A Collection of Papers Which Passed Betw

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Collection of P A P E R S,
Which passed between the late Learned
Mr. LEI B N ITZ,

AND
Dr. CLARK E,
In the Years 1715 and 1716.
Relating to the
PRINCIPLES
O F
Natural Philosophy and Religion.

With an APPENDIX,
To which are added,
LETTERS to Dr. Clarke concerning Liberty and

Necessity ; From a Gentleman of the University of
Cambridge : With the Doctor's ANSWERS to them. *
ALSO
REMARKS upon a Book, Entituled,

A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human
Liberty.
By Samuel Clarke, D. D.
Rector of St. James's Westminster.
LONDON: Printed for James Knapton, at the
Crown in St. Paul's Chwrch-Tard. MDCCXVII.
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OXFORD
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.TO HER
Royal Highness,
thE
Frinccfs of WALES
MadaMj
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sr^-
S the following Papers

3Er were at first written by
your Command j and
had afterwards the Ho
nour of being severally transmitted
'A 2
through
iv
The DEDICATION.
through Your Royal Highneffes
Hands : fo the Principal Encourage
ment upon which they Now prefume to appear in Publick, is the
Permiffion they have ofcoming forth
under the Protection of fo Illuftrious
a Name.
Xhe late Learned Mr. Leibnitz
well underftoodj how great an Ho
nour and Reputation it would be
to him, to have his Arguments ap
proved by a Perfon of Your Royal
Highneffes Character. But the fame
fteady Impartiality and unalterable
Love of Truth, the fame conftant
Readinefs to hear and to fubmit tq
Reafon, always fo confpicuous, al;
ways ihining forth fo brightly
Your Royal Highneffes Conduce
which juftly made Him defrous to
exert in thefe Papers his utmoft Skill
The DEVI CATIOK

in defending his Opinions ; was at
the fame time an Equal Encourage
ment to such as thought him in an
Error, to endeavour to prove that his
Opinions could not be defended.
The Occasion of his giving your
Royal Highness the Trouble of his
Firji Letter, he declares to be his
having entertained some Suspicions^
that the Foundations of Natural
Religion were in danger of being
hurt by Sir Isaac Newton's Philo
sophy. It appeared to Me, on
the contrary, a most certain and
evident Truth , that from the
earliest Antiquity to This Day,
the Foundations of Natural Reli
gion had never been so deeply and
so firmly laid, as in the Mathema
tical and Experimental Philosophy
of That Great Man. And Your
A 3
Royal
The DEDICATION.
Royal Highnesses singular Exactness
in searching after Truths and ear
nest Concern for every thing that
is of real Consequence to Religion
could not permit those Suspicions,
which had been suggested by a
Gentleman of such eminent Note
in the Learned World as Mr. heib*
neitK was_, to remain unanswered.
Chijlianity presupposes the Truth
of Natural Religion. Whatsoever
subverts Natural Religion y does
consequently much more subvert
Christianity : and whatsoever tends
to confirm Natural Religion , is
proportionably of Service to the
True Interest of the Christian. Na
tural Philosophy therefore, so far
as it affects Religion., by determin
ing Questions concerning Liberty
and Fate, concerning the Extent of
i
the
The DEDICATION,
the Powers of Matter and Motion,
and the Proofs from Phenomena, of
God's Continual Government of the
World ; is of very Great Impor
tance. 'Tis of Singular Use, rightly
to understands and carefully to
distinguish from Hypotheses or mere
Suppositions, the True and Certain
Consequences of Experimental and
Mathematical Philosophy ; Which
do, with wonderful Strength and
Advantage, to All Such as are
capable of apprehending them, con
firm, establish, and vindicate against
all Objections, those Great and Fun*
damental Truths of Natural Relii
giott, which the Wisdom of Provi
dence has at the fame time univer
sally implanted, in some degree,
in the Minds of Persons even of
the Meanest Capacities ; not qua*
vij
viij
The DEDICATION.
lifted to examine Demonstrative
Proofs.
...
; - ;
'; ^ .:.', .-
,.;;, ,
'Tis with the highest Pleasure

and Satisfaction, that the following
Papers upon so important a Sub
ject , are laid before a Princess,
who, to an inimitable Sweetness of
Temper, Candour and Affability
towards All, has joined not only
an Impartial Love of Truth, and
a Desire of promoting Learning in
general , but has Herself also at
tained to a Degree of Knowledge
very Particular and Uncommon ,
even in matters of the nicest and
most abstract Speculation : And
whose Sacred and always Unshaken
Regard to the Interest of sincere
and uncorrupt Religion, made Her
the Delight of all Good:, Prote
stants Abroad, and by a just Fame
L,
v
filled
the DEDIC AT lOU.

filled the Hearts of all true Britons
at Home, with an Expectation be
forehand, which. Great as it was^
is fully answered by what they
now see and are blessed with.
By the Protestant Succession in
the Illustrious House of HANOVER
having taken place, This Nation
has Now, with the Blessing of
God, a Certain Prospect, (if our
Own Vices and Follies prevent not,)
of seeing Government actually administred, according to the Design
and End for which it was insti
tuted by Providence, with no other View than that of the Pub*
lick Good, the general Welfare
and Happiness of Mankind. We
have a Prospect of seeing the True
Liberty of a Brave and Loyal Peo
ples t firmly secured, eftabliihed,
*'5*u>
i
and
ix
The DEDICATION:
and regulated, by Laws equally
advantageous both to the Crown
and Subject : Of feeing Learning
and Knowledge encouraged and
promoted, in opposition to all kinds
of Ignorance and Blindness : And,
(which is the Glory of All,) of
seeing the True Christian Temper
and Spirit of Religion effectually
prevail, both against Atheism and
Infidelity on the one hand, which
take off from Men All Obligations
of doing what is Right j and against
Superstition and Bigottry on the
other hand, which lay upon men
the strongest Obligations to d6 the
greatest Wrongs. ,. '.. . . .' .
What Views and Expectations
less than these, can a Nation rea
sonably entertain j when it beholds
a KING firmly settled upon the
.: .
i
Throne
the VEDICATIOK
xj
Throne of a wisely limited Monar
chy^ whose Will, when without
Limitation, showed always a greater
Love of Justice, than of Power ;
and never took Pleasure in acting
any otherwise^ than according to
the most perfect Laws of Reason
and Equity ? When it sees a Suc
cession of the fame Blessings con
tinued, in a PRINCE, whose
Noble Openness of Mind, and
Generous Warmth of Zeal for the
Preservation of the Protestant Re
ligion, and the Laws and Liberties
of these Kingdoms, make him every
day more and more beloved, as he
is more known ? And when these
glorious Hopes open still further
into an unbounded Prospect in a nu
merous Royal Offspring ? Through
whom, that the Just and Equita
ble Temper of the Grandfather j
^mr- .
the
the DEDICATION.
the Noble Zeal and Spirit os the
Father; the Affability, Goodness,
and Judicious Exactness of the
Mother ; may, with Glory to Them
selves, and with the happiest In
fluences both upon These and Fo
reign Countries, descend to all suc
ceeding Generations ; to the Esta
blishment of Universal Peace, of
Truth and Right amongst Men *
and to the entire rooting out That
Greatest Enemy of Christian Reli
gion, the Spirit of Popery both among Romanics and Trotestants :
And that Your Royal Highness may
your Self long live, to continue a
Blessing to these Nations, to fee
Truth and Virtue flourish in your
own Days, and to be a Great In
strument, under the direction of
Providence, in laying a Foundation
for the Highest Happiness of the
Publick
The DEDICATION.
xiij
Publick in Times to come ; is the
Prayer ofj
> -'
4"
1 *
Madam,
7< Royal Highnesses
Mo Humble and
mofl Obedient Servant^
Sam. Clarke.
AVERTISSEMENT.
On prie les Lecteurs de remarquer.*
I. r\ U E les Ecrits suivans ont t inu
-^_ primez, conformment aux Originauxy_sans ajouter, retrancher, ou changer
un seul mot. On n a ajout que les Notes
marginales & s Appendice.
2. Que la TraduBion ejl fort exaBe,
*& qif elle reprsente le vritable sens de
Mr. Leibnitz.
g. Que les Nombres ou les SeBions de cha?ue Ecrit de Mr. Clarke, se rapportent aux
ombres ou aux SeBions de chaque Ecrit de
Mr. Leibnitz, qui prcde immdiatement.
Advertisement to the Reader.

The Reader will be pleased to observe^
l.npHAT the following Letters are
JL all printed exactly as they were
written , without adding, diminishing, or
altering a Word. The Marginal Notes only,
and the Appendix, being added.
2. That the Translation is made with
Great Exactness, to prevent any Mifreps^
sensation of Mr. Leibnitz's Sense.
3. That the Numbers or $'j in Each of
Dr. Clarke's Papers, refer respectively to
the Numbers or $'s of each of Mr. Leib
nitz's Papers immediately fore-going.
ERRATA.
......
. .]
...'.
....
Pag. Line
12, 13. dele, c'est a dire.
81, 26. read; needs.
122,11. in margin. & 4
143, i, 1 by i representative
152, 19. After the word, mantfefle, add; Et le raisonnement sera, le mime, par rapport a la matiere
' ' < -dont les Efpecer particulieres des Corps font
composes, felt que I' on suppose que les pores
font vuides, ottqu' Us font remplis d' me maC . '.
tiere etrangere.
' .'.
1 $3, ri. After the word, Absurdity, add ; And the Argu
ment it the same, with regard to the Matter of
which any particular Species of Bodies is com
posed, whether its Pores be supposed empty, ar
always full of extraneous matter.
1 99, 9. A, and to B,
202, 14. dans ce troisieme
213, 23.' abstract
"220, 25. explique
, _ ^
236, 16. preetablie
241, ult. is the fame
.
. .
242, 5. lesquelles
245, 24. Action, ,
,
21*3, kit. at the bottbm, every thing will be either 265, 26. Miracle; or
. *
298, 12. proportion
,. .
, .,
305, 25;- After the word, Experience, add; Votet **
quatrieme Keplique, 7; is cinquieme Repli*
que, 33.
207, 22. After the word, Experience, add ; See my Fourth
Reply, 7 ; & Fifth Reply, 33.
330, 22. pesent sur le bras
339, n. Absurdities
348, 20. fans commencement & fans fin.
350, 10. nous disons
390, 15. pulchre
391,4. Thoughts, shall be
598, 1. liees
7. appercevons pas
In the REMARKS, &t.
21,9. that all the Actions
27, 22. Mechanical & involuntary.
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Mr. LEIBNITZ'S
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Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Extrait cP une Lettre crite au Mois
de Novembrey 1715*
L semble que la Religion Na*
,a turelle mme s* affoiblit e*->
tremement. Plusieurs font les
JrJ&f Ames corporelles -, d* autres
font Dieu luymme corporel.
2. M. Locke, &ses SeBateurs, doutent
au moins, si les Ames ne font Matrielles,
C^ naturellement prissables.
3. M. Newton dit que VEspace eft
J
JtV l'Organe, dont Dieu se sert pour sentir les
' */C/t K choses. Mais j' il a besoin de quelque
/t. l^/ujlA^p'Moyen pour les sentir, elles ne dependent
'
donc entirement de luy^ & ne font point
fa produBion
W
4. Monsieur Newton, & ses SeBateurs,

ont encore une fort plaisante Opinion de
l'ouvrage
[3]
Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper.

BEING
An ExtraB of a Letter Written in

November ^ 171 5.
: Atural Religion it self, seems
n && to decay [in England~\ very
much. Many will have

^Jws Human Souls to be material :
Others make God himself a corporeal Being.
2. Mr. Locke, and his Followers, are
uncertain at least, whether the Soul be not
Material, and naturally perishable.
3. Sir Isaac Newton says, that Space is
an Organ, which God makes use of to per
ceive Things by. But if God stands in
need of any Organ to perceive Things by,
it will follow, that they do not depend al
together upon him, nor were produced by
him.
4. Sir Isaac Newton, and his Followers,
have also a very odd Opinion concerning
B 2
the
Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz,

Vouvrage de Dieu. Selon eux Dieu a besoin
de remonter, de temps en temps fa Montre :
Autrement elle cefseroit d'agir. Il n'a pas
eu ajse& de veue,pour en faire unMouvement
perptuel. Cette Machine de Dieu ejl mme
fi imparfaite selon eux, qu il e/l oblig de
la dcrasser de temps en temps par un concows extraordinaire, & mme de la raccom
moder, comme un Horloger son ouvrages
qui sera d'autant plus mauvais Maislre, qu'il
fera plus souvent oblig d'y retoucher & d'y
corriger. Selon mon Sentiment, la mme
Force & Vigueuty subjlsle toujours, & passe
seulement
V'V.
: / .' t.
Mr. LfciENlTZ's First Paper.!

the Work of God. According to their
Doctrine, God Almighty * wants to wml
up his Watch from Time to Time : . Qthrwise.it would cease to move. '. He had jwp,
it seems, sufficient Foresight to .maker k\a
perpetual Motion. Nay, the Machine ,pf
God's\sliaking,.i&sp ifnperfect, according tp
these' Gentlemen j that he is obligefl'to
clean it now and then by an extraordinary
Concourse, and even to mend it, as a Clockmaker mends his Work j Who must con
sequently be so much the more unskilful a
Workman, as he is oftner obliged to mend
his Work and to set it Right. According
* The Place Mr. Leibnitz here seems to allude to, is as

follows. Dum Comet moventur in Orbibus valde eccentricis, undiq; & quoquoversum in omnes Cli Partes ; utiq^
nullo modo fieri potuit, ut cseco fato tribuendum sit, quod
Planet in Orbibus concentricis motu consimili ferantur
eodem omnes ; excejptis nimirum irregularitatibus quibusdam vix notatu dignis, qu ex mutuis Cometarum &
Planetarum in fe invicem astiomibus oriri potuerint, qu*q;
verisimile est fore ut longinquitate temporis majores
u% evadant; donee hc Na\ur Compages manum emendatricem tandem sit desideratura. i. e. Whilst the Comets
move in Orbs very eccentrical , with all variety of D/rellions towards every Part of the Heavens ; 'tis not pos
sible it should have been caused by Blind Fate, that the
Planets AU move with one similar Direllion in concentrkk
Orbs; excepting only some very smaU irregularities, which
may have arien from the mutual AZlions of the Planets and
Comets one upon another ; and which 'tis probable will in
length of time increase more and more, tit the present System
of Nature ftiall want to be anew put in Order by its Author.
Newtoni Optice, quasi, ult. pag. 346.
-! t:,VI
B 3
to
Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

feulement de matire en matire, fuivant les
loi* de la Nature, & le bel Ordre prtabli.
Et je tiens, quand Dieu fait des Miracles ,
que ce n efl fas pour foutenir les befoins de
la Nature, mais pour ceux de la Grace. En
juger autrement, ce feroit avoir une ide
fort baffe de la Sagejfe & de la Puijfance
de Dieu.
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Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper.

to My Opinion, the f same Force || and
Vigour remains always in the World, and
only passes from one part of Matter to
another, agreeably to the Laws of Nature,
and the beautiful pre-eftablijhed Order.
And I hold, that When God works Mira
cles, he does not do it in order to supply
the Wants of Nature, but those of Grace.
Whoever thinks otherwise , must needs
have a very mean Notion of the Wisdom
and Power of God.
f See the Note on Dr. CJarkcV Fifth Reply, 93, 9$.

)| See Appendix, N 2. Alto AsrJLeibnitz's Fifth Papers 87,
and 91.
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Dr. Clarke's
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Premiere Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

. JL efl vrai, & c'est une chose dplo* ruble, qu' il y a en Angleterre, aussi
bien qu'en d' autres pais, des personnes, qui
nient mme la Religion Naturelle , ou qui
la corrompent extrmement Mais, aprs
le drglement des moeurs, on doit attri
buer cela principalement la fausse Philoso
phie des Matrialistes , qui efl direBement
combatue par les Principes Mathmatiques
de la Philosophie. Il efi vrai aussi, qu' ily
a des personnes , qui font V Ame matrielle,
& Dieu lui-mme corporel -, mais ces gensl se dclarent ouvertement contre les Prin
cipes Mathmatiques de la Philosophie, qui
font les seids Principes qui prouvent que la
Matire efl la plus 'petite & la moins consi
derable Partie de V Univers.
2. Hy a quelques endroits dans les Ecrits
de Mr. Locke , qui pourraient faire soup
onner avec raison , qu' il doutoit de s Im
matrialit de /'Ame j mais il n'a t suivi
en cela que par quelques Matrialistes, E?memis des Principes Mathmatiques de la Phii,, ?
losophie,
:m ! '.vi
...... t? J
\
Dr. Clarki'j Firji Reply.

1. * I AH A T there are some in England,
X as well as in other Countries,
who deny or very much corrupt even Na
tural. Religion it self, is very true , and
much to be lamented. But (next to the
vitious Affections of Men) this is to be
principally ascribed to the false Philosophy
of the Materialists % to which the Mathematick Principles^/ Philosophy are the most
directly repugnant. That Some make the
Souls of Men, and Others even God him
self to be a Corporeal Being - is also very
true : But those who do so, are the great
Enemies of the, Mathematical Principles 0/
Philosophy } whidh' Principles^ and which
alone, prove Matter, or Body , to be the
smallest and most inconsiderable. Part of
the Universe. ..', (-.; '\ .' _.,*..y.
2. That Mr. Locke doubted whether the
Soid was immaterial or no, may justly be
suspected from feme Parts of his Writings ,:
But herein he has beenfollowe4 only by
some Materialists, Enemies to the Mathe
matical Principles of Philosophy 3 and who
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ap
Premiere Repliqtie de Mr. Clarke.

losophie^gwi ifapprouventpresque rien dans
les Ouvrages de Mr, Locke queses Erreurs.
3. Mr. le Chevalier Newton ne dit pas,
que l' Espace est V Organe, dont Dieu se sert
pour appercevoir les choses. Il ne dit pas
non 'plus, que Dieu ait besoin d'aucun
moyen pour les appercevoir. Au contraire,
il dit que Dieu, tant present par tout, apperoit les choses par fa presence immdiate,
dam tout l'Espace o ellessont,sans l'interven
tion ou le secours d' aucun Organe, ou d' au
cun moyen, four rendre cela plus intelli
gible, il l' clairt par une Comparaison. //
dit que comme /' Ame , tant immdiatement
prsente aux Images, qui Ce forment dans le
Cerveau par le moyen des Organes des
Sens, voit ces Images comme fi elles toient
les choses mmes qii elles reprsentent 5 de
mme, Dieu voit tout par sa presence im
mdiate, tant actuellement present' aux
choses mmes, toutes les choses qui font
dans V Univers , comme V Ame est prsente
toutes les Images , qui se forment dans le
Cerveau. Mr. Newton considre le Cerveau
& les Organes des Sens, comme le Moyen
par lequel ces Images font formes j c^
non comme le Moyen par lequel 1* Ame voit
ou apperoit ces Images , lors qiC elles font
ainsi formes. Et dans V Univers , il ne
considre pas les choses, comme fi elles toient
des Images formes par un certain Moyen ou
far des Organes , mais comme des choses
relles,
Dr. Clarke'/ First Reply,

approve little or nothing in Mr. Locke's
Writings, but his Errors*
3. Sir Isaac Newton doth not fay , that
Space is the Organ which God makes use
of to perceive Things by j nor that he has
need of any Medium at all, whereby to
perceive Things : But on the contrary,
that he, being Omnipresent, perceives all
Things by his immediate Presence to them,
in all Space whereever they are, without
the Intervention or Assistance of any Or.
gan or Medium whatsoever. In order to
make this more intelligible, he illustrates
it by a Similitude : That as the Mind of
Man , by its immediate Presence to the PiBures or Images of Things, form'd in the
Brain by the means of the Organs of Sen
sation, sees those PiBures as if they were
the Things themselves , so God fees all
Things, by his immediate Presence to them :
he being actually present to the Things
themselves, to all Things in the Universe ;
as the Mind of Man is present to all the
ViBures of Things formed in his Brain.
Sir Isaac Newton considers the Brain and
Organs of Sensation , as the Means by
which those PiBures are formed ^ but not as
the Means by which the Mindfees or per
ceives those Pictures, when they are so
formed. And in the Universe, he doth
not consider Things as if they were Pi
ctures, formed by certain Means, or Ogans ;
11
12

relles, que Dieu lui-mme a formesy &
qu'il voit dans tous les lieux o elles font,
fans V intervention d? aucun Moyen. C'est
tout ce que Mr. Newton a voulu dire parla
Comparaison, dont il s' est servi, lors qiM
suppose que l'Espace infini s ejl, ( pouf aintsi dire, ) le Sensorium de /' Etre qui ej pres
sent par tout. ,
4. Si, parmi les Hommes, un Ouvrier
passe avec raison pour tre d' autant plus
habile, que la Machine qu"'il a fait , con-
s Voici le Passage dont il s'agic. Aimon Sensori

um Animalium , &c i. e. C est--dire : Le Sensorium
des Animaux n' est-il pas le Lieu , o la Substance
qui apperoic, est prsente, & o les Images sensibles des
choses font portes par les Nerfs & le Cerveau , afin
qu'elles y soient apperues, comme tant prsentes la
Substance qui apperoit ? Et les Phnomnes de la Nanir
ne font-ils pas voir, qu'il y a un Etre Incorporel, Vivant,
Intelligent, Present partout, qui, dans l'Espace infini,
lequel est, pour ainsi dire, son Sensorium sow le Lieu o M
apperoit,^ voit & discerne de la manire la plus intim
& la plus parfaite, les choses mmes j 8i les comprend,
tomme tant entirement & ' immdiatement prsentes est
lui ? Au lieu que la Substance , qui apperoit & qui
pense en Nous, n'apperoit C ne contemple dans son petit
Sensorium, que les Images de ces choses ; lesquelles (Ima
ges) y font portes par les Organes des Sens. Newtqn'Oj*
tice, Qutst. 20. sag. 315. , i. .;...! .:
. 1
.tiw
',-
Dr. Clarke\t First Reply.

gans 1* but as real Things, fofm'd'by God
himself, and seen by him in all Places
whereever they are, without the Interven
tion of any Medium at all. And this Si
militude is all that he means, when he
supposes Infinite Space f to be (as it
were") the Senforium of the Omnipresent
Being.
4, The Reason why, among Men, an Ar
tificer is justly esteemed so much the more
skilful , as the Machine of his composing
f- The Passage referred to, it as follows. Annon Senforium

Aniltialium, est Lotus cui Substancia sentiens adest, & ia
quern senfibiles rerum Species per nervos & cerebrum defeI'unrur, ut ibi presences a presence sentiri pofsinc ? Atque
annon ex Phaenomehis conslat, esse Entem Incorporeum,
Viventem, Incelligentem, Qmniprscntem, qui in Spatio
infinite?, Tanquam Sensorio suo, Res Iffas intime cernat,
penicufq-j perspiciat , totasq; intra se pnesens pradentes
complectatur ; quarunv quidem rerum, Id quod in Nobis
sencit & cogitat, Imagines tantum ad se per Organa Sensuum delacas, in Sensoriolo suo percipit & contuetnr ? /. ef
Is not the Sensory of Animals, the Place where the Perceptive
Substance if present, and To which the Sensible Images of
Things are convey d by the Nerves and Brain, that they may
there be Perceived, os being Present to the Perceptive Sub
stance ? And do not the Phnomena of Nature flnw , that
there if an Incorporeal, Living, Intelligent, Omnipresent Be
ing, who in the Infinite Space, which is as it were Hit Senfo
rium (or Place of Perception,) fees and discerns, in the inmost
and most Thorough Manner , the Very Things themselves,
and comprehends them at being entirely and immediately Pre
sent within Himself ; Of which Things, the Perceptive and
Thinking Substance that is in Us, perceives and views, in its
little Sensory, nothing but the Images, conveyed thither by
the Organs of the Senses ? Newtoni Optice, Qust. 20.
pagî'M. .
Will
i2
j4
tinue plus long temps d'avoir un mouve

ment rgl, fans quelle ait besoin d'tre re
touche ; c'est parce que l'habilet de tous
les Ouvriers Humains ne consifle qu' compo
ser & a joindre certaines pieces, qui ont un
mouvement, dont les Principes font tout-fait indpendans de l'Ouvrier -, comme les
Poids & les Ressorts, &c. dont les forces ne
font pas produites par l'Ouvrier, qui ne sait
que les ajuster & les joindre ensemble.
Mais il en est tout autrement l'gard de
Dieu -, qui non seidement compose & ar
range les choses , mais encore ~eji ' l'Au
teur de leurs Puissances Primitives , ou
de leurs Forces Mouvantes, & les co?i-
serve perptuellement: Et par consquents
dire qu'il ne se fait rien sans fa Provi
dence & son Inspection, ce n'est pas avilir
son Ouvrage, mais plutt en faire connoitre
la grandeur & l'excellence. L'ide de ceux
qui soutiennent , que k Monde est une
grande Machine, qui se meut sans que Dieu
y intervienne, comme une Horloge continue
de se mouvoir sans le secours de l'Horloger j
cette ide, dis-je, introduit le Matrialisme
C^ la Fatalit \ & fous prtexte de faire
*vo ez ieu ime * Intelligente Supra-mundana ,
l'Appen- elle tend effectivement bannir du monde la
dix, n i. pr0vidence & le Gouvernement de Dieu,
J'ajoute que parla mme raison qu'un Philo
sophe peut s'imaginer, que tout Je passe dans
le Monde, depuis qu'il a t cr, fans que
la
.-.' 2)r. ClarkiV First Reply.
15
will continue longer to move regularly

without any farther Interposition of the
Workman j is because the skill of all Hitman
Artificers consists only in composing, ad
justing, or putting together certain Move
ments, the Principles of whose Motion are
altogether independent upon the Artificer :
Such as are Weights and Springs, and the
like } whose forces are not made, but only
sidjujled, by the Workman. But with re
gard to God, the Cafe is quite different j
because He not only composes or puts
Things together, but is himself the Author
and continual Preserver of their Original
Forces or moving Powers : And conse
quently tis not a diminution, but the true
Glory of his Workmanship, that nothing is
done without his continual Government and
InspeSion. The Notion of the World's
being a great Machine, going on without
the Interposition os God, as a Clock conti
nues to go without the Assistance of a
Clockraaker j is the Notion of Materialism
and fate, and tends, (under pretense of
making God a * Supra-Mundane Intel- , ^^
ligence,) to exclude Providence and God's pendix,
Government in reality out of the World. N *
And by the same Reason that a Philosopher
can represent all Things going on from the
beginning of the Creation, without any
Government or Interposition of Providence j
a Sceptick wiU easily Argue still farther
Backwards,
?6
Premire Replique de Mr. Clarke.

la Providence y ait aucune part j il ne fera
pat difficile un Pyrrhonien de pouffer fes
raifonnements plus loin, & de fuppofer que
Jes chofes font alles de toute ternit, comme
elles vont prefentement, fans qu'il foit ncejfaire d'admettre- une Cration, ou un
autre Auteur du Monde que ce que ces for
tes de Raifonneurs appellent la Nature trsSage de Eternelle. Si un Roi avoit un
Royaume, o tout fe pafferoit, fans qu'il y
intervint, & fans qu'il ordonnt de quelle
maniere les chofes fe feroient \ ce ne feroit
qu'un Royaume de nom par rapport lui ;
& il ne mriteroit pas d'avoir le Titre de
Roi ou de Gouverneur. Et comme on pourrait
fouponner avec raifon que ceux qui pr
tendent, que dans un Royaume les chofes
peuvent aller parfaitement bien, fans que le
Roi s'en mle : comme on pourrait, dis-jet
fouponner qu'ils ne feroient pas fchez
de fe paffer du Roi \ de mme, on peut dire
que ceux qui foiitiennent que l'Univers n'a
pas befoin que Dieu le dirige & le gouverne
continuellement, avancent une Vo&rine qui
tend h bannir du Monde.
.' \. *
:
! .
.
: i
'
. . .'
V/ ....'
<
'
Y Y"- '''{:-: i'""'

:Y/--Y\
Y-VSecond
''" !
: ;
.s i.v A,V.4-.-
2)r. ClarkeV Firjl Reply t

Backwards, and suppose that Things have
from Eternity gone on ( as they now do)
without any true Creation or Original Au
thor at all, but only what such Arguers
call All-Wise and Eternal Nature. If a
King had a Kingdom, wherein all Things
would continually go on without his Go
vernment or Interposition, or without his
Attending to and Ordering what is done
therein ; It would be to him, merely a No
minal Kingdom j nor would he in reality de
serve at all the Title of King or Governor.
And as those Men, who pretend that in an
Earthly Government Things may go on
perfectly well without.the King himself or
dering or disposing of any Thing, may rea
sonably be suspected that they would like
very well to set the King aside : So whoso
ever contends, that the Course of the
World can go on without the Continual di
rection of God, the Supreme Governor j
his Doctrine does in Effect tend to Exclude
God out of the World.
Mr. Leib-
17
i8
Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

J\ q *t, *} & 4 j& .5 *s A -> -> a a A .1 A a A H 4 II ik
Second Ecrit de Mr. LeibnitZj

0 u
Rplique au premier Ecrit Anglois.
i./^N a raison de dire dans le Papier donn

; ^ Madame la Princesse de Galles, d"
que son Altesse Royale m'a sait la grace de
m 'envoyer ; qu aprs les passions vitieusest
les Principes des Matrialistes contribuent
beaucoup entretenir V impiet. Mais je ne
crois pas quon ait sujet d* adjouter, que
les Principes Mathmatiques de la Philo
sophie sont opposs ceux des Matrialistes.
Au contraire, ils font les mmes j except
que les Matrialistes, l'Exemple de Dp.mocrite, ^'Epicure, & de Hobbes, se bornent
aux seuls Principes Mathmatiques, & '
admettent que des corps -, & que les Math
maticiens Chrtiens admettent encore desSubJlances immatrielles. Ainsi ce ne sont pas les
. Principes Mathmatiques, (selon lesens ordi
naire de ce termes) mais les Principes Metaphyfiques, qu'il faut opposer ceux des
Mate-
Mr. Lei b n i t z's Second Paper.
Mr. Leibnitz's Second Paper.

BEING
An Answer to Vr. Clarke'; First

Reply.
1. T T is rightly observed in the Paper deJL livered to the Princess of Wales,
which Her Royal Highness has been pleased
to communicate to me, that, next to Cor
ruption of Manners, the Principles of the
Materialists do very much contribute to
keep up Impiety. But I believe the Au
thor had no reason to add, that the- Mathe
matical Principles of Philosophy are opposite
to those of the Materialists. On the con
trary, they are the same :, only with this
difference, that the Materialists, in Imita
tion of Democritus, Epicurus, and Hobbes7
confine themselves altogether to Mathema
tical Principles, and admit only Bodies ,
whereas the Christian Mathematicians admit
also Immaterial Substances. Wherefore, not
Mathematical Principles (according to the
usual sense of that Word) but Metaphy
sical Principles ought to be opposed to those
C 2
of
19
20

Matrialistes. Pythagore, Platon, & en
partie Aristote, en ont eu quelque connais
sance j mais je pretends les avoir tablis
Demonftrativement, quoi qu' exposs popu
lairement, dans ma heodice. Le grand
Fondement des Mathmatiques, efi le Prin
cipe de h Contradiction, ou de l' Identit,
c' est dire, qiCune Enontiation ne furoit
tre vraye & fausse en mme temps :, e^ qu'
ainsi A eft A, & ne sauroit tre non A.
Et ce seul Principe suffit pour demonjlrer
toute l'Arithmtique & toute la Gomtrie,
c* eft dire tous les Principes Mathematiques. Mais pour passer de la Mathmati
que la Physique, il faut encore un autre
Principe , comme s ay remarqu dans ma
Theodice j c eft le Principe de la Raison
suffisante j c' ejl que rien n arrive, fans qu'il
y ait une Raison pourquoy cela soit ainsi
pluslot qu' autrement. Ceft pourquoy Archimede en voulant passer de la Mathma
tique la Physique dansson Livre de l'Equi
libre, a t oblig d' employer un cas parti
culier du Grand Principe de la Raison suf
fisante. Il prend pour accord, que s'il y a
une Ballance ou tout soit de mme de part
- d'autre, &si Von suspend aussi des poids
gaux de part & d'autre aux deux Extr
mits de cette Ballance, le tout demeurera en
repos. Ceft parce qis il n' y a aucune Rai
son pourquoy un cot descende pluftot que
l'autre. Or par ce principe seuly savoir,
qis
Mr. LeienitzV Second Paper.

11
of the Materialijis. Pythagoras, Plato, and
Arijlotle in some measure, had a Knowledge
of these Principles j but I pretend to have
established them demonstratively in my
Theodica, though I have done it in a po
pular manner. The great Foundation of Mathematicks, is the principle of Contraditlion,
er Identity, that is, that a Proposition can
not be true andfalse at the fame time } and
that therefore A is A, and cannot be not A.
This single Principle is sufficient to demon
strate every part of Arithmetick and Geo
metry, that is, all Mathematical Principles.
But in order to proceed from Mathematicks to Natural Philosophy, another
Principle is requisite, as I have observed in
my Theodic&a : I mean, the Principle of a
sufficient Reason, viz. that nothing happens
without a Reason why it should be so, ra
ther than otherwise. And therefore Archi
medes being to proceed from Mathematicks
to Natural Philosophy, in his Book Dequilibrio, was obliged to make use of a parti
cular Case of the great Principle of a suf
ficient Reason. He takes it for granted,
that if there be a * Balance, in which steAp.
every thing is alike on both Sides, and if f*#*>
equal Weights are hung on the two ends of N *
that Balance , the whole will be at rest.
'Tis because no Reason can be given, why
one side should weigh down, rather than
the other. Now, by that single Principle,
C 3
vim.
3?

qu 'lisant qu' il y ait une Raison suffisante,
pourquoy les choses font plustost ainsi qu*
autrement, se demonfire la Divinit, & tout
le reste de la Mtaphysique, ou de la.
Thologie Naturelle \ & mme en quelque
faon les Principes Physiques ' independans
de la Mathmatique, c'est dire les Prin
cipes Dynamiques, ou de la Force.
2. On passe dire que selon les Principes
Mathmatiques, c'est dire selon la Philo
sophie de M. Newton, (car les Principes
Mathmatiques n y dcident rien,} la Ma
tire est la partie la moins considerable de
l'Univers. C'est qu' il admet, outre la Ma
tire, un Espice vuide -, & que,selon Iuy, la
Matire n occupe qu' une trs petite partie de
l'Espace. Mais Democrite & Epicure ont
soutenu la mme chose, except qu' ils dif
fraient en cela de M. Newton du plus au
moins -, 0- que peut tre selon eux il y
avait plus de Matire dans la monde, que
selon M. Newton : En quoy je crois qu' ils
taient prfrables \ Car jdIus il y a de la
Matire, plus y a-t-il de l' occasion Dieu d*
exercersa sagesse & sa puissance } & c'est
pour celai entre autres Raisons, que je tiens
qu' il n' y a point de vuide du tout, '
3>V
Mr. Leibnitz's Second Taper.
13
viz. that there ought to be a sufficient Rea

son why Things fhoitld be so, ana not other
wise, one may demonstrate the Being of a
God, and all the other Parts of MetaphyJich or Natural Theology , and even, in
some Measure, those Principles of Natural
Philosophy, that are independent upon Ma
thematics : I mean, the f Dynamic k Prin- f set Apciples, or the Principles of Force.
^2^*>
2. The Author proceeds, and fays, that
according to the Mathematical Principles,
that is, according to Sir Isaac Newton %
Philosophy, (for Mathematical Principles
determine nothing in the present Case,)
Matter is the mojl inconsiderable part of the
Universe. The reason is, because he ad
mits empty Space, besides Matter j and be
cause, according to his Notions, Matter
fills up only a very small part of Space.
But Democritus and Epicurus maintained the
same Thing : They differ'd from Sir Isaac
Newton, only as to the Quantity of Mat
ter \ and perhaps they believed there was
more Matter in the World, than Sir Isaac
Newton will allow : Wherein I think their
Opinion ought to be preferred } For, the
more Matter there is, the more God has
occasion to exercise his Wisdom and Power.
Which is one Reason, among others, why
I maintain that there is no Vacuum at
all.
C 4
3. l
24

g. Il se trouve expressment dans /'Ap
pendice de T Optique de M, Newton -, que
/'Espace eft le Sensoriura de Dieu. Or le
mot Sensorium a toujours signifi V Organe
de la Sensation._ Permis luy & ses amis
de s'expliquer maintenant tout autrement.
Je ne my offose sas.
4. On suppose que la presence de l'Ame
sufft pour qiC elle s'apferove de ce qui se
passe dans le cerveau. Mais ceft justement
ce que le Pre Mallebranche & toute /' Ecole
Cartsienne nie, & a raison de nier. Il
faut toute autre chose que la seule presence,
pour qit une chose reprsente ce qui se passe
dans Vautre. Il faut pour cela quelque
communication explicable } quelque manire
J'influence. L'Espace, selon M. Newton,
est intimement present au corps qu' il con
tient, & qui ejl commenfitr avec luy
i ensuit il pour cela que l'Espace s'apperoive de ce qui se passe dans le corps, &
qu* il s' en souvienne aprs que le corps en
fera sorti .<? Outre que l'Ame . estant indi
visible, sa presence immediate qu' on pour
rait / imaginer dans le corps , ne seroit
que dans un Point. Comment donc s* apperevroit elle de ce qui se fait hors de ce Point?
Je pretends d' tre le premier qui ait montr,
comment l'ame s' asperoit ds ce quise fasse
dfltis le corfs.
5 U
Mr. Leibnitz^ Second Paper.
15
3. I find, in || express Words, in the II *' '*

Appendix to Sir Isaac Newton's Opticks,%[^r'
that Space is the Senforium of God. But First Reply,
the Word Senforium hath always signified ?
the Ore^w of Sensation. He, and his
Friends, may now, if they think fit, ex
plain themselves quite otherwise : I shall
not be against it.
4. The Author supposes that the presence
of the Soul is sufficient to make it perceive
what passes in the Brain. But this is the very
Thing which Father Mal/ebranche, and all
the Cartesians deny } and they rightly deny
jt. More is requisite besides bare presence^
to enable One thing to perceive what pas
ses in another. Some Communication, that
may be explained \ some sort of influence,
is requisite for this purpose. Space, ac
cording to Sir Isaac Newton, is intimately
present to the Body contained in it, and
commensurate with it. Does it follow from
thence, that Space perceives what passes in
a Body j and remembers it, when That Body
is gone away ? Besides, the Soul being in
divisible, it's immediate presence, which
may be imagined in the Body, would only
be in one Point. How then could it per
ceive what happens out os that Point > I
pretend to be the first, who has shown * *SeeAphow the Soul perceives what passes in the pendix,
Pody,
N5<
5. The
i6

5. La Raison pourquoy Dieu s'apperoit
de tout, n'est pas fa simple presence, mas
encore son Operation j c'est parce qu'il con
serve les choses par une aBion qui produit
continuellement ce qu'il y a de bont & de
persetlion en elles. Mais les mes noyant
point ^'influence immediate fur les corps, ny
les corps fur les ames j leur correspondence
mutuelle ne sauroit tre explique par la
Presence.
6. La veritable raison qui sait louer
principalement une Machine, est plusloft prise
de /'effect de la Machine, que de sa Cause.
On ne s'informe pas tant de la Puissance
du Machiniste, que de son Artifice. Ainsi
la raison qu'on allgue pour louer la Ma
chine de Dieu, de ce qu'il l'a faite toute
entire, sans avoir emprunt de la Matire
de dehors, ?i'ejl poifit sufjsante. C'est un petit
detour , oit l' on a t forc de recourir.
Et la raison qui rend Dieu preferable ith
autre Machini/le, n'est pas seidement parce
qu'il fait le tout, au lieu que l'Artisan a
besoin de chercher sa Matire. Cette prefe
rence viendroit seulement de la Puissance.
Mais il y a une autre raison de l'excellence
de Dieu , qui vient encore de la Sagesse.
Cejl que sa Machine dure aussi plus long
temps, & va plus juste, que celle de
quelque autre Machinifte que ce soit. Celuy qui achet la Montre, ne se soucie point
fi
2
Mr. Leibnitz*j1 Second Paper.

ij
5. The Reason why God perceives eve
ry thing, is not His bare Presence, but also
his Operation. 'Tis because he preserves
Things by an Action , which continually
produces whatever is good and perfect in
them. But the Soul having * no imraedi- tfn^^
ate Influence over the Body , nor the Body n. 5.'
over tht Soul -, their mutual Correspondence
cannot be explained by their being present
to each other.
6. The true and principal Reason why
we commend a Machine, is rather ground
ed upon the Effetls of the Machine, than
upon its Cause. We don't enquire so
much about the Power of the Artist, as we
do about his Skill in his Workmanship.
And therefore the Reason alledged by the
Author for extolling the Machine of God's
making, grounded upon his having made it
entirely, without wanting any Materials to
make it of , That Reason, I say, is not suf
ficient. *Tis a mere Shift the Author has
been forced to have recourse to : And the
Reason why God exceeds any other Artist,
is not only because he makes the Whole,
whereas all other Artists must have Matter
to work upon. This Excellency in God,
would be only on the account of Power.
But God's Excellency arises also from ano
ther Cause , viz. Wisdom : whereby his
Machine lajls longer, and moves more re
gularly, than those of any other Artist
whatsoever. He who buys a Watch, does
not
28

si l'Ouvrier l'a faite toute entire, ou s'il
en a fait faire les pieces par Vautres
Ouvriers, & les a seulement ajustes -, pourveu qu'elle aille comme il faut. Et fi
l'Ouvrier avoit receu de Dieu le don jusqu'
crer la Matire des roues , on n'en feroit
point content, s'il n'avait receu aussi le don
de les bien ajufler. Et de mme, celuy qui
voudra tre content de Vouvrage de Dieu, ne
le fera point par la feule raison qu'on nom
allgue.
7. Ainsi il faut que V artifice de Dieu,

ne soit point infrieur celuy d'un Ouvrier j
il faut mme qu' il aille infiniment au del.
La simple Production de tout, marqueroit
bien la Puissance de Dieu j mais elle ne mar
querait point assez sa Sagesse. Ceux qui
soutiendront le contraire, tomberont juste
ment dans le dfaut de Matrialistes & de
Spinoza, dont ils protestent de s'loigner :
Ils reconnatraient de la Puissance, mais non
pas assez, de Sagesse dans le Principe des
choses.
8. Je ne dis point que le Monde corporel
est uneMachine ou Montre qui va fans l'inter
position de Dieu, & je presse a(ses que les
Creatures ont besoin de.son influence conti
nuelle : Mais je soutiens que c'e(l une
Montre
Mr. LeienitzV Second Paper.

not mind whether the Workman made eve
ry Part of it himself\ or whether he got
the several Parts made by Others , and did
only put them together ; provided the
Watch goes right. And if the Workman
had received from God even the Gift of
creating the Matter of the Wheels ; yet
the Buyer of the Watch would not be sa
tisfied, unless the Workman had also re
ceived the Gift of putting them well toge
ther. In like manner, he who will be
pleased with God's Workmanship, cannot
be so, without some other Reason than that
which the Author has here alleged.
7. Thus the Skill of God must not be
inferior to that of a Workman j nay, it
must go infinitely beyond it. The bare
VroduBion of every thing, would indeed
(how the Power of God j but it would
not sufficiently show his Wisdom. They
who maintain the contrary, will fall exact
ly into the Error of the Materialisls, and
of Spinoza , from whom they profess to
differ. They would , in such case, ac
knowledge Potver, but not sufficient Wis
dom , in the Principle or Cause of all
Things.
8. I do not fay, the Material World is
a Machine, or Watch, that goes without
God's Interposition j and 1 have sufficiently
insisted , that the Creation wants to be
continually influenc'd by its Creator. But
I
19
30
Skond Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Montre qui va fans avoir besoin de sa Corv rection : Autrement ilfauroit dire que Dieu
se ravise. Dieu a tout prvu, il a remdi
tout par avance : Il y a dans ses ou
vrages wie harmonie^ une beaut dj pr
tablie.
9. Ce Sentiment n exclut point ta Provi

dence ou le Gouvemment de Dieu ; Au
contraire, cela le rend parfait. Une verita
ble Providence de Dieu, demande une parfaite Prvoyance : Mais de plus elle de
mande aussi , non seulement qu'il ait tout
preveu, mais aussi qu il ait pourveu tout
far des remdes convenables prordonns :
Autrement il manquera ou de Sagesse pour
le prvoir, ou de Puissance poury pourvoir.
// resemblera un Dieu Socinien, qui vit
du jour la journe , comme disoit M. Jurieu. Il ejl vfay que Dieu, selon les Sociniens , manque mme de prvoir les inconveniens :, au lieu que, selon ces Messieurs
qui V obligent se corriger, il manque d'y
pourvoir. Mais il me semble que ceft en
core un manquement bien grand j il saudroit qu'il manqut de Pouvoir, ou de bonne
Volont.
10. Je
ftlr. Leibnit^'j Second Paper.

I maintain it to be a Watch, that goes
.without wanting to be Mended by him :
Otherwise we must say, that God bethinks
himself again. No j God has foreseen eve
ry thing j He has provided a Remedy for
every thing before-hand j There is in his
Works a Harmony, a Beauty, already pretftablijhed.
9. This Opinion does not exclude God's
Providence , or his Government of the
World : On the contrary, it makes it perfeEi. A true Providence of God, requires
a perfect Foresight. But then it requires
moreover, not only that he should have
foreseen every thing \ but also that he
should have provided for every thing be
fore-hand, with proper Remedies : Other
wise, he must want either Wisdom to fore
see Things , or Power to provide against
them. He will be like the God of the
Socinians, who lives only from day to day,
as Mr. Jurieu fays. Indeed God, accord
ing to the Socinians, does not so much as
foresee Inconveniences :, whereas, the Gen
tlemen I am arguing with , who put him
upon Mending his Work, fay only, that
he does not provide againft them. But this
seems to me to be still a very great Imper
fection. According to This Doctrine, God
must want either Power, or Good Will.
10. I
3*
32

10. Je ne crois point qu'on me puisse reprendre avec raison, d'avoir ait que Dieu
efl Intelligentia supramundana. Diront-ils
qu'il est Intelligentia Mundana, c'est dire
qu'il efl Y Ame du Monde ? J' espre que non,
Cependant ils feront bien de se garder d'y
donner sans y penser.
il. La Comparaison d'un Roy, o tout
iroit sans qu'il s'en mlt, ne vient point
propos \ puisque Dieu conserve towjours les
choses , & qu'elles ne sauroient substfler
sans lui : Ainsison Royaume n'est point no
minal. Cesi justement comme si Ton disait,
qu'un Roy qui auroit fi bien fait lever ses
Sujets, & les maintiendrait fi bien dans leur
capacit & bonne volont, par le foin qu'il
auroit pris de leursubsidence, qu'il n auroit
point besoin de les redresser \ serait seulement
un Roy de nom.
1 2. Enfin , fi Dieu est oblig de corriger

les choses naturelles de temps en temps , il
faut que cela se faste ou surnaturellement
ou naturellement. Si cela se sait surnatu
rellement, il faut recourir au Miracle pour
expliquer les choses naturelles j ce qui efl en
effefi une redutlion d'un hypothse ad absurdum.
Mr. Le jbnitzV Second Paper.
33
10. I don't think I can be rightly *SvA

blamed, for saying that God is * Intelli- pmdix, '
gentia jupramundana. Will they fay, that N> '
he is InteUigentia Mundana j that is, the
Soul of the World ) I hope not,. However,
they will do well to take care , not to fall
into that Notion unawares.
11. The Comparison of a King, under
whose Reign every thing mould go on
without his Interposition, is by no means
to the present Purpose ; since God pre
serves every thing continually, and no
thing can subsist without him. His King
dom therefore is not a Nominal one. 'Tis
just as if one should say , that a King,
who should originally have taken care to
have his Subjects so well educated , and
should, by his Care in providing for their
Subsistence , preserve them so well in their
Fitness for their several Stations, and in
their good Affection towards him, as that
he should have no Occasion ever to be
amending any thing amongst them ; would
be only a Nominal King.
12. To conclude. If God is oblig'd to
mend the Course ofNature from time to time,
it must be done either supernaturally or
naturally. If it be done supernaturally^
we must have recourse to \ Miracles , in t ** Ah
order to explain Natural Things : Which ^. ''
is reducing an Hypothesis ad absurdum :
For,
34

dum. Car avec les Miracles, on peut ren
dre raison de tout sans peine. Mais fi cela
se fait naturellement, Dieu ne sera point In
telligent supramundana \ il sera compris
fous la nature des choses, cyejl dire il fera
/'Ame du Monde,
Second
Mr. LeibnitzV Second Paper.

35
For, every thing may eafily be accounted
for by Miracles. But if it be done natu,
rally, then God will not be * Intelligentia *s%*m
Supramundana : He will be comprehended n T
under the Nature of Things j that is He
wilJ be the Soul of the World.
D 2
Dr.
[3*3
s|'yf'$%^^c$'$$^$$$ty$$$$qj$i
Seconde Rplique de Mr. Clarjce.

i. Ors que sai dit que les Principes Ma*-* thmatiques de la Philosophie font
contraires ceux des Matrialistes, j'ai
voulu dire, qu'au lieu que les Matrialistes
supposent que la Structure de l'Univers peut
Avoir t produite par les Seuls Principes
Mechaniques, de la Matire & du Mouve
ment, de la Ncessit & de la Fatalit \ les
Principes Mathmatiques de la Philosophie
font voir au contraire, que V Etat des cho
ses [la Constitution du Soleil & des
Plantes ~\ n'a pu tre produit que par une
Cause intelligente & libre. A /' gard du
mot de Mathmatique ou de Mtaphysique,
on peut appeVer, fi on le juge propos, les
Principes Mathmatiques, des Principes M
taphysiques, selon que les Consequences M
taphysiques naissent dmonflrativenmit des
Principes Mathmatiques.
Il eft vrai
que rien n'existe, fans une Raison suffisante j
C?" que rien nexijle d'une certaine manire^
fl(itot que d'une autre, fans qu'il y ait aufj
une Raison suffisante pour cela j & par con
squent, lors qu'il n'y a aucune cause, il ne
geut y avoir aucun Effet. Mais cette Rai-
soq
C 37]
Dr. ClarK E^r Second Reply.

I. TTTHen I said that the Mathematical
V V Principles of Philosophy are op
posite to those of the Materialists ; the
Meaning was, that whereas Materials(Is
suppose the Frame of Nature to be such,
as could have arisen from mere Mechanical
Principles of Matter and Motion, of Neceffity and Fate , the Mathematical Princi
ples of Philosophy (how on the contrary,
that the State of Things [ the Conftitution
of the Sun and Planets ] is such as could
not arise from any thing but an Intelligent
and Free Cause. As to the Propriety of
the Name j so far as Metaphysical Conse
quences follow demonstratively from Ma
thematical Principles, so far the Mathema
tical Principles may (if it be thought fit)
be called Metaphysical Principles.
'Tis very true, that nothing w, without a
sufficient Reason why it is , and why it is
thus rather than otherwise. And there
fore, where there is no Cause, there can be
no Ejsetl. But this sufficient Reason is oftD 3
tirne^
38
Seconde Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

son suffisante, est souvent la simple Volont
de Dieu. Par exemple ^ fi V on considre
pourquoi une certaine Portion ou Syfleme
de Matire a t cre dans uncertain
lieu , & une autre dans un autreîertain
lieu, puisque tout lieu tant absolument in
different toute Matire, c'eut t prcis
ment la mme chose vice versa, suppos que
les deux Portions de Matire \ou leurs Part
ticules,3 soient semblables -, fi, dis-je, Von
considre cela, on n'en peut allguer d'autre
) raison, que la simple Volont de Dieu. Et
Appendice fi cette Vdont * ne pouvoit jamais agir,
n. 4. ' fans tre prdtermine par quelque cause, ,
comme une Balance ne sauroit se mouvoir,
sans le poids qui la fait pencher j Dieu
nauroit pas la libert de choisir \ & ce
seroit introduire la Fatalit.
2. Plusieurs anciens Philosophes Grecs,
qui avoient emprunt leur Philosophie des
phniciens, & dont la doctrine fut cor
rompue par Epicure, admettaient en gnral
la Matire & le Vuide. Mais ils ne surent pas se servir de ces Principes, pour ex
pliquer les Phnomnes de la Nature par le
moyen des Mathmatiques. Quelque petite
que soit la Quantit de l Matire, Dieu
ne manque pas de Sujets , fur lesquels il
pitiffe exercer fa- sagesse & sa puissance j
car ily a d'autres choses, outre la Matire,
qui font galement des Sujets, fur lesquels
Dieu exerce fa puissance & sa sagesse. On
auroit
Dr. Clarke's Second Reply.

times no other, than the mere Will of God.
For instance $ Why This particular System
of Matter, should be created in one parti
cular Place, and That in another particular
Place , when, (all Place being absolutely
indifferent to all Matter, ) it would have
been exactly the fame thing vice versa,
supposing the two Systems [tor the Parti
cles'] of Matter to be alike , there can be
no other Reason, but the mere Will of God.
39
Which if it * could in No Case act without \^s

a predetermining Cause, any more than a n0.4.'
Balance can move without a prepondera
ting Weight , this would tend to take away all Power of Chusing , and to intro
duce Fatality.
1. Many Ancient Greeks, who had

their Philosophy from the Phnicians, and
whose Philosophy was corrupted by Epi
curus, held indeed in general Matter and
Vacuum \ but they knew not how to ap
ply those Principles by Mathematicks, to
the Explication of the Ph&nomena of Na
ture. How Small soever the Quantity of
Matter be, God has not at all the less Sub
ject to exercise his Wisdom and Power up
on : For, Other Things, as well as Mat
ter, are equally Subjects, on which God
exercises his Power and Wisdom. By the
*-
Q 4
same
4<D
Seconde Rplique de Mr. Clarkd.

auroit pu prouver par la mme saison, que
les Hommes, ou toute autre Espce de Crea
tures, doivent tre infinis en nombre, afin
que Dieu ne manque pas de Sujets pour ex
ercer fa Puissance & sa Sagesse.
5. Le Mot de Senforium ne signifie pas
proprement /'Organe, mais le Lieu de la
Sensation. L'Oeil, l'Oreille, Cc. sont des
Organes :, mais ce ne font pas des Sensoria.
D'ailleurs , Mr. le Chevalier Newton s rie
dit pas, que /'Espace ejl an Senforium ^
mais qu'il est, (par voye de Comparaison,-)
pour ainsi dire le Senforium, &c*
4. On nia jamais suppos que la Presence
de l'Ame suffit pour la Perception : On a dit
seulement que cette Presence efl ncessaire
afin que l'Ame apperoive. Si l'Ame n etoit
pas prsente aux Images des Choses , qui
font apperues, elle ne pourroit pas les appercevoir : Mais fa Prsence ne suffit pas,
moins qu'elle ne soit aussi une Substance vi
vante. Les Subjlances inanimes, quoique
prsentes, 71 apperoivent rien : Et une Sub
fiance vivante n efl capable de Perception,
que dans le Lieu o elle efl prsente \ soit
aux choses mmes , comme Dieu efl present
tout l' Univers , soit aux Images des
choses, comme l'Ame leur efl prsente dans
son Senforium // est impossible qu'une chose
s Vocz la Note dans ma premire Rplique, . 3.
'
agisse,
Dn ClArkeV Second Reply.

same Argument it might just as well have
been proved, that Men, or any other par
ticular Species of Beings, must be infinite
in Number, least God mould want Sub
jects, on which to exercise his Power and
Wisdom.
3. The Word Sensory does not proper
ly signify the Organ, but the slice of Sen
sation. The Eye, the Ear, &c. are Or
gans, but not Sensoria. Besides, Sir Isaac
Newton f does not fay, that Space is the
Sensory , but that it is, by way of Simili
tude only, as it were the Sensory, &c
4. It was never supposed , that the Pre
sence of the Soul was sufficient, but only
that it is necessary in order to Perception.
Without being present to the Images of the
Things perceived, it could not possibly per
ceive them : But being present is not suffi
cient, without it be also a Living Substance.
Any inanimate Substance, tho' present, per
ceives nothing : And a Living Substance
can only there perceive, where it is present
either to the Things themselves, (as the
Omnipresent God is to the whole Uni
verse -s) or to the Images of Things, (as
the Soul of Man is in its proper Sensory.)
Nothing can any more AB, or be AEled
f Set the Note in my First Reply, . 3.
upon.
At
4^
Seconde Rplique de Mr. Clarh.

agisse, ou que quelque Sujet agisse sur elle,
dans un lieu ou elle rieft pas prsente \ comme
il est impojftble quelle soit dans un lieu, o
elle rieft pas.
Quoique VAme soit in
divisible, il ne s'ensuit pas qu'elle riejl pr
sente que dans un seul Point. L'Espace,
fini ou infini, eft absolument indivisible, m
me par la pense , car on ne peut s'imaginer
que ses parties se sparent l'une de Vautre,
sans s'imaginer qu'elles * sortent, pour ainsi
dire, hors d'elles mmes ; & cependant
l'Espace riejl pas un simple Point.
5. Dieu riapperoit pas les choses par fa
simple Presence , ni parce qu' il agit sur
elles , mais parce qu'il eft, non seulement
present par tout, mais encore un Etre Vi
vant & Intelligent. On doit dire la mme
chose de l'Ame, dans fa petite Sphere. Ce
rieft point par fa simple Presence, mais parce
qu'elle eft une Subftance vivante, qu'elle apperoit les Images auxquelles elle eft prfente, & qu'elle ne saurait appercevoir fans
leur tre prsente.
6 C 7. // eft vrai, que l'Excellence de
l'Ouvrage de Dieu ne confifte pas seulement
en ce que cet Ouvrage fait voir la Puissance
de son Auteur, mais encore en ce qu'il mon
* Ut partium Tcmporis Ordoest immutabilis, fie eciam
Ordo partium Spati). Moveantur hx de locis fuis, & movebuncur (ut ica dicam) de Seipsis. Newton. Princip. Schol.
ad Defin. 8.
tre
Vr. Clarke1/ Second Reply.

upon, where it is not present , than it can
Be, where it is not.
The Soul's be
ing Indivisible, does not prove it to be pre
sent only in a mere Point. Space, finite or
infinite, is absolutely indivisible, even so
much as in Thought j (To imagine its
Parts moved from each other, is to ima
gine them * moved out of themselves ,) and
yet Space is not a mere Point,
5. God perceives Things, not indeed by

his simple Presence to them, nor yet by his
Operation upon them, but by his being a
Living and Intelligent, as well as an Om
nipresent Substance. The Soul likewise,
Cwithin its narrow Sphere,) not by its sim
ple Presence, but by its being a Living Sub
stance, perceives the Images to which it is
present j and which, without being present
to them, it could not perceive.
6 8C7. 'Tis very true, that the Excellen
cy of God's Workmanship does not consist
in its showing the Power only, but in its
showing the Wisdom also of its Author.
* Uc partium Temporis Ordo est immurabilis, sic etiam
Ordo partium Spatij. Moveantur hsc de locis suis, & movcbuntur ( ut ita dicam ) de Seipjk. Newton. Principia,
&W. ad Defin. 8.
But
43
44
Seconde Rplique de Mr. Clairke.

tre sa Sagef. Mais Dieu ne fait pas paroitre cette Sagesse, en rendant la Nature
capable de se mouvoir sans lui, comme un
Horloger sait mouvoir une Horloge. , Cela
eft impossible, puis qiC il n y a point de
Forces dans la Pature% qui soient indpen
dantes de Dieu, comme les Forces des Poids &
des Ressorts font indpendantes des hommes.
La Sagesse de Dieu consiste donc en ce qu* il
a form ds le commencement une Ide par
faite & complete d'un Ouvrage, qui a
commenc & qui subsiste toujours, confor
mment cette Ide, par V exercice perp
tuel de la puissance & du Gouvernment de
son Auteur.
8. Le mot de Correction, ou de Rforme,
ne doit pas tre entendu par rapport Dieir^
mais uniquement par rapport lSous. UEtat
present du systme Solaire, (par exemple,^
selon les Loix du mouvement qui font main
tenant tablies, tombera un jour * en con
fusion j & ensuite il sera peut-tre redress,
eu bien il recevra une nouvelle forme. Mais
ce changement n'est que relatif, par rapport
notre manire de concevoir les choses. \J
Etat present du Monde, le desordre o il
tombera, & le Renouvellement dont ce
desordre sera suivi, entrent galement dans
* Voez M Note sur le premier Ecrit de Mr. Leib-
niti, 4.
Dr. Clarke'j- Second Reply.

But then this Wisdom os God appears, not
in making Nature ( as an Artificer makes
a Clock) capable of going on Without
him : ( For that's impossible j there being
no Powers of Nature independe?xt upon
God, as the Powers of Weights and Springs
are independent upon Men :) But the Wis
dom os God consists, in framing Originally
the perseB and complete Idea of a Work,
which begun and continues, according to
that Original perfect Idea, by the Continual
Uninterrupted Exercise of his Power and
Government.
8. The Word CorreSion, or Amendment,

is to be understood, not with regard to
God, but to Us only. The present Frame
of the Solar System (for instance,) accord
ing to the present Laws of Motion, will in
time * sail into Confusion j and perhaps,
after That, will be amended or put into
a new Form. But this Amendment is only
relative, with regard to Our Conceptions.
In reality, and with regard to God ; the
present Frame, and the consequent Disorder,
and the following Renovation, are rf# equally
parts of the Design framed in Gods Original
f See the Note on Mr. Leibnitz'/ First Paper. 4.
perfect
45
46

le de/sein que Dieu a form. Il en est de la
Formation du Monde, comme de celle du
Corps Humain : La Sagesse de Dieu ne con
siste pas les rendre temels, mais lesfaire
durer aussi long temps qu* il le juge
propos.
9. La Sage/se & la || Trscience de
Dieu ne consistent pas prparer des remdes
par avance, qui guriront d'eux mmes les
desordres de la Nature. Car, proprement
parler, il n arrive aucun desordre dans le
Monde, par rapport Dieu -, & par con
squent, il n y a point de Remdes, il n y a
s Vocz point mme de Forces naturelles, qui -\ puisl'Appen- s>nt agir d'elles mmes, comme les Poids ?*
lce'N 2' les Ressorts agi/sent d'eux mmes par rapport
aux hommes. Mais la Sage/se & la Prescience
de Dieu confisent, comme on V a dit ci-dessusy
former ds le commencement un dessein,
que sa puissance met continuellement . en
execution.
10. Dieu n efl point une Intelligentja
* voyez Mundana , ni une Intelligentia * SupradkePNi mundana, mais une Intelligence qui est par
tout, dans le Monde, & hors du Monde.
Il est en tout, par tout, C par dessus
tout.
Il Voez mes Discours fur l'Existence de Dieu, la V
rit de la Religion Naturelle, &c. Part I. Pag. 106.
quatrime Edition.
II. Quand
Dr. ClarkeV Second Reply.
47
perfect Idea. Tis in the Frame of the

World, as in the Frame of Mans Body:
The Wisdom of God does not consist, in
making the present Frame of Either of them
Eternal, but to last so long as he thought
sit.
9. The Wisdom and || Foresight of God,
do not consist in providing originally Reme
dies, which shall of themselves cure the
Disorders of Nature. For in Truth and
Strictness, with regard to God, there arc
Nd, Disorders, and consequently no Re
medies, and indeed no Powers of Nature at
all, that f can do any Thing ofthemselves, t SeeAp(as Weights and Springs Work of themselves *Efj
with regard to Men :) But the Wisdom and
Foresight of God, consist (as has been said)
in contriving at once, what his Power and
Government is Continually putting in actual
Execution.
10. God is neither a Mundane Intelli
gence, nor a * Supra-Mundane Intelli- * SeeAPgence ^ but an Omnipresent Intelligence , n" '*'.
both In and Without the World. He is In
all, and Through all, as well as Above
all.
|| See my Sermons preach'd at Mr. Boylca Leisure. Part I.
Page 106. Fourth Edition.
II. If
4$
Skonde Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

il. Quand on dit que Dieu conserve
les choses -, fi Von veut dire par l, qu'il
agit aBuellement fur elles, & qu'il les gou
verne, en conservant & en continuant leurs
Etres, leurs Forces^ leurs Arrangemens, &
leurs Mouvemens; c'est prcisment ce que je
soutiens. Mais fi /' on veut dire simplement,
que Dieu en conservant les choses ressemble
un Roi, qui crroit des Sujets, lesquels
seroient capables d' agir, fans qu' il eut au
cune part ce qui se pajseroit parmi eux j
fi c* efi-l, dis-je, ce que V on veut dire,
Dieu fera un vritable Crateur, mais il
ri aura que le Titre de Gouverneur.
1 3. Le raisonnement que /' on trouve icit
suppose que tout ce que Dieu fait, /? Sur
naturel oit Miraculeux ^ C> par consquent,
il tend excluire Dieu du Gouvernement
atlitel du Monde. Mais il est certain que
le Naturel - le Surnaturel ne different en
rien V un de V autre par rapport Dieu :
Ce ne font que des Distinctions, selon ntre
manire de concevoir les choses. Donner un
mouvement rgl au Soleil (ou a la Terre, )
c* est une chose que nous appelions Naturelle :
Arrter ce mouvement pendant un jour, c*
eft une chose Surnaturelle selon nos ides.
Mais la dernire de ces deux choses ri ejl
pas V effet d' une plus grande puissance que
s autre j & par rapport Dieu, elles font
toutes deux galement Naturelles ou Surnai
turelles
Dr. GlarkeY Second Reply.

11. If God's conserving all Things,
means his atlital Operation and Government,
in preserving and continuing the Beings,
Powers, Orders, Dispositions and Motions
of all Things , this is all that is contended
for. But if his conserving Things, means
no more than a King's creating such Sub
jects, as shall be able to act well enough
without his intermeddling or Ordering any
thing amongst them ever after ; This is
making him indeed a real Creator, but a
Governour only Nominal,
12. "the Argument in this Paragraph

supposes, that whatsoever God does, is Si*pernatural or Miraculous j and consequent
ly it tends to exclude All Operation of God
in the Governing and Ordering of the Na
tural World. But the Truth is ; Natural
and Supernatural are nothing at all dif
ferent with regard to God, but distinctions
merely in Our Conceptions of things. To
cause the Sun [or Eartb~] to move regularly,
is a thing we call Natural ; To flop its
Motion for a Day, we call Supernatural :
But the One is the Effect of no greater
Power, than the Other ; nor is the One,
with respect to God, more or less Natural
or Supernatural than the other.
God's
'
E
being
49
$o

turelles.
Quoique Dieu soit present
dans tout l'Univers, il ne s' enfuit point qu*
il soit * l'Ame du Monde. L'Ame humaine
ejl une partie d' un Compos, dont le Corps
eft V autre partie \ & ces deux parties agis
sent mutuellement V une sur V autre, com
me tant les parties d' un mme Tout. Mais
Dieu eft dans le Monde, non comme une
partie de V Univers, mais comme un Gou
verneur ; // agit fur tout, & rien n' agt
fur lui. Il n' est pas loin de chacun de
nous;
* Deut omma rgit, <fyc. Dieu gouverne tout, non
comme une Ame du Monde, mais comme le Seigneur de
s Vnivers. Le mot de Dieu est Relatif: Il emporte une
ide de Relation des Serviteurs ; & la Divinit de Dieu,
est fa Domination, qui ne ressemble pas celle de 1" Ame
fur son propre corps, mais celle d' un Seigneur ou d' un
Maitre fur ses Serviteurs. ___. Tout Subsiste & se meut
en Dieu ; mais fans aucune passion mutuelle. Dieu n' est
en aucune manire affect par le mouvement des corps ;
&le mouvement des corps n' est point interrompu par
la presence de Dieu. _ Dieu n a ni Corps, ni figute cor
porelle: c' est pourquoi on n sauroit le voir, l'entendre,
ni le toucher -, & il ne doit tre ador sous la ressem
blance d' aucune chose corporelle. Nous, avons des Ides
de ses Attributs ; mais les Substances ds tres, fans au
cune exception , nous font entirement inconnues.,
Nous ne saurions mme connoitre les Substances des Corps
ni par quelqu'un de nos Sens, ni par quelque Aile r
flchi de notre Esprit. La Substance de Dieu nous est en
core moins connue. Nous ne le connoissons que par ses
proprit^ & ses Attributs, par son excellente & tts'Sage
disposition des choses, & par les Causes Finales : Et nous r
adorons, & le servons, cause de fa Domination. Car un
Dieu
Dr. ClarkeV Second Reply.

being present In or To the World, does not
make him to be the * Soul of the World,
A Soul, is part of a Compound, whereof
Body is the Other part j and they mutually
AffeB each other, as parts of the y#w2
whole. But G<?<i is present to the World,
not as a P/zrt, but as a Governor , Acting
upon all Things, himself acted upon by
nothing.
* Hie [Dew'] omnia regie, non ut Anima Mundi, fed uc
universorum Dominut.
Dew est vox relativa, & ad
Servos refertur ; & Deltat est Dominatio Dei, non iii corpus
proprium, fed in Servos.
In ipso continentur & moventur universe , fed ab% mutua pajjione . Deus nihil
pariturex corporum Motibus; ilia nullam sentiunt resistentiam ex Omniprarsentia Dei.
Corpore omni & figurl
corporea prorsus destituitur ; ideoq; videri non potest,
necaudiri, nee tangi, nee sub specie rei alicujus corporei coli debet. Ideas habemus Attributorum ejus ; fed
quid sit rei alicujus Substantia , minime cognoscimus.
.
Incimas [corporum] Substantias nullo Sensu, null
astione reflexa cognoscimus, & multo minus Ideam habe
mus Subslanti Dei. Hunc cognoscimus solummodo per
Proprietates suas & Attribute, & per lapientilTitras &
oprimas rerum structuras, & causes finales ; veneramur
autem&coiimus ob dominium. Deus enim sine Dominio,
Providencia, & Causis Finalibus, nihil aliud tst quam.
Facum & Natura. i. e. God Governs all Things, not as a
Soul of the World, but as the Lord of the Universe.
i
God, it a relative Word, carrying in it the no
tion of Relation to Servants. And the Godhead of God, it.
Hit Dominion . A Dominion, not like that of a Soul over
its own Body, but that of a Lord over his Servants.
In Him all Things subsist and move, but without a mutual
affeiling of each other, [such as is between Soul and Body.]
God it no way assessed by the Motions of Bodies ; and the
Motion of Bodies meets with no Obstruction from the Omni
presence of Gad. .
He is altogether without Body or
Bodily Shipe , and therefore can neither be Seen, nor Heard,
E a
nor
<Ji
52

nous j car en lui nous (& toutes les choses:
qui existent) avons la vie, le mouvement,
& l'tre.
Dieu fans Domination, fans Providence. & fans Causes Finales,
n' est autre chose que le Destin & la Nature. Newtom
Princtyia, Scholium gnrale sub finem.
* & & &
st-v:-.- n . "' ". ". 7 ," Troisime
Dr. Clarke1j* Second Reply.

nothing. He is not far from every one of
Us, for in him We (and all Things^) live
and move and have our Beings,
53
nor Felt ; nor ought to be worshipped under the similitude

es any Corporeal Thing. We have Ideas of hit Attributes ;
but what the Substance of any Thing is, we know not at
aH.
The very Substances themselves, even of Bodies,
we cannot come at the knowledge of, either by any of our
Senses, or by any reflex Act of the Mind : much less have
we any Idea of the Substance of God. Him we knowi
only by his Properties and Attributes, and by his most Wife
and Excellent Disposition of Things, and by Final Causes :
And we adore and worship him, upon account of his Domi
nion. For a God without Dominion, without Providence and
Final Causes, is nothing but Fate and Nature. Newtoni
Principiai Scholium generale sub finem..
.'
.
I
,_- .
_-_
1-1
E 2
Mr. Leib-
C 5*1
.'.- k
Troisime Ecrit de Mr. Lebniz3

ou
*.
Rponse au Second Ecrit Anglois.
i. Olon la manire de parler ordinaire,

^ les Principes Mathmatiques sont
ceux qui consistent dans les Mathmatiques
pures, comme Nombres, Figures, Arithmeti<jjiie,~fjeometrie. Mais les Principes Mta
physiques regardent des notions plus gn
rales, comme la Cause & V Effect.
2. On m accorde ce Principe important,
que rien n' arrive fans qu' il y ait une rai
son suffisante, pourquoy il en soit plutt
ainsi qu' autrement. Mais on me V accorde
en paroles, & on me le refuse en Effect-.
Ce qui fait voir qu"1 on ny en a pas bien
compris toute la force. Et pour, cela on se
sert d' une instance qui tombe juslement dans
une de mes demonstrations contre /' Espace
rel absolu, Idole de quelques Anglois Modernes. Je dis, Idole, non pas dans un
sens Tpeohgique, mais Philosophique j corn_J~J ... u
55 J
Mr. Leibnitz's
Third Paper.
EIN G
An Anfrver to Dr. ClarkeV Second
Reply.
\
,. '
i. Ccording to the ufual way f

jLJL Speaking, Mathematical Principles
concern only mere Mathematicks, viz. Nun>
bers, Figures, Arithmetick, Geometry.
But Metaphyfical Principles, concern more
general Motions , fuch as are Caufe and
Effed.
2. The Author grants me this important
Principle j that Nothing happens withont a
fufficient reafon, why it jhould be So, rather
than otherwise. But he grants it only in
Words, and in reality . denies it. Which
ihows that he does not fully perceive the
Strength of it And therefore he makes
ufe of an Inftance, which exaftly falls in
with one of my Demonftrations againft
real abfolute Space, which is an Idol of
fome Modern Englishmen. I call it an Idol,
not in a Theological Senfe, but in a PhiloE 4
fophical
t6
Troisime Ecrijt de Mr. Leibnitz.

me le Chancelier Bacon disoit autres foisy
qii.ilj a Idola Tribus, Idola Specs.
. ij Ces Messieurs soutiennent donc, que
l'Espace est un Etre rel absolu \ mais cela
les. men* de grandes difficults. Car il
parois que cet Etre doit tre ternel & in
fini. C'est pourquqy il.y gn a qui ont cr
que cestoit Dieu lui mme, ou bien son At
tribut, son Immensit. .<$aijs comme il a des
parties, ce n est pas une those qui puisse con
venir Dieu.
4. Pour moy , s ay marqu plus d' une
fois, queje tenois l'Espace pour qulquf\chose
Je purement relatif, comme le Temps j pour
mm Ordre des Coexistences, comme le Temps
est un Ordre des Successions. Car Y Espace
marque en termes de possibilit, un Ordre des
tboses- qui existent en mme temps, en tant
qu'elles existent ensemble } fans entrer dans
lentmanires d'exister ; Et lors qu'on voit
plusieurs choses ensemhle, on s': apperoit de
cet Ordre des choses entre elles. .
;' "r'~. ': h' :.-..' u\ -.-ji'i
" .O^wKjfoo \\\'A\
iLij.- Pour rfuter l'imagination de ceux qui

prennent l'Espace pom une Substance, ou
du moins pour quelque Etre absolu \ fay
plujkuri Demonstrations. Mais, je n.veux
nu servir present,- que de celle dont m me
fdurnfr icy I' occasion: rJe dis'jan.'^qe fi
J'Espace -toit un Etre, absolu ,.--?/ arriveront
' 'm chose dont Userait impossible qu'il
+ a
y
vMr. LEifcNlXZ'sX\md Paper.

$j
sophical one , As Chancellor Bacon fays,
that there are Jdola Tribus, Idola Speeds.
,.g. These Gentlemen maintain therefore,
that Space is % real absolute Being. But
this involves theta'to.êat Difficulties ,
fox such a Being must needs be Eternal
and Infinite. Hence Some have believed it
to "be God himself, or, one of his Attrifeates, his Immensity. But since Space consifts of Paru , it is not a thing which
can belong to God.. , '- A
; 4. As for my Own Opinion, I have said
more than once, that I hold Space to be
something merely relative, as Time is } that
I hold it to be an Order of Coexistences, as
Time, is an Order of Successions. For Space
demotes, in Terms of Possibility,, an Order
of Things which exist at the fame time,
considered as existing together :, without
enquiring into their Manner of Existing.
And when many Things are seen together,
^Kieii perceives That Order of Things amonir
themselves.
v. I have many Demonstrations, to con
fute the Fancy of Those who take Space
jCo be a Substance, or at least an absolute
-Beifig. But I shall only use, at the pre
sent, one Demonstration, which the Au
thor here gives me Occasion to insist upon.
I fay then, that if Space was an absolute
Being, there would Something happen, for
which
j8
troisime Ecrit de Mr. Libntz.

y eut une raison suffisante j ce qui efl con
tre notre Axiome, Voicy comment je h
prouve. L'Espace est quelque chose ^'uni
forme absolument $ &sans les choses y pla
ces, un point de l'Espace ne diffre absolu
ment en rien d'un autre point de l'Espace.
Or il suit de cela (suppos 1ue l'Espace soit

quelque chose en lui mme outre /'ordre des
corps entre eux,') qu'il est impofible qu'il
y ait une raison, pourquoy Dieu, gardant les
mmes situations des corps entre eux , ait
plac les corps dans l'Espace ainsi " non pas
autrement , & pourquoy tout n'a pas t
pris rebours, (par exemple,} par un Ex
change de /'Orient & de /'Occident. Mais
fi l'Espace n'est autre chose que cet Ordre ou
Rapport, & n'est rien du tout sans les corpst
que la poftbilit d'en mettre j ces deux Etats, l'un tel qu'il est, /' autre suppos re
bours, ne diffreraient point entre eux. heur
Difference ne se trouve donc, que dans no
tre Supposition chimrique, de la realit de
l'Espace en lui mme. Mais dans la vrits
l'unseroit justement la mme chose que l'au
tre^ comme ils font absolument indiscerna
bles j & par consequent, il n'y a pas lieu de
demander la raison de la preference de l'un
l'autre.
6. Il
. . Mr. LeIe^ itz\s Third Taper.

