subleasing of the
leased premises. During the third year of the lease, B subleased the land to C. In turn, C,
without As consent, assigned the sublease to D. A then filed an action for the rescission
of the contract of lease on the ground that B has violated the terms and conditions of the
lease agreement. If you were the judge, how would you decide the case, particularly with
respect to the validity of:
(a) Bs sublease to C? and
(b) C's assignment of the sublease to D?

Explain your answer. (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Bs sublease to C is valid. Although the original period of two years for the lease contract

has expired, the lease continued with the acquiescence of the lessor during the third year. Hence,
there has been an implied renewal of the contract of lease. Under Art. 1650 of the Civil Code, the
lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, when the contract of lease does not contain
any express prohibition. (Articles 1650, 1670 Civil Code). As action for rescission should riot
prosper on this ground.
(b) Cs assignment of the sublease to D is not valid. Under Art. 1649, of the Civil Code, the
lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary. There is no such stipulation in the contract. If the law prohibits assignment of the lease
without the consent of the lessor, all the more would the assignment of a sublease be prohibited
without such consent. This is a violation of the contract and is a valid ground for rescission by A.

IV. Rights and Obligations of Lessor and Lessee

I.

Multiple choice.

A had a 4-storey building which was constructed by Engineer B. After five years, the
building developed cracks and its stairway eventually gave way and collapsed, resulting to
injuries to some lessees. Who should the lessees sue for damages? (1%) (2010 Bar Question)
1.
2.
3.

A, the owner
B, the engineer
both A & B

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3.

Both A & B.

The lessee may proceed against A for breach of contract, and against B for tort or statutory
liability.
Under Article 1654 (2, of the) New Civil Code, the lessor is obliged to make all the necessary
repairs in order to keep the leased property suitable for the use to which it has been devoted.
Consequently, under Article 1659 NCC, the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it is due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Under Article 1723 NCC, the engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications
for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion of the structure, the
same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects
in the ground. This liability may be enforced against the architect or engineer even by a third party
who has no privity of contract with the architect or engineer under Article 2192 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 1. A, the owner.
The lessee can sue only the lessor for breach of contract under Article 1659 in relation to
Article 1654 NCC. The lessee cannot sue the architect or the engineer because there was no privity
of contract between them. When sued, however, the lessor may file a third party claim against the
architect or the engineer.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. B, the Engineer.
Under Article 1723 (NCC), the engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications
for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion of the structure, the
same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in
the ground. Under Article 2192 (NCC), however, if the damages should be the result of any of the
defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723 (NCC), the third person suffering damages
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor within the period fixed therein.
The damages suffered by the lessee in the problem are clearly those resulting from defects in the
construction plans or specifications.

II. Jude owned a building which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing his
tenants, Jude sold the building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the
tenants that he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso ordered the tenants to
vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for
the building. The tenants refused to vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the
term of their lease shall have expired. Is Ildefonso bound to respect the lease contracts
between Jude and his tenants? Explain your answer. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ildefonso must respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants. While it is true
that the said lease contracts were not registered and annotated on the title to the property,
Ildefonso is still not an innocent purchaser for value. He ought to know the existence of the lease
because the building was already occupied by the tenants at the time he bought it. Applying the
principle of caveat emptor, he should have checked and known the status of the occupants or
their right to occupy the building before buying it.
III. Dux leased his house to Iris for a period of 2 years, at the rate of P25,000.00 monthly,
payable annually in advance. The contract stipulated that it may be renewed for
another2-year period upon mutual agreement of the parties. The contract also granted
Iris the right of first refusal to purchase the property at any time during the lease, if Dux
decides to sell the property at the same price that the property is offered for sale to a
third party. Twenty-three months after execution of the lease contract, Dux sold the
house to his mother for P2 million. Iris claimed that the sale was a breach of her right of
first refusal. Dux said there was no breach because the property was sold to his mother
who is not a third party. Iris filed an action to rescind the sale and to compel Dux to sell
the property to her at the same price. Alternatively, she asked the court to extend the
lease for another 2 years on the same terms.
x
x
x
b) Will the alternative prayer for extension of the lease prosper? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the extension of the lease should be upon the mutual agreement of the parties.
IV. Alberto and Janine migrated to the United States of America, leaving behind their 4
children, one of whom is Manny. They own a duplex apartment and allowed Manny to
live in one of the units. While in the United States, Alberto died. His widow and all his
children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Albertos estate wherein the 2-door
apartment was assigned by all the children to their mother, Janine. Subsequently, she
sold the property to George. The latter required Manny to sign a prepared Lease
Contract so that he and his family could continue occupying the unit. Manny refused to
sign the contract alleging that his parents allowed him and his family to continue
occupying the premises.
If you were Georges counsel, what legal steps will you take? Explain. 5% (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As Georges counsel, I will give Manny a written demand to vacate within a definite period,
say 15 days. After the lapse of 15-day period, I will file an action for unlawful detainer to recover
the possession of the apartment from Manny. Mannys occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance of his parents. When all the co-heirs/co-owners assigned the 2-door apartment to Janine
in the extrajudicial partition, Janine became the sole owner of the same. He continued to occupy it
under the same familial arrangement. Upon the sale of the property to George, Mannys lawful
occupation of the property was terminated and Mannys refusal to sign the lease contract and to
vacate the premises after the period to vacate lapsed made his occupation unlawful, hence,
entitling George to the remedy of unlawful detainer.
V. On January 1, 1980, Nestor leased the fishpond of Mario for a period of three years at a
monthly rental of P1,000.00, with an option to purchase the same during the period of
the lease for the price of P500.000.00. After the expiration of the three-year period,
Mario allowed Nestor to remain in the leased premises at the same rental rate. On June
15, 1983, Nestor tendered the amount of P500,000.00 to Mario and demanded that the
latter execute a deed of absolute sale of the fishpond in his favor. Mario refused, on the
ground that Nestor no longer had an option to buy the fishpond. Nestor filed an action for
specific performance. Will the action prosper or not? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the action will not prosper. The implied renewal of the lease on a month-to-month basis
did not have the effect of extending the life of the option to purchase which expired at the end of the
original lease period. The lessor is correct in refusing to sell on the ground that the option had
expired.
VI. Stating briefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the
death (a) of the lessee extinguish the lease agreement? (1997 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. The death of the lessee will not extinguish the lease agreement, since lease is not personal
in character and the right is transmissible to the heirs. (Heirs of Dimaculangan vs. LAC, 170 SCRA
393).
VII. In January 1993, Four-Gives Corporation leased the entire twelve floors of the GQS
Towers Complex, for a period of ten years at a monthly rental of P3,000,000.00. There is
a provision in the contract that the monthly rentals should be paid within the first five
days of the month. For the month of March, May, June, October and December 1993, the
rentals were not paid on time with some rentals being delayed up to ten days. The delay
was due to the heavy paper work involved in processing the checks.
Four-Gives Corporation also subleased five of the twelve floors to wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The lease contract expressly prohibits the assignment of the lease contract
or any portion thereof. The rental value of the building has' increased by 50% since its
lease to Four-Gives Corporation.
1)

Can the building owner eject Four-Gives Corporation on grounds of the repeated

2)

delays in the payment of the rent?

Can the building owner ask for the cancellation of the contract for violation of the
provision against assignment? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) a) The repeated delays" in the payment of rentals would, at best, be a slight or casual
breach which does not furnish a ground for ejectment especially because the delays were only due
to heavy paper work. Note that there was not even a demand for payment obviously because the
delay lasted for only-a few days (10 days being the longest), at the end of which time payments
were presumably made and were accepted. There was, therefore, no default. Note also that there
was no demand made upon the lessee to vacate the premises for non-payment of the monthly rent.
-There is. Therefore no cause of action for ejectment arising from the repeated delays.
b) The building owner cannot eject Four-Gives Corporation on the ground of repeated delays in
the payment of rentals. The delay in the payment of the rentals is minimal and cannot be made the
basis of an ejectment suit. The delay was due to the heavy paper work involved in processing the
checks. It would be otherwise if the lease contract stated that in the payment of rentals within the
first five days of the month, time is of the essence or that the lessee will be in delay if he fails to pay
within the agreed period without need of demand. In this case he can judicially eject the tenant on
the ground of lack of payment of the price stipulated after a demand to vacate. (Article 1673(2),
New Civil Code).
c) No. Resolution of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only
for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement. (Zepeda v. CA, 216 SCRA 293). The delay of ten (10) days is not such a
substantial and fundamental breach to warrant the resolution of the contract of lease specially so
when the delay was due to the heavy paperwork in processing the checks.
2) a) No. Sublease is different from assignment of lease. Sublease, not being prohibited by the
contract of lease is therefore allowed and cannot be invoked as a ground to cancel the lease.

b) No, the lessor cannot have the lease cancelled for alleged violation of the provision against
assignment. The lessee did not assign the lease, or any portion thereof, to the subsidiaries. It merely
subleased some floors to its subsidiaries. Since the problem does not state that the contract of lease
contains a prohibition against sublease, the sublease is lawful, the rule being that in the absence of
an express prohibition a lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to
his/its responsibility to the lessor for the performance of the contract.
VIII. A is the owner of a lot on which he constructed a building in the total cost of
P10,000,000.00. Of that amount B contributed P5,000,000.00 provided that the building
as a whole would be leased to him (B) for a period of ten years from January 1, 1985 to
December 31, 1995 at a rental of P10,000.00 a year. To such condition, A agreed. On
December 20. 1990, the building was totally burned. Soon thereafter, As workers
cleared the debris and started construction of a new building. B then served notice upon
A that he would occupy the building being constructed upon completion, for the
unexpired portion of the lease term, explaining that he had spent partly for the
construction of the building that was burned. A rejected Bs demand.
Did A do right in rejecting Bs demand? (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, A was correct in rejecting the demand of B. As a result of the total destruction of the
building by fortuitous event, the lease was extinguished. (Art. 1655, Civil Code.)
IX. A vacant lot several blocks from the center of the town was leased by its owner to a
young businessman B. for a term of fifteen (15) years renewal upon agreement of the
parties. After taking possession of the lot, the lessee built thereon a building of mixed
materials and a store. As the years passed, he expanded his business, earning more
profits. By the tenth (10th) year of his possession, he was.able to build a three (3)- storey
building worth at least P300,000.00. Before the end of the term of the lease, B negotiated
with the landowner for its renewal, but despite their attempts to do so, they could not
agree on the new conditions for the renewal. Upon the expiration of the term of the
lease, the landowner asked B to vacate the premises and remove his building and other
improvements. B refused unless he was reimbursed for necessary and useful expenses. B
claimed that he was a possessor and builder in good faith, with right of retention. This
issue is now before the court for resolution in a pending litigation.
a) What are the rights of B?
b) What are the rights of the landowner? (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B has the right to remove the building and other improvements unless the landowner
decides to retain the building at the time of the termination of the lease and pay the lessee one-half
of the value of the improvements at that time. The lessee may remove the building even though the
principal thing may suffer damage but B should not cause any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary. The claim of B that he was a possessor and builder in good faith with the
right of retention is not tenable. B is not a builder in good faith, because as lessee he does not claim
ownership over the property leased.
a)

The landowner/lessor may refuse to reimburse 1 /2 of the value of the improvements and
require the lessee to remove the improvements. (Article 1678, Civil Code).
b)

X. Fred sold to Juan a parcel of land, belonging to his minor son, Lino, then under his
guardianship, without judicial approval. After the sale, Juan immediately took possession of the land, built a house and religiously paid the taxes thereon. Nine years
thereafter, Lino, no longer a minor, rented the ground floor of the house built by Juan.
Lino paid the rent for the first month, then stopped paying. Two years thereafter, when
pressed for payment of the accrued rent, Lino refused, claiming ownership over the
property, alleging that the sale of the property to Juan while he was a minor without the
approval of the guardianship court rendered the sale null and void.
Is the claim of Lino valid and meritorious? Explain. (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Linos claim is not valid and not meritorious because Lino is in estoppel. A lessee cannot
assail the right and title of the lessor and cannot claim ownership as against the lessor. The fact

that the sale was made while Lino was a minor is of no moment because he recognized and
ratified the contract after he was already of majority age.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Linos claim is not valid and not meritorious because Juan had already become the owner
of the land by ordinary acquisitive prescription through adverse possession of the land for over
ten (10) years.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, Lino's claim is not valid and not meritorious. Lino can no longer recover the land because
of laches.
V. Special Rules for Lease of Rural/Urban Lands
I.

In 1995, Mark leased the rice land of Narding in Nueva Ecija for an annual rental of
P1,000.00 per hectare. In 1998, due to the El Nino phenomenon, the rice harvest fell to
only 40% of the average harvest for the previous years. Mark asked Narding for a
reduction of the rental to P500.00 per hectare for that year but the latter refused. Is
Mark legally entitled to such reduction? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mark is not entitled to a reduction. Under Article 1680 of the Civil Code, the lessee of a
rural land is entitled to a reduction of the rent only in case of loss of more than 1/2 of the fruits
through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events. While the drought brought about by the
El Nino" phenomenon may be classified as extraordinary, it is not considered as unforeseen.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mark is entitled to a reduction of the rent. His loss was more than 1 /2 of the fruits and
the loss was due to an extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous event. The El Nino" phenomenon is
extraordinary because it is uncommon; it does not occur with regularity. And neither could the
parties have foreseen its occurrence. The event should be foreseeable by the parties so that the
lessee can change the time for his planting, or refrain from planting, or take steps to avoid the loss.
To be foreseeable, the time and the place of the occurrence, as well as the magnitude of the adverse
effects of the fortuitous event must be capable of being predicted. Since the exact place, the exact
time, and the exact magnitude of the adverse effects of the El Nino" phenomenon are still
unpredictable despite the advances in science, the phenomenon is considered unforeseen.
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
I.

Torrens System

I.

Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all their
legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the
situation, Atty. Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the
couples property in Quezon City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the
property in his name. Subsequently, Atty. Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built

an auto repair shop on the property. In 2004, Luis registered the deed of conveyance,
and title over the property was transferred in his name.
In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and
discovered what had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer.
What action or actions will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully.
(4%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will institute the following actions against Atty. Tan:
(a) A civil action for damages for the fraudulent transfer of the title in his name and to

recover the value of the property;

(b) An action against the National Treasurer for compensation from the State Assurance

Fund which is set aside by law to pay those who lose their land or suffer damages as a
consequence of the operation of the Torrens system;
(c) A criminal action for forgery or falsification of public document;
(d) A complaint with the Supreme Court/Integrated Bar of the Philippines to disbar or
suspend him or other disciplinary action for violation or the Code of Professional Ethics.
Any action against Luis will not prosper because he is an innocent purchaser for value. The
Title to the land he bought was already in the name of the person who sold the property to him
and there is nothing on the title which will make him suspect about the fraud committed by Atty.
Tan.
II. The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks of the
Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and as the water
recedes, soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on Jessicas and Jennys
properties. This pattern of the river swelling, receding and depositing soil and other
materials being deposited on the neighbors properties have gone on for many years.
Knowing this pattern, Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters from her
property line and extending towards the river, so that when the water recedes, soil
and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After several years, the area
between Jessicas property line to the concrete barrier was completely filled with soil,
effectively increasing Jessicas property by 2 meters. Jennys property, where no
barrier was constructed, also increased by one meter along the side of the river.
x
x
x
d) If Jessicas and Jennys properties are registered, will the benefit of such
registration extend to the increased area of their properties? (2%) (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the registration of Jessicas and Jennys adjoining property does not automatically
extend to the accretions. They have to bring their lands under the operation of the Torrens system
of land registration following the procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1529.
e) Assume the two properties are on a cliff adjoining the shore of Laguna Lake. Jessica
and Jenny ha hotel built on the properties. They had the earth and rocks excavated

from the properties dumped on the adjoining shore, giving rise to a new patch of
dry land. Can they validly lay claim to the patch of land? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jessica and Jenny cannot validly lay claim to the price of dry land that resulted from
the dumping of rocks and earth materials excavated from their properties because it is a
reclamation without authority. The land is part of the lakeshore, if not the lakebed, which is
inalienable land of the public domain.
III. Juliet offered to sell her house and lot, together with all the furniture and appliances
therein, to Dehlma. Before agreeing to purchase the property, Dehlma went to the
Register of Deeds to verify Juliets title. She discovered that while the property was
registered in Juliets name under the Land Registration Act, as amended by the Property
Registration Decree, it was mortgaged to Elaine to secure a debt of P80,000. Wanting to
buy the property, Dehlma told Juliet to redeem the property from Elaine, and gave her an
advance payment to be used for purposes of releasing the mortgage on the property.
When the mortgage was released, Juliet executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds, and a new TCT was
issued in Dehlmas name. Dehlma immediately took possession over the house and lot
and the movables therein Thereafter, Dehlma went to the Assessors Office to get a new
tax declaration under her name. She was surprised to find out that the property was
already declared for tax purposes in the name of XYZ Bank which had foreclosed the
mortgage on the property before it was sold to her. XYZ Bank was also the purchaser in
the foreclosure sale of the property. At that time the property was still unregistered but
XYZ Bank registered the Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in the day book of the Register of
Deeds under Act. 3344 and obtained a tax declaration in its name.
a)

Was Dehlma a purchaser in good faith? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Dehlma is a purchaser in good faith. She learned about the XYZ tax declaration and
foreclosure sale only after the sale to her was registered. She relied on the certificate of title of her
predecessor-in-interest. Under the Torrens system, a buyer of registered lands is not required by
law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate indicates on its face. If a person proceeds to
buy it relying on the title, that person is considered a buyer in good faith.
The priority in time rule could not be invoked by XYZ Bank because the foreclosure sale of
the land in favor of the bank was recorded under Act No. 3344, the law governing transactions
affecting unregistered land, and thus, does not bind the land.
b)

Who as between Dehlma and XYZ Bank has a better right to the house and lot? (2%)
(2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Between Dehlma and the bank, the former has a better right to the house and lot.
IV. X constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from Y. Later, X executed a chattel

mortgage over said house in favor of Z as security for a loan obtained from the latter.
Still later, X acquired ownership of the land where his house was constructed, after
which he mortgaged both house and land in favor of a bank, which mortgage was
annotated on the Torrens Certificate of Title. When X failed to pay his loan to the bank,
the latter, being the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage and
acquired Xs house and lot. Learning of the proceedings conducted by the bank, Z is now
demanding that the bank reconvey to him Xs house or pay Xs loan to him plus interests.
Is Zs demand against the bank valid and sustainable? Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand is not valid. A building is immovable or real property whether it is erected by the
owner of the land, by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated as a movable by the parties
to a chattel mortgage but such is binding only between them and not on third parties (Evangelista
v. Alto Surety Co., Inc., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]). In this case, since the bank is not a party to the chattel
mortgage, it is not bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the chattel mortgage does not exist.
Moreover, the chattel mortgage is void because it was not registered. Assuming that it is valid, it
does not bind the Bank because it was not annotated on the title of the land mortgaged to the bank.
Z cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to X, because the Bank was not privy
to such loan transaction.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand against the bank is not valid. His demand that the bank reconvey to him Xs
house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a personal right against
X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as movable property is void insofar
as third persons, such as the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the Bank already had a real
right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated at the back of the Torrens title. The
bank later became the owner in the foreclosure sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for Xs loan plus interest. There is no privity of contract
between Z and the bank.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an innocent mortgagee in good faith or a
mortgagee in bad faith. In the former case, Zs demand is not valid. In the latter case, Zs demand
against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Under the Torrens system of land registration, every person dealing with registered land
may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige him
to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to determine the condition of the title. He is not
bound by anything not annotated or reflected in the certificate. If he proceeds to buy the land or
accept it as a collateral relying on the certificate, he is considered a buyer ora mortgagee in good
faith. On this ground, the Bank acquires a clean title to the land and the house.
However, a bank is not an ordinary mortgagee. Unlike private individuals, a bank is

expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings. The ascertainment of the
condition of a property offered as collateral for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part
of its operation. The bank should have conducted further inquiry regarding the house standing
on the land considering that it was already standing there before X acquired title to the land. The
bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, Z's demand against the
Bank is valid and sustainable.
V. Way back in 1948, Windas husband sold in favor of Verde Sports Center Corp. (Verde) a
10-hectare property belonging to their conjugal partnership. The sale was made without
Winda's knowledge, much less consent. In 1950, Winda learned of the sale, when she
discovered the deed of sale among the documents in her husbands vault after his
demise. Soon after, she noticed that the construction of the sports complex had started.
Upon completion of the construction in 1952, she tried but failed to gel free membership
privileges in Verde.
Winda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment of the sale on the ground that
she did not consent to the sale, in answer, Verde contends that, in accordance with the
Spanish Civil Code which was then in force, the sale in 1948 of the property did not need
her concurrence. Verde contends that in any case the action has prescribed or is barred
by laches. Winda rejoins that her Torrens title covering the property is indefeasible, and
imprescriptible.
A.
B.

Define or explain the term laches (2%)

Decide the case, stating your reasons for your decision. (3%) (2002 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Laches means failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
what, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. (De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 624 [1999])
B. While Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code did not require the consent of the wife for the
validity of the sale, an alienation by the husband in fraud of the wife is void as held in Uy Coque v.
Navas, 45 Phil. 430 (1923). Assuming that the alienation in 1948 was in fraud of Winda and,
therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the action to set aside the sale, nonetheless, is already
barred by prescription and laches. More than 52 years have already elapsed from her discovery of
the sale in 1950.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B. Windas claim that her Torrens Title covering the property is indefeasible and
imprescriptible [does not hold water] is not tenable. The rule of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title
means that after one year from the date of Issue of the decree of registration or if the land has fallen
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the title becomes incontestable and
incontrovertible. Imprescriptibility, on the other hand, means that no title to the land in derogation
of that of the registered owner may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive prescription
or that the registered owner does not lose by extinctive prescription his right to recover ownership
and possession of the land.

The action in this case is for annulment of the sale executed by the husband over a conjugal
partnership property covered by a Torrens Title. Actions on contracts are subject to prescription.
VI. Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of land. Sancho sold the property to Bart.
Pacifico sued Sancho and Bari for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the
property based on the fact that the sale included his one-half pro-indiviso share. Pacifico
had a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title covering the property. After trial, the
court declared Bart the owner of the property and ordered the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens could not be cancelled immediately because the
title over the property was with a bank to which the property had been mortgaged by
Bart Pacifico appealed the case. While the appeal was pending and with the notice of lis
pendens still uncancelled, Bart sold the property to Carlos, who immediately caused the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as the issuance of a new title in his name.
Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b) a transferee pendente lite? If your
answer is (a), how can the right of Pacifico as co-owner be protected? Explain. (5%)
(2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis penden swas still annotated at the back of the
title at the time he bought the land from Bart. The uncancelled notice of lis pendens operates as
constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or equitable, included therein. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.

In an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an adverse claim remains effective and binding
notwithstanding the lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry. This ruling is even
more applicable in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as Sanchos share in the co-ownership in the land
is concerned because the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the appeal.
Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his appeal; asking the Court of
Appeals to order the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos', and by invoking his right
of redemption of Barts share under Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
B.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.

Carlos is a purchaser in good faith.

A possessor in good faith has been defined as one who is unaware that there exists a flaw
which invalidates his acquisition of the thing (Art 526, NCC). Good faith consists in the possessors
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could
convey his title. In the case [at bar], in question, while Carlos bought the subject property from Bart
while a notice of lis pendens was still annotated thereon, there was also an existing court order
cancelling the same. Hence, Carlos cannot be considered as being "aware of a flaw which invalidates
[their] the acquisition of the thing since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already
being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, Carlos can already be
considered a buyer in good faith. (Po Lam v. Court of appeals, 347 SCRA 86, [2000]).

B.
To protect his right over the subject property, Pacifico should have timely filed an action for
reconveyance and reinstated the notice of lis pendens.

VII. Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise Co. and paid the price in
full. He moved into the unit, but somehow he was not given the Condominium Certificate
of Title covering the property. Unknown to him. High Rise Co. subsequently mortgaged
the entire condominium building to Metrobank as security for a loan of P500 million.
High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the
foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the building, being the highest bidder. When Cesar
learned about this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was
concerned. The bank put up the defense that it relied on the condominium certificates of
title presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was a mortgagee and buyer
in good faith. Is this defense tenable or not? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Metrobanks defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent purchaser for value acquires a
good and a clean title to the property. However, It is settled that one who closes his eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an innocent purchaser for value. In the present
problem the bank is expected, as a matter of standard operating procedure, to have conducted an
ocular inspection, of the promises before granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow
this procedure, otherwise, it should have discovered that the condominium unit in question was
occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to make further inquiry. Under the
circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
VIII. Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for PI million payable in five (5) equal annual
installments. The sale was registered and title was issued in Carmen's name. Carmen
failed to pay the last three installments and Mario filed an. action for collection, damages
and attorneys fees against her. Upon filing of the complaint, he caused a notice of lis
pendens to be annotated on Carmen's title. Is the notice of lis pendens proper or not?
Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that the case filed by Mario against
Carmen is only for collection, damages, and attorneys fees.
Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases involving recovery of possession of real
property, or to quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or any other proceeding
affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not fall
on anyone of these.
IX. Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore
lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities.
Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty
Company, authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea bordering
the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate as compensation
for its services. The Solicitor General questioned the validity of the agreement on the
ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is beyond the commerce of
man. The City replies that this is authorized by R.A. 1899 because it authorizes the

construction of docks and harbors. Who is correct? (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim
land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land from the sea. The
reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed
land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is necessary in the construction of the
docks and the harbors, the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since RA 1899 authorized
the city to construct docks and harbors, all works that are necessary for such construction are
deemed authorized, including the reclamation of land from the sea. The reclamation being
authorized, the city is the owner of the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as
payment for the services of the contractor.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was entered into before RA 1899 was
repealed by PD 3-A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are beyond the commerce of
man in the sense that they are not susceptible of private appropriation, ownership or alienation.
The contract in question merely calls for the reclamation of 300 hectares of land within the coastal
waters of the city. Per se, it does not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land under the sea. The
city merely engaged the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
X. The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered land to A, delivering as well the OCT
to the latter, but they continued to possess and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of each
harvest to A in partial payment of their loan to the latter. A, however, without the
knowledge of X and Y, forged a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself, got a
TCT in his name, and then sold the land to B, who bought the land relying on As title, and
who thereafter also got a TCT in his name. It was only then that the spouses X and Y
learned that their land had been titled in Bs name. May said spouses file an action for
reconveyance of the land in question against b? Reason. (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land will not prosper because B has
acquired a clean title to the property being an innocent purchaser for value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the forged deed was
registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest upon A
ownership over the property of X and Y. The registration of the forged deed will not cure the
infirmity. However, once the title to the land is registered in the name of the forger and title to the
land thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter acquires a clean
title thereto. A buyer of a registered land is not required to explore beyond what the record in the
registry indicates on its face in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may
subsequently defeat his right thereto. This is the mirror principle of the Torrens system which
makes it possible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.

Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty of contributory negligence when they
delivered this OCT to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage thereon. Between them and
the innocent purchaser for value, they should bear the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the buyer B, who relied on the seller As title, was not aware of the adverse possession of
the land by the spouses X and Y, then the latter cannot recover the property from B. B has in his
favor the presumption of good faith which can only be overthrown by adequate proof of bad faith.
However, nobody buys land without seeing the property, hence, B could not have been unaware of
such adverse possession. If after learning of such possession, B simply closed his eyes and did
nothing about it, then the suit for reconveyance will prosper as the buyers bad faith will have
become evident.
XI. In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. Three years later, A sold
the homestead to B. A died in 1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the
homestead from B on the ground that its sale by their father to the latter is void under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law. B contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot
recover the homestead from him anymore because their action has prescribed and that
furthermore, A was in pari delicto. Decide. (5%) (1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the homestead patent, being in
violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception.
The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or inexistence of the contract and to
recover the land should be given due course.
Bs defense of prescription is untenable because an action which seeks to declare the nullity
or inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. (Article 1410; Banaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755)
On the other hand, Bs defense of pari delicto is equally untenable. While as a rule, parties
who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the principle that a transgressor
cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not apply to violations of Section 118 of the
Public Land Act because of the underlying public policy in the said Act to conserve the land which
a homesteader has acquired by gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his family.
In keeping with this policy, it has been held that one who purchases a homestead within the fiveyear prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has paid by filing a claim against the
estate of the deceased seller (Labrador vs. Delos Santos 66 Phil. 579) under the principle that no
one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. Applying the pari delicto rule to violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that the homesteader suffers the
loss of the fruits realized by the vendee who in turn forfeits the improvement that he has
introduced into the land. (Obot vs. Sandadillas, 62 OG, April 25, 1966)
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The action to declare the nullity of the sale did not prescribe (Art. 1410), such sale being one
expressly prohibited and declared void by the Public Lands Act [Art. 1409, par. (7)]. The
prohibition of the law is clearly for the protection of the heirs of A such that their recovering the
property would enhance the public policy regarding ownership of lands acquired by homestead
patent (Art. 1416). The defense of pari delicto is not applicable either, since the law itself allows
the homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has been sold.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a void contract a nullity (Article
1410). Neither is the doctrine of pari delicto applicable because of public policy. The law is
designed for the protection of the plaintiff so as to enhance the public policy of the Public Land Act
to give land to the landless.
If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be on the ground of laches inasmuch as 40
years had elapsed and the owner had not brought any action against B especially if the latter had
improved the land. It would be detrimental to B if the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
XII. Juan and his sister Juana inherited from their mother two parcels of farmland with
exactly the same areas. For convenience, the Torrens certificates of title covering both
lots were placed in Juans name alone. In 1996, Juan sold to an innocent purchaser one
parcel in its entirety without the knowledge and consent of Juana, and wrongfully kept
for himself the entire price paid.
1. What rights of action, if any, does Juana have against and/or the buyer? (3%)
2. Since the two lots have the same area, suppose Juana files a complaint to have
herself declared sole owner of the entire remaining second lot, contending that her
brother had forfeited his share thereof by wrongfully disposing of her undivided
share in the first lot, will the suit prosper? (2%) (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. When, for convenience, the Torrens title to the two parcels of land were placed in Juan's
name alone, there was created an implied trust (a resulting trust) for the benefit of Juana with Juan
as trustee of one-half undivided or ideal portion of each of the two lots. Therefore, Juana can file an
action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the two parcels which he partly
held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of her
share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral shock and wounded
feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage fey way of example for the common good, and
attorneys fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good
faith, relying on the transfer certificate of title showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
1. Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, Juana can file an action for quieting of title as there is a
cloud in the title to the subject real property. Second, Juana can also file an action for damages
against Juan, because the settled rule is that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property
who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages

against those who caused or employed the same. Third, since Juana had the right to her share in the
property by way of Inheritance, she can demand the partition of the thing owned in common,
under Article 494 of the Civil Code, and ask that the title to the remaining property be declared as
exclusively hers.
However, since the farmland was sold to an innocent purchaser for value, then Juana has no
cause of action against the buyer consistent with the established rule that the rights of an innocent
purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud employed by the
seller in securing his title. (Eduorte vs. CA, 253 SCRA 391)
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
1. Juana has the right of action to recover (a) her one-half share in the proceeds of the sale
with legal interest thereof, and (b) such damages as she may be able to prove as having been
suffered by her, which may include actual or compensatory damages as well as moral and
exemplary damages due to the breach of trust and bad faith (Imperial vs. CA, 259 SCRA65). Of
course, if the buyer knew of the co-ownership over the lot he was buying, Juana can seek (c)
reconvenyance of her one-half share instead but she must implead the buyer as codefendant and
allege his bad faith in purchasing the entire lot. Finally, consistent with the ruling in Imperial vs. CA,
Juana may seek instead (d) a declaration that she is now the sole owner of the entire remaining lot
on the theory that Juan has forfeited his one-half share therein.
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
1. Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the two
parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or compensatory
damage for the loss of her share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral
shock and wounded feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage by way of example for the
common good, and attorney's fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good
faith, relying on the transfer certificate showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Juana's suit to have herself declared as sole owner of the entire remaining area will not
prosper because while Juan's act in selling the other lot was wrongful, it did not have the legal
effect of forfeiting his share In the remaining lot. However, Juana can file an action against Juan for
partition or termination of the co-ownership with a prayer that the lot sold be adjudicated to Juan,
and the remaining lot be adjudicated and reconveyed to her.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
2. The suit will prosper, applying the ruling in Imperial vs. CA cited above. Both law and
equity authorize such a result, said the Supreme Court.
Strictly speaking, Juana's contention that her brother had forfeited his share in the second lot
is incorrect. Even if the two lots have the same area, it does not follow that they have the same
value. Since the sale of the first lot on the Torrens title in the name of Juan was valid, all that Juana
may recover is the value of her undivided interest therein, plus damages. In addition, she can ask

for partition or reconveyance of her undivided interest in the second lot, without prejudice to any
agreement between them that in lieu of the payment of the value of Juana's share in the first lot
and damages, the second lot be reconveyed to her.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
2. The suit will not prosper, since Juan's wrongful act of pocketing the entire proceeds of the
sale of the first lot is not a ground for divesting him of his rights as a co- owner of the second lot.
Indeed, such wrongdoing by Juan does not constitute, for the benefit of Juana, any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under Art. 712, Civil Code.
XIII. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 concerning adverse claims on registered
land, provides a 30-day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the date
of its registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a contract to sell was
registered on March 1, 1997 at the instance of the BUYER but on June 1, 1997, or after
the lapse of the 30-day period, a notice of levy on execution in favor of a JUDGMENT
CREDITOR was also registered to enforce a final Judgment for money against the
registered owner. Then, on June 15. 1997 there having been no formal cancellation of
his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER pays to the seller-owner the agreed purchase
price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the
notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name, the BUYER brings an action
against the JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such annotation, but the latter claims that
his lien is superior because it was annotated after the adverse claim of the BUYER had
ipso facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit prosper? [5%] (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated at the back of a title under
Section 70 of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it
ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property.
While the life of adverse claim is 30 days under P.D. 1529, it continuous to be effective until it is
canceled by formal petition filed with the Register of Deeds.
The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section 108 of P.D. 1529 considering
that the levy on execution cannot be enforced against the buyer whose adverse claim against the
registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy on execution.
XIV. In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land evidenced by a duly
executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the owners certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the day book and corresponding
fees were paid as evidenced by official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title
was issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in Robyns name was
temporarily misplaced after fire partly gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Meanwhile, the land had been possessed by Robyns distant cousin. Mikaelo, openly,
adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since 1960. It was only in April 1998
that Renren sued Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive
prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared owner of the land. Decide the case
by evaluating these defenses. (5%) (1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Renren's action to recover possession of the land will prosper. In 1965, after buying the
land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for registration together
with the owners duplicate copy of the title, and paid the corresponding registration fees. Under
Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to Renren is considered registered from the time the
sale was entered in the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Book).

For all legal Intents and purposes, Renren is considered the registered owner of the land.
After all, it was not his fault that the Registry of Deeds could not issue the corresponding transfer
certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription cannot be sustained. A Torrens title is imprescriptible.
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47. P.D. No. 1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe because
possession is just a necessary incident of ownership.
b) Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable. Renren bought the
land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it appears that it was only in
1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that he took the first step asserting his right to the
land. It was not even an action to recover ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary
standards, 33 years of neglect or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As often
held by the Supreme Court, the principle of imprescriptibility sometimes has to yield to the
equitable principle of laches which can convert even a registered land owner's claim into a stale
demand.

Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is concerned,
there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and possession of the land.
XV. Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Quezon City. One year
later Rachelle, the legitimate owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration
obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against Rommel for reconveyance and
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to
Rommel. Rommel now invokes the indefeasibility of his title considering that one year
has already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.
1.
2.

Will Rachelles suit for reconveyance prosper? Explain.

May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even before final judgment is
rendered? Explain. (1995 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. Yes, Rachelles suit will prosper because all elements for kn action for reconveyance are
present, namely:
a. Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same land.
b. Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c. The action was brought within the statutory period of four (4) years from discovery of

d.

the fraud and not later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of Rommels title.
Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

Rommel can invoke the indefeasibillty of his title if Rachelle had filed a petition to reopen or
review the decree of registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary action in personam for
reconveyance. In the latter action, indefeasibility is not a valid defense because, in filing such
action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn the indefeasibility of Rommels title. She is
only asking the court to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as the legitimate owner of the
land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in
whose name it is registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds the title in bad faith. [WaLstrom v. Mapa, Jr.,
(G.R. 38387. 29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D., Summary of SC Decisions, January to June, 1990.
p. 3591.
2. A notice of li spendens may be canceled even before final judgment upon proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse party or that the notice of
lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to be registered. (Section
77, P.D. No. 1529)

In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in question. It can be
said, therefore, that when she filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose was to protect her interest
in the land and not just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to record the lis pendens to protect her
interest because if she did not do it, there is a possibility that the land will fall into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value and in that event, the court loses control over the land making any
favorable judgment thereon moot and academic. For these reasons, the notice of lis pendens may
not be canceled.
XVI.
x
x
x
2) Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration from the system of recording of
evidence of title.
3) How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a parcel of land originally registered
under the Spanish Mortgage Law? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
2) a) The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to the
land. Thus, under this system what is entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a record of the owners
estate or interest in the land, unlike the system under the Spanish Mortgage Law or the system
under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act 3344 where only the
evidence of such title is recorded. In the latter system, what is recorded is the deed of conveyance
from hence the owner's title emanatedand not the title itself.

b) Torrens system of land registration is that which is prescribed in Act 496 (now PD 1529),
which is either judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of evidence of title is merely the
registration of evidence of acquisitions of land with the Register of Deeds, who annotates the same
on the existing title, cancels the old one and issues a new title based on the document presented for

registration.
3) a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by P.D. 892 on February 16,1976, all
lands covered by Spanish titles that were not brought under the torrens system within six (6)
months from the date thereof have been considered as unregistered private lands."

Thus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law
is now governed by the system of registration of transactions or instruments affecting
unregistered land under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No.
3344. Under this law, the instrument or transaction affecting unregistered land is entered in a
book provided for the purpose but the registration thereof, is purely voluntary and does not adversely affect third persons who have a better right.
b) By recording and registering with the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is
located, in accordance with Act 3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders of Spanish title to bring
the same under the Torrens System within 6 months from its effectivity on February 16, 1976.
XVII. Bruce as the registered owner, of a parcel of land with a building thereon and is in
peaceful possession thereof. He pays the real estate taxes and collects the rentals
therefrom. Later, Catalino, the only brother of Bruce, filed a petition where he,
misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Bruce and falsely alleging that the
certificate of title was lost, succeeded in obtaining a second owners duplicate copy of
the title and then had the same transferred in. his name through a simulated deed of sale
in his favor. Catalino then mortgaged the property to Desiderio who had the mortgage
annotated on the title. Upon learning of the fraudulent transaction, Bruce filed a
complaint against Catalino and Desiderio to have the title of Catalino and the mortgage
in favor of Desiderio declared null and void.
Will the complaint prosper, or will the title of Catalino and the mortgage to Desiderio
be sustained? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint for the annulment of Catalinos Title will prosper. In the first place, the second
owners copy of the title secured by him from the Land Registration Court is void ab initio, the
owner's copy thereof having never been lost let alone the fact that said second owners copy of the
title was fraudulently procured and improvidently issued by the Court. In the second place, the
Transfer Certificate of Title procured by Catalino is equally null and void, it having been issued on
the basis of a simulated or forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no
title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and void because the mortgagor is not the
owner of the mortgaged property. While it may be true that under the Mirror Principle" of the
Torrens System of Land Registration, a buyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears
on the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, is under no obligation
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the mortgagors title, this rule does not find
application in the case at hand because here, Catalinos title suffers from two fatal infirmities,
namely:
1. The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a simulated sale;
2. The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently procured or improvidently issued second
owner's copy, the real owners copy being still intact and in the possession of the true

owner, Bruce.
The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without prejudice to his right to go after
Catalino and/or the government for compensation from the assurance fund.
XVIII. In 1950s, the Government acquired a big landed estate in Central Luzon from the
registered owner for subdivision into small farms and redistribution of bona fide
occupants. F was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in. area. After
completion of the resurvey and subdivision. F applied to buy the said land in accordance
with the guidelines of the implementing agency. Upon full payment of the price in 1957,
the corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed in his favor and was registered,
and in 1961, a new title was issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the said land to X; and in
1965 X sold it to Y. New titles were successively issued in the names of the said
purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and Y and their titles, on
the ground that he (C) had been in actual physical possession of the land, and that the
sale to F and the subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground of fraud. Upon
motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding their defenses
of their being innocent purchasers for value, prescription and laches. Plaintiff appealed.
(a) Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your answer.
(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in filing the said action against

the defendants, would that change the result of the litigation? Explain. (1990 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled correctly in granting defendant's

motion to dismiss for the following reasons:

1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the land was aware of the fact that

C was the bona fide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate of title
may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y
who are innocent purchasers for value, render the latters titles indefeasible. A person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
and the law will not in any way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property in search for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may
later invalidate or diminish his right to the land. This is the mirror principle of the
Torrens System of land registration.
2.

The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more than ten (10) years from the
date of execution thereof in 1957, hence, it has long prescribed.

3.

Under Section 45 of Act 496, the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an
agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all his successors
in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land. A title under Act 496 is
indefeasible and to preserve that character, the title is cleansed anew with every transfer
for value. (De Jesus v. City of Manila: 29 Phil. 73; Laperal v. Citu of Manila, 62 Phil. 313,
Penullar v. PNB 120 SCRA 111).

(b) Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the outcome of the case so much because

of estoppel as an express provision in Section 45 of Act 496 and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1529 that a
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in pursuance thereof shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the national government and all branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application or notice, or not.
XIX. In I960, an unregistered parcel of land was mortgaged by owner O to M, a family
friend, as collateral for a loan. O acted through his attorney-in-fact, son S. who was duly
authorized by way of a special power of attorney, wherein O declared that he was the
absolute owner of the land, that the tax declarations/receipts were all issued in his
name, and that he has been in open, continuous and adverse possession in the concept of
owner.
As O was unable to pay back the loan plus interest for the past five (5) years, M had to
foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon issuance
of the sheriffs final deed of sale and registration in January, 1966, the mortgage
property was turned over to Ms possession and control. M has since then developed the
said property. In 1967, O died, survived by sons S and P.
In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary of his father O, son P filed a suit to
annul the mortgage deed and subsequent sale of the property, etc. on the ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in question was conjugal in nature actually
belonging, at the time of the mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share went
to their sons (S and P) and to O.
(a) Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription? Explain your answer.
(b) After the issuance of the sheriffs final deed of sale in 1966 in this case, assuming

that M applied for registration under the Torrens System and was issued a Torrens
Title to the said property in question, would that added fact have any significant
effect on your conclusion? State your reason. (1990 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by prescription because the wife had
only ten (10) years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the annulment of
the mortgage deed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO (a):
First Alternative Answer:
(a) The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a voidable contract since it involves a
conjugal partnership property. The action to annul the same instituted in 1977, or eleven years
after the execution of the sheriffs final sale, has obviously prescribed because:
1.

