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20692079, 2011
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
0305-750X/$ - see front matter
www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.013
and
ALESSANDRO NICITA *
UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland
Summary. This paper reviews some indices of trade restrictiveness and trade facilitation and compares the trade impact of dierent
types of trade restrictions applied at the border with the eects of domestic policies that aect trade costs. Based on a gravity regression
framework, the analysis suggests that taris and non-tari measures continue to be a signicant source of trade restrictiveness for
low-income countries despite preferential access programs. The results also suggest that behind-the-border measures to improve logistics
performance and facilitate trade are likely to have a comparable, if not larger, eect in expanding developing country trade, especially
exports.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words TARIFFS, nontari measures, trade facilitation, logistics, economic development, DOHA Round
1. INTRODUCTION
and trade facilitation performance levels prevailing in middleincome countries. We nd that the latter will have a substantially larger positive impact on trade volumes than the former.
Section 6 concludes.
2. TRADE POLICIES
Trade policies can be broadly divided into taris (ad-valorem
and specic) and non-tari measures. Although taris are still
the most widely used policy instrument to restrict trade, their
relative importance has been declining. Trade liberalization,
whether unilateral, the result of agreements negotiated under
the auspices of the World Trade Organization, or the consequence of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), has greatly reduced the average level of applied taris. Conversely, the use of
NTMs has been increasing both in terms of the number of products covered and the number of countries utilizing them (World
Bank and IMF, 2008). The use of taris, specic duties and
NTMs in 2006 is illustrated in Figure 1. In general, the use of
non-tari measures increases with the level of economic development of countries. This is particularly true for NTMs, which
are increasingly used to regulate trade, especially in high income
countries. Similarly, specic duties, although aecting only a
relatively small share of total imports, are more prominent in
high income countries.
The type of NTMs included in the analysis of this paper is
limited by the availability of data. In particular, as a measure
of NTMs we use the ad-valorem equivalent of NTMs estimated in (Kee, Nicita, & Olarreaga, 2009). This ad-valorem
* We are grateful to Alan Deardor, Simon Evenett, Sheila Page, and Ben
Shepherd for comments on an earlier draft, and to three referees of this
journal for comments that greatly improved the paper. The authors accept
sole responsibility for any errors remaining. The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank or the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Final revision accepted:
March 28, 2011.
2069
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
.2
.1
.08
.04
specific duties
10
non-tariff measures
.06
.1
.12
.3
2070
12
.15
equivalent of NTMs captures the eect of quantitative restrictions, technical product regulations, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, and any monopolistic measure or
discretionary licensing. 1
The ad-valorem equivalent of NTMs can be combined with
data on taris into an overall trade restrictiveness index
(OTRI) to capture the eect of both types of measures (Kee
et al., 2009). To isolate the eect of taris from the overall index we also calculate the tari trade restrictiveness index
(TTRI). The dierence between the TTRI and OTRI is that
the OTRI includes the eect of both tari and NTMs, while
the TTRI captures only taris, both ad valorem and the ad
valorem equivalents of specic taris. 2 These indices are calculated on a bilateral basis, using the eectively applied tari
and taking into account all preferential regimes. Both the
OTRI and the TTRI are a measure of the uniform tari equivalent implied by observed trade policies aecting a countrys
importsthat is, they represent the ad-valorem tari that
would be needed to generate the observed level of trade. 3
The prevailing average TTRI and OTRI across countries is
plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Trade policies are generally more
restrictive in lower-income countries, reecting both lower tar-
TTRI
.1
Agriculture
Manufacturing
.05
All Goods
10
12
2071
.3
.4
.2
OTRI
Agriculture
.1
All Goods
Manufacturing
10
12
Agriculture (%)
Manufacturing (%)
East Asia
11.3
5.0
26.6
8.7
10.4%
4.8
10.1
4.5
25.9
10.3
9.0
4.0
Latin America
15.0
5.4
28.1
6.6
13.8
5.3
21.6
11.9%
32.3
12.1
19.4
11.8
South Asia
19.5
14.0
46.4
31.4
18.2
13.2
Sub-Saharan Africa
14.4
8.4
24.9
13.8
12.9
7.6
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
.3
.2
0
.1
.2
.1
0
TTRI 2000
.3
.4
.4
2072
.1
.2
.3
.4
.1
.3
.4
.4
.3
.2
.1
0
.2
TTRI 2006
.1
.2
.3
.4
Exporting countries
High
income
Upper middle
income
Lower middle
income
Low
income
East
Asia
E. Europe
Cent. Asia
Latin
America
Mid. East
N. Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
High income
6.3
2.4
5.7
1.2
7.9
2.5
9.1
2.4
8.3
2.6
5.1
1.1
7.0
1.5
4.3
0.8
10.4
3.1
4.4
0.7
QUAD
6.3
2.1
5.2
0.9
8.6
2.5
10.6
2.5
8.9
2.7
5.2
0.8
6.9
1.2
4.4
0.5
13.6
3.3
4.5
0.5
Upper middle
15.6
5.6
11.8
3.8
15.8
5.6
14.7
5.7
19.2
7.2
10.2
4.4
13.6
2.6
6.0
2.5
14.3
6.6
5.9
3.5
Lower middle
12.4
7.1
11.1
4.8
12.9
6.7
9.4
5.1
13.6
6.6
11.2
6.2
12.6
5.1
6.7
2.8
9.9
6.2
4.0
2.7
Low income
18.2
10.9
14.3
8.1
19.5
12.2
25.4
12.9
22.2
13.8
17.7
6.2
15.9
9.0
16.3
10.0
16.2
10.4
16.3
12.2
Note: MA-OTRI in bold; MA-TTRI in italics. QUAD countries are Canada, European Union, Japan, and USA.