$9
which it * would be impossible there should *&J. Af"
be a sufficient Reason. Which is against ^".'4!
my Axiom. And I prove it thus. Space
is Something absolutely Uniform ; and,
without the Things placed in it, One Point
of Space does not absolutely differ in any re
spect whatsoever from Another Point ofSpace.
Now from hence it follows, (supposing
Space to be Something in it self, besides the
Order of Bodies among themselves,') that
'us impossible there should be a Reason,
why God , preserving the same Situations
of Bodies among themselves, should have
placed them in Space after one certain par
ticular manner , and not otherwise , why
every thing was not placed the quite con
trary way, for instance, by changing East
into Weft. But if Space is nothing else, but
That Order or Relation } and is nothing at
all without Bodies , but the Possibility of
placing them j then those two States, the
one such as it now is , the other supposed
to be the quite contrary way , would not
at all differ from one another. Their Dif
ference therefore is only to be found in our
Chimerical Supposition of the Reality of
Space in it self. But in truth the one would!
exactly be the fame thing as the other, they
being absolutely indiscernible j and conse
quently there is no room to enquire after a
Reason of the Preference of the one to the
other.. v
.- ,'.vj\ i'.-V- .'.-> vav.-.w .
~tA
<6. The
Troifme Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.
6. // en ,e de mme' d Temps. Sup~

'.*.' Pfi 1ue' qwlqu un demande pourquoy Dieu
n'a pas .tout cr un An plutt } que
ce personnage veuille infrer de l,
que Dieu -a. fait quelque chofe dont il n'e
pas poble -qu'il y ait une raifon pourquoy
il a fait ainfi plutt qu autrement j On
lui repondroit que fon illation feroit vraye, fi
le temps etoit quelque chofe hors des chofes
temporelles -r Car il feroit impoble qu'il '
tut des raifons pourquoy les chofes eujfent
t appliques plutt de tels inans, qiC
/'autres, leur fuccefwn demeurant la mme.
Mais cela mme prouve que les inftans hors
des chofes ne font rien , & qu'ils ne confi
dent que dans leur ordre fuccef ; lequel
demeurant le , l'un des deux EtatsL
comme celuy de V anticipation imagine, ne
differeroit en rien, - ne fauroit tre difcern
de /'autre qui efi maintenant.
b.'. .-.': -.
r.~
""!.
t:<v'"
'
'v-v
.'
:,
- -t r: .,..;,
;..,-.:
.':; ! 1."
'$& On .voit par tout ce que je viens de
dire, que mon Axiome n'a pas t bien pris i
& qu'en femblant V accorder, on le refufe.
H eft vray, dit on, qu'il n?y a rien fans une
raifon farmanie pourquoy il ieft, & pour-quoy il eft ; ainfi plutt qu' autrement :
Mais on adjoute, que cette raifon fufjante
eft fouvent b:mÛ. [ou. mere"] Volent de
Dieu : Comme lors qu'on demande pourquoy
i'i.
2
la
. Mr. LeIenITz'j Third Paper.

6. The Case is the fame with respect to
Time. Supposing any one should ask, whyGod did not . create every thing a Tear
sooner , and the fame Person should infer
from thence, that God has done something,
concerning which 'tis not possible there
should be a Reason, why he did it 72?, and
not otherwise : The Answer is , That his
Inference would be right, if Time was any
thing distinct from Things existing in
Time. For it would be impossible there
should be any Reason, why Things mould
be applied to such particular Instants, ra-*
ther than to others, their Succession conti
nuing the same. But then the same Argu
ment proves, that Instants, consider'd with
out the Things, are Nothing at all ; and
that they consist only in the successive Or
der of Things : Which Order remaining
the fame, one of the two States, viz.. that
of a supposed Anticipation , , would not at
all differ, nor could be discerned from, the
other which Now is.
7. It appears from what I have said,
that my Axiom has not been well under
stood -, and that the Author denies it, tho'
he seems to grant it. 'Tis true, fays he,
that there is nothing without a sufficient
Reason why it Is, and why it is Thus, ra
ther than otherwise But he adds, that
This sufficient Reason, is often the simple or
merfe Will os God 1 As, when it is asked
why
6 1>
02
Troisime Ecrit de Mr. Lebnitz.

la Matire n'a pas t place autrement
dans l'Espace ; les mmes situations entre
les corps demeurant gardes. Mais c' efl
juflement soutenir que Dieu veut quelque
chose, sans qu'il y ait aucune raison suffi
sante de sa Volont -, contre V Axiome, ou
la Rgle gnrale de tout ce qui arrive.
C'ejl retomber dans V Indifference vague ,
que j' ay amplement rfute, & que s ay
montre chimrique absolument, mme dans
les Creatures j S* contraire la Sagejse de
Dieu , comme s'il pouvoit oprer fans agir
par raison.
8. On m' objeBe qu* en n' admettant point
cette simple {& mere} Volont, ce-seroit oter
Dieu le pouvoir de choisir, & tomber
dans la Fatalit. Mais c'ejl tout le con
traire .' On soutient en Dieu le pouvoir de
choisir, puisqu* on le fonde sur la raison du
choix conforme sa Sage/se. Et ce n'efl
pas cette Fatalit (qui n efl autre chose
que V ordre le plus sage de la Providence,) :
mais une Fatalit ou Neceffit brute, quy il
faut viter j ou il n y a ny Sagesse, ny
Choix.
-' n - : : " ;.- '. y
:. ';,
o. J'avois. remarqu, qu'en diminuant la
Quantit de la Matire , on diminue la
quantit des Objets o Dieu peut exercer.fa
Bont. On me repond, qu'au lieu de la
Matire, il y ad' autres choses dans le vuide,
o il ne laisse pas de l'exercer. Soit. Qyoi'i j. -;:... i UrJ 'V. V.-. u que
Mr. Leibnitz** Third Faser.

why Matter was not placed otherwhere in
Space \ the fame Situations of Bodies arnong themselves being preserved. But this
is plainly maintaining , that God Wills
Something , without any sufficient Reason
for his Will : Against the Axiom, or the
general Rule of whatever happens. This
is falling back into the loose Indifferenee,
which I have confuted at large, and show
ed to be absolutely chimerical even in Crea
tures, and contrary to the Wisdom of God,
as if he could operate without acting by
Reason.
, ,
8. The Author objects against me, that
if we don't admit this simple and mere
Will, we take away from God the Power
of Chusing, and bring in a Fatality. But
the quite contrary is true. I maintain that
God has the Power of Chusing , since I
ground That Power upon the Reason os a
Choice agreeable to his Wisdom. And 'tis
not This Fatality, ( which is only the wi
sest Order of Providence) but a Blind Fa
tality or Necessity, void of All Wisdom
and Choice, which we ought to avoid.
9. I had observed, that by lessening the
Quantity os Matter, the Quantity of Ob
jects, upon which God may exercise his
Goodness, will, be lessen'd. The Author
answers, that instead of Matter, there are
other things in the Void Space, on which
God may exercise his Goodness. Be it so :
Tho'
&y
6&
Troisime Ecrit de Mr. Leienitz.

que je n'en demeure point d'accord y cas je
tiens que Toute Subftance cre eft accom
pagne de Matire. Maissoit, dis-je } je
reponds, que phis de Matire toit compatible avec ces mmes choses j & par conse
quent, c'eft Uuijours diminuer le dit Qbjet
Uinstance d'un plus grand nombre d'Hom
mes ou d'Animaux, ne convient point ; cat
ils teroient la Place ' d'autres choses. '.:'"
10. Il fera difficile de nous faire accroire',
que dans V usage ordinaire , Sensoriutn ne
signifie pas l'Organe de la. Sensation. . ' Voicy
les paroles de Rudolphus Goclenius, dans
son Dictionarium Philofophcum, fi Sensiterium : Barbarum Scholafticorum, dit il;
qui interdum sunt Sirfias GrcoruM. , Hi
dicunt 'Ao^TTipui'. Ex quo iUi fecerunt
Senjiterium, pro Sensorio ^ id eft, Organe
Sensationis.
0 7_ ."
noO
11. La simple Presence d'une Subftance,
mme anime, ne suffit pas pour la Percepti
on. Un aveugle, S* mme un dift?ait,ne
voit point. il faut expliquer comment
l' Ame s'apperoit de ce qui ejl hors d'elle.
1 2. Dieu n'ejl pas present aux, choses par

.Situation, mais par Essence -, fa Presence se
manifejle par son Operation immediate. La.
Presence de l'Ame eft tout d'une autre na
ture. Dire qu'elle efl diffuse par le corps,
c* efl la rendre tendue 3* divisible j dire
c -*
quelle
Mr. L E I E N IT zV Third Taper,

Tho' I don't grant it } for I hold that eve
ry created Substance is attended with Mat
ter. However, let it be so : I answer, that
More Matter was consistent with those same
Things j and consequently the said Ob
jects will be still lessened. The Instance of
a greater Number of Men, or Animals, is
not to the purpose \ for They would fill up
Place, in Exclusion of other Things.
10. It will be difficult to make me be
lieve, that Senforhim does not, in its Usual
Meaning, signify an Organ of Sensation.
See the Words of Rudolpbus Goclenim, in
his DiEiionarium Philpsopbicum ^ v. Sensiterium. Barharum Scbolafticorum, fays he,
qui interdum sunt Simi Grcorum. Hi dicitnt 'AioSvTuejior. Ex quo iUi fecerunt Sensiterium pro Sensorio, id <?/?, Organo Senfationis.
ii. The mere Presence of a Substance,
even an animated one, is not sufficient for
Perception. A blind Man , and even a
Man whose Thoughts are wandering, does
not See. The Author must explain," how
the Soul perceives what is -without it
self.
1 2. God is not present to Things by Si~
Tuation, but by E/fence : His Presence _ is
manifested by his immediate Operation.
The Presence of the Soul, is quite of ano
ther Nature. To fay that it is diffused all
over the Body, is to make it extended and
F .
divi
6z
66
Troisime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

qu'elle eft toute entire en chaque partie de
quelque corps, c'efl la rendre divisible d'elle
mme. V attacher un Point , la rpan
dre par plusieurs Points, tout cela ne font
qu'expressions abusives, Idola Tribus.
1 3. Si la Force active se perdoit dans
l'Univers par les Loix naturelles que Dieuy
a tablies, en forte qu'il eut besoin d'une
nouvelle Impression pour reslituer cette
force, comme un Ouvrier qui remdie l'imperfeBion de fa Machine j le desordre n auroit pas seulement lieu V gard de nous,
mais Vgard de Dieu lui mme. Il pouvoit le prvenir , & prendre mieux ses
mesures , pour viter un tel inconvenient :
Aujfi l'a- 1- ilfait en cffeB.
14. Quand say dit que Dieu a oppos

> de tels desordres des remdes par avance, je
ne dis point que Dieu laisse venir les desor
dres , & puis les remdes j mais qu'il a
trouv moyen par avance d'empcher les de
sordres d' arriver.
15. On s'applique inutilement critiquer
mon Expression , que Dieu esl Intelligentia
Supramundana. Disant qu'il esl au dessus
du Monde, ce nef pas nier qu'il eft dans le
Monde.
16. Je nay jamais donnsujet de douter
que la Conservation de Dieu ejl une Preser
vation
Mr. L E i B N I T z\f Third Paper.

6j
divisible. To say it is, the Whole of it,
in every Part of the Body, is to make it
divided from it self. To fix it to a Point,
to diffuse it all over many Points, are only
abusive Expressions, Idola Tnbus.
13. If aBive Force Ihould diminish in
the Universe, by the Natural Laws which
God has established -, so that there mould
be need for him to give a new Imprejjjon
in order to restore That Force, like an Ar
tist's Mending the Imperfections of his Ma
chine j the Disorder would not only be
with respect: to Us , but also with respect
to God himself. He might have prevented
it, and taken better Measures to avoid such
an Inconvenience : And therefore, indeed,
he has a&ually done it.
14. When I said that God has provi
ded Remedies before-hand against such Dis
orders, I did not fay that God suffers Dis
orders to happen, and then finds Remedies
for them j but that he has found a way
before-hand to prevent any Disorders hap
pening.
15. The Author strives in vain to
criticize my Expression , that God is * In- *fj}^
telligentia Siipramundana. To fay that n. 1.
God is Above the World , is not denying
that he is In the World.
16. I never gave any Occasion to doubt,
but that God's Conservation is an actual
F 2
Prefer
68

vation & Continuation aBuelie des Etres,
Pouvoirs, Ordres, Dispositions & Motions j
& je crois V avoir peutetre mieux expliqu
que beaucoup d'autres. Mais dit on ; This
is All that 1 contended for \ Ceft en cela
que conjijle toute la Dispute. A cela je re
ponds, Serviteur trs humble. Noftre Di
spute consifle en bien d'autres choses. LaQueslion eft, Si Dieu n'agit pas le plus R
gulirement, & le plus Parfaitement ? Si fa
Machine ejl capable de tomber dans des
Dsordres, qu'il eft oblig de redresser par
des voyes extraordinaires } Si la Volont de
Dieu eft capable d'agir fans Raison } Si l'E
space eft un Etre absolu ? Sur la Nature dit
Miracle -, & quantit de Questions sembla
bles, qui font une grande Separation.
17. Les Thologiens ne demeureront
point d' accord de la These qu' on avance
contre moy , qu' il n'y a point de difference
par rapport Dieu, entre le naturel & le
surnaturel. La plus part des Philosophes
Vapprouveront encore moins. Il y a uns
difference infinie :, mais il paroift bien qu'on
ne l'a pas bien considre. Le surnaturel
surpasse toutes les forces des Creatures. 77
faut venir un Exemple : en voicy un, que
say souvent employ avec Succs. Si Dieu
vouloit faire enforte qu'un corps libre se pro
ment dans I'Ether en rond Ventour dûn
certain Centre fixe , fans que quelque autre
Cra
-^"~
Mr. Leibnitz** Third Paper.

Preservation and Continuation of the Be
ings , Powers , Orders, Dispositions, and
Motions of all Things : And I think 1 have
perhaps explained it better than many Others. But, fays the Author, This is all
that I contended for. To this I answer j
Tour Humble Servant for That, Sir. Our
Dispute consists in many other Things,
The Question is , Whether God does not
act in the most regular and most perfecl
Manner ? Whether his Machine is liable
to Disorders, which he is obliged to mend
by extraordinary Means ? Whether the
Will of God can act without Reason >
Whether. Space is an absolute Being > Alfq
concerning the Nature of Miracles ; and
many such Things , which make a wide
Difference between us.
17. Divines will not grant the Author's
Position against me ; viz. that there is no
Difference, with respect to God, between
Natural and Supernatural : And it will be
still less approved by most Philosophers,
There is a vast Difference between these
two Things , but it plainly appears, it has
not been duly consider'd. That which is
Supernatural , exceeds all the Powers of
Creatures. I shall give an Instance, which
I have often made use of with good Suc
cess. If God would cause a Body to move
free in the ther round about a certain
fixed Centre , without any other Creature
F 3
acting
69

Creature agisse sur lui \ Je dis que cela ne
se peut que par Miracle, ri tant pas expli
cable par les natures des corps. Car un
corps libre s'carte naturellement de la ligne
courbe par la tangente, C efi ainsi que je
soutiens que /'attraction proprement dite des
corps, efi une chose miraculeuse, ne pouvant
pas tre explique par leur Nature.
Troi
Mr. L E i B N I t z\r Third Paper.

acting upon it : I say, it could not be done
without a Miracle j since it cannot be ex
plained by the Nature of Bodies. For, a
free Body does naturally recede from a
Curve in the Tangent. And therefore I
maintain, that * the AttraEiion of Bodies,
properly so called, is a Miraculous Thing,
since it cannot be explained by the Nature
of Bodies.
* See Appendix, N. 8. and the Note on Dr. ClarkeV Fifth
Reply, N.ii3.
F4
Dr.
71
[7-]
Troisime Rplique de Mr. Clarke,

i. sÊ que V on dit ici, ne regarde que
^ la Signification de certains Mots.
On peut admettre les Dfinitions, que l* on
trouve ici-, mais cela n* empchera pas au*
on ne puisse appliquer 'les Raisonnejnetis Mathmatiques des Sujets Physiques &. M
taphysiques.
2. // est indubitable, que rien n existe,
sans qu* il y ait une Raison suffisante de
son existence -, & que rien n existe d*
une certaine manire plutt que d' une autre,
sans qu' il y ait auffi une Raison suffisante
de cette manire d* exifter. Mais V gard
des choses qui font indiffrentes en elles
mmes, la simple Volont est une Raison
suffisante pour leur donner V existence, ou
pour les faire exister d* une certaine ma
nire -, & cette Volont ?j' a pas besoin d*
tre dtermine par une Cause trangre.
Voici des Exemples de ce que je viens de
dire. Lors que Dieu a cr ou plac une
particule de Matire dans un lieu plutt que
dans un autre, quoique tous les lieux soient
^semblables -, il n en fi eu aucune autre
raison que sa Volont." Et suppos que l'

}
Espace
C 73 3
Dr. C L A R K E V Third Reply.

I. ^TPHI S relates only to the SignificaX. tlon of Words. The Definitions
here given, may well be allowed j And yet
Mathematical Reasonings may be applyed
to Physical and Metaphysical Subjects.
2. Undoubtedly nothing is, without a

sufficient Reason why it is, rather than not ^
and -why it is Thus, rather than Otherwise.
But in things in their own Nature indiffe
rent ; mere Will, without any thing Exter
nal to influence it, is alone That sufficient
Reason. As in the Instance of God's creat
ing or placeing any particle of matter in
One place rather than in Another, when
All places are Originally alike. And the
Cafe is the fame, even though Space were
nothing real, but only the mere Order os
Bodies: For still it would be absolutely in
different, and there could be no other reason
but mere Will, why Three equal Particles
should be placed or ranged in the Order
p, b, c, rather than in the contrary Order.
And
74
Troisime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

Espace ne ft rien de rel, mais feulement
un Simple Ordre des Corps -, la Volont
de Dieu ne laifferoit pas a" tre la feule
possible raison pour laquelle trois Particules
gales auroient t places ou ranges dans
V ordre a, b, c, plutt que dans un ordre
contraire. On nesauroit donc tirer de cette
Indifference des Lieux aucun Argument,
qui prouve qu' il n y a point d' Espace rel.
Car les differens Espaces font rellement di
stincts /' un de V autre, quoiqu ils soient
parfaitement Semblables. D* ailleurs, fi F
on suppose que l' Espace n eft point rel, &
qu* il n est simplement que 1' Ordre C 1*
Arrangement des Corps, il / ensuivra une
absurdit palpable. Car, selon cette ide ^
fi la Terre, le Soleil, & la Lune, avoient
t placez o les Etoiles fixes les plus loig
nes se trouvent present, ( pourvu qu* ils
eussent t placez, dans le mme ordre, &
la mme distance V un de V autre j ) non
seulement c* eut t la mme chose, comme
le savant Auteur le dit trs-bien ^ mais il
j' ensuivroit aussi que la Terre, le Soleil &
la hune , seroient en ce cas-l dans le
mme Lieu, oie ils font prsentement : Ce qui
ft une Contradiction manisefie.
est
'.es Anciens || n ont point dit que tout
Le.
. || On a fait ces Remarques l' occasion d' un Endroit
de la Lettre de Mr.Leibmt^, qui servoit d'Enveloppe
au troisime Ecrit, qu' il envoya.
Espace
. Dr. Clarke'j UbirA Reply.
75
And therefore no Argument can be drawn

from this Indifferency of AU places, to
prove that no Space is real. For different
Spaces are really different or diflinB one
from another, though they be perfectly
alike. And there is This ' evident absur
dity in supposing Space not to be real,
but to be merely the Order of Bodies ;
that, according to That Notion, if the
Earth and Sun and Moon had been placed
where the remotest fixt Stars now are,
(provided they were placed in the fame
Order and Distance they now are with
regard one to another,') it would not only#
have been, (as this Learned Author
rightly fays,) la meme chose, the fame
Thing in effetl j which is very true :
But it would also follow, that they
would Then have been in the same Place
too, as they are Now : Which is an
express Contradiction.
The
|| Ancients did not call AU Space which
is void of Bodies, but only extramun
dane Space, by the Name of Imaginary
Space. The meaning of which, is not,
|| Th wm occasioned by a Passage in the private Letter,
wherein Mr. Leibnitz'.* Third Paper came inclosed.
that
j6
Troisime Rplique de Mr. Clarke,

Espace destitu de Corps etoit un Espace
Imaginaire : Us ri ont donn ce nom qu' l*
Espace qui eft au del du Monde. Et ils
m' ont pas voulu dire par l, que cet Es
pace n' est * pas rel j mais seulement que
nous ignorons entirement quelles sortes de
choses il y. a dans cet Espace. J* ajoute
que les Auteurs, qui ont quelquefois em
ploy le mot d' imaginaire pour marquer que l'
Espace ri toit pas rel, ri ont point prouv
ce qu ils avanoient par le simple usage de
ce Terme.
3. L' Espace ri ejl pas une Substance,
>wn Etre ternel & infini j mais une Pro
prit, ou une s fuite de /' existence d' un
Etre infini & ternel. U Espace infini est
V Immensit : Mais V Immensit ri eft pas
Dieu : donc /' Espace infini ri est pas Dieu.
Ce que /' on dit ici des parties de V Espace^
ri est point une difficult. L' Espace infini
ejl absolument & essentiellement indivisible j
& c' est une Contradiction dans les termes,
que de supposer qu' il soit divis ; car il

faudroit qu' il y eut un Espace entre
les parties que V on suppose divises \
ce qui eft supposer que Y Espace est || dir
T-T-
* Le Kant n' a point de Dimensions, de Grandeur,

ni de Quantit: il n'a aucune Proprit.
Voie? ci-dessous la Note fur ma quatrime Rpli
que, . 10.
Il Voez. ci-dessus, 4. de ma seconde Rplique,
vis
' 2)r. ClarkeV Third Reply.

that such Space is * not real ; but only
that We are wholly ignorant what kinds of
Things are in that Space. Those Writers,
who by the Word, imaginary, meant at
any time to affirm that Space was not real 9
.did, not thereby prove, that it was not
real.
3. Space is not a Being, an eternal and

infinite Being, but a Property, or a f con
sequence of the Existence of a Being in
finite and eternal. Infinite Space, is Im
mensity : But Immensity is not God : And
therefore Infinite Space, is not God. Nor
is there any Difficulty in what is here
alledged about Space having Parts. For
Infinite Space is One, absolutely and es
sentially indivisible : And to suppose it
parted, is a contradiction in Terms j be
cause there must be Space in the Parti
tion itself; which is to suppose it || parted,
and yet not parted at the same time. The
* Of Nothing, there are no Dimensions, no Magnitude,
no Quantity, no Properties.
f See below, the Note on my Fourth Reply, 10.
D See above, 4. of my Second Reply.
Immensity
77
7S
'Troisime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

vis & non divis en mme temps. Quoi
que Dieu soit Immense ou Present par
rout, sa Subfiance ri en ej pourtant pas
plus divise en parties, que son Existence
V ej par la Dure. La difficult que V on
fait ici, vient uniquement de /' abus du mot
de Parties.
4. Si V Espace n etoit que V Ordre des
choses qui coexistent, il s* ensuivroit que si
Dieu faisait mouvoir le Monde tout entier
en ligne droite, quelque degr de vitesse qiC
il eut, il ne laifseroit pas d' tre toujours
dans le mme lieu j & que rien m re
cevrait aucun choc, quoique ce mouvement
îtr arrt subitement. Et si le Temps ri
toit qu* un Ordre de Succession dans les
cratures \ il j-' ensuivrait que si Dieu avait
cr le Monde quelques millions d' annes
plutt, il n' anroit pourtant pas t cr
plutt. De plus, V Espace & le Temps font
des Quantitez-, ce qu on ne peut dire de
la Situation & de V Ordre.
5. On prtend ici, que parce que V Espace
efl uniforme ou parfaitement Semblable, &
qu aucune de ses parties ne diffre de /'
autre } il s' ensuit que si les Corps qui ont t
crez dans un certain lieu, avoient t
crez dans un autre lieu, (suppos qu* ils
conservassent la mme Situation entre eux ,)
ils 11e laisseraient pas d'' avoir t crez dans
le mme lieu. Mais c'est une Contradi&ion
manifeje.
Dr. ClarkeV Third Reply.

Immensity or Omnipresence of God, is no
more a dividing of his Substance into Parts ,
than his Duration, or continuance of ex
isting, is a dividing of his existence into
Parts. There is no difficulty here, but
what arises from the figurative Abuse of the
Word, Parts.
4. If Space was nothing but the Order
of Things coexisting j it would follow, that
if God should remove in a streight Line
the whole Material World Entire, with any
swiftness whatsoever , yet .it would still
always continue in the fame Place : And
that nothing would receive any Shock up
on the most sudden stopping of that Mo
tion. And if Time was nothing but the
Order of Succession of created Things ? it
would follow, that if God had created the
World Millions of Ages sooner than he did,
yet it would not have been created at all
the sooner. Further : Space and Time are
Quantities j which Situation and Order
are not.
5. The Argument in This Paragraph, is j
That because Space is Uniform or Alike,
and One Part does not differ from another j
therefore the Bodies created in One place,
if they had been created in Another place,
(supposing them to keep the same Situation
with regard to each other,) would still have
been created in the Same Place as before :
Which is a manifest Contradiction. The
. . '1
Uniformity
J<?
8o
manisefte. Il eft vrai que V Uniformit de

V Espace prouve, que Dieu n a pu avoir
aucune raison externe pour crer les choses
dans un lieu phtt que dans un autre : Mais
cela empche-t-il que fa volont n ait t
une raison suffisante pour agir en quelque
lieu que ce soit, puisque tous les lieux sont
indifferent ou semblables, & qiC il y a une
bonne raison pour agir en quelque lieu ?
6. he mme raisonnement , dont je me
suis servi dans la selion prcdente, doit
avoir lieu iciH
7, & 8. Lors qu il y a quelque dif
ference dans la Nature des choses,- la
Consideration de cette Difference dtermine
toujours un Agent Intelligent & trs-sage.
Mais lors que deux manires d' agir font
*voez P galement bonnes, comme dans les cas dont
Appendice, on a par\ ci-dessus -, dire que Dieu * ne
' 4*
sauroit agir du tout, & que ce n est point
une ImperfeBion de ne pouvoir Agir dans
un tel cas, parce que Dieu ne peut avoir
aucune raison externe pour agir d' une cerr
taine manire plutt que J'une autre ^.dire
une telle chose, c est insinuer que Dieu n d
pas en lui mme un Principe d' Action, c"
qu' il ejl toujours, pour ainsi dire, machi
nalement dtermin par les choses de dehors.
9. Je suppose que la Quantit dtermine
de Matire, qui ejl present dans le Monde,
eft la plus convenable V Etat present
des choses; & qu* une plus grande (aussi
;
bien
2)r.. ClarkeV Third Reply.
Si
Uniformity of Space, does indeed prove,

that there could be no (External) reason,
why God should create things in One place
rather, than in another : But does That
hinder his own Will, from being to it self a
fi*fficient reason of Acting jn Any place,
when All Places are Indifferent or Alike,
and there be Good reason to Act in Some
place ?
6* The Same Reasoning takes place here,
as in the foregoing,
. 7 and 8r Where there is any Differencs
in the Nature of things, there the Con
sideration of That Difference always de
termines an Intelligent and perfectly wife
Agent. But when Two ways of Acting
are equally and alike good, fas in the
Instances before mentioned-,) to affirm in
such case, that God * cannot Atl at all, * * Apor that 'tis no Perfection in him to be able ^J**1
to AB, because he can have no External
Reason to move him to Act one way rather
than the other, seems to be a denying God
to have in himself any Original Principle or
Tower of beginningto act, but that he must
neds (as it were Mechanically) be always
determined by things extrinsick.
9. I suppose, That determinate Quantity
of Matter, which is now in the World, is
the mojl Convenient for the present Frame of
Nature, Or the Vresent State of Things :
And that a Greater ( as well as a Less )
G
Quantity
82

bien qu* une plus petite) Quantit de Ma
tire, aurait t moins convenable V Etat
present du Monde ; & que par consquent
elle n aurait pas t un plus grand Objet
de la bont de Dieu.
i o. // ne s' agit pas de favoir ce que
Goclenius entend par le mot de Sensorium,
mais en quel sens Mr. le Chevalier * New
ton j' eft servi de ce mot dans son Livre.
Si Gocienius croit que V Oeil, V Oreille, ou
quelque autre Organe des Sens, eft le Sen
sorium, il se trompe. Mais quand un Au
teur employe un Terme d* Art, & qiC il d
clare en quel sens il s* en sert ^ quoi bon
rechercher de quelle manire d^ autres Ecri
vains ont entendu ce mme Terme ? Scapula
traduit le mot, dont il s1 agit ici, Domicilium, c eft dire, le Lieu o l'Ame reside.
II. U Ame d' un Aveugle ne voit point,

parce que certaines obftrutlions empchent
les Images d* tre portes au Sensorium, o
elle eft prsente. Noits ne savons pas com
ment /' me d* un homme qui voit, apperoit
les Images , auxquelles elle e/l prsente :
Mais nous savons qiC elle ne sauroit appercevoir les choses, auxquelles elle n eft pas
* Voei !i Note sur 3. de m Premiers Rplique.
prsente j
\
Dr. ClarkeV Third Reply.

Quantity of Matter, would have made the
Present Frame of the World less Conve
nient :, and consequently would not have
been a greater Object for God to have exer
cised his Goodness upon.
10. The Question is not, what Goclenius, but what Sir Isaac Netvton means by
the word Sensorium, when the Debate is
about the Sense of * Sir Isaac Newton's, and
not about the Sense of Goclenius's Book.
If Goclenim takes the Eye, or Ear, or any
other Organ of Sensation, to be the Senso
rium j he is certainly mistaken. But when
any Writer express explains what he means
by any Term of Art , of What Use is it,
in this cafe, to enquire in what different
Senses perhaps some other Writers have
sometimes used the same Word ? Scapula
explains it by domiciliwn, the place where
the Mind resides.
11. The Soul of a Blind Man does for
This reason not see, because no Images, are
conveyed (there being some Obstruction in
the way) to the Sensorium where the Soul
is present. How the Soul of a Seeing Man,
sees the Images to which it is present, we
know not : But we are sure it cannot per
ceive what it is not present to \ because no* See th: Ncte on 3. in my First Reply.
G 2
thing
83
84
troisime Rplique de Mr. Clark.

prsente -, parce qu un Etre ne sauroit ni
agir, ni recevoir des impressions, dans un
lieu ou il n efl pas.
1 2. Dieu tant par tout, est actuellement
present tout, Essentiellement & * Sub
stantiellement. // est vrai que la Presence
de Dieu se manifeste par son Operation $
mais cette Operation seroit impossible sans la
presence actuelle de Dieu. V Ame n est
pas prsente chaque partie du Corps ; &
par consquent elle n agit, & ne sauroit
agir pas elle mme fur toutes les parties du
Corps, mais feulement fur le Cerveau, ou
fur certains Nerfs & fur les Esprits, qui
agissent sur tout le Corps, en vertu des Loix
du mouvement, que Dieu a tablies.
13, 14. Quoique les s Forces Actives,
qui font dans l'Univers, diminuent, & qu'
elles
* Deus omniprscns efl, &c. C'est--dire: Dieu eft pre
sent par tout, non seulement virtuellement, mais encore
Substantiellement : Car la Force, [virtus] ne sauroit sub
sister sans une Substance. Ncwtoni Pnncipia, Scholium
gnrale sub finem.
.,..
,
+ Le mot de Force Active ne signifie ici que le Mouve
ment & 1' Impetus ou la Force impulsive & relative de
Corps qui nait de leur mouvement, & qui lui est pro
portionne. Car c' est le Passage suivant, qui a donne
lieu tout ce qu' on dit fur ce sujet dans cette Dispute.
Atparet motum & nasci posse & perire, &c. C est-adire // efl vident que le Mouvement peut augmenter <&
diminuer. Mak-la Tenaciti des Corps Fluides, CAttrition de
leurs parties, & la joliesse de la Force Elastique dans les
Corn Solides, font que le Mouvement- tend toujours beaucoup
plia a diminuer qu augmenter. ,
i7** doncûc
Dr. Clarke1; Third Reply.

thing can Act, or be Acted upon, where
it Is not.
12. God, being Omnipresent, is really
present to every thing, Essentially and * Sub
stantially. His Presence manifests it self
indeed by its Operation, but it could not
operate if it was not There. The Soul is
not Omnipresent to every part of the Body,
and therefore does not and cannot it self
actually Operate upon every part of the
Body, but only upon the Brain, or certain
Nerves and Spirits, which, by Laws and
Communications of God's appointing, in
fluence the whole Body.
13. and 14. The f ABive Forces, which
are in the Universe, diminishing themselves
so
* Deus Omniprsens est, non per virtutem solam, fed
etiam per Substantiam: Nim virtus fine Substantia subsistere non potest. i .e. God if Omnipresent, not only virtually,
but substantially : For, Powers cannot subsist without a Sub
stance. Newtoni Principia, Scholium general' sub finem.
t Note ; Toe word, Astive Force, signifies here nothing but
Motion, and the Impetus or relative impulsive Force of
Bodies, arising from and bsing proportional to their Motion,
For, the Occasion of what has passed upon This Head, was
the following J'djfjdge. Apparet Motum & nasci posse &
perire. Verum, per tenacitatem corporum fluidorum,
partiumq-, suarum Attritum, visq; elastic* in corporibus
iolidis imbecillitatem ; multo magis in earn semper partem
vergit natura rerum, ut pereat Motus, quam ut nascatur.
Oôniam igitur varij illi Motus, qui in Mundo

conspiciuntur, perpetuo decrescunt universi ; necesie est
G 3
prorsus
85
%6

elles ayent besoin dy une nouvelle im
pression -, ce ri ejl point un desordre, ni une
imperseBion dans V Ouvrage de Dieu : Ce
ri eft mC une fuite de la nature des cra
tures', qui font dans la dpendance. Cette
dpendance ri est pas une chose, qui ait be
soin d" tre reBfie. L'Exemple qu' on
allgue d' un homme qui fait une Machine,
ri a aucun rapport la matire dont il s'
agit ici ; parce que les Forces, en vertu des
quelles cette Machine continue de se mouvoir,
sont tout--fait indpendantes de l'Ouvrier.
15. On peut admettre les mots d* In
telligente supramundana, de la manire
dont r Auteur les explique ici : Mais fans
cette explication , ils pourraient aisment
faire natre une fausse ide, comme Jl Dieu
ri toit pas rellement & substantiellement
present par tout.
1 6. Je rponds aux Quefiions que V on
propose ici : Que Dieu agit toujours de la
manire la plus rgulire 0- la plus parfaite:
tous les different mouvemens, qui font dans le monde, dimi
nuent continuellement ; il est absolument ncessaire a" avoir
recours quelques Principes Allifs, pour conjerver <& pour renoU.veller ces mouvement. Newconi Optice, Cuaest. ulr. pag.
341-343-
fe'
.Dr. Clarke'x Third Reply.

so as to stand in need of new impressions j is
no inconvenience, no disorder, no imper
fection in the Workmanship of the Uni
verse j but is the consequence of the Na
ture of dependent Things. Which Depen
dency of Things, is not a matter that
wants to be rectified. The Cafe of a Hu
mane Workman making a Machine, is quite
another thing : Because the Powers or
Forces by which the Machine continues to
move, are altogether independent on the
Artificer.
1 5. The Phrase, Intelligentia supramundana, may well be allowed, as it is here
explained : But without this explication,
the expression is very apt to lead to a
wrong Notion, as if God was not really and
substantially present every where.
1 6. To the Questions here proposed, the
Answer is : That God does always act in
the most regular and perfeB manner : That
prorsus, quo ij conscrvari & recrescere poffint, ut ad
atluosa aliqua Principia recurramus. i. e. Tis evident, that
Motion can in the Whole both increase and diminish. But
because of the Tenacity os Fluid Bodies, and the Attrition
of their Parti, and the Weakness of elaflick Force in Solid
Bodies ; Motion k, in the Nature of things, always much more
apt to diminish, than to increase.
Since therefore all the
various Motions that are in ' the World, are perpetually de
creasing ; 'tis absolutely necessary, in order to preserve and re
new those Motions, that we have recourse to some Active Prin
ciples. Newconi Optice, Qust.ult. pjg. 341, 343.
G 4
there
87
88
Troifime Rplique de Mr. ' Catke.

Qu il n y a mutin dsordre dans son Ou
vrage j & que les changefriens qu il fait
dans r Etat prefont de la Nature, ne font
pas plus extraordinaires, quels foin qu' il d
de conserver cet Etat ; Que lorsque es choses1
font en elles mmes absolument gales & in
diffrentes, la Volont de Dieu peut se d*
terminer librement sur le choix', sans qu*
aucune cause trangre la fasse agir :, e^ que
le pouvoir que Dieu a d'agir de cette ma
nire, es une vritable Perfection, Enfin,
je rponds que V Espace ne dpend peint de
l' Ordre ou de la Situation, ou de /' Exi
stence des Corps.
17. Al' gard des Miracles // ne sf
agit pas de savoir fie que les Thologiens
ou les Philosophes 'disent communment sur
cette matire, -fnAjs sur quelles raisons, ils
appuient leurs sentimens. Si un Miracle
eft toujours une AcTfin, qui surpafl la puis
sance de toutes les {Creatures \ il s* ensuivra
que si un homme marche sur V eau, * fi le
mouvement du Soleil (ou de la Terr) efi
arrt*,, ce ne sera point un Miracle, puisque
ces deux choses se peuvent faire sans V in
tervention d? une Puissance iftfijiie. Si un
Corps se meut autour d'un Centr dans le
Vutde, "fi- ce mouvement eft une chose
ordinaire, conmie celui des Plantes autour
dit Soleil } ce ne fera point un Miracle, soit
que Dieu lui mme produise ce mouvement
immdiatement, ou au' il soit produit' par
quelque
Dr. Clarke1j Third Keply.

there are no Disorders in the Workmanship
of God ^ and that there is nothing more
extraordinary in the Alterations he is pleased
to make in the Frame of things, than in
his continuation of it : That , in things in
their own nature absolutely Equal and In
different, the Will of God can freely choose
and determine it self, without any External
Cause to impell it , and that 'tis a PerseSion
in God, to be able so to do. That Space,
does not at all depend on the Order or Si
tuation or Existence of Bodies. And as to
the Notion of Miracles,
17. The Question is not, what it is that
TJivines or Philosophers usually allow or not
allow ^ but what Reasons Men alledge for
their Opinions. If a Miracle be That only,
which surpasses the Power of all Created
Beings j then for a Man to walk on the
"Water, or for the Motion of the Sun or
the Earth to be stopped, is no Miracle
since none of these things require infinite
Power to effect them. For a Body to
move in a Circle round a Center in Vacuo j
if it be usual (as the Planets moving about
the Sun,) 'tis no Miracle, whether it be ef
fected immediately by God himself, "or me
diately by any Created Power : But if it be
unusual, (as, for a heavy Body to be su
spended, and move so in the Air,) tis equal
ly a Miracle, whether it be effected imme
diately
89
5?o
Troibne Replique de Mr. Clarke.

quelque Crature. Mais fi ce mouvement
autour d* unCentree rare & extraordinaire,
comme feroit celui d' un Corps pefant fufpendu dans V air j ce fera galement un
Miracle, foit que Dieu mme produire ce
mouvement, ou qxi il foit produit par une
Crature invifible.
Enfin, fi tout ce
qui ii e pas effet des Forces naturelles des
Corps, 0 qrf on ne fauroit expliquer par
ces Forces, efi Miracle j il s' enfuivra
que tous les mouvemens des Animaux font
des Miracles. Ce qui femble prouver dmonfirativement, que le favant Auteur a une
faujfe ide de la nature du Miracle.
Quatrime
Dr. Cl akke\t Third Reply.

diately by God himself, or mediately by
any invisible Created Power.
Lastly j
if whatever arises not from, and is not ex
plicable by, the Natural Powers as Body,
be a Miracle -, then Every animal-motion
whatsoever, is a Miracle. Which seems
demonstrably to show, that this Learned
Author's Notion of a Miracle is erroneous.

i 9 *
ftjgft
m
$
'
V
. _.
Mr.L EIB-
91
'. "
[ 9* 3 -
'Qitatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz^

o u
Rponse au Troisime Ecrit Anglois.
i. T\Ans les choses indiffrentes absolu'*-' menty il ri y a soint de choixy &

far consequent point d* lection ny volont j
puisque le choix doit avoir quelque raison
oit principe.
2. Une simple volont fans aucun motifs
(a mere Will,) est une filion non feulement
contraire la perfection de Dieu, mais en
core chimrique & contradictoire, incom
patible avec la Definition de la volont, *
assez rfute dans la Theodice.
g. Il est "indifferent de ranger trois corps
gaux & en tout seitiblables, en quel ordre
qii on voudra j & par consequent ils ne se
ront jamais rangs, par celuy qui ne fait
rien qu avec sagesse. Mais aussi tant V
Auteur des choses, il n' en produira poinr,
& par consequent il n' y en a point dans
la Naiiirf
4- #
'
Mr. Leibnitz's Fourth Paper.

BEING
An Answer to Dr. ClarkeV Third

Reply.
i.TN things absolutely indifferent, there
X is no [Foundation fox"] Choice ^ and
consequently no Election, nor Will , since
Choice must be founded on some Reason,
or Principle.
2. A mere Will without any Motive, ist
a Fiction, not only contrary to God's Per
fection, but also chimerical and contra-,
dictory , inconsistent with the Definition of
the Will, and sufficiently confuted in my
Theodka.
3. Tis a thing indifferent, to place three
Bodies, equal and perfectly alike, in any.
order whatsoever j and consequently they ,
will * never be placed in Any order, by Him '
.
who does nothing without Wisdom. But,/><w,
then, He being the Author of things, no N- 4
such things will be produced by him at all y4" 9'
and consequently there are no such things
in Nature.
1
4. There
94
Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

4. // n y a soint deux Individus indis
cernables. Un Gentilhomme d' esprit de
mes amis, en parlant avec moy en presence de
Madame VEletlricedans le jardin de Herrenhausen, crut qu' il trouverait bien deux
feuilles entirement semblables. Madame 1*
Electrice /' en dfia, 0e il courut long temps
en vain pour en chercher. Deux gouttes es
eau, ou de lait, regardes par le Microscope^
se trouveront discernables. C efl un argu
ment contre les Atomes, qui ne font pas moins
combattus que le Vuide par les Principes de
la veritable Mtaphysique.
5. Ces grands Principes de /^ Raison suf

fisante & de l* Identit des indiscernables,
changent V tat de la Mtaphysique j qui
devient relle & demonstrative par leur
moyen : Au lien qu* autres fois elle ne confifloit presque qif en termes Vitides.
6. Poser deux choses indiscernables, efl
poser la mme chose sous deux noms. Ainsi
/' hypothse, que V Univers auroit eu d'
abord une autre position du Temps & du
Lieu que celle qui efl arrive effetlivement j
& que pourtant toutes le parties de V Univers
auraient eu la mme position entre elles , que
celle qiC elles ont receiie en effet! j efl une
fifth impossible.
2
7. La
Mr. LeienitzV Fourth Paper.

4. There is no such thing as Two In
dividuals indiscernible from each other. An
Ingenious Gentleman of my Acquaintance,
discoursing with me, in the presence of
Her Eletloral Highness the Princess Sophia,
in the Garden of Herrenhausen j thought he
could find two Leaves perfectly alike. The
Princess defied him to doit, and he ran
all over the Garden a long time to look for
some , but it was to no purpose. Two
Drops of Water, or Milk, viewed with a
Microscope, will appear distinguishable from
each other. This is an Argument against
Atoms ; which are confuted, as well as a
Vacuum, by the Principles of true Metaphyficks.
5. Those great Principles of a sufficient
Reason, and of the Identity os Indiscernibles,
change the State of Metaphysicks. That
Science becomes real and demonstrative by
means of these Principles , whereas before,
it did generally consist in empty Words.
6. To suppose two things indiscernible,
is to suppose the same thing under two
Names. And therefore to suppose that the
Universe could have had at first another po
sition of Time and Place, than that which
it actually had ; and yet that all the Parts
of the Universe (hould have had the same
Situation among themselves, as that which
they actually had :, such a Supposition, I
sey, is an impossible Fiction.

J t
7. The
95
$6
Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. LeienitZ.

'7. La mme raison qui sait que s Espace
hors du monde est imaginaire, prouve que
tout espace vuide es une chose imaginaire '%
car ils ne different que du grand au petit,
8. Si /' Espace est une proprit on un
attribut, il doit tre la proprit de quel
que Substance. V Espace vuide born, que
ses patrons supposent entre deux Corps, de
quelle Substance sera-t-l la proprit ou V
Affetlion >
... ; z::n
9. Si /' Espace infini eft /' immensit ;
/' Espace fini fera V oppos de V immensit,
c* est dire, la mensurabilit, ouf Etendue
borne. Or l' Etendue doit tre /' affetlion
d' un Etendu. Mais fi cet Espace ejl vuide,
il sera un attribut sans sujet, une .Etendue
d' aucun Etendu. C es pourquoy, en faisant
de V Espace une proprit, /' on tombe dans
thon sentiment qui le fait un Ordre des choses,
& non pas quelque chose d' absolu.
10. Si /' Espace est we ralit absolu j

bien loin d1 tre une proprit ou acci
dentalit oppose la Substance, il sera
plus Subsistant que les Substances. Dieu
ne le sauroit dtruire, ny mme changer en
rien. Il est non seulement immense dans le
tout , mais encore Immuable & Etemel
en chaque partie. Il y aura une infinit de
choses Eternelles hors de Dieu.
-...'. t
'.
11. Vire
Mr. LeibNitzV Fourth Paper.

7. The same reason, which shows that
extramundane Space is imaginary, proves
rhat All empty Space is an imaginary thing 3
for they differ only as greater and less.
8. If Spade is a property or Attribute^ it
must be the Property of some Substance,
But what Substance will That Bounded
empty Space be an Affection or Property
of, which the Persons I am arguing with,
suppose to be between Two Bodies }.
9. If infinite Space is Immensity, finite
Space will be the Opposite to Immensity,
that is, 'twill be Mensurability, or limited
Extension. Now Extension must be the
Affection of some thing extended. But if
That Space be empty, it will be an At
tribute without a Subject, an Extension
without any thing extended. Wherefore
by making Space a Property, the Author
falls in with My Opinion, which makes it
an Order of things, and not any thing
absolute.
10. If Space is an absolute reality j far
from being a Property or an Accident op
posed to Substance, it will have a greater
reality than Substances themselves. God'
cannot destroy it, nor even change it in
any respect. It will be not only immense
in the whole, but also Immutable and Eter
nal in every part. There will be an infinite
number of Eternal things besides God.
H
it* To
$j
,8
Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Lebniz.

il. Dire que- V Espace infini est .sens
parties, c esc dire que les Espaces finis ne le
composent point ; & que V Espace infini
pourrait subsster, quand tous les Espaces
finis feraient rduits rien. Ce seroit comme
fill m disait dans la Supposition Cartsi
enne d? un Univers corporel tendu fans
bornes, que cet Univers pourrait subsista
quand tous les. Corps qui le composent;, se
raient rduits rien\. <.
, ' m ct
12. On attribue des parties V Espace\
p. 19. 3eme Edition de la Defense de l'Ar
gument contre M. Dodwell y & on les fait
inseparables 1' une de 1' autre. Mais p. 30,
de la Seconde Defense, on enfaitjes parties
improprement dites : Cela se peut entendre
dans tm bon sens,
. -',..'.
13. De dire' que Dieu fasse avancer tout
F Univers, en jigne droite ou, antre, fans y
rien changer autrement, c' est encore une Sup
position Chimrique. Car deuj tats indis
cernables font le mme tat, & par conse
quent c'est un changement qui ne change rien.
De plus, il n y any rime ny raison. Or
Dieu ne fait rien fans rajson jf & H est imposlible qu' il y en ait icy* Outte- que ce
seroit. agendo nibil agere, comme je viens
de dire, cause de V indiseernaHlii. .
14. Ce
Mr. Lei bn it z\r Fourth Paper.
pp
ii. To say that infinite Space has no

parts, is to fay that it does not consist of
finite Spaces \ and that Infinite Space mi^hc
subsist, though all finite Spaces should be
reduced to nothing. It would be, as if
one should 'fay, in the Cartesian Supposition
of a material extended unlimited World
that such a World might subsist, though
all the Bodies of which it consists, should
be reduced to nothing.
1 2. The Author ascribes Parts to Space,
p. 1 9. of the %d Edition of his Defense os
the Argument againjl Mr. Dodwell j and
makes them inseparable one from another.
But, p. 50. of his Second Defense, he fays
they are "parts improperly so called: Which
may be undjtrstood in a good fense.
13. To say that God can cause the
whole Universe to move forwards a Right
Line, or in any other Line, without making
otherwise any Alteration in it ; is another
c Chimerical Supposition. For, two States SeeApindifcemme from each other, are the fame P*'**
State and consequently, 'tis a change N 10*
without any change. Besides, there is nei
ther Rhime nor Reason in it. But God
does nothing without Reason , And tis
tmpoffible there mould be any here. Be
sides, it would be agendo nihil agere, as
I have just now said, because of the'ln-
discernibility.
H 2
14. These
'
ioo Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

14. Ce sont Idola Tribus, Chimres toutes
pures, & Imaginations superficielles. Tout
cela n ejl fond, que fur la Supposition que
s Espace imaginaire eft rel.
15. C* ejl une fition semblable, c' est
dire impossible, de supposer que Dieu ait
cr le Monde quelques Millions d1 annes
pluftost. Ceux qui donnent dans cessortes
de FiBions, nesauroient rpondre ceux qui
argumenteroient pour V Eternit du Monde.
Car Dieu ne faisant rien sans raison, &
su
qu1 il ait produit le monde avant tout temps

assignable, c ejl dire que le monde soit
Eternel. Mais quand on montre que le com
mencements quel quy il soit, eft tousjours la
mme chose, la question pourqitoy iln en a
pas t autrement^ cesse,
16. Si V Espace & le Temps eftoient
quelque chose d' absolu, c' est dire, s' ils
eftoient autre chose que certains Ordres des
choses ^ ce que je dis, seroit Contradiction.
Mais cela n tant point, V Hypothse eft con
tradictoire, cy est dire, c* ejl une FiBion
impossible.
17. Et c' eft comme dans la Gomtrie,
oh r on prouve quelque fois par la Supposi
tion
Mr. Leibnitz^s Fourth Paper.

101
14. These are Idola Tribus, mere Chi
meras, and superficial Imaginations. All
this is only grounded upon the Supposition,
that imaginary Space is real.
1 5. It is a like fiction, (that is) an imftjfible one, to suppose that God might
have created the World some Millions of
Years sooner. They who run into such
kind of Fictions, can give no answer to one,
that should argue for the Eternity of the
World. For since God does nothing with
out Reason, and no Reason can be given
why he did not create the World sooner j
it will follow, either that he has created
nothing at all, or that he created the World
before any assignable time, that is, trot the
World is Eternal. But when once it has
been shown, that the Beginning, whenever
it was, is always the fame thing ; the
Question, Why it was not otherwise or
dered, becomes needless and insignificant.
16. If Space and Time were any thing
absolute, that is, if they were any thing
else, besides certain Orders of things j then
indeed my assertion would be a Contradittion. But since it is not so, the Hypo
thesis [that Space and Time are any thing
absolute~\ is contradictory, that is, 'tis an
impojsible Fiction.
17. And the Cafe is the fame as in Geowtry -3 where by the very Supposition that a
H 3
Figure
102
Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Lebnitz.

ion mme, qu une Figure soit plus grande,
grw' tf <?$?<!? tf//* n' est point plu* grande.
C eft une Contradiction j mais elle eft dans
V Hypothse, laquelle pour cela mme sa
trouve fausse.
18. V uniformit de V Espace sait qu il
,' y a âucune Raison ny Interne ny Externe,
pour en discerner les parties, & poury choisir.
Car cette Raison Externe de discerner, ne
sauroit tresonde que dans V Interne ^ au
trement c eft discerner V indiscernable, ou
c1 eft choisir sans discerner. La volont
sans Raison, feroit le Hazard des Epicuriens.
Un Dieu qui agiroit par une telle volont,
seroit un Dieu de nom. La source de ces
erreurs ejl, qu' on ' a point de foin es viter
ce qui droge aux Persetlions Divines.
19. Lors que deux choses incompatibles
font galement bonnes, & que tant en elles
que par leur combinaison avec d' autres, s
une ' a point d? avantage fur l' autre j
Dieu n' en produira aucune,
20. Dieu n eft jamais dtermin par' les
choses externes, mais tousjours par ce qui
eft en luy, c' eft. dire purses connoijsances,
avant qu' ily ait aucune chose hors de luy.
21. lin y a point 4e raison possible, qui
PMflTe; . limiter la \qmnt de la. matire.
4insi cette limitation ni sauroit avoir lieu.
Mr. Leibn it z's Fourth Paper; '_
103
Figure h greater than it realty is, we -some

times prove that it is not greater. This in1deed is a Contradiction \ but it lies in the
Hypothesis, which appears to be false for
that very reason.
18. Space being imiform, there can be
neither any External nor Internal Reason,
by which to distinguish its parts, and to
make any choice among them. For, any
External Reason to discern between them,
can only be grounded upon some Internal
one. Otherwise we should discern what is
indiscernible, or chuse without discerning.
A Will without Reason, would be the
Chance of the Epicureans. A.God, who
should act: by such a Will, would be a God
only in Name. The cause of these Errors
proceeds from want of care to avoid what
derogates from the Divine Perfections.
1 9. When two things which cannot Both
be together, are equally good \ and neither in
themselves, nor by their combination with
other things, has the one any advantage
over the other \ God will produce * Vei- * SieAPtber of them.
{Jr*
20. God is never determined by external ,-.nd 9.
things, but always by what is in himself;
that is, by his Knowledge of things, before
any thing exists tvithoitt himself.
21. There is no possible Reason, that can
limit the quantity of Matter , and therefore
such limitation can have no place.
H 4
22. And
104 Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

22. Et suppos cetpe limitation arbitraire,
on pourroit tousjours adjouter quelque chose
sans droger la PerfeBion des choses qui
font dj : Et par consequent ilfaudra tousjours y adjouter quelque chose, pour agir sui^
vant le Principe de la PerfeBion des Opera
tions Divines.
2 3. Ainsi on ne saurait dire que la pr
sente quantit de la matire eft la plus con
venable pour leur prsente Constitution. Et
quand mme cela seroit, il s' ensuivrait que
cette prsente Conjlitution des choses ne fe
rait point la plus convenable absolument, fi
ee empche d' employer plus de matire j il
vaudroit donc en choisir une autre, capa
ble de quelque chose de plusf
24. Je ferois bien aise de voir le passage
d' un Philosophe^ qui prenne Sensorium au
trement que Goclenius.
2 5. Si Scapula dit que Sensorium est la
place o V entendement reside, il entendra
V Organe de la sensation interne. Ainsi, tf
ne s* loignera point de Goclenius.
26. Sensorium a tousjours t V organe
de la sensation. La glande pineale seroit
selon des Cartes, le Sensorium dans le sens
qu* on rapporte de Scapula.
27. (/

105
22. And supposing an arbitrary Limi
tation of the Quantity of Matter, some
thing might always be added to it without
derogating from the Perfection of those
things which do already exist j and con
sequently something mufl always be added,
in order to act according to the Principle
of the Perfection of the divine Operations.
23. And therefore it cannot be said,
that the present quantity of Matter is the
fittest for the present Constitution of Things.
And supposing it were, it would follow that
this present Constitution of things would
not be the fittest absolutely, if it hin
ders God from using more Matter. It
were therefore better to chuse another con
stitution of things, capable of something
more.
24. I should be glad to see a passage of
any Philosopher, who takes Sensorium in
any other Sense than Goclenius does.
2 5. If Scapula fays that Sensorium is the
place in which the Understanding resides,
he means by it the Organ of internal Sen
sation. And therefore he does not differ
from Goclenius.
26. Sensorium has always signified the
Organ of Sensation. The Glandula pinealis would be , according to Cartefius ,
the Sensorium^ in the above-mentioned sense
of Scapula.
27. There.
I oS Qttatfttue Ecrit de Mr. Le se-nit z.

27. Il n'y a gueres d' Expression ntoins
convenable fur cesujets que celle qui dtint
Dieu un Sensoriiim. H semble qu* elle le
fait P Ame du Monde. Eu on aura bien de
la peine donner I" wsagt lqe M. New
ton fait de ce mot, Un sens qui le puisse
ju/liser.
28. Quoy qu* il s* agisse du sens de
M- Newton, & non pas de celuy de Goclenius, on ne me doit point blmer d* avoir
allgu le DiBionnaire Philosophique jfy cet
auteur ^ parceque le but des Difliontiittres: est
de marquer V usage des termes. J ; /
29. Dieu j' apperoit des choses en'Ityr
mme. V Espace efl le lieu des choses, &
non pas le lieu des Ides de Dieu : A moins
qit on ne considre /' Espace comme quelque
chose qui fasse V Union de Dieu & des
choses^ /' imitation de V Union de V Ame &
du Corps qu' on s* imagine -, ce qui rendroit
encore Dieu Y Ame du Monde,1 ;
*
go. Aussi a-t-on tort dans la Comparaison
qit on fait de la connoifsance <^ de l' Operation de Dieu avec celle des mes. Les mes
connoiffent les choses, parce que Dieii a mis en
elles un Principe Reprsentatif de ce qui est
hors d' elles. Mais Dieu connoift les vhofest
parce qu* il les produit continuellement.
31. Les ames n oprent fur les chops
selon mqy>. que parceque des Corps s' accom
modent
Mr. LeIBNITZx Fourth Paper.

107
27. There i?. hardly any Expression less
proper upon this Subject, than that which
rmkes God to have a Sensorium. It seems
to make God the Soul of the World. And
it will be a hard matter to put a justifiable
fense upon this Word, according to the Use
Sir Isaac fexvtou makes of it.
28. Though the question be about the
Sense put upon that Word by Sir Isaac
Nezvton, and not by Goclenius ^ yet I am
not to blame for quoting the Philosophical'
Dictionary of that Author, because the
design of Dictionaries is to (hew the use
of Words, y,v, *
29. God perceives things in himself.
Space is the Place of things, and not the
Place of God's Ideas : Unless we look up
on Space as something that makes an Union
between God and Things, in imitation of
the imagined Union between the Soul and
the Body j which would still make God the
Soul of the World.
30. And indeed the Author is much in
the wrong, when he compares God's Know
ledge and Operation, with the Knowledge
and Operation of Souls. The Soul knows
things, because God has put into it a * * sa ApPrinciple Representative of Things without. Pend>IX,
But God knows things, because he produces N' II.
them continually.
31 . The Soul does not aB upon things,
according to my Qpinion,any otherwise than
because
1 08

modent leur de/irs en vertu de V harmonie
que Dieu y a prtablie.
32. Mais ceux qui j' imaginent que les

mes peuvent donner une Force nouvelle au
Corps, & que Dieu en fait autant dans le
monde pour redresser les dfauts de fa
machine -, approchent trop Dieu de V ame,
en donnant trop V orne & trop peu Dieu.
33. Car il n y a que Dieu qui puisse don
ner la nature de nouvelles Forces, mais
Une le sait que furnaturellement. S'il avoit
besoin de le faire dans le cours naturel, il
auroit fait un ouvrage trs imparfait. Il
rejfembleroit dans le monde ce que le vul
gaire attribue V Ame dans le Corps.
34. En voulant soutenir cette Opinion
vulgaire de /' influence de V Ame sur le
Corps, par V Exemple de Dieu oprant hors
de lui j on fait encore que Dieu rejfembleroit
trop V Ame du Monde. Cette affeBation
encore de blmer mon Expression d* Intelligentia Supramundana , y semble pancher
aujfi.
35. Les images dont V Ame efl ajfe&e
immdiatement, font en elle mme j mais
elles repondent celles du Corps. La pre
sence de V ame efl imparfaite, & ne peut
...:.
tre
\
Ms. LilB.NlT2.\f Fourth Paper.
i o^
because the Body adapts it self to the De

sires of the Soul, by virtue of the * Har- * See 4>nwnj>, which God has pre-ejlablified be- ^'J
tween them.
. g2.~ But They who fancy that the Soul
can gjve a new Force to the Body j and that
God does the fame in the World, in or
der to mend the Imperfections of his Ma
chine > make God too much like the Soul,
by ascribing too much to the Soul, and too
little to God.
33. For, none but God can give a new
Force to Nature ^ And he does it only sufernatiirally. If there was need for him to
do it. in the natural course of things :, he
would have made a very imperfect Work.
At That rate, He would be with respect tq
the World, what the Soul, in the vulgar no
tion, is with respect to the Body.
34. Those who undertake to defend the
vulgar Opinion concerning the Soul's in
fluence over the Body, by instancing in
God's operating on things External j make
God still too much like a Soul of the
World. To which I add, that the Au
thor's affecting to find Fault with the
Words, Intelligentia Supramundana, seems
also to incline that way.
.... ,35. The Images,, with which the Soul
is immediately affected, are within it self -,
but they correspond to those of the Body.
The presence of the Soul is imperfect, and
can
1 io

tre explique que par cette correspondance.
Mais celle de Dieu est parfaite, & se mamifeste par son Operation;
36. V on suppose mal contre moy,' que la
presence de V Ame est lie avec son influence
sur le Corps } puis qu* on fait que je rejette
cette influence.
37. Il est aussi inexplicable que l* Ame
soit diffuse par le Cerveau, que d faire
qu' elk soit diffuse par le Corps tout en
tier : La difference n est que du plus au
moins.
38. Ceux qui s1 imaginent que les JForees
actives se diminuent es elles mmes dans h
Monde, tie- eonnoifsent pas bien les princi
pales loix de la nature, &* la beaut des
ouvrages de Dieu..
',"'.'.' "V"
39. Comment prouveront ils, que ce1 dfaut
est une fuite de la dpendance des choses**
40. Ce dfaut de nos Machines, qui fait
qn elles ont besoin d' tre redresses, vient
de cela mme, qu* elles ne font pas assez,
dpendantes de F Ouvrier. Ainsi la dpen
dance de Dieu qui efl dans la TSature, bien
loin d' tre cause de ce dfaut, est pluftoft
cause que ce dfaut n'y eft point, parceqtC
elle eft si dpendante " un Ouvrier trop
parfait pour faire un Ouvrage qui ait be
soin d? tre redress. Il eft vray que chaque
Machine particulire de la nature, est en
quelque faon sujette tre detracque ^
2
mais
$Ir. L e ib N i; nV Fourth Faper.
111
can only be explained by That Correspon

dence. But the presence of God is per
fect, and manifested by his Operation.
96. The Author .wrongly supposes against me, that the presence of the Soul is
connected with its influence over the Body j
for he knows, I reject That influence.
37. The Soul's being diffused through
the Brain, is no less inexplicable, 'than its
being diffused through the whole Body.
The Difference is only in more and less.
38. They who fancy that * active Force
lessens of it seisin the World, do not well
understand the principal Laws of Nature,
and the beauty of the Works of God >
yâbovt,
w ij,'
of Dr.
gjjf'
Reply.
39. How will they be able to prove,

that this Defetf is a consequence of the de
pendence of things ?
40. The imperfection of our Machines,
which is the reason why they want to be
mended, proceeds from this very thing,
that they do pot sufficiently depend upon
the Workman. And therefore the depen
dence of Nature upon God, far from being
the cause of such an imperfection, is rather
the reason why there is no such imper
fection in Nature, because it depends so
much upon an Artist, who is too perfect
to make a work that wants to be mended.
'Tis true that every particular Machine of
Nature,
t il Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. -Leibnitz.

mais non pas l' Univers tout entier, qui ne
sauroit diminuer en Perfection. ;
41. On dit que V Espace ne depend point
de la Situation des Corps. Je reponds qu*
il ejl vray qu' il ne depend point d' une telle5
ou telle Situation des Corps j mais il est cet1
Ordre qui fait que les Corps font Situables,
" par lequel ils ont une Situation entre eux
en existant ensemble, comme le temps est cet
Ordre par rapport leur position succefive.
Mais s' il n y avoit point de Creatures, l*
Espace & le Temps ne feroient que dans les
., Ides de Dieu,
r
1
'1
42;- // semble qu on avoue icy que V ide

qu on se fait du Miracle n ejl pas celle
qu* en ont communment les Thologiens
& les Philosophes. Il me suffit donc, que
mes Adversaires font obligs de recourir a .
ce qu1 on appelle Miracle dans /' usage
receu.
43. J' ay peur qu' en voulant changer le
sens receu du Miracle, on ne tombe dans
un sentiment incommode, ha nature du
Miracle ne confise nullement dans V usualit & inusualit \ autrement les Monstres
seroient des Miracles.
44. Il y a des Miracles d' une forte in
frieure, qu* un Ange peut produire j car il
peut, par Exemple, faire qu' un homme aille
fur V eau fans enfoncer. Mais il y a des
'.
1
Miracles
Mr. Leibnitz'* Fourth Paper.

Nature, is, in some measure, liable to be
disordered j but not the whole Universe,
which cannot diminish in Perfection.
41. The Author contends, that Space
does not depend upon the Situation of
Bodies. I answer : 'Tis true, it does not de
pend upon fitch ok fitch a situation of Bodies j
but it is That Order, which renders Bodies
capable of being situated, and by which
they have a Situation among themselves
when they exist together j as Time is That
Order, with respect to their Successive po
sition. But if there were no Creatures,
Space and Time would be only in the
Ideas of God.
42. The Author seems to acknowledge
here, that his Notion of a Miracle is not
the fame with that which Divines and Phi
losophers usually have. It is therefore suf
ficient for my purpose, that my Adversa
ries are obliged to have recourse to what is
commonly called a Miracle.
43. I am afraid the Author, by altering
the Sense commonly put upon the Word
Miracle, will fall into an inconvenient
Opinion. The nature of a Miracle does
not at all consist in Usualness or Unusualness , For then Monsters would be Miracles.
44. There are Miracles of an inferior
fort, which an Angel can Work. He can,
for instance, make a Man Walk upon the
Water without sinking. But there are MiI
racles
I13
1 14
Qiiatrihne Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Miracles reserves Dieu, & qui surpassent
toutes les Forces naturelles j tel est celuy de
crer oit d* annihiler.
45. // e(l surnaturel aussi, que les Corps
s attirent de loin fans aucun Moyen j &qiC un Corps aille en rond, fans s* carter
par la tangente, quoyque rien ne V empcht,
de j' carter ainsi. Car ces effeSs ne font
point explicables par les natures des choses.
46. Pourquoy la Motion des animaux ne

seroit elle point explicable par les Forces
naturelles .<? Il est vray que le commence
ment des animaux ejl aussi inexplicable par
leur Moyen, que le commencement du Monde.
P. S.
rr OU S ceux qui font pour le Vuide, se
* laissent plus mener par /' Imagination
que par la raison. Quand s tois jeune
garon, je donnay aussi dans le vuide &
dans les Atomes \ mais la raison me ramena.
L'Imagination toit riante. On borne l
ses recherches', on fixe la Meditation comme
avec un clou \ on croit avoir trouv les pre
miers Elemens, un non plus ultra. Nous
voudrions que la Nature ' allt pas plus loin j
qu' elle ft finie, comme notre Esprit : Mais
ce n est point connoitre la grandeur, & la
Majest
Mr, LEiBNlTfj Fourth Paper.

racles, which none but God can work j
they exceeding all natural Powers. Of
which kind, are Creating and Annihilating*
45. 'Tis also a supernatural thing, that
Bodies should attraB one another at a di
stance, without any intermediate Means j
and that a Body should move round, without
receding in the Tangent, though nothing
hinder it from so receding* For these Ef
fects cannot be explained by the Nature
of things.
46. Why should it be impossible to ex
plain the Motion of Animals by Natural
Forces? Tho' indeed, the Beginning of
Animals is no less inexplicable by natural
Forces, than the Beginning of the World.
P. &
AL L those who maintain a Vacuum^
are more influenced by Imagination
than by Reason* When I was, a young
Man, J also gave into the Notion of a Va
cuum and Atoms j but Reason brought me
into the right way. It was a pleasing Ima
gination. Men carry their Inquiries no
farther than those two things : They (as is
were) nail down their Thoughts to them 1
They fancy, they have found out the first
Elements of Things, a non plus ultra* We
Would have Nature to go no farther 5 afl<5
la
to
1 1J
\6 Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibni^

Majeft de V Auteur des choses. Le moindre
Corpuscule efl a&uellement subdivis V insin , . & contient un Monde de nouvelles
Creatures, dont l'Univers manqueroit, fi ce
Corpuscule toit un Atome, c efl dire,
un corps tout d' une piece fans Subdivision.
Tout de mme, vouloir du Vuide dans la
Nature, c' efl attribuer Dieu une Produtlion trs imparfaite -, c' efl violer le grand
Principe de la ncessit d' une Raison suffisante,<pg bien des gens ont eu dans la bouchej
mais, dont ils n ont point connu la force,
comme fay montr dernirement, en faisant
voir par ce Principe que V Espace n efl qu'
un Ordre des choses, comme le Temps, &
nullement un Efre absolu. Sans parler de
plusieurs autres raisons contre le Vuide & les
Atomes ', en voicy celles que je prends de la
Perfetlion de Dieu, & de la raison suffi'
sant. Je pose que toute perseEiion que
Dieu a pu mettre dans les choses satis dro
ger aux autres Perfe&ions qui y font, y a
t mise. Or figurons nous un Espace en
tirement vuide, Dieu y pouvoit mettre quel
que matire fans droger en rien toutes les
autres choses; Donc il l'y. a mise : Donciln
y a point d'Espace entirement vuide : Donc
tout efl plein. Le mme raisonnement prouve
qu' Un y a point de Corpuscule, qui ne soit
subdivis. Voicy encore V autre raisonne
ment pris de la ncessit d' une Raison suf
fisante. // n efl point possible qu' il y ait
un
- Mr. Leibnitz1s Fourth Paper.

to be finite, as our Minds are : But this is
being Ignorant of the greatness and Maje
sty of the Author of things. The least
Corpuscle is actually subdivided in infinitum, and contains a World of other Crea
tures, which would be wanting in the Uni
verse, if That Corpuscle was an Atom, that
is, a Body of one entire piece without Sub
division. In like manner, to admit a Va
cuum in Nature, is ascribing to God a very
imperfect Work : ' sis violating the grand
Principle of the necessity of a sufficient
season \ which many have talked of, with
out understanding its true meaning , as I
have lately shown, in proving, by That
Principle, that Space is only an Order of
things, as Time also is, and not at all an
absolute Being. To omit many other Argu
ments against a Vacuum and Atoms, I shall
here mention those which I ground upon
God's Perfection, and upon the necessity of a
siifficient Reason. I lay it down as a Prin
ciple, that every Perfection, which God
* could impart to things without deroga
ting from their other Perfections, has actual
ly been imparted to them. Now, let us
fancy a Space wholly empty. God * could
have placed some Matter in it, without dero
gating in any respect from all other things :
* See Dr. Clarke's Third Reply, 9 ; and hk
Reply, $22,
I 3
Fourth
There-
ii
118

un Principe de determiner la Proportion de la
tnatiere, ou du rempli au vuide, ou du vuide
au plein. On dira peut tre que V un doit
tre gal V autre j Mais comme la matire
eft plus parfaite que le vuide, la Raifon
veut qvC on observe la Proportion Gomtrique,
& qu il y ait d* autant plus de plein, qu* il
vierite d'' tre prfr. Mais ainfi il n y
aura point de vuide du tout ; car la Perfeclion de la matire eft celle du vuide,
comme quelque chofe rien. en efi de
mme des Atomes : Quee raifon peut on
agner de borner la nature dans le progrs
de la Subdivion .<? Filions purement Arbi
traires\ & indignes de la vraye Philofopbie.
Les raifons qii on allegue pour le vuide, ne
foi}t que des Sophtfmes,
Quatrime
Mr. LeibnitzV Fourth Riper.
i r9
Therefore he hath actually placed some

Matter in That Space : Therefore, there is
no Space wholly Empty : Therefore All is
full. The fame Argument proves that there
is no Corpuscle, but what is Subdivided. I
shall add another Argument, grounded upon
the necessity of a sufficient Reason, 'sis
|| impossible there should be any Principle to
determine What Proportion of Matter there
ought to be, out of all the possible degrees
froirKi Plenum to a Vacuum, or from a Va
cuum to a Plenum. Perhaps it will be said,
that the one should be equal to the other :
But/ because Matter is more perfect than a
Vacuum, Reason requires that a Geometri
cal Proportion should be observed, and
that there should be || as much more Matter
than Vacuum, as the former deserves to
have the preference before the latter. But
then there must be No Vacuum at all , for
the Perfection of Matter is to that of a
Vacuum, as || Something to Nothing. And
the cafe is the fame witn Atoms : What rea
son can any one assign for confining Na
ture in the Progression of Subdivision >
These are Fictions merely Arbitrary, and
unworthy of true Philosophy. The rea
sons alledged for a Vacuum , are mere
Sophisms.
|| See Dr. ClarkeV Third Reply , 9. and hk Fourth
*#i 22.
I 4
Dr.
[ I30 ]
Quatrime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

i , & 2. TA DoBrine que V on trouve ici,
*-^ conduit la Ncessit & la
Fatalit, en supposant que les Motifs ont
le mme rapport la Volont d' un Agent
* voez Intelligent, que * les Poids \ une BacwkiTus lance -, de forte que quand deux choses font
CSricdc absolument indiffrentes , un Agent ntelMr. Leib*^5',f
'
s Voiez
l'Appendicc,N3.
l'igent ne j| peut choisir 1' une ou l' autre, comme

ne t.peut,Jse mouvoir lors
que les
. une
, Balance
'
,.'..
rotas Jont gaux des deux cotez,. Mais voici
en qU0i consiste la Difference. Une Balance
l'Appen- n* eft Pas un Agent : elle esl iout--sait Pasdice,N4. sive, & les Poids agissent sur elle -, de forte
que quand les Poids font gaux, il n y a
rien qui la puisse mouvoir. Mais les En
tres lntelligensynt des Agents ; ils ne font
point simplement paflifs, & les Motifs n agis
sent pas fur eux, comme les Poids agissent
fur une Balance : Ils ont des Forces Actives,
<& ils agifnt, quelque fois par de puissans
Motifs, quelque fois par des Motifs foibles,
<$ quelque foie lors que les choses font abso
lument indiffrentes. Dans ce dernier cas,
tt peut y avoir de trs-bonnes raisons pour
agir, quoique deux ou plusieurs manires
d' agis
Dr. Clarke'/ Fourth Reply.

i, and 2* HpHIS Notion leads to uniX. vzxhWeceffity and Fate, by
supposing that Motives have the same rela
tion to the JPz 0s <? Intelligent Agent,
as * Weights have to f a Balance j so that * &s
of tiro things absolutely indifferent, an In- abme> .
telligent Agent can || no more choose Either, ^/-"
than a Balance can move it self when the and Paper,
Weights on both sides are Equal. But the | ls'ce A
Difference lies here. A Balance is no pendiz,
Agent, but is merely PaJJlve and aBed upon N- 3by the Weights ; so that, when the Weights jLSy/*
are equal, there is nothing to wove it. But N a
Intelligent Beings are Agents j not passive,
in being moved by Motives, as a Balance
is by Weights -, but they have Atiive
Powers and do w<?i> Themselves, sometimes
upon the View of /?? Motives, some
times upon weakoncs, and sometimes where
things are absolutely indifferent. In which
latter case, there may be very good reason
to aB, though two or more Ways of acting
may be absolutely indifferent. This learned
Writer always supposes the contrary, as.* a
Principle , but gives no Proof of it, either
from
rt 1
Qnat rime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.
d' agir puissent tre absolument indiffrentes.

