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his second wife, Andrea Gutang.

Because Francisco was a


minor at the time, his mother administered the property for
him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes due thereon. When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at
the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother,
as his sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale
whereby, among other things, she sold the property in question
to the appellant, Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and
Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who
had declared the questioned property in their name, executed a
deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes. The Trial court declared both sale as void and ordered
that the property be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso,
the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the
death of Andrea Gutang.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is
obliged to reserve the property is valid although at the time of
his death, there are still surviving relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
RULING: The land in question was reservable property.
Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his
father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and
without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to
reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her. The record discloses that when Andrea Gutang
died, the lone reservee surviving her is Cipriana Yaeso.
The reserve creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the
death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came. The
reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a
life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation
transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time
of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was,
therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees would
definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only
if the vendor died without being survived by any person
entitled to the reservable property. When Andrea Gutang died,
Cipriana Yaeso was still alive; thus, the previous sale made by
the former in favor of appellant became of no legal effect and
the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the
sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of

the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right
which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee
survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when
Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the
former became the absolute owner of the reservable property
upon Andrea's death.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990


CELEDONIA
SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26,
1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010
(Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and
damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff
and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be
divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and onehalf for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted
the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged
the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire
estate property, including but not limited to, specific items
already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting
of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall
belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses
of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)


This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.
His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father,
Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10)
months after his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia
Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio
Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the
Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties
(various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles)
which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo,
Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal
property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties
to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La
Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due
time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the
name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once,
expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and
to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked
about what to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told
Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his
properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of
the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978"
which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No.
2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being
the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition
they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia
Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each

other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of
the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation,
Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel,
filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition
(Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her;
that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as
her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for
three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had
come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the
decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with
her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate
to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23,
RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she
sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other
obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA
SOLIVIO
VDA.
DE
JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under
Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana
Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's
order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27,
1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp.
80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia
filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later),
Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment
in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia JavellanaVillanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of
its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit
an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and
were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for
reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the
Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this

petition for review wherein she raised the following legal


issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on


March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without
any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
reared him and with whom he had always been living with
[sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx

2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from


intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them;
and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after
she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been
formed and properties of the estate have already been
transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the
petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's
action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no
orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's
inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate
to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that brings
to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the
administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his
duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860,
March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540
declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a
matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of
Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it
appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the
publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other
heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the
only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana
who died on February 26, 1977.

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is


hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S.
Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz,
Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 1416, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch
11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23),
Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia
as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia)
declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of
the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540.
Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate
the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more
than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was
improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution
of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should
not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal
court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43
SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to
annul a project of partition executed between her and her
father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her
mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The
probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make
distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to
which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is
inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be
contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of
avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive,
dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the

administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an


independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed
(Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however,
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his
share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and
not through an independent action,which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate or intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and
disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29,
1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied) In Litam et
al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence,
entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties
acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court
in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not
children of the deceased, that the properties in question were
paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that
the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled
that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir
of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being
within the exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and,
will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the
project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate
proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three
years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was
allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the
estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir
in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to
discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil
Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in
Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of
Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of
the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to

submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were


improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he
within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate
proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is
noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's
original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her
amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any
act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair
submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G.
714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or
presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the
manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that
there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance,
if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a
litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented
from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the
case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the
aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no
fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment
may be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31,
1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by
Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party
is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA
17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the
following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter
would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes
and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate
of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and
the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the
defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the
payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything
else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the

estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia


denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their
agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2,
Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in
the proceedings. She stayed away by choice.Besides, she knew
that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother,
Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it
in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of
the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules
of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original
petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25,
May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice
of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the
settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in
"Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and
10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice
of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice
of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of
October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed
about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the
sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been
duly published as required by law, despite which the present
movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for
sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with
the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment nor a
motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as
follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction
of probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent
errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack.
(Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir
of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not
false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest
belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from
his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving
relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It
would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her
claim of sole heirshipif she stated in her petition that
Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters


which would defeat one's ow claim or defense is not such
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15
SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a
decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec.
2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition
did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of
the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains
to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncalprovision of the Civil Code
is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged
to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)
the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from
his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous
title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit
by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II,
1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is
not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant,
but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not
hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his
aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who
inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving
spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply

in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of


the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives
of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line,
each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the
estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother,
Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate
came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her
"Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that
agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in
the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving
students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did.
Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no evidence
need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank,
L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido,
G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by


Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case,
although she could have done so by deposition if she were
supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband,
Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated
in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his
wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging
that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of
her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" was established and duly registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No.
0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or
setting up of scholarships for such
deservingstudents as the Board of Trustees
of the Foundation may decide of at least one
scholar each to study at West Visayas State
College, and the University of the
Philippines in the Visayas both located in
Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one
scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist
Community for a deserving student who has
the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will
promote the advancement and enrichment of the various fields
of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named
after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community
to determine community needs and be able to alleviate
partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible.
Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those
of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be
offered every February and October, and Requiem masses
every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source,
to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and
pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be
determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,


mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real
and personal property of every kind and description or any
interest herein.

petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the


probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of the
deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or


proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise
of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in
general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in
particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

MARIA
CANO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, EUSTAQUIA GUERRERO, ET
AL., oppositors-appellants.
JOSE FERNANDEZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3)


of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one
(1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other
was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being
the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso
Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who
would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier
Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation
likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that
gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to
become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly
awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana
Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.
Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate
to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her
commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The
decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby
SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the
late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate.
However, comformably with the agreement between her and
her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the
deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the
private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled
to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute the
Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer
the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The

SO ORDERED.
of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10701

January 16, 1959

Ramon
C.
Fernandez
Jose B. Dealca for appellee.

for

appellants.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:


In an amended decision dated October 9, 1951, issued in Land
Registration Case No. 12, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 2835, the Court
of First Instance of Sorsogon decreed the registration of Lots
Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the Juban (Sorsogon) Cadastre, under
the following terms and conditions:
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the
notices have been duly published and posted as
required by law, and that the title of the applicant to
the above-mentioned two parcels of land is
registrable in law, it is hereby adjudged and decreed,
and with reaffirmation of the order of general default,
that the two parcels of land described in plan SWO24152, known as Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 of the
Cadastral Survey of Juban, with their improvements,
be registered in the name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71
years of age, widow and resident of Juban, province
of Sorsogon, with the understanding that Lot No.
1799 shall be subject to the right of reservation in
favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891
of the Civil code. After this decision shall have
become final for lack of appeal therefrom within the
30-day period from its promulgation, let the
corresponding decree issue.
So ordered. (Rec. App. pp. 18-19)
The decision having become final, the decree and the
Certificate of Title (No. 0-20) were issued in the name of
Maria Cano, subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia
Guerrero. In October 1955, counsel for the reserve
(reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the Cadastral
Court, alleging the death of the original registered owner
and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955, and
praying that the original Certificate of Title be ordered

cancelled and a new one issued in favor of movant Eustaquia


Guerrero; and that the Sheriff be ordered to place her in
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by Jose
and Teotimo Fernandez, sons of thereservista Maria Cano,
who contended that the application and operation of
the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary
contentious proceeding, and that the Registration Court did not
have jurisdiction to grant the motion.
In view of the recorded reserva in favor of the appellee, as
expressly noted in the final decree of registration, the lower
court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate,
for the reason that the death of the reservistavested the
ownership of the property in the petitioner as the
sole reservatorio troncal.
The oppositors, heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly
appealed from the order, insisting that the ownership of
the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere proceeding
under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial
administration proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as
the reservatorio entitled to the reservable property, are to be
declared. In this connection, appellants argue that the
reversion in favor of the reservatorio requires the declaration
of the existence of the following facts:
(1) The property was received by a descendant by
gratuitous title from an ascendant or from a brother or
sister;
(2) Said descendant dies without issue;
(3) The property is inherited by another ascendant by
operation of law; and
(4) The existence of relatives within the third degree
belonging the line from which said property came.
(Appellants' Brief, p. 8)
We find the appeal untenable. The requisites enumerated by
appellants have already been declared to exist by the decree of
registration wherein the rights of the appellee as reservatario
troncal were expressly recognized:
From the above-quoted agreed stipulation of facts, it
is evident that Lot No. 1799 was acquired by the
Appellant Maria Cano by inheritance from her
deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero who, in turn,
inherited the same from her father Evaristo Guerrero
and, hence, falls squarely under the provisions of
Article 891 of the Civil Code; and that each and
everyone of the private oppositors are within the third
degree of consaguinity of the decedent Evaristo
Guerrero, and who belonging to the same line from
which the property came.
It appears however, from the agreed stipulation of
facts that with the exception of Eustaquia Guerrero,
who is the only living daughter of the decedent
Evaristo Guerrero, by his former marriage, all the

