Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tiongson
(16 SCRA 940, April 30, 1966, Dizon, J.)
FACTS:
An LTB bus collided with a 7-UP delivery truck coming from the opposite direction while
trying to evade a road depression. As a consequence, the bud fell on its right side on
the shoulder of the road resulting in the death of Ricardo Tiongson. Both drivers were
prosecuted criminally but a separate action was filed by the heirs of the deceased
against the petitioner LTB. CA affirmed the CFI decision ordering LTB to pay P50,000 by
way of actual, compensatory and moral damages. LTB filed petition for certiorari.
HELD:
The liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon its breach of the obligation, and
there is a breach if it fails to exercise extraordinary diligence according to all
circumstances of each case. A carrier is obliged to carry its passengers with utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, having due regard for all circumstances sorrounding
the case. A carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of
death of, or injury to its passengers, it being its duty to prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence.
LTB has not successfully discharged the burden of disproving its presumptive
negligence because of its failure to transport its passenger to his destination and has
not sufficiently established its defense of fortuitous event. On the contrary, the driver
applied the brakes in his bus too late
(distance of 10 meters) to avoid the accident, and the driver was aware of the
depression, driving along the same route for a considerable period of time.
This sufficiently showed that the company had not exercised due care and diligence in
connection with the hiring of the driver. The CA therefore found that petitioner has failed
to disprove the presumption of negligence (Arts. 1733, 1755, 1756, NCC) and that its
negligence had been established by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner's liability for moral damages cannot now be seriously questioned in view of
Arts. 1764 and 2206 of the NCC and the ruling in Necesito v. Paras. Decision
AFFIRMED.
disregard for the physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag
as a common carrier liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil
Code. Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was
caused solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It
harps on their alleged non-use of an early warning device.
The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention. Col. dela Cruz and
Romano testified that they did not see any early warning devicenat the
scene of the accident. They were refering to the triangular reflectorized
plates in red and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office. However,
the evidence shows that Recontique and Escala placed a kerosene lamp or
torch atbthe edge of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as
an early warning device. This substantially complied with Section 34(g) of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, to wit:
"(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. --- Appropriate parking
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger
passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all
times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at
night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any
of the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."
The aforequoted law clearly allows the use not only of an early warning
device of the triangular reflectorized plates variety but also parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away. Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself
admitted that a kerosene lamp is an acceptable substitute for the
reflectorized plates. No negligence, therefore, may be imputed to A & J
Trading and its driver, Recontique. The CA decision awarding damages to
the Garcias is AFFIRMED.
CERVANTES VS CA
( 304 SCRA 25, March 2, 1999, Purisima, J.)
FACTS:
PAL issued to Cervantes a round trip ticket for Manila-Honolulu-Los
Angeles-Honolulu-Manila. This ticket expressly provide an expiry date of 1
year from issuance or until March 27, 1990.The ticket was issued in
compliance w/ a Compromise Agreement entered between PAL &
Cervantes in 2 previous suits between them. On March 3, 1990, $ days
before the expiry date, Cervantes used it. Upon his arrival to LA, on the
same day, he immediately booked his LA-Manila return ticket w/ PAL office
which was confirmed for April 2, 1990 flight. Cervantes learned that the
same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San Francisco and because he
would be in San Francisco on April 2, 1990, he made arrangements w/ PAL
for him to board the flight in San Francisco instead of boarding it in LA.
When Cervantes checked in at PAL counter in San Francisco he was not
allowed to board. PAL personnel made annotation on his ticket. TICKET
NOT ACCEPTED DUE TO EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY .Aggrieved,
Cervantes filed a complaint for damages for Breach of Contract of
Carriage. The RTC dismissed the complaint w/c was upheld by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the act of the PAL agents in confirming the ticket of
Cervantes extended the period of validity.
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative.
The plane ticket itself provides that it is not valid after March 27, 1990. It is
also stipulated in paragraph 8 of the Conditions of Contract that This ticket
is good for carriage for one year from date of issue, except as otherwise
provided in this ticket, in carrier's tariffs, conditions of carriage, or related
regulations. The fare for carriage hereunder is subject to change prior to
commencement of carriage. Carrier may refuse transportation if the
applicable fare has not been paid.
In the case of Lufthansa vs. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the "ticket
constitute the contract between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the
terms are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting
parties, contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning. "In
his effort to evade this inevitable conclusion, petitioner theorized that the
confirmation by the PAL's agents in Los Angeles and San Francisco
changed the compromise agreement between the parties. As aptly by the
appellate court: on March 23, 1990, he was aware of the risk that his ticket
could expire, as it did, before he returned to the Philippines. The 2
personnel from PAL did not have an authority to extend the validity of the
ticket. Cervantes knew this from the start when he called up the Legal
Department of appellee in the Philippines before he left for the United
States of America. He had first hand knowledge that the ticket in question
would expire on March 27, 1990 and that to secure an extension, he would
have to file a written request for extension at the PAL's office in the
Philippines. ). Despite this knowledge, he persisted to use the ticket in
question. "Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and
Cervantes knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL was
necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The
said agents, according to the Court of Appeals, acted without authority
when they confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the
New Civil Code, the acts an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not
bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly.
Furthermore, when the third person (herein petitioner) knows that the agent
was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held
liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages
from the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's
ratification.
there would have been no contact and accident. He should have foreseen
that at the speed he was running, the vehicles were getting nearer the
bridge and as the road was getting narrower the truck would be to close to
the jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he should
have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right to give way to the
truck because the two vehicles could not cross the bridge at the same.
time.
2.) Yes. x x x [T]he fact is, there was a contract of carriage between the
private respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court of
Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of the Civil Code
which require the exercise of extraordinary diligence on the part of
petitioner
Montefalcon.
Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand extraordinary
diligence. A common carrier is vested with public interest. Under the new
Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary diligence a
common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of travel is
injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver are
presumed to be at fault.
3.) The third assigned error of the petitioners would find fault upon
respondent court in not freeing petitioners from any liability, since the
accident was due to a fortuitous event. But, We repeat that the alleged
fortuitous event in this case - the sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo
truck, was something which could have been avoided considering the
narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough to admit
two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals, Montefalcon contributed to
the occurrence of the mishap.