Le savant Auteur suppose toujours le con
traire, comme un Principe -, mais il n* en
donne aucune Preuve tire de la Nature des
Choses, ou des Perfections de Dieu,
g, & 4. Si le raisonnement que V on
trouve ici, toit bien sond, il prouveroit
que Dieu n' a cr aucune Matire, &
voez mme qu il est * impossible qu' il en puisse
dteN crer. Car les parties de Matire, quelle
sfldij. 9' qit elle soit, qui sont parfaitement solides,
sont aussi parfaitement semblables, pourvu
qu elles ayent des figures e^ des Dimen
sions gales j ce que V on peut toujours sup
poser, comme une chose possible. Ces parties
de Matire pourraient donc occuper galement
bien un autre lieu que celui qu elles occu
pent , & par consquent H coit impossible,
selon le Raisonnement du savant Auteur, que
Dieu les plat oie il les a actuellement
places, parce qu il auroit pu avec la mme
facilit les placer rebours. Il ejl vrai qu*
on ne sauroit voir deux Feuilles, ni peuttre deux Gotes d'eau, parfaitement sem
blables j parce que ce font des Corps fort
composez. Mais il n en eft pas ainsi des
parties de la Matire simple - solide. Et
mme dans les Composez, il n eft pas impos
sible que Dieu fasse deux Gotes d'eau
tout- -sait semblables j & nonobstant cette
parfaite ressemblance, elles ne pourroient pas
devenir une feule C mme Gote d'eau.
J' ajoute

from the Nature of Things, or the Per
fections of God.
125
3, and 4. This Argument, if it was True,

would prove that God neither has created,
nor * can possibly create any Matter at all. "-See ApFor the perfectly solid parts of all Matter, g^'*'
if you take them of equal Figure and Di- and%!
mensions (which is always possible in Sup
position,) are exactly alike j and therefore it
would be perfectly indifferent if they were
transposed in Place j and consequently it
was impossible (according to this Learned
Author s Argument,) for God to place them
in those Places wherein he did actually
place them at the Creation, because he might
as easily have transposed their Situation.
'Tis very true, that no two Leaves^ and
perhaps no two drops of Water are exactly
alike j because they are Bodies very much
compounded. But the case is very different
in the parts of simple solid Matter. And
even in Compounds, there is no impossibi
lity for God to make two drops of Water
exactly alike, And if he foould make them
exaclly alike, yet thev would never the
more become one and the fame drop of
Water, because they were alike. Nor
would the Place of the One, be the Place
of the Other , though it was absolutely incjifferent, which, was placed in which place.
'
The
124

J* ajoute que le Lieu de r une de ces
Gotes ne feroit pas le Lieu de s autre,
quoique leur Situation ft une chose abso
lument indiffrente. Le mme Raisonnement
a lieu aussi par rapport la premiere D
termination du Mouvement dy un certain cot,
ou du cot oppos.
5, & 6. Quoique deux choses soient par
faitement semblables, elles ne cessent pas d*
tre deux choses. Les parties du Temps
font aussi parfaitement semblables, que celles
de /'Espace -, & cependant deux Instants ne
font pas le mme Instant : Ce ne font pas
non plm deux nom* d' un seul & mme
Instant. Si Dieu n avoit cr le Monde
que dans ce moment, // n auroit pas t
er'e dans le temps qu il r a t. Et fi
Dieu adonn, (ou s' il peut donner') une
Etendue borne V Universel s* enfuit qite
V Univers doit tre naturellement capable de
mouvement \ Car ce qui efi born, ne peut
tre immobile. // paroit donc par ce que
je viens de dire, que ceux qui soutiennent que
Dieu ne pouvoit pas crer le Monde dans un
autre Temps, ou dans un autre Lieu -, font
la Matire ncessairement infinie & ter
nelle, & rduisent tout la Ncessit c>
au Destin.
7. Si r Univers a une Etendue borne,
V Espace qui est au del du Monde, n est
point imaginaire, mais rel. Les Espaces
vuides dans le Monde mme ne font pas
imavi-
2)r. Cl arkkV Fourth Reply, >

The same reasoning holds likewise concern*
ing the original determination of Motion^
this way or the contrary way.
5. and 6. Two things, by being exaclly

alike, do not cease to be Two. The parts
cf Time, are as exactly like to each other,
as- those of Space: Yet two Voints ofTimet
are not the fame Point of Time, nor are
they two Names of only the fame Point of
Time. Had God created the World but
This Moment, it would not have been,
created at the Time it was created. And
if God has made (or can make) Matter
Finite in Dimensions, the material Universe
must consequently be in its Nature Move"
able \, For nothing that is iinite, is rmmovcable. To fay therefore that God could not
have altered the Time or Place of the ex
istence of Matter, is making Matter to be
necessarily Infinite and Eternal, and redu
cing all things to Necessity and Fate.
7. Extra-mundane Space, (if the mate

rial World be Finite in its Dimensions,) is
not imaginary, but real. Nor are void Spaces
in the World, merely imaginary. In an
* exhausted
125
1 26
Quatrime Rplique de Mr. Clairke.

imaginaires. Quoi qu il y ait des rayons
de Lumire , & peut-tre quelque autre
matire en trs-petite quantit, dans un *
Recipient j le dfaut de resistance fait voir
clairement, que la plus grande partie de cet
Espace eft destitue de Matire. Car ta
Subtilit de la matire ne peut tre la
caisse du dfaut de Resistance. Le Mercure
est compos de parties, qui ne font pas moins
Subtiles & fluides que celles de V Eau ; &
cependant il fait plus de dix fois autant de
Resistance. Cette Resistance vient donc de
la Quantit, & non de la Grossiret de
la Matire.
8. V Espace destitue' de Corps, ejl une
Proprit a" une Substance immatrielle. L*
Espace n est pas born par les Corps ; mais
il existe galement dans les Corps & hors
des Corps. V Espace n est pas renferm
entre les Corps } Mais les Corps, tant dans
V Espace immense, sont eux-mmes bornez
par leurs propres Dimensions.
9. V Espace vuide n est pas un Attri
but sans Sujet -, car, par cet Espace nous
n entendons pas un Espace o il n' y a rien,
mais, un Espace sans Corps. Dieu est cer
tainement present dans tout VEspace vuide ;
& peut-tre qii ily a aussi dans cet Espace
* Un Passage de la Lettre de Mr. Libn\t\, qui servoic d' Envelope son Ecrit, a donn lieu ce que i' oa
dit ici.
plusieurs
cDr. Clarke'j- fourth Reply.

* exhausted Receiver, though Rays of Light,
and perhaps some Other Matter, be There in
an exceeding small Quantity \ yet the want
of Residence plainly shows, that the greatest
part of That Space is void of Matter. For
Subtleness or Fineness of Matter, cannot
be the cause of want of Resilience. Quick
silver is as subtle, and consists of as fine
parts and as fluid, as Water j and yet makes
more than ten times the resistence : Which
resistance arises therefore from the Quantity,
and not from the Grosihess of the Matter.
8. Space void of Body, is the Property
of an incorporeal Substance. Space is not
Bounded by Bodies, but exists equally
within and without Bodies. Space is not
inclosed between Bodies ; but Bodies, ex
isting in unbounded Space, are, themselves
only, terminated by their own Dimensions.
9. Void Space, is not an Attribute with
out a SubjeB \ because, by void Space, we
never mean Space void of every thing, but
void of Body only. In All void Space,
God is certainly present, and pojsibly many
other Substances which are not Matter j
* This was occasioned by a Paffage in the Private Letter,
wherein Mr. LeibnitzV Paper came inclosed.
being
127
isS

plusieurs autres Subfiances, qui ne font pas
matrielles, & qui par consquent ne peu~
vent tre tangibles, ni apperues par aucun
de nos sens.
io. L'Espace n est pas une Substance,
mai* itn Attribut -, & fie est un Attribut
d'un Etre ncessaire, il doit (comme tous
les autres Attributs d* un Etre ncessaire')
exister plus ncessairement, que les Sub*
stances mmes, qui ne font pas ncessaires.
V Espace est immense, immuable, & ter
nel -, & V on doit dire la mme chose de
la Dure. Mais il ne s* enfuit pas de ldt
qu il y ait rien d* ternel hors de Dieu.
Car V Espace & la Dure ne font pas hors
de Dieu : Ce font * des suites immdiates
& ncessaires de son Existence, sans les
quelles
* Dem tterms est, &c. C est- dire: Dieu est Eternel
& Infini, il est Tout-puissant, & rien n' chape fa connoissance ; je veux dire, que si dure n' a ni commence
ment, ni fin -, & que si Presence est immense, & n' a- point
des bornes : Qu' il rgie touces les choses qui existent, &
qu'il connoit tout ce qu'il est possible de connoitre. H
n' est pas s Eternit ou l' Infinit ; mais il est Eternel &
Infini. Il'n" est pas la Dure, ou 1' Espace ; mais il continue
d exister, & il est prsent. Il existe toujours, & il est pre
sent par tout ; & en existant toujours & par tout, il'
constitue la Dure & 1' Espace, Y Eternit & l'Infinit. Cer
tainement, puisque chaque particule de 1' Espace existe
toujours, & que chaque Moment indivisible de la Dusse
est par tout, on ne peut pas dire du Matre & du Seig
neur de toutes choses, qu' il n' existe ni en aucun temps,
ni en aucun lieu. Il est present par tout, non seulement
Virtuellement ,
Vr. C L A R K V FohW/j Re/>/y.

being neither Tangible, nor Objects of Any
of Our Senses.
1 o. Space is not a Substance, but a P;v>^rfy ^ Arid if it be a Property of That

which is' necessary, it will consequently
(as all other Properties of That which is
necessary must do,) exist more necessarily ,
(though it be not itself'a Substance,) than
those Substances Themselves which are not
necessary. Space is immense, and immutable,
and eternal ; and so also is Duration. Yet it
does not at all from hence follow, that any
thing is eternal hors de Dieu. For Space
and Duration are not hors de Dieu, but *
are caused by, and are immediate and neces
* Deus ternus est & Infinitm, Omnipotent 8i Omnijciens ;

id est, durat ab terno in ternum, & adest ab infinito ia
infinicum ; omaia regie & omnia cognoscit, qu fiunc aut
sciri possunt. Non est ternitas vel Infinitas, fed ternus Sc
Infinitm ; non eft Duratio vel Spatium, fed aforaf & <&/f.
Durat Semper, &c Adeii Vbique ; & existendo semper Si
ubique, Duratjonem & Spatium, ternitatem & infinitatem
constituit. Cum unaquq; Spacij particuk sic semper , &
unumquodq; Durationis indivisibile momentum ilbiqui ;
certe rerum omnium Fabricator ac Dominus, non eric nunquam nufquam. Omtriprsens est, non per Virtutem solam,
led etiam per Subflantiam': Nam Virtus fine Substantia subsiftere non potest. /. e. God 'is Eternal and Infinite, Om
nipotent and Omniscient : That is, he endures from Ever
lasting to Everlasting , and is present from Infinity to In
finity : He governs all things which are , and knows all
i . I
K
things
i 29
1 2o

quelles il ne seroit point Eternel & present
par tout.
il & 12. Les Infinis ne font composez
de Finis, que comme les Finis font composez
dy Infiniteiimes. J' ai fait voir ci-dessus,
( 3. de ma 3 Rplique,) en quel sens on
peut dire que V Espace a des parties, ou qii
il n en a pas. Les parties, dans le sens
que V on donne ce mot lors qu' on V ap
plique aux Corps, font separables, composes,
desunies , indpendantes les unes des au
tres, & capables de mouvement. Mais
quoique V Imagination puise en quelque
manire concevoir des parties dans V Espace
infini -, cependant, comme ces parties, im
proprement ainsi dites, font essentiellement
immobiles & inseparables les unes des au
tres, (Votez ci-dessus, Rplique II, 4. &
Rplique III, % 3.) il s* ensuit que cet
Espace es essentiellement simple, & abso
lument indivisible.
Virtuellement, mais encore Substantiellement : Car la puis
sance [virtus] ne sauroir, subsister sans ne Substance.
Newtoni Principia, Schol. gnrale sub finem,
13. bl
Dr. ClarkeV Fourth Reply.

131
sary Consequences of His Existence. And
without them, his Eternity and Ubiquity
[or Omnipresence'] would be taken away.
1 1 , and 1 2. Infinites are composed of
Finites, in no other sense, than as Finites
are composed of infinitesimals. In what
sense Space has or has not Parts, has been
explained before, Reply %d, $ 3. Parts, in
the corporeal Sense of the Word, Mt sepa
rable, compounded,ununited, independent on,
and moveable from, each other: But infinite
Space, though it may by Us be partially
apprehended^ that is, may in our Imagina
tion be conceived as composed of Parts }
yet Those Parts (improperly so called) be
ing essentially indiscerp'ible and immoveable
from each other, and not partable with
out an express Contradiction in Terms,
[See above, Reply II, '4. and Reply III,
3 {] Space consequently is in itself essen
tially One, and absolutely indivisible.
things which are possible to be known. He is not Eter
nity or Infinity, but Eternal aud Infinite. He is not Dura
tion, or Space ; but he endures, and is Present. He endures
Always, and is Present every where ; and, by exiting al
ways and every where, constitutes Duration and Space, Eter
nity and Infinity. Seeing every particle of Space is Always,
and every indivisible Moment of Duration every where ;
surely it cannot be said of the Maker and Lord of all
things, that he is [ at no Time, and in no Place,] Never
and No-vvhere. He is Omnipresent, not only Virtually, but
Substantially : For Power cannot subsist without a Subtlance.
Newtoni Principia, Schol. generate sub finem.
K 1
13. If
Ouatribne Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

1 3. Si le Monde a une Etendue borne, il
peut tre mis en mouvement par la puissance
de Dieu \ & par consequent V Argument que
je fonde sur cette Mobilit, est une preuve
concluante. Quoique deux Lieux soient par
faitement semblables, ils ne font pas un seul
5c mme Lieu. Le Mouvement ou le Re* vc-z P0S ds V Univers, n est pas non plus le *
Y Appen- mme Etat ; comme le Mouvement 011 le
dif'
Repos <T un Vaisseau, n est pas le mme
N I0' Etat, parce qii un homme renferm dans
la Cabane ne fiauroit / apercevoir si le
Vaisseau fait voile ou non, pendant que
son mouvement est uniforme. Quoique cet
homme ne s apperoive pas du mouvements
du Vaisseau, ce mouvement ne laisse pas '
tre un Etat rel C different, & il produit
^w Effets rels 5c differens -, & s tl tait ar
rt tout d' un coup, il auroit d' autres ef
fets rels. Il en finit de mme d' Un mou
vement imperceptible de V Univers. On r
a point rpondu cet Argument \ fur lequel
Mr. le Chevalier Newton insiste beaucoup
dans fis Principes Mathmatiques. Apre
avoir considr {dans fa Definition 8.) les
Proprietez, Us Causes, & les Effets du
Mouvement ; cette consideration lui sert
sre voir la difference qtt' il y a entre le
mouvement rel, ou le transport d'un Corps
qui passe d' une partie de F Espace dans^
une autre ; & le Mouvement relatif, qui n
cil ait un changement de /' Ordre ou de
J
la
l32
Dr. C L a r k eV Fourth Reply,
I 33
13. If the World be Finite in Dimen

sions, it is moveable by the Power of God j
and therefore my Argument drawn from
that moveableness, is conclusive. Two places,
though exaBly alike, are not the fame place.
Nor is the Motion or Reft of the Universe,
the * fame States any more than the Mo- * see Ac
tion or Reft of a S&//>, is the fame State, pendix,
because a Man shut up in the Cabbin can- N 10,
not perceive whether the Ship sails or
not, so long as it moves uniformly. The
Motion of the Ship, though the Man per
ceives it not, is a real different State, and
has real different EffeBs ^ and, upon a sud
den flop, it would have Other real EffeBs j
And so likewise would an indiscernable Mo
tion of the Universe. To This Argument,
no Answer has ever been given. It is
largely insisted on by Sir Isaac Newton in
Jiis Mathematical Principles, (Definit. 8.J
where, from the Consideration of the Pro
perties, Causes, and EffeBs of Motion, he
shows the difference between real Motion,
or a Bodie's being carried from one part of
Space to another j and relative Motion,
which is merely a change of the Order or
Situation of Bodies with respeB to each
other. This Argument is a Mathematical
one j showing, from real EffeBs, that there
may be real Motion where there is none re
lative j and relative Motion, where there is
K 3
none
134
QÂtrime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

la Situation des Corps entre eux. C est un
Argument Mathmatique, qui prouve par
des Effets rels, qri il peut y avoir w mou
vement rel, o il ri y en a point de relatif ;
& qu' ilpeut y avoir un mouvement relatif,
oh il n y en a point de rel : C est, dis-je,
un Argument Mathmatique, auquel on ne
rpond pas, quand on se contente a" assurer
le contraire.
14. La ralit de 1' Espace ri est pas
une simple Supposition : Ee a t prouve
par les Arguments rapportez ci-dejsus, aux
quels on n a point rpondu. V Auteur
ri a pas rpondu non plus un autre Argu
ment, savoir, que l' Espace & le Temps
sont des Quantitez :, ce qii on ne peut
dire de la Situation & de V Ordre.
1 5. Il ri toit pas impossible que Bien ft
le Monde plutt ou plus tard, qu' il ne V a
sait.
Il ri es pas impossible non plus, qu' il
le dtruise plutt ou plus tard, qu' il ne

sera atluellement dtruit. Quant la
dotlrine de /'Eternit du Monde \ ceux qui
supposent que la Matire & V Espace sont
la mme chose, doivent supposer que le
Monde est non seulement infini & ternel,
mais encore que son immensit & son ter
nit sont ncessaires, & mme aijsi nces
saires que V Espace & la Dure, qui ne
dpendent pas de la Volont de Dieu, mais
*y$n de son * Existence. Au contraire, ceux qui
la Noce fur croyent que Dieu a cre la Matire en telle
$ IOquantit, en tel temps, & en tels Espaces
qu' il
Dr. ClarkeV fourth Reply.
135
none real : And is not to be answered, by

barely asserting the contrary.
14. The reality of Space is not a Suppo

sition, but is proved by the fore-going Ar
guments, to which no Answer has been
given. Nor is any Answer given to
That other Argument, that Space and Time
are Quantities, which Situation and Order
are not,
1 5. It was no impossibility for God to
make the World sooner or later than he did :
Nor is it at all impossible for him to destroy
it sooner or later than it shall actually be
destroyed. As to the Notion of the World's
Eternity ; They who suppose Matter and
Space to be the same, must indeed suppose
the World to be not only Infinite and Eter
nal, but necessarily so :, even as necessarily
as Space and Duration, which depend not
on the Will, but on the * Existence of*suabwe,
God. Rut they who believe that God tbt mte
created Matter in what Quantity, and at on l0'
what particular Time, and in what particu
lar Spaces he pleased, are here under no dif
ficulty. For the Wisdom of God may have
very good reasons for creating This World,
K 4
at
3'6

qiC il lui a phi, ne se trouvent embarassez
d' aucune difficult. Car la Sagesse de Dieu
peut avoir eu de trs-bonnes raisons pour
crer Ce Monde dans un certain temps : elle
peut avoir fait d' autres choses avant que
Ce Monde ft cr -, & elle peut faire d'
autres choses aprez que Ce Monde fera
dtruit.
16, & 1 7. J' ai prouv ci- de[fus, (Votez
ma Troisime Rplique $ 4, & la 19, de
cette Quatrime Rpliques) que /'Espace &
le Temps ne sont pas V Ordre des choses,
mais des Quantitez relles ; ce quy on ne peut
dire de V Ordre & de la Situation. Le
savant Auteur n a pas encore rpondu
ces Preuves j &, moins qiC il n y rponde;
ce qit il dit, efl une Contradiction, comme
il l' avoue lui-mme ici.
18. L' Uniformit de toutes les parties
de V Espace, ne prouve pas que Dieu ne
puisse agir dans aucune partie de /' Espace,
de la manire qiC il le veut. Dieu peut
avoir de bonnes raisons pour crer des Etres
finis -, & des Etres finis ne peuvent exister
qu en des Lieux particuliers. Et comme
tous les Lieux font originairement sembla
bles, (quand mme le Lieu ne seroit que la
Situation des Corps ;) si Dieu place un
Cube de matire derrire un autre Cube
gal de matire, plutt qu' rebours, ce
choix n efl pas indigne des Persistions de
Dieu, quoique ces deux Situations soient
parfaitement semblables j parce qti il peut
y avoir

at That particular Time he did :, and may
have made other kinds of things Before this
material World began, and may make other
kinds of things Aster This World is de
stroyed.
1 6. and i j. That Space and Time are

not the mere Order of things, but real
Quantities, (which Order and Situation are
not ,) has been proved above, (See Third
Reply, 4 :, and in This Paper, 1 3,) and
no Answer yet given to those Proofs. And
tilt an Answer be given to those Proofs,
this learned Author's assertion is fby his
own Confejjion in this placeJ a Contradiction.
1 8. The Uniformity of all the parts of
Space, is no Argument against God's acting
in Any part, after what manner he pleases.
God may have good reasons to create finite
Beings, and Finite Beings can be but in
particular Places. And, all places being
originally alike, (even though Place were
nothing else but the Situation of Bodies j)
God's placing one cube of matter behind
another equal cube of matter, rather than
the other behind That ; is a choice no
way unworthy of the Perfections of God,
though Both these Situations be perfe&ly
equal : Because there may be very good
reasons why Both the Cubes mould exist,
and
\ij
1 38

y avoir de trs-bonnes raisons pour l* exi
gence de ces deux Cubes, & qu ils ne sauroient exifler que dans 1' une ou Y autre de
ces deux Situations galement raisonnables.
Le hazard dy Epicure n est pas un Choix,
mais une Ncessit aveugle.
1 9. Si V Argument que V on trouve ici,
prouve quelque chose, il prouve, (comme je
/' ai dj dit ci-dessus 3.) que Dieu n' a
*voezi' * cr, & mme qii il ne peut crer auAppen- 4. parfies
cune matire
que ladeSituation
des
dice,Nn
(galesj &parce
similaires
la Matire,
toit ncessairement indiffrente ds le com
mencement -, aussi bien que la premiere Dter
mination de leur mouvement, d1 un certain
cots ou du cot oppos,
20. Je ne comprends point ce que V Au
teur veut prouver ici, par rapport au sujet
dont il j' agit.
21. Hire que Dieu ne peut donner des
bornes la Quantit de la Matire, c' est
avancer une chose d' une trop grande Impor
tance, pour V admettre fans preuve. Et fi
Dieu ne peut non plus donner des bornes
la Dure de la Matire, il s* ensuivra que
le Monde est infini & temel ncessairement
& indpendamment de Dieu.
. 22, "2^. Si V Argument que V on trouve
ici, toit bien sond, il prouveroit que Dieu
ne sauroit s' empcher de faire tout ce qu
il peut faire -, & par consquent qu il ne
sauroit s' empcher de rendre toutes les .
i
Cratures
139
and they cannot exist but in one or other

of equally reasonable Situations. The Epicitrean Chance^ is not a Choice of Will, but
a blind Necejfity of fate.
1 9. This Argument, (as I now observed,

% 3,) if it proves any thing, proves that
God neither * did nor can create any mat- * see Af
ter at all j because the Situation of equal />#*,
and similar parts of matter, could not but ^/*'
be originally indifferent : As was also the
original Determination of their Motionsy this
way, or the contrary way.
20. What This tends to prove, with re

gard to the Argument before us j I under
stand not.
. \ 21. That God Cannot limit the Quantity
of Matter, is an Assertion of too great con
sequence, to be admitted without Proof, If
he cannot limit the Duration of it neither,
then the material World is both infinite
and eternal necessarily and independently
upon God,
92, and 23. This Argument, if it were
good, would prove that Whatever God
can do, he cannot but do j and consequently
that he cannot but make every thing infinite,
and every thing eternal. Which is making
him
14

Cratures infinies & ternelles. Mais, selon
cette DoBrine, Dieu ne seroit point le Gou
verneur du Monde : il seroit un Agent n
cessaire j c ejl--dire qu il ne seroit pas
mme un Agent, mais le Destin, la Nature,
& la Ncessit.
24.
28. On revient encore ici
l* usage du mot de Sensorium , quoique
Mr. Newton se soit servi d' un Correctif,

lors qu il a employ ce mot. Il n ejl pas n
cessaire de rien ajouter ce que s ai dit
sur cela. Votez ma Troisime Rplique,
10. la Seconde, $ 3. la Premiere 3.
29. V Espace est le Lieu de toutes les
Choses & de toutes les Ides : Comme la
Dure eft la Dure de toutes les Choses, &
de toutes les Ides, js aifait voir ci-dessus (Rplique II. 1 2.) que cette DoBrine
ne tend point faire Dieu /' Ame du Monde.
Il n y a point d' Union entre Dieu & le
Monde. On pourroit dire avec plus de rai
son, que /' Esprit de V homme est l' Ame des
Images des choses qu' il apperoit, qu on ne
peut dire que Dieu eft V Ame du Monde,
dans lequel il eft present par tout, & sur
lequel il agit comme il veut, fans que le
Monde agisse sur lui. 'No?wbstant cette
Rponse, qu on a vu ci-dejsus, (Rplique II.
$ 12.) /' Auteur ne laisse pas de rpeter la
mme Objection plus d? une fois, commefi on
n y avoit point rpondit.
30. Je
Dr. Cl arkeV fourth Reply. .

14.1
him no Governor at all, but a mere necessary
Agent, that is, indeed no Agent at all, but
mere Fate and Nature and Necessity.
24,
28. Concerning the Use of
the word, Sensory , (though Sir Isaac New
ton says only, as it were the Sensory ; )
enough has been said in my Third Reply,
10 j and Second Reply, % 3 j and First
Reply, 3.
29. S/)tf<;<? is the P/rf<? of All Things,
and of All Ideas : Just as Duration is the
Duration of ^// Things, and of ^// i^j.
That This has no Tendency to make God
the Soul of the World, See above, Reply If,
<$" 12. There is no Union between God and
the World. The vWi<^ of Man might with
greater propriety be stiled The Soul of the
Images of things which it perceives, than
God can be stiled the Soul of the World, to
which he is present throughout, and aBs
upon it as he pleases, without being aBed
upon by it. Though this Answer was given
before, (Reply II, 12.) yet the fame Ob
jection is repeated again and again, with
out taking any Notice of the Answer.
30. What
1^2

30. Je n entends point ce que V Auteur
*Voczp vgut jjre par * un Principe reprsentatif.
ce^Nnu. L' Ame apperoit les choses, parce que les
Images des choses lui font portes par les
Organes des Sens. Dieu apperoit les choses,
parce qu il est present dans les Substances
des choses mmes. Il ne les apperoit pas,
en les produisant continuellement j (car il
se repose de l' Ouvrage de la Cration j)
mais il les apperoit, parce qu il est conti
nuellement present dans toutes les choses
qu' il a cres.
fvoezi'
31 Si r Ame s n' agissoit point furie
Appen- Corps j &si le Corps, par un simple mouvelcc' s' ment mchanique de la Matire, se confor
mait pourtant la volont de V Ame dans
une varit infinie de mouvemens spontanes,
ce seroit un Miracle perptuel. V Har
monie prtablie n eft qu1 un mot, ou un
terme d' Art } & elle n est d* aucun usage
pour expliquer la cause d' un effet si mi
raculeux.
32. Supposer que dans le mouvement spon
tane du Corps, I7 Ame ne donne point un
nouveau mouvement ou une nouvelle Im
pression la Matire, & que tous les mou
vemens spontanes font produits par une
impulsion mchanique de la Matire -, s' efl
rduire tout au Dejlin & la Ncessit.
Mais- quand on dit que Dieu agit dans le
Monde fur toutes les Cratures comme il
le veut, sans aucune Union, & fans qu*
aucune
jDr.CLARKfcV Fourth Reply.

14.3
. go. What is meant by * representative * See APPrinciple, I understand not. The Soul dis- %?*.
cerns things, by having the Images of things
conveyed to it through the Organs of Sense :
God discerns things, by being present to
and in the Sub/lances of the Things them
selves. Not by producing them continually \
(For he rests now from his work otCreation:')
but by being continually omnipresent to
every thing which he created at the Beginning.
31. That the Soul f should not operate j.See Ap_
upon the Body ; and yet the Body, by pendix,
mere mechanical impulse of Matter, con- N Sform itself to the Will of the Soul in all the
infinite variety of spontaneous Animal-Mo
tion , is a perpetual Miracle. Pre-eftablified
Harmony, is a mere Word or Term of Art,
and does nothing towards explaining the
cause of so miraculous an effect.
32. To suppose that in spontaneous Ani
mal-Motion, the Soul gives no new Motion
or Impression to Matter ^ but that all spon
taneous Animal-Motion is performed by
mechanical impulse os Matter j is reducing
all things to mere Fate and Necessity.
God's aBing in the World upon every
thing, after what manner he pleases, with
out any Union, and without being aBed
upon by any thing } shows plainly the
difference
144
Q&dtrime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

aucune chose agisse sur lui -, cela fait voir
videmment la difference qtt* il y a entre un
Gouverneur qui eft present par tout, & une
Ame imaginaire du Monde.
33. Toute Action constfte donner une
nouvelle Force aux choses , fur lesquelles
elle s* exerce. Sans cela, ce ne ferait pas
une Action relle, mais une simple Paslion,
comme dans toutes les Loix mchaniques
du mouvement. D' ou il s1 ensuit que fi
la communication d' une nouvelle Force est
surnaturelle, toutes les actions de Dieu se
ront surnaturelles , & il sera entirementexclu du Gouvernement du Monde. .// s*
enfuit aussi de l, que toutes les actions des
hommes font surnaturelles, ou que V homme
est une pure Machine, comme une Horloge.
34, d" 35. On a fait voir ci-dessus la
difference qu* il y a entre la vritable Ide
de Dieu, & celle d* une Ame du Monde.
Voie* ma Seconde Rplique, 1 2 -, &
dans cette Quatrime Rplique, % 29 &
36. J'ai rpondu ci- dessus, $ 31. ce que
V on trouve ici.
37. U Ame n eft. pas rpandue dans le
Cerveau :, mais elle est prsente dans le Lieu,
qui eft le Sensorium.
38. Ce que V on dit ici, est une simple
Affirmation fans preuve. Deux Corps, de
stituez ^ Elasticit , se rencontrant avec
des forces contraires & gales, perdent
leur

145
difference between an Omnipresent Gover*
nor, and an imaginary Soul of the World.
33. Every ABion is (in the nature of

things) the giving of a new Force to the
thing aBed upon. Otherwise 'tis not really
ABion, but mere paffivenejs j as in the
cafe of all mechanical and inanimate com
munications of Motion. If therefore the
Giving a new Force, be supernatural , then
every aBion of Godtls supernatural, and he
is quite excluded from the Government of
the natural World : And every aBion of
Man, is either supernatural, or else Man
is as mere a Machine as a Clock.
34, /wig 5. The difference between the
true Notion of God, and that of a Soul of
the World, has been before shown : Repljll, 12. and in This Paper, 29
and %2*
36. This has been answered just above,
37. The Soul is not diffused through
the Brain j but is present to That particu
lar Place, which is the Sensorium.
. 38. This is a bare Assertion, without
Proof. Two Bodies , void of Elasticity,
meeting each other with equal contrary For
ces, Both lose their Motion. And Sir Isaac
L
Newton
i^6

leur Mouvement. Et Mr. le Chevalier New
ton a donn un Exemple Mathmatique,
(pag. 341 , de V Edition Latine de son Op
tique,) par lequel il paroit que le Mouve
ment diminue & augmente continuellement
en Quantit, sans qu il soit communiqu
d* autres Corps.
gcj. Le Sujet, dont on parle ici, n ejl
point un dfaut, comme V Auteur le suppose :
C* est la vritable- nature de la Matire
inactive.
40. Si V Argument que V on trouve ici,
ejl bien sond, il prouve que V Univers doit
tre infini ; qu H a exist de toute ternit,
G^ qif il ne snuroit cesser d' exister j que
Dieu a toujours cr autant d' hommes, &
d* autres Etres, qu* il toit possible qu il
en crt -, & qtf il les a crez pour les
faire exister auff long temps, qit il lui
toit possible.
41. Je n* entends point ce que ces mots
veulent dire : Un Ordre, ( ou une Situa
tions) qui rend les Corps situables. // me
semble que cela veut dire, que la Situation
est la cause de la Situation. J' ai prouve
' ci-dejsus sRplique III, g 2 & 4.J) que t*

Espace n est pas V Ordre des Corps : Et j* ai
fait voir dans cette Quatrime Rplique,
1 3 & 14, que V Auteur n a point rpondu
aux Arguments que sai propos, il n est
' pas moins vident, que le Temps n est pas
V Ordre des choses qui succdent 1? une 4*
" autre j puisque la Quantit du 'Temps peut
tre
Dr. Clarke'/ Fourth Reply.

Newton has given a Mathematical Instance
(** 941, 0/ tfo Latin Edition of hh
Opticks, ) wherein Motion is continually
diminishing and increasing in Quantity,
without any communication thereof to other Bodies.
39. This is no DefeB, as is here supposed , but 'tis the jusi and proper Nature of
inert Matter.
40. This Argument ( if it be good )
proves that the Material World must be
infinite, and that it must have been from
eternity , and must continue to eternity :
And that God must Always have created as
many Men, and as many of all other things,
as 'twas possible for him to create ; and for
as long a time also, as it was possible for
him to do it.
m 41. What the meaning of these Words
b S/n rder> (0r Situation,) hich makes
Bodies to be Situable j I understand not.
It seems to me to amount to This, that
Situation is the cause of Situation. ' That
Space is not merely the Order of Bodies
has been mown before ; Reply HI, #a and 4.'
And that no Answer has been given to the*
Arguments there offered, has been shown
m This Paper, 13 and 14. Also that
rime is not merely the Order of thingssucceeding each other, is evident ; because
the Quantity of Time may be greater or
La
Ufi
147
1 48
tre plus grande ou plus petite, $" cepen

dant Cet Ordre ne laisse pas d" tre le mme.
U Ordre des choses qui succdent 1' une
I* autre dans le Temps, ri eft pas le Temps
mme : Car elles peuvent succder s une
V autre plus vite ou plus lentement dans le
mme Ordre de Sticceflion, mais non dans le
mme Temps. Suppos qu il n y eut point
de Cratures, V Ubiquit de Dieu, & la
* voici Continuation de son Existence, feroient s
h Note* #w s Espace & la Dure feroient prcisesur 10. trient les mmes qu present.
42. On appelle ici de la Raison V Opi
nion vulgaire. Mais comme V Opinion vul
gaire n eft pas la Rgie de la Vrit, les
Philosophes ne doivent point y avoir recours.
43. U ide d'un Miracle renferme nces
sairement /' ide d'une chose rare C ex
traordinaire. Car, d' ailleurs, il ri y a
rien de plus merveilleux, & qui demande
une plus grande puissance, que quelques unes
des choses que nous appelions naturelles -,
comme, par exemple, les Mouvemens des
Corps Celestes, la Gnration & la For
mation des Plantes & des Animaux, &c.
Cependant ce ne font pas des Miracles, parce
.que ce font des choses communes. // ne s'
ensuit pourtant pas de l, que tout ce qui
ejl rare & extraordinaire, soit un Miracle.
Car plusieurs choses de cette nature, peuvent
tre des Effets irrguliers & moins com
muns, des Causes ordinaires j comme les
Eclipses, les Monstres, la Manie dans les
hommes,
149
less, and yet That Order continue the fame.

The Order of things succeeding each other
in Time, is not Time itself: For they may
succeed each other safer or flower in the
same Order os Succession, but not in the
same Time. If no Creatures existed, yet
the Ubiquity of God, and the Continuance
of his Existence, would make * Space and * See
Duration to be exactly the same as they dove, '
are Now.
the Note
on 10.
42. This is appealing from Reason to

vulgar Opinion j which Philosophers should
not do, because it is not the Rule of Truth.
43. TJnusuahess is necessarily included in
the Notion of a Miracle. For otherwise

there is nothing more wonderful, nor that
requires greater Power to effect, than some
of those things we call natural. Such as,
the Motions of the Heavenly-Bodies , the
Generation and Formation of Plants and
Animals, Sec. Yet these are for This only
reason not Miracles, because they are com
mon. Nevertheless, it does not follow,
that every thing which is unusual, is there
fore a Miracle. For it may be only the
irregular and more rare effect of usual
Causes : Of which kind are Eclipses, Mon
strous Birthsj Madness in Men, and innuL 3
merable
ô

hommes, & une infinit d' autres choses que
le Vulgaire appelle des Prodiges0.
44. On accord ici ce que s ai dit* On
soutient pourtant une chose contraire au sen
timent commun des Thologiens, en suppo
sant qu un Ange peut faire des Miracles.
45. // est vrai que si un Corps en attiroit un autre fans /' intervention d' aucun
moyen, ce ne serot pas un Miracle, mais une
Contradiction j car ce seroit supposer qiC
une chose agit o elle n' est pas. Mais le
Moyen par lequel deux Corps s' attirent V un
V autre, peut tre invisible & intangible,
& dy une nature diffrente du Mchanisme .*
Ce qui n empche pas qu* une a&ion rgu
lire & constante ne puisse tre appellee na
turelle , puis qu elle est beaucoup moins
merveilleuse, que le mouvement des Animaux,
qui ne passe pourtant pas pour un Miracle.
45. Si par le terme de Forces naturelles,
on entend ici des forces Mchaniques j tous
les Animaux, fans, en excepter les hommes,
seront de pures Machines, comme une Hor
loge. Mais si ce terme ne signifie pas des
Forces Mchaniques j la Gravitation peut
tre produite par des Forces rgulires &
naturelles, quoi qu elles ne soient pas M
chaniques.
N.B.On a dj rpondu ci-dessus aux Arguments que Mf.
Leibnit a >nferez dans uneAddition son Quatrime Ecrit.
La seule chose qu' il soie besoin d' observer ici, c' est que
tQr.Leibnitz. en soutenant ]' impossibilit des Atomes Physi
ques, (il ne s' agit pas entre nous des Points Mathmatiques,)
soutient
2)r. ClarkeV Fourth Reply.

merable things which the Vulgar call
Prodigies.
44. This is a Concession of what I al
leged. And yet 'tis contrary to the com
mon Opinion of Divines, to suppose that an
Angel can work a Miracle.
45. That One Body should attratl ano
ther -without any intermediate Means, is
indeed not a Miracle, but a Contraditlion :
For 'tis supposing something to aB where
it is not. But the Means by which Two
Bodies attract: each other, may be invisible
and intangible, and of a different natures
from mechanism \ and yet, acting regularly
and constantly, may well be called na
tural -j being much less wonderful than
Animal-motion, which yet is never called a
Miracle. "
46. If the word, natural Forces, means
here Mechanical j then all Animals, and
even Men, are as mere Machines as a Clock.
But if the word does not mean, mechanical
Forces -, then Gravitation may be effected
by regular and natural Powers, though they
be not Mechanical.
N. B. The Arguments alleged in the Postscript to Mr. Leib

nitz'* Fourth Paper, have been already answered in the fore
going Replies. All that needs here to be observed, is, that
hit Notion concerning the Impossibility of Physical Atomes,
{for the Question is not about Mathematical Atomes,) is a
manifest Absurdity. For either there are, or there are not
any perfectly solid particles of Matter. If there are any
(Hch ; then the parts of such perfeclly solid particles, taken of
L 4
equa\
i51
1^2

soutient une Absurdit manifeste. Car ou il y a des
ptfties parfaitement solides dans la Matire, ou il n y en a
pas. S' il y en a, & qu' en les subdivisant on y prenne de
nouvelles particules, qui ayent toutes la mme Figure C
ksmcir.-iDimensions^ce qui est toujours possible,') ces nou
velle* particules seront des Atomes Physiques parfaitement
semblables. Que s' il n' y a point des parties parfaitement
solides dans la Matire, il n' y a point de Matire dans 1'
Univers. Or plus en Divise & Subdivise un Corps, pour
arriver enfin des parties parfaitement solides c fans
pores, plus la Proportion que les Pores ont la matire
solide de ce Corps, plus, dis-je, cette Proportion aug
mente. Si donc , en poussant la Division & la Sub
division V infini , il est impossible d' arriver des
parties parfaitement solides & fans pores ; il s' en
suivra que les Corps font uniquement composez de pores,
(le rapport de ceux-ci aux parties solides , augmentant
Uns cesse ;) & par consequent qu' il n' y a point de Ma
tire du tout: Ce qui est une Absurdit manifeste.
Ciuquime
Dr. ClarkeV Fourth Reply. (

equal Figure and Dimensions, (which k always possible in Sup'
position,) are Physical Atoms perfectly alike. But if there
be No such perfectly solid particles, then there is m
Matter at all in the Vniverfe. For, the further the Di
vision and Subdivision of the parts of any Body it carried^
before you arrive at parts perfectly jolid and without pores;
the greater k the Proportion of Pores to solid matter in That
Bods. If therefore, carrying on the Division in infinitum,
you never arrive at parts perfectly {olid and without Pores-,
it wjll follow that All Bodies consist of Pores only, without
an^ Matter at all': Which k a manifest Absurdity,
Mr. Leie
1^3
[ -lui"
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr.LEiBNiTZ^

ou
Rponse au Quatrime Ecrit Anglois.
[Les diffrentes Leons, imprimes Ja Marge de l'Ecrit

suivant, font ds changemens faits de la />ro/>re main de
Mr. Leibnit^ dans une autre Copie de cet Ecrit, laquelle
il envoya - un de ses amis en Angleterre peu de temps
avant fa mort.}
. Sur i c 2, du Papier precedent..

i. JE rpondray cettefois plus amplement,
T pour clarcr les difficults, & pour
essayer si V on eft d* humeur se payer de
raison, & de donner des marques de l'amour
de la vrit, ou fi F on ne sera que chicaner
sans rien claircir.
i. On s* efforce souvent nf impttfer la
ncessit & la fatalit, quoyque peut tre
personne n' ait mieux expliqu & plus
fond que j ay fait dans la Theodice, la
veritable difference entre Libert, Contin
gence, Spontanit, d' un cot j & Nces
sit absolue. Hazard, CoaBion, de V autre.
Je lie sais pat encore fi on le fait parce qu*
on
3Vlr. Leibnitz's Fifth Paper*

being
Ait Answer to IV.ClarkeV Fourth
To $ i and 2, of the foregoing Paper.

1. T Shall at This Time mike a /^r^r
X Answer j to clear the difficulties -0 and
to try whether the Author be willing to
hearken to reason, and to show that he is
a lover of truth j or whether he will only
cavil, without clearing any thing.
2. He often endeavours to impute to me
Necessity and Fatality j though perhaps no
One has better and more fully explain
ed, than I have done in myTheodica,
the true difference between Liberty, Con
tingency, Spontaneity, on the one Side 5,
and absolute Necessity, Chance, CoaBion,
on the other. I know not yet, whether
; ;- J
the
1 56
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

on le veut, quoyque je puisse dire ^ ou si
ces imputations viennent de bonne soy, de ce
qu on n a point encore pes mes sentimens :
js exprimenteray bien tot ce que j* en dois
juger, & je me regleray l dessus
g. Il ejl vray que les Raisons font dans

V Esprit du Sage, & les Motifs dans quel
que Esprit que ce soit, ce qui rpond V effeB
que les Poids font dans une Balance. On
objeBe, que cette notion men la Nces
sit & la Fatalit. Mais on le dit fans
le prouver j & fans prendre connoijsance
des Explications que s ay donnes autres
fois pour lever toutes les difficults qif on
peut faire l dessus.
4. Il semble aussi, qi on se joiie d' qui
voque. Il y a des Ncessits, qu il faut
admettre. Car il faut distinguer entre une
Ncessit absolue & une Ncessit Hypo
thtique. H faut distinguer aussi entre une
Ncessit qui a lieu parceque s oppos impli
que Contradiction, & laquelle est appellee
Logique, Mtaphysique, ou Mathmatique -,
& entre une Ncessit qui est Morale, qui
fait que le sage choisit le Meilleur, & que
tout esprit suit V Inclination la plus grande.
5. La Ncessit Hypothtique est celle,
que la Supposition ou Hypothse de la pre
vision & prordination de Dieu impose aux
futurs
Mr. Leibnitz'j" Fifth Paper.
157
the Author does this, because he will

do it, whatever I may say j or whether he
does it, (supposing him sincere in those
imputations,) because he has not yet duly
considered my Opinions. I (hall soon find
what I am to think of it, and 1 (hall take
my measures accordingly.
3. It is true, that Reasons in the Mind
of a Wife Being, and Motives in Any
Mind whatsoever, do that which answers to
the effect produced by Weights in * a Ba- *setAtlance.
Theto Author
that this Notion leads
Necessityobjects,
and Fatality.
But pendix,
NO,?'
he fays so, without proving it, and with
out taking notice of the explications I have
formerly given, in order to remove the
difficulties that may be raised upon that
Head.
4. He seems also to play with Equi
vocal Terms. There are Necessities, which
ought to be admijted. For we must di
stinguish between an absolute and an Hypo
thetical Necessity. We must also distinguish
between a Necessity', which takes place be
cause the Opposite implies a Contradiction j
(which necessity is called Logical, Meta
physical, or Mathematical;) and a Necessity
which is Morals whereby a Wife Being
chuses the Best, and every Mind follows
the strongest Inclination.
5. Hypothetical NeceJJity is that, which
the Supposition or Hypothesis of God's
Foresight and Fre-ordination lays upon su
ture
1 58

futurs contingent. Et il faut V admettre si
ce n est qu* avec les Sociniens on refuse
Dieu la prescience des Contingens futurs, &
la Providence qui rgle & gouverne les
choses en detail.
6. Mais ny cette prescience ny cette Vre
ordination ne drogent point la Libert.
Car Dieu port par la Supreme Raison
choisir, entre plusieurs suites ds choses ou
Mondes possibles , celuy ou r les Creatures
libres prendraient tel/es ou telles Resolutions,
quqyque non fans son concours -, a rendu,
par l, leur vnement certain & determine
une fois pour toutes j fans droger par la
la Libert de ces Creatures ' Ce simple d
cret du choix, ne changeant point, mais
aBualisant seulement leur Natures libres qu
ily voyait dans ses Ides.
7. Et quant la Ncessit Morale, elle ne
droge point non plus la Libert. Car lors
que le sage, &, sur tout, Dieu, (le sage
souverain,) choisit le Meilleur, il n en est
pas moins libre \ au contraire, c eft la plus
parfaite Libert, de n tre point empche'
d' agir le mieux. Et lors qu un autre
choisitselon le bien le plus apparent, & le plus
inclinant -y il imite en cela la Libert dit
sage proportion de sa disposition. Et sans
cela, le choix ferait un hazard aveugle.
4' * <
8. Mai
Mr. Leibnitz'j- Fifth Paper.

tare Contingents. And This must needs be
admitted, unless we deny, as the Socinians
do, God's Foreknowledge offuture Contin
gents, and his Providence which regulates
and governs every particular thing.
6. But neither That Foreknowledge, nor
That I're-Ordination, derogate from Liber
ty. For God, being moved by his Su
preme Reason to chuse, among many Series
of Things or Worlds possible , That, in
which free Creatures should take such or
such Resolutions, though not without his
Concourse ; has thereby rendred every
Event certain and determined once for all-,
without derogating thereby from the Li
berty of those Creatures : That simple de
cree of Choice, not at all changing, but
only aBualizing their free Natures, which
he saw in his Ideas.
7. As for Moral Necessity, This also
does not derogate from Liberty. For when
a Wife Being, and especially God, who
has Supreme Wisdom, chuses what is Best,
he is not the less free upon that account :
On the contrary, it is the most perfect Li
berty, not to be hindred from acting in the
best manner. And when Any Other chuses
according to the most apparent and the
most strongly inclining Good, he imitates
therein the Liberty of a truly Wife Being,
-in proportion to his disposition. Without
, this, the Choice would be a blind Chance.
'-.i. .
8. But
1 59
i6o

8. Mais le bien, tant vray qu apparent
en un mot le motif, incline fans ncessiter 5
C est dire, fans imposer une Necejfit ab*
solue. Car lors que Dieu (pour exemple")
choijt le Meilleur -, ce qi? il ne choisit points
& qui eft infrieur en PerfeBion, ne laisse
pas d* tre possible. Mais fi ce que Dieu
choisit, eftoit absolument Ncessaire, tout
autre parti feroit imposible j contre l' Hypo
thse : Car Dieu choisit parmy les possibles,
1 est dire parmy plusieurs partis, dont pas
un n implique ContradiBion.
9. Mais de dire que Dieu ne peut choisir
que le meilleur, & d' en vouloir infrer que
ce qiC il ne choisit point, efl imposible ; C*
est confondre les termes j la Puissance, d la
Volont ; la Ncessit Mtaphysique, &
la Ncessit Morale ; les Tissences, & les
Existences. Car ce qui est ncessaire, s efl
par son Essence, puisque V oppos implique
ContradiBion } mais le Contingent qui exifte, doit son existence au principe du Meil
leur, Raison suffisante des choses. Et c' est
pour cela que je dis, que les Motifs incli
nent fans ncessiter \ & qu il y a une certi
tude & infaliibilit, mais non pas une N
cessit absolue dans les choses contingentes.
Joignez cecy, ce qui se dira plus bas,
Nomb. 73 & y 6.
10. Et s ay assez montr dans ma Theo\ct que cette Ncessit Morale*/? heureusey
conforme laperfeBion Divine, conforme au
1
grand
Mr. LiiBNiTZ^s Fifth Paper.

8. But Good, either true or apparent^
in a word, the Mbtive, inclines without
necessitating ; that is, without imposing "aft
absolute Necessity. For when God ( for
Instances,} chuses the Best j what he does
not chuse, and is inferior in Perfeflrioh, h
nevertheless possible.,; 'But if' what he
chuses, was absolutely, necessary :> any other
way would be impossible': Which is against
the Hypothesis. For God chuses among
Possibles, that is, among many ways,* 'done
of which implies a Contradiction.'- *
9. But to fay, that God can only- 'chafe
What is Best -, and tb infer from thence,
that what he does not chuse, is impossible ;
this, I fay, is confounding of Terms : 'Tis
blending Power and Will, Metaphysical Ne
cessity* and Moral Necessity , Essences and
Existences. For, what' is necessaryy is' fd
by its Essence, since the Opposite implies a
Contradiction j But a Cbritingent which
exists, owes it's Existence to the *Yrlncip%
os what is Beft, which is a sufficient Rea
son for the Existence of Things. And
therefore I fay, that Motives incline with
out necessitating j and that there is a Cer
tainty and Infallibility, but not an absolute'
Necessity in contingent Things. Add to
this, what will be said hereafter, Numb.
73^ and 7 6.
10. And Thave sufficiently shown in
my ThedtJica, that this Moral Necessity is
a good Thing,agreeable to the Divine Per'*\
" "
M
section ;
161
1 6i
CinquMe Ecrit de Mr. Leibntz.

grand principe des Exigences, qui est celuy
4u besoin d' une Raison suffisante -, au lieu
mie la Ncessit absolue & Metaphy/ique,
depend de V autre grand principe de nos
yajsonnemens, qui est ceuy des Essences, c
est dire celuy de Y Identit\ oit de la Con
tradiction : Car ce qui est absolument N
cessaires ejl seul possible entre les partis,
& son contraire implique ContradiBion.
y
"; '
> iJ .
"jv: '
< i;i. 7' ay sait voir aussi', que notre Vo

lont ne suit pas tousjours prcisment V
Entendement practique, parcequ* elle peut
avoir; ou trouver des raisons pour suspendre
'fa Resolution jusqu' une- discussion ul
trieure. ', -,0 -.
12. M* imputer aprs cela une Ncessit
absolue, fans avoir rien dire contre des
Considerations queje .viens d* apporter, &
qui vont jttsqu- au fond des choses, peut
tre au del de ce qui se voit ailleurs j ce
fera une- obstination draisonnable. .,
,'v 'u. /
ii ?< '> .,''' V.
Ig. Pour ce qui esi de la Fatalit, qu
on m impute aussi, c\ est encore une Equi
voque. . Il y a fatum Mahometanum, fa
tum Stoicum, fatum Christianum. Le
destin la Turque,, veut que les Effets
arriveraient quand on en viterait la cause j
comme s'il y avoit une Ncessit absolue.
Xe destin Stoicien veut qu on soit tranquille, parce qu il faut avoir patience par
'".
force,
. * i < Mr. LeibnitzV Fifth safes.

section , agreeable to the great Principle or
Ground of Existences, which is that of
the Want of a sufficient Reason : Whereas
Absolute and Metaphysical Necessity, de^pends upon, the Other great Principle of
our Reasonings, viz* that of Essences j
that is, the Principle pf Identity or Cort*
tradiction ; For, what is absolutely neces
sary, is the only possible Way, and its con
trary implies a Contradiction.
11. I have also shown, that our Will
does not always exactly follow the Practi
cal under(landing , because it may have
or find .Reasons to suspend its Resolution
till a further Examination. . .
12. To , impute to me after this, the
Notion of an absolute Necessity, without
having any thing to fay against the Rea
sons which I have just now alledged, and
which go to the Bottom of Things, per
haps beyond what is to be seen elsewhere ;
This, I fay, will be an unreasonable Ob
stinacy.
13. As to the Notion of Fatality,
which the Author lays also to my Charge j
this is another Ambiguity. There is a Fatum Mahometanum, a Fatum Stoicum, and
a Fatum Chriftianum. The Turkish Fate
will have an Effect to happen, even though
its Cause should be avoided^ as if there
was an Absolute Necessity. The Stoical Fate
will have a Man to be quiet, because he
M 2
must
163
1 6^
Cinquihme Edrit deiMr . Ihifel itz.

force,, puisqif on ne sMrok regimber contre^
la suite des choses. Mais oh convient qit
il y a fatum Christianum,Utfe destine cer
taine de toutes choses,rgle parla Prescience
& par la Providence de Dieu. Fatum est
driv de sari , '/ es dire, prononcer,
-dcerner :, & dans le bon sent, il signifie^ le
dcret de la Providence* Et ceux qui s* y
fiusmettent par la connaissance des Fer
sefiions Divines^- dont amour de Dieu est
une fuite, * ne prennent pas feulement pa
tience . comme les Philosophes Payens, mais
ils font mme contents -de c^qUe Dieu or*
donne,fachans qi il fait tout pour H Mieux,
& non feulement, pou* le plus grand bien en
general, mais encore pour le plus grand bien
particulier de ceux'quf aiment.
. ) H. '!;
*4< s ay t- oblig de m* tend?*, four

dtruire une borne fois les imputations mal
fondes, comme s espre de- pouvoir1 faire par
tes Explications dans'P Esprit de Personnes
quitables. Maintenant je ^vU^jdVay Une
Objection quy on me fait icy contre -la com
paraison de'* Poids iff une. Baabc^wfc les
Motifs de la Volont. [ >On<bj que la
Balance eft.ipurement' passive-, &piif[fe par
h$. Poids, au lieu >qm lsgW ntuigens
& dous d vol sent-act-lfo- N A'cla je
rponds, que :k' mnpe dit ^ besoin a une
' .,.(_ ,_
': i l'u'.nl Du;.?...
" ' '."%". " , ' ]' '..v* ..-. ,"' 'W^k !-""
'*( Plri%.i consiste' 'Jatt'l flaisir q^' donae cette

c3nnoiiiifcevJ
' ' zr' c- ":"n * "'"
,,
c 1/.
Raison
Mr: Le p b n i f zV F//*fc F^cr.

must have Patience whether he will or not,
since 'tis impossible to resist the Course of
Things. But 'tis agreed, that there is Fairim
Chrifiianum, a Certain Defiiny of every
Thing, regulated by the Foreknowledge
and Providence of God/ Fatwn is derived
from Tan , that 15, to Pronouncey to De
cree , and in its right Sense; it signifies1 the
Decree of Providence. And those who
submit to it through a Knowledge of the
Divine Perfections, whereof the Love of
God is a Consequence , have hot only
Patience, like the Heathen Philosophers,
but are also contented with what is or
dained by God, knowing he does every
thing for the best j' and not only for
the greatest Good in general, but also for.
the greatest particular Good of those who
love him*
165
14. I have been obliged to enlarge, in

order to remove ill-grounded Imputations,
once for all } as I hope I shall be able to 4
by these Explications, ' so as to satisfy .equi
table Persons. I shall now come to qn
ObjeElioh raised here, against my com
paring the Weights of a Balance wrth the
Motives of thclFilh 'Tis objected, that
a Balance is merely Passive, and mov'd by
the Weights j whereas Agents intelligent,
and endowed with Will, are Atlwe. To **" ,;::."
this I answer, that the * Prbiciple op the s." '
M 3
Want
1 66
Cinquime Ecrit d Mr. LeieInitz.

Raison suffisante est _, commun aux Agens
& aux Patiens : Ils ont besoin d* une Rai
son suffisante de hut Action, aussi bien que
de leur Passion. Non seulement la Balance
n' agit pas, quand elle eft pousse Egale
ment de part & d? autre -, mais les Poids
Egaux aussi n agissent point quand ils font
en Equilibre, en forte que V un ne peut
descendre sans que V autre monte autant.
1 5. Il faut encore considrer qu propre
ment parler, les Motifs w' agissent point sur
V Esprit comme les Poids fur la Balance ;
mais c' efl plutt V Esprit qui agit en vertu
des Motifs, qui font ses Dispositions agir.
Ainsi vouloir, comme /' on veut icy, que F
Esprit prfre quelques sois les Motifs foibles
aux plus forts, & mme V indifferent aux
Motifs j c est sparer /' Esprit des Motifs,
comme s* ils toient hors de luy, comme le
Poids est distingu de la Balance j & comme
fi dans l' Esprit il y avoit d' autres Dispo
sitions pour agir que les Motifs, en vertu
desqueues V Esprit rejetterait o accepterait
les Motifs. Au lieu que dans la vrit les
Motifs comprennent toutes les Dispositions
que V Esprit peut avoir pour agir volon
tairement j Car Us ne comprennent pas feu
lement les Raisons, mais encore les Inclina
tions qui viennent des Paffons ou dr autres
impressions prcdentes. Ainsi fi V Esprit
prfrait V Inclination soible la forte, ih
agiroit contre soy mme, & autrement qu7
il est dispos d' agir, Ce qui sait vois que
Mr. L E I B N I T z\r Fifth Taper.

\6j
Want of a sufficient Reason is common both
to Agents and Patients : They want a
sufficient Reason of their ABion, as well as
of their Passion, k Balance does nor only not
act, when it is equally pulled on both Sides j
but the. equal Weights likewise do not act
when they are in an quilibrium, so that
one of them cannot go down without the
others rising up as much.
1 5. It must also be considered, that, pro
perly speaking, Motives do not act upon
the Mind, as Weights do upon a Balance -,
but 'tis rather the Mind that acts by virtue
of the Motives, which are its Dispositions
to act. And therefore to pretend, as the
Author does here, that the Mind prefers
sometimes weak Motives to strong ones, and
even that it prefers that which is indiffe
rent before Motives : This, I fay, is to
divide the Mind from the Motives, as if
they were without the Mind, as the Weight
is distinct from the Balance \ and as if the
Mind had, besides Motives, other Disposi
tions to act, by Virtue of which it could
reject or accept the Motives. Whereas, in
truth, the Motives comprehend all the Dis
positions, which the Mind can have to act
voluntarily ^ for they include not only the
Reasons, but also the Inclinations arising
from Passions, or other preceding Impressi
ons. Wherefore, if the Mind should pre
fer a weak Inclination to a strong one, it
would act against it self, and otherwise
M 4
than
1 68
Cituftime Ecrit <1 Mr. Leibnitz.

tes Votions contraires icy aux miennes, font
superficelles, & se trouvent ri avoir rien
de solide, quand*lies font bien considres.
, < -i 6. De dire aussi que T Esprit peut avoir
de bonnes Raisons pour agir^ quand il ri a
aucuns Motifs, & quand les choses font
absolument indiffrentes, comme on s"" ex
plique icy } c* efl une ContradiBion manifejie.
Car s* il a de bonnes Raisons pour le- parti
qit il prend, les choses ne luy font ppint in
diffrentes.
' ?'> ,!'''' "~;
' fffi pt de dire qu on agita quand on a
des Raisons pour agir, quand* mme les
voyes d' agir seroient absolument indiff
rentes \ c* eft encore parler son superficiel
lement, & es une manire trs insoutenable.
Car on ri a jamah une Raison sufnsnte/tfwr
;igir, quand < on ri a -pas. aujfi ime Raison
suffisante pour agir tellement -, toute aion
estant individuelle, & non gnrale ny ab
straite des ses Qrconftances, & ayant besoin
d- quelque voye , pour tre EffeBue. Donc
apian il 'y a une Raison suffisants pour
d*ir tellement, ily en a aujji pour agir par
uh'telk-vGyf) & par consquent les voyes
ne- font point indifferen tes. Toutes, les foi*
qtiôi}. a des Raisons suffisantes .pour une
dffibi 'singulire, m en a pour ses requiJit Yvys ekcore ce qu'use dim plus 'bas,
NW-6& ' "': -' 'i ,' fiû,-/
Jiiv/'j :il, j '.hi* tljJ; :. .'irii.'gfi &> '.:">'';
fc-;J
18. Ces
Mt*. L e ib :n i t zV Fifth Paper.

than it is disposed to act. Which (hows
that the Author's Notions, contrary to
mine, are superficial, and appear to have
no Solidity in them, when they are well
considered.
16. To assert also, that the Mind may
have good Reasons to aB, when it has no
Motives, and when Things are absolutely in
different, as the Author explains himself
here j this, I fay, is a manifest Contradi
ction. For if the Mind has good Reasons
for taking the Part it takes, then the Things
are not indifferent to the Mind.
17. -Arid to affirm that the Mind will
act, when it has Reasons to act, even though
the tWays of a,Bing were absolutely indiffe
rent : This, 1 fay, is to speak again very
superficially, and in a manner that cannot
be defended. For a Man riever has a suffi
cient Reason t'o'aB, when he has not also
a sufficient Reason to act in a certain particular manner j every Action being Indi
vidual, and not general, nor abstract from
its Circumstances, but always needing some
particular way of being put in Execution.
Wherefore, when there is a sufficient Rea
son to do any particular Thing, there is
al&j * sufficient Reason to do ^'iri a certain
particular manner , and consequently, seve
ral manners of doing it are not indifferent.
As often as a Man has sufficient Reasons for
a single Action, he has also sufficient Rea
sons for all its Requisites. See also what I
shall fay below, 2wmk. 66,
18. These
i $9
1 79

18. Ces rdifonnemens fautent aux
& il e bien erange de m imputer que j*
avance mon principe du befoin /' une Rai
fon fuffifante, fans aucune preuve tire oit
de la Vature des chofes, ou des perfections
Divines. Car la nature des chofes porte
que tout vnement ait preallablement fes
Conditions, Requits , Difpqfitions conve
nables, dont exience en fait la Raifon
fuffifante.
. -.. I
19. Et la perfection de Dieu demande
que toutes fes anions foyent conforme?
fa fageffe, <& qit on ne puiffe point luy
reprocher d' avoir agi fans Raifon, ou mme
d' avoir prfr une Raifon plus foible
une Raifon plus forte.
20. Mais je parleray plus amplement fur
la fin de ce papier, de la folidit " de
V. importance de ce grand Principe du befoin
d' une Raifon fuffifante pour tout vnement,
dont le renverfement renverferoit la meil
leure partie de toute la Philofophie. Ainfi il
e bien trange quJ on veut icy qiC en cela
je commets une Petition de Principe j & il
paroi bien qu* on veut foutenir des fentimens
infoutenables, puifqu' on e rduit me
refufer ce grand Principe9 un des plus effentiels de la Raifon,
:
: ;- - i
'. , 1 . i; >.'
>:-
. *
'
< i
t . v ..
Si
Mr. L. e t e .tf h% zV Fifth Taper,
iji
1 8. These Arguments are very obvious ^

and 'tis very strange to charge me with ad
vancing my Prmciple of the Want of a
sufficient Reason, without any Proof drawn
either from the Nature of Things, or from
the Divine Perfections. For the Nature of
Things requires, that every Event should
have before-hand its proper Conditions,
Requisites, and Dispositions, the Existence
whereof makes the sufficient Reason of such
Event.
'.
1 9. And God's PerfeBion requires, that
all his Actions should be agreeable to his
Wisdom \ and that it may not be said of
him, that he has acted without Reason ^ or
even that he has prefer'd a weaker Reason
before a stronger*
v.-j) . v
20. But 1 shall speak more largely- at the
Conclusion of this Paper, concerning the
Solidity and Importance of this great Prin
ciple, of the want of a sufficient- Reason
in order to every Event j the overthrowing
of which Principle, would overthrow the
best part of all Philosophy. *Tis therefore
very strange that the Author should say,
I am herein guilty of a Petitio Principii j
and it plainly appears he is desirous to
maintain indefensible Opinions, since he is
reduced to deny That great Principle,which
is one of the most essential Principles of
JJeasofj.
.V..*
.en/-.
/,.-.
x.
1 7*2
Cinqmkm. Ecrit de Mr. LEiiNiVz.

; '"..'o\rj' ;.* ^"AjTuisiL :\ )T .Si
';> ;::i Sur $ 3 & -4!; vi . / ah' '.
SI. lisant /tvouer que ce grand Principe,

quoyqu il ait t reconnu, n a pas t as
sez, employ. Et c st en bonne partie la
[liaison pourquoy jusqu* icy la Philosophie
premiere a) t fi peu seconde, & fi feu De
monstrative,' < J' en infr entre autres consequemejy qu' il n y a point dans la Nature
deux Etres rels absolus indiscernables; parpeque sr H y. en avait, Dieu & la Nature
jgiroient fans Raifo^ 1 en traitant F un
autrement que V autre j & qii ainsi. Dieu
fie produitlpoint deux portions ds matire
parfaitmint gales- & semblables. On re
fond cette Conclusion, sans en rfuter, la
Raisons & ony repond par une ObjeBion
bien -faible. Cet Argument {dit on) -a* il
eftfc tbon, prouveroit, qu' il seroit imptfible Dieu de, cr? aucune matire. Car
les parties del matire parfaitement solides,
estant prises gales & de la mme Figure,
(ce qui,est une Supposition possible, ) <seroient
exactement faites 1' une comme 1* autre.
Mais c'-' ft.> une. Petition de principe .trs
manifeste, de suppostr cette parfaite toiive*
nance, qui selon may n sauroit tre admise.
Cette Supposition de . deux indiscernables,
comme de deux portions . de matiere:qni con*
viennent parfaitement entre elles, paroifi post
stble en termes abstraits \ mais elle n est
point compatible avec V ordre des choses,
i
ny
Mftfo'ti-dE-Vi'&ds Vifih safer.

-<vA; *A. a'.;- *-,- 'A"-. V '--<'" A .'\'v'i':
#^3
>".
^'*i^ It must be eotiFesscd, te though

this great Principle has been acknowledged,
yet it has not been sufficiently made use of.
Which is, in great measure, the^Reaon
Why the Prima Philojophia ha's^-frorbeen
hitherto so fruitful and demonstrative, as'
it should have been.0 I "inset1 from that'
Principle, among other Conleûerices, that'"
there are not in- Nature two rest;'* abfblufe^
Beings, indiscernible from- e^ mhef j be
cause if there were, God and' Nature wdukf
a1$ without Reason, in OT'deririgv'lrte' one'
otherwise than the' other j and 'that there
fore God does not produce Twb <Rfrcei (if
Matter perfectly equal and airkev ^he1 Ad-'
thot-jhrswers this" CoricTusion,.-wSrhdut' con.-*
furing the Reason of it ; and' he' answef$
With a very weak Objection. That Argil?
tft$nt\ says he, if it was good, woulaproij^
tfraiii Would bl? impossible for Go<d to creai
any Matter at all. For, the perfectly folia
Parts of Matter, if we take them of equalFigure and Dimensions, (whii$ is always
possible in Supposition,') would *#? exaatf
alike. But 'tis a manifest Pethib Ptlhci-'
pii to suppose That perfecl Likeness?1which,
according to me, cannot beâ'drnitted. 'This
Supposition of two Indiscernible^, Yuch as'
two Pieces of Matter perfectly alrke, seems,
indeed to be possible in abstractVfeVms j bus
it
174
Cinquante Ecrit; de Mr. Leibnitz.

ny avec la sagesse Divine, o rien ' ejl admis
fans Raison. . Le : vulgaire'J imagine de
telles choses, parce qit il se contente de No
tions rncompletes. Et c' eft un des'dfauts
des Atofiiisl!^.
.-. r-|fIr
/-, .'/;' Y! T. ' .'1:) :'.'. A r .'t;!';; i .y
. ^22. .Outre que je 11 admets point dans la
matire-des, sortions parfaitement solides, oit
mil' soyent tout d' une piece, sans aucune
varit, ou mouvement particulier dans leur
parties, comit\e V on conoit les prtendus
Atomesr /. Poser de tels Corps, ejl encore une
Opinion populaire mal-fonde. Selon mes denon/rations, chaque portion de matire est
a<ftuellejnept sous-divisie en- parties diffrem
ment miGip je* pas une, ne ressemble entire
ment l' autre.
. \ ..
-, : "
23. J1 avais allgu, que dans les chosessensibles om n* en trouve jamais deux in
discernables & que {par exemple) on tie
trouvera point deux feuilles dans un jardin,
?y> deux gouttes d' eau parfaitement sembla
bles. On l, admet .V gard des feuilles, &
peut tre (perhaps) /' gard des gouttes d'
eau. Mais on pouvoit V admettre fans ba
lancer, ou. fans perhaps, (senzaforse, dirait
un Italien,') encore dans les gouttes d' eau.
24. Je crois que ces Observations gnrales
qui se trouvent dans les choses sensibles, se
trouvent encore proportion dans les insen
sibles. Et qiC cet gard on peut dire ,
comme
"it is not consistent with the Order of Things,

nor -vîth the Divine Wisdom, by which
nothing is admitted without Reason. The
'Vulgar fajicy such Things, because they
content themselves with, incomplete Noti
ons. And this is ons of the Faults of the
s.
23. Besides j I don't admit in Matter,

Parts perfectly Solid, or that are the fame
throughout, without any Variety or parti
cular Motion in their Parts, as the pretend
ed Atoms are imagined to be. To suppose
such Bodies, is another popular Opinion illgrounded. According to my Demonstra
tions, every Part of Matter is aBually sub
divided into Parts differently moved, and
no one of them is perfectly like another.
23. I said, that in sensible Things, two,
that are indiscernible from each other, can
never be found } that (for Instance) two
Leaves in a Garden; or two Drops of Wa
ter, perfectly alike, are not to be found.
The Author acknowledges it as to Leaves^
and perhaps as to Drops of Water. But he
might have admitted it, without any Hesi
tation, without a perhaps^ (an Italian
would fay, Senza Forse,) as to Drops of
Water likewise.
.,-24. I believe that these general Obser
vations in Things sensible , hold also in
proportion in Things insensible -, and that
ope may fay, in this Respect, what Hari-iS
lequin
i j6
Ctnquihie Ecrit de Mr. :LEifeNiz.
comme difoit Arlequin dans "f Empereur d'

la Lune, que e tout comme cy. Et Ve
' un grandi prjug contre les- indifcfnables,
qu'on n'en trouve auturi exemple. Mais on
p oppf cette* ebfequence, parce que
(dit en) les Corps fenfibles font Compofs,
au lieu qii on foutient qu' il y en a d* infenfibles qui font Simples. Je reponds encore,
que je n'en accorde point. Il n'y a rien de
Simple felon moy, que les vritables Mona
des, qui n ont point de Parties ny d* Eten
due. Les Corps Simples, et mme les par
faitement fimilaires, font une fuite de la
fanffe Pofition du Vuide & des Atomes, ou
d* ailleurs de la Philofophi prefieufe, qui
ne pouffe pas ffez f anlyfe^das chofes, &
s' imagine de pouvoir parvenir aux premiers
Elemens Corporels de la Nature,parceque cela
contenieron nflre Imagination.
25 Quand je nie q il y ait deux gouttes
d'eau entirement femblbhs, ou deux autres
Corps m'difcernables , Je tie dis point qu'il
foit impoflible abfolument d'en pofer, ' mas
que c'efi une chofe contraire' la Sagefl Dvin, *&-qni par Cnfequent n' exitc
point, '{.1, -
VA
Sur f 5 S" &
- l.- J* avoue que fi deux chofes par

faitement indifcernables exifoient, elles feroient Deux. Mais la Suppofition e fauffey
& contraire au grand Principe de la raifim
1
Les
fyTfytiBNiTzV Fifth Taper.
177
tequin says in the Emperor of the Moon j

*Tis therei just as 'tis here* And 'tis a great
Objection against Indiscernible* , that no
instance of them is to be found. But the
Author opposes this' Consequence, because
(says he) sensible Bodies are compounded j
whereas he maintains there are insensible
Bodies, which are simple. I answer again,
that I don't admit simple Bodies. There is
nothing simple, in my Opinion, but true
Monads, which have neither parts nor ex
tension. Simple Bodies, and even perfectly
firailar ones, are a consequence of the false
Hypothesis of a Vacuum and ot Atoms,
or of'Lazy Philosophy, which does not
sufficiently carry on the Analysis of things,
and" fancies it can attain to the first mate
rial Elements of Nature, because our Ima
gination would be therewith satisfied.
25. When I deny that there are Two
Drops of Water perfectly alike, or any two
other Bodies Indiscernible from each other ;
I don't fay, 'tis absolutely impossible to sup
pose them *, but that 'tis a thing contrary
to the divine Wisdom, and which conse
quently does not exist.
*--\M :
._
by:: ;-. ;"'.'!' .
To 5 and 6.
26. I own, that if two things perfectly
indiscernible from each other did exist, they
would be Two , but That Supposition is
wife, and contrary to the Grand Principle
N
of
1 ;8
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Le bn i t 2 .

Les Philosophes vulgaires se sont tromps
lors qv? Us ont cr qu'il y avott ds choses
diffrentes solo numro, ou feulement par
ce ait elles font Deux -, & c eft de cette er
reur que font venues leurs perplexits fur ce
au Us appelaient le principe d' individuation.
La Mtaphysique a t traite ordinairement
en simple DoBrine des Termes, comme un
Visionnaire- Philosophique, sans venir la
discussion des Choses. La Philosophie su
perficielle, comme celle des Atomiftes & Va
cuities, se forge des choses que les raisons
suprieures n admettent peint. J espre que
mes Demonstrations seront changer de face
la Philosophie, malgr les foibles contradiBions telles qu* on m* oppose icy.
- 27. Les Parties du Temps ou du Lieu,
prises en elles mmes, font des choses Ida
les . ainsi elles se ressemblent parfaitement,
comme deux Units abstraites. Mais il n en
ejl pas de mme de deux uns concrets, ou de
deux Temps effectifs, ou de deux Espaces
remplis, c'est dire vritablement actuels.
28. Je ne dis pas que deux points de V
Espace sont un mme point, ny que deux
Inftans du temps font un mme Instant,
comme il semble qu' on m' impute : Mais on
peut j' imaginer, faute de connoijsance, qitil
y a Deux Instans difftrens, o Un y en a
au* Un j Comme fay remarqu dans V Ar
ticle 17 de la prcdente Rponse, que sou
vent en Gomtrie on suppose Deux, pour
reprsenter P erreur d* un contredisant, &
Mr. LeibNitzV Fifth Taper.

of Reason. The vulgar Philosophers were
mistaken, when they believed that there
are things different solo numero, or only
because they are two ^ And from this error
have arisen their perplexities about what
they called the Principle of Individitation.
Metaphysicks have generally been handled
like a Science of mere Words, like a Phi
losophical Dictionary, without entring into
the discussion of Things. Superficial Phi
losophy, such as is that of the Atomifts and
Vacuijls , forges things, which superior
Reasons do not admit. I hope My Demon
strations will change the Face of Philo
sophy, notwithstanding such weak Ob
jections as the Author raises here against me.
27. The Parts otTiwe or Place, considered
in themselves, are ideal things , and there
fore they perfectly resemble one another,
like two abJlraB Units. But it is not so
with two concrete Ones, or with two real
Times, or two Spaces filled up, that is,
truly abJual.
28. I don't fay that two Points of Space
are one and the fame point, nor that two
Instants of Time are one and thefame In
stant, as the Author seems to charge me
with saying. But a Man may fancy, for
want of Knowledge, that there are two
different Instants, where there is but one :
In like manner as I observed in the 17th Pa
ragraph of the foregoing Answer, that fre
quently in Geometry we suppose Two, in
N a
order
1 79
i So

on n en trouve mt Un. Si quel qu'un supposoit qu une ligne droite coupe /' autre en
deux points, il 'se trouvera au bout du
compte, que ces deux points prtendus dotvent concider, & n en sauroient faire qu
Un.
, _
,
2. Jay dmontr que V Espace n est au
tre chose qu un ordre de V Existence^ des
Choses, qui se remarque dans leur simul
tanit. Ainsi la FiBion d' un Univers ma
teriel fini, qui se promen tout entier dans
un Espace vuide infini, ne saurait tre ad
misse. Elle eft tout sait draisonnable &
impracticable. Car outre qu'il n'y a point d
Espace rel hors de V Univers materiel ; une
telle ABion seroit sans but, ce seroit tra
vailler sans rien faire, agendo nihil agere,
' II ne se produiroit aucun changement ob
servable par qui que ce soit. Ce sont des
Imaginations des Philosophes Notions
incompltes, qui se font de l' Espace une
realit absolue. Les Simples Mathmaticiens,
qui ne s' occupent que de jeux de V Imagi
nation, font capables de se forger de telles
Notions ; mais elles font dtruites par des
Raisons Suprieures.
30. Absolument parlant, il paroist que
Dieu peut faire V Univers materiel fini en
Extension ; mais le contraire paroist plus con
forme fa Sagesse.
Mr. LeienitzV Fifth Taper.