An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four (4)
years from the date of discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an action to recover
ownership, it must be reckoned from the date of execution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessors office for the purpose

of transferring the tax declaration, this being unregistered land, (Bael v. Intermediate
Appellate Court G. R. L- 74423 Jan.30. 1989 169 SCRA 617).
2. If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it would have

prescribed just the same because more than 10 years have already elapsed since the date
of the execution of the sale.
Second Alternative Answer:
(a) The action to recover has been barred by acquisitive prescription lii favor of M considering
that M has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10) years with a just title.
(b) If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more S and P could not recover because
if at all their remedies would be:
1.

A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can be availed of within one (1) year
from the entry thereof, but only upon the basis of actual fraud." There is no showing that
M committed actual fraud in securing his title to the land; or

2.

An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of the title in their favor. Again,
this remedy is available within four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud but
not later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of the title in the name of M.

XX. Spouses A and B are registered owners of lot 1 consisting of 20,000 square meters
while spouses C and D are owners of lot 2. These lots are separated by a river. For a
period of more than 40 years, the river overflowed its banks yearly and the property of
the spouses C and D gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current
of the river so that an alluvial deposit of 29,000 square meters was added to their lot,
11,000 square meters of which used to be part of lot 1. Spouses "A and B contend
that accretion should not extend to registered land because to allow the spouses C and
D to acquire title over the accretion will be in derogation of the indefeasibility of the
Torrens Title of spouses A and B. Is this contention correct? Explain. (1989 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of A and B is not correct because the registration under the Torrens Law
does not protect the owner against the diminution of his land through gradual changes due to the
effects of the current of the river. The accretion will benefit C and D.
XXI. Subsequent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a river, its area
was increased by accession. This additional area was not included in the technical
description appearing on the Torrens Certificate of Title having been acquired
subsequent to the registration proceedings. May such additional area be acquired by
third persons thru prescription? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Land Registration Law provides that no title in derogation of the registered owner may be
acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive possession. Since the law refers to registered lands,

the accession mentioned in this question may be acquired by a third person through adverse
possession or acquisitive possession.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the accession is manmade, then it cannot be considered as private property. It belongs to the
public domain, and, therefore, cannot be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive possession.
XXII. A is the owner of a registered land. The Torrens Title is entrusted to B, his clerk
secretary, who forges AY signature on a deed of sale of said land in his (Bs) favor. A
new title is issued in the name of B, upon registration. Does B have a valid title over
the land? If B sells the property to C, does the latter acquire a valid title over it? (1989
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title but it can be the root of a title. If title
to the land has been transferred to a party based upon a forged deed, and later on after the
issuance of such title the property is transferred to another who is an innocent purchaser for value,
then the latter acquires a valid title.
XXIII.

(b) Since 1935, Janice possessed alone a parcel of land which she co-owned with Lenny.

In 1970, with the knowledge of Lenny, Janice obtained a torrens title over the land in
her own name alone. On August 1, 1988, Lenny brought an action against Janice for
reconveyance of her share. Janice set up the defense of laches. Will the defense
prosper? Reasons. (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is submitted that the defense of laches will prosper. As held by the Supreme Court in
several notable decisions, in order that the doctrine of laches or stale demands can be applied, the
following elements must concur: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made arid for which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or
notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred (Miguel vs. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234).
All ot these elements are present in the instant case. As a matter of fact, the doctrine was applied to
a case wherein co-heir and another were able, through fraud, to register a tract of land in their
names. According to the Supreme Court, the action for reconveyance brought by the other co-heirs
more than twenty years later is now barred not only by extinctive prescription but also by laches.
(Fabian vs. Fabian, 22 SCRA 231).
XXIV.
(a) 1) Is title to registered land subject to prescription?

Explain your answer.

2)

How about the right of the registered owner to recover possession, is it equally
imprescriptible? Why? On the imprescriptibility of Torrens Title? Explain.

(b) In passing upon the registrability of a document sought to be registered, what formal

requisites is the Register of Deeds charged to determine, under his responsibility,

whether or not they have been complied with? (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) 1) No because under Section 47, P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of that

of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. A similar

provision is found in the Civil Code. The reason is that once a piece of land is registered under the
Torrens System, it operates as a notice to the whole world. All persons are bound by it. No one can
plead ignorance of the registration.
(2) The right to recover the land from another person holding it is equally imprescriptible, the
reason being that possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
(3) While a Torrens Title is imprescriptible, under certain exceptional circumstances, it may

yield to the equitable principle of laches. In other words, certain circumstances such as inaction or
utter neglect on the part of the owner and the intervention of rights by third parties may, for
reasons of equity, convert the claim of imprescriptibility into a stale demand. (Mejia vs. Gamponia,. 100 Phil. 277; Miguel vs. Catalino, G.R. L-23072, Nov. 29, 1968; Heirs of Batiog Lacarnen vs.
Heirs of Laruan, G.R. L-27058, July 31, 1985).
(b) To be registerable, a voluntary document affecting registered land must be sufficient in law.
(Section 51, P.D. 1529) Sufficiency refers to both substance and form. As to form, it is the RODs
responsibility to check such items as the full name and signature of vendor or grantor, the marital
consent of the wife if the land sold is conjugal, the full name, nationality, the civil status, the name
of spouse, if married, the resident and postal address of the grantee. If the grantee is a corporation,
the deed must be accompanied with the Articles of Incorporation, a board resolution authorizing
the corporation to buy and another resolution of the Board naming the corporate officer
authorized to execute and sign the contract. This is not to mention the proper observance of the
requirements in the acknowledgment portion of the deed.

II. Regalian Doctrine

I.

The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks of the
Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and as the water
recedes, soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on Jessicas and Jennys
properties. This pattern of the river swelling, receding and depositing soil and other
materials being deposited on the neighbors properties have gone on for many years.
Knowing this pattern, Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2 meters from her
property line and extending towards the river, so that when the water recedes, soil
and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After several years, the area
between Jessicas property line to the concrete barrier was completely filled with soil,
effectively increasing Jessicas property by 2 meters. Jennys property, where no
barrier was constructed, also increased by one meter along the side of the river.
x
x
x

c) Assume the two properties are on a cliff adjoining the shore of Laguna Lake. Jessica

and Jenny ha hotel built on the properties. They had the earth and rocks excavated
from the properties dumped on the adjoining shore, giving rise to a new patch of
dry land. Can they validly lay claim to the patch of land? (2%) (2008 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jessica and Jenny cannot validly lay claim to the price of dry land that resulted from
the dumping of rocks and earth materials excavated from their properties because it is a
reclamation without authority. The land is part of the lakeshore, if not the lakebed, which is
inalienable land of the public domain.
III. Citizenship Requirement
I.

In 1972, Luciano de la Cruz sold to Chua Chung Chun, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land in
Binondo, Chua died in1990 leaving behind his wife and three children, one of whom,
Julian is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Six years after Chua's death, the heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of estate, and the parcel of land was allocated to Julian. In 2007,
Luciano filed suit to recover the land he sold to Chua, alleging that the sale was void
because it contravened the Constitution which prohibits the sale of private lands to
aliens, Julian moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of pari delicto, laches and acquisitive
prescription. Decide the case with reasons. (4%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The case must be dismissed. Julian, who is a naturalized Filipino citizen and to whom the
property was allocated in an extra-judicial partition of the estate, is now the new owner of the
property. The defect in ownership of the property of Julian's alien father has already been cured by
its transfer to Julian. It has been validated by the transfer of the property to a Filipino citizen.
Hence, there is no more violation of the constitution because the subject real property is now
owned by a Filipino citizen (Halili v. CA 287 SCRA 465 [1998]). Further, after the lapse of 35 years,
laches has set in and the motion to dismiss may be granted, for the failure of Luciano to question
the ownership of Chua before its transfer to Julian.
II. In 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz, then Filipinos, bought a parcel of
unregistered land in the Philippines on which they built a house which became their
residence. In 1986, they migrated to Canada and became Canadian citizens.
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the Republic, for the registration of the
aforesaid land in their names. Should the application of the spouses de la Cruz be
granted over the Republics opposition? Why? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the application should be granted. As a rule, the Constitution prohibits aliens from
owning private lands in the Philippines. This rule, however, does not apply to the spouses Juan
and Juana de la Cruz because at the time they acquired ownership over the land, albeit imperfect,
they were still Filipino citizens. The application for registration is a mere confirmation of the
imperfect title which the spouses have already acquired before they became Canadian citizens.
(Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]).

IV. Original Registration

I.

Bedrock Land & Property Development Corp. is a development company engaged in

developing and selling subdivisions, condominium units and industrial estates. In order
to replenish its inventories, it embarked on an aggressive land banking program. It
employed scouts who roam all over the Philippines to look for and conduct
investigations on prospective sites for acquisition and development, whether developed,
semi-developed or raw land. The management of Bedrock asks you as the company
counsel to prepare a manual containing a summary of the pertinent laws and
regulations relating to land registration and acquisition of title to land. The manual
should include the following items:
(a)

What is the governing law? (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The governing law is the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration
Decree (Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529).
[Note: It is respectfully recommended that full credit be given to examinees who did not
give the exact title or number of the law but merely stated a description of the law.]
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In general, the governing law relating to registration and acquisition of title to land is Act 496
of 1902 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree of
June 11, 1978.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

Chapter III-I governs original registration of land title under the Torrens System by
voluntary or ordinary judicial proceedings.
Chapter II-II governs compulsory registration of lands through cadastral proceedings.
Section 103 governs registration of homestead, sales or free patent under C.A. No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
Section 104 governs registration of certificates of land transfer, emancipation patents
and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) under the Comprehensive Land
Reform Law.
Chapter V governs the registration of voluntary dealings on registered land like
conveyances, transfers, mortgages, leases, powers of attorney, trusts and similar
contracts inter vivos.
Chapter V-II governs the registration of involuntary dealings on registered land like
attachments, adverse claims, enforcement of liens on registered land, notices of lis
pendens.
Chapter VI governs the registration of judgments, orders and partitions, condemnation in
eminent domain proceedings, judicial and extra-judicial settlement of estates.
Sections 107, 108 and 109, governs petitions and actions after original registration like:
a)
b)
c)

Compulsory surrender of withheld owners duplicate certificate of title;

Amendment and alteration of certificate of title;
Replacement of lost or destroyed owners duplicate certificate of title.

R.A. No. 26 governs judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed originals of the certificate
of title.
10. R.A. No. 6732 governs administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
certificates of title.
11. Section 113 governs the registration of instruments affecting unregistered private lands.
12. Section 117 governs consultas, where the Register of Deeds refuses to register a deed or
when he is in doubt as to what action to take on an instrument presented for registration.
9.

II. Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star hotel in New York, U.S.A.,
entrusted to his first-degree cousin Dewey an application for registration, under the
Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod City. A year later, Louie
returned to the Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained
an Original Certificate of Title over the property in his Deweys name. Compounding the
matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly
filed an action for reconveyance of the parcel of land against Huey.
(a) Is the action pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
(b) Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will the action prosper if the

case was filed beyond one year, but within ten years, from the entry of the decree
of registration? (2003 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy, because Huey is an
innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to go after Dewey for damages by
reason of the fraudulent registration and subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie
may file a claim against the Assurance Fund (Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro 324 SCRA 591 [2000]
citing Sps. Eduarte v. CA, 323 Phil. 462, 467 [1996]).
(b) Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten (10) years, not within one
(1) year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may be filed. The action for
reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of registration (Grey Alba v. De la
Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 [1910]). There is no need to reopen the registration proceedings, but the property
should just be reconveyed to the real owner.
The action for reconveyance is based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in
ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. This rule assumes that the
defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the land, the
action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which action is
imprescriptible (David v. Malay, 318 SCRA 711 [1999]).
III. Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a free
patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the basis of a
certification by the District Forester that the same is already alienable and disposable.
Moreover, Jorge had already registered the patent with the Register of Deeds of the
province, and he was issued an Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina filed an
action for annulment of Jorges title on the ground that it was obtained fraudulently. Will
the action prosper? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge's Original Certificate of Title will prosper on the
following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, foreshore
lands are disposable for residential, commercial, Industrial, or similar productive
purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the government for public service.
(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes, it comes under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and can only be
acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3) Free Patent is a mode of concession under Se ction 41, Chapter VII of the Public Land Act,
which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is already alienable and disposable"
simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the Bureau of
Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is already covered by a lease
contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab Initio, not only because the Bureau
has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also because of
the false statements made in his sworn application that he has occupied and cultivated
the land since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section 91 of the
Public Land Act, any patent, concession or title obtained thru false representation is void
ab initio. In cases of this nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment
proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a prayer for the reversion of the land
to the state. However, Regina is a party in interest and the case will prosper because she
has a lease contract for the same land with the government.
IV. On June 30. 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an application for registration of title to a
parcel of land under P. D. No. 1529, claiming that since June 12. 1945, he has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of said parcel of
land of the public domain which was alienable and disposable, under a bona fide claim of
ownership. After issuance of the notice of initial hearing and publication, as required by
law, the petition was heard on July 29, 1987. On the day of the hearing nobody but the
applicant appeared. Neither was there anyone who opposed the application. Thereupon,
on motion of the applicant, the RTC issued an order of general default and allowed the
applicant to present his evidence. That he did; On September 30, 1989, the RTC
dismissed As application for lack of sufficient evidence. A appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
The appellant urged that the RTC erred in dismissing his application for registration
and in not ordering registration of his title to the parcel of land in question despite the
fact that there was no opposition filed by anybody to his application.
Did the RTC commit the error attributed to it? (1993 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the RTC did not commit the error attributed to it. In an application for Judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to public agricultural land under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, the lack of opposition and the consequent order of default against those who did
not answer or show up on the date of Initial hearing, does not guarantee the success of the

application. It is still incumbent upon the applicant to prove with well nigh incontrovertible
evidence that he has acquired a title to the land that is fit for registration. Absent such registrable
title, it is the clear duty of the Land Registration Court to dismiss the application and declare the
land as public land.
An application for land registration is a proceeding in rem. Its main objective is to establish
the status of the res whether it is still part of our public domain as presumed under the Regalian
doctrine or has acquired the character of a private property. It is the duty of the applicant to
overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence.
V. What are the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or
review of a decree of registration? (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2) that he
has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one (1) year from th'e
issuance of the decree; and (4) that the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser (Rublico vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Libudan vs. Gil 45 SCRA 17).
OPTIONAL EXTENDED ANSWER:
Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A remedy expressly provided in Section 32
of P. D. No. 1529(formerly Section 38, Act 496), this remedy has the following elements:
a. The petition must be filed by a person claiming dominical or other real rights to the land
registered in the name of respondent.
b. The registration of the land in the name of respondent was procured by means of actual,
(not just constructive) fraud, which must be extrinsic, Fraud is actual if the registration
was made through, deceit or any other intentional act of downright dishonesty to enrich
oneself at the expense of another. It is extrinsic when it is something that was not raised,
litigated and passed upon in the main proceedings.
c. The petition must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the decree.
d. Title to the land has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value (Libudan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 27, 1972), Rublico vs. Orrelana, 30 SCRA 511, 1969); RP vs. CA, 57 G. R. No. 40402,
March 16, 1987).
The buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of land does not have to look beyond the torrens
title in search for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his
right to what he purchased (Lopez vs. CA, G. R. 49739, January 20, 1989).
V. Subsequent Registration
I.

Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an envelope containing TCT No. 65432
over a lot registered in Cesars name. Posing as Cesar, Rod forged Cesars signature on a
Deed of Sale in Rods favor. Rod registered the said document with the Register of Deeds,
and obtained a new title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Don, a buyer in good
faith and for value, who also registered the lot in his name.

a) Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Rod did not acquire title to the land covered by T .C. T. No. 65432of Cesar. A forged deed is
an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
b) Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Don acquired a good title to the land. Under the Torrens System, a forged deed can be the
root of a good title. Since the certificate of title was already transferred to Rod, upon the
subsequent transfer thereof to Don, an innocent purchaser in good faith, Don acquired a good title
to the land. The registration of the land in the name of Rod was conclusive notice to the whole
world. Persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens
title and to dispense with the need to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the
vendor appearing in the certificate in the absence of facts and circumstances what would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. This is the Mirror Principle of the Torrens system.
In an ejectment case filed by Don against Cesar, can the latter ask for the
cancellation of Dons title considering that he (Cesar) is the rightful owner of the lot?
Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
c)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Cesar cannot ask for cancellation of Don's title in the ejectment case filed by Don against
him. Under Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, a Torrens title shall not be
subject to collateral attack, it cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law. The ejectment proceeding does not provide the proper forum for the
cancellation of Dons title. While Cesars counterclaim for cancellation of Dons title may be
considered a direct attack, the same should nevertheless be denied on procedural grounds because
a Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court is without jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title.
II. JV, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to PP. But the deed of sale was not registered. One
year later, JV sold the parcel again to RR, who succeeded to register the deed and to
obtain a transfer certificate of title over the property in his own name.
Who has a better right over the parcel of land, RR or PP? Why? Explain the legal
basis for your answer. (5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on whether or not RR is an innocent purchaser for value.
Under the Torrens System, a deed or instrument operated only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make the registration. It is the
registration of the deed or the instrument that is the operative act that conveys or affects the
land. (Sec. 51, P.D. No. 1529).
In cases of double sale of titled land, it is a well-settled rule that the buyer who first registers
the sale in good faith acquires a better right to the land. (Art. 1544, Civil Code).
Persons dealing with property covered by Torrens title are not required to go beyond what

appears on its face. (Orquiola v. CA386, SCRA301, [2002]; Domingo v. Roces 401 SCRA 197,
[2003]). Thus, absent any showing that RR knew about, or ought to have known the prior sale of
the land to PP or that he acted in bad faith, and being first to register the sale, RR acquired a good
and a clean title to the property as against PP.
III. In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a Free Patent.over a parcel of agricultural
land with an area of 30 hectares, located in General Santos City. He presented the Free
Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was issued a corresponding Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 375. Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The deed of sale was
submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the basis thereof, OCT No. 375 was cancelled
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4576 was issued in the name of Eddie. In 1986,
the Director of Lands filed a complaint for annulment of OCT No. 375 and TCT No. 4576
on the ground that Nestor obtained the Free Patent through fraud. Eddie filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that he was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith
and as such, he has acquired a title to the property which is valid, unassailable and
indefeasible. Decide the motion. (5%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and T.C.T. No.
4576 should be denied for the following reasons:
1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value nor can he interpose the
defense of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a void title. Under Section 91 of
CA No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, statements of material facts in
the applications for public land must be under oath. Section 91 of the same act provides that such
statements shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of the concession, title, or permit
issued, any false statement therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of
the concession. The patent issued to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only because it was
obtained by fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far beyond the maximum of 24
hectares provided by the free patent law.

The government can seek annulment or the original and transfer certificates of title and the
reversion of the land to the state. Eddies defense is untenable. The protection afforded by the
Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for value can be availed of only if the land has been titled
thru judicial proceedings where the issue of fraud becomes academic after the lapse of one (1) year
from the issuance of the decree of registration. In public land grants, the action of the government
to annul a title fraudulently obtained does not prescribe such action and will not be barred by the
transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
2)

IV. In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land evidenced by a duly
executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the owners certificate
of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the day book and corresponding
fees were paid as evidenced by official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title
was issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in Robyns name was
temporarily misplaced after fire partly gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Meanwhile, the land had been possessed by Robyns distant cousin. Mikaelo, openly,
adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since 1960. It was only in April 1998
that Renren sued Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive

prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared owner of the land. Decide the case
by evaluating these defenses. (5%) (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Renren's action to recover possession of the land will prosper. In 1965, after buying the
land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for registration together
with the owners duplicate copy of the title, and paid the corresponding registration fees. Under
Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to Renren is considered registered from the time the
sale was entered in the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Book).

For all legal Intents and purposes, Renren is considered the registered owner of the land.
After all, it was not his fault that the Registry of Deeds could not issue the corresponding transfer
certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription cannot be sustained. A Torrens title is imprescriptible.
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47. P.D. No. 1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe because
possession is just a necessary incident of ownership.
b) Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable. Renren bought the
land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it appears that it was only in
1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that he took the first step asserting his right to the
land. It was not even an action to recover ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary
standards, 33 years of neglect or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As often
held by the Supreme Court, the principle of imprescriptibility sometimes has to yield to the
equitable principle of laches which can convert even a registered land owner's claim into a stale
demand.

Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is concerned,
there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and possession of the land.
VI. Non-registrable Properties
I.

Bedrock Land & Property Development Corp. is a development company engaged in

developing and selling subdivisions, condominium units and industrial estates. In order
to replenish its inventories, it embarked on an aggressive land banking program. It
employed scouts who roam all over the Philippines to look for and conduct
investigations on prospective sites for acquisition and development, whether developed,
semi-developed or raw land. The management of Bedrock asks you as the company
counsel to prepare a manual containing a summary of the pertinent laws and
regulations relating to land registration and acquisition of title to land. The manual
should include the following items:
x
x
x
(b) What properties are not registrable? Supply this information. (2007 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The following properties are not registrable:

1. Properties of the public dominion;
2. Properties for public use or public service;
3. Inalienable lands of the public domain;
4. Military installations, civil and quasi-public lands; and
5. All lands not classified as alienable and disposable.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Properties of public dominium intended for public use, like roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and the like, are
incapable of private appropriation, much less registration (Article 420, New\ Civil Code).
This includes public markets, public plazas, municipal streets and public buildings
(Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820 [1986]); Martinez vs. CA, 56 SCRA 647
[1974]; Navera v. Quicho, 5 SCRA 454 [1962]).
2. Lands proclaimed or classified as forest or timberland, mineral lands and national parks.
Under Section 2, Article XII, Constitution of the Philippines, these lands are inalienable.
3. Lands that have been reserved by law or Presidential proclamation for military, civil or for
public or quasi-public purpose. Under Section 88, Chapter XII of the Public Land Act, such
lands shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other
disposition.
4. In general, all lands of the public domain that have not been classified as alienable and
disposable under the Public Land Act.
5. Lands that form part of the seabed, riverbed or lakebed. These lands are not susceptible to
private appropriation.
6. Foreshore lands or that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide belong to the public domain, and
can only be acquired by lease if not needed by the government for public or quasi-public
purposes.
7. Lands reclaimed by the government from the sea, lakes or other bodies of water are
disposable or acquisible only by lease and not otherwise, under the Public Land Act.
VII. Dealings with Unregistered Lands
I.

Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the sea. The
land had been brought under the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano and his
family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river brought silt and sediment from
its source up in the mountains and forests so that gradually the land owned by Marciano
increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this additional area,
where he and his two married children live. On this same area. Ulpiano and his family
planted peanuts, mongo, beans and vegetables. Ulpiano also regular paid taxes on the
land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.
When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land he ordered Ulpiano to
demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the
harvest. Marciano claims that under the civil code, the alluvium belongs to him as a
registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his right is
enforceable against the whole world.
[a]

Is Marciano correct? Explain. (3%) (2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marciano's contention is correct. Since the accretion was deposited on his land by the action
of the waters of the river and he did not construct any structure to increase the deposition of soil ad
silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. His real right of ownership is enforceable against
the whole word including Ulpiano and his two married children. Although Marciano's land is
registered the 3 hectares land deposited through accretion was not automatically registered. As
unregistered land, it is subject to acquisitive prescription by third persons.
Although Ulpiano and his children live in the 3 hectare unregistered land owned by
Marciano, they are farmworkers; therefore they are possessors not in the concept of owners but in
the concept of more holders. Even if they possessed the land for more than 30 years, they cannot
become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitive prescription, because the law
requires possession in the concept of owner. Payment of taxes and tax declaration are not enough
to make their possession one in the concept of owner. They must repudiate the possession in the
concept of holder by executing unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to custer of Marciano,
known to Marciano and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then would his
possession become adverse.
II. A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary
between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B owned the adjoining parcel of
unregistered land on the Pangasinan side.
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a public instrument by A
and X. After X paid in full the price of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan
parcel in the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale executed by
A and X.
After twelve (12) years, a controversy arose between B andX on the issue of the
ownership of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B never
sold that parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel
by acquisitive prescription, because X possessed this parcel for over ten (10) years
under claim of ownership.
Decide on these claims, giving your reason. (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At this point in time, X cannot claim the right of vested ownership over the Pangasinan
parcel by acquisitive prescription. In addition to the requisites common to ordinary and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription consisting of uninterrupted, peaceful, public, adverse and
actual possession in the concept of owner, ordinary acquisitive prescription for ten (10) years
requires (1) possession in good faith and (2) just title. "Just title" means that the adverse claimant
came into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the
acquisition of ownership but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right (Art.
1129. Civil Code). In this case, there is no "just title" and no "mode" that can be invoked by X for the

acquisition of the Pangasinan parcel. There was no constructive delivery of the Pangasinan parcel
because it was not the subject-matter of the deed of sale. Hence, B retains ownership of the
Pangasinan parcel of land.
III. Maria Enriquez failed to pay the realty taxes on her unregistered agricultural land
located in Magdugo, Toledo City. In 1989, to satisfy the taxes due, the City sold it at public
auction to Juan Miranda, an employee at the Treasurers Office of said City, whose bid at
P10,000.00 was the highest. In due time, a final bill of sale was executed in his favor.
Maria refused to turn-over the possession of the property to Juan alleging that (1)
she had been, in the meantime, granted a free patent and on the basis thereof an Original
Certificate of Title was issued to her, and (2) the sale in favor of Juan is void from the
beginning in view of the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 which prohibits
officers and employees of the government from purchasing directly or indirectly any
property sold by the government for nonpayment of any tax, fee or other public charge.
(a) Is the sale to Juan valid? If so, what is the effect of the issuance of the Certificate of

Title to Maria?

(b) If the sale is void, may Juan recover the P 10,000.00? If not, why not?
(c) If the sale is void, did it not nevertheless, operate to divest Maria of her ownership?

If it did, who then is the owner of the property? (1991 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being contrary to law. Therefore, no transfer of

ownership of the land was effected from the delinquent taxpayer to him. The original certificates pf
title obtained by Maria thru a free patent grant from the Bureau of Lands (under Chapter VII, CA
141) is valid but in view of her delinquency, the said title is subject to the right of the City
Government to sell the land at public auction. The issuance of the OCT did not exempt the land
from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that every registered owner receiving a
Certificate of Title shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, subject to certain exemptions.
B. Juan may recover because he was not a party to the violation of the law.
C. No. the sale did not divest Maria of her title precisely because the sale is void. It is as good
as if no sale ever took place.

In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon award and issuance of a Certificate
of Sale, and finally after the lapse of the 1 year period from date of registration, to redeem, upon
execution by the treasurer of an instrument sufficient in form and effects to convey the property.
Maria remained owner of the land until another tax sale is to be performed in favor of a qualified
buyer.
IV. May the owner of a building constructed on an unregistered land belonging to another
apply for the registration of such building under the Land Registration Act and P.D.
1529? What should he do to protect his rights in case the owner of the land applied for
registration thereof? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Land Registration Act and PD 1529 apply to registration of land only. It may include the
building as an accessory but the building cannot be registered independently of the land because
registration contemplated under this Act refers only to ownership of land.
The owner of the building should file an opposition or answer to the application for
registration and ask the court that his right to the building be annotated in the decree and later in
the certificate of title.
TORTS AND DAMAGES
Book ITorts
I.

Principles

I.