market access. With the increase in reciprocal and nonreciprocal preferential trade agreements, almost all trade ows today
are aected by some sort of tari preference. This is particularly true for high income countries, where market access is affected by an increasing number of such agreements.
The proliferation of preferential trade arrangements makes
it important to properly measure preferential margins in
assessing the relative market access conditions confronting
exporters. This is done in the TTRI and OTRI in a direct
way, as the calculations take into account the bilateral market
access conditions that apply. But what matters for a given
country, however, is the relative preference (the relative market access conditions), not just the absolute level of prevailing
barriers at the border.
Commonly used measures of preference margins compare
the preferential tari to the most-favored-nation (MFN) rate.
This will overestimate the relative preference enjoyed by coun-
tries as in most instances other countries will also have preferential access. In practice it is possible that preferential rates
granted to a particular country, although lower than MFN,
still penalize it relative to other countries that benet from
even lower or zero taris. To calculate the relative preferential
margin the focus needs to be on the average advantage in
tari percentage points that a given basket of goods enjoys
when exported from country A as compared to when it originates in other countries.
To clarify with an example, in what follows we calculate the
relative preferential margin that Mexico enjoys in the US by
using as the counterfactual the average tari for Mexicos export bundle if this were to originate in other countries. The relative preferential margin is the dierence between the bilateral
trade-weighted preferential tari imposed by the US on
Mexico and that counterfactual. There are two sets of weights
when calculating this margin: rst, the counterfactual, which is
m;hs
hs
PP
k
PP
impjk;hs k;hs
hs
hs
hs
2073
ence that countries outside Latin America face when they export to that region. Relative preference margins, whether
positive or negative, are much smaller for other regions. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, enjoy a relative preferential margin of only about 0.5% in the EU, as they compete
both among themselves and other countries to which the EU
provides preferences (Eastern Europe, North Africa and Latin
America). Relative preferential margins are mostly negative
for East Asian states.
Country-specic estimates of the relative preference margin
for a number of Sub-Saharan countries are reported in Table
4. Bilateral preferences are substantial in only a few cases, and
in a few instances they are actually negative, putting the countries concerned in a situation similar to that applying to East
Asian economies. Only Madagascar has relatively large preferential margins in more than two markets, while most countries
have meaningful preferential margins in only one or two markets, if any.
4. OTHER TRADE COSTS
The foregoing discussion illustrates that NTMs as well as
taris are a signicant source of barriers to trade. A question
to which we return below concerns the relative importance of
various barriers, especially from a developing country perspective. In particular, given the still high taris in agricultural
products, remaining taris may still have large eects relative
to NTMs, especially in the case of South-South trade ows.
On the other hand, the average impact of NTMs in regulating
imports into higher-income countries clearly suggests that action to reduce their trade-impeding eects could have high
payos.
Besides taris and NTMs, we are also interested in the impact of other trade related costs. Internal trade and transactions costs may be of equal if not greater importance in
reducing volumes of trade. Many of these trade costs reect
the domestic economic environment: the legal and regulatory
framework, the eciency of infrastructure services and related regulation, customs clearance procedures, administrative red tape, etc. Data on domestic trade costs are often
lacking. However, the World Bank has recently initiated
the collection of data for a large number of developing countries on the performance of logistics services and on the internal costs associated with shipping goods from the factory
gate to the port, and from ports to retail outlets. The rst
is captured by the Logistics Performance Index (World Bank
2007); the second is covered by the Doing Business database
(World Bank, 2008). All of these indicators capture dimensions of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes that aect
trade.