181
order to represent the error of a gainsayer,
when there is really but One. If any
Man should suppose that a right Line
cuts another in two Points j it will be found
after all, that those two pretended Points
must co-incide, and make but One Point.
"29. I have demonstrated, that Space is
nothing else but an Order of the existence
of things, observed as existing Together j
And therefore the Fiction of a material
finite Universe, moving forward in an in
finite empty Space, * cannot be admitted. *&eApIt is altogether unreasonable and impratli- P^'**
cable. For, besides that there is no real
Space out of the material Universe j such
an Action would be without any Design in
it : It would be working without doing
any thing, agendo nihil agere. There
would happen no Change, which could be
observed by Any Person whatsoever. These
are Imaginations of Philosophers who have
incomplete notions, who make Space an ab
solute Reality. Mere Mathematicians, who
are only taken up with the Conceits of Ima
gination, are apt to forge such Notions \
but they are destroyed by superior Reasons-.
30. Absolutely speaking, it appears that
God can make the material Universe finite
in Extension , but the contrary appears
more agreeable to his Wisdom.
31. I don't grant, that every Finite is
moveable. According to the Hypothesis of
my Adversaries themselves, apart of Space,
N 3
though
1 8a

n eft point mobile. Il faut que ce qui eft
mobile, fuisse changer de Situation par rap
port quelque autre chose, & qu'il puisse
arriver un Etat nouveau discernable du pre
mier : Autrement le changement est une
fi&ion. Ainsi il saut qiC un fini mobile
fasse partie d* un autre, afin qil puisse ar
river un changement observable.
32. Des Cartes a soutenu que la Matire
n a point de bornes, & je ne crois pas qu*
on V ait suffisamment refut. Et quand on
le luy accorderoit, il ne j' ensuit point, que
la Matire seroit ncessaire, ny qu' elle ait
t de toute ternit ^ puisque cette Diffusion
de la Matire sans Bornes, ne seroit qu* un
effet! du Choix de Dieu, qui V aurait trouv
mieux ainsi.
Sur $. 7.
33. Puisque V Espace en soy efl une
chose idale comme le Temps, il faut bien
que V Espace hors du Monde soit imagi
naire, comme les Scholaftiques mmes V ont
bien reconnu. Il en est de mme de s Espace
vuide dans le Monde ^ que je crois encore
tre imaginaire, par les Raisons que fay
produites.
34. On m* objet!e le vuide invent par
M. Guerike de Magdebourg, qui se fait
en pompant V air d" un Recipient \& on pre
tend qu* il y a vritablement du vuide par
fait, ou de l* Espace sans Matire, en par
tie
Mr. LeibnitzV Fifth Taper.

though finite, is not moveable. What is
moveable, must be capable of changing its
situation with respect lo something else, and
to be in a new state discernible from the
first : Otherwise the Change is but a
Fiction. A moveable Finite, must therefore
make part of anot^Finite, that any Change
may happen which can be observed.
32. Cartesiw maintains, that Matter is
unlimited \ and I dont think he has been
sufficiently confuted' And though this
be granted him, yet it does not follow
that Matter would be necessary, nor that
it would have existed from all eternity^
since That unlimited diffusion of Matter,
would only be an effect of God's Choice-?
judging That to be the better.
,'-W'
To $7.
33. Since Space in it self is an Ideal

thing, like Time j Space out os the World
must needs be imaginary, as the Schoolmen
themselves have acknowledged. The cafe is
the fame with empty Space within the
World j which I take also to be imaginary,
for the reasons before alledged.
34. The Author objects against me the
Vacuum discovered by Mr. Guerike of
Magdeburg, which is made by pumping
the Air out of a Receiver ; And he pretends
that there is truly a perfect Vacuum, or a
i
N 4 Space
183
1 84
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. LeIenitz.

tie au moins, dans ce Recipient. Les Ari
stotliciens <& les Cartsiens, qui ' admet
tent point le veritable vuide, ont repondu
cette Experience de M. Gutike, atijfi bien
qu' a celle de M. Torricelli de Florence
(qui vuidoit l' air d'un tuyau de verre par le
moyen du Mercure^)qu'il ny point de vuide
du tout dans le tuyau ou dans le Recipient
puisque le verre a des Pores subtils, ' tra
vers desquels les Rayons de la Lumire^
ceux de /' aimant, & autres matires trs
minces peuvent passer. Et je suis' 'd' 'leur
Sentiment, trouvant qii on peut comparer le
Recipient une caisse pleine de trous, qui
seroit dans V eau, dans laquelle il y aurait
des Poijsons, ou d' autres Corps grossiers,
lesquels en tant tes, la place ne laisferoit
pas d' tre remplie par de V eau : Il y a
feulement cette difference, que V eau, quoyqu' elle soit suide & plus obissante que
ces Corps grossiers, est pourtant aussi pesante
& aussi massive, ou mme d' avantage -, ait
lieu que la Matire qui entre dans Te Reci

pient la place de F Air, eft bien plus mince.
Les nouveaux Partisans du vuide repondent
cette Instance, que ce n est pas la grossi
ret de la Matire, mais simplement sa
quantit,qui sait de la Residence \& par con
sequent qit'il y a ncessairement plus de vuide,
ou il y a moins de resilience. On adjoute que
la subtilit n y sait rien, & que les par
ties dt4 vif argent font aujji subtiles & fines
que celles de l' eau, & que neantmoins
1 le vif

Space without Matter, (at least in part,) in.
that Receiver. The Aristotelians and Car
tesians, who do not admit a true Vacuum,
have laid in answer to that Experiment of
Mr. Guerike, as well as to that of Torricellhts
of Florence, (who emptied the Air out of
a Glass-Tube by the help of Quick-Silver,)
that there is no Vacuum at all in the Tube
or in the Receiver , since Glass has small
Pores, which the Beams of Light, the Ef
fluvia of the Load- Stone, and other very
thin fluids may go through. I am of
their Opinion: And 1 think the Receiver
may be compared to a Box full of Holes in
the Water, having Fisti or other gross
Bodies shut up in it \ which being taken
out, their place would nevertheless be sil
led up with Water. There is only this
difference \ that though Water be fluid
and more yielding than those gross Bodies,
yet it is as heavy and maffive, if not more,
than they : Whereas the Matter which gets
into the Receiver in the room of the Air,
is much more subtile. The new Sticklers for
a Vacuum allege in answer to this Instance,
that it is not the groffness of Matter, but
its mere quantity, that makes resistance j
and consequently that there is of necessity
wore Vacuum, where there is less Resistance.
They add, that the subtleness of Matter has
nothing to do here j and that the particles
of Quick-Silver are as subtle and fine as those
of Water j and yet that Quick-Silver re
sists
185
1 86

le vif argent rsiste plus de dix fois d' avan
tage. A cela je rplique, que ce ' est pas
tant la quantit de la Matire, que la diffi
cult qu elle fait de cder, qui fait l
rejijlence. Par Exemple, le bois flottant con
tient moins de Matire pesante quel eau de
pareil volume, & neantmons il rsiste plus
au bateau que V eau.
35. Et quant au vif Argent, il contient
la vrit environ quatorze fois plus de
Matire pesante que V eau,dans un pareil Vo
lume j mais il ne s'enfuit point qiC il contien
ne quatorze fois plus de Matire absolument.
Au contraire, V eau encontient autant j ma
is prenant ensemble tant sa propre Matire
qui efl pesante, qu une Matire trangre
non pesante, qui passe travers deses pores.
Car tant le vifArgent que V Eau, font des
Masses de Matire pesante, perces jour,
travers desquelles passe beaucoup de Ma
tire non pesante *, comme es apparemment
celle des Rayons de lumire, & d? autres
fluides insensibles j tels que celuy fur tout,
qui cause luy mme la pesanteur des Corps
grossiers, en sy cartant du centre oit il les
fait aller. Car c* est une trange ficlion que

de faire toute la Matire pesante, & mme
vers toute autre Matire, comme fi tout
Corps attirait galement tout autre Corps fer
Ion les Masses & les Distances -, & cela pat
* (Et qui r.e rsiste point sensiblement,.)
une
Mr. Leibnitz'/ Fifth Taper.

187
sifts above Ten times more. To this I
reply, that it is not so much the quantity of
Matter, as its difficulty of giving placey
that makes resistance. For instance , floating
Timber contains less of heavy Matter, than
an equal Bulk of Water does j and yet it
makes more refinance to a Boat, than the
Water does.
35. And as for Quick-Silver , 'tis true,
it contains about Fourteen times more of
heavy Matter, than an equal Bulk of Water
does j but it does not follow, that it con
tains Fourteen times more Matter abso
lutely. On the contrary, Water contains
as much Matter } if we include both its
own Matter, which is heavy ^ and the ex
traneous Matter void of heaviness, which
paries through its Pores. For, both QuickSilver and Water , are masses of heavy
matter, full of Pores, through which there
passes a great deal of Matter void of Hea
viness j such as is probably that of the Rays
of Light, and other insensible Fluids j and
especially that which is it self the Cause of
the gravity of gross Bodies, by receding
from the Center towards which it drives
those Bodies. For, it is a strange Imagina
tion to make all Matter gravitate, and That
towards all other Matter, as if each Body
did equally attraB every other Body ac
cording to their Masses and distances j and
this by an Attraction properly so called,
which is not derived from an occult im
pulse
1 88
une Attraction proprement dite, qui ne soit

point drive d' une Impulsion occulte des
Corps : Au lieu que la pesanteur des Corps
sensibles vers le Centre Je la terre, doit tre
. produite par le mouvement de quelque flui
de. Et il en fera de mme d* autres pe
santeurs, comme de celles des Vlanetes vers
lesoleil, ou entre elles \.
Sur . 8, 5c 9.
36. Comme j avois objetl que V Espace
pris pour quelque chose de rel & d' absolu
sans les Corps, ferait une Chose ternelle,
impajsible, indpendante de Dieu ^ on a ta
ch d* luder cette difficult, en disant que
V Espace efl une proprit de Dieu. J'ay
oppos cela dans mon Papier precedent,
que la proprit de Dieu est V immensit \
mais que V Espace, qui est souvent commensur avec les Corps, & l' immensit de
Dieu, nefl pas la mme chose.
37. fay encore objeB, fil' Espace est
une proprit, & fi V Espace infini eft s
Immensit de Dieu, que V Espace fini sera
V Etendue on la mensurabilit de quelque
chose finie. Ainsi V Espace occup par un
\ Un Corps n' est jamais m naturellement, que par un
autre Corps qui le pouffe en le touchant ; & aprs cela
il continue jusqu' ce qu' il soit empch par un autre
Corps qui le touche. Toute autre Operation ur les Corps,
est ou miraculeuse ou imaginaire.
Corpst
Mr. Leienitz\t Fifth Paper.

pulse of Bodies : Whereas the gravity of
sensible Bodies towards the Centre of the
Earth, ought to be produced by the mo
tion of some Fluid. And the cafe must
be the fame with other gravities, such as
is that of the Planets towards the Sun,
or towards each other.
To 8, and9. "/"';
96. I objected , that Space, taken for
something real and absolute without Bodies,
would be a thing eternal, impassible, and
independent upon God. The Author en
deavours to elude this Difficulty, by laying
that Space is a property of God. In an
swer to this, I have said, in my foregoing
Paper, that the Property of God is Im
mensity j but that Space (which is often
commensurate with Bodies,) and God's Im
mensity, are not the fame thing.
37. I objected further, that if Space
be a property, and infinite Space be the
Immensity of God ', finite Space will be
the Extension or Mensurability of something
finite. And therefore the Space taken up
by a Body, will be the Extension of that
Body. Which is an absurdity j since a
Body
>
187
iqo
Corps, fera V Etendue de ce Corps '. Chose

absurde, puisqu* un Corps peut changer d'
Espace, mais il ne peut point quitter son
Etendue.
38. s ay encore demande, fi V Espace
est Une Proprit, de quelle chose sera donc
la Proprit un Espace vuide born, tel qii
on s' imagine dans le Recipient puis d*
air .<? il ne paroist point raisonnable de dire,
que cet Espace vuide, rond ou quarr, soit
une Proprit de Dieu. Sera ce donc peut
tre la Proprit de . quelques Subfiances im
matrielles, tendues, imaginaires, qu' on se
figure (ce semble) dans les Espaces ima
ginaires ?
39. Si V Espace eft la Proprit ou V Affe&ion de la Sub/lance qui efi dans l'Espace,
le mme Espace sera tantt V Affection d* un
Corps, tantt a' un autre Corps, tantost d'
une Substance immatrielle, tantost peut
tre de Dieu, quand il est vuide de toute
autre Substance matrielle ou immatrielle.
Mais voil une estrange Proprit ou AffeBion, qui pafle de sujet en sujet. Les
sujets quitteront ainjst leurs accidens comme
un habit, fin que d'autres sujets s' en puis
sent reveftir. Aprs cela, comment difiinguera t' on les Accidens & les Subfiances .<?
40. Que fi les Espaces borns font les
AffeBions des Substances bornes qui y font,
& fi /'Espace infini est la Proprit de Dieu -,
il faut (chose trange} que la Proprit de
Dieu
Mr. Leibnitz's Fifth Paper.
iyi
Body can change Space, but cannot leave

its Extension.
.
',.,'
38* I asked also ; If Space is a Property,

What thing will an empty limited Space,
(such as that which my Adversary ima
gines in an exhausted Receiver,) be the
Property of ? It does not appear reasonable
to fey, that this empty Space, either round
or square, is a Property of God. Will it
be then perhaps the Property of some im
material, extended, imaginary Substances,
which the Author seems to fancy in the
imaginary Spaces >
39. If Space is the Property or Affection
of the Substance, which is in Space \ the
same Space will be sometimes the AffeBion
of One Body, sometimes of another Body,
sometimes of an immaterial Substance, and
sometimes perhaps of God himself, when it
is void of all other Substance material or
immaterial. But this is a strange Property
or AffeBion, which passes from one SubjeB
to another. Thus Subjects will leave off
their Accidents, like Cloaths j that Other
Subjects may put them on. At this rate,
how shall we distinguish Accidents and
Substances >
40. And if limited Spaces are the AffeBions of limited Substances, which are in
them-, and infinite Space be a Property of
God } a Property of God must (which is
:VV
very
Ip2

Dieu soit compose des Affections des Cras
titres ; car tous Us Espaces finis fris en*semble composent V Espace infini.
41. Que si V on nie que V Espace born
* soit. * esl itne\AffeBion des. choses bornes , il ne
fera pas raisonnable- non plus, que V Espace
infini soit V AffeBion ou la .Proprit d' une
chose infinie. J* avais insinu toutes ces
difficults dans mon papier precedent. Mais
il ne paroifi point qti on ait tach a" y
satisfaire.
' vn. , .': .
42. y ay encore d"1 autres Raisons contr
V- trange Imagination q\e V Espace, ejl une
Proprit de Dieu. Sicel'aefly l'Espace
entre dans V essence de Diext* Or l'Espace
a des parties : donc il y aurait des parties
dans /'essence de Dieu. Spectatum admifl,
43. De plus, les Espaces, font tantofl
puides, tantofl remplis : donc il y aura
dans 1' essence de Dieu des parties tantt
vudes, tantt remplies, & par consequent
sujettes un changement perptuel.' . Les
Corps remplissant F Espace; rempliraient une
partie de /' essence de' Dieu, & y sroient
commensurSy &, dans la Supposition du
vuide, une -pattie dt V essence de Dieu sera
dans le Recipient. Ce Dieu parties, res
semblera fort au Dieu Stocien, qui efioit V
Univers tout entier considr comme Tin Ani
mal divin. .*-.'
...:..-.'. ' ''.'. ,0
44. Si V- Espace infini eft l' immensit de
Dieu, le Temps infini fera V ternit de. Dieu.:
Il faudra donc dire que ce qui est dans V
Espace
Mr. L e i fe n i f 2fj Fifth Taper.

tp3
very strange,) be made up of the Affections
of Creatures , For All finite Spaces, taken
together, make up infinite Space*
41. But if the Author denies, that li
mited Space is znAffeftivn of limited'Things j
it will not be reasonable neither, that in
finite Space should be the AffeBion or Pro
perty of an infinite thing. I have suggested
all these difficulties in my foregoing Paper j
but it does not appear that the Author has
endeavoured to answer them.
42. I have still other Reasons against
this strange Imagination, that Space is a
Property of God. If it be so, Space be
longs to the Essence of God. But Space
has parts : Therefore there would be parts
in the Essence of God. Spetlatum admijji.
43. Moreover, Spaces are sometime'*
empty> and sometimes silled up. There
fore there will be in the Essence of God,
Parts sometimes empty, and sometimes full,
and consequently liable to a perpetual
Change. Bodies, filling up Space, would
fill up part of God's Essence, and would
be commensurate with it ^ and in the Supr
position of a Vacuum, Part of God's Es
sence will be within the Receiver. Such a
God having Parts, will very much resem
ble the Stoicks God, which was the whole
Universe considered as a Divine Animal.
44. If infinite Space is God's Immensity,
infinite Time will be God's Eternity \ and
therefore we must fay, that what is in
O
Space,
1 94
Cinquimement de Mr. Leibnitz.
Espace, eft dans V immensit de Dieu, &

par consequent dans son Essence \ & que ce
* est dans qui ejl dans le Temps, * est aussi dans V
Y ternit e(fence de J>\eu. Phrases tranges, & qui
font bien connoijire qu on abuse des termes.
de
Dieu.
{!
,.
.n
45. En voicy encore une autre infiance.

V immensit de Dieu, sait que Dieu est
dans tous les Espaces. Mais fi Dieu est
dans /' Espace, comment peut on dire que
V Espace est en Dieu, ou qu* il est sa pro
prit .<? On a bien oui dire que la Proprit
soit dans le Sujet, mais on ri a jamais oui
dire que le Sujet soit dans fa Proprit.
De mme, Dieu existe en chaque Temps : Com
ment donc le temps est il dans Dieu j C^ com
ment peut il tre une Proprit de Dieu ?
Ce font des Allogloflies perptuelles.
46. // paroist qu on confond V immensit
ou r tendue des choses, avec Y Espace
selon lequel cette tendue est prise. IS
Espace infini ri eft pas V immensit de Dieu,
V Espace fini ri est pas V tendue des Corps j
comme le temps ri eft point la dure. Les
choses gardent leur tendue, mais elles ne
gardent peint tousjours leur Espace. Cha
quechose asa propre tendue,sa propre dures
mais iellk ri a point son propre temps, &
elle ne garde point son propre Espace.
47; Voicy comment ses hommes viennent
se former la notion de 1' Espace. Ils con
sidrent que phfieursi choses existent lafois,
& ils y trouvent lUVyWtHin ordre de. toex* .
O
istence
Mr. L E i E N I T zV Fifth Paper.

Space; is in God's Immensity, and conse
quently in his Essence , and that what is
in Time, is alfa in the Essence of God.
Strange Expressions ^ which plainly show,
that the Author makes a wrong use of
Terms.
' .
45. Isti'aH give another Instance of This.
God's Immensity makes him actually pre
sent in all Spaces. But now if God is in
Space, how can it be said that Space is in
God, or that it is a Property of God > We
have often heard, that a Property is in its
Subject *, but we never heard, that a Sub
ject is in its Property. In like manner,
God exists in all Time.How then can Time
be in God , and how can it be a Property
of God ? These are perpetual AUogloffies.
46. It appears that the Author confounds
Immensity, or the Extension of Things,
with the Space according to which that
Extension is taken. Infinite Space, is not the
Immensity of God , Finite Space, is not the
Extension of Bodies : As Time is not their
Doration. Things keep their Extension , but
they do not always keep their Space. Eve
ry Thing has its own Extension, its own
Duration ; bat it has not its own Time,
and does not keep its own Space.
47. I will here show, how Men come
to form to themselves the Notion of Space.
They consider that many things exist at
once, and they observe in them a certain
0 2
Order
Ip^
ip6
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leienitz.

istence, suivant lequel le rapport des uns &
des autres ejl plus ou moins simple. C est
leur Situation ou distance. Lors qu* il ar* de ce rjve qj/ lln ae ces coexiftens change * de
rapport rapport une multitude dy autres, fans qu*
ils en changent entre eux -, & qu1 un nouveau
venu acquiert le rapport tel que le premier
avoit eu d' autres \ on dit qu il est venu
sa place, & on appelle ce changement un
mouvement qui efi dans celuy o est la cause
immdiate du changement. Et quand plu
sieurs, ou mme tous, changeraient selon
certaines rgles connues de direBion & de
viflesfe j on peut tousjours determiner le
rapport de Situation que chacun acquiert
chacun \ & mme celuy que chaque autre
aitroit, ou qii il auroit chaque autre, s*
il n avoit point chang, ou s' il avoit autrement chang. Et supposant ou feignant
que parmy ces coexisiens il y ait un nombre
suffisant de quelques uns, qui ' ayent point
eu de changement en eux j on dira que
ceux qui ont un rapport ces exisiens fixes,
tel que d* autres avoient auparavant eux,
ont eu la mme place que ces derniers avoient
eue. Et ce qui comprend toutes ces places, est
appelle Espace. Ce qui fait voir que pour
avoir V ide de la place, & par consequent
de T Espace, il suffit de considrer ces rap
ports & les rgles de leurs changemens, fans
avoir besoin de se figurer icy aucune realit
absolue hors des choses dont on considre la
Situation. Et, pour donner une Espce de
dfini'
\
Mr. L E I B N I T z V Fifth Paper.

Order of Co-Existence, according to which
the relation of one thing to another is
more or less simple. This Order, is their
Situation or Distance. When it happens
that one of those Co-existent Things chang
es its Relation to a Multitude of others,
which do not change their Relation among
themselves \ and that another thing, new
ly come, acquires the fame Relation to the
others, as the former had j we then fay,
it is come into the Place of the former ^
And this Change, we call a Motion in That
Body, wherein is the immediate Cause of
the Change. And though Many, or even
All the Co-existent Things, mould change
according to certain known Rules of Dire
ction and Swiftness , yet one may always
determine the Relation of Situation, which
every Co-existent acquires with respect to
every other Co-existent j and even That
Relation, which any other Co- existent
would have to this, or which this would
have to any other, if it had not chang
ed, or if it had changed any otherwise.
And supposing, or feigning, that among
those Co-existents, these is a sufficient
Number of them, which have undergone
no Change ^ then we may say, that Those
which have such a Relation to those fixed
Existents, as Others had to them before,
have now the fame Place which those
others had. And That which comprehends
aH thqfe Places, is called Space. Which
O 3
ihows,
1 07
ip8
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. LeibnitZ.

definition, Place eft ce qit on dit tre le
mme A & B, quand le rapport de coexiftence de)$, avec G, E, F, G, &tc. con
vient entirement avec le rapport de coex
iftence qu* A a eu avec les mmes ^ suppos
qu il n y ait eu aucune cause de change
ment dans C, E, F, G, &c. On pourrot
dire aussi, sans ecthese, que place eft ce qui
eft le mme en momens differens des exiftens quoyque differens, quand leur rap
ports de coexiftence .avec certains exiftens,
qui depuis un de ces momens .1' autre font
supposs fixes, conviennent entirement. Et
exjstens fixes font ceux dans . lesquels il
n y a point eu cause du changement de V
ordre de coexiftence. avec 4' <av*nes j ou
(ce qui eft le mme) dans.- lesquels- H y
a point eu de mouvement./A Enfin, Espace
eft ce qui resuite des places prises ensemble.
Et il eft bon icy de. conficferer la. 'difference
entre la Place, <& entre- le rapport de Situa
tion qui eft dans le Corps qui occupe la
place. Car la place d' A & 4t' B eft la
mme j au lieu, que le rapport d? A aux corps
fixes, n eft pas prcisment & individuelle
ment le mme que le rapport- que B (qui
prendra sa place) aura aux .mmes fixes j
* ces' & * ils conviennent seulement. Car deux
rapports sujets differens* comme A & B, ne sauroient
tonvienavoir prcisment la mme affection indivi
nenc
duelle j un mme accident individuel ne se
pouvant point trouver en. deux sujets, ny
.,;,:. ....
./as*
Mr. LuienitzV Fifth Paper.

shows, that in order to have an Idea of
Place, and consequently of Space, it is
sufficient to consider these Relations, and
the Rules of their Changes, without need
ing to fancy any absolute Reality out of
the Things whose Situation we consider.
And, to give a kind of a Definition : Place
is That, which we fay is the fame to /i
and, to , when the Relation of the Goexistence of B, with C, E, F, G, &c.
agrees perfectly with the Relation of the
Co-existence, which A had with the sime
C, E, f, G, &c. supposing there has been
no cause of Change in C, E% F, G, &c.
It might be said also, without entring into
any further Particularity, that Place. -is
That, which is the Same in different mo
ments to different existent Things, when
their Relations of Co-exijlence with certain
Other Existents, which are supposed to con
tinue fixed from one of those Moments to
the other, agree intirely together. And
fixed x'iftents are those, in which there
has been no cause of any. Change of the
Order of their Co-existence with others \
or Cwhich is the fame Thing,) in which
there has been no Motion. Lastly, Space
is That which results from Places taken to
gether. And here it may not be amiss. to
consider the Difference between Place, and
the Relation of Situation, which is in the
Body that fills up the Place. For, the
Place of 4 and B, is xht fame ^ whe'regs
O 4
" * " the
199
2-00

passer de sujet en sujet.
Mais V esprit nno
content de la convenance, cherche une iden

tit' une chose qui soit vritablement la
mme, & la conoit comme hors de ces sujets^
& c* est ce qxC on appelle icy place & Espace.
Cependant cela ne sauroit tre qu* ideal,
contenant un certain ordre o V esprit con
oit /' application des rapports : Comme V
esprit se peut figurer un ordre confinant en
lignes Gnalogiques, dont les grandeurs ne
confineraient que dans le nombre des Gene
rations, oh. chaque Personne auroit sa place j
Et si V on adjoutoit la ficlion de la me. empsychose ; &- faisait revenir les mmes
mes humanes, les Personnes y pourroient
changer de place ; Celuy qui a t pre ou
grand pre , pourrait devenir fils oit petit
fils, &c. Et cependant ces places, lignes-,
& Espaces Gnalogiques, quoy qu* eies
exprimeraient des vrits relles, ne sroient
que choses idales. Je donneray encore un
exemple de V usage de s esprit de se for
mer, V occasion des accidens qui font dans
les sujets, quelque chose qui leur reponde
hors des sujets. La Raison ou Proportion
entre deux lignes , L, & M, peut tre
concile de trois faons : Comme Raison du
plus grand L, au moindre M \ comme Raison
du moindre M, au plus grand L -, & enfin
comme quelqife chose dy abstrait des deux,
c eft dire comme la Raison entre L &
^ sans considrer lequel eft V antrieur
eu le pofterieur, le sujet ou l* objet ; Et c'
-.- *
eft

the Relation of A to fixed Bodies,is not pre
cisely and individually the same, as the
Relation which B (that comes into its
Place) will have to the fame fixed Bodies j
But these Relations agree only. For, two
different Subjects, as A and By cannot have
precisely the same individual Affection , it
being impossible, that the same individual
Accident should be in two Subjects, or pass
from one Subject to another. But the
Mind not contented with an Agreement,
looks for an Identity, for something that
should be truly the seme -, and conceives it
as being extrinsick to the Subjects: And
this .is what we here call Place and Space.
But this can only be an Ideal Thing ^ con
taining a certain Order, wherein the Mind
conceives the Application of Relations. In
like manner, as the Mind can fancy to it
self an Order made up of Genealogical
Lines, whose Bigness would conGst only
in the Number of Generations, wherein
every Person would have his Place : And
if to this one should add the Fiction of a
Metempsychosis, and bring in the fame Hu
man Souls again } the Persons in those
Lines might change Place j he who W3S
a Father, or a Grand-Father, might be
come a Son, or a Grand-Son, &c. And
yet those Genealogical Places, Lines, and
Spaces, though they should express real
Truths, would only be Ideal Things. I
shall allege another Example, to show how
the
2o %
ô2

est ainsi que les proportions font consid
res dans la Musique. Dans la premiere con
sideration, L le plus grand, eft le sujet ;
Dans la seconde, M le moindre, est le sujet
de cet accident, que les Philosophes appel
lent relation ou rapport : Mais quel en fera
le sujet dans le troisime sens .<? On ne
sauroit dire que tous les deux, L^M
* soient ensemble, * sont le sujet a" un tel accident -,
le &c.
car ainsi nous aurions un accident en deux
sujets, qui aurait une jambe dans l' un,
& V autre dans V autre ^ ce qui est contre,
la notion des accidens. Donc il faut direy
sue ce rapport dans le troisime sens, est bien
ors des sujets 7 mais que n tant nysubstance
ny accident, cela doit tre une chose pure
ment idale, dont la consideration ne laisse
pas dy tre utile. Au retfe, s ay fait icy
peu prs comme Euclide, qui ne pouvant pas
bien faire entendre absolument ce que c eft
que Raison prise dans le sens des Gomtres,
dfinit bien ce que c est que mmes Raisons.
Et c" est ainsi que, pour expliquer ce que
t' eft que la Place, s ay voulu dfinir ce que
c' est que la mme Place. Je remarque
enfin, que les traces des mobiles, qiC ils
laissent quelques fois dans les immobiles fur
lesquels ils exercent leur mouvement -, ont
donn V imagination des hommes V occa
sion de se former cette ide, comme s* il
restait encore quelque trace lors mme qi? il
n y a aucune chose immobile : Mais cela n
eit qt' ideal, & porte seulement que s' il y
avoit
Mr. L e i b N I x zV Fifth Taper.

the Mind uses, upon occasion of Accidents
which are in Subjects, to fancy to it self
something answerable to those Accidents,
out of the Subjects. The Rath or Proportion
between two Lines L and M, may be con
ceived three several Ways ^ as a Ratio of
the greater L, to the lesser M , as a Ratio of
the lesser iks, to the greater L , and lastly,
as something abstracted from Both, that is,
as the Ratio between L and M, without
considering which is the Antecedent, or
which the Consequent ; which the Sub
ject, and which the Object. And thus it is,
that Proportions are considered in Musick.
In the first way of considering them, L
the greater j in the second, M the lesser, is
the Subject of That Accident, which Phi
losophers call Relation. But, Which of
them will be the Subject, in the Third way
of considering them ? It cannot be said that
both of them, L and M together, are the
Subject of ftich an Accident -f so* if so,
we fhouU have an Accident in two Sub
jects, with oseLeg in one, and the other
in 4the other j Which is contrary to the
Notion of Accidents. Therefore we must
fay-, that this Relation, in this Third way
of considering it, is indeed out of the
Subjects; } but being neither a Substance,
nor ajj Accident, it must be a mere Ideal
Thing, the consideration of which is ne
vertheless useful. To conclude : I have
here done much like Euclid, who not be
ing
2Q3
204

avoit l quelque immobile, on y pourrait
defigner. Et cette Analogie qui fait
mi on s* imagine des Places, des Traces, des
Efpaces, quoyque ces chofes ne conent que
dans la vrit des Rapports, & nullement
dans quelque realit abfolue.
. I. <
. t-'i til
48. Au ree, fi Bfpace vuide de corps

(qu* en s* imagine") n e pas vuide tout
fait, de quoy e il donc plein ? T a-t-il peut
tre des Efprits tendus, ou des Subances
immaterielles capables de s* tendre & de fe
refserrer, qui s*y promnent, & qui fe pn
trent fans s* incommoder, comme les ombres
de deux corps fe pntrent fur la furface
dy une muraille ? Je voy revenir les plaifantes Imaginations de feu M, Henry
Morus (homme [avant & bien intentionn a
ailleurs^) & de quelques autres, qui ont cru
que ces Efprits fe peuvent rendra impenetra
bles
Mr. Leibnitz'j Fifth Paper.

205
ing able to make his Readers well under
stand what Ratio is absolutely in the Sense
of Geometricians j defines what are the
same Ratio's. Thus, in like manner, in
order to explain what Place is, I have been
content to define what is the fame Place.
Lastly , I observe, that the Traces of
moveable Bodies, which they leave some
times upon the immoveable ones, on which
they are moved \ have given Men occasion
to form in their Imagination such an Idea,
as if some Trace did still remain, even when
there is Nothing unmoved. But this is a
mere Ideal Thing, and imports only, that
if there was any unmoved thing there, the
Trace might be marked out upon it. And 'tis
This Analogy, which makes Men fancy
Places, Traces and Spaces j though those
things consist only in the Truth of Rela
tions, and not at all in any absolute Reality.
48. To conclude. If the Space (which
the Author fancies) void of. all Bodies, is
not altogether empty j what is it then full
of? Is it full of extended Spirits perhaps,
or immaterial Substances, capable of ex
tending and contracting themselves j which
move therein, and penetrate each other
without any Inconveniency, as the Sha
dows of two Bodies penetrate one another
upon the Surface of a Wall > Methinks I
fee the revival of the odd Imaginations of
Dr. Henry More (otherwise a Learned and
well-meaning Man,) and of some Others,
3
who
206
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz,

bles quand bon leur femble. en a mme
eu, qui fe font imagin que V homme dans
tat d* intgrit, avoit auffi le don de la
penetration ; mais qiC il efi devenu folide,
opaque & impenetrable, par fa beute. 2f*
e/ ce pas renverfer les Notions des chofes,
donner Dieu des parties, donner de V ten
due aux Efprits .<? Lefeul principe du befoin
de la Raifon fuffifanre, fait difparoitre tous
ces fpetlres d* Imagination. Les Hommes
fe font aifement des fitlions, faute de bien
employer ce grand Principe.
Sur J io.
49. On ne * fauroit dire que la Dura
tion eft ternelle, mais que les chofes qui
durent tousjours, font temelles. Tout ce '
qui exifte du Temps - de la Duration, prit
continuellement : Et comment wie chofe pourroit elle exier ternellement, qui a parler
exatlement n* exie jamais .<? Car comment
pourrait exifter une chofe, dont jamais au
cune partie n* exie .<? Vu Temps n exient
jamais que des inans, & l* inant n' e
pas mme une partie du temps. Quiconque
.1 v! - confiderera
* peut point dire qu' une certaine dure eil ternelle;
mais on peut dire que les chofes qui durent tousjours, font
ternelles, en gagnant toujours une dure nouvelle. Tout
ce qui exifte du Temps Se de la Duration, tant fucef*
yfcperit, &c.
3
Mr. L e i b N i f z\s Fifth Paper.

2o;
who fancied that those Spirits can make
themselves impenetrable whenever they
please. Nay, some have fancied, that Man,
in the State of Innocency, had also the
Gift of Penetration j, and that he became
Solid, Opake, and Impenetrable by his Fall.
Is it not overthrowing our Notions of
Things, to make God have Parts, to make
Spirits have Extension ? The Principle of
the Want of a sufficient Reason does alone
drive away all these Spectres of Imagina
tion. Men easily run into Fictions, for
want of making a right Use of that great
Principle.
To 10.
49. It cannot be said, that Duration is
Eternal , but that Things, which continue
always, are Eternal. Whatever exists of
Time and of Duration, perishes continual
ly : And how can a thing exist Eternally,
which, (to speak exactly,) does never exist
at all ? For, how can a thing exist, where
of no Part does ever exist ? Nothing of
Time does ever exist, but Instants ; and an
Instant is not even it self a part of Time.
Whoever considers these Observations, will
easily apprehend that Time can only be an
Ideal Thing. And the Analogy between
Time and Space, will easily make it appear,
that
so8
Cinquime crit de Mr.LEiBNiTZ.

considrera ces Observations, comprendra bien
que le Temps ne sauroit tre qu une chose
idale j O /' analogie du Temps & de
V Espace fera bien juger\ que V un est aujji
ideal que /' autre, s
50. Si la realit de V Espace & du Temps
esl ncessaire pour V immenjit & V ternit
de Dieu j s' il faut que Dieu soit dans des
Espaces -, si tre dans /' Espace est une Pro
prit de Dieu % Dieu sera en quelque faon
dependant du Temps & de /' Espace, &
en aura besoin. Car l' chappatoire que P
Espace & le Temps || font des Proprits
de Dieu, est dj ferm.
Sur 11 & 1 2.
51. Commej'avois objetl' que V Espace ne

sauroit tre en Dieu, parce que /' Espace a
des parties ; on cherche un autre chappa
toire en s' loignant du sens receu des ter
mes, & soutenant que V Espace n* a point
de parties, parceque ses parties ne font point
separables , & ne sauraient tre loignes
les unes des autres par discerption. Mais
il suffit que V Espace ait des parties, soit
que
t Cependant, si en disant que la Duration d' une chose
est ternelle, on entend seulement que la chose dure ter
nellement 5 je n' ay rien y redire.
Il sont en Dieu, & comme des proprits de Dieu, est
dj ferm. Pourrait on supporter l' Opinion qui soutiendroit que les Corps se promnent dans les parties de
V essence divine.'
Mr* LeibnitzV Fifth Taper.

that the one is as merely Ideal as the
other.
50. If the reality of Space and Time,

is necessary to the Immensity and Eternity
of God j if God must be in Space , if be
ing in Space, is a Property of God , he
will, in some measure, depend upon Time
and Space, and stand in need of them.
For I have already prevented That Subter
fuge, that Space and Time are Properties
of God.
Tb $ 11, and ti*

51* I objected that Space cannot be in
God, because it has Parts* Hereupon the
Author seeks another Subterfuge, by de
parting from the received Sense of Words j
maintaining that Space has no parts, be
cause its parts are not separable, and can
not be removed from one another by discerption. But 'tis sufficient that Space has
parts, whether those parts be separable or
not i, And they may be assigned in Space,
either by the Bodies that are in it, or by
P
Lines
i op
a io

que ces parties soyent separables ou non \
& on lis peut assigner dans V Espace, soit
far les corps qui y font, soit par les lignes
ou surfaces qif on y peut mener.
Sur #13.
y
. 52. Pour prouver que V Espace fans les

corps, eft quelque realit absolue \ on w'
avait objetl que F Univers materiel fini, se
pourrot promener dans V Espace, J'ay re
pondu, qu'il ne paroisi point raisonnable que
V Univers materiel soit fini j Et quand on le
supposeroit, il ejl draisonnable qu'il ait de
mouvement autrement qu* entant que ses
parties changent de Situation entre elles j
parce qu' un tel mouvement ne produirait au
cun changement observable, & ferait fans
but. Autre chose eft quand ses Parties
changent de Situation entre Elles -, car alors
on y reconnoift un mouvement dans V Espace,
consi- mais * qui confijle dans V ordre des rapports,.
stantdans qui font changs. On rplique maintenant
que la vrit du mouvement ejl indpendante
des Observation, & qu un Vaisseau peut

avancer, sans que celuy qui ejl dedans s* en
apperoive. Je reponds que le mouvement eft'
indpendant de V Observation, mais quil
neft point indpendant de /' observabilit. //
n'y a point de mouvement, quand il ny a point
^changement observable. Et mme quand il
ny a point de changement observable, il n'y
a point de changement du tout. Le Con
traire
Mr. LeibnitzV Fifth Taper,
211
Lines and Surfaces that may be drawn and

described in it.
To t3.
52. In order to prove that Space, with-,
out Bodies, is an absolute reality ^ the Au
thor objected, that a finite material Uni
verse might move forward in Space. I an
swered, it does not appear reasonable that
the material Universe should be finite \
and, though we should suppose it to be
finite , yet "tis unreasonable it should have
motion any otherwise, than as its parts
change their Situation among themselves ;
because such a motion would * produce no ^&eA^
Change that could be observed, and would pendix,
be without Design. 'Tis another thing, n". 19.
when its parts change their Situation among themselves j For then there is a mo
tion in Space ; but it consists in the order
ofRelations which are changed. The Au
thor replies now, that the reality of Motion
does not depend upon being observed , and
that a Ship may go forward, and yet a
Man, who is in the Ship, may not perceive
it. I answer, Motion does not indeed de
pend upon being Observed; but it does
depend upon being possible to be Observed.
There is no Motion, when there is no Change
that can be Observed. And when there
P a
is
ail
Cinquimement de Mr. Leibnitz.

traire eft fond sur la supposition (T un
"Espace rel absolu, que say rfut demonsirativement par le principe du besoin d'
une raison suffisante des choses.
53. Je ne trouve rien dans la definition

huitime des Principes Mathmatiques de la
Nature, ny dans le Scholie de cette Defi
nition, qui prouve ou puisse prouver la ra
lit de /' Espace en soy. Cependant s ac
cord qu' il y a de la difference entre un
Mouvement absolu veritable d'un corps,
& un simple changement relatif de fa Situ
ation par rapport un autre Corps. Car
lors que la Cause immediate du changement
est dans le Corps, il eft vritablement en
mouvement j & alors la Situation des au
tres par rapport luy, fera change par con
sequence, quoyque la Cause de ce changement
ne soit point en eux. Il eft vray qu par
ler exaBement, il n y a point de Corps qui
soit parfaitement & entirement en repos }
mais cejl de quoy on fait AbjlraBion, en
considrant la chose Mathmatiquement.
Ainsije n ay rien laisssans rponse, de tout
ce qu on a allgu pour la ralit absolue
de V Espace. Et say demonftr, la fausse
t de cette ralit, par un principe fonda
mental des plus raisonnables & des plus
prouvs, contre lequel on ne saurait trou
ver aucune Exception ny Inslance. Au resie,
on peut juger par tout ce que je viens de
dire,
M\ LeienitzV Fifth Taper.

213
is no Change that can be Observed, there is
no Change at all. The contrary Opinion
is grounded upon the Supposition of a real
absolute Space, which I have demonstra
tively confuted by the Principle of the
want of a sufficient Reason of things.
53. I find nothing in the Eighth Defi
nition of the Mathematical Principles of
Nature, nor in the Scholium belonging to
it, that proves, or can prove, the reality
of Space in it self. However, I grant
there is a difference between an absolute
trite motion of a Body, and a mere relative
Change of its Situation with respetl to another Body. For when the immediate
Cause of the Change is in the Body, That
Body is truly in Motion \ and then the
Situation of other Bodies, with respect to
itf will be changed consequently, though
the Cause of that Change be not in Them.
'Tis true that, exactly speaking, there is
not any one Body, that is perfectly and
intirely at Rest \ but we frame an abstarct
Notion of Rest, by considering the thing
Mathematically. Thus have 1 left nothing
unanswered, of what has been alledged
for the absolute reality of Space.And I have
demonstrated the falftiood of that reality,
by a fundamental Principle, one of the
most certain both in Reason and Experi
ence j against which, no Exception or In
stance can be alledged. Upon the whole,
one may judge from what has been said,
V 1
th4|
1 14

dire, que je ne dois point admettre un Uni
vers mobile, ny aucune Place hors de V Uni
vers materiel.
Sur 14.
54. Je ne comtois aucune ObjeBion a la
quelle je ne cros a" avoir repondu suffisants
ment. Et quant cette ObjeBion, que Y
Espace & h Temps font des Quantits, ou
plufiest des choses doues de quantit, &
que l Situation & V Ordre ne le font point -,
Je reponds que V Ordre a aufi fa quantit;
il y. a ce qui precede & ce qui fuit -, il y a
distance ou intervalle. Les choses Relatives
imt leur Quantit, auffi bien que les absih
kes. Par Exemple, les Raisons ou Propor
tions dans les Mathmatiques, ont leur
quantit , & se mesurent par les Loga
rithmes ; & cependant ce font des Relati
ons. Ainsi quoyque le Temps & V Espace
consistent en rapports, ils ne laissent pas d?
avoir leur quantit.
Sur 1 5.
55. Pour ce qui est de la Question, si
Dieu a pu crer le monde plustolt, il faut
se bien entendre. Comme say dmontr
que le Temps sans les Choses ?' eH autre
chose qu unesimple possibilit idalejl est ma
nifeste que fi qmlmC un disait que ce mme
i .*/
:.[
.monde
fyr. Le i en it zV Fifth Paper.

115
that I ought not to- admit a moveable Univerfe -, nor any Flace out of the material
Univerfe.
To 14.
54. I am not fenfible of any objection,
but what I think I have fufficiently anfwered. As for the objection that Space
and Time are Quantities, or rather things
endowed tvith Quantity -, and that Situa
tion and Order are not fo : I anfwer, that
Order alfo has it? Quantity -, There is in
it, that which goes before, and that which
follows -, There is Diftance or Interval.
Relative things have their Qimitity.* as
well as absolute ones. For inftance, Ra
tios or Proportions in Mathematicks, have
their Qitantity, and are meafured by LTogarithms j and yet they are Relations. And
therefore though Time and Space conflit
in Relations, yet they have their Quantity.
To$ 15.
55. As to the Queftion, Whether God
could have created the World fooner -, 'tis neceflry here to underftand each other right
ly. Since I have demonftrated, that Time,
without Things, is nothing elfe but a mere
ideal Poffibility 'tis manifeft, if any one
fhould fay that this Same World, which
P
116
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnit z.

monde qui a t cr effectivement, * sans
aucun autre changement ait pu tre cr
plustost, il ne dira rien d* intelligible. Car
il ri y a aucune marque ou difference, par
laquelle il seroit pojjible de connoiflre qu'il
eut t cr plustost. Ainsi, comme je V ay
dj dit, supposer que Dieu ait cr le mme
monde plustost, eft supposer quelque chose
de chimrique. C" eft faire du Temps une
chose absolue indpendante de Dieu j au
lieu s que leTempsne coexiste qri aux Crea
tures, & ne se conoit que par V ordre &
la quantit de leurs changements.
56. Mais absolument parlant, on peut
concevoir q un Univers ait commenc plu
stqst qu'il ri a commen
: -.5
c effeBivement. Sup
posons que noftre Uni
vers, ou quelque autre,
soit reprsent par la
Figure A F \que V Or
donne A B, reprsente
son premier eftat ^ &
que les Ordonnes C D,
E F, reprsentent des
Eftats suivans. Je dis
au' on peut concevoir qu'il ait commenc
plustost,' en concevant la Figure prolonge
- en arrire, & en y adjoutant S R A B S.
.Car ainsi, les choses eftant augmentes, le
* ait, fens aucun autre changement, pu tre &c.
s <juc le temps doit coexister aux &.:
Hmfc
Mr. Leibnitz'j- Fifth Taper.

has been actually created, might have been
created sooner, without any other Change ,
he would fay nothing that is intelligible.
For there is no mark or difference, where
by it would be possible to know, that
this World was created sooner. And there
fore, ( as I have already said, ) to suppose
that God created the same World sooner, is
supposing a Chimerical Thing. Tis making
Time a thing absolute, independent upon
God \ whereas Time does only co-exist with
Creatures, and is only conceived by the
Order and Qjiantity of their Changes.
56. But yet, absolutely speaking, one
tnay conceive that an Universe began sooner,
than it actually did. Let us suppose our
Universe, or any other, to be represented by
the Figure A F j and that the Ordinate A B
represents its first State \ and the Ordinates
C D, E F, its following States : I fay, one
may conceive that such a World began
sooner, by conceiving -.
the Figure prolonged
backwards, and by ad
ding tokSRABS.
For thus, Things be
ing encreased , Time
will be also encreased.
But whether such an
augmentation be rea
sonable and agreeable
so God's Wisdom, is
-: 1
another
217
2 18

temps fera augment aujji. Mats fi une
telle Augmentation est raisonnable & con
forme la sagesse de Dieu, c* est une autre
Question -, & il faut dire que non, autre
ment Dieu V auroit faite. Ce seroit comme,
Humano capiti cervicem Pictor equinam
Jungere si velit.
i
Il en est de mme de la DeftruBion. Com
me on poutroit concevoir quelque- chose a"
adjout au commencement, on pourroit con
cevoir de mme quelque chose de retranch
vers la fin. Mais ce retranchement encore
seroit draisonnable.
57. C'est ainsi qu'il parotst comment on
doit entendre que Dieu a cr les choses en
quel temps il luy a plu \> car cela depend des
choses qu'il a rsolu de crer. Mais les
choses tant rsolues avec leurs rapports, il
n'y a plus de choix fur le Temps ny fur la
Place ^ qui n ont rkn de rel en eux part,
& rien de dterminant, ou mme rien de
discernable*
. . ^ ;
58. On ne peut donc point dire, comme

V on fait icy, que la sagesse de Dieu peut
avoir de bonnes Raisons pour crer ce Mon
de (this World) dans un tel temps particu
lier j ce temps particulier pris fans les cho
ses, estant une fiion impossible *, & de
bonnes Raisons a" un choix ne se pouvant
point trouver l o tout eft indiscernable.
59. Quand

another Question, to which we answer in
the Negative j otherwise God would have
made such an Augmentation. It would be
like as
Humano capiti cervicem piBor equinam
Jungere si veliu
The cafe is the fame with respect to the
deJlruSion of the Universe. As one might
conceive something added to the Beginning,
so one might also conceive something taken
off towards the End. But such a Retrench
ing from it, would be also unreasonable,
57. Thus it appears how we are to un
derstand, that God created things at what
Time he pleased; .For this depends upon
the Things, which he resolved to create.
But Things being once resolved upon, to
gether with their Relations j there remains
no longer any choice about the Time and
the Place, which of themselves have no
thing in them real, nothing that can di
stinguish them, nothing that is at all
discernible.
58. One cannot therefore say, as the
Author does here, that the Wisdom of
God may have good reasons to create
this World at such or such a particu
lar Time : That particular Time, consi
dered without the things, being an impos
sible fiction } mdgood reasons fora choice,
..beieg not to be found, where every thing
-is indiseecnibtei
50. xy.-a
119
2 do
59* Q}'and je parle de ce Monde, j* en

tends tout V Univers des Creatures matri
elles " immatrielles prises ensemble, depuis
le commencement des choses -, mais fi l' on
n entendoit que le commencement du monde
materiel, & supposoit avant luy des crea
tures immatrielles, on se mettroit un peu
plus la Raison en cela. Car le temps, alors
ejlant marqu par des Choses qui exigeraient
dj, ne seroit plus indifferent ; & il y
pourroit avoir du choix. Il eft vray qu' on ne
feroit que diffrer la difficult. Car suppo
sant que V Univers entier des Creatures im
matrielles & matrielles ensemble a com
menc, il n y a plus de choix fur le temps
ou Dieu le voudrait mettre.
60. Ainsi on ne doit point dire, comme V
on fait icy, que Dieu a cr les choses dans
un Espace, ou dans un Temps particulier,
ui luy a plu. Car tous les Temps, & tous
l'es
e Espaces, en eux mmes, eftant parfaite
ment uniformes & indiscernables, l'un ne sau
rait plaire plus que V autre.
61. Je ne veux point m' arrejler icy fir

mon sentiment explique ailleurs, qui porte
qu'il n y a point de Subfiances cres en
tirement destitues de Matire. Car je ti
ens avec les Anciens & avec la Raison, que
les Anges ou les Intelligences, & les Ames
spares du corps grossier, ont tousjours
des Corps Subtilst quoyqiC elles mmes soyent
M\ LeibnitzV Fifth Paper.

59. When I speak of This World, I mean
the whole Universe of material and imma
terial Creatures taken together, from the
beginning of Things. But if any one mean
only the beginning of the material World,
and suppose immaterial Creatures before it j
he would have somewhat more Reason for
his Supposition. For Time then being
marked by things that existed already, it
would be no longer indifferent ^ and there
might be room for choice. And yet in
deed, this would be only putting off the
difficulty. For, supposing the whole Uni
verse of immaterial and material Creatures
together, to have a beginning j there is no
longer any Choice about the Time, in which
God would place that Beginning.
60. And therefore one must not fay,
as the Author does here, that God created
things in what particular Space, and at
what particular Time he pleased. For, All
Time and All Spaces being in themselves
perfectly uniform and indiscernible from
each other, one of them cannot please more
than another.
61. I shall not enlarge here upon my
Opinion explained elsewhere, that there
are no created Substances wholly destitute
of Matter. For I hold with the Ancients,
and according to Reason, that Angels or
Intelligences, and Souls separated from a
gross Body , have always subtil Bodies ,
though
221
222
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Le i bn i tz,

ent incorporelles. La Philosophie vulgaire
admet aisment toute sorte de Fixions j la
mienne est plus severe.
6-2. Je ne dis point que la Matire & V
Espace ejl la mme chose \je dis seulement, qu'
il n y a point d' Espace, o il riy a point de
Matire -, & que l' Espace en luy mme nejl
point une> ralit absolue. U Espace & la
Matire different comme le temps & le mouve*
ment. Cependant ces choses, quoyque diff
rentes, se trouvent inseparables.
63. Mais il ne j' ensuit nullement que la
Matire soit ternelle & ncessaire, si non
en supposant que V Espace est ternel *
ncessaire j Supposition mal sonde en toutes
manires.
Sur . 16 & 17.

64. Je crois d* avoir repondu tout }
& fay repondu particulirement cette Objetlion, qui pretend que V Espace & le
Temps ont une Quantit, & que V Ordre
nen a point. Voys cydessus, n. 54.
65. J'ay fait voir clairement, que la
Contra'diBion ejl dans V Hypothse du sen
timent oppos, qui cherche une difference
l o il n y en a point. Et ce seroit une
iniquit manifeste, d'en vouloir insrer, que
say reconnu de la Contradiction dans mon
propre sentiment.
a
Sur
Mr. Leibnitz1/ Fifth Taper.
223
though they themselves be incorporeal.

The vulgar Philosophy easily admits all
forts of Fictions: Mine is more strict.
62. I don't fay that Matter and Space are
the fame Thing. I only fay, there is no
Space, where there is no Matter ^ and that
Space in it self is not an absolute reality.
Space and Matter differ, as Time and Mo
tion. However, these things, though dif
ferent, are inseparable.
$%. But yet it does not at all follow,
that Matter is eternal and necessary ; unless
we suppose Space to be eternal and neces
sary : A Supposition ill grounded in all
respects.
To 16, and 17.
64. I think I have answered every thing j
And 1 have particularly replied to That Ob
jection, that Space and Time have Quantity,
and that Order has none. See above,
Numb. 54.
65. I have clearly stiown that the Con
tradiction lies in the Hypothesis of the op
posite Opinion, which looks for a diffe
rence where there is none. And it would
be a manifest Iniquity to infer from thence,
that I have acknowledged a Contradiction
in my own Opinion.
To
254

Sur 18*
66. // revient icy un raisonnements que

j'ay dj dtruit cydessus, Nomb. 1 7. On
dit que Dieu peut avoir de bonnes Raisons
pour placer deux Cubes parfaitement gaux
& semblables : Et alors il faut bien (dit
on) qu'il leur assigne leurs Places, quoique
tout soit parfaitement gal. Mais la chose
ne doit point tre dtache des ses Circon
stances. Ce raisonnement, consiste en Notions
incompltes. Les Resolutions de Dieu, ne
font jamais abflraites & imparfaites -, com
me fi Dieu decernoit premirement crer let
deux Cubes, & puis decernoit part ou les
mettre. Les Hommes borns comme ils font,
font capables de procder ainsi j ils rsou
dront quelque chose, & puis ils se trouve
ront embarrasss fur les moyens, fur les
voyes, fur les Places, fur les Circonstances.
Dieu ne prend jamais une Resolution sur les
Fins, fans en prendre en mme temps fur les
Moyens, c^ fur toutes les Circonjlances. Et
mme fay montr dans la Theodice, qu
proprement parler, tin y a qu* Un Seul
Dcret pour V Univers tout entier, par le
quel il eft rsolu de V admettre de la possi*
bilit r existence. Ainsi Dieu ne choisira
point de Cube, sans choisir fa Place en mme
temps j & il ne choisira jamais entre des
indiscernables.
67. Les
fair. L E i B N I t 2\* Fifth Paper.

To '$!&.'.
66. Here I find again an Argument,which
I have overthrown above, Numb. 1 7. The
Author" says, God may have -good Reasons
to make two Cubes perfectly equal and
alike : And then (fays he) God must needs
assign them their Places, though every other
Respect be perfectly equal. But Things
ought not to be separated from their Cir
cumstances. This Argument consists in in
complete Notions. God's Resolutions are.
never abstract and imperfect : As if God
decreed, first, to create the two Cubes;
and then, made another decree where to
place them. Men , being such limited
Creatures as they are, may act in this man
ner. They may resolve upon a thing,
and then find themselves perplexed about
Means, Ways, Places, and Circumstances*
But God never takes a Resolution about the,
Ends, without resolving at the same time,
about the Means, and all the Circumstan-,
ce6. Nay, I have shown in my Theodic&a,
that, properly speaking, there is but One
Decree for the whole Universe, where
by God resolved to bring it out of possibi
lity into Existence.. And therefore God
will not chuse a Cube, without chusing its
Place at the fame time ; And he will never
chuse among Indiscanabks.
67. The
225
2 20

67. Les parties de V Espace ne sont d
termines O1 distingues que par les choses
qui y font : Et la diversit des choses dans
F Espace, determine Dieu agir diffrem
ment fiir diffrentes parties de P Espace.
Mais l' Espace pris fans les choses, n a rien
de determinant, & mme il n* est rien d*
actuel; ''
s;i
68. Si Dieu efl rsolu de planer un certain
Cube de matire, iks' est aussi determine sur
la ?Uce de ce Cube \ mais cy est pas rapport
~7P 'autres sortions de matire, & non pas
par rapport- VEspai dtach, -o il!*'y
H rien de determinant.' ' >' * , ; r
: '69. Mais la'sagesse Me 'permet pas qu* il
plac en inertie temps deux Cubes parfaterhtit-gstux &"semilabU'\parc^'il n y
d's>s\ mvyen de rmkier une Raison de leur
assigner des places diffrentes* $y aurait
une volont uns motif.
76. J1 avois compar une- Volont fans
motif, (telle que de-s raijonriemeris- superfi
ciels 'assignent Dieu,") au hazard d'fipicure.
On y oppose queidhxzax d' Epicure efl une
ncessit aveiigle, & non pas un choix -de
volont. Je rplique que le hazard d' Epicure nv est pas vne ncessit, mais quelque
chose ~<F indifferent* Epicure s introduisait
exprs pour viter la ncessit. Il est way
qtte le hazard est aveugle j mais' Une -vo*
lont fhS' motif 'ne firoit pas moins aveugle^
& ne feroit pas moins due au simple hazards
tfT .ri
S)
Sur
Mr.-L Et b tfir ziV ifth fbpet. ny

6"/. The Parts of Space are not determinedand distinguislJedy but by the Things
which are in it : And the Diversity of
Things in Space,- determines? God- to act
differently upon different Parts of Space.
But Space without Things, has nothing
whereby it may be distinguished j and in
deed not any thing affuaJ.-- " \ \ ,v ;'
& IfGod is resolved to place a certain
Cubefvof Matter atÛ/ h* is also resolved
ih what particular Place to put it. But
'tis with respect to Other Parts of Matter j
and not with respect to bare Space it self,
in which there is nothing to distinguish it.
69. But Wisdom does not allow God to
place at the fame time two Cubes perjeBly
equal arid alike j because there is no Way
to' find any Reason for assigning them diffc- &eAp.
rent Places. At this Rate, there would he ***** *
* a'JPW without a Motive.
w.v.v.,V N*
70. A Will without Motivet '{{fees* as
superficial Reasoners suppose to be in God,)
I compared to Epicurus % Chance. The Au
thor >aftswers , Epicurus't Chance is a- blind
Necessity, and not a Choice of Will.. I
reply, that Epicurus's Chance is not a Ne
cessity, but Something indifferent. Epi
curus brought ft in on purpose to avoid
Necessity. 'Tis true, Chance is Blind -,
But a Will without Motive would be no less
Blindy ati*' ha iefc wing to tfiefti Chance.
''" T. n - ;-'' : -
a2
To
n%
Cmquume Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

.. . ' .,r. . _
.."..;
;, - .-; V
;. ; .
;r> v, $ui <*9-
"
\r'\
''r 71.S On W *<? <* ?"' <* *j<* ^ r*"
to* o> <&/K Nomb. 21 i ?ff ^J Ve

saurait tre cre, si Dieu ne choisit point
parmy les indiscernables. On aurott Rai
son, si la matire consiste* en Atomes en
Corps similaires, ou autres fitlions sembla' '; bls de la Philosophie superficielle. Mais ce
mme grand principe, qui combat le choix
entre les indiscernables, dtruit aujji ces
Relions mal bties, s:-:/.
:
f; . r<
il
Sur 20.
72, V m avoitobjeSk dans le ^ Pa. * . pies, <Nornb. 7 & 8.) p* D^ '" J*

. joi/tf enluy un fritipe d' agir, s_U atott
* choses dtermin par les * externes. J ay reexternes; pondu qUe ls ides des choses, externes font
en luy j '& qu* ainsi il est dtermin par
des raisons internes, c'est dire par fa sa
gesse., Maintenant on ne veut point entendre,
~ propjos de quoy je V aye dit. . ,-
Sur 2 *. I;::.- .7:'
73. On confond souvent- dant, tes, ob}e8i' ons. qu% on me fait, ce que Dieu n^veut
point, avec ce qu il ne peut point. Voyes
r
ci dilus,
r ,
Mr. L E I E N I t zY Fifth Paper,
iy^
71* The Author repeats here, what has.

been already confuted above, Numbr2i j-:
that Matter cannot be created, without
God's chusing among Indiscernibles. He
would be in the right, if Matter consisted
of Atoms, similar Particles, or other, the
like Fictions of superficial Philosophy,-,
But That great Principle, which, proves
there is no Choice among Indiscemibles,
destroys also these ill-contrived Fictions
1.
1 .. i
..
>\ .,
>\
> .5
7.2. The Author objected against roe in

his Third Paper, (Numb. 7, and 8;) that
God would not have in himself a, Princi
ple of Acting, if he was determined by
Things External. I answered, that the.
Ideas of External Things are in him, j and
that therefore he is determined by Internal
Reasons, that is, by his Wisdom. JJutthe,
Author here will not, understand, to what
end I said it.
,, ",, ,>..;, . ;vjtv
.,..;,. TO -Zl.\..
:-V
73. He frequently confounds, in his

Objections against me* what God will not
do, with what he cannot do. See above,
Numb. 9. For Example-, God can do every
(X 3
Thing
Cinquime Ecrit At Mr. Leieiz.
t & plus ci- de flus, Norab. 9 f. Par Exemple -, Dieu

as' 7 ' peut faire tout ce qui efi poble, mais il ne
veut faire que le Meilleur. Ainfi je ne dis
point, comme on m* impute icy, que Dieu nes
peut point donner des bornes V Etendiie de
la matire, mais il y a de V apparence qu
il ne le veut point, &~qu* il a trouv mieux
de ne luy en point donner.
- ^.4. De tendue,; h dure, non valet
confequCntia. Quand /' tendue de la ma
tire ri uroit point de bornes, il h s' en
fuit point que fa dure ri en ait pas non
plus y pas mme en arriere, * eft dire qu*
elle n ait point eu de commencement. Si la
nature des chofes -dans le total eft de crotre
uniformment en perfeblion, V Univers des
Creatures doit avoir commenc. Ainfi il y
aura des Raifons pour limiter la me des
hofes, quand mme il n'y en auroiC point
pour en limiter V etendite. ' D plus, le corntnencement du Monde rk droge point l* in
finit de fa dure parte poil, ou dans la
fuite \ mais les bornes de V Univers droge
raient l' infinit de fon tendue. Ainfi il
efiL'flus- raifonnable cP en p'ofr uii com
mencement, que d' en admettre des bornes j
fin de conferver dans V un dans au' tre le caraBere dy- Un Auteur infini.
~:'f
*- '

. ' ;.':,
i
,'
-i '
." , Jf
i . .;
7 5^ Cependant ceux qui ont admis Z'ternit '"dir Monde, ou, du moins, camine ont
>y- ' i'
Mr. L e i b n i ? z!s Fifth Taper.

231
Thing that is possible, but he will do only '.,
what is best. And therefore I don't fay,
as the Author here will have it, that God
cannot limit the Extension of Matter ^ but
'tis likely he will not do it, and that he has
thought it better to set no Bounds to
Matter.
74. From Extension to Duration, npn
valet confiquentia. Though the JExtsn/ion
of Matter were unlimited, yet it. would
not follow that its Duration woul^bealso
unlimited j nay, even d parte ante, it would
.not follow, tnat it had no Beginning. If
it. is the Nature of Things in the whole,
to srow.uniformly in Perfection ^ the ]LJn.iverle of Creatures must have had a Be
ginning.. And therefore, there will be"Rea
sons to limit the Duration of Things,. even
though there were nope to limit their Êx
tension. Besides, the World's having a
Beginning, does nqt (derogate from tbe: In
finity of its Duration,d.{.parte. pflst''^. but
Bounds of. the Universe wonlet derogate
from the Infinity of it? Extension. And
therefore it is more reasonable to admit a
Beginning. ,of tl?6, $flfld, -than . so .admit
any Bounds of it. j tj$t .the Character, of
its infinite Author, may... be in Both' -Respect;s preserved. .
75* ; However^^who Jâye. admitted
ths^w'f/ f .tfow&?$L orât leaft, (as
some famous Divines have done,') the'pqffiQ. 4
bility
2^7

fait des Thologiens clbres, la possibilit
de V ternit du Monde ; ' ont point ni
pour cela fa dpendance de Dieu, comme on
le leur impute icy fans fondement,. ,
Sur % 22 dC 23.
76. On m' objecte encore ky fans fonde

ment, que, selon moy, tout ce que Dieu peut
faire, doit tre fait ncessairement. Comme
si V on ignorait que s ay rfut cela solide
ment dans la Theodice, & que s y ren
verse V opinion de ceux qui soutiennent qu
il n* y a rien de possible que ce qui arrive
effectivement; comme ont fait dj quelques
anciens Philosophes, &, entre autres, Diodore chez, Ciceron. On confond la nces
sit morale, qui vient du choix du meilleur^
avec l(i ncessite absolue \ on confond la
volont avec la puissance de Dieu. Il peut
produire tout possible^ ' ou ce qui n implique
point de contradiction ; mais il veut pro
duire le meilleur entre les possibles. Voys
*<grN"74, ce.qui a t dit y-dessus, N cf. "* -*-'
'! ;
77.' Dieu m' est donc point un Agent N

cessaire : en produisant les Cratures, puis
au* H agispar Choix.' Cependant t$'rifu* on
. adjoute icy, eft malfond, qu" uri Agent N
cessaire ne feroit point un Agent. ' Qn pro' vott~fbu,vett hardiment & sans fondernent.
en
*X>"
Mrl h E rs tf i Tr 2?x Fifth Paper. '

W/iyr of its, Eternity"5 did not, for all that,
deny its dependence upon God-5as the.
Author here lays to their Charge, without
any Ground.
To 22, 33.
76. He here further objects, without
any Reason, that, according to my Opini
on, whatever God can do, he must needs
have done. As if he was ignorant, that
I have solidly confuted this Notion in my
Theodic&a ; and that I have overthrown the
Opinion of those, who maintain that there
is nothing possible but what really hap
pens -j as some ancient Philosophers did,
and among others Diodorus in Cicero, The
Author confounds Moral Veceffity^wKxch
proceeds from the Choice of what is Best,
with Abjbhtte Necessity : He confounds the
Will of God, with his Power. God can
produce everyj Thing that is possible, or
whatever does not imply a Contradiction ;
but he! wills only to produce what is the
Best among Things possible. See what has
'been-said -above, Numb. 9. : ; "'' v. '* .
^yD God is not therefore a necessary
Arerit in producing -Creatures} since he
acts with ChAieft However, what the
Author adds ' hefey isv iil-grouhded, viz.
that a NeceJpribJgty&'-xrauid'itiot-Jbe an
Agent at all. He frequently affirms Things
boldly,
V-'
^gp
nils'' >
:b von:
-...:.1
a 34 Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

t contre en avanant, s des theses qu* on ne saurait
mov
thesesdes prouver.: ,v
i- ..jo".
Sur # 24
2$. . if. .
78. On s* excuse de ' avoirpoint dit que

V Espace est le sensorium de Dieu, mais feu
lement comme son senforium. It semble
que V un efl auffi peu convenable, & aussi
peu intelligible que autre*, ...;..
r.'
;.. . !
:.
Sur 29*
. ."! h s;" .
?.;: -,.-;.( ,
79. : 1/ Espace ' est }pas. la. place, de tou~

tes cbosis, car il n est pas U ptace de Dieu. t
autrement.voil une chose co'ternelle Dieuf
& indpendante ds{uy*\& mme de laquelle
il dpendrait / H a besoin de place* r, r; >, /,
, . \ '! 3m! -v ; .-iot'KJ : ' ; ' : so 'V.i j
- 80. feme voy pas auffi comment un
peut dira, que l* ECpace ..est la place des
ides ; car les ides font dans V Entendement,
81. Il est fort trange auffi de- dire que
/'Ame de 1' Homme est: Y Ame des images.
Les images qui font dans Y Entendement,fans
dam V Esprit; mais S il toit Y Ame des
images^ elles seroien km de_ luy. : Que fi
Y on entend des Images corporelles, comment
veut on que noflre ftrit nfoit Y Ame-, puis
que ce ne sont que des intprejfwns (affaires
dansde Corps dstihîl^Ke^
.vltlod
82. Si
\
Mr, LlsiizV Fifth Taper.

boldly, and without any ground ; advan
cing Notions which cannot be proved.
To 24
y8. The Author alledges, it was not
affirmed that Space is God's Senforium, but
only as it were his Senforium^ The latter
fcems to be as improper, and us. little intel
ligible, as the former.
s\ ;
To 2<p
79. Space is not the Place of all Things -,
for it is not the Place of God, Otherwife
there would be a thing co-eternal with
God, and independent upon him \ nay, he
himfelf would depend upon , if he has
need of Place.
80. Nor do I fee, how it can be faid,
that Space is the Place of Ideas ; for Ideas
are in the Under/landing, -, < ~^ . } .;
'Tis alfo Very ftrange to fay, that
the Soul of Man is the Soul of the Imager
it perceives. The Images, which are in the
Underftanding, are in the Mind : But if
the Mind was the Sow/ of the Images, they
would then be e&trinfick to it. And if the
Author means xorforeal Imager, how then
will he have a human Mind to be the Soul
of thofe Imagers, they being only tranfient
Impreflions in a Body belonging to that
Sodt^v v ;
C. Vj
-,
...', .v.,v.-. '
82. f
235
3 36

82. Si Dieu sent ce qui se passe dans le
Monde,.par h moyen d* un sensorium 5 il
semble que les choses agissent sur luy, d qu
ainsi il efl comme on conoit V Ame du
Monde. On m'impute de repeter les ob
jections, fans .prendre connaissance des r
ponses , mji'je ne voy point qu* on ait sa
tisfait cette difficult ^ on ferait mieux
de renoncer tout fait ce sensorium
prtendu.
.- :'.;vA : .
Sur 30;
83* On parle comme fi V on n' entendait
point comment selon moy Y Ame efl un prin
cipe reprsentatif, c efl dise, comme fi V
on n avoit jamais ou parler de mon har
monie prtablie.
... r.u ! '.'
84. Je ne demeure point d* accorde des
notions- vulgaires, comme fi les Images' des
choses toient transportes^ (conveyed) par
les Organes jusqu* Y Ame* Car il ' est
point concevable par quelle ouverture,* -ou
par) quelle voiture, * ce \transport des images
depuis r Organe jusques dans V Ame se peut
faire, i Cette notion de la Philosophie vul
gaire, nest point intelligible -, comme les
nouveaux .-Cartsiens /' ont assez montr*
L' on ne saiirot expliquer comment la Sub
stance, immatrielle esk.affeBe par la ma
tire : & soutenir une chose . non intelligible
l ckjsus,;-cêftlmqtr)t , la notion Sholajlique chhnerique de je ne fay quelles
.".;$
Espces
Mr. L E i B^ t zY Fifth Paper.

237
. 82. If 'tis by means of a Senforium,
that God perceives what paffes in the
World ^ it feems that Things aft upon
hira j and that therefore he is what we
mean by a Soul of the World. The Au
thor charges roe with repeating Objections,
without taking notice of the Anfwers ; but
J don't fee that he has anfwered this.Diffi
culty. They had better wholly lay aJe
.this pretended Senforium. .
.'. \- /,. J: ; To 30.. ' '.
..-.; $w,'v
-v. : ' 'V-'
'
". 1 -,'. .
83. The Author fpeaks, as if he did

not underftand, how,, according to my Opi
nion, the Soul Is a Reprefentative Principle*
Which is, as if he had never heard of my
f Pre-eablixd Harmony. . ...
..,.'. f See Ap84. I don't aflent to the vulgar Notions, ?elJix>
that the Images of Things are conveyed by N s*
the Organs [of Senfe] to the Soul. For,
it is not conceivable by what Paflage, or
by what Means of Conveyance, thefe ima
ges can be carried from the Organ, to the.
Soul. This Vulgar Notion in Philofophy
is not intelligible, as the new Cartefians
have fufficiently ihown. It cannot be ex
plained, how immaterial Subftance js affeded by Matter : And, to maintain; an un
intelligible Notion thereupon, is having recourfe. to. the Schplaftick Chimerical J^pLqu
of I know not what inexplicable; /Species
Intentionales , paffng from the Organs
238
Cinqmtntt Ecrit de Mr. LeiMnitz.

Espces intentionelles inexplicables+ qui pas
sent des Organes dans V Ante. Ces Cartelsiens ont vu la difficult, mais ils ne /' ont
point rsolue , ils ont eu rcours un con
cours *< de Dieu, qui seyait miraculeux en
effet! : Mais je crois d* avoir donn la
veritable solution de cet Enigme.
85. e dire que Dieu' discerne les thses
qui se pffnt , parce qu H est present
aux Substances, & nonp- \ partitif pro
duction continuelle, c' est dire des choses
non intelligibles. La.simple presence, ou la
proximit de coexistence, ne sufft point pour
entendre comment ce cjui se passe dans un
Etre, doit rpondre ce qiii se passe dans un
autre Etre. ^' ',;,ii' ' .iW, -a-. ,rr. 86. Par aprs c* est donner justement
dans la doSrine qui fait de Dieu 4* Ame
du Monde, pifqu' on le fait sentit* les cho
ses non pas par la dpendance qu* elles ont de
luy, c est dire par la production conti
nuelle de ce qu* ily a de bon & de parfait
en elles -, mais par une manire de sentiment
comme l' on s* imagine quenoRt hint sent
ce qui se passe dans le Corps. C est-' bien
dgrader la connoijsance divine.
-..--:
.;."
. -
' jKfljL
87. Dans la vrit des choses, cette ma

nire d sentir est entiresnent chimrique,
i
* de Dieu tout particulier,

s parla dpendance que la continuation de leur exi
stence a de luy, & qu' on petit dire d' envelopper une
production grc
Mr. LeibUi z's Fifth Paper.

to the- Soul. Thofe Cartefians faw the
Difficulty , but they could not explain it.
They had recourfe to a Concourfe of God,
which would really be miraculous. . But, I
think, 2" have given the true, Solution of
that Enigma*
-> ! .*.- i^smj . V .'*.
85. To fay that God perceives what paf

fes in the Worldêcaufe he is prefent to the
Things, and not.by a continual ProduQion
of them } is faying fomething unintelligible.
A mere Presence or Proximity of Co-exiftence, is not fufhcient to make us underftand, how that which paifes in One Being,
ihould anfwer to what panes in another.
r.'V*. v. v.\ \iV
86. Bedes j This is falling into
That Opinion, which makes God to be the
Soid of the World -, feeing it fuppofes God
to perceive Things, not by their depen
dence upon him, that is, by a continual
Pradutfidn of what is good and perfect in
them } but by a Kind of Perception, fitch
as that by which Men fancy Oar Soul
perceives what panes in the Body. This
is a degrading of God's Knowledge very
much.
'-*
87. In Truth and Reality* this way of
Perception is wholly Chimerical, and has
no place even in Human Souls, They
perceive what paifes without them, by
what panes within them, anfwering to the
v.tfi "".". lui n ..'<'. 'v v.- <\\ '.. '-.Things
2 39
$4
Cinqttne Ecrit de Mr.LEiBNiTZ.

c n' dipas mme lieu dam lesAmes. Elles
sentent ce qui se pajse hors a" elles, par ce
qui se passe en elles, repondant aux choses de
dejoors 5 en vertu de V harmonie que Dieu a
prtablie, par la plus, belle & la plus admi
rable de toutes ses produirions \ qui fait
que chaque substance simple, en vertu de fa
'nature, vft, pour dire ainsi, une concentra
tion & un miroir vivant de tout 1' Univers
suivant son point de vede. Ce qui est encote une. des plus belles, & des plus incon
testable*: Preuves de V Existence de Dieu;
puisqu* il tf y a que Dieu, c' est dire la
cause commune, qui puisse faire cette batmone des choses. Mais Dieu mme ne peut
sentir les choses par le moyen par lequel il
des fait sentir aux autres. Il les seht, par&*! qu? il left capable de, produire ce moyen j
^ il ne les feroit point sentir aux autres,
-s'il ne les produisoit luy mme toutes con
sentante, & s* il n avoit ainsi en soy leur
representation, non comme venant d' elles,
mais tpare qu* elles viennent de luy, c?
parcequ? il en eft la cause efficiente & exem
plaire. . Il les sent parce qu* Ues viennent
de luy, s\ il est permis de dire qu* il les sent ;
ce qui ne se doit, qu3 en dpouillant le. terme
de son ithperfclion, qui semble signifier qiC
elles agissent fut. luy. Elles sont, & luysont
connues, parce qu' il les entend & veut -, &
parce que ce qu'il veut, eft autant que ce
qui existe. Ce qui paroist d' autant plus,
parcequ* il Les fait sentir les unes aux
autres j
."Mr. LElBNrfz'x Fifth Taper.