Define quasi tort. Who are the persons liable under quasi torts and what are the defenses
available to them? (2010 Bar Question)
NOTE: It is recommended that the examiner exercise leniency and liberality in grading the
answers given to this question. The term quasi-tort is not a part of legal developments in civil
law. In Philippine legal tradition, quasi-delict has been treated as the closest civil law equivalent
of the common law tort. In fact, in a number of Supreme Court decisions, the two terms have
been considered synonymous. In reality, however, the common law tort is much broader in scope
than the civil law quasi-delict.
In recent developments in common law, the concept of quasi-torts can be considered as the
closest common law equivalent of the civil law concept of quasi-delict. This is because it is
argued that the growing recognition of quasi-torts as a source of obligation is hinged on the
acceptance at common law of the civil law principles of quasi-delict.

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Quasi-tort is a legal concept upholding the doctrine that some legal duty exists that can not be
classified strictly as a personal duty (that is, resulting in a tort), nor as a contractual duty (thus
resulting in a breach of contract) but rather some other kind of duty recognizable by the law. Tort
or Quasi-Tort is an Anglo American or Common Law concept, while Delict or Quasi-Delict is a
Civil Law concept. (Wikipedia Encyclopedia)
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Quasi-tort is considered as the equivalent of quasi-delict. Hence the rules of the latter
pertaining to persons who can be held liable and their defenses would also apply.
Those liable for quasi-delict include:
The tortfeasor or the person causing damage to another through fault or negligence
(Article 2176 NCC); and
2. Persons vicariously liable under Article 2180 (NCC).
1.

The defenses available include:

a.

That the defendant was not negligent or that he exercised due diligence (Article 2176

NCC).
That although the defendant is negligent, his negligence is not the proximate cause of the
injury. (Article 2179 NCC).
c. That the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury
(Article 2179 NCC).
d. That the person vicariously liable has observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage (2180 NCC).
e. That the cause of action has prescribed after the lapse of 4 years (Article 1146 NCC).
b.

The fact that the plaintiff had committed contributory negligence is a partial defense (Article
2179 NCC).
II. As a result of a collision between a taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B,
X, a passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action
against both drivers.
Is it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil action for damages
against both taxicab owners before he can file a civil action for damages against
them? Why?
(b) May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their drivers to be absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason.
(2003 Bar Question)
(a)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) It depends. If the separate civil action is to recover damages arising from the criminal act,
reservation is necessary. If the civil action against the taxicab owners is based on culpa contractual,
or on quasi-delict, there is no need for reservation.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(a) No, such reservation is not necessary. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the New Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action
(Section 3, Rule 111, Ibid.), The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the New Civil
Code (Casupanan v. Laroya, GR No. 145391, August 26, 2002).

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) It depends. If the civil action is based on a quasi-delict the taxicab owners may raise the
defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver; if the
action against them is based on culpa contractual or civil liability arising from a crime, they cannot
raise the defense.

III. A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city
road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and
bumped a car in front of it, causing severe damage to the car and serious injuries to its
passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The car owner and the
injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused by Diego's negligence, in
their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and
that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing
the van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego
contend that the sudden malfunction of the vans brake system is a fortuitous event and
that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability.
x
x
x
B. Explain the concept of vicarious liability in quasi-delicts. (1%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The doctrine of vicarious liability is that which renders a person liable for the negligence of
others for whose acts or omission the law makes him responsible on the theory that they are under
his control and supervision.
IV. Silvestre leased a car from Avis-Rent-A-Car Co. at the Mactan International Airport. No
sooner had he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he bumped
an FX taxi owned and driven by Victor, causing damage to the latter in the amount of P
100,000.00. Victor filed an action for damages against both Silvestre and Avis, based on
quasi-delict. Avis filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. Resolve the motion. (3%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. AVIS is not the employer of Silvestre; hence, there is
no right of action against AVIS under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Not being the employer, AVIS
has no duty to supervise Silvestre. Neither has AVIS the duty to observe due diligence in the
selection of its customers. Besides, it was given in the problem that the cause of the accident was
the negligence of Silvestre.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion should be denied. Under the Public Service Law, the registered owner of a public
utility is liable for the damages suffered by third persons through the use of such public utility.
Hence, the cause of action is based in law, the Public Service Law.
V.

When would an employer's liability for damage, caused by an employee in the

performance of his assigned tasks, be primary and when would it be subsidiary in
nature?
(b) Would the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee
be available to the employer in both instances? (1997 Bar Question)
(a)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The employer's liability for damage based on culpa aquiliana under Art. 2176 and 2180 of

the Civil Code is primary, while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary.
(b) The defense of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is available only to those primarily liable thereunder, but not to those
subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (Yumul vs. Juliano, 72 Phil. 94).
VI.

(1) What are the requisites in order that the defendant can be held liable for damages

in a quasi-delict case? (1988 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) In actions based on quasi-delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from the
defendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damages suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the

damage incurred by the plaintiff. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8.)

VII. Ato was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, which was involved in a collision
accident with a vegetable truck, resulting in the death of four passengers and injuries to
three. At the time of the accident, Ato was legally married to Maria but was cohabiting
with Tonia in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
from:

Could the heirs of the dead passengers and the injured persons recover damages
(a) Ato?
(b) Maria?
(c) Tonia?

Explain each case. (1987 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.

Ato Yes. Insofar as the dead passengers are concerned, the heirs can recover damages on
the basis of culpa contractual. If the injured persons are also passengers, Ato is likewise
liable on the same basis of culpa contractual. However, if the injured persons are not
passengers, then the liability for damages of Ato will be on the basis of a quasi-delict.

b.

Maria In view of the ruling in Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306) that the passenger jeepney
acquired by the husband during an illicit cohabitation with the paramour is conjugal
property, Maria is liable to the same extent as Ato insofar as the conjugal property in the
marriage between Ato and Maria could be answerable. But as regards her paraphernal
property, Maria cannot be held answerable.

c.

Tonia No. In Juaniza v. Jose the paramour of the owner of the passenger jeepney that
figured in an accident was held to be not a co-owner, and therefore not liable for damages.
Article 144 is inapplicable.

II. Classification of Torts

III. The Tortfeasor
I.

A Galant driven by John and owned by Art, and a Corolla driven by its owner, Gina,
collided somewhere along Adriatico Street. As a result of the accident, Gina had a
concussion. Subsequently, Gina brought an action for damages against John and Art.
There is no doubt that the collision is due to Johns negligence. Can Art, who was in the
vehicle at the time of the accident, be held solidarlly liable with his driver. John? [5%]
(1998 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Art may be held solidarily liable with John, if it was proven that the former could have
prevented the misfortune with the use of due diligence. Article 2184 of the Civil Code states: In
motor mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune, x x x"
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. The Supreme Court In Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil 374), held: An owner
who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of law
by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them
and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts, x x x On
the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own."
IV. Act or Omission and its Modalities
I.

Under the law on quasi-delict, aside from the persons who caused injury to persons, who
else are liable under the following circumstances:
a) When a 7-year-old injures his playmate while playing with his father's rifle.

Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children or wards living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
b) When a domestic helper, while haggling for a lower price with a fish vendor in the

course of buying foodstuffs for her employers family, slaps the fish vendor, causing
her to fall and sustain injuries. Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Under Article 2180, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry. As the domestic helper was then in the exercise of her
duties and acting within the scope of her assigned tasks, her employer is also liable for the damage
she has caused to the fish vendor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The act of slapping the fish vendor" is not "within the scope of the assigned tasks" of the
domestic helper. Hence, under Article 2180, the employer is not liable for the damages caused by
the domestic helper to the fish vendor.
c) A carpenter in a construction company accidentally hits the right foot of his co-

worker with a hammer. Explain. (2%) (2005 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
His employer, the construction company, is also liable for the damages that the carpenter
caused to the latters co-worker. Under Article, 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based
on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees
subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employees. (Franco v. IAC, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]).
d) A 15-year-old high school student stabs his classmates who is his rival for a girl
while they were going out of the classroom after their last class. Explain. (2%)
(2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under Section 218 of the Family Code, the school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority
and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution.
e) What defense, if any, is available to them? (2%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
These persons identified by law to be liable may raise the defense that they exercised
proper diligence required under the circumstances. Their responsibility will cease when they
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. As
regards the employer, if he shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision of his employees he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. (Layugan v. 1AC, 167 SCRA 363
11988]).
II. OJ was employed as professional driver of MM Transit bus owned by Mr. BT. In the
course of his work, OJ hit a pedestrian who was seriously injured and later died in the

hospital as a result of the accident. The victims heirs sued the driver and the owner of
the bus for damages
Is there a presumption in this case that Mr. BT, the owner, had been negligent? If so,
is the presumption absolute or not? Explain. (5%) (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. However, such
presumption is rebuttable. The liability of the employer shall cease when they prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (Article 2180, Civil Code).
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own
duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family (Metro Manila Transit v. CA, 223
SCRA 521 [1993]; Delsan Transport Lines v. CSLA Construction, 412 SCRA 524 [2003]).
Likewise, if the driver is charged and convicted in a criminal case for criminal negligence,
BT is subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the criminal act.
III. If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the school
corridor, a 7-year old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ballpen during a
fight, causing permanent blindness to the victim, who could be liable for damages for the
boy's injury: the teacher, the school authorities, or the guilty boy's parents? Explain.
(2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody (Article
218, FC). They are principally and solidarity liable for the damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor unless they exercised the proper diligence required under the
circumstances (Article 219, FC). In the problem, the teacher and the school authorities are liable
for the blindness of the victim, because the student who caused it was under their special parental
authority and they were negligent. They were negligent because they were chatting in the corridor
during the class period when the stabbing incident occurred. The incident could have been
prevented had the teacher been inside the classroom at that time. The guilty boys parents are
subsidiarily liable under Article 219 of the Family Code.
IV. After working overtime up to midnight, Alberto an executive of an insurance company
drove a company vehicle to a favorite Videoke bar where he had some drinks and sang
some songs with friends to "unwind". At 2:00 a.m., he drove home, but in doing so, he
bumped a tricycle, resulting in the death of its driver. May the insurance company be
held liable for the negligent act of Alberto? Why? (5%) (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The insurance company is not liable because when the accident occurred, Alberto was not
acting within the assigned tasks of his employment.

It is true that under Art. 2180 (par. 5), employers are liable for damages caused by their
employees who were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. However, the mere fact that
Alberto was using a service vehicle of the employer at the time of the injurious accident does not
necessarily mean that he was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment. In Castilex
Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, Jr. (321 SCRA393 [1999]), the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding
the fact that the employee did some overtime work for the company, the former was, nevertheless,
engaged in his own affairs or carrying out a personal purpose when he went to a restaurant at 2:00
a.m. after coming out from work. The time of the accident (also 2:00 a. m.) was outside normal
working hours.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The insurance company is liable if Alberto was negligent in the operation of the car and the
car was assigned to him for the benefit of the insurance company, and even though he was not
within the scope of his assigned tasks when the accident happened. In one case decided by the
Supreme Court, where an executive of a pharmaceutical company was given the use of a company
car, and after office hours, the executive made personal use of the car and met an accident, the
employer was also made liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for the injury caused by the
negligent operation of the car by the executive, on the ground that the car which caused the injury
was assigned to the executive by the employer for the prestige of the company. The insurance
company was held liable even though the employee was not performing within the scope of his
assigned tasks when the accident happened [Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303 (1996)].
V. Romano was bumped by a minivan owned by the Solomon School of Practical Arts
(SSPA). The minivan was driven by Peter, a student assistant whose assignment was to
clean the school passageways daily one hour before and one hour after regular classes,
in exchange for free tuition. Peter was able to drive the school vehicle after persuading
the regular driver, Paul, to turn over the wheel to him (Peter). Romano suffered serious
physical injuries. The accident happened at night when only one headlight of the vehicle
was functioning and Peter only had a student drivers permit.
As a consequence, Peter was convicted in the criminal case. Thereafter. Romarjo
sued for damages against Peter and SSPA.
(a) Will the action for damages against Peter and SSPA prosper?
(b) Will your answer be the same if, Paul, the regular driver, was impleaded as party

defendant for allowing Peter to drive the minivan without a regular driver's
license.
(c) Is the exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter and Paul a
material issue to be resolved in this case? (1991 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. Yes. It will prosper (Art. 2180) because at the time he drove the vehicle, he was not
performing his assigned tasks as provided for by Art. 2180. With respect to SSPA, it is not liable for
the acts of Peter because the latter was not an employee as held by Supreme Court in Filamer
Christian Institute vs. CA, (190 SCRA 485).
Peter belongs to a special category of students who render service to the school in exchange

for free tuition fees.

B. I would maintain the same answer because the incident did not occur while the employee
was in the performance of his duty as such employee. The incident occured at night time, and, in
any case, there was no indication in the problem that he was performing his duties as a driver.
C. In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered as employee, the exercise of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of peter would not be a material issue since the conviction of Peter
would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since the basis of subsidiary liability is the paterfamilias rule under Art.
2180, the defense of selection and supervision of the employee would be a valid defense.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered an employee, the exercise of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of Peter would not be a material issue since the conviction of Peter
would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since he was in the performance of his work at the time the incident
occurred, the school may be held subsidiarily liable not because of the conviction of Peter, but
because of the negligence of Paul under Art. 2180.
V. Proximate Cause
I.