The Doing Business cost of trading indicator measures the
fees associated with complying with the procedures to export
or import a 20-foot container, measured in US dollars
(Djankov, Freund, & Pham, 2010). These include costs for
documents, administrative fees for customs clearance and
technical control, terminal handling charges and inland transport. The cost measure does not include taris or trade taxes
and only ocial costs are recorded. The indicator is part of
the Doing Business trading across borders index. The methodology, survey instruments and data are available at http://
www.doingbusiness.org.
The Logistics Performance Index (LPI) provides a snapshot
of the supply chain performance of countries. Based on a
worldwide survey of global freight forwarders and express
carriers, the LPI measures the logistics friendliness of the
2074
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 3. Relative preference margins, 2006 (percentage points)
Importers
East Asia
East Europe Central Asia
Latin America
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
High Income Countries
Australia and New Zealand
Canada
European Union
Japan
USA
East
Asia
East Europe
Central Asia
Latin
America
South Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
High income
countries
0.22
0.01
2.54
0.29
0.21
0.10
0.46
0.18
1.00
0.05
0.34
0.67
0.06
0.45
1.88
0.24
0.08
0.03
0.42
0.61
0.85
1.07
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.37
2.98
0.25
0.04
0.06
0.71
0.28
1.75
0.98
0.07
1.01
0.02
0.39
0.51
0.91
0.26
0.02
0.19
0.08
0.01
0.64
0.00
0.08
0.03
0.20
2.13
0.22
2.03
0.12
0.46
0.23
1.79
0.70
0.70
0.22
0.01
0.04
1.22
0.10
0.15
0.30
0.13
0.11
0.02
0.51
0.08
0.11
0.03
0.15
1.69
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.10
1.01
0.50
0.13
0.03
Table 4. Relative preference margins for selected african countries in high income markets, 2006 (percentage points)
Exporter
Angola
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cent.African. Rep
Chad
Cote DIvoire
Cameroon
Congo
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Madagascar
Mali
Mozambique
Mauritania
Malawi
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sudan
Senegal
Togo
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Canada
European Union
Japan
USA
4.70
0.00
4.23
1.93
4.61
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.11
0.15
0.04
1.43
1.89
0.54
0.37
0.04
2.27
0.29
4.20
1.33
1.41
0.00
0.15
0.03
0.37
0.10
0.00
2.72
1.02
0.65
0.78
0.04
0.16
0.01
0.34
0.06
0.48
7.53
1.63
0.17
4.37
0.35
0.52
0.03
0.14
0.00
0.60
0.06
0.00
0.16
0.82
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.60
0.06
0.08
0.36
0.40
0.07
0.50
0.92
1.25
3.89
0.43
4.46
0.37
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.02
0.06
2.29
0.32
1.13
1.45
0.13
0.60
0.03
0.23
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.04
0.01
0.08
0.06
0.02
0.08
0.83
2.84
0.53
6.95
0.05
0.43
0.00
0.20
0.00
2.99
0.28
0.05
0.22
0.82
0.01
0.08
0.18
0.40
0.03
0.17
0.02
1.16
0.27
0.01
0.38
0.92
0.97
0.24
0.18
0.00
2.96
2.01
0.13
0.05
0.00
0.22
1.42
0.32
-0.01
0.56
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.27
0.03
0.01
0.24
0.27
0.01
0.76
0.59
0.68
2.92
0.29
2.76
0.22
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.98
0.12
2.33
1.22
-0.32
0.25
countries surveyed. Feedback from the survey is supplemented with data on the performance of key components
of the logistics chain. For the analysis in this paper we use
the overall LPI score. This score summarizes six sub-indicators (eciency of clearance process, quality of trade and
transport infrastructure, ease of arranging competitively
priced shipments, competence and quality of logistic services,
ability to track and trade consignments, and timeliness of
shipments within the expected delivery time. The LPI indicators range from 1 (worst) to 5 (best). In practice, the LPI
score varies from 1.2 (Afghanistan) to 4.2 (Singapore). The
underlying methodology and data on the LPI are available
at http://www.worldbank.org/lpi.
Table 5 reports the average of these indices by income country groups. Developing countries generally have weaker trade
facilitation performance than higher-income economies.
5. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
The literature on trade costs has recently devoted some
attention to the role that domestic costs play in aecting international trade. The impact of dierent sources of trade costs is
frequently assessed through the inclusion of specic variables
(generally measures of infrastructure availability such as
roads, railways, phone lines, etc.) in gravity type models. In
general, the literature supports the hypothesis that domestic
trade costs and the economic business environment are significant determinants of the volume of trade between countries
(Limao & Venables, 2001; Wilson, Mann, & Otsuki, 2003;
Anderson & Marcouiller, 2002; Francois and Manchin,
2007). What follows builds on the existing gravity model literature to investigate the importance of trade and related regulatory policies on trade ows.
2075
High income
Middle income
Low income
1.98
4.45
2.77
4.56
0.04
774.40
813.60
3.90
6.86
4.45
2.79
4.72
0.44
867.20
1024.20
3.00
10.22
6.71
6.02
5.07
0.23
949.30
1212.00
2.80
2076
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Table 6. Gravity model results.
Variable
GDP Importer
(log)
GDP Exporter
(log)
Population Importer
(log)
Population Export
(log)
Multilateral Resistance
(Distance)
Multilateral Resistance
(Board)
Land Importer
(dummy)
Land Exporter
(dummy)
Distance (log)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Common Board
(dummy)
Common language
(dummy)
Bilateral trade agreement
(dummy)
Trade policy tari (log)
DB import costs(log)
LPI importer(index)
LPI exporter(index)
Pseudo R-squared
Observations
+
+
+
(1)
***
0.837
(0.041)
0.739***
(0.030)
0.056
(0.040)
0.146***
(0.059)
1.246***
(0.163)
1.413***
(0.131)
0.019
(0.131)
0.078
(0.100)
0.784****
(0.054)
0.428***
(0.143)
0.038**
(0.140)
0.199**
(0.092)
0.209***
(0.041)
0.185***
(0.053)
0.872
10920
(2)
***
0.722
(0.045)
0.620***
(0.024)
0.089**
(0.042)
0.191***
(0.048)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.015)
0.030
(0.139)
0.109
(0.104)
0.786***
(0.054)
0.216
(0.159)
0.228
(0.171)
0.227**
(0.088)
0.211***
(0.041)
0.172***
(0.054)
0.874
10920
(3)
***
0.724
(0.045)
0.622***
(0.023)
0.084**
(0.042)
0.187***
(0.047)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.015)
0.037
(0.138)
0.106
(0.104)
0.784***
(0.054)
0.184
(0.159)
0.210
(0.166)
0.199**
(0.087)
0.204***
(0.041)
0.173***
(0.054)
0.023**
(0.011)
0.879
10920
(4)
***
0.701
(0.041)
0.617***
(0.022)
0.077**
(0.036)
0.168**
(0.033)
0.006**
(0.001)
0.001***
(0.014)
0.012
(0.131)
0.061
(0.103)
0.748***
(0.050)
0.331**
(0.156)
0.228
(0.165)
0.222***
(0.081)
0.176***
(0.044)
0.134***
(0.047)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.496***
(0.094)
0.485***
(0.108)
0.888
10920
(5)
***
0.552
(0.041)
0.318***
(0.058)
0.209***
(0.049)
0.354***
(0.061)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.044**
(0.018)
0.080
(0.132)
0.168
(0.104)
0.701***
(0.052)
0.374**
(0.152)
0.270*
(0.162)
0.203***
(0.085)
0.221***
(0.042)
0.167***
(0.050)
0.030***
(0.008)
0.671***
(0.142)
0.905***
(0.168)
0.885
10920
(6)
0.606***
(0.069)
0.430***
(0.053)
0.149***
(0.051)
0.312***
(0.051)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.029*
(0.015)
0.032
(0.129)
0.126
(0.105)
0.705
(0.050)
0.401
(0.150)
0.261
(0.161)
0.213***
(0.083)
0.198**
(0.044)
0.146***
(0.046)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.324***
(0.094)
0.222
(0.096)
0.408***
(0.149)
0.701***
(0.150)
0.897
10920
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Multilateral resistance terms in the rst specication are a-theoretical: partner GDP-weighted averages of
each importer and exporter distance from all of its trading partners.
*
Signicance level of 10%.
**
Signicance level of 5%.
***
Signicance level of 1%.
maintain their signicance suggests that each is capturing distinct dimensions of the trade facilitation environment.