241
Things without -, in virtue of the f Har- t See A^
monyv which God has pre-established by the p^'x$\
most beautiful and the most admirable of
all his Productions \ whereby || every fim- 1| Stee
ple Substance is by its nature, (if one may ffi**
so fay,) a concentration, and. a living mirror of
the whole Universe, * according to its Point *seeAp~
of view. Which is likewise one of the /*<#*
most beautiful and most undeniable Proofs N '"'
of the existence of God } since none but
God, -viz. the universal Cause, can pro
duce such a Harmony of things. But God
himself cannot perceive thing3 by the same
Means whereby he makes other Beings per
ceive them He perceives them, because
he is able to produce That Means. And
Other Beings would not be caused to per
ceive them, if he himself did not produce
them all harmonious^ and had not there
fore in himself a representation of them j
Not as if tbat Representation came from
the Things, but because the Things pro
ceed from Him, and because he is the Effi
cient and Exemplary Cause of them. He
perceives them, because they proceed from
him , if one may be allowed to say, that
he perceives them : Which ought not to be
said, unless we divest That Word of its im
perfection , for else it seems to signify, that
things act upon him. They exist, and are
known to him , because he understands
and wills them j and because what he wills,
is the fame, as what exists. Which apR
pears
243
autres -, & qu* il les fait sentis mutueSament par la fuite des Natures, qu* il leur a
donnes une fois pour toutes, & qu* il ne
fait qu' entretenir suivant les loix de cha
cune partt les quelles bien que diffrentes
aboutissent une correspondence exatfe des
rsultats. Ce qui passe toutes les Ides cnt
on a eu vulgairement de la Verfe&ion t>i
' '
vine & des Ouvrages de Dieu, &\P lev
t
vc au plus haut degr -, comme M, Bayle a bien
reconnu, quoy qu il ait cru fans sujet que
cela passe le possible.
88. Ce serait bien abuser du Texte de la

Sainte Ecriture, suivant lequel Dieu repose
des ses Ouvrages ^ que d' en infrer qu il
n'y a plus de production continue. // eji
vray qu' il 11y a point de ProduBion de Sub
stances simples nouvelles -, mais on aurait
tort d' en infrer que Dieu n'est maintenant
dans le Monde, que comme l' on conoit que
Y Ame est dans le Corps, en le gouvernant
seulement par fa Presence, sans un concours
ncessaire pour lui faire continuer son Exijlence.
Sur
Mt. Leibnitz'j Fifth Taper.
243
pears so much the more, because he makes

them to be perceived by ofie another , and
makes them perceive one another in conse
quence of the Natures which he has given
them once for all, and which he Keeps up
only, according to the laws of every one
of them severally j which, though different
one from another, yet terminate in an ex
act correspondence of the Results of the
whole. This surpasses all the Ideas, which
Men have generally framed concerning the
divine Perfections, and the works of God j
and raises [uw notion os'] them, to the
highest degree , as Mr. Bayle has acknow
ledged* though he believed, without any
ground, that it exceeded possibility.
88. To infer from That passage of Holy
Scripture, wherein God is said to have
rested from his Works, that there is no
longer a continual Production of them \
would be to make a very ill use of that
Text. 'Tis true, there is no production
of New Simple Substances : But it would
be wrong to infer from thence, that GocL
is now in the World, only as the Soul is
conceived to be in the Body, governing it
merely by his presence, without any con
course being neceuary to continue itsExi*
stence.
1
*2
T*
2 44

Sur $ 31.
89. V Harmonie ou Correspondence en
tre Ame & le Corps, n est pas un Mi
racle perptuel, mais V EffeB ou fuite d' un
Miracle primigene fait dans la Creation des
choses, comme font toutes les choses natu
relles. Il est vray que c est une Merveille
perptuelle, comme font beaucoup de choses
^naturelles.
yc. Le mot d" Harmonie prtablie est

un Terme de /' Art, je s avoue j mais non
pas un Terme qui n explique rien -, jWi/flM
il est expliqu fort intelligiblement, & s
on n oppose rien qui marque qrf il y <M
de la difficult.
u
91. 'Comme la nature de chaque buDstance simple, Ame ou veritable Monade,
est telle que son tat suivant est une Conse
quence de son tat precedent ; voil la caiift
de /' Harmonie toute trouve. Car Duu <*
qiC faire que la Substance simple m
une fois & d' abord une Representation de
1' Univers selon son point de veue : iisque de cela seul il suit qu' elle le fi
perptuellement -, & que toutes les Subitances simples auront tousj oursune Harmonie
entre elles, parceqif elles reprsentent tou
jours le mme Univers.
Sur
Mr. Leibnitz'j Fifth Taper.
245
To 31.
89. The Harmony, or Correspondence
between the Soul and the Body, is not a
perpetual Miracle , but the effect or con
sequence of an original Miracle worked at
the Creation of things j as all natural
things are. Though indeed it is a perpe
tual Wonder, as many natural things are.
90. The word, Pre-established Harmony,,
is a Term of Art, I confess j but 'tis not a
Term that explains nothing, since it is
made out very intelligibly , and the Author
alledges nothing, that (hows there is any
difficulty in it. .
....
91. The nature of * every simple Sub- *&? Af
fiance, Soul, or true Monad, being such, /***>
that its following State is a consequence of 2"
the preceding one , here now is the cause
of the Harmony found out. For God needs
only to make a simple Substance become
once and from the beginning, a representa
tion of the Universe, * according to its Point * s.-eApof viezv ; Since from thence alone it sol- pemtix,
lows, that it will be so perpetually j and N "*
that all simple Substances will always have
a Harmony among themselves, because they
always represent the fame Universe.
.
I -:^K\^.r
, To
1^6
Cmqme.me'Ecvit de Mr.LE i en i tz.

Si4r $ 32.
92. Il e( vray que, selowmoy, 1' Ame ne

trouble point les loix du Corps, ny le Corps
celles de l' Ame j f qit* ils s' accordent
seulement j /' un agissant librement, suivant
les Rgles des Causes finales \ & l' autre
agissant machinalement, suivant les Loix des
Causes efficientes^ Mais cela ne droge point
la Libert de nos Ames, comme on le prend
icy. Car tout Agent qui agit suivant les
causes finales, ejl libre, quoyqiC il arrive
quf il j' accorde avec celuy qui n agit que
par des Causes efficientes fans connoiffance,
ou par Machine \ parceque Dieu prvoyant
ce que la cause libre feroit, a rgl d* abord
sa Machine en sorte qu elle ne puisse man
quer de j* y accorder. Monsieur Jaquelot
a fort bien rsolu cette difficult dans un de
ses Livres contre Jks.Bayle \ & fen y cite
le Passage dans la Theodice, Part I. g
63. J' en parleray encore plus bas, Nomb.
124.
Sur 33.
93. Je n admets point que toute Act on

donne une nouvelle force ce qui patit. Il
arrive souvent dans le concours des Corps,
que chacun garde, fa force , comme lors
V**
'Mr. Leibnitz'/ Fifth Paper,
^47
To $ 32.
92. *Tis true, that, according to Me,
the Soul * does not disturb the Laws of the * *? AP~
Body, nor the Body those of the Soul j and no "'
that the Soul and o^y do only agree to
gether j the one acting freely, according to
the rules of Final Causes j and the other
acting f mechanicals , according to the f see Aplaws of Efficient Causes. But this does &&*>
not derogate from the Liberty of our Souls-, N '3*
as the Author here will have it. For, every
Agent which acts according to Final Cau
ses, 'is free, though it happens to agree with
an Agent acting only by Efficient Causes
without Knowledge, or mechanically ^ be
cause God, foreseeing what the free Cause
would do, did from the beginning regulate
the Machine in such manner, that it can
not fail to agree with that free Cause. Mr.
Jaquelot has very well resolved this diffi
culty, in one of his Books against Mr.
Boyle \ and I have cited the Passage, in my
Theodk&a, Part J. $63. I shall speak of it
again below, Numb. 124.
To 33.
93. I don't admit, that every aBion
gives a new force to the Fatient. It fre
quently happens in the concourse of Bodies,
that each of them preserves its force j as
R 4
when
548

que deux corps durs gaux concourent dire
ctement. Alors la feule DireBion est change,
fans qu' ily ait du changement dans la force \
chacun des Corps prenant la DireBion de /'
autre, & retournant avec la mme vitesse
qu'il avoit dj eue.
94. Cependant je n ay garde de dire
qu'il soit surnaturel de donner une nouvelle
force un Corps \ car je reconnois qu' un
Corps reoitsouvent une nouvelle force d' un
autre Corps, qui en perd autant de la sien
ne : Mais je dis seulement qu il efl sur
naturel que tout Y Univers des Corps re
oive une nouvelle force *, & ainsi qu' un
corps gagne de la Force, fans que d' au
tres en perdent autant; Ceft pourquoy je
dis aufi, qu il eft insoutenable que Y Ame
donne de la Force au Corps \ car alors tout
V Univers des Corps recevrait une nouvelle
force.
95. Le Dilemme qu' on fait icy, est mal
fond, que selon moy il faut ou que l' Hom
me agisse surnaiureUement, ou que l* Hom
me soit une pure Machine comme une Mon
tre. Car V Homme n agit point surnaturellement, & son Corps est vritablement
une Machine,^ n agit que machinalement-,
mais son Ame ne laisse pas d' tre une cause
libre.
:. \f :
- 1 ..-
Sur
Mr. LeibnitzV Fifth Paper, \ 349

when two equal hard Bodies meet directly.
Then the Direction only is changed, with
out any change in the Force j each of the
Bodies receiving the Direction of the other,
and going back with the fame swiftness
it came.
, .
94. However, I am far from faying that
it is supernatural to give a -new force to a
Body , for I acknowledge that One Body
does frequently receive a new Force from
another, which loses as much of its own.
But I fay only, 'tis Supernatural that the
whole Universe of Bodies mould receive a
netvforce , and consequently that one body
should acquire any new force, without the
loss of as much in others. And therefore
I fay likewise, 'tis an indefensible opinion
to suppose the Soitl gives force to the
Body ^ for then the whole Universe of
Bodies would receive a neve farce,,
95. The Author's Dilemma here, is ill
grounded ;viz,. that according to Me, either
a Man must act Supernaturally, or be a
mere Machine, like a Watch. For, Man
does not act Supernaturally : And his Body
is truely a Machine, acting only mechani
cally j and yet his Soul is a free Cause,j
.L'i..
.
'
..
'.
To
i $o

Sur $ 34 & 35.
96. jfc we remets aussi ce qui a t ou
fera dt dans ce present Papier, Nomb. 82,
86, & 1 1 1 \ touchant la comparaison entre
Dieu & V Ame du Monde ; & comptent
le sentiment qu* on oppose au mien, fait trop
approcher V un l* autre.
Sur $ 36*.
97. Je me rapporte aussi ce que je viens
de dire touchant V Harmonie entre V Ame
& le Corps. Nomb, 89, & seqq\
Ji v"-
Sur ? 37-
' ':
98. On me dit que V me n'es pas dans

le Cerveau, mais dans le Sensorium, fans
dire ce que c* est que ce Sensorium. Mais
suppos que ce Sensorium soit tendu, com
me je crois qu* on /' entend -, c* est tousjours
la mme difficult, & la Question revient fi
T Ame est diffuse par tout cet Etendit, quelque grand ou quelque petit qiC il soit. Car
te plus ou moins de grandeur, riy fait
rien.
Sur % 38.
*- 90. Je n entreprends pas icy es tablir
ma Dynamique, ou ma Dorinedes Forces .*
Ce

'-'
To 34, *i 35;
$& I here refer to what has been or

shall be said in this Paper, Numt>< 82, 86,
and 1 1 1 ^ concerning the comparison be
tween GtfJartd a Soul of the World ^ and
how ' the opinion contrary to mine, brings
the one of these too near to the other.
..'
? "*''< Jo 26.
' v 1 . .' -. .\
; -. - .
97. I here also refer to what I have be

fore said, concerning the Harmony between
the Soul and the Bodyy Numb. 89, &c.
v \ r. ''-
'" *-< To 37.

98. The Author tells us, that the Soul
is not in the Brain, but in the Sensorium j
without saying What that Sensorium is.
But supposing That Sensorium to be extend
ed, as 1 believe the Author understands it j
the fame difficulty still remains, and the
Question returns, Whether the Soul be
diffused through that whole Extension, be
it great or small. For, more or less in big
ness; is nothing to the purpose here.
: -*'
To 538.
99V IdonV undertake here to establish

my Dynamieks, or my Doctrine of Forces:
- -l!LLThis
251
2 5-
Ce lieu riy feroit point propre. Cependant

je puis fort bien repondre V Objection qu*
on me fait icy. j avois foutenu que les
Forces aftivs fe conservent dans le Monde.
On tri objefle, que deux Corps Mois ou nonelaiques, concourant entre eux, perdent de
leur force. Je reponds que non. Il efl vray
que les Touts la perdent par rapport leur
mouvement total \ mais les Parties la reoi* agites vent, tant * agites par la force du coninterieu- cours% jin ce dfaut ri arrive qu'en ap
parence. Les Forces ne font point dtruites,
mais d'iffipces parmy les Parties menues* Ce
ri e pas les perdre, mais eft faire comme
font ceux qui changent la groe Monnoye en
petite. Je demeure cependant d* accord, que
la quantit du mouvement ne demeure point
la mme ^ & en cela j' approuve ce qui fe
dit, pagi 341 de Optique de M. New
ton, qri on cite icy. Mais f ay montr
ailleurs, qu il y a de la difference entre la
quantit du mouvement la quantit d
la force.
. ' . y
: s
Sur 39.
' ico. On m avoit foutenu que la Force^

fdecro- f fe diminuoit naturellement dans Vlfniifoie
vers corporelt que cela venoit de la d
pendance des Cbofes -, ( $me papier, fur
12 & 14O avols demande dans ma
3me rponfei qit on prouvt que ce -dfaut e
fuit\ de- dpendance, .des Cbofes. On
..:,
efquive
255*
This would not be a proper Place for it.

However, I can very well answer the Ob
jection here brought against me. I have
affirmed that * ABive Forces are preserved in *&e*B**t
theWorld {without diminution.'] The Author *0 /fj|
objects, that two Soft or Un-elastick Bodies of Dr.
meeting together, lose some of their fine. 2j5e''
I answer, No. 'Tis true, their Wholes lose Reply.
it with respect to their Total Motion > but
their Parts receive it, being shaken by the
force of the Concourse. And therefore
That loss of Force, is only in appearance.
The forces are not destroyed, but scattered
among the small parts. The Bodies do not
lose their forces , but the cafe here is the
fame, as when Men change great Money
into small. However, I agree that the
quantity of Motion does not rerflain the
fame ^ And herein I approve what Sit Isaac
Newton fays, page 341 of his Opticks,
which the Author here quotes. But I have
shown elsewhere, that there is a difference
between the quantity of Motion, and the
quantity of Force.
.vV;V
- /'. - '. '
To tf 29.
'* ' ' ."

\ \\ V., '..-.-. .'-.
100. The Author maintained against me,

that Force does naturally lessen -in the ma^f ***** *
teriaLUniversei.andthat.This arises from Sdb"
the dependence of things, ( Third Reply, Fourth
$ 13 and 14.) In my f Third Answer , f/per' ,'"
I desired him to prove that this Imper- te'nkn.'
:"-',
section
1 54
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leinitz.

esquive de satisfaire ma demande, en se
jettant sur un incident -^ & en niant que ce
soit un dfaut. Mais que ce soit un d
faut ou non, il falloit prouver que c'est une
suite de la dpendance des Choses
loi. Cependant il faut bien, que ce qui
rendrait la Machine du Monde aujji impar~>
faite que celle d'un mauvais Horloger, soit
un dfaut.
102. On dit maintenant, que c'eft une
suite de /' inertie de la Matire j mais c'eft
ce qu on ne prouvera pas non plus. Cette
inertie mise en avant,0" nomme par Kepler,
e^ rpte par Des Cartes *, f que s as
employe dans la Theodice pour donner une
s Image* de F ImperfeBon naturelle des
Creatures ; fait seulement que les vitesses
font diminues quand les Matires font
augmentes, mais c* est fans aucune dimi
nution des Forces.
.'. i
.;..'
.:
Sur $ 40.
103. J1 avois soutenu, que la dpen
dance de la Machine du monde d'un Auteur
Diviit, est plustofl cause que ce dfaut n'y
est point -, & que l' ouvrage n' a point beii
i m
ytiii
i 1 1 1 1
* dans ses Lettres,

s Image, & en mime temps un chantillon,
., - .1
soin
Mr. Leibnitz^ Fifth Taper.

section is a consequence of the dependence
of things. He avoids answering my de
mand ; by falling upon an Incident, and
denying this to be an imperfection. But
whether it be an imperfection, or not, he
should have proved that "tis a consequence
of the dependence of things.
1 Of < However , That which would make
the Machine of the World as imperfect, as
that of an unskilful Watchmaker ^ surely
must needs be an imperfection.
102. The Author fays now, that it is a
Consequence of the Inertia of Matter. But
This also, he will not prove. That Inertia^
alledged here by him, mentioned by Kepler^
repeated by Cartesms, and made use of by
Me in my Tbeodic&a, in order to give a
notion or the natural imperfection of Crea
tures j has no other effect, than to make the
Velocities diminish, when the Quantities
of Matter are encreafed : But this is with
out any diminution of the Forces,; ,
To 40,
103. I maintained, that the dependence of
the Machine of the World upon its divine
Author, is rather a reason why there can be
no such imperfection in it y and that the
Work of God does not want to be set right
again *, that it is not liable to be disordered j
and lastly, that it cannot lessen in Per-r
section. Let any one guess now, how the
3
Author
^55
a $6 Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

soin d' tre redress i, qu' il ' est point sujet
se-. dtraquer j & enfin, qu'il ne fauroit
diminuer en PerfeBion. Je donne mainte
nant deviner aux Gens, comment on en
peut infrer contre moy, comme on fait icy,
qu' il faut, fi cela est, que le Monde ma
teriel soit infini & ternel, sans aucun com-.;....mneement j & que Dieu doit toujours
:. -?;;savoir cr autant d' hommes df d* autres
espces, qu' il est possible de crer.
Sur $ 41.
- '-
104. Je ne dis point que l' Espace est un

Ordre ou Situation qui rend les choses situables -, ce seroit parler galimatias. On ri
a qii considrer mes propres paroles, 0e
les joindre ce que je viens de dire cy dessus,
Nmb. 47 ; pour montrer comment V Esprit
vient se former V ide de V Espace, sans
qu il faille qu il y ait un tre rel & ab
solu qui y reponde hors de V Esprit & hors
des rapports. Je ne dis donc point, que V
Espace est un Ordre ou Situation, mais un
Ordre des Situations, ou selon lequel les
Situations font ranges \ * que >l' Espace
abstrait est cet Ordre des Situations coivues comme pojfibles. Ainsi c' est quelque
chose d' idal. Mais il semble qu' on ne
me veut point entendre, fay repondu d
j icy, Norab. 54, s ObjeBion qui pre
tend qu' un Ordre ?i'eft point capable de
quantit.
*.
105. On

i $y
Author can hence infer against me, as he
does, that, if this be the Cafe, then the
material World must be infinite and eternals
without any beginning j and that God must
always have created as many Men and other
Kinds of Creatures, as can postbly be created.
To 41,
104. I don't fay, that Space is an Order
or Situation, which makes Things capable
of being situated : This would be Non
sense. Any one needs only consider my
own Words, and add them to what I said
above, ( Numb. 47. ) in order to show
how the Mind comes to form to it self an
Idea of Space, and yet that there needs not
be any real and absolute Being answering
to that Idea, distinct from the Mind, and
from all Relations. I don't fay therefore,
that Space is an Ordtr or Situation, but an
Order of Situations ; or [an Order] ac
cording to which, Situations are disposed ;
And that abftratl Space is That Order of Si
tuations, when they are conceived as being
possible. Space is therefore something [mere?} Ideal. But, it seems, the Author will
Dot understand me. I have already, in this
Paper, (Numb. 54.) answered the Objecti
on, that Order is not capable of Quan
tity.
S
105. The
2 58
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz. .
105. On objetle icy, que le Temps ne

sauroit tre un Ordre des choses successives,
parce que la quantit du temps peut devenir
plus grande ou plus petite, Y ordre des suc
cessions demeurant le mme. Je reponds
que cela n ejt point : Car fi le temps est plus
grand, ily aura plus d' tats succejfs pa
reils interposs ; & s' il est plus petit, il y
en aura moins -, puisqi il n y a point de
vuide ny de condensation ou penetration,
pour ainsi dire, dans les temps, nonplus que
dans les lieux.
* Je sou- 106. * Il efl vray que fans les Creatures,
tiens que /> immensit & /' ternit de Dieu ne laisse
raient pas de subsister -, mais fans aucune
dpendance ny des temps ny des lieux. S' il
ny avoit point de Creatures, il n y aurait
ny Temps ny Lieu, & par consequent point
d* Espace actuel. V immensit de Dieu est
indpendante de V Espace, comme Vternit de
Dieu est indpendante du Temps. Elles s
partent que Dieu seroit present & coexi
stant toutes les choses qui exisieroient. Ainsi
je n* admets point ce qu' on avance icy, que
si Dieu seul exstoit, il y auroit Temps &
Espace, comme prsent. Au lieu qu' alors,
mon avis, ils ne feraient que dans les ides,
comme des simples possibilits. V immensit
& l' ternit de Dieu font quelque chose de
plus eminent que la dure & V tendue des
Creatures -%
s portent seulement l' gard de ces deu* ordres des
choses, que Dieu Htc
Mr. L e i b N I f z's Fifth Paper.

105. The Author objects here, that
Time cannot be ah Order of successive
Things, because the Quantity of Time may
become greater or less, and yet the Order
of Successions continue the fame. I an
swer j this is not so. For if the Time h
greater, there will be More successive and
like States interposed ; and if it be less,
there will be fewer ; seeing there is no
Vacuum, nor Condensation, or Penetration,
(if I may so speak,) in Times, any more
than in Places.
106. Tis true, the Immensity and Eter
nity of God would subsist, though there!
were no Creatures ; but those Attributed
would have no dependence either on Times
or Places. If there were no Creatures,
there would be neither Time nor Placet
and consequently no actual Space. The
Immensity of God is independent Upon
Space, as his Eternity is independent upon
Time. These Attributes signify only, that
God would be present and co-existent with
all the Things that should exist.
And
therefore 1 don't admit what's here alledged*
that if God existed alone, there would b<2
Time and Space as there is now : Whereasthen, in my Opinion, they would be only
in the Ideas of God as mere Possibilities*
The Immensity and Eternity of God, are
things more transcendent, than the Dura
tion and Extension of Creatures , not only
With respect to the Greatness, but also to*

S a
the
i $9
a 60

Creatures -, 0 feulement par rapport la
grandeur, mais encore par rapport la na
ture de la chose. Ces attributs Divins n
ont point besoin de choses hors de Bien,
comme font les lieux & temps aBuels. Ces
vrits ont t affe's reconnues par les Tho
logiens & par les Philosophes.
Sur 42.
107. J* avois soutenu que V operation de
Dieu, par laquelle H redrefseroit la machine
du monde corporel , prte par sa nature
( ce qii on pretend) tomber dans le re
pos , seroit un Miracle. On a rpondit,
que ce ne seroit point une operation Miracu
leuse, parce qit elle seroit ordinaire, & doit
Arriver ajss souvent, s ay rpliqu, que ce
11 est pas V usuel ou non-usuel, quifait le Mi
racle proprement dit, ou de la plus grande es
pce, mais de surpasser les forces des creatures :
Et que c'est le sentiment des Thologiens &
des Philosophes. Et qu" ainsi on m' accorde
jiu moins, que ce qi on introduit, & que je
desapprouve, est un Miracle de la plus grande
Espce, suivant la notion receue ; c' est
dire, qui surpasse les forces cres -, & que c
1st justement ce que tout le monde tche d'vi
ter en Philosophie. On me repond mainte
nant, que c' est appeller de la Raison /'
' opinion vulgaire. Mais je rplique encore
que cette opinion vulgaire, suivant laquelle
Usant viter, en Philosophant, autant qu'il
Mr. Leibnitz'; Fifth Paper.
261
the Nature of the Things. Those Divine

Attributes do not imply the Supposition of
Things extrinsick to God, such as are actu
al Places and Times. These Truths have
been sufficiently acknowledged by Divines
and Philosophers.
To J 42.
107. I maintained, that an Operation
of God, by which he should mend the
Machine of the material World, * tending *See above,
in its Nature Cas this Author pretends) to J^f***^
lose all its Motion, woujd be a Miracle. Dr.curks
His Answer was :, that it would not be a n'fd &emiraculous Operation, because it would be ^
usual, and must frequently happen. I re- ,
ply'd ^ that 'tis not Usualness or Unufit- .

alness, that makes a Miracle properly so
called, or a Miracle of the highest Sort-,
but it's surpassing the Powers of Creatures j
and that this is the \_general~\ Opinion of
Divines and Philosophers : And that there
fore the Author acknowledges at leaft, that
the thing He introduces, and I disallow,
is, according to the received Notion, a Mi
racle of the highest Sort, that is, one which
surpasses all created Powers : And that this
is the very Thing which all Men endea
vour to avoid in Philosophy. He answers
now, that this is appealing from Reason to
vulgar Opinion. But I reply again, that
S 3
this

fe peut, ce qui furpajfe les natures des crea
tures, e tres-raifonnable. Autrement rien ne
fera fi aif que de rendre raifon de tout, en
faifant furvenir une Divinit, Deura ex ma
china, fans fe foncier des natures des chofes.
108. D' ailleurs le fentiment commun des

Thologiens ne doit pas tre trait fimpletnent en opinion vulgaire. Il faut de gran
des rifons pour qri on ofe y contrevenir^
& je ri en vois aucune icy.
\io?. Il femble qu on j' carte de fa pro
pre notion, qui demandoit que le Miracle
foit rare j en me reprochant quoyque fans
fondement,) fur $ 31, que l' harmonie pr
tablie feroit un Miracle perptuel j fi ce
ri efi qiC on ait voulu raifonner contre moy
1
ad hominem.
Sur % 43.
ne. Si le Miracle ne diffre du naturel
aue dans l' apparence & par rapport
Nous, en forte que nous appeions feulement
miracle ce que nous obfervons rarement, H
ri y aura point de difference interne relle
entre le miracle & le naturel j &, dans
h fond des chofes, tout fera galement na
Mr.. LeibnitzV Fifth Paper.

this vulgar Opinion, according to which
we ought in Philosophy to avoid, as much
as possible, what surpasses the Natures of
Creatures:, is a very reasonable Opinion.
Otherwise nothing will be easier than to
account for Any thing by bringing in the
Deity, Deum ex Machina, without minding
the Natures of Things.
108. Besides \ the common Opinion of*
Divines, ought not to be looked upon mere
ly as vulgar Opinion. A Man mould have
weighty Reasons, before he ventures to con
tradict it j and I fee no such Reasons
here.
109. The Author seems to depart from
his own Notion, according to which a Mi
racle ought to be unusual j when, in $ 31,
he objects to me, (though without any
Ground,) that the pre-ejlablijhed Harmony
would be a perpetual Miracle. Here, I fay,
he seems to depart from his own Notion j
unless he had a Mind to argue against me
ad Hominem.
To 4
no. If a Miracle differs from what is
Natural* only in Appearance, and with
respetl to Us , so that we call That only a
Miracle, which we seldom see *, there will
be no internal real Diseretice, between a
Miracle and what is natural \ and at the
torn, every thing will be etiher equally natuS 4
ral,
16^
564

turel, ou tout sera galement miraculeux.
Les Thologiens auront ils raison de s1 ac
commoder du premier, & les Philosophes
du second?
111. Cela ri irat-il.pas encore faire de
Dieu /' Atne du Monde, fi toutes ses opera
tions font naturelles, comme celles que l' Ame
exerce dans le Corps s? Ainsi Dieu sera une
partie de la Nature.
112. En bonne Philosophie, & en saine
Thologie, il saut di/iinguer entre ce qui
esl explicable par les Natures & Forces des
Creatures, & ce qui n eft explicable
que par les forces de la Substance Infinie.
// faut mettre une distance infinie, entre V
operation de Dieu qui va au del des For
ces des Natures :, &, entre les operations des
choses qui suivent les loix que Dieu leur a
donnes, & qu' il les a rendu capables de
suivre par leur natures, quoyqit avec son
affi/ance,
113. C eft par l que tombent les At
tractions proprement dites, & autres operaons inexplicables par les natures des crea
tures, qu* ilfaut faire effeBuer par miracle,
eu recourir aux absurdits, cy eft q dire, aux
qualits occultes Scholaftiques, q& on com
mence nous dbiter fous le spcieux nom
de forces, mais qui nous ramnent dans le
royaume des tnbres, C'est, inventa fruge,
glandibus yesci,
J14. Du
Mr. LeienitzV fifth Taper.
265
ral, or equally miraculous. Will Divines

like the former, or Philosophers the latter ?
in. Will not this Doctrine, moreover,

tend to make God the Soul of the World ; if
all his Operations are natural, like those of
our Souls upon our Bodies ? And so God
will be a part of Nature.
112. In good Philosophy, and sound
Theology, we ought to distinguish between
what is explicable by the Natures and
Powers of Creatures , and what is explicable
only by the Powers of the Infinite Subfiance. We ought to make an infinite
Difference between the Operation of God,
which goes beyond the Extent of Natural
sowers -, and the Operations of Things that
follow the Law which God has given
them, and which he has enabled them to
follow by their natural Powers, though not
without his Assistance;
113. This overthrows *Attra8ions, pro- * $e Apperly so called, and other Operations inex- padix,
plicable by the natural Powers of Crea- N
tures :, which Kinds of Operations, the
Assertors of them must suppose to be effe
cted by Miracles or else have recourse to
Absurdities, that is, to the occult Quali
ties of the Schools , which some Men be
gin to revive under the specious Name of
forces , but they bring us back again into
the Kingdom of Darkness, This is, inven.
fa fruge, glandibus vefci.
114. In
i66
* de Monu^. Du temps* du Chevalier Boyle, C^"
sieur Bylt, ^ autres eXceuens hommes qui fieuriffoient
en Angleterre s soits Charles II, on n auroit pas os . nous dbiter des notiotis Ji
creuses. Jy espre que ce beau temps re
viendra fius un aussi bon gouvernement que
eeluy a" present ||. Le capital de M. Boyle
toit d' inculquer que tout se saisoit mechaniquement dans la Physique. Mais cy est
un malheur des hommes, de se dgoter enfin
de la raison mme, & de j' ennuyer de la
lumire. Les chimres commencent re
venir, & plaisent parce qu elles ont quel
que chose de merveilleux. Il arrive dans le
pays Philosophique ce qui est arriv dans le
pays Potique. On s* est lass des Romans
raisonnables, tels que la Clelie Franoise,
ou /' Aramene Allemande -, & on est revenu
depuis quelque temps aux Contes des Fes.
115. Onant aux Mouvemens des corps
celestes, & plus encore quant la for
mation des plantes & des animaux 5 il
ri y a rien qui tienne du Miracle, except
le commencement de ces choses. U orga
nisme des animaux est un median isme qui
supposa une Prformation Divine : Ce qui en
suit, est purement naturel, & tout fait
mechanique.
116. Tout
s sous les commencemens de
D & que les esprits un peu trop divertis par le mal
heur des temps, retourneront mieux cultiver les CMBoislnces solides. Le Capital &c.
Mr. L ei B N i t z"s Fifth Paper.

114. In the time of Mr. Boyle, and
other excellent Men, who flourished in
England under Charles the Hd, no Body
would have ventured to publish such Chi
merical Notions. 1 hope, That happy time
will return under so good a Government as
the present. Mr. Boyle made it his chief
Business to inculcate, that every thing
was done mechanically in natural Philoso
phy. But it is Men's Misfortune to grow,
at last, out of Conceit with Reason it self,
and to be weary of Light. Chimra's be
gin to appear again, and they are pleasing
because they have something in them that
is wonderful. What has happened in Poe
try, happens also in the Philosophical World.
People are grown weary of rational Ro
mances, such as were the French Clelia, or
the German Aramene , and they are be
come fond again of the Tales of Fairies.
115. As for the Motions of the Celeftial
Bodies, and even the Formation of Plants
and Animals j there is nothing in them
that looks like a Miracle, except their Be
ginning. The Organism of Animals is a
Mechanism, which supposes a Divine Preformation. What follows upon it, is purely
natural, and entirely Mechanical.
1 16, What-
167
a8

i i 6. Tout ce qui se fait dans -le Corps
de 1' homme, & de tout animal, eft aitjfi
mechanique que ce qui se sait dans une
Montre. La difference eft feulement telle
qu* elle doit tre entre une Machine d' une
invention Divine, C^ entre la produBion d*
un Ouvrier aussi born que V homme.
Sur $44.
117. // n y a point de difficult chez les
Thologiens, fur les miracles des Anges. Il
ne s'agit que de V usage du mot. On pourra
dire que les Anges font des miracles, mais
moins proprement dits, ou d' un ordre inf
rieur. Disputer l dessus ferait une question
de nom. On pourra dire que cet Ange qui
transportoit Habacuc par les airs, qui remu
ait le Lac de Bethesda, faisait un miracle.
Mais ce n eftoit pas un miracle du premier
rang \ car il eft explicable par les forces na
turelles des Anges suprieures aux ntres.
Sur $-45,
118. J* avois objeB, qu un Attraction
proprement dite, ou la Scholaftique, seroit
une operation en diftance, sans moyen. On
repond icy qu' une Attraction fans moyen
seroit une contradiBion. Fort bien : mais
comment V entend on donc, quand on veut
qtte
Mr. Leibnitz1; Fifth Paper.

269
116. Whatever is performed in the Body
os Man, and of every Animal, is * no less t S"^
pendix,
Mechanical, than what is performed in a n" '*
Watch. The Difference is only such, as
ought to be between a Machine of Divine
Invention, and the Workmanship of such
a limited Artist as Man is.
To 44.
117. There is no Difficulty among Di
vines, about the Miracles of Angels. The
Question is only about the use of that
Word. It may be said that Angels work
Miracles j but less properly so called, or of
an inferior Order. To dispute about this,
would be a mere Question about a Word.
It may be said that the Angel, who carried
Habakkuk through the Air, and he who
troubled the Water of the Pool diBethesday
worked a Miracle, But it was not a Mira
cle of the highest Order , for it may be
explained by the natural Powers of Angels,
which surpass those of Man.
To 45.
1 1 8. I objected, that an Attraction, pro
perly so called, or in the Scholastic Sense,
would be an Operation at a Distance, with
out any Means intervening. The Author
answers here, that an AttraBion without
any Means intervening, would be indeed a
Contra-
jo
Cinquime Ecrit de Mi-.LeibnitZ.

que le Soleil travers a" un Espace vuide at
tire le globe de la Terre ? Est ce Dieu qui
sert de moyen ? Mais ce seroit un miracle,
s' ily en a jamais eu. Cela surpafferoit les
forces des Creatures,
9. Ou font- ce ptut-tre quelques substan

ces immatrielles, ou quelques rayons spi
rituels, ou quelque accident fans substance\
quelque Espce comme intentionnelle, ou quel
que autre je ne say quoy, qui doit faire ce
moyen prtendu .<? choses dont il semble qu'
on a encore bonne provision 6n tte, sans j'
ajss expliquer*
1 20. Ce moyen de communication est (dit
on) invisible, intangible, non mecbanique.
On pouvoit adjouter avec le mme dtoit, in
explicable, non intelligible , prcaire, sans
fondement, fans exemple.
121. Mais il efl rgulier, (dit on,) il est
constant, & par consequent naturel. Je
reponds, qu1 il ne sauroit tre rgulier sans
tre raisonnable j & qii il ne sauroit tre
naturel, sans 'tre explicable par les natures
des creatures.
122. Si ce moyen qui fait une veritable
Attraction, est constant, & en mme temps
inexplicable par les forces des creatures, es
s? il efl veritable avec cela j c' est tin Mi
racle perptuel : Et s* il ' est pas mifacu2
leuxf
Mr. Leibnitz1; Fifth Paper.

Contradiction. Very well ! But then what
does he mean, when he will have he Sun
to attract the Globe of the Earth through
an empty Space ? Is it God himself that
performs it > But this would be a Miracle,
if ever there was any. This would surely
exceed the Powers of Creatures.
119. Or, are perhaps some immaterial
Substances, or some spiritual Rays, or some
Accident without a Substance, or some
kind of Species Intentionalts, or some other
/ know not what, the Means by which this
is pretended to be performed ? Of which sort
of things, the Author seems to have still a
good Stock in his Head, without explain
ing himself sufficiently.
120. That Means of communication (says
he) is invisible, intangible, not Mechani
cal. He might as well have added, inex
plicable, unintelligible, precarious, ground
less, and unexampled.
I2i. But it is regular, (fays the Au
thor,) it is constant, and consequently na
tural. I answer , it cannot be regular,
without being reasonable , nor natural, un
less it can be explained by the Natures of
Creatures.
122. If the Means, which causes an
Attraction properly so called, be constant,
and at the fame time inexplicable by the
Powers of Creatures, and yet be true :, it
must be a perpetual Miracle : And if it is
<.->
not
271
i"ji

leux, lefi faux. C" eft une chose chimrique;
une qualit occulte Scholaftique.
123. // feroit comme le cas d* un corps
allant en rond [ans s' carter par la Tan
gente, quoyque rien cT explicable ne V empcht
de le faire. Exemple que fay dj allgu,
auquel on n a pas trouv propos de re
fondre^ parce qif il montre trop clairement la
difference entre le veritable naturel d' un
cot, & entre la qualit occulte chimrique
des Ecoles de V autre cot.
Sur $ 46.
1 24. Les forces naturelles des Corps, font
toutes soumises aux loix mcaniques j d^
les forces naturelles des Esprits, font toutes
soiimifes aux loix morales. Les premieres sui
vent V ordre des causes efficientes j & les se
condes suivent /' ordre des causesfinales. Les
premieres oprent fans libert, comme une
Montre -, les secondes font exerces avec li
bert, quoyqn' elles s* accordent exactement
avec cette espce de Montre, qii une autre
cause libre suprieure a accommode avec
elles par avance. J' en ay dj parl,
N 92.
125. Je finis par un point qu* on m* a
oppos au commencement de ce quatrime
Papier, o say dj rpondu cydessus ,
Nomb. 18, 19, 20. Mais je me fuis reserve
4' en dire encore d' avantage en concluant.
1
"
On
.Mr. LjElj&NitfzV Fifth Taper.

3-3
riot miraculous, it is false. 'Tis a Chimerical)
Thing, a Scholastick <?m///r Quality.
123. The Cafe would be, the fame, as in
a Body going, round without receding in
the Tangent,, though nothing that can be
explained , hindered it from receding*
Which is an Instance I have already al
ledged \. and the Author has not thought
fit to answer 'it, because it shows too clearly
the difference between what is truely Na
tural, on the one side, and a chimerical
eccult Quality of the Schools on the other.
*'
.*..,,
'
124. AH the natural forces of bodits,

are subject to Mechanical'haws and all
the natural Powers of Spirits are subject to
Moral Lam*; The, former follow the Or
der of Efficient Causes ; and the latter fol
low the Order of Final Causes* The for
mer operaswithout liberty, like a Watch j
the latter operate with liberty, though they
exactly agree with That Machine, which
Another Cause, Free and Superior, has
adapted to them before-hand. I have al
ready spoken of this, abovei Ny2d
125. I shall conclude with what the1 Au
thor objected against me at the Beginning of
this Fourth Reply : To which I have already
giveri an Answer above, (Numb. 18, Jo,
as,) But I deferred peaking more fully
: .7.2
T
tipetfi
a 74
Cinquime crit de Mr, Leibnitz.

On a prtendt d' abord que je commets^
une Petition de Principe. Mais de quel^
Principe, je vous en prie ? Plt Dieu qu
on n eut jamais suppos des Principes moins
clairs. Ce Principe est celuy du besom d
une Raison suffisante, pour qu* une chose ex
iste, qu'un vnement arrive, qu une vente
milieu. Est ce Un Principe qui a besoin
de preuve ? On me V avoit mme accord,
ou fort semblant de l' accorder, au second
Nombre du 3mc papier .-Peut tre, parce qu*
il auroit paru trop choquant de le nier.^
Mais ou on ne V a fait qen paroles^ ou V
on se contredit, ou V on se retraBe.
,
': i \
ia6. sose dire que sans ce grand Prin
cipe, on ne sauroit venir la preuve de l'
Existence de Dieu, ny rendre raison de plu
sieurs autres vrits importantes.
127. Tout le monde ne s'en est t-point ser
vi en mille occasions ? Il est vray qu on l' a
oubli par negligence en beaucoup a" autres \
Mais c'est l justement V origine des Chim
res -, comme, par exemple, d? un Temps ou
d' un Espace absolu rel, du Vuide, des
Atomes, <F une Attraction la Scholasti
cs- entre 1' que, de V Influence Physique * de l' Ame
Ame & le fur le Corps, & de mille autres Fictions,
Corps' tant de celles qui font restes de la fausjt
persuasion des Anciens, que de celles qu* on
a inventes depuis peu. ''"'','
, . :."
128. V
. Mr. LeIbnitz^ Fifth Tapers.
jf
upon That Head, to the Conclusion of this

Paper. He pretended, that I have been guilty
of a Petitio Principii. But, of What Princt
pie, I beseech you > Would to God, left
clear Principles had never been laid dowm
The Principle in Question, is the Principle
ot the want of'a sufficient Reason; in order
to any thing's existing in order to . any
Event's happening, in or4er to any truth's
taking place. Is This a Principle, that
wants to be proved* The Author granted
it, or pretended to grant it,,Numk 2, of
his Third Paper ; Possibly, because the de
nial of it would have appeared too untear
sonablc. But either he has done it only
in words, or he contradicts himself, or re*
tracts his concession. .-, ,;,m ,..; ,J. , '~X ,1_ i ?6. I dare fay, that without this gxeat
Principle, one cannot prove the existence
of God, nor account for many other important Truths.
:,.',,; ,,_..- ,\^,,:
127. Has not every body made. use of
This Principle, upon a thousand occasions?
Tis true, it has been neglected, out of carelesnese, on many, occasions: But That Neglect,-.has:bee0fthe true, cause of Chimxra^
iuch as are, (&r inftance,) an absolute real
Time or Space, a Vacuum, Atoms, AttraBim in the Scholastic* sense, a Physical
Influence, of the Soul over the Body,. andka
thousand other siclions , either derived
from erroneous opinions of the Ancients,
Or lately invented by Modern Philosophers.
Th 2
128. Was
%-j

.'<2& N' / *- /" * cause de h violation
de ce grand Principe, que les Anciens se
sont dj moqus de la Dclinaison fans sujet
de* Atomes d* Epicure ? Et ;' ose dire que
V Attraction la Scbolastique qi on renotif
velle'-aujoilrdhuy,& dont on ne se moquait
pas moins il y a o,o ans ou environ, n'a rien
de plus raisonnable.
^
f':i*2$. ?' ay souvent dfi les gens de m
apporter une Instance- -contre ce grand Princi
pe, un Exemple non contest, o il manque.
Mais on ne V a jamais fait, & on ne le
fera jamais. Cependant il y a une infinit
d' Exemples, o il * russit dans tous les
* n?fh cas connus ou il est employ. Ce qui doit faire
7Su juger raisonnablement, qu'il russira encore
dans tous janS ]es Cas inconnus\ ou qui ne deviendront
connus que par son moyen ; suivant la Max
ime de la Philosophie exprimentale, qui procede posteriori -, quand mme il ne serait
pint d' ailleurs justifi par la pure Raison,
ou priori.
. *
- *.
-..'. 140. Me nier ce grand Principe, c'est

faire encore d' ailleurs comme Epicure, rduit
- nier. cet autre grandirincipe, qui est celuy
del Contradictions savoir, que toute
Enontiation intelligible doit tre vraye, ou
fausse. Chrysippe / amusoit le prouver
contre Epicure } mais je ne crois pas s
voir besoin dtV imiter, quoyque s aye dj
, .
.:' dit

128. Was it not upon account of Bpicurm's violating this great Principle; rhat
the Ancients derided his groundless Decli
nation of Atoms ? And I dare fay, the
Scholastick AttraBion, revived in our days,
and no less derided about thirty Years ago,
is not at all more reasonable.
129. I have often defied People to al
ledge an Instance against that great Princi
ple, to bring any one uncontested Example
wherein it fails. But they have never
done it, nor ever will. 'Tis certain, there
is an infinite number of Instances, where
in it succeeds in all the Known Cafes
in which it has been made use of. From
whence one may reasonably judge, that it
will succeed also in Unknown Cases, or in
such cases as can only by its means become
known : According to the Method of Ex
perimental Philosophy, which proceeds a
posteriori ^ though the Principle were not
perhaps otherwise justified by bare Reason,
or a priori.
130. To deny this great Principle, is
likewise to do as Epicurus did j who was
reduced to deny That Other great Princi
ple, vim. the Principle of ContradiBion j
which is, that every intelligible Enuncia
tion must be either true, or false. Chryfippus undertook to prove That Principle against Epicurus 5 but I think I need not
T 3
imitate
ijy
s78
Cinquime Ecrit de Mr. Le bn i tz.

dit\cy Jefus ce qui peut juifier lernten, &
moyqm je puijfs encore dire quelque chofe
U dejfus, mais qui feroit peut tre trop
profond pour convenir cette presente conteation. Et je crois que des Perfonnes rai
sonnables & impartiales m accorderont, que
d' avoir rduit fon Adverfaire nier ce
Principe, c* efl /' avoir men ad abfur-,
dura/
rh.{ vi !:
,
..-,
nv. .
. 'ii
1 .,
; :j o
-:'.\-r.'i --TT? 'T
.0
v .
-.)
-c ; :i)r-:-i: :r!"l" ..
!." - I ;, !
o::.2f"i
s.
Mr. Leibnitz'.* Fifth Taper.

2 79
imitate him. I have already said, what is
sufficient to justify mine : And I might
say something more upon it j but perhaps
it would be too abstruse for this present
Dispute. And, I believe, reasonable and
impartial Men will grant me, that ha
ving forced an Adversary to deny That
Principle, is reducing him ad absurdum.
^ ;n T 4
Dr. Clak ke*s
, -
Cminihie Rplique de Mr. Clakke.

'O.mme un Discours diffus n* est pas une
marque d'un 1sprit clair;j unmoyenpropre donner des ides claires aux Lectures ;
Je tcherai de refondre ce cinquime Ecrit
d' une manire distincte., & en aussi peu de
mots qu il me fera possible,
*>*
20. J L n'y a aucune * ressemblance

entre une Balance mise .en
mouvement par des Poids ou par une Im
pulsion, & un Esprit qui Je meut, ou qui
apt, par la Consideration de certains Mo
tifs. Voici en quoi consiste la Difference.
La Balance est entirement passive, & par
confluent sujets*, une ncessit absolue :
Au lieu que s Esprit non seulement reoit une
Impression, mais encore agit j ce qui fait V
'4'Essence de la Libert. Supposer s que lors
que diffrentes manires d' agir paraissent
!iv Jp-LIi-1* galement bonnes, elles tent || entirement
v, m. 4. V Esprit le pouvoir d' agir, comme les
Poids gaux empchent ncessairement une
Balance de se mouvoir j c'est nier qu* un
Esprit ait en lui-mme un principe d' Acti
on -, O- confondre le pouvoir d' agir, avec
V Impression que les Motifs font fur 1
esprit,
[8r]
Dr. Clarki'x FiftbReph.
'..'
AS Multitudes ofWords are neither an Ar*

* x gument of clear Ideas in the Writer, nor
a proper means of conveying clear Notions
to the Reader ; I shall endeavour to give a
distinct Answer to this Fifth Paper, as
briefly as I can.
*,20. nn HE RE is no * si'miti. . $,.

'\ >_
*- tude between a Balance
being ww</ by Weights or Impulse, and a
.fcfW w<wz i?//f, or aBing upon the
View of certain Motives, The Difference
i$, that the one is entirely pajswe j which is
being subject to absolute Necessity. ; The
other not only is acted upon, but aBs also
which is the essence of Liberty, To f sup- f 14.
pose that an equal apparent Goodness in
different Ways ofaffing, takes away II from i&A<
the Mind all Poxver of ABing at iff, as an In
equality of Weights keeps a Balance neces N
sarily at Rest h is denying the Mind to
iiave in itself a Principle of ABion\ and ia
confounding the Power of ABing, with the
Impreffian made upon the -Mind by the Mo- '
tive, wherein the Mind- is purely paffive.
The Motive, or thing considered as in View
is
182
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

Esprit, w quoi il est tout fait passif. Le
Motif, o# ta chose que V Esprit considere,,d"
qu'il a en vue, */? quelque chose d'Externe .
V Impression que ce motifsaitsur V Esprit,
est la qualit perceptive, dans laquelle V
Esprit <?/? passif. "Paire quelque chose aprez, ou
en vertu de cette Perception, est la fauk
de fe mouvoir de soi-mme, ou d* agir.
Bans tou* 'ter Agents animez, c'est la Spon
tanit y&" dans les Agents intelligents,'
iest proprement ce que now appelions Liber
t. ,V erreur o /' on tombe fur cette ma- .
tiere, vient de ce qi on ne distingue pas
soigneusement ces deux choses \ de ce qua
S *$' /' m confond * le motif avec le Principe cP
action *, de ce que V on pretend que V,
Efyrit n a point d' autre Principe d' Action
que t motif, quoique V Esprit (bit touV.
ptJtM en recevant 1' Impression du mo
tif.'' Cette Dotlrhe fait croire que V Esprit
j? est pas plus actif, que le seroit une Ba
lance, fi elle avoit d' ailleurs la Facult d*
+t o appercevoir ks choses : Ce que l' on ne peut
dire fans renverser entirement l' ide de l
^k- ? || Libert. Une Balance pouife des deux c:}$s% par une force gale, ou presse des deux
V cotez par des Poids gaux, ne peut avoir- au
cun mouvement. Et suppos que cette Ba
lance reoive la facult d* appercevoir, en
sorte qu* elk sache qu'il lui est impossible
* voezr"de se mouvoir, *w qu"T ellese \ fasse illusio:
ePNdi2 * sHmginant qtf elle se, meut elle mme;
(;"\: ' R'. "'"V".* '/*'-''< '-' ^
- quoi
' Pr. Clarke's fifth Reply.
283
is something extrinsick to the Mind : The

imprefionmade upon the Mind by That Mo
tive, is the perceptive Qiiality, in which the
Mind is pajjive : The Doing of any thing,
upon and after, or in consequence of, that
perception \ this is the Power of SelfMotion, or ABion : Which, in All animate
Agents, is Spontaneity j and, in moral
Agents, is what we properly call Liberty.
The not carefully di/linguifiing these things,
but confounding * the Motive with the * 15.
principle of Action, and denying the Mind
to have any Principle of ABion besides the.
Motive, (when indeed in receiving the im
pression of the Motive, the Mind is purely
pajjive :, ) This, I fay, is the Ground of
the whole Error ^ and leads Men to think
that the Mind is no more ABive, than aBalance would be with the Addition of a
Power ofPerception : Which is wholly taking
away the very Notion of Liberty. A Ba- -i->i**
lance pushed on Both sides with equal force, 5I '*
or preffe'd on Both fides with equal Weights,
cannot move at all: And supposing the Ba
lance indued with a Power of Percep
tion, so as to be sensible of its own incapa
city to move or so as to f deceive itself + &eAtl.
with an imagination that it moves itself, pendix,
when indeed it is only moved \ it would be N I2'
exactly. in the fame state, wherein this
learned Author supposes a free Agent to be
in all cafes of absolute Indifference. But the
Fallacy plainly lies here :The Balance, for
i }
want
384
quoi qu elle n ait qii un mouvement com

muniqu j elle se trouveroit prcisment dans
le mme tat, o le savant Auteur suppose
que se trouve un Agent libre, dans tous les
cas d' une Indifference absolue. Voici en
quoi confifle la fausset de V Argument, dont
ils' agit ici. La Balance, faute d'' avoir en
elle mme un Principe d' action, ne peut se
mouvoir lors que les Poids font gaux :
Mais un Agent Libre, lors qu'il se prsente
deux on plusieurs manires d' agir galement
raisonnables & parfaitement semblables, con
serve encore en lui mme le pouvoir d' agir,
parce qu'il a la facult de se mouvoir. De
plus, cet Agent libre peut avoir de trs-bon
nes & de trs-fortes Raisons, four ne pas
s' abstenir entirement d' agir j quoique
peut tre il n'y ait aucune Raison, qui pu
isse dterminer qu une certaine manire d*
aqir vaut mieux qu une autre. On ne peut
* if,7, donc soutenir +<jM3,fuppof que deux diffren
ts 19 ; & tes manires de placer certaines particules de
*9'
Matire fissent galement bonnes & raifonnables,Ditf ne pourroit absolument, ni con
formment sa sagesse, les placer d' aucune
de ces deux manires, faute d' une Raison
suffisante qui pt le dterminer choisir l*
une prferabletnent V autre \ on ne peuty
..:. 1 dis-je, soutenir une telle chose, sans faire
Dieu un Etre purement passif \ S" par con
squent il ne seroit point Dieu, ou le Goipverneur du Monde. Et quand on nie la
possibilit -de cette Supposition, savoir, qu* il
.__.;.
\ peut
Dr. GlarIceV Fifth Repty. .
* a8$
want of having in itself a Principle or

Power of ABion, cannot move at all when
the Weights are equal: But a Fm Agents
when there appear two, or more, perjeBly
alike reasonable ways ofactings has still with
in itself by virtue of its Self- Motive Prin
ciple, % Power of aBing : And it may have
very Jlrong and good Reasons, not to for
bear aBing at all j when yet there may be
no possible reason to determine one parti
cular Way of doing the thing, to be better
than another. To affirm therefore, * that, * ltfil^
Jttpposing two different ways of placing cer- 18.19-,
tain particles of Matter were equally good- aad 69~
and reasonable, God could neither wisely
nor possibly place them in either of those
ways, for want 6$ i. sufficient Weight to de
termine him which way he should chuse j is
making God not an ABive, but a Passive
Being : Which is, not to be a God, or Go
vernor, at all. And for denying the Pot
Ability of the Supposition, that there may be
two equal Parts of Matter, which may
with equal fitness be transposed in situation j
no other reason can be alleged, but this
|| petitio Principii, that Then this Learned |j 2*
Writer's Notion o &sufficient Heason would
not be well-grounded. For otherwise, how
can any Man say, that 'tis f impossible for
God to have wise and good reasons to create * ljlZ*
inany particles of Matter exaBly alike in
different Parts of the Universe? In which
case., the parts of Space being alike, 'tis
evident
5$rj
peut y avoir deux parties /gales de Matire,

dont la situation peut tre . galement bien
\
transpose \ onri en sauroit allguer d' au* 20. tre Raisoni que cette ,* Petition de Principe,
savoir, qu en ce cas l, ce que le savant
Auteur dit a" une Raison suffisante, ne seroit
pas bien fond. Car fans cela, comment
t ltf'7> peut-on dire qu il est \ impossible que Dieu
9y
' puisse avoir de bonnes- Raisons pour.ctfer,
plusieurs particules de Matire parfaitement
semblables en different lieux de V Isniversr >,
Et en -ce cas l, puisque les parties de V
. , ( "Espace sont semblables, il efl vident que fi
-& * Dieu n a point donn ces parties de Ma
tire des Situations diffrentes ds, le Com
mencement, il n a pu en avoir d' autre. Rai
son que fa feule Volont. Cependant on
ne peut pas dire avec raison, qu une telle
ll i6,& Volont efl j| une Volont fans aucun mo9'
tif \ Car les bonnes Raisons que Dieu peut
avoir de crer plusieurs particules de Ma
tire parfaitement semblables, doivent par
consquent lui servir de Motifpour choisir (ce
qu une Balance nesauroit faire) /' une de
deux choses absolument indiffrentes j c'est
.- 0 dire, pour mettre ces \ particules dans une
Certaine Situation, quoi qu une Situation
tout fait contraire eut. t galement bonne.
La Ncessit, dans les Quefiions Pbiloso.*i$4* S, phiques, signifie toujours une Ncessit ab"ii8;!?) solue. La * Neiit;f Hypothtique, &
s'
s Voez mes Discours flir 1 existence de Dieu, la vric

de la Religion naturelle, ;&!'. Parti. Pag. io^. quatrime
Edit. ;
la
.DtXlarkeV Fifth fcply.

. 387
evident there can, be no season,, but were
Will, for not having originals transposed
their Situations. And yet even This can
not be reasonably said to be a *,MU without * ^ and
Motive j forasmuch as the wife reasons God *?
may possibly have to create waxy particles
of Matter exaBly alike, must consequently
be a Motive to him to take (what a balance
could not do,) one out ot mo absolutes
Indifferent* y that is, to r4ace\ tKera< in on*
Situation, when the transposing .of them
could not but have been em8Iy aim
good*
-> ti;; :/.<',' iA \ >v.i *.& v^vA/y -^ a

' :
t".--^ '' vis, '\ v. v.ûlS
',. aO '\ w^ v, \V> "D
-1 1
?'
v. ..
':'
t."' ' .
\.'..
r.v;".
.; ."
0 ';' > .'
-c ' /.
;.'
it
-..\
juA-Iv
..la
. i. .;'.1 '.' ,..!.',; v.\\\ tv.<v;^\

.,";
'".. li r.b ?.pr) {'An ^/>
.:
'\ ' .':\y\ ir ys v/.f v.Avi
/. . ''. :
.] OlJ.'J;'. Vi'-.V.-.-.^ Trt
i,i .ro; '.-.' v 'StUf-'i j.i . . :ht
:-.. i A:s, "... .\] .\;v^ 'O ,>';; \ '\
i s^'fj-.v, -r. .; ,'i;-.vA\ 'AlsvAty*
v- \ u'i\.'. "ivyiwv.yt ''to1. 0
,.V! i'\_ A
w) W)5k li'.i.':^\
.--. -1 : *. / Â + ^'..jj V.Vv U 'u^s ru\ .o'hril

;. . ' r; ".i.î. *1 ir.n. < :',:?:-:o 'ttî^vr.,'. .: pitil
.11 J*
KeceBy,
in Philosophical' Questions* al- 1 S 4. 5,
r!
:c "' iu .. %t" . -' t t.^.. <J. 7. 8. o.
TT~T
* See my. Sermons at Mr. Boyle's Le8nret Part I. "Pag.
-ioSsJEdii. 4. onJy
5 S8
$n.
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Cldrke.

la Ncessit Morale, ne font que des manu
res de parler Figures \ & la rigueur
Philosophique, elles ne font point une N
cessit. Il n s* agit pas de savoirsi une
chose doit tre, lors que V on suppose qu*
elle est, ou qu' elle sera : C est ce qu' on
appelle une Ncessit Hypothtique. // ne
'** a&* Pas non Pûs de savoir, s' il est vrai
qu un Etre bon, & qui continue d'tre bon,
ne saurott faire le mal j ou si un Etre sage,
qui continue d' tre sage, ne sauroit agit
a* une manire contraire la sagesse \ oust
une personne qui aime la vrit, & qui con
tinue de V aimer, peut dire un mensonge t
C est ce que l' on appelle une Ncessit Mo
rale. Mais la vritable & la feule Question
Philosophique touchant la Libert, consiste
savoir, fila Cause ou le Principe immdiat
C physique de 1' Action est rellement dans
celui que nous appelions V Agent j ou fi c*
est quelque autre Raison suffisante, qui est la
vritable] cause de V ABion, en agissant fur
l* Agent, & en faisant qu* il ne soit pas un
vritable Agent, mais un simple Patient.
On peut remarquer ici en passant, que le
savant Auteur contredit sa propre Hypothese, lorsqu'il dit que * la Volont ne
(utastoisjours exactement T Entendement
pratique, parce qu' elle peut quelquefois
trouver des raisons pour suspendre sa reso
lution. Car ces raisons-l ne font- elles pas
le dernier jugement de Entendement pra
tique?
2)r. Clarke,'.* Fifth Reply.

289
only Figurative Ways of Speaking, and in
Philosophical striBness of Truth, are no
Necessity at all. The Question is not, whe
ther a Thing must be, when it is supposed
that it is, or that it is to be j (which is Hy
pothetical Necessity :) Neither is it the
Question whether it be True that a good
Being, continuing to be Good, cannot do
Evil j or a wife Being, continuing to be
Wife, cannot ad unwisely , or a veracious
Person, continuing to be veracious, cannot
tell a L*<? \ (which is moral Necessity : )
But the true and only Question in Philoso
phy concerning Liberty, is, whether the
immediate Physical Cause or Principle of
AElion be indeed in Him whom we call the
Agent , or whether it be some other Reason
sufficient, which is the real Cause of the
Action, by operating upon the Agent, and
making him to be, not indeed an Agent,
but a mere Patient.
It may here be observed, by the way j

that this learned Author contradiBs his
own Hypothesis, when he fays, that f the f u#
Will does not always precisely follow the
practical Understanding , because it may
sometimes find Reasons to suspend its Reso
lution. For are not those very Reasons, the
last Judgment of the praBical UnderstandU
31,
25.
$o

2 1 ,2 5. S' il eft possible que "Dieu pro
duise ou qu il ait produit deux portions de
Matire parfaitement semblables, deforte que
le changement de leur Situation seroit une
chose indiffrente j ce que le savant Auteur
dit a" une Raison suffisante, ne prouve rien. En
rpondant ceci, il ne dit pas (comme il le
devroit dire,) qu il eH s impossible que
Dieu safe deux portions de Matire tout-fait semblables ; nrnis que fa sagesse ne lui
permet pas de le faire. Comment sait-il
cela? Pourra-t-il prouver qu' il n* est pas
possible que Dieu puisse avoir de bonnes
raisons pour crer plusieurs parties de Ma
tire parfaitement semblables en diffrents
lieux de s Univers l La feule preuve
qtt7 il allgue, <?/?, qiliy auroit aucune
Raison Suffisante, qui put dterminer la Vo
lont de Dieu mettre une de ces Parties de
Matire dans une certaine Situation plutt
que dans une autre. Masfi Dieu peut avoir
plusieurs bonnes raisons, (on ne sauroit
prouver le contraires) fi Dieu, dis-jet peut
avoir plusieurs bonnes raisons- pour crer
plusieurs parties de Matire " thiit-a-fait
semblables -, /' indifference de leur Situation
suffira-t-elle pour en rendre /# Cration impofble, ou contraire fa Sagesse Il me
semble que c' eft * formellement supposer ce
20.
s Voe^le Quatrime Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz, 2, 3,5,

13 & 15.
qu
Dr. t L arKE'j fifth Reply.
4p I
21
25. If it is fg^r&fc for God td
shake or to have made two Pieces of Mat- ter exaElly alike, so that the transposing
them in Situation would be persetlly indif
ferent , this learned Author's Notion of a
sufficient Reason, falls to the Ground. To
this he answers , not, (as his Argument re
quires,) that 'tis * impossible for God to make * See Mr.
two Pieces exactly alike j but, that 'tis ^$a'S
not Wife for him to do so. But how does paper, 2,
he know, it would not be Wife for God to 3 * '3>
do so > Can he prove that it is not possible & IS*
God may have Wise Reasons for creating
Many Parts of Matter exaBly alike in dif
ferent Parts of the Universe ? The only
Argument he alledges, is, that then there
would not be a sufficient Reason to deter- '"- ^ "
mine the Will of God, which Piece should
be placed in which Situation. But if, for
ought that any otherwise appears to the con
trary, God may pofliblyhave many wise .-
Reasons for creating many Pieces exactly
alike j will the Indifference alone of the
Situation of such Pieces, make it impossible
that he should create, or impossible that it
should be Wise in him to create them? I
humbly conceive, this is an f express Beg- f 20.
ging os the Question. To the like Argu
ment drawn by me from the absolute Indifferency. of the original particular Deter
mination of Motion, no Answer has been .
returned.
U 2
26
32.
1p i
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Clark.
qui lest en Question. On na point rpondu

un autre Argument de la mme Nature,
que ]f ai fond sur /' Indifference absolue
de la premiere Determination particulire
du Mouvement au commencement du Monde*
36,-
32. Il semble qu* il y ait ici
26. plusieurs contradiBions. On reconnoit * que
deux choses tout--fait semblables, seroient
vritablement deux choses -, & nonobjant
cet aveu, on continue de dire qu* elles n* au
raient pfls le principe d' Individuation :
<- dans le IV Ecrit, 6, on assure posi
tivement, qu* elles ne seroiert qu* une mme
chose sous deux noms. Quoi que l* on
t 26. reconnaisse s que ma supposition efl possible,
on ne veut pas me permettre de faire cette
g 27. supposition. On avou || que les parties du
Temps & de V Espace font parfaitement
semblables en elles-mmes \ mais on nie cette
ressemblance lors qu' il y a des Corps dans
* 28. ces Parties On compare * les diffrentes
parties de 1' Espace qui coexistent, & les
diffrentes parties successives du Temps,
une Ligne droite, qui coupe une autre Ligne
droite en deux Points concidents, qui ne
f 29. font qu un seul Point. On soutient que s
/' Espace n est que V Ordre des choses qui
H 30. coexistent j & cependant on avoue \\ que
. le Monde materiel peut tre born : d* o il
s' ensuit qu'ilsauf ncessairement qu* ily ait
* ,0 Vn. Espace vuide au del du Monde. On
& 8, ty reconnoit * que Dieu pouvoit donner des
73.
bornes V Univers j & aprez avoir sait
.-? __..
3
cet
Vr. Clar$e'x Fifth Reply,

' . v ")
'-/' \ .
; '.V. .
993
1
26,--32. In these AaticleS, there

I
seem to be contained many Contradicliont.
It is allowed || that Two Things exactly ||2<?.
alike, would really be Two , and yet it is
still alledged, that they would want the
Principle of Individuation j And m- Paper
4th, 6, it was . expresly affirmed, that
they would be *>nly the fame Thing under >'<>'
two Names, j A * Supposition is allowed td * 26. I
be possible, . and yet 1 must not be allowed .
to make the Supposition. . The f Parts of t 27Time and Space are allowed to be exactly ??]!
alike mThmsehes, but not (owhen Bodies
exist, in them. Different corexistent Parts
of Space, and different successive Parts of
Time, are * compared to a JlrAit Line cat* * ..28.
ting another strait Line, in two coincident
Points, which are but one Point only. ' Tis
affirmed, that:f Space is nothing but thef2?
Order of Things co-existing ';, and yet it is
|| confessed that the material Universe may II 3
possibly be Finite ^ in which. Cafe there
must necessarily be an empty extra-mundane
Space. 'Tis *. allowed, that God could *$i&8>
make the material Universe Finite: And yet & n'
the supposing it to be possibly Finite, is stiled
not only 4 Supposition unreasonable and
void of Design, but also an f itnpt'atlicable + =? ii
2p4

cet aveu, on ne laisse pas de dire que cette
supposition est non seulement draisonnable
s 29. & sans But, mais encore une s Fiction imKiEcrlt' Posslble ? & V on aiwe .11 u\ il n' y. a au"
cune raison possible, qui puisse limiter la
* 29. quantit de la Matire. On soutient * que
le mouvement de V Univers tout. entier\ ne
produroit aucun changement j & cependant
on ne rpond pas ce que j* svois dit, qtt*
une augmentation ou une cessation subite du.
mouvement du Tout, causeroit un choc sen
sible toutes les parties : Et il n' est pas
s voex moins vident, qu' un s mouvement circur Appen- ja-re ju Tout, produirait une Force CentriN* 'io. fuge dans toutes les parties. J^ ai dit que
r- ' le Monde materiel doit tre mobile, Ji le
Il ?* Tout est born : On \\ le nie, parce que les
parties de V Espace font immobiles, dont le
Tout est infini & existe ncessairement. On
soutient que le. mouvement renferme ncessaire* "ti' ment un * cnanSement Relatif de Situation
dans un conps, par rapport d a" autres corps :
Et cependant on ne fournit aucun moyen t
\ . viter cette consquence absurde, savoir, que
la mobilit d' un corps dpend de V exi:
stence a" autres Corps -, & que fi un corps
exifloit seul,- il seroit incapable de mouve
ment \ ou que les parties d* un corps qui
circule, (du Soleil, par exemple,) perdroient
la Force centrifuge qui nat de leur mouve
ment circulaire, fitoute la matire extrieure ,
qui les environne, toit annihile. Enfin,
t If2?. Onsoutient que, s /' infinit dp la Matjere est
s J
V effet
Dr. Cl ar keV Fifth Reply.
295
Ficlion j and 'tis affirmed, || there can be no t ^wtb

postble Reason which can limit the Quantity aper^21'
of Matter. 'Tis affirmed, that the Motion
of the material Universe would produce
* no Change at all } and yet no Answer is
given to the Argument I alledged, that a
sudden. Increase or Stoppage of the Motion
of the Whole, would give a sensible Shock
to all the Parts : And 'tis as evident, that
f a circular Motion of the Whole, would tj*e 4*
produce a aw centrifuga in all the P^rfj. n. 10.
My Argument, that the material World
must be moveable, if the Jôfe be Finite ;
is * denied, because the Parts of Space are * jr.
immoveable, of which the Whole is Infinite
and necessarily existing. It is affirmed, that
Motion necessarily implies a f Relative f 3l.
Change os Situation in one, Body, with re
gard to other Bodies : And yet no way is
shown to avoid this absurd Consequence, , . . ,
that then, the Mobility of one Body depends
pn the Existence os other Bodies j and that
any single Body existing Alone, would be
incapable os Motion j or that the Parts of
a circulating Body, (Tuppose the Sun,)
would lose the vis centrifuga arising from
their circular Motion, if all the extrinsick
Matter around them were annihilated. Last
ly, 'tis affirmed that the || Infinity of Mat- \\ 32.
ter is an Effect of the Wifl of God j And
yet Cartesius's Notion is * approved as irre- * /W4
fragable , the only Foundation of which,
all Men know to have' been this Supposition,
V 4
that
2p6
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Urke.
V effet de la Volont de Dietrj '-& cependant on || approuve la doBrine de Des Car

tes, comme si eue toit incontestable j quoi
que tout le monde sache que le seul fonde
ment sur lequel ce Philosophe V a tablie,
esl cette Supposition, Que la Matire toit
ncessairement infinie,^/ quel* on ne sauroit la supposer finie sans contradiction.
* Epist. Voici ses propres termes, Puto * irtjplicr
Jnmr!t1S cntradictionem, ut Mundus fit fintus. Si
cela eft vrai, Dieu ri a jamais pu limiter
la Quantit de la Matire j & par cons
quent il ri en eft point le Crateur, & il ne
peut la dtruire.
// me semble que le savant Auteur n*
est jamais d' accord avec lui mme, dans
tout ce qri il dit touchant la Matire df
V Espace. Car tantt il combat le Vuide,
ou T Espace destitu de Matire, comme s* il
* 29,33 toit * absolument impossible, (s Espace
la' 6*. & % Matire tant s inseparables. :) & cet S 62. pendant il reconnat souvent, que la Quantit
de h Matire dans V Univers dpend de la
I75.'32' il Volont de Dieu.
33,* 35. four prouver qu* il y a du
Vuide, s ai dit que certains Espaces ne font
point de resistance. Le savant Auteur r
pond que ces Espaces font remplis d? une
t 35- Matire, qui ri a point s ^Pesanteur.
Mais l' Argument ri toit pas fond fur la
Pesanteur: Il toit fond fur la Resistance,
qui doit tre proportionne la || Quantit
|| Ibid.
Il Sans cela, pourquoi seroit-il plus difficile de mettre

la Terre en mouvement (mme du cot oa tend pe
santeur,) que de faire mouvoir un tris-petit Globe ?
de
Dr. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.
29 7
that Matter was infinite necessarily in the

Nature of Things, it being a Contradiction
to suppose it Finite : His Words are, f Puto iEf>fl^9*
implicare contradiffionem, ut Mundus Jit m*ts frt'
finitus. Which if it be true, it never was
in the Power of God to determine the
Quantity of Matter \ and consequently he
neither was the Creator of it, nor can de
stroy it.
I
And indeed there seems to run a conti

nual Inconsistency through the Whole of
what this Learned Author writes con
cerning Matter and Space. For sometimes
he argues against a Vacuum (or Space void
vf Matter,) as if it was || absolutely im- j^'J'f*
possible in the Nature of Things j space tfj.'
and Matter being * inseparable j And yet * 62m
frequently he allows the Quantity of Mat
ter in the Universe, to depend upon the
f rriS of God.
f 30,32,
33,-35. To the Argument drawn against &7ia Plenum of Matter, from the Want of Re~
sisience in certain Spaces ^ this Learned
Author answers, that those Spaces are filled
with a Matter which has no * Gravity. * 3S>
But the Argument was not drawn from
Gravity, but from Residence j which must
be proportionable to the * Quantity of
.
* Otherwise, What mates the Body of the Earth more
difficult to if moved, (even the fame way that its Gravity
tends,) than the smallest Ball .'
Mat-
2o8
C//?^^,i?lepIi(}iie.de Mr. Clarke.
de la Matire, soit que la Matire ait de la

pesanteur, ou qu''elle:' en ait pas*,v
,&>.;. *. - Pour prvenir cette . Rplique, /' Auteur
* S ?4> dit que ,*; //* Resistance ,<? views passant de
' w'Quantit; de l Matire, gw ^ //? diffi
cult, qu'elle, a, ^ ecjor. ..Mais cet. Argu
ment est tout- -fait hors d' oeuvre \ .parce
que la -Question, dont il* agit, n regarde
que les corps fluides qui ont peu de tnacitju
qui ri en ont point du tout, comme V Eau &
le Vif Argent, dont les parties n ont de la peine
cder, qri propotion de la Quantit de
Matiete <jUj' ejles contiennent; V: Exemple
s ibid, yyejjmtirertfu s bois ;flqfafit, qui contient
moins der.niatiere pesante qri un gal -Vo
lume dâu,j & qui ne.laisse pas de faire
une plus. gr,ande^ retape, j,, cet Exemple,
,t t x r- '< . disjer ?f est: rien,, moins que. Philosophique*
'**'} Car un gal tyolume.<d*eau renferme: dans
.:> j' n Vaisseau^ au gele ",.sloante, fait une
plus grande resistance #wt? /e bois, fiotant }
parce. ,qu. alors la resistance est cause par le
... Volume entier ifc /' w. Mais.lors que Veau
'\rJ se trouve en libert & dans son tat de fimditj la resistance,ri est pas-cause pat'toute
la tnie du. Isolume. gal 4\ eau, piais feule
ment par \int.^zxt\t 4e, cette masse ^ de sorte
au' il. ri est pas surpreriqy$rque dans c? cas
V eau semble sairer moins <de resistance que
le bois. ..,*,., .,.^.vn^ r.d ,*5ww
%6y--48. L'Auteur ne,parafa pas
raisonner srieusement dans cette partie de
son Ecrit, lise contente de donner un feu*
1
joui
v
' 2)r. Clarke^ Fifth Reply.
199
Matter, whether the Matter had any Gra

vity, or no.
1 ' iv..\ ss \\
To obviate this Reply, he alleges that
* Resilience does not arise so much from the * 54Quantity of-Matter, as from its Difficulty
of giving Place. But this Allegation -is
wholly wide of the Purpose -, because the
Question related only to such Fluid Bodies
< *
which have little or no Tenacity^ as Water
an& Quicksilver, whose Parts have* no other ? * t
Difficulty of*s -giving Place, but what arises
from the Quptftity of the Matter they con
tain. The Instance of a f floating Piece offjhid.
Wood, containing iefs of heavy Matter than
an equal Bulk of Water, and yets making -,?g :;
greater Resiflence ^ is wonderful/y unphilofophical : For an equal Bulk of Water shut
up in a Vessel, or frozen into Ice, and
floating, makes & greater Resiflence than the
floating Wood \ the Resistance Then arising
from the whole Bulk of the Water : But .ei.i-*
when the Water is loose and at liberty in
its State of Fluidity, the Refistence Then is
made not by the whole, but by part only, pi
the equal Bulk of Water , and then it is
no wonder that it seems to make less Rest- < *r
stence than the Wood, ;> <.':!: :m .. <j m
.-...;:'
;v.
.a.'
. ,
jiAiihl
i-'
'
36,
48. These Paragraphs do not
seem to contain serious Arguments, but on
ly represent in an /// Light the Notion of
the
200
jour s ide de /' Immensit de Dieu, qui

n' est pas une Intelligentia supramundana,
(semota nostris rebus sejunctaque longe,)
BActt xvii. & qui \\ n* est pas loin de chacun de nous ;
*7' 28, car en lui nous avons la vie, le mouvement,
& r tre.
. M
V Espace occup par un Corps n* est pas
* 3<*>37- * s Etendue de ce Corps -, mais le Corps
tendu existe dans cet Espace.- ! ;
t $ 38.
// n y a . aucun Espace s born 5 mais
notre Imagination tmfidere dans /' Espace,
qui n a point de bornes, & qui n* en peut
avoir, telle partie ou telle quantit qui elle
juge propos d'y considrer .
Il j9.
V Espace n efl pas une \\ Affection d' un
ou tie plusieurs corps, ou d' aucun Etre
born -, & il ne pane point d' un Sujet
)un autre y. mais il est toujours & fans varia
tion, /' Immensit d* un Etre Immense, qui
ne cesse jamais d' tre le mme.
*4o.
Le* Espaces bornez ne font point des *
proprietez des Substances bornes. Ils ne
font que des parties de V Espace infini, dans
lesquelles les Substances bornes existent.
Si la Matire tait infinie,. /' Espace inf 4 fini ne seroit pas plus une s Proprit de
ce Corps infini, que les Espaces finis font
des Proprietez des Corps finis . Mais en ce
cas, la Matire infinie seroit dans V Espace
infini, comme les Corps finis y font prsente
ment
' i .
Dr, L arkeV fifth Reply.