Tony bought a Ford Expedition from a car dealer in Muntinlupa City. As payment, Tony
issued a check drawn against his current account with Premium Bank. Since he has a
good reputation, the car dealer allowed him to immediately drive home the vehicle
merely on his assurance that his check is sufficiently funded. When the car dealer
deposited the check, it was dishonored on the ground of Account Closed. After an
investigation, it was found that an employee of the bank misplaced Tony's account
ledger. Thus, the bank erroneously assumed that his account no longer exists. Later, it
turned out that Tonys account has more than sufficient funds to cover the check. The
dealer however, immediately filed an action for recovery of possession of the vehicle
against Tony for which he was terribly humiliated and embarrassed. Does Tony have a
cause of action against Premium Bank? Explain. 5% (2006 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Tony has a cause of action against Premium Bank. According to Art. 2176, whoever by
act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. The proximate cause of the injury which is the dishonor of Tonys check, was the
banks negligence in misplacing his account ledger. The fiduciary nature of banking requires high
standards of integrity and performance necessitating banks to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care.
II. Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for PI Million. Benjamin took the vehicle but did not
register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son Carlos, a minor
who did not have a drivers license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal in a bakery. On the
way, Carlos, driving in a reckless manner, sideswiped Dennis, then riding a bicycle. As a

result, he suffered serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a criminal complaint against
Carlos for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
1. Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father Benjamin
for damages based on quasi-delict? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Dennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father, Benjamin. The
independent civil action against Carlos can be based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
states that, "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there, being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." The proximate cause of the injury suffered by
Dennis, was the negligent driving of Carlo. He can thus be held personally liable by the former for
said injuries.
III. A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city
road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and
bumped a car in front of it, causing severe damage to the car and serious injuries to its
passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The car owner and the
injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused by Diego's negligence, in
their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and
that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing
the van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego
contend that the sudden malfunction of the vans brake system is a fortuitous event and
that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability.
A. Is this contention tenable? Explain. (2%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the
presence of such defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. The
failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.
VI. Legal Injury
VII. Intentional Torts
VIII. Negligence
I. On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to school
a car, a gift from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go on a field
trip, his teacher requested him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4) of his
classmates because the van rented by the school was too crowded. On the way to a
museum which the students were scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a wrong maneuver,
causing a collision with a jeepney. One of his classmates died. He and the three (3)
others were badly injured.
x
x
x
B. [Who is liable for] the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

With respect to the damages caused to the jeepney, only Rozanno should be held liable
because his negligence or tortious act was the sole, proximate, and immediate cause thereof.
C. Under the same facts, except the date of occurrence of the incident, this time in
mid-1994, what would be your answer? Explain. (2%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the middle of
1994, Rozanno would have been 21 years old at that time. Hence, he was already of legal age. The
law reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect in December 1989.
Being of legal age, Articles 218, 219, and 221 of the Family Code are no longer applicable. In
such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible for all the consequences of his act unless the
school or his parents were themselves also negligent and such negligence contributed to the
happening of the incident. In that event, the school or his parents are not liable under Article 218,
219 or 221 of the Family Code, but will be liable under the general provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delict.
II. Explain the following concepts and doctrines and give an example of each:
x
x
x
(b) doctrine of discovered peril (last clear chance) (5%) (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the ultimate opportunity to avoid the impending
harm failed to do so, it is the defendant who is liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
An example is where a person was riding a pony on a bridge and improperly pulled the
pony to the wrong side when he saw a car coming. The driver of the car did not stop or change
direction, and nearly hit the horse, and, the frightened animal jumped to its death. The driver of the
car is guilty of negligence because he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident and failed to avail
himself of that opportunity. He is liable under the doctrine of last clear chance (Picart v. Smith, 37
Phil. 809 [1918]).
III. Despite a warning from the police that an attempt to hijack a PAL plane will be made in
the following week, the airline did not take extra precautions, such as frisking of
passengers, for fear of being accused of violating human rights. Two days later, an armed
hijacker did attempt to hijack a PAL flight to Cebu. Although he was subdued by the other
passengers, he managed to fire a shot which hit and killed a female passenger. The
victims parents sued the airline for breach of contract, and the airline raised the
defense of force majeure. Is the airline liable or not? (2%) (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The airline is liable. In case of death of a passenger, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary

diligence (Article 1756, Civil Code). The failure of the airline to take extra precautions despite a
police warning that an attempt to hijack the plane would be made, was negligence on the part of
the airline. Being negligent, it is liable for the death of the passenger. The defense of force majeure
is not tenable since the shooting incident would not have happened had the airline taken steps that
could have prevented the hijacker from boarding the plane.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Article 1763 of the Civil Code, the common carrier is not required to observe
extraordinary diligence in preventing injury to its passengers on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers. The common carrier, in that case, is required to
exercise only the diligence of a good father of a family; hence, the failure of the airline to take
EXTRA precautions in filsking the passengers and by leaving that matter to the security personnel
of the airport, does not constitute a breach of that duty so as to make the airline liable. Besides, the
use of irresistible force by the hijackers was force majeure that could not have been prevented even
by the observance of extraordinary diligence.
IV. As the result of a collision between a public service passenger bus and a cargo truck
owned by D. X sustained physical injuries and Y died. Both X and Y were passengers of
the bus. Both drivers were at fault, and so X and Z, the only heir and legitimate child of
the deceased Y, sued the owners of both vehicles.
a) May the owner of the bus raise the defense of having exercised the diligence of a

good father of a family?

b) May D raise the same defense? (1992 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) No. The owner of the bus cannot raise the defense because the carrier's liability is based on

breach of contract.
(b) Yes. D can raise the defense because his liability is based on a quasi-delict.

V. Mr. and Mrs. R own a burned-out building, the firewall of which collapsed and destroyed
the shop occupied by the family of Mr. and Mrs. S, which resulted in injuries to said
couple and the death of their daughter. Mr. and Mrs. S had been warned by Mr. Mrs. R to
vacate the shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do
so.
Mr. and Mrs. S filed against Mr. and Mrs. R an action for recovery of damages the
former suffered as a result of the collapse of the firewall. In defense, Mr. and Mrs. R rely
on the doctrine of last clear chance" alleging that Mr. and Mrs. S had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the formers warning to vacate the shop,
and therefore Mr. and Mrs. Rs prior negligence should be disregarded.
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? State your reasons. (1990 Bar
Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would decide in favor of Mr. and Mrs. S. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs. (Article 2190, Civil Code).
As regards the defense of Mr. and Mrs. R relying on the doctrine of last clear chance. the
same is not tenable because according to the Supreme Court in one case (DeRoy v. Court of Appeals.
G. R. L-80718. January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 757) the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable
to instances covered by Art. 2190, Civil Code
Further, in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court {G.R. L-65295, March 10,
1987. 148 SCRA 353). the Supreme Court held that the role of the common law "last clear chance
doctrine in relation to Article 2179 of the Civil Code is merely to mitigate damages within the
context of contributory negligence.
IX. Special Liability in Particular Activities
X. Strict Liability
I. Primo owns a pet iguana which he keeps in a man- made pond enclosed by a fence
situated in his residential lot. A typhoon knocked down the fence of the pond and the
iguana crawled out of the gate of Primos residence. N, a neighbor who was passing by,
started throwing stones at the iguana, drawing the iguana to move toward him. N
panicked and ran but tripped on something and suffered a broken leg.
Is anyone liable for Ns injuries? Explain. (4%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No one is liable. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage (Art. 2183, New Civil Code).
II. Rommels private car, while being driven by the regular family driver, Amado, hits a
pedestrian causing the latters death. Rommel is not in the car when the incident
happened.
[a] Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased? Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar

Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Rommel may be held liable for damages if he fails to prove that he exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family (Art. 2180, par. 5, NCC) in selecting and supervising his family driver.
The owner is presumed liable unless he proves the defense of diligence. If the driver was
performing his assigned task when the incident happened, Rommel shall be solidarily liable with
the driver.

In case the driver is convicted of reckless imprudence and cannot pay the civil liability,
Rommel is subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded against the driver and the defense of
diligence is not available.
[b] Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the time of the
accident? Explain. (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, my answer would be the same. Rommel, who was in the car, shall be liable for damages if
he could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence in supervising his driver but
failed to exercise it (Art. 2184, NCC). In such a case, his liability is solidary with his driver.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, my answer will be the same except that in such a case the liability of the owner is not
presumed. When the owner is inside the vehicle, he becomes liable only when it is shown that he
could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence (Article 2184, NCC). For the
owner to be held liable, the burden of proving that he could have prevented the misfortune rests
on the shoulder of the victim.
III. Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for PI Million. Benjamin took the vehicle but did not
register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son Carlos, a minor
who did not have a drivers license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal in a bakery. On the
way, Carlos, driving in a reckless manner, sideswiped Dennis, then riding a bicycle. As a
result, he suffered serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a criminal complaint against
Carlos for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
Assuming Dennis' action is tenable, can Benjamin raise the defense that he is not
liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that he is not liable because the vehicle is not
registered in his name. Had Dennis sued Benjamin based on the latters liability as the owner of
the vehicle, the non-registration of the vehicle in his name would have been a valid defense. As
held in the case of BA Finance Corporation v. CA (215 SCRA 715 [19921), it is the registered
owner of any vehicle, who should be primarily responsible to the public or third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven. In this case, Arturo was not sued. If
sued, Arturo should be held liable for the injury incurred by Dennis.
However, Benjamin is not being sued based on his ownership of the registered vehicle, but
rather for his responsibility as the parent of a minor child whose negligent act resulted to damage
or injury to another. As provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as amended by Article 221 of
the Family Code, the father and mother are responsible for the damages caused by the fault and
negligence of the minor children who live in their company. This liability is imposed upon the
parents on the presumption that they have failed in their duty of supervision over their children.
Regardless of the ownership of the vehicle, Dennis, therefore, has a cause of action against
Benjamin.

IV. A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city
road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and
bumped a car in front of it, causing severe damage to the car and serious injuries to its
passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The car owner and the
injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused by Diego's negligence, in
their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and
that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing
the van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego
contend that the sudden malfunction of the vans brake system is a fortuitous event and
that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability.
x
x
x
C. Does the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing damage to a third party
affect his liability for his drivers negligence? Explain. (2%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is made solidarily liable with his driver if he (the
owner) was in the vehicle and could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the mishap.
(Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410 [1968]). However, this question has no factual basis in the
problem given, in view of the express given fact that Orlando was not in the car at the time of the
incident
Book IIDamages
I.

General Considerations

I. Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective buyer,
Ray. Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a fair price of
P2 Million. Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the property. Later,
another couple, Bemie and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower price of PI.5 Million.
But Ray insisted on buying the house of Biong and Linda for sentimental reason. Ray
prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the couple and a managers check of P2 Million.
After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the deed of sale. However, Linda was not
able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return she refused to sign the document
saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the deed of sale and for
moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
x
x
x
(3) Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong and Linda? Can he also recover
damages from the spouses? Explain. 2.5% (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and Biong for the return of the 2 million pesos he
paid for the property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if it can be proven that they were
in bad faith in backing out from the contract, as this is an act contrary to morals and good customs
under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected, Ray may file a counterclaim against
Linda and Biong for specific performance or rescission, with damages in either case. Linda has
breached the obligation created by the contract when she filed an action for nullification of sale.
On account of Lindas bad faith or fraud, Ray may ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code.
II. Stockton is a stockholder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his shares in Core Corp. in view
of a court suit that Core Corp. has filed against him for damages in the amount of P10
million, plus attorneys fees of PI million, as a result of statements published by Stockton
which are allegedly defamatory because it was calculated to injure and damage the
corporations reputation and goodwill.
The articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right of first refusal in favor
of the corporation. Accordingly, Stockton gave written notice to the corporation of his
offer to sell his shares of P10 million. The response of Core Corp. was an acceptance of
the offer in the exercise of its rights of first refusal, offering for the purpose payment in
form of compensation or set-off against the amount of damages it is claiming against
him, exclusive of the claim for attorney's fees. Stockton rejected the offer of the
corporation, arguing that compensation between the value of the shares and the amount
of damages demanded by the corporation cannot legally take effect. Is Stockton correct?
Give reasons for your answer. (5%) (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Stockton is correct. There is no right of compensation between his price of P10 million and
Core Corp.s unliquidated claim for damages, in order that compensation may be proper, the two
debts must be liquidated and demandable. The case for the P10 million damages being still pending
in court, the corporation has as yet no claim which is due and demandable against Stockton.
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
The right of first refusal was not perfected as a right for the reason that there was a
conditional acceptance equivalent to a counter-offer consisting in the amount of damages as being
credited on the purchase price. Therefore, compensation did not result since there was no valid
right of first refusal (Art 1475 & 1319, NCC)
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
Even [if] assuming that there was a perfected right of first refusal, compensation did not
take place because the claim is unliquidated.
III. On 8 December 1991 Vanessa purchased from the Manila office of Euro-Aire an airline
ticket for its Flight No. 710 from Dallas to Chicago on 16 January 1992. Her flight
reservation was confirmed. On her scheduled departure Vanessa checked in on time at
the Dallas airport. However, at the check-in counter she discovered that she was
waitlisted with some other passengers because of intentional overbooking, a Euro-Aire
policy and practice. Euro-Aire admitted that Vanessa was not advised of such policy
when she purchased her plane ticket. Vanessa was only able to fly two days later by
taking another airline.

Vanessa sued Euro-Aire in Manila for breach of contract and damages. Euro-Aire
claimed that it cannot be held liable for damages because its practice of overbooking
passengers was allowed by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Vanessa on the other
hand contended that assuming that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations allowed
intentional overbooking, the airline company cannot invoke the U.S. Code on the ground
that the ticket was purchased in Manila, hence, Philippine law should apply, under which
Vanessa can recover damages for breach of contract of carriage.
Decide. Discuss fully. (1995 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Vanessa can recover damages under Philippine law for breach of contract of carriage.
Philippine law should govern as the law of the place where the plane tickets were bought and the
contract of carriage was executed. In Zalamea v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104235. Nov. 10. 1993)
the Supreme Court applied Philippine law in recovery of damages for breach of contract of
carriage for the reason that it is the law of the place where the contract was executed.
If the violation of the contract was attended with bad faith, there is a ground to recover moral
damages. But since there was a federal regulation which was the basis of the act complained of, the
airline cannot be in bad faith. Hence, only actual damages can be recovered. The same is true with
regards to exemplary damages.
IV. Johnny Matons conviction for homicide was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and, in
addition, although the prosecution had not appealed at all, the appellate court increased
the indemnity for death from P30.000.00 to P50.000.00. On his appeal to the Supreme
Court, among the other things Johnny Maton brought to the high courts attention, was
the increase of indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals despite the clear fact that the
People had not appealed from the appellate courts judgment.
Is Johnny Maton correct? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) In Abejam v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that even if the issue of damages were
not raised by the appellant in the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals in its findings increased
the damages, the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals.
b)
No, the contention of the accused is not correct because upon appeal to the Appellate
Court, the court acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as civil. Since the
conviction of homicide had been appealed, there is no finality in the amount of indemnity because
the civil liability arising from the crime and the judgment on the crime has not yet become final.
c) Yes. Since the civil indemnity is an award in the civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the rule that a party cannot be granted affirmative relief unless he himself has appealed
should apply. Therefore, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have expanded the indemnity since
the judgment on the civil liability had become final.
d)

309).