Although PPML is often used in gravity model estimation,
other models may t the data better. As a robustness check,
we also estimate the model in standard OLS (by adding 1 to
the trade values and taking the log), zero inated Poisson
(ZIP), negative binomial regression (NBREG), and zero inated negative binomial regression (ZINBR) as in Burger,
van Oort, and Linders (2009). 16 Table 7 reports the relevant
coecients for specication 6 of table 6 estimated with these
alternative models. 17 In general, the coecients are similar
across the various models. This is partly due to the limited presence of zero observations in our dataset (around 10%). However, while the results of the PPLM and the ZIP are quite
similar, some dierences arise with respect to OLS, NBREG
and ZINB. The alternative models indicate that taris play a
2077
0LS
PPML
NBREG
ZIP
ZINB
0.315***
(0.025)
0.030
(0.025)
0.016*
(0.010)
0.098*
(0.057)
0.394***
(0.057)
0.357***
(0.083)
1.182***
(0.087)
0.198**
(0.044)
0.146***
(0.046)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.324***
(0.094)
0.222**
(0.096)
0.408***
(0.149)
0.701***
(0.150)
0.312***
(0.035)
0.053*
(0.028)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.240***
(0.078)
0.201***
(0.070)
0.279**
(0.109)
0.135
(0.108)
0.197***
(0.044)
0.146***
(0.046)
0.027***
(0.008)
0.326***
(0.094)
0.224**
(0.096)
0.403***
(0.149)
0.695***
(0.150)
0.299***
(0.032)
0.054**
(0.026)
0.025**
(0.010)
0.245***
(0.070)
0.168***
(0.065)
0.300***
(0.100)
0.150
(0.101)
Increase in
Imports (%)
Increase in
Exports (%)
6.5
4.9
0.6
5.0
8.5
10.6
1.0
0.6
1.9
15.1
2078
WORLD DEVELOPMENT
NOTES
1. Although important, other types of NTMs such as rules of origin and
government procurement could not be included in the analysis of this
paper as comprehensive and suitable data are lacking.
2. The inclusion of NTMs in the OTRI is done through estimation of advalorem tari equivalents. Both the TTRI and the OTRI provide a
measure of the uniform tari equivalent of observed policies that is needed
to generate the observed level of trade for a country. See Kee et al. (2009)
for details.
4. As NTM data have not been updated recently, the change in the OTRI
is not reported.
14. Following the existing literature, we add two terms for multilateral
resistance in our preferred specication: distance and border. Results
obtained by adding two additional terms (language and trade agreements)
were similar.
5. As trade ows are generally reported at the six digit level of the
Harmonized System (HS), this indicator is constructed at the HS 6 digit
level instead of the tari line level.
6. This is the approach taken by Low, Piermartini, and Richtering
(2008).
7. This simpler methodology would be consistent with a framework
where export composition is a function of the structure of the tari of the
importing country (everything else equal, exports would concentrate in
product lines with lower taris), however, as the intent is to assess the
preferential margin applied on the existing structure of trade, the measure
controlling for product composition is to be preferred. Also, export
composition is more likely to be determined by other factors aecting
comparative advantage, such as level of development, land quality,
climate, geography and labor force skills.
8. Complicating the framework even more, one should take into account
substitution possibilities across similar products originating in dierent
countries. For simplicity, we abstract from this and assume that
substitution elasticities are equal to one.
9. See Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga (2008) for the methodology used to
estimate import demand elasticities.
10. This approach allows us to assess the impact of border and domestic
trade impediments on international trade. However, it does not allow
disentangling how these impediments aect the xed and variable costs of
12. See Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for the rationale behind Poisson MLE.
15. The eect of NTMs is captured at the margin, that is given the eect
of the existing tari structure.
16. For ZIP and ZINBR the presence of a zero trade ow is determined
by the standard gravity variables.
17. Results from other specications are qualitatively similar.
18. To identify the most appropriate model for our analysis we base the
choice on visual inspection of how the various functional forms t the
data. Given the limited presence of zeros in the dataset, the choice is
restricted between the PPML and the NBREG. A plot of the meanvariance relationship of the PPML and NBREG did not indicate a clear
winner. The Poisson model has a better t for most of the data, while
negative binomial appears to t better the few extreme high values such as
intra-NAFTA trade and China-USA trade. In the absence of a clearly
superior model and to be consistent with the mainstream literature on this
subject, we choose to report the main results of Table 6 based on the
PPML model.
19. For the logged variables the change in trade is simply the estimated
elasticities multiplied by the change in the policy variable. For the index
variables (RPM and LPI) the change in trade is calculated as the
exponential of the dierence in the index multiplied by the coecient,
minus 1.
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