301
the Immenfity or Omniprefence of God who
is not a mere Intelligentia fupramundana,
[jSemota noftris rebus fejun&aqj long Q
is not far from every one of us y for in
him we (and all Things) live and move f*lu
and have our Being,
The Space occupied by a Body, is not
the f Extenon of the Body j but the ex- f 3$, 37.
tended Body exifts in that Space,
There is no fuch Thing in reality, as
* bounded Space y but only we in our Iraa-r.* S38
gination fix our Attention upon what Tart
or Quantity we pleafe, of that which it felf
is always and neceflarily unbounded.
Space is not an \ AffeBion of Body, f 39i
or of another Body, or of any finite Being .;
nor pajfes from SubjeB to SubjeB y but is
always invariably the Immenfity of one only
and always the fame Immenfum. ,
, -, '..'.\
Finite Spaces are not at all the || AffeBi- \ 40.
ons of Finite Subfiances \ but they are only
thofe Farts of Infinite Space, in which Fi
nite Subftances exift.
If Matter was infinite, yet infinite Space
would no more be an * AffeBion of that * * *r
infinite Body, than finite Spaces are the
AffeBions of Jfoit Bodies j but, m that
Cafe, the infinite Matter would be, as fi-
nite Bodies now are, in the infinite Space.
Immenfity
._
%o
Il 5 42.
* Voez
ci-dessus
^Rc '
que, \ -,
& quatripHqoe,C
V immensit n'est pas moins s) eflntielle

^ Dieu, que son Eternit. Les * Parties de
/' Immensit tant tout-a- fait diffrentes
des Parties matrielles, separables, divisibles,
& mobiles, d' ou nat la corruptibilit ; eU
les * empchent sas V Immensit d' tre
essentiellement simple, comme les Parties de
"*
la Dure n* empchent pas que la mmesim

plicit ne soit essentielle V Eternit,
t 43Dieu lui-mme n est sujet aucun s Chan
gement, par la diversit & les changemns
des Choses, qui ont la vie, le mouvement, c.
Y tre en lui. .
)| 44.
Cette H DoBrine, qui parois si trange
: /' Auteur; est la DoBrine formelle de St.
Ast. xvii. pauj j, fa voix jg >ia Nature & de la
Raison. -..-1>.-;--( * ;
* 4$.
Dieun1 existe point *' flan's1 T Espace,- ni
t voez dans & 7Vth/>j j m^w son existence s est ht
ci-dessus Cause de 1' Espace & du Temps. f /onfur mfiv 9^ n0US disons, conformment au "Language
Rplique, du Vulgaire, que Dieu exijle dans tout 1"
s IO'
Espace & dans tout le Temps -, nous vou
lons dire feulement qu'il est par tout e*
., . au* il est ternel, c'eft-a-dire, que V Espace
infini <& le Temps font des Suites ncessai
res de son Exigence \ & non, que /' Espace
& le Temps font des Etres distinBs de luit
' DANS lesquels il existe. ' ' f ' ' ' ;
* 4$.
J'ai fait voir- ci-dessus, fur 40, * que
V s Espace born n est pas /' Etendue des
Corps,,
t Voici, ce me semble, la principale raison de la con
fusion & des contradiiiont, que Y on trouve dans ce que la
plupart
Dr. Clarke'j- Fifth Reply.
303
Immensity, as well as Eternity, is f essen- 1 4*ttal to God. The |j Parts of Immensity', ||5tefot,
(being totally of a different kind from nwtjTbM
corporeal, partable, separable, divisible, move- a^d%urU
"ame'Varts, which are the ground of Cor- Repfy,iu
ruptibility j) do no more hinder Immensity
from being essentially One, than the Parts
of Duration hinder Eternity from being
essentially One.,-, -, i,-.y..:
,/..:>
God himself suffers no * Change at all, *
by ihtKarietj and Changeableness of Things
which sew and move and have their Being
in him.
,;'
Thisf strange Doctrine, is the express 1544.
Assertion of * St. Pm/, as well as the plain *^xviL
Voice of Nature and Reason. . .
a7>28.
God does not exist |J In Space, and In II 45Time^ but His Existence * causes Space *see above,
and Time. And when, according to the-JJ^J
Analogy of vulgar Speech, we fay that he Repfy,$to.
exists in y4// S/wf* and / -*4# TW } the
Words mean only that he is Omnipresent
and Eternal; that is, that Boundless Space
and Time are necessary Consequences of his
Existence j and not, that Space and Time
are Beings distinct from him, and IN which
he exists.
.
f How || Finite Space is not the *#?*- t4*-
'. ; ,. ^
swn
|| Note: The principal Occasion ar .Reason of the Confusion

and Inconsistencies, wbkh appear in what most Writers have
advanced
3 o4
Cinquim e Rplique de Mr. Clarke.
Corps. Et V on n a aussi qu* comparer

les deux SeBions suivantes (tf& $%)
s voiez avec ce que sai dj s dit.
aussi ci-
sufuss, 49,
5i Il me sm^le 1ue ce ?ue l'on
& sur la trouve ici. neft qu une chicane sur des mots.
S $4.
,
Pour
plupart des Philosophes ont avanc fur la nature de Y. Espace.
Les hommes font naturellement portez, faute d' attention,
ngliger une distinction trs-nceffaire, & fans laquelle on
ne peut raisonner clairement : Je veux dire qtf ils n' ont
pas soin de distinguer, quoi qu' ils le dussent, toujours faire,
entre les Termes Abstraits & Concrets, comme font Y Im
mensit & l' Immense. Ils ngligent aussi de faire une distin
ction entre les Ides & les Choses ; comme font r Idee de
Y Immensit, que nous avons dans notre Esprit ; & Y Im
mensit relle, qui existe actuellement hors de nous.
je crois que toutes les Notions qu'on a eu touchant la
Nature de 1' Efface, ou que 1* on s' en peut former, se
rduisent celles-ci. L' Espace est m pur nant, ou il n' est
ou' une simple Ide, ou une simple Relation d' une chose une
autre, ou bien il est la Matire, ou quelque autre Substance,
ou la Proprit d" me Substance.
,
Il est vident que l' Espace n' est pas un pur nant. Car
le nant n* a ni Quantit, ni Dimensions, ni aucune Proprit.
Ce Principe est le premier Fondement de toute sorte de
Science ; & il fait voir la feule difference qu' il y a entre
ce qui existe, & ce qui n' existe pas.
Il est aussi vident que l' Espace n' est pas une pure Idee.
Car il n' est pas possible de lormer une Ide de 1* Espace,
qui aille au del du fini ; & cependant la Raison nous en
seigne que c' est une contradiction que l' Espace lui-mimt
ne toit pas aftuellement Infini.
Il n' est pas moins certain que l' Espace n' est pas e
simple Relation et une chose i une autre, qui resuite de leur
Situation, ou de 1* Ordre qu' elles ont entre elles: Puisque
l' Espace est une Quantit ; ce qu' on ne peut pas dire des
Relations, telles que la Situation & Y Ordre. C est ce que je
fais voir amplement ci-deffous, fur 54. J' ajoute que si
le Monde materiel est, ou peut Itxe, born ; il faut nces
sairement qu' il y ait un Espace atluel ou possible au del de
V Univers. Voez fur 31, 52, & 73.
Dr. Clarke'/ Fifth Reply*
305
sion of Bodies, I have shown just above, on

40. And the two following Paragraphs
also, ( 47 & 48J need only to be com
pared with what hath been already * said. * See also
49>
51- These seem to me, to be on- f^
ly a quibbling upon Words. Concerning s 54'
the
advanced concerning the Nature of Space, seems to be Thk :
that {unless they attend carefully,) men are very apt to heglett That Necessary Distinilion, (without which there can be no
clear Reasoning,) which ought always to be made between Ab
stracts and Concretes, such as are Immensicas & Immensum;
CSr also between Ideas and Things, such as are The Notion
{which is Within our own Mind) of Immensity, and the
real Immensity actually existing Without us.
All the Conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can

be framed concerning Space, are these which follow. That it
is either absolutely Nothing, or a mere Idea, or only a Re
lation of one thing to another, or that it is Body, or some
other Substance, or else a Property of a Substance.
Tljat it is not absolutely Nothing, is most evident. For of
Nothing there is No Quantity, No Dimensions, No Proper
ties. This Principle is the First Foundation of All Science
whatsoever ; expressing the Only Difference between what docs,
and what does not, exist.
That it it not a mere Idea, is likewise most manifest. For
no Idea of Spacej can possibly be framed larger than Finite ;
and yet Reason demonstrates that 'tis a Contradiilion for Space
itself not to be actually Infinite.
That it it not a bare Relation of one thing to another,
wifing from their Situation or Order among themselves, k
no less apparent : Because (Space k a Quantity, which Rela
tions (such as Situation and Order) are not ; As 1 have
largely shown below, on 54. Also because, if the material
"Universe is, or can possibly be, Finite ; there cannot but be,
actual or possible^ Extramundane Space : See on 31, 52,
and 75..
That Space is not Body, is also most clear. For then
Body would e necessarily infinite-, and No Space could be
X
raid,
306
Cinqilme Rplique de Mr. Clrke.

Paur te qui eft de la question touchant les
parties de V Espace, voez ci- dessusy R
plique III, 3j & Rplique IV, 11.
. 52, & 53. V Argument dont je me fuis
fervi ici pour faire voir que V Espace eji
rellement indpendant des Corps, eji fond
ft ce qu il eft possible que le Monde materiel.so.it born <3c mobile. Le savant Au
teur ne devait donc pas se contenter de r
pliquer, qu il ne croit pas que la Sagei de
Dieu lui ait pi permettre de donner des
bornes V Univers , C^ de le rendre capa
ble de mouvement. // faut que V Auteur
soutienne qu'il toit impossible que Dieu ft
un Monde born & mobile j ou, qu'il re
connaisse la force de mon Argument fond
sur ce qu il eft possible que le Monde soit
born c mobile. U Auteur ne devoit pas
non plus se contenter de repeter ce qu'il
avoit avanc, savoir, que le mouvement
' d* un
Il est aussi trs-vident, que 1' Espace n' est pas la Ma
tire. Car, en ce cas, la Matire seroic ncessairement in
finie; & il n' y auroit aucun Espace, qui ne rsistt au mou
vement. Ce qui est contraire Y Exprience.
Il n' est pas moins certain que l' Espace n' est Aucune
sorte de substance ; puisque Y Espace- infini est 1' Immensit,
& non pas l' Immense : au lieu qu' une Substance infinie est
1' Immense, & non pas Y Immensit. Comme la Dure n' est
pas une Substance ; parce qu' une Dure infinie est l'Eternit,
& non un Etre Eternel : mais une substance infinie est un ,
Etre Eternel, & non pas 1' Eternit.
Il s' ensuit donc ncessairement de ce que Y on vient
de dire, que 1' Espace est une Proprit, de la mme ma
nire que la Dure. V Immensit est une Proprit de 1'
Etre Immense, comme l' Eternit est une Proprit de Y
Etre Eternel.
307
the Question about Space having Parts, see

above j Reply 3, 3 j and Reply 4, $11..
52, and 53. My Argument &<?r<?, for the
Notion of Space being really independent
upon Body, is founded on the Possibility of
the material Universe being finite and moveable i 'Tis not enough therefore for this
Learned Writer to reply, that he thinks it
would not have been wife and reasonable
for God to have made the material Uni
verse finite and moveable. He must either
affirm, that 'twas impossible for God to make
the material World finite and moveable j or
else he must of necessity allow the Strength
of ray Argument, drawn from the PoJ/ibif.
lity of the World's being finite and moveable. Neither is it sufficient barely to r&peat his Ajsertiony that the Motion of a fi
nite ma'terial Universe would be nothings
0i .
X 2
and
Yoid of Resistence to Motion. Which it contrary to Ex

perience.
That Space is not Any kind of Substance, k no kfs flairs
Because infinite Space is Immenlitas, not Immensum ; wherer
as infinite Substance is Immensum", not Immensiras. Just
as Duration is not a Substance : because infinite Duration is
ternitas, not ternum ; but infinite Substance is sternum,
not termtas.
It rentains therefore, by Necessary Consequence, that Space
it a Property, in Hie manner as Duration is. Immenjjcas,
is n, Jjwmenfi ; just as fermtas is n cerni..
3 o8

a" un Monde born ne seroit rien, & que,,
faute d' Autres Corps avec lesquels on put
52. le comparer, il ne * produiroit aucun
changement sensible. Je dis que V Auteur^
ne devoit pas se contenter de repeter cela,
moins qu'il ne ft en tat de rfuter ce que
j* avois dit d'un fort grand changement qui
arriveroit dans le cas propos \ savoir, que
les Parties recevroient un choc sensible par
une soudaine Augmentation du mouvement
du Tout, ou par la Cessation de ce mme
mouvement. On- n'a pas entrepris de r
pondre cela.
53. Commme lesavant Auteur est oblig
de reconnoitre ici, qu'il y a de la difference
entre le mouvement absolu & le mouve
ment relatif ; il me semble qu'il s' ensuit de
l ncessairement, que V Espace est nme chose
tout--fait diffrente de la Situation ou de V
Ordre des Corps. Cejl de quoi les LeHeurs
pourront juger, en comparant ce que V Au
teur dit ici avec ce que V on trouve dans
les Principes de Mr. le Chevalier Newton,
lib. 1. defin. 8.
54* T avols dlt iue le Temps & V Espace
ktoient des QUANT ITEZ -, ce qu on^
ne peut pas dire de la Situation & de l*
Ordre. On rplique cela, que V Ordre a
sa Quantit j qu* il y a dans Y Ordre quel
que chose qui prcde, & quelque chose
qui suit -, qit il y a une Distance ou un In
tervalle. Je rponds, que ce qui prcde
^ ce qui suit, constitue la Situation m /*
,
Ordre j
.. . Clarke'/ Fifth Reply,

309
and ffor. want of other Bodies to compare
it with) would f produce no discoverable t 5.
Change : Unlefs he could difprove the In
flame which I gave of a very great Change
that would happen -, viz. that the Parts
would be fenfibh) wcked by a fitdden Ac
celeration, or topping of the Motion of the
Whole : To which Inftance, he has not at
tempted to give any Anfwer.
53. Whether this learned Author's being

forced here to acknowledge the difference
between abfolute real Motion and relative
Motion, does not neceffarily infer that Space
is really a quite different Thing from the
Situation or Order of Bodies j I leave to
the Judgment of thofe who (hall be pleafed
to compare what this learned Writer here
alleges, with what Sir Ifaac Newton has
laid in his Principia, Lib, 1, Defin. 8.
54. I had alleged that Time and Space
were QUANTITIES, which Situati
on and Order were not. To this, it is re
plied } that Order has its Quantity ; there
is that which goes before, and that which
follows j there is Distance or Interval. I
anfwer : Going before, and following, conftitutes Situation or Order : But the Di
slance, Interval, or Quantity of Time or
X 3
Space
31o
Cinquime Rplique de Mt. Clarke.

Ordre -, niais ta Distance, /"Intervalle, 6U
la Quantit du Temps ou de /'Espace, dans
lequel une chose suit une autre, efl une
chose tout-a-fait difiinBe de la Situation ou
de ' Ordre, & elle ne constitue aucune
Quantit de Situation ou d' Ordre. ^Si
tuation ou /' Ordre peuvent tHles mmes,
lors que l Quantit du Temps- o de 1'
Espace, qui intervient, se trouve fort diff
rente. Le savant Auteur ajoute, que les Rai 54. sons & les Proportions || ont leur Quantit ;
<& que, par consquent,le Temps & V Espa
ce peuvent aussi avoir leur Quantit, quoi
qii'ils ne soient que des Relations. Je r
ponds, Premirement, que s'il toit vrai que
quelques sortes de Relations, (comme, pat
exemple, les Raisons ou /^Proportions,^
fussent des Quantitez \ il ne s'erisuivroh
pourtant pas que la Situation & Y Ordre,
qui font dis- Relations d' une Nature touta-fait diffrente, feroient aussi ds Quantitez!
Secondement:, /^Proportions ne font pas desQuantitez, iriais- les Proportions d Quantitez. Si elles taient des Quantitez, elles feroent les Quantitez de Quantitez } ce qui
eft absurde. J* ajoute que si elles etoient ds
Quantitez, elles {augmenteroient toujours par
s Addition, comme toutes les autres Quarttitez. Mais- T Addition de la Proportion
de d , la Proportion de i s,'*}
fait pas phfs que la Proportion de t
r\-' Et V Addition de la Proportion de \ ^
la Proportion de i , n fait pns< tk
Propos
Dr. ClarkeV Fifth Reply:'
gil
Space, wherein one Thing follows another,

is entirely a diftinct Thing from the Situa
tion or Order, and d,oes not conftitute any
Quantity ofSituation or Order .-The. Situa
tion o Order may be the fame, when the
Quantity of Time or Space intervening is
very- different. This Learned Author fur-
ther replies, that Ratio's or Proportions
f- have ; their Quantity ; and therefore fot S4>
may Time and Space, though they be no
thing but Relations. I anfwer i $ If it
had been true, that fome particular Softs of
Relations, fuch as Ratio's or Proportions,
were Quantities ^ yet it would not have
followed, that Situation and Order, which
are Relations of a quite different Kind, would
have been Quantities too* But idly \ Pro
portions are not Quantities, but the Pro
portions' ofQuantities. If they were Quanti
ties, they would htthe Quantities of Quan
tities -, which is abfurd. Alfo, if they were
Quantities, they would (like all other
Quantities) increafe always by Addition :
But the Addition of the Proportion of r to
i, to the Proportion of i to i, makes ftill
no more than the Proportion of i to i :,
and the Addition of the Proportion of half
to i, to the Proportion of i to4 i, does
not make the Proportion of i and a half to
i, but the Proportion only of half to .
That which Mathematicians fometimes in
accurately call the Quantity of Proportion,
is (accurately and itri&ly fpeaking,) only
X 4
the
41 ?
Proportion de \\ i, mais feulement la

Proportion de \ I. Ce que les Mathma
ticiens appellent quelquefois avec peu d'
exactitude la Quantit de la Proportion, n*
est, parler proprement, que la Quantit
de la Grandeur Rl itive ou Comparative ?
une chose par rapporta une autre ;Et la Pro
portion n est pas la Grandeur comparative
mme, mais la Comparaison ou le Rapport
d' une Grandeur une autre, ha Propos
tion de 6 i, par rapport ceUe de % i,
n efl pas une double Quantit de Propor
tion, mais la Proportion d' une double.
Quantit. Et en gnral, ce que V on dit
Avoir une plus grande ou plus petite Pro
portion, ' eft pas, avoir une plus grande
ou plus petite Quantit de proportion ou
de rapport, mais, avoir la proportion ou
le rapport d' une plus grande ou plus pe
tite Quantit une autre : Ce n est pas une.
plus grande ou plus petite Quantit de
Comparaison, mais la Comparaison d' une
plus grande ou plus petite Quantits -^1$
S 54- Expression * Logarithmique d' une Propor
tion, ri eft pas {comme le favant Auteur le
dit) la Mesure, mais feulement F Indice oit
]e Signe artificiel de la Proportion .* Cet In
dice ne dsigne pas une Quantit de la pro
portion ; il marque feulement combien de
fois une Proportion eft rpte ou complique^
Le Logarithme de la Proportion d' Egajit;
est o \ ce qui ' empche pas que ce m fuit
une Proportion auji relle qiC aucune a^
tre z
Dr. Clarke Fifth Reply.
313.
the Quantity of the Relative ox Comparative

Magnitude of one Thing with regard to
gnotber : And Proportion is not the compa*
rative Magnitude it felf, but the Comparifon
or Relation of the Magnitude to Another.
The Proportion of 6 to 1, with, regard to
that, of 3 to 1, is not a double Quantity of
Proportion, but the Proportion of a double
Quantity. And in general, what they call
Bearing a greater or lefs Proportion, is not
bearing a greater or. lefs Quantity of Pro
portion or Relation, but, bearing the Proportion or Relation ofa greater or lefs QuanA
tity to Another.- 'Tis nota greater or lefs
Quantity of Comparison, but the Comparifon
of a greater or lefs Quantity, The || -Lg/z- II *4*
fithmick Expreion of a Proportion, is not
(as this learned Author ftiles it) a Meafure,
but only an artificial Index or Sign of Pro
portion : 'Tis not the expreffing a Quantity
of Proportion, but barely a denoting the
Number of Times that any Proportion is re
peated or complicated. The Logarithm of
the Proportion of Equality, is ; and yet
'tis as real and as much a Proportion, as any
other : And when the Logarithm is nega
tive, as } yet the Proportion, of whieh
it is the Sign or Index, is it felf affirmative.
Duplicate or Triplicate Proportion, does
pot denote a double or triple Quantity of
Proportion, but the Number of Times that
the Proportion is repeated. The tripling
pf any Magnitude or Quantity once, pro*
duces
514
Cinquime Rpfque de Mr; Clarke.
tre : Et lors que le Logarithme e ngatif,

comme 7 \ 1 proportion, dont il e le Signe
ou l' Indice, ne laiffe pas d* tre affirmative.
La Proportion double triple, ne defigne pas une double ou triple Quantit de
Proportion; elle marque -feulement combien
de fois la Proportion e rpte, - Si l' en
triple une fois quelque Grandeur- ou quel*
que Quantit, cela produit une Grandeur ou
une Quantit, laquelle par rapporta la pre
miere a la proportion de 3 1. \Si on la
triple une fconde fois,, cela produit (ho/a
pas une double Quantit de Proportion,
mais) une Grandeur mi une Quantit, laquelle
par rapport la premiere a la proportion
'
(que V on appelle doblej de 9 1. Si
on la triple une troilme fois, cela produit
(non pas une triple Quantit de proportion,
maisywie Grandeur ou une Quantit, laquelle
par rapport la premiere a la proportion
(que l' on appelle triple) de if \ : Et
ainfi du rejle. Troifimement, le Temps &
V Efpace ne font point du tout de la Na
ture des Proportions, mais de la Nature des
Quantitez abfolues, auxquelles les Propor
tions conviennent. Par exemple \la Proportion
de 12 i,efl une Proportion
* c'efl--dire, comme je beaucoup plus grande * que
*iens de le remarquer, elle
n eft pas une plus grande
Quantt de Proportionnais la
Proportion dune pins grande
Quantit comparative.
_ ... ./
,
*
*
fim ae 2 " l 5 *-^ eependant une feule mme
peut avoir la pro^~ .
J
r
portwn de 1 2 a 1 par rap

port
Dt. GHarkkV Fifth Reply.
5^5
duces a Magnitude or Quantity, which to

the former bears the Proportion of 3 to 1.
The- tripling, it a second time, produces
(not a double Quantity os Proportion, but)
a Magnitude or Quantity, w'hich.tp the fa*
mer bears die Proportion (called duplicate)
of 9 to 1. The tripling if a third time,
produces (not- a triple Quantity os Propor
tion, but) a Magnitude or Quantity, which
to- the former bears the Proportion (called
triplicate') of 27 to 1 : And so on. %dly,
Tifne and Space are not of the Nature of
Proportions at all, but of the Nature Of
absolute Quantities to which Proportions
belong. As for Example :The Proportion
of 12 to iy. ia a much greater Proportion,
(that is, as I now observed, not a greater
Quantity of Proportion, but the Proportion
of a greater comparative Quantity,) that!
that of 2 to 1 j and yet one and the fame
unvaried Quantity, may to one. Thing bear
the Proportion of 12 to 1, and to another
Thing at the same time the Proportion os
2 to 1. Thus the Space of a Day, bears a <
much greater Proportion to an Hour, than
,,
it does to half a Day j and yet it remains,
notwithstanding Both the Proportions, the
fame unvaried Quantity of Time. Time
therefore, [and Space likewise by the same
Argument,'] is not of the Nature of a Pro
portion, but of an absolute and unvaried
Quantity, to which different Proportions be
long. Unless this Reasoning can be mown
* .
"
to
5 i$
part une chose, & en mme temps la pro

portion de i ' par rapport une autre.
C est ainsi, que l' Espace d' un Jour*? une
beaucoup plus grande proportion une
Heure, qt la moiti d'un Jour ^ & ce
pendant, nonobftant ces deux Proportions,
il continue d'tre la mme Quantit de
-Temps fans aucune variation. // est donc
certain, que le Temps \& V Espace aussi par
la mme raison] ric'fi pas de la "Sature des
Proportions, mais de la Nature des Quantitez absolues & invariables, qui ont des
Proportions diffrentes. Le Sentiment du
savant Auteur fera donc encore, de son
s iVEcrit, $ propre- 'aveu,' une ContradiBion j moins
l6'
qu'il ne fasse voir la fausset de ce Raison

nement.'
,-"<
35,>~ 6* g. Il me semble que tout ce que

V on trouve ici, eft une Contradiction mani
feste. Les Savans en pourront juger. On
Il $s. suppose formellement dans || Un endroit, que
Dieu auroit pu crer V Univers plutt ou
* 55,57 Pûs tar<^* & *Ailleurs on dit que ces termes
58,-63. mmes ("plutt & plus tard ) font des
siv Ecrit, termes inintelligibles & des s Suppositions
15.
impossibles. On trouve de semblables ContradiBions dans ce que V Auteur dit tou
chant V Espace dans lequel la Matire sub
siste: Voiez, ci-dessus, fur % 26, ~- 32.
64, & 65. Voiez ci-dejsus, 54.
66, 70. Voiez, ci-dessus, j,. .. .20;

& 01, ' < * 25. s ajouterai seulement
r 570.
ici, que t Auteur, en || comparant la Vo

lont
"Dr. Cl arkeV Fifth Reply. -.')
3 1
to be false, our Learned Author's Opinion

still remains, by his * own Conseston, a* f*rth.
Contradiction.
-^ "
./;: ,' A)' -. * ' '. .... h.. '' - > '..>, i\
:..(.' ,--|
* "' " , .>;- " ' '-' -**'"(.
.
' >
. <i'" V'"-'-
'r
. -
.-
55i^63. All This, seems to me to be

a plain Contradiction , and I am willing to
leave it to the Judgment of the Learned.
In f one Paragraph, there is a plain and di-> ^ $&
stinct Supposition, that the Universe might
be created as much sooner or later as God
pleased. In the || reft, the very Terms || 55,57,
{sooner or /rft<?r'} are treated as unintelligi- 58, 63.
ble Terms and * impossible Suppositions. * Fwik
And the like, concerning the Space in P<*per,%i$.
which ikser subsists -, See above, on $
26-32.
64, and 65. &* above upon $ 54. .,;.
66,70. See above, on 1,'20 ^
4ctf on ii~-r-*a$. I shall here only add,
that f comparing ih&Will rf Go</, when it f 7P;
518

lont de Dieu au hazard d' Epicure, lors
' qu' entre plusieurs manires d' agir gale
ment bonnes elle en choisit une, compare
ensemble deux choses, qui font aujji diff
rentes que deux choses le puissent tre -, puis
qu* Epicure ne reconnoissoit aucune Volont,
aucune Intelligence, aucun Principe actif
dans la formation de l' Univers.
71. Voez ci-dessus, $ 21 25.
72. Voez ci-dessus, $1
20.
73
75. Quand on considre fil' Espa
ce est indpendant de la Matire, & Jit
Univers peut tre born & mobile ; {voez
ci-dessus, % 1
20, & % 26
32 i)
* 73. /'/ ne s' agit pas de la Sagesse ou de la * Vo
lont de Dieu, mais de la Nature absolue
& ncessaire des choses. Si /' Univers
PEUT tre born & mobile, par la Vo
lont de Dieu j (ce que lesavant Auteur est
oblig d' accorder ici, quoi qu'il dise conti
nuellement que c'esl une Supposition impossi
ble jj il s' ensuit videmment que V Espace,
dans lequel ce mouvement se sait, ejl ind
pendant de la Matire. Mais si, au confiv Ecrit, traire, F Univers s ne Peut tre born &
21 ; & mobile, & fi V Espace ne Peut tre indv Ecnc, pendant de la Matire -, il s' ensuit videm
ment, que Dieu ne Peut ni ne Pouvoit don
ner des bornes la Matire } & par cons
quent V Univers doit tre, non seulement
fans bornes,- mais encore j| ternel, tant
H 74. Irfe ante qu' parte post, nceslireraent
& indpendamment de la Volont de Dieu.
3
Car
Pr.Gi arkbV Fifth Reply.
$*?
chooses one out of .many equally good pays

of aSing, to Epicurus's Chance, . who al- .<<, :
lowed No Will, No Intelligence, No AStiv^
Principle , at
all in the,together
formation
the
Universe
is comparing
Twoof
things,
than which No Two things can postibly be
more different. ( . ..-.,
71. See above? on 21,
72. &<? above, on 1,
75,
75. In the consideration whe
ther Space be independent upon Matter and
whether the material-Universe Can be Finite
and Moveable, (See &w, on % i-^-20,
and on 26,
2,2 ^) the question is not
concerning the Wisdom or, * Will of"God, * 73,
but concerning the absolute and necessary
Nature of Things. If the Material Uni
verse CAN possibly, by the Wil^God,
be Finite and MoveabU j (which this learned
Author here finds himself necessitated to
grant, though he perpetually treats it as an
impossible supposition p then Space, (in
which That Motion is performed,) is ma
nifestly independent upon Matter. But if, on
the contrary, the material Universe f Can- f Fourti,
not be finite and moveable, and Space can- Paper,f2t,
not be independent upon Matter j then JjJJjjjJ,
(I,fay). it follows evidently, that God nei
ther &z nor ever Coidd set Bounds to
Mattery and consequently the material
Universe must be not only boundless, but || jj 74,
eternal also, both /z <zrte /?/# and # /?#*?<?
PJ!>
32b
* $ 75.
Cinquime Rplique d Mr. Clarke.

Car V Opinion de ceux qui soutiennent que
le Monde * pourrait avoir exist de toute
Eternit', par la volont de Dieu qui exer
ait sa Puissance ternelle j cette Opinion,
dis-je> n a aucun rapport la Matire dont
il s' agit ici
76 & 77 Voie* ci-dessus, 73?5, & 1

ao ? & ci-dejsous,
103.
.;
78. On ne trouve ici aucune nouvelle

Objection. J'ai fait voir amplement dans
les Ecrits prcdens, que la Comparaison
dont Mr. le Chevalier Newton s'est servi, &
que Von attaque ici, est juste & intelli
gible. ' , .
ri ' ja<^ _82. Tout ce que V on objet!e
ici dans la Se&ion 79, & dans la suivan
te, eft une pure Chicane sur des Mots. U
Existence de Dieu, comme je V ai dj dit
plusieurs fois, est la Cause de V Espace ; &
Toutes les Autres choses existent dans cet
Espace. Il s enjttit donc que V Espace est
s 80. aussi s le Lieu des Ides j parce qu'il est le .
Lieu des Substances mmes, qui ont des
Ides dans leur Entendement.
Y avois dit , par voye de comparaison,
que le Sentiment de V Auteur toit austi
draisonnable , que si quelqu'un soutenait
g 81. que |l /' Ame humaine est V Ame des Ima
ges des choses qu' elle apperoit. Le sa~
vant Auteur raisonne l dessus en plai
santant, comme fi s avois assur que ce fut
mon propre sentiment,
t>ieu
Dr. Clarke'/ Fifth Reply.

321
poft, necessarily and independently on the
will os God. For, the Opinion of those
who contend, that the World * might post?' * 75My be Eternal, by the WiU of God exer
cising his Eternal Power j this has no Re
lation at all, to the Matter at present in,
Question.
76 and 77. See above, on 73 75 -r
and on 1
20. And below, on
103.
78. This Paragraph contains no new

Objection. The Aptness and Intelligibleness of the Similitude made use of by Sir
Isaac Newton, and here excepted against,
has been abundantly explained in the fore
going Papers.
79>"
82. All that is objected in the
f- two former of these Paragraphs, is a mere f 79,80,
quibbling upon Words. The Existence of
God, fas has often been already observed,)
causes Space -, and In that Space, All other
Things exist. It is therefore jj the Place of
Ideas likewise , because it is the Place of 8
the Substances themselves, in whose Under-
standings Ideas exist.
The Soul of Man being *the Soul of the * 8l(
Images of the Things which it perceives,
was alledged by me, in way of comparison,
as an Instance of a ridiculous Notion : And
this learned Writer pleasantly argues against
it, as if I had affirmed it to be my own
Opinion.
Y
God
3^2
*82-

J)ieu apperoit tout , non * par le
moyen d' un Organe, mais parce qu'il
est lui-mme aBuellement present par tout.
V Espace universel ejl donc le Lieu o il
apperoit les Choses. J'ai fait voir ample
ment ci-dessus ce que V on doit entendre par
le mot de Sensorium, & ce que c'est que
./' Ame du Monde. C'est trop que de de
mander qu' on abandonne la Consequence
d' un Argument, fans faire aucune nouvelle
ObjeBion contre les Premisses.
83
88 \ & 89
\ 91. J* avoue
que je n entends point ce que V Auteur dit,
t 83 lors quil avance, que s /' Ame est un Prin 87- cipe reprsentatif \ que || chaque Substance
* voiez F simple * est par fa propre nature une conAppendi- centration c un miroir vivant de tout 1'
" 91. ' Univers -, qu' elle s est une Representation de
Il voyez 1' Univers, || selon son Point de vue j &
dicePen" %ue toutes es Substances Simples auront
n 11. toujours une Harmonie entre elles, parce
qu' elles reprsentent toujours le mme Uni
vers.
* 83,87, Pour ce qui est de * /'Harmonie pr*?> 9' tablie, en vertu de laquelle on prtend que
les Affections de F Ame, & les mouvemens
mchaniques du Corps, s* accordent fans
i'Appe*^ "^ aucune influence mutuelle \ voiez dice, N5. dessous, fur 110
116.
J'ai suppos que les Images des choses
font portes par les Organes des Sens dans
le Sensorium, o V Ame les apperoit. Qn
2 y
soutient
2>. ClarkeV Fifth Reply. J ' 313

God perceives every Thing, not "* ^/S^
means of any Organ, but by being himself
actually present every where. This every
where therefore, or universal Space, is the
Place of his Perception. The Notion of
Sensorium, and of the Soul of the World,
has been abundantly explained before. 'Tis
too much to desire to have the Conclusion
given up, without bringing any further
Objection against the Premises.
83,
88-, and 89
91. That
f" the Soul is a Representative Principle 5 f $ 83.
That * every simple Subslance || is by its Wa- * 87.
ture a Concentration and living Mirror of H *f 4"
f&<? 7#We? Universe , That * it fc fl?0f- n" 2?
sensation of the Universe, f according to its * 91.
/Vwf of r;<?ze> and that all simple Sub- JS^**
/lances will always have a Harmony between n. ii
themselves, because they always represent
the same Universe : All This, I acknow
ledge, I understand not at all.
Concerning the || Harmonia pt&slabilita, y $,g
by which the AffcBions of the Soul, and 89, Po.
the Mechanic Motions of the Body, are
affirmed to agree, without * at all influ- * ^ ^
encing each other j See below, on \ to pendix,
116.
That the Images of Things are conveyed

by the Organs of Sense into the Sensory,
ivhere the Soul perceives them j is affirmed,
Y 2
but
N*'
324
* 84- soutient que ceft une chose * inintelligible }
mais on n en donne aucune preuve,
t 84. \ Touchant cette Question, savoir, fi *f"
fine Substance immatrielle agit sur une
Substance matrielle, ou si celle-ci agit sur
P autre j votez ci-dessous, 1 10 1 i.
Il 8 s.
Dire que Dieu \\ apperoit & connoit tou
tes choses, non par fa presence actuelle, mais
parce qu'il les produit continuellement de
nouveau -, ce sentiment, dis-je, ejl une pure FiBion des Scholafliques,sans aucunsondement.
Vour ce qui ejl de V ObjeBion, qui porte
* 86,87, que Dieu seroit * Y Ame du Monde ^ sy
88"> 82. ai rpondu amplement ci-dessus, Rplique
II, 12 j & Rplique IV," $. 32.
92. U Auteur suppose que tous les mouvemens de nos Corps font ncessaires, & prot 92, duits s par une simple || impulsion mcha\\ voVez'l' nique de *a Matire, tout fait indpenAppendi- dante de V Ame : Mais je ne saurois tn*
cc,n9 13. empches de croire que cette DoBrine conduit
la Ncessit & au Destin. Elle tend
faire croire que les hommes ne font que de
pures Machines, (comme des Cartes s* toit
imagin que les Btes n avoient point d*
Il Volez F Ame ^ y en dtruisant j| tous les Argumens
ff 12.fondez, fur les Phnomnes, c'efl--dire,
fur les Actions des hommes, dont on se
sert pour prouver qu ils ont des Ames, &
qu' ils ne font pas des Etres purement ma
triels. Votez ci- dessous, fur 1.10
116.
93,95. jp avois dit que chaque
Action confifle donner une nouvelle force
aux
323
but not proved, to be an f unintelligible * 84.

Notion.
- . Concerning [| immaterial Substance afe-'^H'
Bing, or being affeBed by, material Subfiance j See below, on no
ii.
That God - * perceives and knows /7#*8j.
Things, not by being Present to them, but
by continually producing them anew , is a
mere Fiction of the Schoolmen, without
any Proof.
The Objection concerning God's being
f the Soul of the World, has been abun- f 85,
dantly answered above j Reply II, $ 12 87>88>82,
and Reply IV, % 32.
92. To suppose, that all the Motions of
our Bodies are necejsary, and caused entirely
j| by mere * mechanical Impulses of Matter, 11 p8
altogether independent on the Soul ^ is'w/i5.'
what (I cannot but think) tends to intro- *SeeAt>duce Necejtty and Fate. It tends to make n J*'
Men be thought as mere Machines, as Des
Cartes imagined Beasts to be j by taking
away f all Arguments drawn from Ph- f &e Ap.
nomena, that is, from the ABions of Men, *"f*>
to prove that there is any Soul, or any N * I2'
thing more than mere Matter in Men at
all, , See below, on $ 110^116.
93 -r-95. I alledged, that every JBion

is the giving of a Jsew Force to the Thing
Y 3
aBed
i6

aux choses, qui reoivent quelque impres
sion. On rpond cela, que deux Corps
durs i gaux, poussez 1' un contre l'autre,
rejaillissent avec la mme force :, & que par
cons'quent leur Action rciproque ne donne
point une nouvelle force. Il susstroit de r
pliquer qu' aucun de ces deux Corps ne rjaillit avec fa propre force j que chacun
* voez la d' eux * perd fa propre force, & qu U e
99. on repouss avec une nouvelle force communi
cate ma- ^g âr jg Reff-ort de V autre : Car si ces
mkepks deux Corps n ont point de Ressort, ils ne
ample- rejailliront pas. Mais il efl certain que
mcnt"
toutes les Communications de mouvement
purement mchaniques, ne font pas une
Action, parler proprement : Elles ne font
qu' une simple Passion, tant dans les Corps
qui poussent, que dans ceux qui font pouf
fez. V Action est le commencement d'un
mouvement qui n existoit point auparavant,
produit par un Principe de vie ou d* Activit :
Et fi Dieu ou V Homme, ou quelque Agent
vivant ou actif, agit fur quelque partie du
Monde materiel \ fi tout n efl pas un sim
ple mchanisme -, U faut qu* il y ait une
augmentation & une Diminution continuelle
de toute la Quantit du mouvement qui est
dans P Univers. Mais cefl ce que le favant Auteur * nie en plusieurs endroits.
96* 97
* Tout ce que Mr. Leibnitx. dit fur cette matire,
fxiroit rempli de confusion & de contradictions. Car le
,
- <
* < mot
337
aBed upon. To this it is objected, that two

equal hard Bodies striking each other; return
with the fame Force j and that therefore
their ABion upon each other, gives no New
Force. It might be sufficient to reply, that
the Bodies do Neither of them return with
their own Force, but each of them * loses *See mre*
its own Force, and each returns with a new m "'
Force impressed by the others Elasticity :
For if they are not elaftical, they return
not at all. But indeed, all mere mechani
cal Communications of Motion, are not
properly ABion, but mere Pajjiveness, both
in the Bodies that impell, and that are im
pel/ed. ABion, is the beginning of a Mo
tion where there was none before, from a
Principle of Life or ABivity : And if God
or Man, or Any Living or ABive Power,
ever influences any thing in the material
World \ and every thing be not mere ab
solute Mechanism j there must be a continual
Increase and Decrease of the whole Quantity
of Motion in the Universe. Which this
learned Gentleman * frequently denies.
Y 4
96 and 97.
* There appears a great Confusion and Inconsistency in

Mr Leibnitz'/ whole Notion of this Matter. For the Word,
Force,
328
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Clrke.

o6, 97. // se contente ici de renvoyer
ce qu'il a dit ailleurs. Je ferai aussi la m
me chose.
*A
98. Si
mot de Force, ou de Force aftive, signifie, dans la question

donc il s' agit ici, 1' impetus ou la Force impulsive r rela
tive des Corps en mouvement : Voiez 1 g de ma Troisime
Rplique. Mr. Leibnitz employe toujours ce mor en ce
sens; Comme lors qu'il dit, [93,94,99, & 107, de
cette dernire Rponse,'] Que les Corps ne changent point leur
Force aprez la Rflexion, parce qu' ils retournent avec la
mme Vitesse : Que quand un Corps reoit une nouvelle Force
cC un autre Corps, cet autre en perd autant de la sienne : Qu' i
eft impossible qu' un Corps reoive une nouvelle Force,fans que les
autres en perdent autant : Que /' "Univers des Corps recevroit
une nouvelle Force, fi /' Ame donnoit de la Force au Corps :
Que les Forces Altives continuent toujours tre les mmes
dans s Vnivers, parce que la Force que les Corps fans
ressort perdent dans leur Tout, ef communique leurs par
ties menues, & dissipe parmi elles. Or' il paroit claire
ment tant par la Raison que par F Experience, que cet
Impetus, ou cette Force ailive impulsive & relative des
Corps en mouvement, est toujours proportionne la Quan
tit du Movement. Donc, felon les! Principes de Mr. Leibttit^, puisque cette Force active & impulsive est toujours Ja
mme en Quantit, il faut aussi ncessairement que la
Quantit du Mouvement soit toujours la mme dans l' Uni
vers. Cependant il tombe en contradiction en1 reconnoissant ailleurs, [ 99,] que la Quantit du Mouvement n' est
pas toujours la mme : Et dans les Alla Eruditorum, ad
ann. 1686. pag. 161, il tche' de Prouver, que la Quan
tit du Mouvement dans F Univers ri est pas toujours la
mme-, il tche, dis-je, de le prouver par cette mme
& feule Raison , que la Quantit de la Force impul
sive est toujours la mme. Mais si cela tic vrai, il
s' ensuivroit au contraire, que la Quantit du Mouvement
ferait toujours ^r ncessairement la mme. Ce qui a donn
occasion Mr. Leibnit^ de se contredire sur cette
matire, c' est q' il a supput, par une mprise tout
+ Acta
fait ind'gne d'un Philosophe, la Quantit de'la Force imfcrUdit.ad Pftfive daps un Corps qui monte, parla Quantit de fa Mann. 1 6Z6. #"* & de '" Espace qu' il dcrit en montait, fans considrer
Fag 162. ,1e temPS <xe ce Corps employe monter. > Supporte, s ditf i ." , tanta viopus effe, frc. C'est--dire : u T suppose que
',,

".*.,
la
<Dr. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.

329
96 and 97. Here this learned Author
refers only to what he has said elsewhere :
And I also am willing to do the same.
98. If
Force, and Active Force, signifies in the present Question,
the Impetus or relative Impulsive Force of Bodies in Mo
tion : See my Third Reply, 13. jWr.Leibnitz constantly uses
the Word in this Sense : As when he [peats [93, 94, 99,
and 107, of this last Answer,] of Bodies not changing their
Force after Reflexion, because they return with the same
Swiftness : Of a Body's receiving a new Force from ano
ther Body, which loses as much of its own ; Of the im
possibility, that one Body should acquire any new Force,
without the Loss of as much in Others : Of the new Force
which the whole material Universe would receive,, is the
Soul of Man communicated any Force to the Body : And
of Active Forces continuing always the fame in the Uni
verse, because the Force which un-elastick Bodies lose in
their Whole, is communicated to and dispersed among
their small Parts. Now this Impetus, or relative Impulsive
Active Force of Bodies in Motion, is evidently both in Rea
son and Experience, always proportional to the (Quantity of
Motion. Therefore, according to Mr. LeibnitzV Principles,
this impulsive active Force being always the fame in Quan
tity, the Quantity of Motion also must of necessity be always
the [ame in the Vniverfe. Tet elsewhere, he inconsistently ac
knowledges, [ 99,~] that the Quantity of Motion is Not al
ways the fame : And in the Asta Eruditorum, ad Ann.
1 686, pag. 161, he endeavours to Prove that the Quantity
of Motion in the 1)niver[e is Not always the {ame,fromthat
very Argument, and from that single Argument only, (of the
Quantity of Impulsive Force being always the fame,) which,
if it was true, would necefjarily infer on the contrary, that the
Quantity of Motion could not but be always the fame. The
Reason of his Inconsistency in this Matter, was his computing,
by a wonderfully unphilofophical Error, the Quantity of Impul
sive Fprce in an Ascending Body, from the Quantity of its
Matter and pf the Space de[cribed by it in Ascending, without
considering th Time of its ascending. * " Suppono, fays f jjâ
" he, tanta vi opus effc ad elevandum corpus A unius libra? Erudit. ad
J*i u% ad ajcicudinem qu'atuor ulnarum, quanta opus est ad Ann.1686.
mtj'K, "": >'J . ''< ele&- pag. 16?.''
330

98. Si V Ame est une Substance, qui
remplit le Sensorium, ou le lieu dans lequel
elle apperoit les Images des choses, qui y
font
" la mme Force est requise pour lever le Corps A dit
" poids d' Une Livre la hauteur de quatre aunes, que
" celle qui lev le Corps B du poids de quatre Livres
*' la hauteur d' une aune. C est de quoi les Cartsiens, &
" les autres Philosophes & Mathmaticiens de ntre temps
*' conviennent. Or il s' ensuit de l, que le Corps A en
11 tombant de la hauteur de quatre aunes, acquiert pr" cisment la mme Force, que le Corps B en tombant de
" la hauteur d' Une aune ". Mais Mr. Leibnit^ se trompe
fort en faisant cette supposition. Ni les Cartsiens, ni les
autres Philosophes ou Mathmaticiens n' accordent jamais
ce qu' il suppose, except dans les cas o les Temps que
les Corps employent monter ou descendre, sont gaux
entre eux. Si une Pendule dcrit une Cyclode, l'Arc de
la Cyclode dcrite en montant, sera comme la Force avec
laquelle le Corps suspendu commence monter du plus
bas point ; parce que les temps qu' il employe monter,
font gaux. Et fi des Corps gaux plent le bras d'
une Balance, diffrentes distances de l' Axe de la Ba
lance ; les Forces des Corps seront en proportion comme
les Arcs qu' ils dcrivent en pesant, parce qu' ils les dcri
vent en mme temps. Et si deux Globes gaux placez fur
un Plan Horizontal, font poussez par des Forces ingales,
ils dcriront en temps gaux des Espaces proportionnels aux
Forces qui les poussent. Ou fi des Globes ingaux sont
poussez avec des Forces gales, ils dcriront en temps gaux
des Espaces rciproquement proportionnels leurs Masses.
Et dans tous ces cas, fi des Corps gaux font poussez par
des Forces ingales ; les Forces imprimes, les Vitejses pro
duites, & les Espaces dcrits en temps gaux, seront propor
tionnels P un Y autre. Et fi les Corps sont ingaux, la
Viteffe des plus grands Corps fera d' autant plus petite, que
les Corps sont plus grands ; Donc le Mouvement (qui resuite
de la masse & de la vitesse prises ensembles fera dans tous
ces cas, & par consquent dans tous les autres cas, pro
portionnel la Force imprime. f_D' o il s' enfuit claire
ment, pour le dire en partant, que fi la mime Farce imr. puisne
Vr. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.

98. If the Soul be a Substance which
fills the Sensoriutn, or Place wherein it per
ceives the Images of Things conveyed to it ;
yet
" elevandum corpus B quatuor Iibrarum usq; ad altitudi" nem Unius Ulnae. Omnia hc zCartesianis parker ac c" teris Philoibphis & Mathemacicis nostri temporis conce" duntur. Hinc scquitur, corpus A dela*>sum ex akitudi" ne quatuor ulnarum, praecife tincura acquisivilse virium,
*' quantum B lapsum ex altitudine Unius Uln". That
is : " [I suppose the same Force is requisite to raise a Body A.
"of one Pound Weight, to the Height of four Tards; which
" will raise the Body B of four Pounds Weight, to the Height
" of One Tard. This is Granted both by the Cartesians, and
" other Philosophers and Mathematicians of our Times. And
" from hence it follows, that the Body A, by falling from
" the Height of four Tards, acquires exalfly the fame Force,
" as the Body B by falling from the Height of One Tard".]
But in this Supposition, Mr. Leibnitz is greatly mistaken. Net"
ther the Cartesians, nor any other Philosophers or Mathema
ticians ever grant this, but in such Cases only, where the
Times of Ascent or Descent are equal. // a Pendulum
osciUates in a Cycloid ; the Arch of the Cycloid described in
ascending, will be as the Force with which the pendulous Body
begins to ascend from the lowest Point ; because she Times of
ascending are equal. And if equal Bodies librate upon the Arm
if a Balance, at various Distances from the Axis of the Ba
lance ; the Forces of the Bodies will be in Proportion as the
Arches described by them in librating, because they librate in
the same Time. And if two equal Globes lying upon an
Horizontal Plain, be impelled by unequal Forces, they will in
equal Times describe Spaces proportional to the Forces im
pelling them. Or if unequal Globes be impelled with equal
Forces, they will in equal Times describe Spaces reciprocally
proportional to their Masses. And in all these Cafes, if equal
Bodies be impelled by Unequal Forces, the Forces impressed,
the Velocities generated, and the Spaces described in equal
Times, will be proportional to one another. And if the Bodies
be Junequal, the Velocity of the bigger Bodies will be so
much less, as the Bodies are bigger ; And therefore the Mo
tion (arising from the Mass and Velocity together) will be
*?? '
in
33
5 33

sont portes :, il ne s' enfuie point de lt
qu* elle doit tre compose de Parties sem
blable? celles de la Matire, (Cas les Par
ties de la Matire font des Substances di
stinctes
pulsive sublifle toujours dans le Monde, comme Mr. Leibnit^
le prtend ; il faut qu' il y ait toujours le mme Mauve-*
ment dans le Monde, ce qui est contraire ce qu il affirme.^ '
Mais Mr. Leibnit^ confond les Cas o les temps sont gaux,
avec les Cas o les temps font ingaux. Il confond parti
culirement le Cas o des corps montent & descendant aux
extrmit^ des bras ingaux a" une Balance, (Alla Erudit. ad
ann. 1686. pag. 162 ; qj ad ann. 1690, pag. 234 ; & ad
M. 16*01, pag. 439; & ad ann. 1695, pag. I55i) il'
confond, dis-je, ce Cas avec celui des corps qui tombent en
bat, Si que 1' on jette en haut, fans faire attention l' inga
lit du tempt. Car un corps avec la mme Force & la
mme Vitesse, dcrira un plus grand Espace dans un temps
plus long : Il faut donc considrer le temps; & 1' on ne doit
pas dire que les Forces sont proportionnelles aux Espaces,
moins que les temps ne soient 'aux. Lors que les tempt
font ingaux, les Forces des Corps gaux sont comme les
Espaces applique^ aux temps. C est en quoi les Cartsiens
Se les autres Philosophes & Mathmaticiens s'accordent:
tous. Us disent tous que les Forces impulsives des Corps font
proportionnelles leurs Mouvemens, Se ils mesurent leurs
Mouvemens par leurs masses & leurs Vitesses prises ensemble,
& leurs Vitesses par les Espaces qu' ils dcrivent, appliques
aux temps dans lesquels ils les dcrivent. Si un' Corps
jette en haut monte, en doublant fa Vitesse, quatre fois plus
haut dans un temps double ; fa Force impulsive seraaugmente, non pas proportion de Y Espace qu' il dcric en
montant, mais proportion de cet Espace appliqu au temps^
c' est--dire, proportion de 4 -j-, ou de 2 1. Car fi,
dans ce Cas, la Force toit augmente proportion de 4
1 -, & si le mme corps, (ayant un mouvement d' Oscilla
tion dans une Cyclode,j avec la mme vitesse double, ne
dcrit qu' un Arc double, & par consequent si sa force n'est
que
Dr. Gl arkeV Fifth R-eply.

yet it .does not thence follow, that it must
consist of corporeal Parts, (for the Parts
of Body are dijlinB Subjlances independent
on each other j ) but the Whole Soul sees^
and
in all these Cafes, and in aU Other Cafes consequently, propor
tional to the Force imprest. [From whence, by the way, it
plainly follows, that if there be always the fame impulsive
Force in the World, as Mr. Leibnitz affirms ; there must be
always the lime Motion in the World, contrary to what he
affirms/]
But Mr. Leibnitz confounds these Cafes where the Times
Are .equal, with the Cafes where the Times are unequal:
And chiefly That of Bodies rising and falling at the Ends of
the unequal Arms of a Balance, [Alia Erudit. id Ann.
1686, Pag. 162 ; & ad Ann. 1690, Pag. 234 ; & ad Ann.
11591, Pag. 439 i &ad Ann. 1695, Pag. 15s ;] is by him
confounded with That of Bodies falling downwards and
thrown upwards, without allowing for the Inequality of the
Time. For a Body with one and the fame Force, and one and
the fame Velocity, will in a longer Time describe a greater
Space ; and therefore the Time is to be considered ; and the
Forces are not to be reckoned proportional to the Spaces, unless
where the Times are equal. Wliere the Times are unequal,'
the Forces of equal Bodies are as the Spaces applied to the.
Times. And in This, the Cartesians and other Philosophers
and Mathematicians agree ; all of them making the impul
sive Forces of Bodies proportional to their Motions, and
measuring their Motions by their Mastes and Velocities toge
ther, and their Velocities by the Spaces which they describe,
applied to the Times in which they describe them. If a
Body thrown upwards does,- by doubling its Velocity, ascend
four Times higlier in twice the Time ; its impulsive Force
will be increased, not in the proportion of the Space described
by its A[cent,but in the Proportion of that Space applied to the
Time ; that is, in the Proportion of to f or 2 to i.For if, in
this Cafe, the Force should be increased in the Proportion of 4
to 1 ; and, in oscillating in a Cycloid, the fame Body, with
fi>e fame Velocity doubled, describes only a doubled Arch,
and its Force is therefore only doubled ; this Body, with
one and the fame Degree of Velocity, would have twice as
much
333
334

stinctes & indpendantes V une de V autre j)
mas V Ame toute entire voit, entend, ex
pense, comme tant essentiellement un :seul
Etre individuel.
99. Four
que double ; ce Corps, avec le mme degr de viteffe, aufoit deux fois autant de Force lors qu il est jette en haut,
que lors qu' il est pouss horizontalement : Ce qui est une
contradiction manifeste. La contradiction est la mme
quand on assure, que quoi qu' un Corps 1' extrmit des
bras ingaux d' une Balance, en doublant fa viteffe, n' ac
quire qu' une double Force impulsive, cependant, si on le
jette en haut avec la mme viteffe double, il acquiert une
Force impulsive quadruple ; je dk que ce sentiment renferme
1 a mme contradiction : Car des Corps gaux avec des vites
ses gales, ne peuvent pas avoir des Forces impulsives
ingales.
Galile, en supposant que la Gravit est uniforme, a d
montr le mouvement des Corps projette^ dans les Mi
lieux qui ne font point de resistance 5 & tous les Math
maticiens conviennent de ses Propositions, fans en excepter
Mr.Leibnit^ lui-mme. Or si l'on suppose que le temps qu'un
corps employe tomber, est divise en parties gales ; puis
que la Gravit est uniforme, & que par consquent elle
agit galement dans les parties gales du temps, il faut
que par son action elle imprime & communique au corps
qui tombe, des Forces, des Vitesses, & des mouvemens gaux,
en temps gaux. Et par consquent la Force impulsive, la
Viteffe, 2c Je Mouvement du corps qui tombe, augmente
ront proportion du temps de fa chute. Mais I' Espace
dcrit par le corps qui tombe, resuite en partie de la Vi
teffe du Corps, & en partie du Temps qu' il employe
tomber ; de forte qu' il est en raison compose de la Vitesse
& du Temps, ou comme le Quarr de 1' un ou de 1* au
tre ; & par consquent comme le Oûarr de la Force im
pulsive. Et par le mme raisonnement on peut prouver,
que lors qu' un Corps est jette en haut avec une Force im
pulsive, la Hauteur laquelle il montera, fera comme le
Huarr de cette Force : Et que la Force requise pour lever
le Corps B, du poids de quatre Livres, la hauteur d' une
aune, lvera le Corps A, du poids d" Vne Livre, (non pas
a la
..; Dr. Clarke'x Fifth Reply.
and the Whole hears, and the Whole thinks^

as being essentially one Individual,
\ :
99. In
much Force e thrown upwards, <w wfon thrown hori

zontally . WWeft is a plain ConiradiSion And there is the
fame Contradiftion in affirming, that although a Body at the
end of the unequal Arms of a Balance, by doubling its Velo
city, acquires only a double impulsive Force, yet, by being
thrown upwards with the fame doubled Velocity, it acquires
a quadruple impulsive Force ; in this Assertion, I fay, there
is the fame Contradiction : For equal Bodies with equal
Velocities, cannot have unequal impulsive Forces.
Vpon the Supposition of Gravity being, Uniform, Galiteo

demonstrated the Motion of Projectiles in Mediums void of Kesistence ; and his Propositions are allowed by all Mathematici
ans, not excepting Mr. Leibnitz himself. Now, supposing the
Time of a falling Body to be divided into equal Parts ; since
Gravity is uniform, and, by being so, ails equally in equal
Parts of Time, it must by its AUion impress and communicate
to the falling Body, equal impulsive Forces, Velocities, and
Motions, in equal Times. And therefore the impulsive
Force, the Velocity, and the Motion of the falling Body,
will increase in Proportion to the Time of falling. But the
Space described by the falling Body, arises partly from the
Velocity of the Body, and partly from the Time of its fal
ling ; and so is in a compound ratio of them Both, or as the
Square of either of them ; and consequently as the Square
of the impulsive Force. And by the fame way of arguing, it
may be proved, that when a Body is thrown upwards with
any impulsive Force, the Height to which it will ascend, will
be as the Square of that Force .- And that the Force requi
site to mate the Body B, of four Pounds Weight, rife up
one Yard, will make the Body A, of One Pound Weight,
r'fe *P Cm* four Yards, as Mr. Leibnitz represents, but)
sixteen Yards, in quadruple the time. For the Gravity of
?-.
...
,
four
v h
335
33

yy. Pour faire voir que les * Forces
actives qui font dans le Mondey c*ef--d\rey
la s Quantit du mouvement, ou la Force
impulsive
* Voez
ci-dessus
la Note,
13 de
ma troi
sime R
plique.
T Voez
ci-dessus la hauteur de quatre aunes, comme Mr. Leibnit^ le dit,
mais) la hauteur de feixe aunes, en quatre fois le mme
la Note
fur 93, temps. Car la Gravit du poids de quatre Livres dans une
partie du temps, agit autant que la Gravit du poids cfVne
95.
Livre en quatre parties du temps.
Mais Mr. Herman, dans fa Phoronomie, pag. 1 1 3, fote'naot le parti de Mr. Leibnit^ contre ceux qui disent que
les Forces acquises par les corps qui tombent, font pro
portionnelles aux temps qu' ils employenc tomber, ou
aux Vitesses qu' ils acquirent -, Mr. Herman, dis-;e, assure
que cela est fond fur une fausse supposition, savoir que les
Corps jettes en haut reoivent de la Gravit qui leur r
siste, un nombre gal <t impulsions en temps gaux- C est
comme fi Mr. Herman disoit, que la Gravit ri est pas uni
forme ; Se, par consquent, c' est renverser la Thorie de
Galile touchant les corps Projette^, dont tous les Gom
tres conviennent. Je crois que Mr. Herman s' imagine que
plus le mouvement des Corps a de vitesse en montant, plus
les Corps reoivent d' impulsions ; parce qu' ils rencontrent
les particules [imaginaires'] qui causent la Gravit. Ainsi
le poids des corps fera plus grand lors qu' ils montent, &
plus petit lors qu' ils descendent. Et cependant Mr. Leibnit^ & Mr. Herman reconnoissent eux-mmes, que la Gra
vit en temps gaux produit des vitesses gales dans les
corps qui descendent , & qu' elle te des vitesses gales
aux corps qui montent ; & que par consquent elle est
uniforme. Us reconnoissent qu' elle est uniforme, lors
qu' elle agit fur les Corps pour produire la Vitesse ; & ils
nient qu' elle soit uniforme, lors qu' elle agit fur eux pour
produire la Force impulsive : De sorte qu' ils ne sont point
d' accord avec eux mmes.
Si la Force qu' un Corps acquiert en tombant, est comme
l' Espace qu' il dcrit ; que P on divise le Temps en par
ties gales -, & si dans la premiere partie du temps il ac
quiert Vne partie de Force; dans les deux premieres
parties du temps il acquerra quatre parties de Force ; dans
les trois premieres parties du temps , il acquerra neuf
parties de Force ; & ainsi du reste.
Et par cons
quent,
Dr. C L arkeV Fifth Reply.

337
99. In order to show that the * AElive *Seeab<n*t
Forces in the World (meaning the f Quan- *mey ^nwd
tiij of Motion or Impulsive Force given to *fp/r, 13.
Bodies,) *
9S>
four Pounds Weight /n One /w* 0/ Time, ails as much as
the Gravity of one Pound Weight in Four Parts of Time.
But Mr. Herman, in his Phoronomia, Pag. t 1 3, (argu*
ing jar Mr. Leibnitz against Those who hold that the Forces
acquired by falling Bodies are proportional to the Times of
faffing-, or to the Velocities acquired,) represents that this is
founded upon a False Supposition, that Bodies thrown upwards
receive from the Gravity which resists thew, an equal Num
ber of Impulses in equal Times. Which it as much as ta
fay, that Gravity is not uniform ; and, by consequence, ta
overthrow the Theory of Galilo concerning Projectiles, al
lowed by all Geometers. I suppose, he means that the swifter
the Motion of Bodies is upwards, the more numerous are tho
Impulses ; because the Bodies meet the [[imaginary] gravi
tating Particles. And thus the Weight of Bodies wilt be
greater when they move upwards, and less when they move
downwards. And yet Mr. Leibnitz and Mr. Herman them
selves allow, that Gravity in equal Times generates equal
Velocities in descending Bodies, and takes away equal Ve
locities in ascending Bodies ; and therefore is Uniform. In
its alfion upon Bodies for generating Velocity, they allow
it to be uniform ; in its alfion upon them for generating im
pulsive Force, they deny it to be uniform . And so are in
consistent with themselves.
If the Force acquired by a Body in falling, be as the
Space described \ let the Time be divided into equal parts j
and if in the first part of Time it gain One part of Force,
in the two first parts of Time it will gain four parts of
Force, in the three first parts of Time it will gain nine
parts of Force, and so on. And by consequence, in the second
part o/Time it will gain three parts of Force, in the third
part of Time it will gain five parts of Force, in the fourth
Part of Time it will gain seven parts of Force, and so on.
And therefore if the Action of Gravity for generating these
Forces, be supposed, in the middle of the first part of Time,
to be of One degree ; it will, in the middle of the second,
third, and fourth parts of Time, be of three, five, and
(e>en degrees, and so on: That it, it will be proportional to
Z
the
33$

impulsive communique aux Corps -, pour
faire voirt dis-je, que ces Forces atlives ne
diminuent foint naturellement , le savant
Auteur
quent, dans la seconde partie du temps il acquerra trait
parties de Force, dans la troisime partie du temps il ac
querra cinq parties de Force, dans la quatrime partie da
temps il acquerra sept parties de Force, & ainsi du reste.
Si l' on suppose donc que I' Ailion de la Gravit pour pro
duire ces Forces , a un degr au milieu de la premiere
partie du temps ; elle aura, au milieu de h seconde, de la
troisime, & de la quatrime parties du temps, trois, cinq,
& sept degrez, & ainsi du reste; c'est--dire, qu'elle
fera proportionnelle au temps & la vitesse acquises : -&,
par consquent, au commencement du temps il n' y aura
point de Gravit -, de sorte que, faute de Gravit, le Corps
ne tombera pas. Et selon le mme raisonnement, lors qu
un Corps est jette en haut, fa Gravit diminuera mesure
que, sa vitesse diminue, & elle cessera lors que le Corps
cesse de monter ; & alors, faute de Gravit, le Corps de
meurera dans 1' air, & ne tombera plus. Tant il est vrai
que le sentiment du sayant Auteur sur ce Sujet, est rem.
pli d' absurditez.
Pour dcider cette Question d'une manire demonstra
tive ; que l' on suspende deux Qlobes d'Acier par des Rayons
gaux, ou des Filets d' une gale longueur ; en forte que
lors qu' ils sont suspendus, & qu' ils se touchent Y un l' au
tre, les Rayons ou les Filets soient Parallles. Que s m
de ces Globes soit toujours le mme, & qu' il soit cart
de F autre la mme distance dans toutes les Experiences
suivantes. Que l'autre soit de telle grosseur que l'on
voudra, & qu' il soit cart du cot oppose une distance
rciproquement proportionnelle son poids. Qu' on lche
cetteux Globes dans le mme moment, en sorte qu' ils se
puissent rencontrer dans le plus bas lieu de leur descente,
o ils pient suspendus avant que d' tre cartez. Le prtyier; Globe rebondira toujours de la mime manire, c' est-tlire, la mme hauteur. Donc la Force de 1' autre est
eqjours la mme, lors que fa vitesse est rciproquement
proportionnelle son poids. Et par consquent, si son
pofiis continue d' tre le mme, fa Force fera proportion
nelle la vitesse. Q. E. D.
Z)r. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.
339
Bodies, ) do not naturally diminiih ; this

Learned Writer urges, that two /oft unelaftick Bodies meeting together with equal
the Time and to the Velocity acquired . And, by confequence,
in the Beginning of the Time it will be none at ; and
fo the Body, for want of Gravity, will not fall dawn. And
by the Jame way of arguing, when a Body is thrown upwards,
its gravity witt decreafe as its velocity decreafes, and ceafe
when the Body ceafes to afcend ; and then, for want of gravity,
it will, reft in the Air, and fall down no more. So full of
Abfurditis the Notion of this Learned Author in this par
ticular.
.1 i
To-decide thi$ queftion demonftratively ; let two pendulous
lobes of bardned Steel, be fufpended by equal radij or Threads
ef equal length: So that when they hang down and touch each
other, the Radij or Threads may be parallel. Let One of the
Globes be conftantly the fame, and be drawn afide from the
Other to one and the fame diftance in All the fubfequent
Trials, Let the. Other be of Any Bignefs, and be drawn afide
the contrary way to a Diftance reciprocally proportional'.,.to its
Weight. Let Both of them then be let go at one and the
fame Moment of Time, fo that they may meet each other at
the loweft place of their Defcent, where they hung before tlxy
were drawn afide : And the firft Globe will always rebound
alike, from the Other. Wherefore the Force of the Other is
always the fame, when its Velocity is reciprocally proportional
to its Weight. And by confequence, if its Weight remains the
fame, its Force will be proportional to its Velocity, . . t>.
and
340

Auteur soutient, que deux Corps Mous &
fans Ressort, se rencontrant avec des forces
gales & contraires, perdent chacun tout
leur mouvement, parce que ce mouvement
ej communiqu aux petites parties dont ils
font composez. Mais lors que deux Corps
tout- -fait Durs & fans Ressort perdent tout
leur mouvement en se rencontrant, il s* agit
de savoir que devient ce mouvement, ou
cette force aBive & impulsive? Il ne sattroit tre dispers parmi les parties de ces
Corps, parce que ces parties ne font suscep
tibles a" aucun tremoussement , faute de
Ressort. Et si on nie que ces Corps doivent
perdre leur mouvement total ; je rponds
qi en ce cas-l, il j* ensuivra que les Corps
durs & Elastiques rjailliront avec nne
double force, savoir, avec la force qui
resuite du Ressort, & de plus avec toute la
force diretle & primitive, ou du moins avec
une partie de cette force : ce qui eft con
traire F experience.
Enfin, V Auteur ayant considr la Dmonftration de Mr. Newton, que s ai cite
- 99. ci-dessus, eft oblig de * reconnoitre, que la
Quantit du mouvement dans le monde n*
est pas toujours la mme \ & il a recours
un autre subterfuge, en disant que le mouve
ment & la force ne sont pas toujours les
mmes en Quantit. Mais ceci eft aussi
contraire V Experience. Car la Force
dont il s' agit ici, ri est pas cette force de la
matire,
2)r. Clarke^ Fifth Reply.
341
and contrary Forces, do for this only Rea~

son lose each of them the Motion of their
Whole, because it is communicated and di
spersed into a Motion of their small Parts.
But the Question is j when two perfectly
HARD un-elastick Bodies lose their whole
Motion by meeting together, what then
becomes of the Motion or active impulsive
Force ? It cannot be dispersed among the
Parts, because the parts are capable of no tre
mulous Motion for want of elasticity. And
if it be denied, that the Bodies would lose
the Motion of their Wholes-^ I answer:
Then it would follow, that Elastick Hard
Bodies would reflect with a double Force ^
viz. the force arising from the elasticity,
and moreover all ( or at least part of) the
original direct force: Which is contrary to
experience.
At length, fupon the "Demonstration I

cited from Sir Isaac Newton,) he is obliged
to * allow, that the Quantity of Motion * 9f:
in the World, is not always the fame } And
goes to another refuge, that Motion and
Force are not always the fame in Quantity.
But this also is contrary to experience.
For the Force here spoken of, is not the
Z3
\Vis
242

matire, qu on appelle s Vis inerti, la
quelle continue effeivement d* tre toujours
la mme, pendant que la Quantit de la ma
tire ejl la mme ; mais la Force dont nous
parlons ici, eft la Force active, impulsive,
&C relative, qui eft toujours || proportionne
a la Quantit du mouvement relatif. C*
est
s La Force de la Matire, qu' on appelle Vit inertia, est
cette Force passive, par laquelle la Matire continue d' elle
tnme dans 1" tat o elle est, & ne fort jamais de cet tat
ou' Proportion de la puissance contraire qui agit fur elle.
C'est une Force passive, non pas par laquelle (comme Mr.
Leibnit^ Y entend aprez Kepler, voez F Appendice N9 7,)
k Matire rsiste au mouvement ; mais par laquelle la Ma
tire rsiste galement tout ce qui pourrait changer I*
tat o elle est, (bit qu' elle se trouve en repos, ou en
mouvement : De sorte que la mme Force requise
pour donner une certaine Vitesse une certaine Quantit de
Matire qui est en repos, est aussi toujours requise pour
faire perdre ce mme degr de vitesse la mme (Quantit
de Matire, & pour la rduire 1" tat de repos o elle
toit auparavant. Cette Vis inertia est toujours propor
tionne la Quantit de la Matire ; & par consquent elle
est toujours la mme fans aucune variation, soit que la Ma
tire se trouve en repos ou en mouvement ; & elle ne passe
jamais d'un Corps un autre. Sans cette Vis inertia, la
moindre Force mettroic en mouvement la Matire qui est
en repos, quelque grande qu' en ft la Quantit ; & cette
mme Quantit de Matire tant en mouvement, quelque
grande qu' en ft la vitesse, seroit arrte par la moindre
force, fans aucun choc. De forte qu' parler proprement,
toute la Force de la Matire, soit qu' elle se trouve en re
pos ou en mouvement, toute son Aiion & fa R-aSion, toute
son Impulsion & sa Resistance, n' est autre chose que cette
Vis inertia en diffrentes Circonstances.
j| C'est--dire, proportionne la Quantit de la Ma
tire Si. la vitesse, & non scomme Mr. Leibnitz 1* assure,
ASa Erudit. ad Ann. 1695, pag. 1 $6,) la Quantit de la
Matire & au Quarr de la Vitesse. Voez ci-dessus la Note
for 93
95.
- :,'

f Vis inertia of Matter, (which continues
indeed always the fame, so long as the
Quantity of Matter continues the fame :)
but the Force here meant, is relative Atlive
impulsive force \ which is always || propor
tional to the Quantity of Relative Motion ;
f The Vis inerti of Matter, is That Passive Force, by
which it always continues of itself in the State 'tit in ; and
never changes That State, but in proportion to a contrary
Power ailing upon it. 'Tis That Pajjive Force, not by which
Cas Mr. Leibnitz from Kepler understands it, See Appen
dix, NQ j,) Matter resists Motion ; but by which it equally
resists Any Change from the State 'tis in, either of Rest [or
Motion ; So that the very fame force,- which is requisite to
give any certain Velocity to any certain Quantity of Mat
ter at Rest, is always exaSly requisite to reduce the [ame
Jiuantity of Matter from the [ame degree of Velocity to a state
of Rest again. This Vis inerti is always proportional to the
Quantity of Matter ; and therefore continues invariably the
fame, in all possible States of Matter, whether at Rest or \n
Motion ; and it never transferred from One Body to another.
Without this Vis, the Least Force would give Any Velocity to
the Greatest Quantity of Matter at Rest; and the Greatest
/Quantity of Matter in Any Velocity of Motion, would be stop
ped by the Least Force, without any the least shock at all.
So that, properly and indeed, All Force in Matter either at
Rest or in Motion, all Ar Action and Reaction, all Impulse
and all Resistence, is nothing but this Yis inerti in different
Circumstances.
":
.
' - . .
.-:"
[| That is ; proportional to the Quantity of Matter and
. the Velocity; not {as Mr. Leibnitz affirms, Asta Erudit.ad
Ann. i^9<, pag. 156,) to the Quantity of Matter and the
Square .of the Velocity. See- above, the Note on" 93,
Z 4
343
344

eft ce qui paroit conslamment par V Expe
rience, moins que l' on ne tombe dans quel
que erreur, faute de. bien supputer & de
dduire la Force contraire, qui nat de la
Resistance que les Fluides font aux Corps
de quelque manire que ceux-ci se puissent
mouvoir , & de l' ABion contraire & con
tinuelle de la Gravitation sur les Corps
jettez, en haut.
ioo
102. J* ai fait voir dans la
dernire SeB ion, que la * Force active, selon
la Dfinition que s en ai donne, diminue
continuellement & naturellement dans le
Monde materiel. Il eft vident que ce n efi
pas un dfaut, parce que ce n efi qrf une
fuite de r inactivit de la Matire. Car
cette inactivit eft non seulement la cause,
comme V Auteur le remarque, de la diminu
tion de la Vitesse mesure que la Quan
tit de la Matire augmente j (ce qui la
vrit n eft point une diminution de Ja
Quantit du mouvement : ) mais elle efi
aussi la cause pourquoi des Corps solides,
parfaitement Durs, & fans Ressort, se ren
contrant avec des forces gales & contraires,
perdent tout leur mouvement & toute leur
Force active, comme je /' ai montr ci-dessus'^
& par consquent ils ont besoin de quelque
autre Cause pour recevoir un nouveau mou
vement.
m>T
* Voez ci-dessus la Note fur $
Rplique, 13.
. ?; j & la III
Dr. Claro^ Fifth Reply.
345
As is constantly evident in Experience ;

except where some Error has been commit
ted, in not rightly computing and subduBing the contrary or impeding Force, which
arises from the Resistence of Fluids to Bo
dies moved any way, and from the conti
nual contrary Action of Gravitation upon
Bodies thrown upwards.
100102. That f A&ive Force, in
the Sense above-defined, does naturally di
minish continually in the material Universes
hath been shown in the last Paragraph.
That this is no Defefi, is evident j because
'tis only a Consequence of Matter being
lifeless, void of Motivity, unatlive and
inert. For the Inertia of Matter, causeth,
not only fas this learned Author observes,)
that Velocity decreases in proportion as
Quantity of Matter increases, fwhich is
indeed no decrease^ of the Quantity of Mo
tion \) but also that solid and perfectly
hard Bodies, void of Elasticity, meeting
together with equal and contrary Forces,
lose their whole Motion and Aftive Force,
("as has been above shownJ and must de
pend uppn some other Cans/ for new Mo
tion, .,-... v - ,1
-. .v
f See above, the Note on 95
95 } & Third Reply,
103. That
.1
'
54 6

103. J1 ai sait voir amplement dans mes
Ecrits prcdons, qu' il ri' j a aucun dfaut
dans les choses dont on parle ici. Car pour
quoi Dieu n auroit-il pas eu la libert de
faire un Monde, qui continuerait dans l'tat
o il eft prsentement, auffi long temps ou
ujf peu de temps qu il le jugerait pro
pos, & qui seroit en suite chang, & re
cevrait telle forme qu il voudroit lui don
ner, par un changement sage & eonvenable,
mais qui peut-tre seroit tout--fait au dessus
des faix du Mchanisme } JJ Auteur foufiv zcr\t,tient s que V Univers ne peut diminuer en
1140,22' Perfection -, qu' il n' y a. aucune raison qui
gr v E- ': puisse s borner la Quantit de la Matire;
fric, 29. qlte * ies Perfections de Dieu /' obligent
.produire toujours autant de Matire qu' il
lui ejl poffible \ & qu' un Monde born eft
une s Fiction impracticable. J' ai infr .
de cette dotlrine, que le Monde doit tre
ncessairement infini & ternel. C ejl aux
Savans juger fi cette Consequence ejl
: tien fonde.
.<.'" 04,106. V Auteur dit present,
H $ 104. que ||"/' Espace n ejl pas un Ordre oit une
Situation* mais un Ordre de Situations. Ce
qui n* empche pas que la mme Qbje&ion
ne subfile toujours, savoir, qu' un Ordre
de Situations n ejl pas une Quantit, comme
"*' Voez ci-dessus 1' Apostille de Mr. Lebmt\ la f de
son IV Ecrit.
,1 V
l'espace
\ Dr. Clarke'j fifth Reply.
347
103. That none of the things here re

ferred to, are Dese&s j I have largely shown
in my former Papers. For why was not God
at Liberty to make a World, that ihould
continue in its present Form as long ot as
short a time as he thought fit, and should
then be altered ("by such Changes as may
be very wife and Fit, and yet Impoffible per
haps to be performed by Mechanism,*) into
whatever other Form he himself pleased >
Whether my Inference from this Learned
Author's affirming f that the Universe can
not diminish in Persetfion, that there is m
possible Reason which can f limit the Quati- f Fmth
tity os Matter, that * God's Perfections Paper,
oblige him to produce always as much Mat- 22,20aad,
ter as he can, and that a Finite Material Fifth FaUniverse is an f ImpraBicable FiBion } whe- Pf? 2?*
ther (1 fay) my Inferring, that ("according
to these Notions) the World must needs
have been both Infinite and Eternal, be a
just Inference or no, I am willing to leave
to the Learned, who shall compare the Pa
pers, to judge.
104 ic6. We are Now told, that
f Space is not an Order or Situation*, but f ic4.
an Order of Situations. But still the Ob
jection remains } that an Order of Situa
tions is not Quantity, as Space is. He re See above, Mr. LeibnitzV Postscript to his Fourth Paper.
fers
34?