other oppositors are grandchildren of the said


Evaristo Guerrero by his former marriages. Eustaquia
Guerrero, being the nearest of kin, excludes all the
other private oppositors, whose decree of relationship
to the decedent is remoter (Article 962, Civil Code;
Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 62 Phil., 279). (Rec.
App. pp. 16-17)
This decree having become final, all persons (appellees
included) are bared thereby from contesting the existence of
the constituent elements of the reserva. The only requisites for
the passing of the title from thereservista to the appellee are:
(1) the death of the reservista; and (2) the fact that
the reservatario has survived the reservista. Both facts are
admitted, and their existence is nowhere questioned.
The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary
rests upon the assumption that the reservatario will succeed
in, or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This
is
not
true.
The reservatario is
not
thereservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable
property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatarioreceives
the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed
during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed
that there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the
latter must be deemed to have enjoined no more than a life
interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to theprepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated,
that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does
not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence, its
acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property
records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic
requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled
that the reservable property can not be transmitted by
a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa,(like
appellants herein) so long as a reservatario within the third
degree from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence
the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.
Of course, where the registration decree merely specifies
the reservable character of the property, without determining
the identity of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatarios
dispute the property among themselves, further proceedings
would be unavoidable. But this is not the case. The rights of
the reservataria Eustaquia Guerrero have been expressly
recognized, and it is nowhere claimed that there are
other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. It is thus
apparent that the heirs of the reservista are merely
endeavoring to prolong their enjoyment of the reservable
property to the detriment of the party lawfully entitled thereto.
We find no error in the order appealed from and therefore, the
same is affirmed with costs against appellants in both
instances. So ordered.

endoza
GR

No

v
176422,

Delos
March

20,

Santos
2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-infact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORA
CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA,
FELY BAUTISTA, JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA,
Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her
heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENA
VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE
MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS, ELVIRA P. DELOS
SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOSCABUHAT, MERCEDITA P. DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P.
DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P.
DELOS SANTOS, JR., and CECILIA M. MENDOZA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of
land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in the name
of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent but coowned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido)
and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that
were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated
to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it passed on to his spouse
Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her
share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias death,
respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all
these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and
Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should
have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must
now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil
Code
on
reserva
troncal.
DECISION
OF
LOWER
COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied their motion
for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO
FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO
NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.
APPLICABLE LAW:

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of


the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and belong to the line from which said property came.
(Emphasis
ours)
RULING:
No,
CA
is
correct.
I.
Reserva
troncal
is
not
applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure
the return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came,
and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties


should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the
ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from
whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law
does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property. It was also
immaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the
properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other
hand, is the descendant who received the properties from
Exequiel
by
gratuitous
title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias
collateral
relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as
they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from
whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon

whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in


this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are
fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
OTHER
NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant
called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation
of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor,
also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is
from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must
be relatives within the third degree from which the property
came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received
the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained
the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and (4)
The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from

the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from


which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved
by
the
reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be
either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by
the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but
who
come
from
a
common
ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance
with
the
following
articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall
succeed
to
the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title. In reserva
troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether
by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively.

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