No. Courts can review matters not assigned as errors. (Hydro Resource vs. CA, 204 SCRA

V. Julio and Lea, both 18 years old, were sweethearts. At a party at the house of a mutual
friend. Lea met Jake, also 18 years old, who showed interest in her. Lea seemed to
entertain Jake because she danced with him many times. !n a fit of jealousy, Julio shot
Jake with his fathers 38 caliber revolver which, before going to the party he was able to
get from the unlocked drawer inside his fathers bedroom. Jake died as a result of the
lone gunshot wound he sustained. His parents sued Julios parents for damages arising
from quasi-delict. At the time of the incident, Julio was 18 years old living with his
parents. Julios parents moved to dismiss the complaint against them claiming that since
Julio was already of majority age, they were no longer liable for his acts.
1) Should the motion to dismiss be granted? Why? (1993 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted. Article 236 of the Family Code as
amended by Republic Act 6809, provides in the third paragraph that nothing in this Code shall be
construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years or age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
II. Actual and Compensatory Damages
I.

DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers club of FX Airlines. In

Hong Kong, the couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which they had bought
tickets. On checking in, however, they were told they were upgraded by computer to
First Class for the flight to Manila because the Business Section was overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in
First Class. They said they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They felt
humiliated, embarrassed and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly
threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade. Thus they gave in, but
during the transfer of luggage DT suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrival in
Manila, they demanded an apology from FX's management as well as indemnity
payment. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million pesos in
damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly.
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their objections,
to First Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage. However, although there is a
breach of contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual damages only for such pecuniary losses
suffered by them as a result of such breach. There seems to be no showing that they incurred such
pecuniary loss. There is no showing that the pain in DT's arm and wrist resulted directly from the
carrier's acts complained of. Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages. Moreover, DT could
have avoided the alleged injury by requesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer as a matter
of duty on their part. There is also no basis to award moral damages for such breach of contract

because the facts of the problem do not show bad faith or fraud on the part of the airline. (Cathay
Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [20031). However, they may recover moral damages if the cause
of action is based on Article 21 of the Civil Code for the humiliation and embarrassment they felt
when the stewardess threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If it can be proved that DTs pain in his arm and wrist occasioned by the transfer of luggage
was caused by fault or negligence on the part of the airlines stewardess, actual damages may be
recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 (10) if the cause of action
is based on Article 21 or an act contrary to morals in view of the humiliation suffered by DT and
MT when they were separated from their guests and were threatened to be offloaded.
II. On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of P1,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
1)

What actual damages can Raffy recover? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Raffy may recover the amount of the promissory note of PI million, together with interest
at the legal rate from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. In addition, however, inasmuch
as the debtor is in bad faith, he is liable for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation. (Art. 2201(2), NCC).
III. Moral Damages
I.

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old
girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital
and other medical expenses in delivering the child by caesarean section; moral, claiming
that Rodolfo promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in fact, he
was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
[a] If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain. (3%)

(2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Rodolfos marriage could not have been possibly known to Nanette or there is no gross
negligence on the part of Nanette, Rodolfo could be held liable for moral damages.
If there is gross negligence in a suit for quasi-delict, exemplary damages could be awarded.
II. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in the cases
specified therein, several of which are enumerated below.

Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral damages. Explain. 1.5% (2006 Bar
Question)
a) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
b) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries
c) Immorality or dishonesty
d) Illegal search
e) Malicious prosecution
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Moral damages may not be recovered in (c) immorality or dishonesty because it is not
included in the enumeration in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Moral damages may be recovered in all of the five instances enumerated above. While
immorality and dishonesty" are not included in the ten instances enumerated in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, the same article provides that moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases". Article 2219(10) provides and includes: Acts and actions referred to in
Article 21...". Article 21 in turn provides: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for damages. Immorality or dishonesty is analogous to acts contrary to morals, and therefore
covered by Article 2219.
III. DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers club of FX Airlines. In
Hong Kong, the couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which they had bought
tickets. On checking in, however, they were told they were upgraded by computer to
First Class for the flight to Manila because the Business Section was overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in
First Class. They said they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They felt
humiliated, embarrassed and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly
threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade. Thus they gave in, but
during the transfer of luggage DT suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrival in
Manila, they demanded an apology from FX's management as well as indemnity
payment. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million pesos in
damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly.
(5%) (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their objections,
to First Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage. However, although there is a
breach of contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual damages only for such pecuniary losses
suffered by them as a result of such breach. There seems to be no showing that they incurred such
pecuniary loss. There is no showing that the pain in DT's arm and wrist resulted directly from the
carrier's acts complained of. Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages. Moreover, DT could
have avoided the alleged injury by requesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer as a matter

of duty on their part. There is also no basis to award moral damages for such breach of contract
because the facts of the problem do not show bad faith or fraud on the part of the airline. (Cathay
Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [20031). However, they may recover moral damages if the cause
of action is based on Article 21 of the Civil Code for the humiliation and embarrassment they felt
when the stewardess threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If it can be proved that DTs pain in his arm and wrist occasioned by the transfer of luggage
was caused by fault or negligence on the part of the airlines stewardess, actual damages may be
recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 (10) if the cause of action
is based on Article 21 or an act contrary to morals in view of the humiliation suffered by DT and
MT when they were separated from their guests and were threatened to be offloaded.
IV. If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular
accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim
damages from the bus company for the death of their unborn child? Explain. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life
of the unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet considered a person and the law
allows indemnity only for loss of life of persons. The mother, however, may recover damages for
the bodily injury she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal
organs. The parents may also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them,
e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that attended the loss of the unborn child. Since there is
gross negligence, exemplary damages can also be recovered. (Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801[1961])
V. Ortillo contracts Fabricate, Inc. to supply and install tile materials in a building he is
donating to his province. Ortillo pays 50% of the contract price as per agreement. It is
also agreed that the balance would be payable periodically after every 10% performance
until completed. After performing about 93% of the contract, for which it has been paid
an additional 40% as per agreement, Fabricate, Inc. did not complete the project due to
its sudden cessation of operations. Instead, Fabricate, Inc. demands payment of the last
10% of the contract despite its non-completion of the project. Ortillo refuses to pay,
invoking the stipulation that payment of the last amount of 10% shall be upon
completion. Fabricato, Inc. brings suit for the entire 10%, plus damages, Ortillo counters
with claims for (a) moral damages for Fabricato, Inc.s unfounded suit which has
damaged his reputation as a philanthropist and respected businessman in his
community, and (b) attorneys fees.
A. Does Ortillo have a legal basis for his claim for moral damages? (2%)
B. How about his claim for attorneys fees, having hired a lawyer to defend him? (3%)
(2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. There is no legal basis to Ortillo's claim for moral damages. It does not fall under the
coverage of Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
B. Ortillo is entitled to attorneys fees because Fabricatos complaint is a case of malicious
prosecution or a clearly unfounded civil action. (Art 2208 [4] and [11], NCC).

VI. On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of P1,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
x
x
x
2) Can Raffy ask for moral damages from Nonoy? (1994 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, under Article 2220, NCC moral damages are recoverable in case of breach of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
VII. As the result of a collision between a public service passenger bus and a cargo truck
owned by D. X sustained physical injuries and Y died. Both X and Y were passengers of
the bus. Both drivers were at fault, and so X and Z, the only heir and legitimate child of
the deceased Y, sued the owners of both vehicles.
x
x
x
c) May X claim moral damages from both defendants?
d) May Z claim moral damages from both defendants? Give reasons for all your
answers. (1992 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(c) Because X suffered physical injuries, X can claim moral damages against D. But as against
the owner of the bus, X can claim moral damages only if X proves reckless negligence of the carrier
amounting to fraud.
(d) Z can claim moral damages against both defendants because the rules on damages arising
from death due to a quasi-delict are also applicable to death of a passenger caused by breach of
contract by a common carrier (Arts. 1755. 1756, 1764, 2206 and 2219. Civil Code).

IV. Nominal Damages

I.

Dr. and Mrs. Almeda are prominent citizens of the country and are frequent travelers
abroad. In 1996, they booked round-trip business class tickets for the Manila-HongkongManila route of the Pinoy Airlines, where they are holders of Gold Mabalos Class
Frequent Flier cards. On their return flight, Pinoy Airlines upgraded their tickets to first
class without their consent and, inspite of their protestations to be allowed to remain in
the business class so that they could be with their friends, they were told that the
business class was already fully booked, and that they were given priority in upgrading
because they are elite members/holders of Gold Mabalos Class cards. Since they were
embarrassed at the discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced to take the
flight at the first class section apart from their friends who were in the business class.
Upon their return to Manila, they demanded a written apology from Pinoy Airlines.

When it went unheeded, the couple sued Pinoy Airlines for breach of contract claiming
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Will the action prosper? Give reasons. (5%) (2005 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Pinoy Airlines breached its contract of carriage by upgrading the seat accommodation of
the Almedas without their consent. The object of their contract was the transportation of the
Almedas from Manila to Hongkong and back to Manila, with seats in the business class section of
the aircraft. They should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the
privilege and would consent to a change of seat accommodation. It should not have been imposed
on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Pinoy Airlines breached its
contract of carriage with the Almedas.
However, the upgrading or the breach of contract was not attended by fraud or bad faith.
They were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or deceitful
machination or through willful concealment of material facts. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Neither is Pinoy Airlines in bad faith since Section 3 of the Economic Regulation No.7 of the
Civil Aeronautics Board provides that an overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is not
considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith.
As a result, the Almedas are not entitled to recover moral damages. Moral damages
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or when the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in
bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the
liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.
It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender be accompanied
by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Such requisite is absent in this
case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages. Since the Almedas are not entitled to any of these damages,
the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And where the awards for moral and
exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorneys fees.
The most that can be awarded for the breach of contract is an award for nominal damages.
Pinoy Airlines may be said to have disturbed the spouses' wish to be with their companions at the
Business Class on their flight to Manila. (Cathay Pacific v. Spouses Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [2003]).
II. On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of P1,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.

3) Can Raffy ask for nominal damages? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Nominal damages may not be recoverable in this case because Raffy may already be
indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. Nominal damages
are adjudicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
V. Temperate or Moderate Damages
I.

On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of P1,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
x
x
x
4) Can Raffy ask for temperate damages? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Raffy may ask for but would most likely not be awarded temperate damages, for the reason
that his actual damages may already be compensated upon proof thereof with the promissory note.
Temperate damages may be awarded only when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. (Article 2224,
Civil Code)
VI. Liquidated Damages
VII. Exemplary or Corrective Damages
I.

Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old
girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital
and other medical expenses in delivering the child by I caesarean section; moral,
claiming that Rodolfo promised to marry her, representing that he was single when, in
fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
x
x
x
[b] If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain. (3%)
(2009 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Rodolfos marriage could not have been possibly known to Nanette or there is no gross
negligence on the part of Nanette, Rodolfo could be held liable for moral damages.
If there is gross negligence in a suit for quasi-delict, exemplary damages could be awarded.
II. If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular
accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim

damages from the bus company for the death of their unborn child? Explain. (2003 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life
of the unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet considered a person and the law
allows indemnity only for loss of life of persons. The mother, however, may recover damages for
the bodily injury she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal
organs. The parents may also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them,
e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that attended the loss of the unborn child. Since there is
gross negligence, exemplary damages can also be recovered. (Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801[1961])
VIII. Damages in Case of Death
I.

Julio and Lea, both 18 years old, were sweethearts. At a party at the house of a mutual
friend. Lea met Jake, also 18 years old, who showed interest in her. Lea seemed to
entertain Jake because she danced with him many times. !n a fit of jealousy, Julio shot
Jake with his fathers 38 caliber revolver which, before going to the party he was able to
get from the unlocked drawer inside his fathers bedroom. Jake died as a result of the
lone gunshot wound he sustained. His parents sued Julios parents for damages arising
from quasi-delict. At the time of the incident, Julio was 18 years old living with his
parents. Julios parents moved to dismiss the complaint against them claiming that since
Julio was already of majority age, they were no longer liable for his acts.
x
x
x
2) What is the liability of Julios parents to Jakes parents? Explain your answer. (1993
Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The liability of Julios parents to Jakes parents arises from quasi-delict (Arts. 2176 and
2180 Civil Code) and shall cover specifically the following:
a)
b)
c)

P50.000.00 for the death of the son;

such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and
moral damages.

II. The X Electric Cooperative, services a small town where the roads are lined with lush
acacia trees. Normally these trees are pruned before the onset of the rainy season by the
cooperative itself since the power lines of the cooperative are not infrequently affected
by falling branches. This year, for financial reasons, the electric cooperative omitted the
pruning in spite of reminders from the townspeople. In August this year a strong
typhoon hit the town and live wires fell to the ground. While the cooperative made a
preliminary survey of the damages, it did not immediately take precautionary measures
against possible harm. Thus, the attention of one of its employees was called to the fallen
wire in the center of the town. Before the cooperative could make the necessary repairs,
a four-year old boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by the live wire.
His parents sued the electric cooperative for damages.

(a) If you were counsel for the parents, what arguments would you advance to support

your claim for damages and how much damages would you demand?
(b) If you were counsel for the electric cooperative, what defenses would you offer?
(c) If you were judge, how would you decide the case? (1987 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.

The damages that can be claimed by the parents are the following:
1. civil indemnity for death - P30,000.00,
The People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Tray a, L-48065, Jan. 29, 1987-;
2. actual and compensatory damages;
3. moral damages for mental anguish;
4. exemplary or corrective damages.

As counsel for the electric cooperative, I would offer the defense of fortuitous event,
because the strong typhoon could not be foreseen and even if foreseen, could not be avoided.
b.

c. As judge, I would rule for the parents. The attention of the cooperative through its
employee was called to the fallen live wire. If there had been care and diligence, the death could
have been avoided. The cooperative could have made the necessary repairs before the 4 year old
boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by the live wire. It failed to do so, hence it is liable.

IX. Graduation of Damages

X. Miscellaneous Rules
I.

On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of P1,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
x
x
x
5) Can Raffy ask for attorneys fees? (1994 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, under paragraph 2, Article 2208 of the Civil Code, considering that Nonoy's act or
omission has compelled Raffy to litigate to protect his interests. Furthermore, attorneys fees may
be awarded by the court when it is Just and equitable. (Article 2208(110) Civil Code).