V Espace V est. V Auteur renvoy donc
la SeBton 54, o il croit avoir prouv que
V Ordre e[i une Quantit. Et moi je ren
voy ce que s ai dit fur cette SeElion dans
ce dernier Ecrit j o je crois avoir prouv
que V Ordre n' est pas une Quantit. Ce
* 105. que V Auteur dit auffi touchant le * Temps,
renferme videmment cette Absurdit : savoirt que le Temps n' est que T Ordre des
choses succelives j & que cependant il ne
laisse pas d7 tre une vritable Quantit j
parce quy il <?/?, non seulement l' Ordre des
choses successives, mais auffi la Quantit de
la Dure qui intervient entre chacune des
choses particulires qui se succdent dans
cet Ordre. Ce qui est une Contradiction
manifeste.
t 106.
Dire que \ V Immensit nesignifie pas un
Espace fans bornes, & que /' Eternit ne
signifie pas une Dure ou un Temps fans
fin, c est (ce me sembl) soutenir que les
mots n ont aucune signification. Au lieu
de raisonner sur cet Article^ V Auteur nous
renvoy ce que certains Thologiens C^*
Philosophes, (qui taient de son sentiments)
ont pens sur cette matire. Mais ce n ejl
pas l de quoi il s* agit entre lui & moi.
107
109. y ai dit que parmi les
-choses possibles\ il n y en a aucune qui soit
plus miraculeuse qit une autre, par rapport
Dieu } & que par consquent le Miracle
ne consiste dans aucune difficult qui se
trouve dans la Nature d' une chose qui doit
*
tre
.Dr. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.
34c;
fers therefore to $ 54, where he thinks he

has proved that Order is a Quantity : And
I refer to what I have said above in this Pa
per, upon that Section j where I think I
have proved, that it is not a Quantity.
What he alledges concerning || Time like
wise, amounts plainly to the following Ab- " I0S'
surdity : that Time is only the Order of
Things successive, and yet is truly a Quan
tity j because it is, not only the Order of
Things successive, but also the Quantity of
Duration intervening between each of the
Particulars succeeding in That Order,
YVhich'is an express Contradiction.
To fay that * Immensity does not signify * toS.
Boundless Space, and that Eternity does
not signify Duration or Time without Be
ginning and End, is (I think) affirming
that Words have no meaning. Instead of
reasoning upon this Point, we are referred
to what certain Divines and Philosophers
(that is, such as were of this Learned Au
thor's Opinion,) have acknowledged: Which
is not the Matter in Question.
107.109. I affirmed, that, with re

gard to God, no one Possible thing is more
miraculous than another j and that there
fore a Miracle does not consist in any Dif
ficulty in the Nature of the Thing to be
done, but merely in the Unusualness of
God's
3'\$o

tre faite, mais qu* il consistesimplement en
ce que Dieu le fait rarement. Le mot de
Nature, & ceux de Forces de la Nature,
de Cours de la Nature, &c. sont des mots qui
signifient simplement, quy une chose arrive or
dinairement ou frquemment, hors qu* un
Corps humain rduit en poudre est ressuscit,
nous disons que c est un Miracle j lors qiC un
corps humain est engendr de la manire
ordinaire, nous disous que c* est une chose na
turelle ^ & cette distinction est uniquement
fonde fur ce que la Puissance de Dieu pro
duit V une de ces deux choses ordinairement,
& l' autre rarement. Si le soleil (ou la
Terre) efl arrt soudainement, nous disons
que c* est un Miracle ^ & le mouvement con
tinuel du soleil (ou de la Terre) nous paroit
une chose naturelle . c* est uniquement parce
que V une de ces deux choses est ordinaire,
& s autre extraordinaire. Si les hommes
sortoient ordinairement du Tombeau, comme
le Bled sort de la Semence, nous dirions
certainement que ce seroit ausi une chose
naturelle.- Et si le soleil (ou la Terre) etoit
toujours immobile, cela nous paroitroit natu
rel j & en ce cas-l nous regarderions le
mouvement du soleil (ou de la Terre,)
comme une chose miraculeuse. Le savant
Auteur ne dit rien contte ces Raisons [ces
t 108. .j- grandes raisons, comme il les appelles] qui
font fi videntes. Il se contente de nous
.renvoyer encore aux manires de parler ordi
naires de certains Philosophes & -de certains
i
Tho
Dr. Clarke^ Fifth Reply.
^f
God's doing it. The Terms, Nature, and

Powers of Nature, and Course of Nature,
and the like, are nothing but empty Wordsand, signify merely, that a thing usually or
frequently comes to pass. The Raising a
Human-Body out of the Ditft of the Earth,
we call a Miracle \ the Generation of a Hu
man Body in the ordinary way, we call Na
tural , for no other Reason, but because
the Power of God effects one usually, the
other unusually. The sudden slopping of
the Sun for Earth,) we call a Miracle ;
the continual Motion of the Sun (or Earth,)
we call Natural , for the very same Reason
only, of the one's being usual, the other
unusual. Did Men usual/y arise out of the
Grave, as Corn grows out of Seed sown,
we should certainly call That also natural :
And did the Sun (or Earth) constantly
Jland still, we should then think That to be
natural, and its Motion at any time would
be miraculous. Against these evident Rea
sons, [cess grandes Raisons,'] this learned f 108.
Writer offers nothing at all , but continues
barely to refer us to the Vulgar Forms of
Speaking of certain Philosophers and Divines :
Which (as I before observed) is not the
Matter in Question.
Vtt, . .
no-i 16".
3 5^

Thologiens -, mais, comme je F ai dj re
marqu ci- dessin , ce riejl pas l de quoi il
s' agit entre F Auteur & moi.
i ioil 6. // est surprenant, que sur
une matire qui doit tre dcide par la Rai|| no. son & non par F Autorit, on nous || ren
voy encore F Opinion de certains Philoso
phes & Thologiens. Mais, pour ne pas
insister sur cela j que veut dire le savant
^
Auteur par une * difference relle & in
terne entre ce qui eft miraculeux, ff ce qui
s m. ne F est pas ; ou entre s des Operations na
turelles & non naturelles, absolument, &
par rapport Dieu .<? Croiul- qu'il y ait en
Dieu deux Principes d' action diffrents c
rellement distincts ? Ou qu' une chose soit
plus difficile Dieu q une autre ? S'il ne
le croit pas, il s* enfuit, ou que les mots d?.
Action de Dieu naturelle & surnaturelle,
font des Termes dont la Signification eft uni-'
quement relative aux hommes \ parce que.
nous avons accoutum de dire qu* un effet
ordinaire de la puissance de Dieu esi une
chose naturelle, & qiC un effet extraordi
naire de cette mme puissance esl une chose
t H2. surnaturelle \ (ce qu' on appelle les * Forces
de la Nature, n tant vritablement qu' un
mot fans aucun sens :) Ou bien il s' enfuit
que par une Action de Dieu surnaturelle, il
faut entendre ce que Dieu fait lui-mme
immdiatement j & par une Action de
Dieu naturelle, ce qu'il fait par F interven
tion des Causes secondes. V Auteur se
2
declare
Dr. Cl arkeV Fifth Reply. .,

l:i
353
. v
.
-.- > ' . .'.: :_:{ v. v . - . .- -
- ' \ ". . ' . ,Y . r0; t'iib .__-. ' V. - ; .-... ".
iiio-~*.ii6. It here very furprizing,

that, in a Point of Reafaad not of Au
thority, we are ftill again \[temtted to the II no.
Opinions of certain Ymofophers and Divines.
But, to omit This : What does' this Learned
Writer mean by a * real Internal Difference * no;
between what is miraculous, and not mira
culous -, or between * Operations natural^ * ,,
and o natural j abfojutely, and with re
gard to God Does he think there ar in
Gbd two different and really diflinB Princi
ples or Power(f_A8ingtând that one
thing is more difficult to (Wthan another >
if not : then either a natural Ana a fupernatural Anion of Go, are Terms whofe
Signification is only relative to C\r j we cal
ling an // Effe of God's Power, natu*
rl j and an unufual one, fupernatural ;
the * force of Nature being, in truth, no- * ua.
thing but an empty word : Or elfe, by the
One muft be meant That which God does
immediately Himfelf; and by the Other;
that which he does mediately by the iwflrumentality of feconJ Caufes. The /r of thefe Diftin&ions, is what this
Larnd Author, is here profeiTedly oppofng The latter is what he exprefly difclims, 117, "where he allows that yi?igels may work T^* Miracles, And yet,
-
Aa
betides
354

dclare ouvertement dans cette partie de son
Ecrit, contre la premiere de cet deux DiiinBions -, & il recette formellement la seconde
dans la SebTnon 117^ tiiil reconnat que les
Anges peuvent, faite de vritables Mirades.
: (. Cependant je ne crois pas que V on,puisse in
venter une troiBme Distinction fur ta ma
tire dont il s" agit ici.'. ..: .
.xz< lle toittx-fait. draisonnable d* appelles
113, \\ F Attraction un Miracle,., & de dire que
: f.-eft un Terme <p.ti me doit.point entrer dans
la Philosophie y Quoique nom ayons fi sou
vent dclar s a une manire diiinBe &
.': -V. -AV..M \.\ .-. \\. ..IV- formelle,
s Qu causa efficiente hx. Attralfiones peragantur, Sec.

C'est--dire. " je ne recherche point ici quelle est la
" Cause Efficiente de ces Attractions. Ce que s appelle
" Attralfion, est peut-tre caus par quelque impulsion, on
" de quelque autre 'manire qui nous j;st inconnue. Je ne me
* fen du mot d' Attralmn qu' en gnral, pour designer
" la Force par laquelle les corps tendent Y un vers 1' au*' tre, quelle que soit- la Cause de cette Force. Car il
.:.:;' u faut que notisapprenions par les Phnomnes de la Na" me,- quels Corpse attirent 1' un 1' autre, & quittes font les
" Loix & les Pmpriste^ de cette Attraction, avant qu'il sok
w convenable de rechercher Quette est l Cause efficiente de
" l' Attraction ";/Et aitteurs : " Je considre ces Principes,
non comme des' fiuatite^ Occultes que T on supposcroit
" natre des -Formes Spcifiques des choses-, mais comme des
M Loix Vnh-erfeUes de la Nwr, relon lesquelles les chases
" mmes ont t formes. Car iT paroit par les Phnorae" ns de la Nature, qu'il y a actuellement de tels Principes.
" quoi qu* on ne puisse pas encore en expliquer les Can
'* ses. Soutenir que chaque espce distincte des Choses, est
" doue de Qualits occultes Specijjues, -pu le moyen des" quelles les choses ont certaines Farces Actives -x iceirir,
dis-je, une teH .Doctrine,
rie lire, rtais
dV
2 ,.. ctest
-*.:kit"^~'f
'duirc
i
, ' " *; '.yi.'iti .'itin i 'Wioisk

'.'.';. PwO'fd e'.IU'tli-l'O lulllSJ
Dr. Clarke'/ Fifth Reply.
355
besides these Two, I think no other Distin

ctions can possibly be imagined. . -.,
...
... ... v, . .:. .. > ... .1 .-.i
It is very unreasonable to call * AttraBion a Miracle , and an unphilosophical

Terra, j 'after iit has been so often distinctly
f declared, that by Thkt Term we do not
','n -'-',
mean
f Qu3"causa'efficiiie hi? Attractiones pcragantur, in id
verb hie non. inquiro. Quam ego AttraSionem appello,
fieri fane potest ut ea efficiatur Impulfu, vel alio aliquo
mode nobis ignoto. Haric vocem Attraiiionti ita hie aecipi
velim, ut ill universum solummodo vim aliquam fignificare
"inteiliga'tur, qua corpora' ad se mutuo cendant ; cuicunq^
demutn cauCr attribuenda sic iila vis. Nam ex phnomenis
Kfa'turzillud nos prius edostos oporcet, qunarri corpora fe
invicem Attrahant, & qunam fint Leges & Proprietaies
isliusAtcractionis ; quam in id inquirere par fie, quanam Efficiente Causa peragacur Attrastio. Newtoni Optice, Qu.2%,
pag.$22. Atq^hacquidem Principia considero,non ut aa//<j.r
Slualitates,qux ex Specific'/* rerum Formis oriri fingantur; fed
ut universals* Naturae Leges, quibus res iplE sunc formatar.
Nam Principia quidem talia revera existere, ostendunt Phe
nomena Nature -, licet ipsorum cause qu sine, nondum
fuerit expiicatum. Affirmare singulas rerum species, specificis praedicas esse qualitatibus occulcis, per quas ca Vim
certam in Agendo habeant ; hoc utiq-, est Nihil dicere. At
ex phaenomenis Naturae, duo vel tria derivare generalia
Motus Principia ; & deinde explicare quemadmodum pro
prietary & astiones rerum corporearum omnium ex Principiis istis consequantur ; id vero magnus esl'et saf'lus in
Philosophia progrtsius, etiamfi Principiorum istorum Cau
sa; nondum essent cognitae : Id. ibid, Pag. 344. Phenomena
Clorum & maris nostri per Vim Gravitatis exposui, fed
causam Gravitatis nondum asligmvi. Oritur utique hsc
A a a
Vu
S113.
<6
Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

fpr&tflle, qti* en .nous fervant de ce Terme,
nous ne prtendons pas exprimer la Caufe
qui
" duire des Phnomnes de la Nature, deux ou trois Prin" cipes gnraux de mouvement ; & enfuite expliquer
" comment les Proprierez & les Actions de toutes Its cho" fes materielles fuivent de ces Principes ; ce feroit faire
" un grand progrs dans la PhiJofophie, quoi que on
" ne connt pas encore les Cufes de ces Principes. " Et
dans un autre endroit : " J'ai expliqu les.Phnomenes des
" .Cieux & de la Mer parla Force de la Gravit -, mais
f je n'en ai pas encore aflfign la Caufe. C'en une Force
" produite par quelque Caufe, qui pntre jusqu' aux
Centres du Soleil & des Plantes, fans rien perdre de fa
*' Force : Et elle n' agit pas proportionnellement aux
" Surfaces des Particules fur Jefquelles elle agit, comme
" fes Caufes Mchaniaues ont accoutum de le dire, mais
" ,proportionneHement la Qjaantit de la Matire folide :
*" EtTon" A'ftion s' tend de tous cotez des diftances im'** menfes', diminuant toujours en Raifon double des di,4f tanceS.'
Mais je n'ai pas encore pu deduire des
" Phnomnes la Caufe de c(i proprietez de la Gravit :
" '8i je ne fais point d' Hypotbefcs ". Newton. Opic. pag.
322 r 34}. Scrrncip. Pbihfofb. Scboi. enerle ub finenu
t
i . j.-.r.J ni" VJJ^ }, .5... ' 'I-'LIJA ',.
] : ' >7 ':"/-
<-.{
' " r-4 :*:.*" ' .;. ;-iV--ufr. i iV l''1 :r.Uri-j '' .-'fit.T.l!,-: :...'
ii;.
- .
i
-.
-....
_.'-.
, , ' , ,,: ' .

i ::-...('
i
1 *'. , '
- .1 .1 4 .* . . ..
. :. .'-t v.
''t' ' ,!' 1
'.>,.
.
('*'
S " ' ubi.: , ..'." .\\l. .1 \
1. ...;;. ;
r~ :,.< . j xui/i .....-1;
" '. ' ... .
i- - '.. < i
-.4 - ..-II!
'.'' 1'-' ; !''
' .*-./ . . ..
,
; ;'> .> ,.
'. . j,( .,,.
. .' < ' lib
\v. . .. mUv.'j. ,-_
. .".- * S-
. . S.<4. . v-* . ,.,* i* ;f'riM
-n .: S. :-r
. ,\. n... 1 ! >'.?; 'vyj ;,: ; .\<*.'il, '.; \
i 1 1 . ; .. :. -..-.,> : 1 ij'v*"
?
-i;j
j 1(1 j'|f"'!< .'
. ......: , -1
.'. . : ---. .
v.' I .'. ..'yj
,*
-.. .
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1 ",' .'i '!.: 1

-"
fc i.
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.
1' ;
' . -'
Dr. Clarke1'j- Fifth Reply.;; "'

mean to express the Cause of Bodies tending
towards each other, but barely the EffeB,
Vis a causa aliqua, qua: penetrat ad usque centra.Sdis &
Planetarum, fine vircucis diminutione ; quque agic non
pro quantitate Superftcicrum particularum in quas agit, (ut
solent causa; meehanic,) fed pro quantitate materi& solid* \
& cujus actio in immenus diftantias undique exrenditur,
decrescendo semper in duplicata ratione distantiarum.___
Rationem vero harum Gravitatis proprietatum ex Phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, Zc Hypotheses non fingo .
Principia Philos. Schol. generate sub finem. i. e. What the effi
cient Cause of these AtPraHions is, I do not here inquire. What
I call Attraction, may possibly be caused by some Impulse, or
some other way unknown to us. t ust-the. Word Attraction, only
in general, to signify the Force by which Bodies tend towards
each other ; whatever be the Cause of that Force. For we
must first learn from the Phenomena of Nature, what Bodies
attract each other, and what are 'the Laws and Properties of
that AttraUhn, before 'tis proper to inquire what the efficient
Cause of Attrall'w is. Again : / consider these Principles,
not as occult (Qualities, imagined to arise from the speqifick
Forms of Things ' but as Universal Laws of Nature, ac
cording to which the Things themselves were formed. For, that
such Principles do really exist, appears from the Phenomena of
Nature ; though, what the Causes of them are, be no? yei ex
plained. To affirm that every distinU Species of Tilings, is in
dued with specifick occult Qualities, by means whereof the
Things have certain AUive Forces ; thisindeed is saying No
thing. But to deduce from the Phenomena of Nature, two or
three general Principles of Motion ; and then to explain how
the Properties and AHions of all corporeal Tilings follow from
those Principles ; This would be a great Progress in Philosophy>1
though the Causes of those Principles were not yet discovered.
Again : / have explained the Phenomena of the heavens and
the Sea, by the Force of Gravity ; but the Cause of Gravity
I have not yet assigned. It is a Force arismg from some
Cause, which reaches to the very Centers of the Sun and Pla
nets, without any diminution of its Force And it alls, notpro'. portionally to the Surfaces of the Particles it alls upon, as
Mechanical Causes use to do; but proportionally to the Quantity
of Solid Matter . And its AHion reaches every way to im
mense Distances, decreasing always in a duplicate ratio of tie
Distances. But the Caqfe of these Properties of Gravity, I
have not yet found deducible from Phenomena : And Hypo
theses I make not.
A a 2
Ot
357
3 5S
Cinqnihffg Rplique .de Mr. Clarke.
sut. fe# que les Corps tendent 1' un vers 1'

autre, triais seulement V Effet de cette Cau
se^ ou le Phnomne mme, & les Loix oi*
les: Proportions selon lesquelles }es Corps
tejn'ejnt.l' un vers l'autre, comme on les de/wyre par /' Exprience, quelle au en puisse
tre la Cause, Il est encore plus draisonfiable , de ne ypulpir foint admettre la Gra
vitation ou s Attraction dans le sens que
nous lui' donnons,, felon lequel elle eft cer-,
tanement un Phnomne de la Nature } <$*
de prtendre en mme temps que nous admet
tions une Hypothse aussi trange que V es?
+ io9& celle de s /'Harmonie prtablie, selon laloi %87' quelle 11 J' Ame C^ h Corps d* un homme n'
|| y'oez r ont pas plus d" influence V un fur V autret
diPPN 1l'e êux Horloges, qui vont galement bien,
' quelque loignes qu* elles soient /' une de
V autre, & fans qu il y ait entre elles av
eline atlion rciproque. Il e/l vrai que F
*?2. Auteur dit, que Dieu * prvoyant les incli
nations>' de chaque Ame, a form ds le
commencement ,lti grande Machine de /' Uni-.
vets d' une telle manire, qu* en vertu des
fjmplqs Loix du MchaniOe, les Carps
humains reoivent des mouvemens convena
bles , comme tant des parties de cette
grande Machine-, . Mais e/l- i( possible, que
t voezr de s pareils mouvemens, & gtant diversoient produits par un pur Mchanisraeîu
que ^Volont & Y Esprit ^M^'fyrM
CorpsJ. Est-il croyable, que Ms m^yp
'"
* comme
Da C e a hk eV , Fifth Reply.
359
or the Phenomenon ti self, and the Law*

or Proportion? of that Tendency discovered,
by Experience j whatever fa or be not the
Cause of k. And it seems still more unrea
sonable* not to adroit Gravitation or A
tratfion'i This sense,, in which it is mani
festly an aBual Phenomenon of nature; 5
and yet at the seme time to expect that;
there should be admitted so strange anJ$t<pothesis,: d$ the-'* harmonia preftabilfta.^ io?
which is^ f that the'.SW and 0^7, as a and 92^
Man have no more Influence upon each \7,*%:
others Motions and Affections, than:tfti pens,Xi
Clock, which* at the greatest distanceiôva n 5.
each other, go alike, without at all affect- r.
ing each other, It isalleged indeed, that
God, f fo%&t\flgxhesn<lwations o{ everts 92.
Man's Soul, so contrived at first the great
Machine of the material Universe, as that;
by the mere necessary Laws of Mechanism^
suitable Motions mould ' fcje,excited in fir
man Bodies, as Parts of tba.t great Machine,
But is it possible, that such \\ Kinds of 'Mo~\\ see AptmK and of such variety,?* those in Hu-/*^*
man Bodies are 5 mould be performed by '
mere Mechanism, without any: Influence of
WiU and Mind upon tlaem..? , Or is it cred'u
ble, that when a Man has it in his Power
to resolve and know a Month before- bandt
what he will do upon such a particular . Pay
or Hour to come , i&h credibley I say, that
his Body (hall by the mere Power of Me
chanism, impressed originally upon the maAa 4
ter?a'
3ô
Cinquime Rplique <3d Mr\ Clarke.

homme forme une resolution, & qri ilsat,
tt mois par avance; ce qu 'il fera un cer
tain jour oit une certaine heure } efi-il
croyable, dis-je, que son Corps, en vertu d*
sm simple Mchanifme qui a t produit dans
le Monde Materiel ds le commencement de la
Cration, se conformera ponluellement tou
tes les resolutions de V Esprit de cet homme
au temps marqu ? Selon cette- Hypothse,
tous les Raisonnement Philosophiques, fon
dez, fur les Phnomnes S- fur les Expe
riences, deviennent inutiles. Car, fi I*
Harmonie prtablie est vritable, itn homme
ne voit, n'entend, & ne sent rien, & il ne
II v> meut point son Corps : Il \\ s' imagine feudK
lement voir, entendre, sentirr & mouvotr
N 12. son corps. Et fi les hommes toient persua
dez que le Corps humain ri est qu* une pure
Machine, & que tous ses mouvemens qui
paroissent volontaires, " font produits par les
Loix ncessaires d* un Mchanifme materiel,
fans aucune influence ou operation de l* Ame
fur le Corps -, ils conclurroient bientt que
cette Machine eft V Homme tout entier,
&que r Ame Harmonique, d'ans V Hypo
thse d' une Harmonie prtablie, ri eft qu*
une pure fiSin & une vaine imagination.
De plus : Quelle difficult vte-ton par l
moyen d* une si trange Hypothse ? On ri
vite que celle-ci, savoir, qu* il ri est pas
possible de concevoir comment <? Substance
immatrielle peut agir sur la Matire.
MaisDk ri est-il pas une Substance im^
fr * '
matrielle X
2>. Cl AkoV Fifth Reply.
36 1
terlal Universe at its Creation, punctually

conform it self to the Resolutions of the
Man's Mind at the Time appointed > Ac
cording to This Hypothesis, All Arguments
in Philosophy, taken from Phenomena and
Experiments, are at an end. For, if the
Harmonia prftabilita be true, a Man does
not indeed fee, nor hear, nor feel any
thing, nor moves hit Body } but * only * Su a?dreams that he fees, and hears, and feels, and ?dix>
moves his Body, And if the World can I2,
once be perswaded, that a Man's Body is a
mere Machine \ and that all his seemingly
voluntary Motions are performed by the
mere necessary Laws of corporeal Mecha
nism, without any Influence, or Operation,
or ABion at all oi the Soul upon the Bo
dy , they will soon conclude, that this Ma
chine is the whole Man , and that the bartnonical Souly in the Hypothesis of an har
monia pr&Jlabilita, is merely a Fitlion and
a Dream. Besides : What Difficulty is there
. .
avoided, by so strange an Hypothesis ? This
only -,that it cannot be conceived (it seems,)
how immaterial Substance mould atl upon
Matter. But is not God an immaterial
Subflance > And does not He act upon
Matter > And -what greater Difficulty is
there in conceiving how an immaterial Sub
stance should act upon Matter, than in con
ceiving how Matter acts upon Master > Is
it not as easy to conceive, how certain
Parts
$6*
Cinqnbne Rpliqtfe de Mr. Clarke.

matrielle? Et ri agit-il pas sur la Matire .<?
V>y ailleurs, eft-il plus difficile de concevoir
qiC une Substance immatrielle agit fur
la Matire, que de concevoir que la Ma
tire agit fur la Matire .<? W efi-il pas
aujfi ais de concevoir que certaines par
ties de Matire peuvent tre obliges de
suivre les inouvemens & les inclinations de
F hwz fans aucune impression corporelle, qw
. . ; de concevoir que certaines partions de Ma
tire soient obliges de suivre leurs mouve*
mens rciproques cause, de P Union ou Ad
hesion de leurs patties, au' on ne sauroi.
expliquer par Aucun Mcbanisme .<? Ou que.
les Rayons de la Lumire scient rflchis r'f
gxdieremint par une surface qui {$ * ne tau,
chent jamais,i C e/l dequoi Mr. le Cheva*
lier Newton ftaus a donn diverses Expe
riences oculaires dans fan Optique.
Il ri efl pas moins surprenants que V Au*
teitr rpte encore en termes formels , qite -s:
11V *' depuis que le Mande a t cr, la continua
tion du mouvement des Corps celestes;, lit
formation des Plantes c des Animaux, d**
tous les mouvemens des Corps humains
de tous les autres Animaux, ne font pas
moins mchaniques que les. mouvemens &'
une Horloge. // me semble que ceux qm
soutiennent ce sentiment, devraient expliquer
en dtail par quelles Loix de Mchanjsine
/^Plantes & les Comtes cotitmuent de
r.V". -V-.-'i
>.:" ' <'
"yn.^P.trfj^
* Voez 1' Optique de Mr. Newton, Edit. LitTag. 224.

Edit. Angloise Lib. 2. Pag. 6$.
Dr.ClAKK^s Fifth Reply.

; 363
Part? of Matter may be obliged to follow
the Motions and Affections of the Swly
without corporeal Contact j as that certain
Portions of Matter should be obliged to
follow each others Motions by the adhesion
of Parts, which, no Mechanism can account
for ? or that Rays' of Light should reflect
regularly from a Surface which they f ne~
ver touch? Of which, Sir Isaac Newton
in- his Opticks has given us several evident
s*nd ocular Experiments.
Nor is it less surprizing, to find this As
sertion again repeated in express Words,
that, , after the. first Creation of Things, || II S 115,
Hbe Qfflitinuatifln. of the Motions of the hea- ll6'
venly Bodies, and the Formation of Plants
#Hd,4nimaIsy and every Motion ofthe Bodies
koth of Men and all other Animals, is >as
mecfaiflical as the Motions of a Clock. Who
ever entertains th|s Opinion, is (I thinks
obliged in reason to be able to explain partkiikrty, by what Lams of Mechanism the
Planets and Comets can continue to move
ii| the. Orbs they do, thro' unresisting Spo
ols ^ and by what mechanical Laws, both
Planss and Awwakm formed } and how
tj\e infinitely va.rjc#s spontamms * Moti- * See ap$ns us Animals, j*HdMen, ate performed* Hk.n9
Wkisfc* 1 :3:fu% persuaded, is as kapofiEb I3'
\\\i r.v- -. jI wit&.-y : _ 1 .-t.V-M'i 1 We
on.
'ii- i
. -j-,t ';, JIT.VJU-.. y.t -.|.,^ ,,
;,
.mi y, ,>, ,j
t &e Sir Isaac Newton's Opticks, Latin Edition, Pag. 224.
Sniliflr &/thn, Book 2, Page $5.
3^4

se mouvoir dans les Orbes o elles se meu
vent, au travers dy tin Espace qui ne fait
point de resistance j par quelles Loix Mchaniqus les Plantes1 <& les Animaux font
H voex rformez, & quelle est la cause des || moucewT Vemens Spontanes des Animaux & des
' Hommesj dont la varit esi presque infinie.
Mais je suis fortement persuad, qu* Un*
ft pas moins impossible d* expliquer toutes
ces choses, qiC il le feroit de faire voir qrt*
une Maison, ou une- Ville, a t btie par
*M simple Mchnisme, ou que le Monde
mme a t form des le commencement fans
:;I aucune Cause Intelligente & Active. U
Auteur reconnoitformellement, que les choses
fie ponvoient pas tre produites au com
mencement par un pur Mchnisme. Aprez
cet aveu) je'ne saurais comprendre pourquoi
il paroit fi zl bannir Dieu du Gouverne^
ment atluel du Monde, & soutenir que sa
Providence ne consiste que dans un simple
Concours (comme on V appelle,} par lequel
toutes les Cratures ne font que ce qu* elles
feraient d* elles mmes par un simple M
chnisme. Enfin, je ne saurois concevoir
pourquoi V Auteur s* imagine que Dieu est
oblig, par fa Nature ou par fa Sagefie, de
' ne rien produire dans l* Univers, qite ce
qu* une Machine corporelle peut produira
par de simples Loix Mchaniques, aprez qu
elle a t une fois mise en mouvement*.
..._ i
". <
-, v
i. '.
''
i ,
117. Cf
*. ClarkeV -Fifffc Keplyi-.-\':
%$
ble to make out, as it would be* to-flrow

how a Houfe or Ct/ could be built, or the
World it felf have been at firft formed by
mere Mecbanifm, without -any latejligent
and ABive Caufe. That Things could not
Vibe at fir produced /^* ;:i -i
prefly allowed : And, when this-'.-'
. ,:i:5
granted 5 why, after -That, fo -great Con- ' Tf
cern ihould be mown, to exclude: God's
/ Government of the WorFd, and to
allow his Providence to aB no. further than
barely in concurring' (s the Phraf is) to
let allThngs do only what, they would do
of tbemfelves by mere Mchanifmr, and
why it ihould be thought that God is.un
der .any Obligation or Confinement either
m.Nafrire QtWifdom\ never to bring about
any -thing in.th Univerfe, but what is
pofftble Sqv a. corporeal Machine to accompih by mere mechanik Latos, after it is
once fera going ;. l< can m jaon
: ri
,r ;,y,"..-,. if j ^.nWk:
. i.\\.:^ .A. C'A' - ;\>) '.<

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ii-. \\ v..-' '. '
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l'.-'jr '-v, ' ,
' rj y, 3^, -
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: . ">b
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me
$66

il 7*; Ce que le savant Auteur avoue icz%
qiC il y a du pius fr du moins dans les
vritables Miifaclesj & que les Anges peu
vent faire de tels Miracles \ ceci, dis-je,
ci^dessus efi dte&emnt * contraire ce qu' il a dit
le m E- ci-devant de la nature du Miracle dans tous
critdeMr ces Ecrits.
. :u ,':'
5 ,"^
118115. Si nous disons que le So
leil attire la Terre, au travers d1 un Espace
vuide } .F eft dire, que la Terre & le So
leil tendbnc /' un vefs V autre ( quelle qu9
en puisse tre la cause,*) \ avec une Force qui
eft en proportion dire&e de- leur Masts, ou
de leurs Grandeurs1-$* dentez prises en
semble, & m propftiott doiMe inverse de
leurs Distances ; &' que s Espae qui eft
entr ces deux Covps\ e/Nuide^ c eft dire,
quxS H* #'iet* qui rsiste sensiblement au
mmfOement des Corpt qui le traversait : tout
eela n* eft quy un Phnomne, ou- an Fast
actuel, dcouvert par- /' Experience. Il est
sans doute vrai que ce Phnomne ri est pas
j| 11& produit y sans moyen, c' eft dire, fans
une Cause capable de produire un tel effet.
Les Philosophes peuvent donc rechercher
cette Cause, & tacher de la dcouvrir, CA
cela leur eft possible, soit qu1 elle soit mchanique ou non mchanique. Mais s* ils
ne peuvent pas dcouvrir cette Cause j s* eiti
suit-il que V Effet mme, ou le Phnomnes
*voez ci- dcouvert l- par 1' Experience, (car c* est-l
dessus la
* tout ce qUe i> on veut jjre par jes mots
S uV Us ^'Attraction & de Gravitation,) s* enfuit-il,
y Dr.CLA&KEV Fifth Reply.

, 567
117. This learned Author's allowing in
this Place, that there is greater and less in
true Miracles, and that Angels are capable -1 I "
of working some true Miracles -y is perfect
ly-+ contradiftory Xo that Notion of the tf'fT*
Nature of a Miracle, which he has all mtz'jj-bird
along pleaded for in these Papers.
^,17.
118
'i 23. That the Sun attraBs
the Earth, through the intermediate void
Space j that is, that the Earth and Sun rj ^ .,
gravitate towards each other, or tend
(whatever be the Cause of that Tendency)
towards each other, with a Forte which is
in a direct proportion of their Masses, or
Magnitudes and'Densities together, and in
an inverse duplicate proportion of their D+
jlancts ^ and that the Space betwixt them
is void, that is, hath nothing in it which
sensibly resists the Motion of Bodies passing
transverfly through : All This, is nothing
but a Phenomenon, or aBual Matter of
FaB, found by Experience. That this
Phenomenon is not produced \\ satis moyen, aîlf,
that is, without some Cause capable of pro
ducing such an Effect .*, is undoubtedly
true. Philosophers therefore may search
after and discover That Cause, if they can -,
be it mechanicah ox not mechanical. But .8-' Si
if they cannot discover the Cause j is there
fore the EffeB it self, the Phnomenon, or
the Matter of FaB discovered by Experif;e, (which is * all that is meant by the *feafêe*
oids Jttraflipn and Gravitation.) ever oAuV
the
&
'
11
Mf
Leib-
"3 8
Cinquime Rplique d Mr. Clarke.

disje, que ce Phnomne soit moins ertain & Moins" incontestable ? Une Qualit
* 122. vidente doit-elle tre appellee * occulte,
parce que- la Cause1 immdiate en eft peut.. tre occulte, ou qu'elle n' est pas encore d'j.s jt ! couverte ? Lors qu uriCorps j- se meut dans
'>;'. * un Circle, fans s* loigne* par la Tangente j
ily a certainement quelque' chose, qui F en
empche: Mais fi dans quelques cas Un*
Il g* fl /wi possible; || expliquer mchaniquement la Cause "de cet Effet, ou fi elle n' a
pas encore 't dcouverte, s* enfuit-il que le
Phnomne soit faux .<?. ; Ce serait une ma
nire de raisonner sort singulire.
1 24
13c. Le Phnomne mme,
/'Attraction, la Gravitation, ou T effort
(quelque 'nom - qu* on lui donne) par lequel
les Corps tendent l'un vers -l'autre ; & les
Loix, ou les Proportions* de tette force 5
font affe& connues par les Observations C
les Experiences. Si Mr. Leibnitz, ou quelque autre Philosophe, peut expliquer ces
* ai?4 Phnomnes par * les t,oix du Mcnanisine^
bien loin d* tre contredit, tous les savana
/' en remercieront. En attendant , je ne
saurcis m* empcher de dire que V Auteur
raisonne d* une manire tout--sit extrabrti28- dinaire , en s comparant la Gravitations
qui est Phnomne oit' un Flit actuel,
wee la Dclinaison des Atomes filon la
doBrine d' Epicure j lequel ayant corrompn\
'; ; ;,* dans le dessein d* introduire -V Athisme, une
. -. \ 1 Philosophie plus, ancienne & peut- tre plut
~-'
faine
Dr. Clarke'j- Fifth Reply.
369
the less True ? Or is a manifest Quality to

be called \\bccult, because the immediate effi-'ll I22cient Cause of it fperhaps) is occult, or not
yet discovered ? When a Body * moves in a * 123.
Circle, without flying off in the Tangent \
'tis certain there is something that hinders
it : But if in some Cases it be not mecha.
nically f explicable, or be not yet disco- f 123,
vered, what that something is j does it
therefore follow, that the l Phenomenon it
self is false ? This is very singularÂrgu
ing indeed.
' ',*";
' .1 * $ :j
124 '130. The Phenomenon it self,
the'; Attraction, Gravitation, or Tendency of
Bodies towards each other, ("or whatever
other Name you please to call it by \) and
the haws, or Proportions, of that Ten
dency, are now sufficiently known by Ob
servations and Experiments. If This or any;
other learned Author can by || the Ljaws. of\\ I24,
Mechanism explain these Phenomena, he
will not only not be contradicted, but will
moreover have the abundant Thanks , of
the Learned World. But, in the, mean
time, to f compare Gravitation, (which is f ut.
a Phenomenon or atlual Matter ef FaB,)
with Epicurus's Declination of Atoms/
("which, accordingtto his corrupt and Athe
istical Perversion of,some more antientand
perhaps better Philosophy, was an Hypo
thesis or FiBion only, and an impossible ont
B b
too
370
saine, s1 avisa d' tablir cette Hypothse,

qui ri est qu* une -pure Fiction, & qui es
ailleurs est impossible dans un Monde o P
on suppose qri Un y a aucune Intelligence.
Pour ce qui est du grand Principe d* une
y las, H Raison suffisante, tout ce que le savant
&cAuteur ajoute ici touchant cette matire, ne
consiste qiC soutenir sa Conclusion, sans la
prouver -, & par consquent il ri eft pas n
cessaire d* y rpondre. Je remarquerai seu
lement que cette Expression eft Equivoque j
& qiC on peut /' entendre, comme fi eue ne
rensermoit que la Ncessit, ou commefi elle
pouvoit aussi signifier une Volont C un
Choix. Il eft trs-certain, & tout le monde
convient, qu en gnral * ily a une Raison

' lK' suffisante de chaque chose. Mais il s* agit
de savoir, si, dans certains cas, lors qi il
eft raisonnable d* agir, diffrentes manires
d' agir possibles ne peuvent pas tre gale
ment raisonnables -, si, dans ces. cas, h
s voez s simple Volont de Dieu ri eft pas une
ci-deffus Raifon suffisante pour agir dy une certaine
2o,&27^ manire plutt que d1 une autre -, & si, lors
=5que les raisons les plus fortes se trouvent S
un seul cot, les Agents intelligens 8>C libres
ri ont pas un Principe d' action, ( en quoi
je croi que V Essence de la Libert confije, )
tout sait distinct du Motif ou de la Rai
son que r Agent a en viV. Le savant Ait'
Il 5 2o & ieur n*e tout ceâ z Et comme il \\ tablit
i2$,&c. son Grand Principe d* une Raison suffisante
dans
SDr. ClarKeV Fifth Repty>
%jt
too, in a World where no Intelligence Was

supposed to be present j) seems to be a very
extraordinary Method of reasoning.
As to the grand Principle of a * suffi- ^
dent Reason ; all that this Learned Writer ^ |25'
here adds concerning it, is only by way of
Affirming, not proving, his Conclusion j
and therefore needs no Answer. I shall
only observe, that the Phrase is of an equi
vocal Signification j and may either be so
understood, as to mean Necessity only, or so
as to include likewise Will and Choice. That
in general there || is a sufficient Reason why t2i
every Thing is, which Is -, is undoubtedly
true, and agreed on all Hands. But the
Question is, whether, in some Cafes, when
it may be highly reasonable to aB, yet
different possible Ways of aBing may not
posiibly be equally reasonable \ and whe
ther, in such Cases, the * bare Will os *See above,
God be not it self a sufficient Reason for %\^
acting in this or the other particular mari
ner ^ and whether in Cafes where there are
the strongest possible Reasons altogether on
One Side, yet in all Intelligent and Frea
Agents, the Principle of Atlion ("in which
I think the Essence of Liberty consists,)
be not a diftintl Thing from the Motive or
Reason which the Agent has in his View*
All these are constantly denied by this
Learned Writer. And his |f laying down j| 2e> &
his grand Principle of a sufficient Reason t^$, <&**
B b a
in
3/2
Cinquime Rplique de Mr. Ciar kt.

dans un fens qui exclud tout ce que je viens
de dire ; qu* il demande qu' on lui ac
corde ce Principe dans ce fens-l, quoi qu'il
riait pas entrepris de le prouver ^ f appelle
cela une Petition de Principe : ce qui en tout
fait indigne d* un Philofophe.
N. B. La mort de Mr. Leibnitz a

empch de rpondre ce dernier
Ecrit. -
APP ENi
r_ .Si
....
2)r. ClarkeV Fifth Reply.

in such a Sense as to exclude all these j and
expecting it should be granted him in that
Sense, without Proof y Thisis what I- callhis Petitto Principii^ or Begging of the Que
stion : Than which, nothing can be more
unphilofophical.
' :
N. B. Mr. Leibnitz was prevented
by Death, front returning any Answer
to this last Paper. .
Bb 3
THE
373
C 374 3
APPENDICE,
o u
Recueil de 'Pajjages, tiret, des Ou
vrages imprime*, de Mr. Leibnitz,
qui peuvent servir claircir

plusieurs Endroits des Ecrits prcdens.
No
i.
I EU selon nous est Intelligentia Extramundana, comme Martianus Capella /' appelle >
D
pag. m plutt Supramundana. Theodice,
39^-
2.
J7 faut savoir qu une spontanit exaffe

nous est commune avec toutes les substances Am
ples ; fSf que dans la substance intelligente ou
libre-, elle devient un Empire sur ses aSions.

Nata
[ 375]
THE
APPENDIX.
BEING
t
A Collection of Tajfages out of Mr.

Leibnitz's Primed Works3
which may give Light to many
'Parts of the fore-going Papers.
N i.
GO D, according to My opinion, is an Ex
tramundane Intelligence , as Manianus
Capella stiles him ; or rather, a Supramandane
Intelligence. Theodicy pag. 396.
N2.
We must know , that a Spontaneity strictly
speaking, is common to Us with Allsimple Sub
stances ; and that This, in an Intelligent or Free
Substance, amounts to a Dominion over its own
Bb 4
Actions.
376
APPEND ICE.
Naturcllcment chaque substance simple a
de Id perception, ?V. Theodiceepag,. 479...
SeA vis- alliva ABum queniatn five lvn*iyeta.v
coniinet, atque inter jacultatem agenii aUioncmque ipsam media eft, & conatum involvit,
atque ita per se ipsam in operationem fertur -,
nee auxiliis indiget, fed sola sublatione impedirrfmti. %.uod; Exemplis, Gravis sufpenji funem
sustinemem intendent-k, aut Arctis terifiyilluftrari
poteft. Etfi emm gravitas aut vis elaftica mechanics
explicari pojfint debeantque ex tberismotu-,ulrima
tamen ratio motus in materia, eft vis in creatione
imprefla ; qu in unoepoque corpore ineft,Jed ipso
cofifliBu corporum varie in natura timitatur Us
ceercetur. Et bane agendi virtutem omni sub
stantial jnejfe aio, semperque aliquam ex ea aSio'nemnasci -, adeoque nee ipsam substantiam Corpoream, (non magis quam spiritualem) ab agendo
ceflare unquam. ûod illi non satis percepifle
videntur, qui Eflentiam ejus in sola extensione,
vel etiam impenetrabilitate collocaverutit, &
corpus omnimode quiescens concipere fibi Junt
vifi. Apparebtt etiam ex noftris meditationibus,
subftantiam creatam ab alia substantia creata non
ipsant vim agendi, fed prexistentisyV/ nifus
Juj, five virtutis agendi, Unites tantummodo ac
Aeterminationem accipere. Acta Erudit. Ann.
1094, pag. 11?. \ . .
Agere, eft cbaratfer substantiarum. Ibid, ad

Ann. 1695. pag. i4>.
lu< [vis activa primitiva] in omni substantia
corporea per se ineft $ cum corpus cmnimode qui
escens
The /PFE.NPIX
Actions. Naturally, 'every simple Substance
has Perception, Uc. Theoik. pag. 479.
But Active Forte contains a certain Act or
Efficacy, and is something of a middle nature
between the Faculty of acting and Action itself:
It involves zConatus or Indeavour, and is of it
self carried towards Action \ and stands in need
of no Helps, but only that the Impediment be
taken away. This may be illustrated by the
Examples of a Heavy Body stretching thelstting
it is hung by, and of a Bow bent. For though
Gravity or Elasticity may and ought to be ex
plained mechanically by the Motion of ther ;
yet the ultimate Cause of Motion in Matter, is a
Force impressed at the Creation: Which is in
every part of matter, but, according to the
course of nature, is variously limited and re
strained by Bodies striking against each other.
'And this aftive faculty I affirm to be in Ah
Substance, and that some action is always arising
from it : So that not even corporeal Substancey
any more than Spiritual, ever ceases ailing.
Which seems not to have been apprehended
by Those, who have placed the Essence of Mat
ter in Extension alone, or even in Impenetrabi
lity ; and fancied they could conceive a Body ab
solutely at Rest. It will appear also from what
I have advanced, that One created Substance does
not receive from Another the active Force it sel
but only the Limits and Determination of the
Indeavour or AUive Faculty already pre-existing
in it, ABa Erud.Ann. 1694, Pag. 112.
To Aft, is the Characteristick of Substances,
Ibid, ad Ann. 1695, Pag. 145.
Which primitive aBive Power, is of it self in
All corporeal Substance : ;For, I think, a Body
absolutely
377
378
APPENDICE.
e/certs, a rerum natura \abborrere arbitrer. Ibid.
pag. 146.
Ob formam, corpus omsemper agere. Ibid.
pag. 147.
Potentis scilicet actricis in forma, & igntm*
feu ad metum refifienti* in materid. Ibid.
pag- I5i....
Etfi principium a&ivum materialibut nottonibus superius, Us (ut sic dieam) vitale, ubique
in corpoiibus admittam. Ibid. pag. 153ABi I me explicates* est, etfi ncniun fortafte satis perspetium omnibus -, ipftm rerum
substantiam in agendi patiendique vi consiftere.
Ibid, ad Ann, 1698, Pag. 432.
,,
Ita ut mntantum omne quod agit,&tSvbstantia
singularis, fed etiam ut omnis finguhris Sub
stantial agat fine intermijjione , corpore ipib non
excepto, in quo nulla unquam quies abfoluta reperitur. Ibid.
Quod ft vero memi nostra vim infitam tribuimust attiones immanentes producendi, vel, quod
idem est, agendi immanenter , jam nihilprohibet,
itno consentaneum est, aftis animabus vet fbrmis,
aut, ft mavis, naturis Substantiarum eandem vim
inejje : Nifi quis solas in naturd rerum nobis obvia Mentes nostras a&ivas ejse j aut omnem vim
agendi immanenter, atque adeo vitaliter, ut fie
dicam, cum intellettu ejse conjunBam arbitretur :
Quotes certh AJfeverationes neque ratione ulla
consirmantur, nee nifi invttd veritate propugnantur. Ibid. Pag. 433.
Hinc
the AT FEND IX.
379
absolutely at Rest, is inconsistent with the Na

ture of Things. Ibid. Pag. 146.
Every Part of Matter is, by its .E>ra, conti
nually Atting. Ibid. Pag. 147.
The ASive Power, which is in the Form -, and
the inertia, or repugnance to Motion, which is
in the Matter. Ibid. Pag. 151. .
Though I admit every where in Bodies, a
Principle superior to the [common] Notion of
Matter , a Principle ASive, and (if I may Ib
speakJ Vital Ibid. Pag. 153,
I have elsewhere explained, though it is a
Thing perhaps not- yet well understood by All ;
that the very Substance of Things, consists in the
Power of ABing and being ABed upon. Ibid, ad
Ann. 1698. Pag. 432.
So that, not only every Thing which a&s, is a
single Substance- , but also every single Substance
does perpetually aft : Not excepting even Matter
itself; m which there never is any Absolute
Rest. Ibid.
If we ascribe to our own Minds an intrinsic!?
Power of producing immanent Actions, or
("which is the fame Thing,) of Acting imma-nently : 3Tis no way unreasonable, nay 'tis very
reasonable, to allow that there is the fame Pow
er in other Souls or forms, or (if that be a better
Expression,) in the Natures of Substances. Un
less a Man will imagine, that, in the whole Ex
tent of Nature within the compass of our Know
ledge, our own Minds are the only Things en
dued with ASive Powers -, or that All Power of
a&ing immanently and vitally (if I may so speak,)
is connected with Understanding, Which Kind
,of Assertions, certainly, are neither founded on
any Reason , nor can be maintained, but in op
position to Truth. Ibid. Pag. 433.
The
3Sb
APPENDICE.
Hinc judicari potest, debere in corporea SurP
stantia reperiri entelechiamprhnam, tanquam Tfra
Aktikov activitatis ; vim scilicet motricem primitivam, qua prater extenswnem {feu id quod est
mere G'eometrieum) & prater ntolem (feu id
quod eft mere materiale) superaddita, semper
quidem agit, fed tamen varie ex corporum concurfibus per conatus impetusve modificatur. . Atque hoc ipsnm Substantiate principium est, quod
m viventibus anitria, in a/iis forma Substantialis
appeUatur. Ibid. Pag. 434.
' \ ' ^
Primam [materiam] ejfe mere pajjivam, Jed

non ejfe completam Substantiam ; accedereque
aded debere animam vel forman Anim analogam,,/w 'vniM.x<*a w-7i-?*T*\ id est, nilum quendam feu vim agendi primitivam, qua ipsa est
hex in/ita, deeret0 divino impreffa. A qua Jententid non puto abborrere Virum cekbremtSf ingeniosum, qui nuper defendit, Corpus constare ex
Materia & Spiritu $ modb sumatur Spiriras non
pro re intelligente {ut alias folet,) fed pro Ani
ma vel forma Anim analoga ; nee pro fimpliei
fnodificatione, Jed pro constitutive Substantial!
perieverante, quod Monadis nomine appellare Joleo, in quo est velut Perceptio & appetitus. Ibid.
F^.435.
Contra potins arbitror, neque ordini neque pulcbritudini rationive rerum ejfe consentaneum, ut
vitale aliquid, feu immanenter agens, fit in exigua tantum pane materi ; cum ad majorem perhftionem pertineat, ut fit in omni^ neq; quicquam obstei, quo minus ubiq; fint Anim, nut
analoga saltern Animabus ; etfi dominantes Ani
m
The APPENDIX.
381
Hence we may gather, that there must needs

be in corporeal Substance an original Efficacy, or
(as it were) prime Recipient of Attive Force :
That is, there must be in it a primitive Motive
Tower: Which being added over and above the
Extension (or that which is merely geometrical,)
and <over and above the Bulk (or that which is
merely material;) alls 'indeed continually, but
yet is variously modified by the Conatws and
Impetus's of Bodies striking against each other.
And This is That Substantial "Principle, which,
in Living Substances, is stiled Soul ; in Others,
the Substantial Form. Ibid. Pag. 434.
The materia prima is indeed merely passive,
but 'tis not a complete Substance. To make it
complete Substance, there must be moreover a
Soul, or a Form analogous to Soul, or an original
Efficacy, that is, a certain Indeavour, or Primi
tive Power of Ming ; which is an innate Law,
impressed by the Decree of God. Which Opi
nion I think is not different from that of. an Eminent and Ingenious Gentleman, who has lately
maintained, that Body consists of Matter and
Spirit-, meaning by the word Spirit, not (as usu
ally) an intelligent thing, but a Soul ox Form ana
logous to Soul; and not a simple Modification, but
a substantial Permanent Constituent, which I used
to call a Monad, in which is,,as it were, Per
ception and Desire. Ibid. pag. 435. .
On the contrary, I am rather ofopinion, that
'tis neither agreeable to the Order, nor Beauty,
nor Reason of things, that there should be a
Vital Principle or Power os ailing immanently ,
only in a very small part os Matter ; when it
would be an argument of greater Perfection, for
it to be in M matter; and nothing hinders but
' that
382
APPENDICE.
mar, atque adeo intelligentes, quales sunt httman, ubique esse non possmt. Ibid. Pag. 456.
Cum id quoi non agit, quoi vi activa caret,quo
iifcriminibilitate, quoi itn'ique omni subsistenii
ratione ac sundamento spoliaur ; subitantia esse
nuo moiopojfit. Ibid. Pag. 439.
Voiez cy-dessous, N il.
N 3.
Il [Monsieur Bayle] sait voir assis amplement
(Rep. au Provincial, ch. 139, P748, fqq.) qii .
on peut comparer s ame une Balance, o les
Raisons & les Inclinations tiennent lieu de poids;
C selon luy, on peut expliquer ce qui se passe
dans nos rsolutions, par /' Hypothse, que la vo
lont de V Homme est comme une Balance, qui
se tient en repos, quand les poids, de ses deux
bassins font gaux ; & qui panche toujours au d'
un cot ou de s autre, selon que V un des bassins
est plus charg. Une nouvelle Raison sait un
poids suprieur ; une nouvelle Ide rayonne plus
vivement que la vieille ; la crainte i une grosse
peine, s emporte sur quelque plaisir ; quand deux
passions se disputent le terrein, cess toujours la
plus forte qui demeure la Maitrejfe, moins
'que l' autre ne soit aide par la Raison, ou par
quelque autre passion combine. Theodice, Pag.
5H-,
' .
.
V on a d* autant plus de peine fe determi
ner, que les Raisons opposes approchent plw de
Tk APPENDIX.
383
that there may Everywhere be Souls, or at least

Something analogous to Souls ; though Souls in
dued with Dominion and Understanding, such as
are Humane Souls, cannot be Everywhere. Ibid.
pag.^6.
What doth not ait, what wants Atfive Vovoer,
what is void of Difcernibility, what wants the
whole ground and foundation of Subsistence-,
can no way be a Substance. Ibid. pag. 439.
See below, N 11.
'
Mo
fM ->3-
Mr. Boyle has shown at large (in his Answer

to a Provincial, eh. 139, p. 748 tfc.) that a
Mans Soul may be compared to a Balance,
wherein Reasons and Inclinations are in the place
of Weights: And, according to Him, the man
ner of our forming our resolutions may be ex
plained by This Hypothesis , that the Will of
Man is like a Balance , which stands always un
moved when the Weights in Both Scales are
equal, and always turns on one fide or the other,
in proportion as One Scale has more Weight in
it than the Other. A New Reason, makes an
Overpoise of Weight. A new Idea strikes the
Mind more vigorously than a foregoing one.
The Fear of a Great Pain , determines more
strongly than the expectation of a Pleasure.
When Two Passions contend against each other,
the stronger always remains Master of the Field,
unless the Other be assisted either by Reason,
or by some other passion conspiring with it.
Theodic. pag. 514.
A Man has always so much the more diffi
culty of determining himself, as the opposite
Reasons
3S4
APPENDICE;
s galit -, comme s on voit que la Balance se da
termine slus promtement, lors qu il y a une
grande difference entre les poids. Cependant ;
comme bien souvent, il y\ a plusieurs partis
prendre, on pourroit, au lieu de la Balance, com
parer s ame avec une force, qui fait effort en
mme tems de plusieurs cots, mais qui n' agit
que l o elle trouve le plus de facilit, ou le
moins de refinance. Par Exemple, s air tant
comprim trop fortement dans un Recipient de
verre, le caffera pouf sortir. Il fait effort sur
chaque partie, mais il se jette enfin fur /a plus
feible. C est ainsi que les Inclinations de Y ame
vont fur tous les biens qui se prsentent ; ce
font des volonts antcdentes ; mais la volont
consquente, qui en est le rsultat, se determine
vers ce qui touche le plus. Theodice, Pag. 515.
Votez cy-deflbus, N 4 ifs 9.
;
: .'
": ...
'** *
N 4>.
Il n'y a jamais d' indifference d' quilibre,
c'est dire, o tout soit parfaitement gal de
part ff d' autre, sans qu, il y ait plus d' Inclina
tion vers un ct. , Theodice, Pag. 158.
Il est vray, fi le cas [de 1' ne entre deux prz,
galement port T un & 1' autre,] etoit
pojjble, qu il faudrait dire qu il se laisseroit
mourir de faim : Mais dans le fond la Question
est fur t impossible, moins que Dieu ne produise
la chose exprs. Ibid. Pag, 16 1.
Voez ci-dessus, N 3 -, 8c ci-deilbus, N 9.
Tk ATTfNDlX.
3S5
Reasons draw nearer to an equality : Just as we

fee a Balance turn lb much the more readily, as
the Weights in each Scale are more different
from one another. However, since there are of
ten more than two ways which a Man may
take , we may therefore, instead of This simi
litude of a Balance, compare the Soul to a Force,
which has at one and the fame time a Tendency
many ways, but ails on That part only where it
finds the Greatest Ease, or the Least Resilience.
For example : Air strongly compressed in a
Glass-Receiver, will break the Glais to get our.
It presses upon every part, but at last makes its
way where the Glass is weakest. Thus the In
clinations of the Soul, tend towards All apparent
Goods ; And these are the antecedent Volitions:
But the Consequent Volition, which is the last
Result, determines itself towards That Good
which affects us the most strongly. Ibid.pag. 5 15.
See below, N 4 and 9.
There is never any such thing as an Indiffe

rence in aquilibrio ; that is, such an one, where
every circumstance is perfectly equal on Both
fides, so that there is no inclination to one side
rather than the other. Theodic&a, pag. 158.
'Tis True, if the Case [of the Ass sanding
between Two green fields, and equally liking Both
of them] was possible, we must fay he would
suffer himself to be starved to Death. But at
the bottom, the Case is impossible to happen \
unless God should order circumstances so on
Purpose. Ibid. pag. 161.
See above, N 3; and below, Na .
Cc
N 5.
3S6
APPENDICE.
N 5.
. ' --r- C est yne suite du Systme e V Har
monie prtablie, dont il est ncessaire de donner
quelque explication icy. Les Pbilosopbes de /'
Ecole croyaient, qu il y aitoit une influence phy
sique rciproque entre le corps C /' ame: Mais
depuis quon a bien considr que la sense &
la maffe tendue ri cm aucune liaison ensemble,
& que ce sont des creatures qui different roto
gnre i plusieurs modernes ont reconnu, qu' il
n'y a aucune communication physique entre s
ame & le corps, quoique la communication M
taphysique subsiste toujours, qui fait que s ame
(y le corps composent un mme suppost, ou et
qu on appelle une personne. Cette communication
physique, s' il y en avoit, seroit que P ame
ebangeroit le degr de la vitejje & la ligne de
direction de quelques mouvemens qui font dans
le corps ; y que, vice versa, le corps ebange
roit la fuite des penses qui font dans ame.
Mais en ne fauroit tirer cet effet dr aucune no
tion qu on conoive dans le corps, & dans s
ame -, quoique rien ne nous soit mieux connu
que s ame, puisqu elle nous est intime, c1 est
dire intime * elle mme. Theodice, pag. 172.
The APPENDIX.
This is a Consequence of my System of a

pre-establifhei Harmony-, which it may be ne
cessary here to give some Account of The
Scholastick Philosophers were of Opinion, that
the Soul and Body mutually offered each other by
^Natural Influence : But since it has been well
considered, that * Thought and extended Lub~
stance have no Connexion with each other, and
are Beings that differ totogenere ; many modern
Philosophers have acknowledged, that there is
no physical Communication between the Soul and
the Body, though a Metaphysical Communication
there always is, by means of which the Soul
and the Body make up one Suppositum, or what
we call a Person. If there was any physical
Communication between them, then the Soul
could change the Degree of Swiftness, and the
Line of Direction of certain Motions in the Bo
dy ; and, on the other side, the Body could
cause a Change in the Series of Thoughts which
are in the Soul. But now, such an Effect as
this, cannot be deduced from the Notion of any
thing we can conceive in the Body and Soul \
though nothing be better known to us t than the
Soul, because 'tis intimate to Us, that is, to it
self Theodicxa, Pag. 172.
Cc 2
I can* The Thinking Substance, he stiouli have said : For
Thought, or the Aft. of Thinking, u not a Substance.
f Note. As tb~e Eye sees not itself; and if a Man had
never seen Another's Eye, nor the Image of his own in a
GLfs, be could never have had Any Notion what an Eyeh-'
Si the Soul discerns not its own Substance*
387
3$$
APPENDICE.
Je ne pouvais manquer de venir ce syfleme,
qui porte que Dieu a- cr s cime d' abord de telle
fa<;on, qu elle doit se produire & se reprsenter
par ordre ce qui se passe dans le corps ; & le corps
aussi de telle finon, qu7 il doitfaire de foi mme
ce que /' ame ordonne. Desorte que les loix, qui
fient les penses de s ame dans s ordre des causes
finales, Cf suivant s volution des perceptions,
doivent produire des images quise rencontrent C
s' accordent avec les impressions des- corps fur
nos organes ; tf que les loix des mouvemens
dans le corps, qui j1 entresuivent dans s ordre
des causes efficientes, se rencontrent aussi C s
accordent tellement avec les penses de V ame,
que le corps est port agir dans le tents que t
ante le veut. Ibid. Pag. 176.
Monsieur jaquelot a trs bien montr danssm

Jvre de la conformit de la Raison & de la Foy,
que c est conime fi celui qui sait tout ce que s
ordonnerai un valet le lendemain tout le lorig
du jour, saisoit un Automate qui ressemblt par
faitement ce valet, f qui excutt demain
point nomm, tout ce que s ordonnerons ; Ce qui
ne ni empecberoit pas <r ordonner librement
tout ce qui me plairoit, quoique /' atlion de s Au
tomate qui me serviroit, ne tendroit rien du
libre. Ibid. pag. 176.
Le vray moyen, par lequel Dieu fait que s
ame a des sentimens de ce qui se passe dans le
corps, vient de la nature de Y ame, qui eft repre
sentative des corps, & faite en forte par avance,
que
The AT FEN D IX.

I cannot help coming into this Notion, that
God created the Soul in such manner at first, as
that it produces within it self, and represents in
it self successively, what passes in the Body ; and
that he has made the Body also in such manner,
as that it must os it self do what the Soul wills.
So that the Laws which make the Thoughts of
the Soul follow each other successively in the Or
der of final Causes, and in the Order of its Per
ceptions arising within it self; must produce
Images, which shall be coincident, and go Hind
in Hand with the Impressions made by Bodies
upon our Organs of Sense : And the Laws by
which the Motions of the Body follow each
other successively in theQrder ofefficient Causes,
are likewise coincident and go Ifand in Hand
with the Thoughts of the Soul, in such manner
as that these Laws of Motion make the Body
act at the same Time that the Soul Wills. Ibid.
Fag. 176.
Mr. Jaquebt has very well shown, in his
Book concerning the Agreement os Reason and
Faith, that this is just as if One who knew be
fore-hand every particular thing that I should
order my Footrnan to do to Morrqw all the
Day long, should make a Machine to resemble
my Footman exactly, and punctually to perform
all Day to Morrow every Thing I directed,
Which would not at all hinder my freely ordering
whatever I pleased, though the Actions of my
Machine-lootman had no Liberty at all. Ibid.
Fag. 176.
The true Means by which God causes the
Soul to have a Perception of what passes in the
Body, is This -, that he has made the Nature os
the S011I to b& Representative of Bodb$, and tq
38?
390
A P P E N D I C E.
que les representations, qui naltront en elle les
tines des autres par une suite naturelle de pensees, repondent au cbangement des corps. Ibid.
Pag. 550.
Yoiez cy-dessus, N 2 j & cy-dessous N it.--
N 6.
Et de mime, fi Dieu vouloit qtê les organes
des corps humains fe conformajfent avec les valontes de /' ame, suivant lesyjleme des causes 00
calionelles ; cette by ne s' executeroit aujfi, que
par des miracles perpetuels. Theodicee,Pag. 383.
, Voiez cy-deflbus, N 8.
N7lmb pctius materiam resistere motui, per quaniamjuam inertiam naturalem, aKepletopluchre
sic denominatam ; ita ut non fit indifferens ad
motum & quietem, uti vulgo rem astimare falent ; fed ad motum, pro magnitudine sua, vi
tanto majore aBiva indigeat. Acta Erudit. ad
Ann. 1698. pag. 454.
Inertiam naturalem, oppositam motui. Ibid,.
Ignavia quadam, ut se dicam , id eji, ad Mo
tum icpugnatione. Acta ad Ann. i6?j, Pag.
H7'
Ignaviac, feu ad Motum reiistenti, in materia. Ibid. Pag. iji.
Les Experiences aujfi du choc des corps,
jointes a la raijon, font voir qu ilfaut employer
djeuxfois plus deforce pour donnerune meme vi\'iT' ' '.'""< Vs.."
jefy
The AT TEND IX.
3pi
be before-hand Ib constituted, as that the" Repre

sentations which shall arise in it, one following"
another according to the natural Succession of.
Thoughts shall be coincident with such Change
as happens in Bodies. Ibid, Pag. 550.
See above, N 2 ; and below, N 11.
N 6.
'
In like manner, should it be the Will of God,

that the Organs of human Bodies should move
conformably to the Volitions of the Soul, consi
dering those Volitions as occasional Causes , such
a Law could not be put in Execution, but hjr
perpetual Miracles. Theodica, Pag. 383.
See below, N 8. . .
'
N
7.
';
"j
Nay rather, Matter resists Motion, by a cer

tain natural Inertia, very properly 10 stikd by
Kepler : So that Matter is not indifferent to Mo
tion and Rest, as is vulgarly supposed ; but needs
a greater active Force, in proportion to the
Magnitude of the Body, to put it in Motion.
A8a Erudit. ad Ann 1698, Pag. 434.
A Natural Inertia, repugnant to Motion.
Ibid.
A certain Sluggishness, if I -.may so speak,
that is, a repugnancy to Motion. ASa Erudit,
ad Ann. 169;, Pag. 147.
A Sluggishness, or Resistence to Mptm, in
Mter. Ibid. Pag. 151. b \.
The Experiments of Bodies striking against
each other, as well as Reason, (how that twice
3s m/ach Force is required to give the fame Ve->
Cc 4
iocity
55?2
APPENDICE.
te(fe un corps de la mme matire, mais deux

fois plus grand: Ce gui ne feroit peint nsceffaire, fi la matire tQit abfolument 'indifferente
an repos & au mouvement, & fi elle n avoir
pas cette inertie naturelle, dont; nons venons de
parler, qui lui donne une efpece de repugnance
tre mue. Theodice. Pag. 14.2.
Il femble, en confider'ant indifference de la
matire au mouvement 8c au repos, que le plus
grand corps en repos pourroit tre emportJans
* aucune refinance par le moindre corps quijeroit
en mouvement ; au quel as'il y auroit anion fans
reaBion, tf un effet plus grand que fa eaufie.
Ibid. Pag. 538.
8.
.'
eft pourquoy, fi Dieu faifoit une loy gner

raie, qui portt que les corps attiraient les
uns les autres -, il n en faurojt obtenir F exe
cution, que par des miracles perptuels. Theo
dice, Pag. 382.
Voiez cy-deffus, 6.
9On peut dire de mme en matire de parfaits
fagejje, qui ri1 efl pat moins rgle que les Moz
thmatiques -, que s' y avojt pas le Meil
leur (Optimum) parmi tous les mondespoffibles.
Dieu en auroit produit aucun. Theodice.
pag. n.
*
Voiez cy-deffus, 4 3j.i.
': * ;..*
Ttie APPENDIX.
393
locity * to a Body of the same Kind of Matter,

double in Bigness. Which would not be needful,
if Matter was absolutely indifferent to Rest and
Motion, and had not that natural Inertia I spoke
of, which gives it a fort of Repugnancy to Mo
tion. Theodicaa, Pag. 142.
It might be expected, supposing Matter in
different to Motion and Reft, that the largest
Body at Rest, might be carried away without
any Resistence, by the least Body in Motion. In
which Case, there would be Action without Re
action, and an Effect greater than its Cause.
Bid. Pag. $38.
N 8.
Wherefore if God made a general Law, that
Bodies should Attratt each other ; it could not
be put in Execution, but by perpetual Miracles.
Theodicaa, Pag. 382.
See above, N 6.
N 9.
The same may be said concerning perfect
Wisdom, (which is no less regular than Mathernaticks ,) that if there was not a Best among all
the Worlds that were possible to have been made,
God would not have made Any at all. Theo
dicaa, Pag. l\6.
See above, N 4, and 3.
N 10.
* Note. The Author did not consider, that twice as much
force is requisite likewise to stop the fame-Velocity in a Bod/
of (be fame Kind of Matter, double in Bigness.
^4
APPENDICE.
';' N 10.
SI -fingeremitsuai sphttras c&ncentricas ftrfieras, & perse&e tarn' inter se qum in partibus Juis similares, alteram. alteri ita inclufar
esse*, ut nee minimus fit hiatus ; tune, five volvi
inclfnm , five quiescere ponamus, ne Anglus
quidem, ne quid amplius dieam, ullum poterit notare discrhnen inter divers temporis status, aui
indicium habere discernendi utrum quiescat an
volvatur indusa spheera, & qua mots leg
ActaErudit. ad Ann. 1698, pag.437. . -
N 11.
jF y [dans le system? del' Harmonie prtabliej fais voir, que naturellement chaque sub
stance simple a de la perception, ifs que son in
dividualit confifte dans la loy perptuelle qui fait
la fuite des perceptions qui lui font affeiesy ?
qui naissent naturellement les unes des autres,
pour reprsenter le corps qui lui est assigns M.
par son moyen V Univers entier, suivant le point
de veue propre cette substance simple, sans qu
elle ait besoin de recevoir aucune influence phy
sique du Corps : Comme le Corps aujfi deson caf,
s' accommode -aux volonts de s ame par ls pro
pres loix, Of par consequent ne lui obit, q
<WMt -3.xs3._loix le. jparwiy Theodice,
P*g- 479 >.''.
the AFP EN2) JX

N 10.
If we imagine two perfect Spheres concentrical, and perfectly similar both in the Whole and
in every Part, to be inclosed one in the other, Ib
as that there (hall not be the least Interstice be
tween them , then, whether the inclosed Sphere
be supposed to revolve, or to continue at Rest -,
an Angel himself (not to say more) could disco
ver no difference between the State of these
Globes at different Times, nor find Any Way of
discerning whether the inclosed Globe continued
at Rest, or turned about , or with what Law of
Motion it turned. ASa Erudit. ad Ann. 1698.
Tag. 437.
N9 11.
In my Doctrine of a pre established Harmony,

I show, that every single Substance is naturally
indued with perception ; and that its Individua
lity consists in that perpetual Law, which causes
its appointed Succession of Perceptions, arising
naturally in order one from another, so as to re
present to it its own Body, and, by the fame
Means, the Whole Universe, according to the
Toint of View proper to that single Substance ,
without its needing to receive any physical Influ
ence from the Body. And the Body likewise, on
Its Part, acts correspondents to the Volitions
of the Soul, by its own proper haws ; and con
sequently does not obey the Soul, any otherwise
than as those Laws are correspondent. Theodicta. fag. 479.
$p5
%96
.APPENDICE.
Aussi faut-il avouer, que Saque ame se re
prsente l' Univers suivant son point de vue, ?
far un rapport qui luy est propre-, mais une par
faite harmoniey subsiste toujours. Ibid. Pag. 5 5: 2.
V operation des Automates spirituels, c est
aire des Ames, n est point mcanique ; mats elle
contient minemment ce qu il y a de beau dans la
Jllecanique ; les mouvemens, dvelopps dans les
corps, y tant concentrs par la representation,
comme dans un monde Ideal, qui exprime ks.foix
du monde actuel & leursfuites-, avec cette dif
ference du monde ideal parfait qui est en Dieu,
que la popart des perceptions dam les autres ne
font que consufe.s. Car U sfut savoir que toute
Substance simple enveloppe 1' Univers par ses
perceptions confuses ou fentimens, C que lafuite
des ces perceptions est rgle par la nature par
ticulire de cette substance ; mais d' une ma
nire quiv exprime toujours toute la nature uni
verselle : ? toute perception prsente, tend #<?
perception nouvelle, comme tout mouvement qu
elle reprsente, tend un autre mouvement.
Mais il est impossible que V ame puijfe connoitre
distinctement toute fa nature, U s appercevoir
comment ce nombre innombrable de petites per
ceptions entastes, ou plutt concentres ensemble,
s'y forme: Il faudroit pour cela qu elle connt
perfalternent tout s \Jnivers qui y est envelopp,
c est dire,qu elle ft un Dieu. Ibid. pag. 6c?.
Votez cy-dessus, N 2 (s 5.
K 12.
the XPPEtmiX.
3p7
It must also be contested, that every Soul re

presents to it self the Universe\ according to its
Point of View, and by a Relation peculiar to it :
But there is always a perfect Harmony between
them. Ibid. Pag. 5^2.
The Opetation of Spiritual Machines, that is,
of Souls, is not mechanical , but it contains
eminently, whatever is excellent in Mechanism i
the Motions which appear actually in Bodies,
being concentred by representation in the Soul,
as man Ideal World, which represents the Laws
of the Actual Worlds and the Series of thei*
being put in Execution 5 differing in This from
the Perfect Ideal World which is in God, that
most of the Perceptions in Human Souls are but
confused. For we must know, that every single
Substance includes the Universe in its indistinct
Perceptions j and that the Succession of these
Perceptions is regulated by the particular Na
ture of the Substance ; but yet in a manner
which always represents . Whole Universal Na
ture. And every present Perception tends to
wards a new Perception , as every Motion,
which such Perception represents, tends towards
a new Motiatt. But 'tis impossible the Soul
should be able to understand distinctly its own
whole Nature, and to apprehend how this num
berless Number of little Perceptions, heaped up,
or rather concentred together., are produced. In
order to This, it would be requisite that the
Soul understood perfectly the whole Universe,
which is included within it ; that is, it must be
a God. Ibid. Pag. 603.
See above, N 2 and j".
N 12.
3^8
APPENDICE.
N* 12.
V enchanement des caufes l'tes les unes

avec les autres, va loin. eft pourquoi la raifon que M. Defcartes a allgue, pour prouver
/' indpendance de nos allions libres par un pr
tendu fentiment vif interne, n a point deforce.
Nous ne pouvons pasfent'tr proprement ntre in
dpendance-, i5> nous ne nous apercevons, pas
tousjours des caufes, fouvent imperceptibles, dont
ntre refolution depend. eft comme fi guille
aimante prenoii plaifir de je tourner vers le
Nord -, car elle croiroit tourner indpendamment
de quelque autre caufe, ne s3 appercevant pas des
mouvemens infenfuies de la matire magntique.
Theodice pag. 162.
Voiez cy-deflbus, 13.
-:
13.
Une infinit de grands & de petits mouve
mens internes 8c externes concourent avec nous,
dont le plus fouvent on ne s1 appen/rt pas -, &j'
ai dj dit, que lors qu onfort une chambre, il
y a telles raifons qui nous dterminent mettre
un .tel pied devant, fans qu on y reflechijfe.
Theodice pag. 158.
Voiez cy-deius, 12.
: .?.
The APPENDIX.
399
N9 12.
The Chain of Causes connected one with ano
ther, reaches very far. Wherefore the Reason
alledged by Des Cartes, to prove by a pretended
vigorous inward Sense, the independence of our
Free Actions \ is altogether inconclusive. We
cannot, strictly speaking, be sensible of our not
depending on other Causes : For we cannot al
ways perceive the Causes, (they being often imperceptible,) on which our Resolutions depend.
Tis as if a Needle touched with a Loadstone,
was sensible os, and pleased with its turning to
wards the JW/fc. for it would believe that it
turned it self, independently on any other Cause ;
not perceiving the insensible Motions of the
Magnetick Matter. Theodica, Pag. 162.
See below, N 1 3.
N 13.
An infinite Number of Great and Small Mo
tions Inttrnal and External, concur with us,
which generally we are not sensible of And I
have already said, that, when a Man walks out
of a Room, there are such reasons which de
termine him to set One Foot forward rather.than
the other, though he observes it not. Tbeodicta,
Pag.itf.
See above, N 12.
L E T,'
LETTERS
T O
Dr.CLARJÊ
CONCERNING .
Liberty and Necessity

FROM
Gentleman of the University

of Cambri dge;
WITH
The Doctor's Answers to them.
LONDON:
Printed in the Year, MDCCXVII.
*<t * <C M
! i:< ~7.
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. . . .- i : . . ' .
[ 43 ]
First L E IT ER.
Reverend SIR,
Jan. i. 171s;
%&$s$& Have no other pretense to trouble
p^r nr^ you on this occasion, but That
fc!!L * j^ kight which all Mankind may
jl^ jfc"B|! plead to the Instructions of a
mw*m Great and Good Man. The small
share of time I have spent in Study, has been
employ'd in examining the fundamental Princi
ples of Reason and Philosophy. In this pursuit
I must have been absolutely blind, if your
Discourse on the Being, and Attributes of Go&
had escap'd me-, in which your account of Li
berty and Necejfity has fileric'd a great many
Dimcultiesywhich perplex'd me very much.But I
have One still remaining on my Mind, which I
could wish to get rid of-, and therefore beg your
Assistance. I see plainly, Man is not over-ruTd
by any blind Impulse : But, that every Volition
is not necessary, this I cannot lee. 'Tis allow'd,
that the Will is no other but the last Judgment
of the Understanding. It will likewise, I sup
pose, be granted, that the Last Judgment ofthe
Understanding assenting to or dissenting ftom any
Speculative Proposition, is necessary. My enSuiry then is, Why the last Judgement of the
Understanding assenting to or dissenting from
any VraBical proposition Cby which the Man is
determin'd to actj should not be equally neces
sary : And also, whether such a NeceJJity be
not, in all its Consequences and Effects, (tho not
Dd 2
in
4o4
The First LETTER.

in its foundation,) the very fame which the Fa
talists maintain. To give an Instance : A Man
Judges it better to consult his present Ease,
than to wait for the greatest Happiness in Re
version. Does he not then AB by the fame
KeceJJity, by which Another Man fudges the
Contrary to be more Eligible- ? or, to speak
more properly, by the same Neceffity by which
a Mathematician Judges that a Triangle is one
half of a Square on the fame Base and between
the lame Parallels ? To pursue this Matter a
little farther ; God is absolutely perfect , He
Judges then, in every Instance, That to be best,
(i. e. Wills ThatJ which in Nature and Reality
n best; He is therefore necessarily Good and
Just. Every Man is Imperiect -, He judges
then in many Instances. That to be best, ('i.e.
Wills ThatJ which in Nature and Reality k
not best: Every Man therefore is by necejjity
imperfectly Good and Just , and That, accord
ing to their several Degrees of Imperfection.
How is any Creature then accountable for the
Want of that Perfection which God never gave
N it, neither was it in its Power to give itself?
Thus, Sir, I have open'd my Opinion, as cleatly
and fully as I could ; which will, I hope, save
you some Trouble. And now, when I look
back, I cannot but suspect that I am got into a
very odd train of Thoughts . And yet, when
I take a survey of my Ideas on all sides, I am
at a Loss how or where the Delusion could creep
in. If you condescend to answer my Letter, I
shall receive it with the Reverence and Esteem
due to so great a Character, and for ever think
my gjf
Tour Most Obliged
Humble Servant, Sec.
THE
C 45 ]
THE
Answer to the First LETTER,

Jan. i\ 171ss
SIR,
YO U have put the Argument against Li*
berty, more short and strong than I have
usually seen it. The True Answer to it, I think,
is This. So tar as any thing is Pajstve, so fir
'tis subject to Necessity -, so far as 'tis an Agent,
so far 'tis Free : For ABion and Freedom are, I
think, perfectly Identical Ideas. To explain this,
in the Instance you alledge. Truth and Good are
to the Understanding, what a Luminous ObjeB is
to the Eye. The Eye, when open, fees the Object
neceffarily, because 'tis passive in fb doing. The
Understanding likewise, when open, perceives the
Truth of a speculative Proposition, or the Rea
sonableness of a PraBical Proposition, necestarily^
because the Understanding also is pastive in so
doing. Only, as a Man by the ABion of shut
ting his Eyes, may avoid seeing -, so by the
ABion of withdrawing his Attention , he may
avoid understanding. But allowing the last
Judgment of the Understanding to be always necejsary, as indeed I think it is ; yet tishat follows
from thence ? Judging, is one thing , and Ming,
is another. They depend upon Principles to
tally different from each other, and which have
no more connexion than ABiveness and Paffiveness. Neither God nor Man can avoid seeing
That to be True, twhich they fee is True ; or
judging That to be Fit and Reasonable, which
Dd 3
they
406
The Answer to the FirfiLettefi

they see is Fit and Reasonable. But in All this,
there is no Attion , any more than Gods being
Omnipresent, (which depends not on his Will,)
can be said to be a Divine AS. The physical
Power of Atfing, (which, both in God andsMan,
is the Essence of Liberty,) continues exactly the
lame aster the last Judgment of the Understand
ing, as before. For example : It appears from
several Promises (suppose, ) that 'tis at this In
stant the last Judgment of the "Divine Under
standing, that 'tis not reasonable the world
should be destroyed This day. Does it follow
from thence, that God's physical Power of de
stroying it, is not exactly the fame This day, as
it will be at any time hereafter ? And is it not
evident, that the necessity by which (God is Om
nipresent or Omniscient, and the necessity by
which he keeps his Promise, are things that have
no similitude but in Name ; the one being na
tural and literal, the other merely figurative%
and moral? The Summ is: There is no Con-'
nexion between Approbation and ABion ; be
tween what is Passive, and what is ABive. The
Spring of ABion , is not the Understanding :
For a Being incapable of ABion, might never
theless be capable ofPerception : But the Spring
ofA8ion,\s The SelfMotive Power, which is (in
AU Animals) Spontaneity, and (in rational ones)
what we call Liberty. All Errour in this Mat
ter, has ( I think ) arisen from Mens using the
word, Will, in a confused Sense, to express
(indistinctly) partly what is Passive, and partly
what is ABive.
."., :
J am, Sir, Sac.
.... -m . i
THE
[407]
THE
Second LETTER.
Jan, 6^ 1-)%
Reverend SIR,
!?fiP$15
Shall detain you
longer,
thanand
to
gjr Jr*ji acknowledge
yournogreat
Favour,
!?<* * *jj proceed to offer my Reasons, why I
ShC^s
c311001satisfies
apprehend
your Argum^m Jn ment
the how
Difficulty.
But
first it will be of use, to settle my Notion of
NeceJJity. Thus therefore : When in any giveri
Circumstance it is a Contradiction to suppose any
Being, Mode, or Action, to have been other
wise than it actually is ; That Being, Mode, or
Action, is in That Instance necessary, absolutely
and properly speaking. To apply this to the
Question before us, viz. Whether Human
Actions are strictly and properly necejsary. The
last Judgment as the Understanding, is grant
ed necejsary in every Instance of Volition $ Every
Action therefore, or Self-Motion, (be its Cause
or Principle what it will,) is, I think, also
necejsary. For it either necessarily follows a Man s
last Judgment or Volition, or it does not : If it
does, it is then strictly and properly necessary :
If it be laid that it does not necessarily follow,
D d 4
is
408
The Second LETTER.

is not That a Contradiction in the very Terms >
Is it not to suppose the very lame Creature Selfmoving and not Selfmoving at the very lame
time ? So that if the Idea of Freedom be the
Idea of Self-Motive Power, it is so far from be
ing oppos a to Necessity, that it may be, and I
think, it is it self necessary. Thus then Necessi
tyeis consistent with perfect Freedom, (i. e. ivith
Selfmotive Yovcer \) And the Divine Being him
self is in all his Actions neceffary, in the Natu
ral and Literal Sense of the Word. For it is as
direct a Contradiction in Nature, to suppose
AU-Wisdom (if I may use that Term,) acting
unjustly or cruelly (that is, unwisely , ) as to
suppose Omnipresence confin'd : Since the Moral
Attributes of God are as truly and properly Na
tural, as those which are distinguished by that
Name ; and are therefore equally necessary. But
this is a very high Perfection in the Creator ; It
cannot therefore be an Imperfection in the Crea
ture. Nothing csn be more clear. But then
will it not unavoidably follow, that no Creature
can be accountable for his Actions? Every Action
or Self-Motion necessarily follows the last De
termination of the Understanding: Where then
can the Blame lye, but at the Understanding ?
What is Sin, but Folly ? And how cap any Man
be accountable for it, any more thin for not
being Wiser than God made him ? Nothing re
mains, but to observe that I always use the
Word, Necejjity in this Argument, to signify,
not an external Necejjity or blind Impulse, but a
Necejjity Internal, which results from the very
Being and Constitution of rational Nature T
which latter will, 'I think, as naturally infer the
:,\:
.. Conse"
The Answer to the Second Letter.

Consequence I have deduc'd, as the former : And
to conclude my (elf
Tour most Obliged
Humble Servant.
THE
Answer to the Second LETTER.

Jan. 8th, 171s.
SIR,
YOUR Argument is urged with much In
genuity. But it plainly appears to Me,
that there is an Errour which lies under the
Word Volition. Under that Term, you include
both the final Perception of the Understanding,
which is Passive , and also the first Operation ox
Exertion of the ABive Faculty or Self-motive
Power. These two, you iuppose to be necessa
rily conneBed. I think there is no connexion at
all between them : And that in their not being
connected, lies the Difference between A3ion
and Passion : Which Difference, is the Essence of
Liberty. If the two Things now-mentioned,
were (as you suppose) connected by a true phy
sical Necessity, there would remain no difference
between ABion and Passion, but this only, that
What we now call an Agent, would erroneously
imagine it self to be an Agent, when in reality
it was merely passive. Nay, indeed, there would
be
409
41o
TheAiasv/ER to the Second Letter.

be no such Thing as an Agent or ABion in the
Universe. Neither Man, nor Angel, nor even
God himself, would slff in any other sense, than
ta Balance determined on one fide by an overplus
of Weight ; supposing it indued with Percep
tion ot Understanding. Now the Consequence
of This is, th3t there would be in the Universe,
AU Patient and No Agent, All EffeB and No
Cause : Which is a manifest and most express
Contradiction.
Again: You plainly confound Moral Contra
diction and Moral Necessity, with natural QontradiBion and natural Neceffity. 3Tis indeed
a contradiBion in Terms, Morally speaking, that
a Wife Man should do a foolish Thing, or an
hottest Man a dishonest Thing : But 'tis no Con
tradiction in Physicks. And in God himself, were
his doing ABs of Goodness and Mercy as physi
cally necessary as his being Omnipresent ; 'twould
be as absurd to Thank him for Doing Good, as
for Being Omnipresent. Wherefore, were the
moral Perseftions of God Necessary (in the Jame
physical Sense, as the Natural Attributes are,
which have No Dependence on his Will or Power
of ABing ;) they would not be moralPerfections
at all.
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THE
Third L E T T E R.
7<"- ioth. 171s.
Reverend SIR,
j|ffifÎSS 0 U have now brought the Debate
s* y 72 int0 a vfery narrow Compass. The
S \JJ only Difficulty I find remaining, is,
yL$J^l to disjoyn in my Mind the last Judg
ment or Perception of the under*
standing, and thejust Exertion of the Self-motive
Power. For let us suppose them disjoyn d, and
consider the Consequence. Will it not follow,
that unintelligent Substance may be capable of
Self-Motion, and mere Matter be as absolutely
Tree as Infinite Wisdom itself > Nay, if in any
Instance, Action or SelfMotion does not follow
the last Perception or Judgment of the Under
standing, the Agent must in That Instance be
over-ruTd by a blind Impulse : There is no Me
dium. To consider this Matter more distinct
ly in the great Author of all Perfection :
If his Actions do not necessarily follow the final
Perception of his Understanding, how can it be
{roved that he is infinitely Just and Good ?
i
'Tis
4i2
lb Third LETTER.
'Tis no Impobility, on this Hypothefis, but he
may An in the wor conceivable Manner, at
the very fame time when he Judges and Wills
the befl : For 'tis fuppos'd that there is no Con
nexion between Judgment and Selfmotion, be
tween Volition and Aftion. I do not underftand
your Diftin&ion between Pbycal and Moral Neceffity, becauie indeed I have no Idea at all of
the Latter. If it means the fame which I exprefs'd by the Term Necety Internal; it has,
I think, as clear and diftinfta Foundation' in
Nature, s any Pbycal Neceffity whatfoever.
Which I delire Vou particularly to obferve, be
cauie I had reafon to iufpett from your laft Fa
vour, that my Meaning was not fufficiently dear
on that Head.
I am S IK,
' V .'
Tour ma Obliged
. Humble Servant. ' '
T ft E
Anfwer to the Third LETTER.4

..-'.,' Jin. 12th, 171*.
S I R,
Jr Think your remaining Difficulty may be
L removed by the following Similitude. The
erception or laft Judgment of the Underftanding, .
'the Answer to the Third Letter.
413
ing, is as distinct from the actual Exertion of the

Self-motive Power , as seeing the Way, is, from
Walking in it. Nor will it follow, because the
Perception of the Understanding is denied to
be the immediate efficient necessary Cause of
the Exertion of the Self-motive Power, that
therefore unintelligent Matter may be capable of
Self-Motion , any more than it will follow, if
a Man's Eyes be denied to be the immediate effi
cient necessary Cause of his Walking, that there
fore the Man may be capable ofwalking, though
he has neither Legs nor Life. A Man s Under
standing judges of what he is to do, as his Eyes
discern the Way : But a Blind or winking Man
has Power to walk without seeing 1 and every
living Agent has a physical Power to act, whe
ther he makes any: Use of his Judgment and Un
derstanding or no. Unintelligent Matter can be
no Agent, because AB'wn supposes (in the very
Notion of it) Life and Consciousness ; But That
Consciousness which makes Aftien to be A3ion,\s
entirely a distinct Thing from That Perception or
Judgment, by (which a Man determines before
hand concerning the Reajonablencss or Fitness of
what he is about to act. An Agent overruled by
a blind Impulse, is a Contradiction in Terms *
for then he is not at all an Agent, but a mere Pa
tient. But an Agent acting not according to the
last Judgment of his Understanding, (meaning
always by the last Judgment of the Understand
ing, the last passive Perception, and not the first
attive Volition of the Agent ; which two Things
must by no Means be confounded -,) such an
Agent, I say, is like a Man shutting his Eyes,
and walking at a Venture down a Precipice,
Qoi
414
The Answer to the Third Letter.
God always Difcerns and Approves what is

Juft and Good, neceffarily, and cannot do otherwife : But he always aBs or does what is Juft
and Good, freely -, that is, having at the ime
time a full natural or phyfical Tower of ailing
differently. Otherwife, J*/?/V* (for Example)
/ God, would be nothing different from
in a Siwri, when it executes a jufl Sentence
fuppofing the Sword to perceive what 'tis doing'
and yet cannot help doing it. The Confluence
whereof is, that there could not poffibly be in
God Any Moral Perfeion at ail. For every
Thing that is of a Moral Nature, implies in the
very Notion or EJfence of it, the Doing of
lomething, which at the fame time was in the
Agents Power not to have done. Moral Necekty
therefore, is diftinguifhed from Pbyfical Necefityy juft as all other figures of Speech are from
literal Expreons: That is, 4is in Truth, and
philofophically fpeaking , no Necety at all
And yet every one eafily fees, that the Tuftice
and Goodnefs ofan infinitely perfet Free Agent
may as frmly andreafonably be relied on, as the
Neceifary Efibft ofany neceffary Agent is known
to be phyfically unavoidable.
[.-
J am S I R, &c.
THE
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THE
.-_ _" . ; ;
_"*.- L
Last LETTER.
SIR,
J^4-,7i?-
2BT$1i HAVE now to my great Satisfagy~ ^S ction a clearer Insight, than I ever
fe^L * >^ expected,into Ib Intricate a Question
!Im[^!* as we have êen uPon" ê ôn^"

*^* deration, that the last Judgment of
the Understanding can have no Influence on SelfMotion, because there is no resemblance between
an Action and a Perception of the Mind, and
that therefore there must -be some distinct Prinr
ciple of SelfMotion entirely Independent on the
perceptive Faculty, weighs very much with me -,
and I think it is very probable (as you ob
serve,) that our want of clearly distinguishing be
tween the Perceptive and the ABive Faculty,
is the chief Origine of all Perplexity in this
Question. I shall trouble you no farther on this.
(Occasion, but leave the Rest to Time, and re
peated Reflection. But it were perfect Stupidity,
or worse Ingratitude, not to acknowledge your
Candour and even Friendship to an entire Stran
ger, who appear'd to be engag'd in the pursuit of
Truth.
express my ment
Sentis':'1"' I*' know not how to':.-.--
4i6
The Laft LETTER.

ments of it with Truth and Sincerity, unle in
a Manner which will certainly be difigreeabie
to you : But I ihould have no Senfe of any thing
that is Serious and Rational, if I knew not how
to efteem it.
I am, S I R, (ft.
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Remarks
'- -
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'.'V
REMARKS
UPON A
BOOK,
INTITULED,
A Philosophical Enquiry
Concerning
Human Liberty.
^SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D. Ret?or
of St. James'j Westminster.
ION ON :
Printed, for JA ME S K N A P T 0 N, at
the Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard, 17 17.
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REMARKS upon a Book,

entituled, A- Philosophical In
quiry concerning Humane
Liberty/ v '* "'* ..j a:-;-.
I N C E the greater part qf the fore-,
going Papers were printed off, there
has been published a Book entituled,
A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Hu^
man Liberty : In which the Author
proposes Six distinct Arguments, to prove that
there neither is, nor can be, any Liberty in
Human Actions, The Arguments he offers,
have (I think) been already in great mea
sure obviated in the fore-going Papers. Yet
because some of them seem to be placed in
such a Light, as may possibly deceive un
wary Persons, whose Thoughts have not been
much conversant upon so nice a Subject j
I thought it not improper, upon this Occa
sion, to set down such Brief Remark?, as
might be sufficient to lay open to an intel
ligent Readex the Fallacy of the whole
Book.
*
Aaa ?
In
[4.]
Tn the First place, I observe \ the Author
lays great stress upon the necessity of Mens
forming7~to themselves clear Ideas , and
expressing those Ideas in clear Words.
* Pag. 7. " There is No Qiteftion (fays * he) in the
" whole compass of Speculation , of which
"Men. have written itiore obscurely, arki of
' c which it in thought more impossible to dis" x^Wj/^ .dtiarly, and concerning which Men
'** more'expecl and pardon obscure Discourse,
" than upon the SubjeEls cf Liberty andpie" ceffity : But this common Observation, (says
" he,,) is both a common and a learned Er'* rour, Tor\ 'whoever employs bis Thoughts
" abbutânySubjetl, ought to have some
" Icteai-iofot-fo ObjeB of his Thoughts-:
"'for. where Idessfailus in any smatter, 'out
* Thoughts- must also- fail us ,v AnT*tu
" 'flams whenever tie h'atie IdeaSj' <we are a" Me to ^ communicate' them to Ôthers by
" W&3si-~Wben~anfWriter speaks obscureFag. 8. *fffJBEJ3|p0j did be write ^besweihl) had a
if,/Meaning, or befdre^he ii<as\ab\e.i9 'express
lu td -Qttbers whaP'lte meant -< Is it not un** pardonable, for 4 fitfan ta qantJ-L b>ho \preT
M tends to Teach" Qîl-This; is Iv&ty well
soid. Let us nowrfe, how: rkeoAuthor
Himself hafs observed hie <5vVniRuJes.,:yosfi \
' The Question he; undertakes tOidetcrmiue,
* p.u.ii;is *' Thus 'stated by hihv-, .ffibetbtf. Man be
$**'"* a Free, or Necessary JgenU Aridiie is con
fident, that Meri ate f .Necessary Agents \.fr*g it.

that All allow Mad Men, and Children, ' and ^
Beasts, to be * necessary Agents l that some 5d ^j.*3'
Actions,, are plainly ** Actions that are ** pai.y>.
Necessary } that there can be no dispute, but _
.
Perception is a f Necessary Action of Man ;
and that Causes act on * Necessary Agents,
to whom they are neceiiary Causes of Ac
tion. How here I desire to know, what
Idea the word Agent or Action carries along
With it, when joined with Necessary. Vul
garly indeed, in loose, figurative, and impro
per Speech, we .call Clocks and Watches, Ne
cessary Agents. But in truth and strictness
of speaking, (Which ought always to be care
fully preserved in Philosophical Debates,)
a 'Necessary Agent or Necessary Action is a
Contradiction in Terms. For whatever acts
Necessarily, does not indeed /itt at all, but is
only atfeJ upon j is not at all an Agent, but
a mere Patient j does not move, but is moved
only. Clocks and Watches, are in no Sense
Agents j neither is their Motion, in any
Sense, an A&iom Nor is it merely, " for pref. p. j.
" want of Sensation and Intelligence, that
" Clocks and Watches are subject to an ab" solute, Physical, and Mechanical Neces" sity". For the Pulsation os the Heart,
though joined with Sensation, is yet as ne
cessary a Motion, as that of a Ctock :, aud
the One isnqfmore an Action cf the Man,
than the other is of the Clock. Nor would
a Balance indued with Sensation and IntelliAa a 3
gene?..
! Ef]
'
gence, be any more an Agent when it felt

itself moved by the Weights, than it is
Now an .Agent without Perception. A ne
cessary Agent therefore, I fay, whether with
ox without Sensation, is No Agent it alls
1 Bat ;the-T<?nwj are contradictory to each o* ther.\To bean Agent, signifies, to have
3. Tower of beginning Motion : And Motion
cannot begin necessarily ^ because Necessity'
of Motion, supposes an Efficiency Superiour
to, and irresistible by, the thing moved , and
consequently the Beginning of the Motion
cannot be in that which is moved necessa
rily, but in the superiour Cause, or in the
Efficiency of some Other Cause still supe
riour to That, till at length we arrive at
some Free Agent. Which Free Agent, may
either (which is the cafe of SMen,) have re
ceived the Power of beginning Motion^ from
the Will of a Superiour Free Agent : Or
(which is the cafe of God Almighty,) he
may be Himself necessarily exiftent, necessa
rily all-knowing , necessarily all-powerful j
because Existence, Knowledge, Power, and the
like, are not AEiions j But he cannot be a
necessary Aênt, without an express contra. diction in the very Terms. All Power of
. ABing, essentially implies at the fame time
a Power of not acting : Otherwise 'tis not
Acting, but barely a being atled upon by That
Power (whatever it be) which Causes the Act
ion. When therefore this Author talks so
much of Necessary Agents and NecefJ'ary
Actions .
C 7 ]
ABions , may not his own Question be very
t ,.
reasonably put to him,. "-Why Mb***?*?* *fU
before he bad a Meaning,. or before he Was
" able to express to Others what he meant ?
" Is it not unpardonable for a Man to Cant,
who pretends to Teach"? & if (aS seems
most probable,) his real Meanings, that Man
is not an Agent at all j hisj Qjiestion ftll re
turns, Why did he. write,before be was Willing
to express to Others what he meant I
,
Again t Does the Author really think
that he expresses clear Ideas m.clear Word*,
when he constantly confounds Perception
/wherein, the Mind is entirely passive,) vwdj
ABion itself? And by the word, Will,
without Any Distinction, means sometimes
the Last Perception of the Understanding-,
which is entirely passive- and sometimes
the first exertion of the Self-moving faculty,
which again is ABion ? Thus he tells us,
(Paze a i ) " There can he no Dispute, but
" Perception of Ideas k a necessary Action
" of Man :" And yet, without all diipute,
Perception of Ideas is No ABion at all. sage
22 " A Second. Action of Man, is judging of
"Propositions ;" 'As if feeing a thing to be
true or false, was an ABion, or had any
thing to do with the Will *'*<?, The.
Physical power of doing, what a wise Man
will certainly chuse not to do h .or ot forbearhi to do, what yet a wise Man viU not
fail to ^ ^ is compared with being
Able,
to refuse our Assent to what U evidently.
JJ
Aa4
True
. , "8
*r True'to us ' Which (as before,) is not
an ifio, but Perception. Page 78, . 7 0,
8f anJZiy By the fame' abfurd Confound?
irigjo 'what is ABive with what is Paffive,
<t is alleged, that, ,if Man was indued with
-Liberty of A&ion, he would not be " necejfa" rr^j determinedto ATent o rrtf <?/ j" he
wuuld.hot " be nedjfarily determined in his
** Aflent, > whatfeews a- reafin to him-** he
would M-'fo indifferent to Proportions, tiht* wnhandhgny reefon for them * he might
<** r/?? n>/b? appears True to himi and a'ent
" fe what feems ahfard to him " he would
have an " Indifference to receive Truth"
he would be u capable of Judging contrary
<ilio,his Reafon ". and would " not be ne**" ce(farily determined by the greaten Evift dence, to aifent to Truth." From p/tge 36
<v '57, the Words Willing and Preferring.
arc continually made ufe of in the moil
confufed manner; to denote equally, and
without Any Diftinftion, both the La Per
ception Judgment of the Underlanding
wfich is entirely Pajfive , and alfo the
Fir/I'Exertwn of the Self moving Power which'
is euTntially Ailive. Thefe Two Things,
I fay,'- the Author conftantly confounds to
gether,^ as One Individual, by the ambiguous
ufe of the words Willing end Preferring.
Arguing, tfa.t becaufe Willing and Prefer
ring, fo far as thofe Words fignify the la
Perception oxApprobation of the Underanding^
are PaJJive ana Wecefary 3 therefore Will
ing
Tl,.m ,.
.., I ItJ
?> and Preferring when .tfi'd'iarrie 'Wfttcfe

imply the psi Exertion if ity-$els-moying
Power, whicjfi . is essentially Active, are ' n*.
pessary also ; And because^ when! ?H# signi"fies the actual 'exertion of the $elf-moving
Power, a Man then indeed muii necessary
do that which he ff?#f, (because it is not
possible that/ a Man should not 'do 2. thing,
.when he is supposed to do it $ therefore^
wh'en the fame,word [TOT| 'signifies nothing
more than the //?/? ''Approbation of the Under*
standing it shall still be true -.that a Man
must Necessarily do (using the ! word Necessa
rily \v\ the' -Physical and proper' SenseJ .what
liis Understanding approves**. Than which
Consequence, nothing can be .more weak*
JoV though the Self-moving Pomesy -(which*
if.it is not fra?,is a contradiction [in. Terms,j
is an adequate Cause' of Action y yet Under-
ji'anding orJudgment or 4^* or Approba

tion oV Lj&ng, or whatever Name you please
ro call it by, cari.no more possibly be the
efficient Cause of A&ion, than ft?/? can be the
Cause -as Motion. Nothing can possibly be
the CJitt/fc of an #?? more considerable than
?/S5- Nothing that \* passive^ can possibly be
tUCause of any thing that, is ABive. AnWcasion indeed, it>>> be j and ^tfi may be
consequent (tho' without any P/jy/W connexi
on,; upon Perception or Judgment y nay" it
57'Sfiiyr(cfyour^s besurPscd ^'b3
. r
consequent upon it, and yet that
at the fame time there be no manner of 'Phy
sical
1 1 .-
steal or necessary connexion between them. For

instance : God's performing his Promise, is
A L W A T S consequent upon his making it:
Yet there is no connexion between them, as be
tween Cause and EffeB: For, not the Promise
of God, but his ABive Power is the alone
Physical or efficient Cause of the Performance.
" When Authors, who in other respeBs are et'g. 9
f* qual, treat of any SubjeBs further tha?i they
" have clear and distinct Ideas ^ they do and
" cannot but write to as little purpose, and
" take as absurd pains, as the mojl ignorant
" Authors do."
Again : What is become of clear and dife- ' Jljnct Jdeas, when we are told of '* Actions
. being determined by the CAUSES preced" ing each Action?" of Man's being" Everun" avoidably determined in every point of time
" by the Circumstances he is in, and the
" CA USES be is under, to do that one thing
" he does, and not po/Jibly to do any others of
pag. 32. This first necesjary A8iori\ [ viz. Percep
tion, which is No Action at all,3 being " the
" Foundation and C A U S E of all the other
M-h- intelligent Actions of'Man"? and, of" Plea" sure and Pain being CAUSES to determine
<c Mens Wills" For, what Idea can any Man
frame, hew Pleasure or Pain, which are mere
passive Perceptions \ or how Reasons, Motives ,
and Arguments, which are mere abflraB Noti
ons, cm be the physical, necessary, and efficient
Cause of AB'wn ? May not an abflraB Noti
on as well strike a Ball, as be the efficient
Cause
C H 3
Cause of Motion in a- Man's Body .<? Occasions
indeed they may be, and are, upon which
That Substance in Man, wherehv the Selfmoving Principle resides, freely exerts its Ac["
the Power. But Yis.the Selfmoving Princi
ple, and not at ' all the Reason or Motive,
which is the physical ox efficient CAUSE
of Action. When we fay, . in vulgar Speech,
that Motives ox Reasons DETERMINE
a Man j 'tis nothing but a mere Figure or
Metaphor. 'Tis the Man, that freely deter
mines himself to act. Reasons, or Perceptions
of the Understanding, can no more (properly
and strictly speaking) determine an Action,
than an abfiract "Notion can be a Subfiance or
Agent, can strike or move a piece of Matter.
Unless All thak this Gentleman advances about Reasons and Motives and Perceptions of
the Understanding, be mere * Cant j and his * pag. 8,
true meaning be, that Man is indeed No
Agent at all, but is moved necessarily and
mechanically by mere Impulses of subtle Mat
ter. And then the Question will still for
ever return upon him, about the Original
Cause of Motion , Which must either finally
be resolved into a Firft Mover, in whom
consequently there is Liberty of Action j or
else into an infinite and eternal Chain of Ef
fects without Any Cause at all : Which is an
express contradiction, except Motion could
be necesfarily-exiftent in its own Nature \
Which that it is not, is evident, because the
Idea of Rest is no contradiction ; and also be'* ca life
t *U
Cause there, being no Motion without a ^zr*i<rw/<*r Determination one certain way, and
fto one Determination being in nature more
necessary than another, an essential arid ne
cessary Tendency to Motion iri all Determina
tions equally, could never have produced any
Motion at all.
, _ j' Lastly : By rvbat clear artd diflintl Ideas
can any Man perceive, that an Indifferency as to sorter, (that is, an equal Physical
Power either of atling or oi forbearing to
a&j) and an Indifferency as to Inclination,
(that is, an equal Approbation or Liking of
owe T&iwg or of he contrary j ) is One and
the fame Thing? And yet these Two, are
constantly confounded through the whole
Book; The Author always supposing, that
isa Man is not determined as necessarily and
irresistibly, as a Weight determines the Moti
on of a Balance \ then he can in no Degree
be influenced by, nor can have any Regard
to, any Motives or Reasons ofAElion what
soever, but must be totally indifferent to
AU Actions alike. Thus page 66, an " 7.
" differency to good and evil" is put as equivalent to a Physical Pojstbility of doing
what appeals least eligible y And a Physical
Possibility of doing what appears least eligigible, \$ "represented as. "a Necessity of doing
what appea.s least eligible' \ like u Infants
" that cannot walk, left to go alone, with
" Liberty to fall*. Page 72,73, Liberty
is reprelcnted as an "" arbitrary faculty, to
ebufl
S 3
" chufe without Regard to the Qualities of
" ObjeEts ; indifferent to all Objects, and
" fwayed by no Motives in the Choice of
" ObjeEls". Page 79, 80, " Indifferent to
" any Obje&s, notwithftanding they feemed
"j good:
Indifference to Pleafure and
" fain, that is, Liberty To refufe the firft,
" and chufe the la ".
Page 87, 88, 'tis
argued, that " were Pain, as fuch, eligible"
[That is, POSSIBLE, to be chafen,'{o the
Word muft be undei flood in this Place ~]
" and Pieafure, as fuch, avoidable \ Rewards
" and Punijhments could be NO MOTIVES
" to- a Man". That unlefs " Pleafure and
" Pain have a NECESSART Effett on Meny
" and it be IMPOSSIBLE for Men not, &c.
\ >-v
" of what USE would be the Profpetf of
" Rewards-^ or Puifhments* .<? And, " if
" all Men COULD prefer r will Punifh' ment confidered as Pain, and rejef Re- " V!1
" wards confidered as Pleafure , Men would
" <? under NO RESRAINT ". Page 89,
90, It is fuppofed to follow, if Man be not
a Neceffary Agent, that then he is not at all
" affetfed with Pleafure and Pain" , but i$
' indifferent to Pleafure and Pain " , and
" equally indifferent to Morality and ImmOr
\\ rality ". The fame abfurd Suppoiition,
is repeated again, page 96. And page 99,
?tis alleged, that " to reprefent Reafons to
-r Men, would be of no Ufe, if Men had
" free-Wills, or their Wills were not moved
[[ by them"* As if nothing could poffi
E *4 I
bly be of any Weight, or of any Use with
Men, that did not Necessitate them: And
if a Person be not determined irresistiblyy
then he must be totally Indifferent to All Ac
tions alike, and can have no Regard to Mo
tives or Reasons of Action at alt. Of which
Consequence, no Man can have i clear Idea j
'rill it has first been proved, that Self-Moving
61 ASive Power, is inconsistent with having
any> RejgafU!to Reasons of Acting, 'i ; iâ i .'... f*
i(.r,,,i.. ;;.- ;-
;- in-1&rNext Place, I observe, that the

Atftftor erideavours to impose upon his Rea
der a False Definition pi'Liberty. "I con*fref. p.s. ,w teny ' says *l hs;for- Liberty, as itsignifies
tsyaPcnver in Man, to do as he wills or
'' pteajesk\ And this, he' elsewhere stiles
fag II? T f Valuable Liberty* '^Nowi'n this Defini
tive tioh, besides the **;fbremention'd Ambigutietc, pag.ttyôf the Words, wills dr pleases; it ought
t *<* 9- carefully to be retnarkedtnat the word, Do,
has no Signification. ' For his Meaning is
not, that the Min atls'ox does any Thing:
But the Liberty, or Power in Man, to do as
hc"*cilts or pleases-, is, with Him, exactly and
onfy -the' fa me, as the Liberty or Power in a
Balance would be^: i& move as it wills or
shafts, supposing the Balance indued with
such a Sensation or Intelligence,, as enabled
it to' perceive which way the Weights turn
ed it, arid to approve the Motion, so as to
fancy that it "moved itself when indeed it
\ J
'
was
C-si ,
was only moved by the Weights/ That this'
is his real Meaning, appears plainly from
hence 5 that he -makes the Difference be- ,
tweeh a Man and a Clock, to consist only itf>
ff Sensation and Intelligence, hot in any ^ p'ef'
sower ofaBing. Whereas indeed the whole '
Essence of Liberty, consists in the Power of
aBing. A9ion and Liberty, are identical L<?eas: And the True DEFINITION of
a Free-Beingy is, One that is indued with a,
Power of aBing as well as of- being aBed
upon. i"5 ""/*" " ' >_ "
'''' *& (...
This Mistake 'in the Notion of Physical
Liberty arid ; Necessity, led him also into the
like Mistake "in his Notl&ln of~ Moral Necrfi
fry. Moral 'Necessity, in true' and Philoso
phical Strictness, is not indeed- -any NeceJJt- r,
ty at all ^ bur 'tis merely a figurative MariJ
rier of Speaking, which, like all Other figu*
rativc Expressions, has nothing Stall of Phy
sical Reality in it. When a; Man lays, hk
cannot POS&IBLT be deceived in relying
on the Word of a Person of known Vefa-i
city ? the Meaning i6 not, that That Other
Person has no Power to deceive him, or that
(with Regard to the Physical A&ion) it is not
3s"i ease for That Person to depart from his
Promise, as to keep it :, but that the Man
has great Reason to depend on such a Person's
Character, that he shall not be deceived by
' him. But now this Author makes * Moral * Pref,
Necessity and Physical Necessity to be exactly^ 3;
and Phijosoghically the same Thing: Only
... r,
. t,
. ;
..\..
. ..
w^
with this Distinction, that Physical Neces

sity in m Unintelligent Subject, is Physical
Neiejsity j hut that the fame Physical Necessi
ty^ \t\ an Intelligent Subject, is, only- Moral
V" Necessity. .When a Stone/folk, or a OWi
bi Watch moves, it moves by a Physical Ne*
cesiity : But when a Man fells }'. or. when
hp is determined to do Any Affion, which
he is exactly under the saute Physical ISecessity' os-doing, !(OnJy with this Circumstance,
that bis Understanding approves, 'of is phas
ed with it,) as he is of falling when he is
thrown down a. Precipice $ this it seems) is
Moral Necessity only, in which Matter,
tlê: Author ^s'jguilty of a double Absurdity.
FitfcAn supposing Reasons or M&tivts (yn* rag s. Ufethose Terrms be mere * Qurtt^) to make
the .fame necessary . Impulse upon Intelligent
Sufcyects, as Matter, in Motion does upon w
wtewgent ffabjeBs; which j? supposing Abftxtoft Notions to -be $ubjl.4nt$s. And &<?fnd)y^ in endeavouring rtoV impose it, upon
his Jfcteader as aching taken for granted, that
Afo>!J .Nect/pfy'. and. Physicd'JSIecesiiiyio
aox differ intrinsically in t-beir^ww Nature,
fFrtf.f.3,. but; only wirh:.Regatd to. the f &u.bje& they,
are applied toj;> When; on tithe contrary he
well knows; ;that,-> by Moral 'Necessity, con
sistent Writers ever mean any -thing more^
than to express is* -a .figurative I Marnier the
V'v* Geuainty offfoch;an Event, a* may in Rea- '
: '*' son be sully 'depended upoh,', thbugh literaU

Is. and in. Phiksophiaal^ StriUness of Truth,
uk--j
" * there
L >]
there be no Necessity at all of the Eve*nf.'
Thus if God has promised that the World
shall continue another Year, 'tis a very na
tural and obvious Manner of Expression, to
fay that the World cannot possibly come to
an End This Year 5 arid yet no reasonable
Person is by that Manner of speaking led
to imagine, that God has not at this mo
ment the very same physical Power of destroy
ing the World, as he will have at any time
hereafter. And therefore 'tis with great un
fairness, that this Author, ar the Conclusi
on of his Book, having cited from t)r Clarke
a Passage wherein such a figurative Expres
sion occurs, makes from thence the following
Inference: " In this, fays* he, Dr Clarke *P*g.uii
" plainly allows the Necessity for which I have
11 contended : For he assigns the fame
*' Causes oshuman A&ions, that I have clones
" and extends the Necessity of humane Ac*' tions ds jar j rfhen he asserts that a Man
" cannot, under those Causes, possibly do the
" the contrary to what he does." Dr Clarke's
Words were these : " A Mart intirely free
" from all Pain of Body and Disorder of
" Mind, judges it unreasonable for him to
" hurt or destroy himself j and, being un" der no temptation or external Violence,
'* he cannot possibly act contrary to this Judgtc ment ;' Not because he wants a natural or
" physical Power so to do, but because it is" absurd and mischievous and Morally impose
" sbk,
that with a perfect Knowledge ofr
B bb
" whi}.
[ .8 ]
,f
" what is best, and without Any temptation

" to evil, his Will should determine itself to
" choose to act foolishly and unreasonably."
It was reasonable to expect, that these words
f" Not because he wants a Natural or Phy" sical Power so to do",'] had been suffi
ciently explicatory of the foregoing ones.
And yet This ingenious Writer has found a
way to put an absurd Interpretation even
upon These laft Words also. " As to a m" tural or physical Power in Man, to act
ni " contrary to That judgments this (says\\ie)
'" is so far from being inconsistent ivith the
" Doctrine os Necessity, that 'tis a Con" sequence os the Doctrine of Necessity :
" For is Man is necessarily determined by
" particular moral Causes\ and cannot then
" possibly act contrary to what he dies \
" be must , under OPPOSITE moral
* ' Causes, have a Power to do the contrary".
That is to fay : A Man's having, under the
SAME moral Causes, (which is evidently the
Sense of Dr Clarke's words,) a Physical Pow
er to do the contraV to what he does } means
only his having, under the OP I'OSITE moral
Causes, a Physical Power to do the contra
ry to what he does.
This being premised j I proceed now brief
ly to consider the Six Arguments, by which
the Author undertakes to prove, that Man is
(what by a plain contradiction in Terms he
calls) a Necessary Agents and that there nei
ther is, nor can be, any such thing as Liberty.
his
C <?3
ffis First Argument is : That Experience, !
which the Vulgar urge in Proof of Liberty,/^. 1 1,12.
is not a Proof of it : That many celebrated ^.14,Philojophers and Theologers, both antient and1 9*
modern, have given Definitions of Liberty,
that are consistent with Fate or Necessity :
That some Great Patrons of Liberty, do,pag. i9,-i
by their Concessions in this matter, destroys
all Arguments from Experience : That AU/,^.31 ..
the Actions of Men may be ranked under $6the four Heads of Perception, Judging, Wil
ling, gnd Doing as we will j and that Expe
rience does not prove Any of these to be free :
And lastly, that Experience not only does tpag.3,,52,
prove Liberty, but, on the contrary, Menmay^.
fee by Experience that they are Necejsary
Agents j 'Tis matter of Experience, that Man
is ever Determined In his Willing , We expe
rience perfect Necessity :, zn&tbey who think
Liberty a matter of Experience, yet allow that
the Willfollows the Judgment of the TJnderflanding, and that, when twoObjects are pre
sented to a Man's Choice, one whereofappears
better than the other, he cannot choose, the
worst.
1. To the/?;-/? part of This Argument, viz.
that Experience, which the Vulgar urge in
Proof of Liberty, is not a Proof of it :_ I
answer j that AU our Actions do Now in
experience Seem to us to be Free, exactly
in the Same Manner, as they would do upon
bbb % \
suppo-
Tag.
14
' supposition o our being really Free Agents:

And consequently, though This alone does
not indeed amount to a slrift Demonstration
of our beingFree j yet it leaves on the other
side of the Question nothing but a bare Possi
bility of our being so framed by the Author
of Nature, as to be unavoidably deceived in
this matter by every experience of every Ac
tion .we perform. The cafe is exactly the
fame, as in that notable Question, -whether
the World exifls or no. There is no Demon
stration of it from Experience : There always
remains a bare Possibility, that the Supreme
Being may have so framed my Mind', as that
i (hall always necessarily be deceived in eve
ry one of my Perceptions as in a Dream,
tho' possibly there be No material Worlds
nor any other Creature whatsoever, existing
besides my Self. Of This, I fay, there always 1
remains a bare possibility; And yet no Man '
in his Senses argues from thence, that Expe- \
rience is no Proof to us of the Existence of
Things.
2. But many celebrated Philosophers and
Theologers, both antient and modern, havet
given Definitions of Liberty, that are consi
stent with Fate and Necessity. I answer:
Whether this be so, or no, is nothing to the
purpose. The true definition of Liberty, is,
a Power to A3 \ as J have just now shown,
sag. 15. When ThisGentlemancan mow,that
ASion, or the Power os Acting, is consistent
with Fate or Necessity j then "he will gain
his Point.
'
2. But
9- But further j .SW* of the greatest^-'jyPatrons of Liberty, Jo, by their Concessions 3'
f?i ^^/'j matter^ sufficiently destroy all Argu
mentsfrom Experience. I answer again : Whe
ther This also be so, or no, is nothing at all
to the purpose. The Question is not, what !
any Man has or has not conceded , but
what the Truth of the Cafe is.
4. To the Allegations all the Actions? 'six
es Men may be ranked under the four Heads s
of Perception, Judging, Willing, and Doing
as we mil j and that experience does not
prove Any of these to be Free: \ answer:
First, As to the Perception of Ideas ; this is
not an Action at all , but a mere Passive
Faculty -j And therefore all that the Author Pag-% 2.
here advances about its being a Necessary
Jlction, is an entire Absurdity. "Secondly, As^.53?^
to Judging of Propositions, that is, (as the
Author here explains it,) assenting to what7
.appears true, and dissenting from what ap-Y
pears false ^ This also, tike feeling what we
feel, or hearing what we hear, is not an Ac
tion at all, but is merely passive j And is
therefore absurdly called, Another Action of
Man. Attention indeed, or a Man's chusing
to fix his Thoughts on one Subject rather
than another, is an Action j and therefore
belongs not to This Head, but comes pro
perly under the fourth Head, of Doing as
ipewill : But, Assenting to what appears True,
pr Diflhitifig from what appears False, are not
Jffiw- Thirdly, As to' Willifig^ This?. 3^
Bhbs
word3*'
[3
Word (as I before observed) has a great Am
biguity in it, and signifies two distinct
Things. Sometimes it signifies the last Per
ception or Approbation of the Understanding,
and sometimes the first Exertion os the Selsmoving or AB'we Faculty. It can only be in
the former Sense of the Word, that this Aupag. <o. thor fays, " Willing or Preferring, is the
il fame with RefpeEl to Good and Evil, that
" judging is withRespetl to Truth or Falshood:
" It is JUDGIFG that one thing is upon the
*' whole better than another, or not so bad as
" another ". And it can only be in the Ut
ter Sense of the Word, that he says, " This
pg. 37. u p0iper 0f thg ]\,[an tfatg i0 order the Begin" ning or Forbearance, the Continuance or End" hig of any Atlion, is called the Will - and
" the ACTUAL EXERCISE thereof, Wil
" ling ". Now these two things, tho' ex
pressed by the fame Word, are yet very dif
ferent things, and have no Similitude rhe
one to the other. The one is entirely pjffive, belonging to the Understanding only,
and has nothing to do with the Question about Liberty j The other is truly atlive, and
therefore comes not under this rlead, but
under the followingfourth Headoi Doing as
we will. By confounding these two things to
gether, the Author constantly amuses and per
plexes his Reader: By dijiinguisaing them
carefully, the Difficulties he proposes, are
all easily removed. Thus, to that Question,
Mb 37-" Whether we are at Liberty to will, ot
" tut '
[3]
t not to will " . The true Answer is j in
the former Sense of that Word, we are not
at Liberty j in the latter Sense of it, we
are. To the Question, " Whether we can pag. 3j.
" suJPeru^ Willing, or no \ " (in which, the
Learned and Judicious Mr. Locke was indeed
much perplexed :) the Answer is the fame ^
that, in the former Sense os the Word Will
ing, we cannot suspend} in the latter, we
can. To the Question, " Whether we are pag, 40.
'* at Liberty to Will or chuse one or the o** ther of two or more Objeffs " : The An
swer is still the fame j in the former Sense of
the Word, we are not at Liberty j in the
latter, we are. Nor does it make any Alte- w H*
ration in this Cafe,, whether the Objects ~"52*
proposed be perfeBly alike and indifferent, or
whether they be unlike and different. For
if the Understanding judges them to be in
different, it cannot help judging them to be
indifferent j and if it judges them to be dif
ferent, it cannot help judging them to be
different: And yet in either Cafe, the Selfmoving Faculty retains fully a Physical Pow
er, or Liberty, of a&ually exerting itself'to
wards either of the indifferent, or either of
the different Objects. Which Liberty of
acting, with Regard to the indifferent Ob
jects, is a moral as weJ I as Physical Liberty:
But with Regard to the Different Objects,
'tis joyned with that Inclination, which (by /a
an usual Figure of Speech) is stiled Moral
Necessity , Which every rational Being does
Bbb 4
Co
I "4 ]
so much the more constantly and regularlyfollow, as the Being is more rational and
perfect j but which nevertheless is as far
from intrenching in the least Degree upon
Literal and Physical Liberty, as even a per
fect Indifferency itself. This, I fay, is plain
ly the true Answer to all the foregoing Ques
tions: Except \t be denied, that there is at
all in Man any Self moving Power: Which
shall be considered presently in its proper
Place. Fourthly and lastly j as to that which
ffg 5 1, This Gentleman calls the Fourth (but which
and 12, js indeed the Only} Action of Man, viz.
DOING as we mill, or actually exerting the
Self moving Faculty: Of this I fay, as be
fore, that since in All Cafes it does now by
Experience Seem to us to be free, that is, Seem
to us to'be really a Self moving Poiuer, exactly
in the fame Manner as it would do upon Sup
position of our being aBually Free Agents ; the
bare physcal Possibility of our being so fra
med by the Author of Nature, as to be un
avoidably deceived in this Matter by every
Experience of every Action we perform, is
nd more any just Ground to doubt the Truth
of our Liberty, than the bare natural Possi
bility of our being all our Jife-time, as in
a Dream, deceived in our Belief of the Exis
tence os the Material World, is any just
Ground to doubt of the Reality of its Exis
tence. But this Author goes still further j
-&
and contends, not only that Experience is m
Proof of Liberty , but
" '*'
g. That
5. That, on the contrary, Men may see by fig. ?T;

Experience, that they are necessary Agents ; **' and
That 'tis Matter ps Experience, that Man is
ever determined in his Willing : That we ex
perience perfebl Necessity ; That is we Will
any Actions, we find we MUST do those
A&ipns, unless some external Impediment hin
ders us : That Man is ever unavoidably de
termined in every Point of Time, by the Cir
cumstances he is in, and CAUSES he is un- '
der, to do That One thing he does, and not
Poffibly to do any other ; And that They who
think Liberty a Matter of Experience, yet
allow that the Willfollows the Judgment of the
Under/landing, and that, when two ObjeEls
are presented to a Mans Choice, he CANNOT
choose the worft. To all which, I answer :
First ^ The Experience of a Man's ever
doing what he judges reasonable to do, is
not at all an Experience of his being under
any Necessity so to do. For Concomitancy
in this Cafe, is no Evidence at all of 'Physi
cal Connexipn. Upon Supposition of perfect:
Liberty, a reasonable Being would still conflantly do what appeared reasonable it should
do: And therefore its constantly doing so, is
no Proof at all of its wanting Liberty or a
Physical Power osdoing otherivise : See above,'
page 9, lo.
But Secondly : Either Man has within him
self a Faculty or Principle -of Self- Motion,
that is, a Power of Beginning Motions or he
has 7JQtH
'
f ?
If
If he, W within himself a Principle or

Power of Self-Motion :, then (which is the
Essence of Liberty^) That aSlive Substance,
in which the Principle of Self-Motion in
heres, is it lelf the only proper, Physical,
and immediate CaUSE of the Motion or
Action: For, that any thing extrinfick to
the Agent, mould be the Mover, or Physi
cal Cause of the Self-Motion, is a Contradic
tion in Terms. And if it be said, that Rea
sons or Motives are the Causes of Action $this can be true only in a Figurative Sense ;
For, to make Reasons or Motives the Literal
and Physical Cause of Motion or Action, is
supposing abflraB Notions to be Sub/lances.
In like manner j if it be said, a Man MUST
do those Actions which he Wills, and CAN
NOT do otherwise j this also must either
be understood in a figurative Sense only, if
by the word \Wilt\ be meant merely the
approbation of the Understanding : or else,
if by the word [_Wils] be meant the actual
exertion of the Self-moving Power, then the
saying a Man MUST necessarily do those

actions which he Wills, signifies nothing more
than that it is not possible for a Man not to do
a thing at the fame time that he is Supposed to
doit.
.But now, on the other hand, if a
Man has not within himself a Principle of
Selfmotion, ora Power of Beginnimg Motions
then, being No Agent at all, (notwithstand
ing his Perception or Intelligences any more
fhan
Cv 3
than a Clock or a Watch ;- his Motions must
all be wholly owing to the efficient Impulse of
some extrinsick Cause, and the Motions of
That to the Efficiency of some Other Cause j
and so on ^ till either at length we arrive at
some Free Agent, in whom is perfect Liber
ty; or else we must go on in infinitum through
an eternal Chain of dependent Effects with
out Any Cause at all ; Which is Absurd.
See above, pag. 6 & 1 1 .
The Author concludes this Argument,with
observing that the Actions of Children and of $i**'
Beafts, are allowed, by the Greatest Advo
cates of Liberty, to be All necessary : And
thereupon asks, To what Age do Children
continue necejsary Agents, and When do they
become Free .<? I answer : If any Advocates
of Liberty have allowed any such thing, it
was very weakly done of them. The ABions
pf Children, and the ABions of every living
Creature, are all of . them essentially Free.
The Mechanical and voluntary Motions of
their Bodies, such as the Pulsation of the
Heart, and the like, are indeed all necessary 5
but they are none of them A&ions. Every
Aft'ion, every Motion arising from the Selfmoving Principle, is essentiallyfree. The Dif
ference, is This only. In Men, this Physi
cal Liberty is joined with a Sense or con
sciousness of moral good and m/,and is there
fore eminently called Liberty. In Beafls, the
fame Physical Liberty or Self-moving Porvei\
is wholly separate from a Sense c>r conscious-
ness or capacity of judging of moral good and

evil j and is vulgarly called Spontaneity. In
CbiUren, the fame Physical Liberty always
is from the very Beginning \ And in propor
tion as they increase in Age, and in capaci
ty of Judging, they grow continually in
Degree, not more free, but more Moral,
Agents. ,; V.
"* '
| His Second Argument to prove Man a Ne

cessary Agent, is, " because all his AEtions
cj have a Beginning : For whatever has a Be" ginning, must have a Cause j And every
"Cause,
is
Necessary
Cause."
A-
82. gain: " If Any. A8ion whatsoever, can be.

"done without, a Cause \ then EjseEls and
" Causes have no necessary relation, and by
" consequence, we should not be neceffarily de" termined 'many case at all." . The Fallacy
of This Argument, lies in the words, Neces
sary Cause. ' sis. true,* that whatever has a
Beginning, mufl have a Cause. 'Tis true al
so, that every Cause is a Necessary Cause j
that is, that, every adequate efficient Cause,
vyhen it is supposed to operate^ cannot but
produce the Ejsetl, of which it is at That
., time an adequate efficient Cause. , But This
j, is faying nothing more, than that any thing
laufl needs be, when it is supposed that it is.
Which is nothing to the Cjuemon about Li
berty and Necessity. For the Free Self-moving
J?on>er} when it is supposed to exert itself,cmnot
?9 1
not but .produce J.hat Motion or Aflion, of
whicjbi it is at that time the immediaje efficient
Cause. If I mistake riot"therefore;; This Ar
gument (in the True Intent and Meaning of
the Author) is en.fir.ely founded upon the
Supposition, that there neither is nor can be in
Nature any such, thing as a Self-moving Power
at all. For, What else is the Meaning of
his affirming-, that, if Man Actions are not
Weeeffary,. (t&a't is, if they be not physically
and efficiently caused by ' mechanical Impulse
of Matter, which is making them to be mere
Passions and not Actions at all :, or by Reasons:
and Motives, which is making Reasons and
Motives to be physical Agents or Substances:,)
then " a thing can have a Beginning, which Pa&- *7
" has .no. Cause s and,'*' Nothing can product
" Something <?" And when he tells us, that;
" if Any A3ion, whatsoever can bt doneSN\\\\-r âgr g2.
" out a Cause, then EffeBs. and Causes have
" no neccefjary relation, ,and by consequence
" we [hould not.be necessarily determined iti
" Any cas at alls. And that, " if in theM- 82
" most, indifferent things there, was not a
" Cause of Choice, but a* Choice could
" be made without a Cause, then All Choices
" might be made without a Cause, and we
" should not be necessarily determined by the
" greatest Evidence to Assent to Truth : "
What is this, but Supposing that there is no
such thing in nature as a. Self-moving Power-,
and'that if every ABion and Choice be not as
necessarily determined by something over
.
which
1 30 1
Which the Person has No Power, as our

Assent to Truth (which is not at all an Ac
tion or a Choice) is necessarily determined by
the appearing Evidence j then.- an Atlion is
done absolutely without any Cause at all, and
Nothing can produce Something .<? What is
This, I fay, but Supposing (instead of proving)
that there neither is nor can possibly be, any
such thing as Self-moving or Aftive Power,
not in Man only, but even in no other
Being whatsoever, no not even in God him
self .<? For, the Argument is Universal : And
the Conclusion also is Universal : " Liberty
" ("says he) or a Power to aB or not to aSf,
" to do this or another thing under the fame
it
Causes, is an Impossibility" The Argu
ment therefore standing thus : I answer j
(Though to the bare Supposition, that a Selfmoving or AB'we Power is impossible, it were
sufficient to oppose the contrary Supposition,
that fitch a Power is not impossible : But I
answer :,) If there be no such thing in nature,
as a Self-moving or AElive Power or Principle
of beginning Motion, (which is the Essence
of Liberty :,) tnen there is, in the Motions
of the Universe, an infinite progression of
dependent EjseQs without any Cause at all j
an infinite progression of passive Communica
tions,without any Agent, without any thing Ac*
tive at all in Nature. Which is a manifest
Contradiction j Unless Motion could be ne
cessarily- exigent : Which that it cannot
possibly be, 1 have shown above, sag. 11,12.
lean
r 3 3
1 caiinot omit to take notice here by the
way, that This Gentleman, in the passage*"*' i9'
now cited, pleasantly stiles Liberty, not on
ly an Impossibility, hut AT H E I SI IC A L
also', and contends that " Liberty sands,
*' andean only be grounded , on the absurd
" Principles of Epicurean Atheism." Mr.
Leibnitz, has done the fame, in his Debate
with Dr. Clarke, Paper IV, 18 j and Pa
per f\ 70 As if Epicurus's supposing
Lifeless Atoms to be moved by Chance, that
is, by Causes to Him unknown j was the fame
t thing as our ascribing either to God or Man,
^ Principle or Power of Action or of begin
ning Motion.
The Authors Third Argument against Li- III.

berty, is, that Liberty would not be a Per* ' 62 -*
section, but an ImperfeBion j and that to be
a Necessary Agent, is an Advantage and a
Perfection. And upon this Argument, he is
very large.
He alleges, that Men would be irrationals -i- *3Agents, if they had a powers judging otherwise than according to appearing evi
dence j And that nothing " can be more ir- MP 5*'
" rational and inconsistent, than- to be able to
" refuse our Assent to what is evidently true
" so *, rfw<i to asjent to what we see to be
" evidently false.** AU which, is very right.
But this Argument is founded on a ridicu-
bus definition of Liberty j as if a i>o,ver
of
of Acting, implied also a Power of Understanding, as Men pleased.

M- *<* - He supposes, that a Pinter f_a Physical
Power 3 of choosing Evil as Evil, implies
being " indifferent to Good and Evil" :, " inP"i-7o,j2: a. difterent f0 what causes pleasure or pain "
tC indifferent to all Objects, and swayed by
" no Motives." . Which is supposing, that
whatever; things are naturally possible for a
Man to do, he has an equal inclination to do.
t^. 66,
Hq urges, that Liberty would be an Iraperfection j because 'tis an Imperfection, to
be capable of chusing Misery. And, by the
fame Argument, Existence or Life, in all Be
ings except God Almighty, is an Imperfecti
on 5 because it subjects them to a Possibility
of Pain and Uneasiness. Also Virtue and
Moral Goodness will, for the fame reason*, be
imperse&ions j because they essentially include
a Physical Power of doing what is Evil. And
even in the Divine Nature itself it would be
a contradiction to suppose any Moral perfe&ion, if. God was under the fame physical ne
cessity of doing all the good he does, as he is
of being Ommpresent and Omniscient*
M- &7He argues, that " a Power to will or chuse
" at the same time any one out os two or more
" indifferent things, would be no perfedfion"
because, if the things were " really indisfat68. il ftrent," there could be no " Benefit" ari
sing from the Choice. This is the fame Ar
gument, by which Mr. Leibnitz proved that
'tis impossible for God ever to have created
any
.]
any two pieces of Matter exaftly alike, be
cause, whatever Situation he placed them in,
there could be no Benefit in their not being
transposed.
He insists, that this " arbitrary faulty pag.-a^t,
" wouldsubjeft a Man to more wrongChoices," 73
to " more Mistakes , than Man consider" ed as a Necessary Being" [as a Nece(/'ary
Agent,ht means -s\ " determined in bis Choice."
That is to fay : The Power of Choosing, sub
jects a Man to make more wrong Choices, than
if he had no Power osChoofing at all. Which
is undoubtedly true. But if the Power os
Choosing, be art imperfection \ then Life and
ABivity, which essentially involve a Power of
Choosing, are imperfections likewise j and a
Stone is a more perfeft Creature than a Man.
He asks, concerning the Perfection of God j
" can any thing be perseft, that is not Nece(sa~
" rily perjeft .<? " That is to fay j If God
be necessarily indued with perfeel Liberty,
then, by reason of That necessity, he cannot
be indued with any Liberty at all.
Again : " Is it not a Perfection in God;Ne f:s- 74.
" ce(sarily to Know all Truth, aftd to be ne-' cejfarily Happy"? I answer : Yes j Because
Knowledge and Happiness are neither of them
Aftions.
Again^ : Is it not also a Perfection in him, pag. 74.
" to Will andDo ALW AT S what is Beft .<?
I answer , Yes : But not to Do so by a Phy
sical 'Necessity :, because That is not a Perfec
tion, but a Contradiction in Terms. WhateCcc
ver
C 34 3
pig, 7i,
7J76, 77-
pig. 73,
& 67.
ver is physically necessary, is Wo AStion, nei

ther in God, riot irt any other Being.
He cites, with Great Satisfaction, certain
Weak Expressions of Some very Learned and
Eminent Men, concerning all things being
in their own nature indifferent j and becom
ing Good, only by God's Willing them : Also
concerning infinite Perfe&ion excluding Suc
cessive Thoughts in God : And that the Essence
of God is one perfect Thought : And that tho*
his Transient Acts are done in a Succession of
Time, yet his Immanent Acts, his Knowledge
and his Decrees, are One with his Essence :
And that the Immanent Acts ofGod being sup
posed Free, 'tis not easy to imagine how they
should be One with the divine Essence, to which
Necessary Exigence does mojl certainly belong :
And that if the Immanent A&s of God are ne
cessary, then the Transient muft be so likewise ,
as being the certain effeflls ofhisImmanentA&s:
And thatthusrf Chain of necessary fate must
run through the whole Order of things , and
God himself then is no free Being, Ail which,
and many yther the like Citations, are no
thing at all to the Purpose : Proving nothing, but only mowing the pernicious Ef
fects of Scholaflick Jargon, which has some
times imposed 10 far even upon very Learned
and Good Men, as to make them think that
More Knowledge is conveyed into the Mind
by wards that have no Signification, than by
mere inarticulate Sounds,
He alleges, that Saints in Heaven cease to
have Liberty , and that Angels are more per-
fe&
[35]
JeB than Men, because they are necessarily.daêrmined to judge right in relation to Truth
and Falfoood, and to chuse right in Relation
to Good and Evil. . I answer : Neither. Sqinis\
nor Angels, nor God himself, have in any
degree the less Liberty,, upon account of the
Perfection of their Nature : Because, between
the physical Power os ASlion, and the Perseaion os Judgment which is,, not A&ion, (which
two things ThisAuthor constantly confounds,)
there is no Connexion. God judges what is
right, and approves what is Good7 by a phy
sical necessity os Nature, j in which physical
necessity, all notion of A&ion is necessarily,
excluded : But Doing what is good, is
wholly owing, to an Affive Principle, in
which xs-effentially included the notion of
Liberty.,. Nor. is it any thing to the pur
pose, that, in a perseB Being, Doing right is
Always concomitant n>ith,\ ox. consequent upon,
.Judging right- unless it was. a Consequence
in the wayidf Physical connexionbettizn Cause
and Effe&: Which that it is not, and can
not be, I have shown above, (pag. 9 j ) both
from the Nature of the thing, and from the
Instance df a Promise made by a Perseft Be*
trig, which is A L W AT S followed with
Performance, and yet^ being a mere Absira&t
cannot be itself a physical or immediate effi
cient Cause of Action* A proper physical effi
ciency might as well, and with as much truth*
be ascribed to final Causes, which every one
knows to be nothing but Abstract ConsideraVcc 2
tions j
tin
tions ; as it is by This Author ascribed to
Moral Causes, to Reasons, Arguments, Judg
ment, and the like.
All that follows upon This Head, is not"i- 78, thing but Repetitions of the fame groundless
Notions : That Man would be more perfeB
than he is, if he were indued with only Pas
sive , and Perceptive Faculties, without any
proper A&ive Powers : That if Man was not
a "Necessary Agent, then he would be INDIF
FERENT both to Propositions and ObjeBs j
he could be convinced upon no Principles } all
Reasonings would be osnoUse to him^he might
reject what appears True to htm, and assent to
what appears absurd to him ; and all his
Motions, would depend upon Chance : Last
ly, that if a Man's Actions were not Necessa
ry, then there Would not be a Cause of Choice,
but a Choice could be made without a Cause,
attd All Choices could be made without a Cause,
and tee should not be necessarily determined by
the greatest Evidence tt> Assent to Truth , 5cc.
Thin all which Aii'ertions, nothing can be
more absurd -, They being all built entirely
Upon such Suppositions as these j that there
is no Middle between Necessity and Absolute
Indifferency \ that Perception of Truth, is as
much an A&ion, as Doing what is right j and
that either Necessity or Nothing, is the effici
ent Cause of all Choice and Aclion : As if
there could not possibly be any such thing in
Nature, either in Man or in Any Other Being
whatsoever, as a Power or Principle of begin
r 37 ]
ning Morion. Concerning which Matter, see
above; pag. 30.
His Fourth Argument against Liberty, is, jy#
that *tis inconsistent with the Divine Presaeience : For " if God foreknows the existences* 82,84" of any thing, as it depends on its own
" Causes ^That existence is no less necessary,
" than if it was the Effect of his Decree' :
" For it no less implies a Contradiction, that
" Causes should not produce their Effects j
" than that an Event fliould not come to pass,
" which is decreed by God. " The Fallacy
of which Argument, arises merely from a
Narrowness or DefeB in Language ; The
word Prescience being used to signirie Two di
stinct Attributes or Perfections of the Divine
Nature, which, though vulgarly called by
the Same common Name, are yet as really
and truly different from each other, as any
other two Attributes whatsoever. This will
appear by considering, that the only means
we have of framing to our selves any true
Notion of the Divine Perfections, is, by way
of Analogy ^ inlarging in our Ideas, to an in
finite Degree, every kind of Perfection which
we observe in Finite Intelligent Beings.
Now One fort of Perfection is, Knoivledge,
And Knowledge, in Men, signifies Three di
stinct Things. A Man who never was in
France, KNOWS that there is such a Place as ' *
Paris : And here the word, Knowledge, means
nothing but a firm ^lies, founded, upon unCcc 3
questionable
U8]
questionable Evidence. A Man KNOWS,
that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal
to two right ones : Here the word, Knowledge,
signifies Science, or the Perception of a Truth
which is necessary in it's own Nature. A Man
KNOWS, that a very Covetous Person, whose
Temper he is perfectly acquainted with, will
certainly accept a Very gainful Proposal when
laid before him : And here the word, Know
ledge, means nothing but right and good
'Judging. Now, to apply this to the present
Argument : The former of these three forts,
of Knowledge, can in no cafe, and in no degree
whatsoever, have any place in God \ because
ft essentially includes, in its very Notion, a
finiteness or limitation of Presence. But rhe
S'ecoyd'fortof Knowledge, the Science or Per
ception of necessary Truths, is, in God, just
as much more extensive and perfeB than in
Jtyfart, as \i\^> infinite nature \s more perfeB than
amfinite, The Third fort of Knowledge also,
the Judging rightly concerning Truths which
depend not on necessity put on Free Causesjst
in God, just: as much more extensive and more
infallible than 'in- Man, as the Divine Nature
and Understanding is Svperipur to Ours. Newerthel'efsi in God, these, Two Perfections,
each of them infinite in their Degree, are yet
in thejr Kinct as truly distinct from each other^ as Our narrow Science, of 'Necessary
Truth, and our fallible: Judgment of Contin
gent Truths,, are things very different from
'$3ch. other, ' ^hi God's infaphle Judgment
itncernin^ Contingent Truths., does np more*
ajtvr
[39]
alter the nature of the things, and cause them
to be necessary ^ than Our judging right at any
time concerning a contingent Truth, makes it
cease to be contingent \ or than Our Science
ef a present Truth, is any Cause of its being
either True or Present. Here therefore lies
the Fallacy of our Author's Argument. Be^cause from God's foreknowing the existence
of things depending on a Chain ot necejsary
Causes, (which is stiled Presciences) it follows
that the existence of the thjngs mast needs
be necessary, it being a contradiction that ne
cessary Causes should not produce their Effects:
Therefore from God's Judging infallibly con
cerning things which depend not on necessary
but on free Causes, (which Attribute, tho*
totally of a different kind from the other, is
yet usually stiled by the general name of
Prescience }) he concludes that these things
also, contrary to the Supposition, depend not
upon Free, but upon Necessary Causes. Con
trary, I say, to the Supposition in the Argu
ment : For in the Argument drawn against
Liberty from the Divine Prescience, it must
not be first Supposed that things are in their
own Nature necessary j but from the Divine
Prescience, or power of Judging infallibly
concerning Free Events, it must be proved
-that things otherwise supposedfree, will there
by unavoidably become necessary. Which
can no more be proved, than it can be proved
that an Action supposed at this present time
to be free, is yet fcontrary to the SupppsitiCcc 4
on)
[ 40 ]
pn)' at the same timp necessary, because in all
past tije (whether foreknown or not fore
known) it could not (upon That very Sup
position of its beiqg now freely done -, I fay,
it could mot) but be future* As has been
as, larg ^plained in my Discourse con
cerning the JB.eing and Attributes of God,
Pars I- pag* 106. dit. ^th.
V*
Yk% fifth Argument, is as follows, " If
' ' " Man was not a Necessary Agent, determined
" />y Pleasure and Pain j f/^rtf would be no
" Foundationfor Rewards and Punishments"
sag, orf.-Pu.niflimenrs " would be useless, unless Men
? ..were necessary Agents, and were determined
** 'by Pleasure ana. Pain j because, if Men
" were Free or indifferent to Pleasure and
*' Ptfin, Pain could be no Motive to cause Men
." to observe the Law." This Argument Sup
poses, th3t whatsoever has in itself a Power
>i Self-motion or ABion, cannot pcffibly have
Any Regard at all to Reasons or Motives of
Action : And that ah Indifferency as to Power,
{that j?, an equal physical; Power, either of */<:ig Qr of forbearing to Afi j) and an Indiffermcy as to Inclination, (that is, an ^z/rf/
Approbation or Liking of <? Object or of the
contrary ,) is One and the fame thing. Than
which , nothing can be more evidently
absurd,
- '' i
''
Vf,
His Sixth and Last Argument, is: " If
p*g. 8?..Vj Man was not a nece/Jary Agent, determin" .>J '";" ...
" ed
t 4 . . .. I ' .
J
*, <
[ A' ]
u ed by pleasure and Pain j he would have
no Notion of Morality, or Motive to prac
tise it." If " he was Indifferent to plea
sure and pain, he would have no Rule to go
4 by, and might never judge, will, andprac:' life Right." This Argument, is merely
to make up the Number j being the very fame
with the foregoing. ,
The remaining part of his Book, is taken
up in answering Objections.
The Chief
of which, is j that Punishments would be
useless and unjuft, if Men were not Free Agents. To which he answers \ that Punish*,
merits, or the Fears of Punishment, have the
fame effect upon intelligent neceJJ'ary Agents,
to determine their Actions towards the Publick Good j as Weights have upon a Clock, to
make it go right. But how much soever
political Ends may sometimes possibly be ser
ved, by doing great Injuries to Innocent Per
sons, such as necessary Agents cannot but be j
yet all Personal Juftice and Injuslice, all
Right and Wrong with regard to particular
Persons, is hereby totally taken away. And
though Weak and Frail Men may fall under
KeceJJities of doing great Hardships to parti
cular Persons, when there is no other possible
way of securing the Publick Safety j yet
God Almighty, we are sure, can never be re
duced to any such Di/lress, in order to sup
port his own Government. And therefore,
if there be no such thing as tree Agents,
ij . ;.:.
! .< :
.,
n&
pas- ?o.
. t *3 .
and cpnsequently no such thing as Personal
Merit or Demerit j God, to be sure, can
never either reward or pwiiJJj any Creature :,
(Punishment, at least, he can never possibly
inflict ;) because it must necessarily be al
ways unjust. And thus this Author's Opini
on absolutely takes away all Foundation of
Religion.
But because answering Objections of his
own raising, (if he were never so able to do
it,) is nothing to the purpose : I fliall briefly
draw up for him the Sum of what has been
said, into One ObjeBion ~y To which if he
can give a clear and distinct Answer, aster the
manner of one who sincerely seeks after riieTruth, and not in a loose and ambiguous
Use of Words of uncertain Signification j
this whole Matter may then possibly deserve
to be reconsidered.
Man, either has within himself a Vrinciple of ABion, properly speaking j that is, a
Self-moving Faculty, a Principle or Power of
beginning Motion : Or he has not.
Jf he has within himself such a Principle ,
then he is a Free, and not a "Necessary Agent.
For every Vecefsary Agent is moved necessari
ly by something else j and then That which
moves it, not the thing it self which is moved,
is the True and Only Cause of the Action.
That any Other thing operating upon an A$ent, should efficiently and necessarily produce
Self-motion in That Agent \ is a direct Contra
diction in Terms.
If
C 43 ]
If Man has not within himself a Principle
or Power of Self-motion } then every Motion
and Affion of Man, is strictly and properly '
produced by the efficiency of some extrinsick;
Cause : Which Cause, must be either what we
usually call the Motive or Reason,uyon which
a Man acts ^ or else it must be some insensible
Subtle Matter, or some other Being or Subfiance making an Impression upon him.
If the Reasons or Motives upon which a
Man acts, be the immediate and efficient Cause
os the ABion : then either abftraft Notions,
such as all Reasons and Motives are, have a
/(?rf/ Subsistence, that is, are themselves Saflances j or else 27w? n?lw/b Zw zYy^ o /y<*/
Subsistence, can />r a Body into Motion : Ei
ther of which, is manifestly absurd.
If insensible Subtle Matter, or any other
Being or Sw/?7w3continuaHy making impres
sion upon a Man, be the immediate and efficicient Cause of his acting j then the Motion of
That Subtle Matter or Substance, must be
caused by some Other Substance, and the
Motion of That by some Other, till at last we
arrive at a Free Agent : And then Liberty
is a possible thing: And then Man possibly
may have Liberty : And if he may possibly
have it, then Experience will prove that ha
probably^ nay, that he certainly has it.
If we Never arrive at Any Free Cause :
Then there is either in infinitum a Progression
of Motions without any Mover, of Effe3s
without any Cnufi, of things afted without
r 44 ]
any Agent ; Which is a manifest Contra
diction : Or else Motion exists necessarily of
itself.
If Motion exists necessarily os itself^ it
must be either with a Determination every
way, or one certain way : If with a Determi
nation everyway, This is no Motion at all : If
with ^Determination one certain wtf,thenThat
Determination is' either necessary, and conse
quently all other Determinations impossible which is contrary to experience ^ Or else
there must be a particular Reason of That
determination, and so backwards in infinitwn \
which comes to the forementionedAbsurdity,
of Effe3y existing without Any Cause.
I cannot make an End, without earnestly
desiring this Author seriously to consider
with himself, What it is that he has all this
time been pleading for. For though it
might be supposed possible, that, among
Necessary Agents, a sort' of a Machine of
Government might be carried on, by such
Weights and Springs of Rewards and Punish
ments, zsClocks and Watches (supposing them
to feel what is done to them) are rewarded and
puiiiihed withal \ yet in truth and reality, ac
cording to This Supposition, there is nothing
intrinsically good ox evil, there is nothing per
sonallyjuft or unjust , there is no Behaviour os
rational Creatures in any degree acceptable or
unacceptable to God Almighty. Consider ths
Consequence of This. Supersitien
Bi' and
gotirjt
gottry, (things v&tf mechaniinl, ds.tfell as

very mifcUevoits to Mankind,) can tiever be
rooted out,, but by persuading Met* to look
upon themselves as rational GreStufes, arid
so implant in their Minds rational Notions of
Religion : Religion there Can be'None, with
out a Moral Difference of Things : A moral
Difference of things there cannot be, where
there is no pl'ace for Acliont And Atiion
there can be none, t without Liberty,
A Eree and Impartial Inquiry after Truth,
where-ever it is to be found, is indeed a No
ble and most Commendable Disposition ; A
Disposition, which; every Mati ought himself
to labour after, and1 to the utmost of his
Power incourage In all Others : Tis the
Great Foundation of all useful Knowledge,
of all true Virtue, and of alt sincere Religi
on. But when a Man in his Searches' into
the Nature of Things, finds his Inquiries
leading him towards such Notions, as, if
they mould prove true, would manifestly
subvert the very Essences ot Good and Evil \
The Leaf that a Sober-miuded Man can in
such a cafe possibly be supposed to owe to
God, to Virtue, to the Dignity of a ra
tional nature, is, that he ought to be in the
highest degree fearful and suspicions of
himself, least he be led away by Any Preju
dice, least he be deceived by any erroneous
Argument, least he suffer himself to be im
posed upon by any wrong Inclination. Too
great an Assurance in Arguments of This
Nature,
40
Nature, (even though at prefent they feemed to him to heDemonrations ) Rejoicing in
the Strength of them, and taking pleafure in
the carrying of iuch a Caufe ;-iswhata Good
Mind can never be capable ofi To fuch a
Perfon, the finding his own Arguments unanfwerable, would be the greateft Grief:
Triumphing in fo melancholly a Field, would
be the higheft DiJfatisfatTion j and nothing
could afford fo pleang, fo agreeable a difappointment^ as to find his own Reafo?iings
ihown to be inconclufive.
I (hall fugged to this Author's Confident
tion, only one thing further : That All
fincere Lovers of Truth and Liberty, of
free and impartial Examination, are under
the higheft Obligations in reafon and Con
fidence, always to make ufe of That Free
dom which we fo greatly efteem and fo
juftly boaft of, in fuch a manner only, as
may give no occafion to Superfiitious Men
and Lovers of Darknefs , to endeavour to
retrench That Liberty of inquiring after
Truth, upon which All valuable Knowledge
and all true Religion Eflentially depends^
F I N I &
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Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of
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The Fourth Edition, corrected. There are added in this
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Drs Answers.
A Paraphrase on the four Evangelists. Wherein, for
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more difficult Passages. Very useful for Families. In
two Volumes. The 2J. Edition, 8110. pr. 12 s.
Three Practical Essays on Baptism, Confirmation, and
Repentance : Containing full Instructions for a holy Life,
with earnest Exhortations, especially to young Persons*
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cipline of the Primitive Church. The Third Edition*
This new Edition makes 1 1 Sheets in Twelves, on good
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A Letter to Mr DodweH; wherein all the Arguments
in his Epistolary Discourse against the Immortality of the
Soil,
Son], arc particularly answered, and the judgment of the

Fathers concerning that Matter truly represented. To
gether with four Letters in Answer to the Author of Re
marks on the Letter to Mr Dodwett. To which is added,
some Reflections on that part of a Book call'd Amyntor,
or, the Defense of Mi/ton's Life, which relates to the
Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the
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Jacobi Rohaulti Phyfica. Latine vertit, resensuit, &
uberioribus jamAnnotationibus ex illustriffimi Isaaci Newtoni Philosophia maximam partem haustis, amplificavit
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multuni sunt auct, 'Svo. price Bs.
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If. Newtoki Optice. Latins reddidit S. Clarke, S. T. P.
The Scripture-Do&rine of the Trinity. In three Parts.
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swer to the Remarks of the Author of some Considerati
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^t'.^ey-.x HU^l ^ewskay, ^t\r At

Mr. LEI B N ITZ,

Natural Philosophy and Religion.

LETTERS to Dr. Clarke concerning Liberty and

REMARKS upon a Book, Entituled,

S the following Papers

The DEVI CATIOK

'Tis with the highest Pleasure

the DEDIC AT lOU.

7< Royal Highnesses

mofl Obedient Servant^

Advertisement to the Reader.

Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

4. Monsieur Newton, & ses SeBateurs,

Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper.

An ExtraB of a Letter Written in

much. Many will have

Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz,

Mr. LfciENlTZ's First Paper.!

* The Place Mr. Leibnitz here seems to allude to, is as

Premier Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper.

f See the Note on Dr. CJarkcV Fifth Reply, 93, 9$.

Premiere Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

Dr. Clarki'j Firji Reply.

Premiere Repliqtie de Mr. Clarke.

Dr. Clarke'/ First Reply,

Premiere Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

s Voici le Passage dont il s'agic. Aimon Sensori

Dr. Clarke\t First Reply.

f- The Passage referred to, it as follows. Annon Senforium

Premiere Rplique de Mr. Clarke.

tinue plus long temps d'avoir un mouve

.-.' 2)r. ClarkiV First Reply.

will continue longer to move regularly

Premire Replique de Mr. Clarke.

Y Y"- '''{:-: i'""'

2)r. ClarkeV Firjl Reply t

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Second Ecrit de Mr. LeibnitZj

Rplique au premier Ecrit Anglois.

i./^N a raison de dire dans le Papier donn

Mr. Lei b n i t z's Second Paper.

Mr. Leibnitz's Second Paper.

An Answer to Vr. Clarke'; First

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Mr. LeienitzV Second Paper.

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Mr. Leibnitz's Second Taper.

viz. that there ought to be a sufficient Rea

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Mr. Leibnitz^ Second Paper.

3. I find, in || express Words, in the II *' '*

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

Mr. Leibnitz*j1 Second Paper.

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

7. Ainsi il faut que V artifice de Dieu,

Mr. LeienitzV Second Paper.

Skond Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

9. Ce Sentiment n exclut point ta Provi

ftlr. Leibnit^'j Second Paper.

Second Ecrit de Mr. Leibnitz.

3. I find, in || express Words, in the II ' '