Filinvest v. IAC, G.R. No.

65935
Facts:
Nestor B. Sunga, businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries
Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a
passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor Center, Inc. on March 21, 1978 and for
which he executed a promissory note to cover the amount of P62, 592.00 payable
monthly. On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in
favor of the Motor Center. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to
the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of the plaintiff. Sunga claimed
that the minibus was seized by two employees of the defendant Filinvest upon
orders of the branch manager, without any receipt, who claimed that he was
delinquent in the payments of his vehicle. the loss was reported to PC and the said
vehicle was later recovered from the Crisologo Compound which was released by
Assistant Manager of Filinvest. Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the
minibus was confiscated because the balance was already past due. After
verification that his accounts are all in order, Florence Onia admitted it was their
fault. The motor vehicle was returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation
expenses?
Held:
The respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule when it increased
the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, notwithstanding the
fact that the private respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court,
an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
There is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount
of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances." Be that as it may and in amplification of this generalization, the
criterion "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount
awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that
it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must
always be exercised with balanced restraints and measured objectivity.

LLDA v. CA, G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

Facts:
The LLDA (Laguna Lake Development Authority) Legal and Technical
personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Decree No. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
4850 and issued a cease and desist order for the City Government of Caloocan to
stop the use of the dumpsite.
Issues:
1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the
complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan?
2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order?
Held:
1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the
LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory law s to carry out and make
effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions
for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas.
2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by
law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory

and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order is, perforce, implied.
Magbanua v. IAC, G.R. Nos. L-66870-72 June 29, 1985
Facts:
Magbanua and the other petitioners are share tenants of an agricultural land
owned by the private respondents. The petitioners alleged in the case they filed in
the trial court that the private respondents diverted the free flow of water from their
landholdings which dried up their farm and wilted their palay crops. The trial court
decided in favor of the petitioners. They were maintained as agricultural lessees
and granted each one of them the amount of P10, 000 as moral & exemplary
damages and P5,000 for the attorneys fees to be paid by the private
respondents. However, the private respondents appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court but
removed the award of payment of damages and attorneys fees granted to the
petitioners. The IAC said in removing the damages award that there was no
evidence that private respondents acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and no reason
either in the recovery of attorneys fees under Art 2208, Civil Code. And so the
petitioners filed in the SC for the reinstatement of the damages and attorneys fees
awarded by the trial court, on the ground that the IAC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in removing the said award.
Held:
The SC granted the reinstatement of the award of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees, subject to modification of the amount. Art 2219,
Civil Code states that moral damages may be recovered when a person willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. Under Art 2232, Civil Code, In contract and quasi-contracts, the
court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. Art 2208, Civil Code states
that attorneys fees can be recovered, among others, when exemplary damages are
awarded. The private respondents acted in an oppressive manner in closing the free
flow of water into the farm lots of the petitioners in order to make the latter vacate
their landholdings. The closure caused losses on the petitioners palay crops. The
foregoing entitled the petitioners to payment of moral and exemplary damages, and
as such, entitled them also to the recovery of attorneys fees. And so the SC
granted the payment to each of the petitioners in the amount of P1000 as moral
damages, P500 as exemplary damages, and P1000 for attorneys fees payable by
the private respondents.

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083

Facts:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing timber
license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. They alleged
that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest. They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights of the
generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. It was claimed that the
resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15,
Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented
others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing
Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
Issue:
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had
the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation
to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court
said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the
police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.

Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter:
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions.
The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental,
constitutionalized, self-executing and judicially enforceable. It imposes the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The court stated that
the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and
for succeeding generations as the minors assertion of their right to a sound
environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Rodriguez v. IAC, G.R. No. 74816

Facts:
Plaintiff filed on December 16, 1980 , an action for abatement of public
nuisance with damages against defendant. The continued operation of the cement
batching plant of the defendant (Daytona Construction & Development
Corporation) poses a great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health and
property.
Plaintiff Ernesto LL. Rodriguez Ill testified that he has three parcels of
residential lots adjacent to the Daytona compound. He informed the Court that his
property, with an area of 8,892 square meters has been over-run by effluence from
the cement batching plant of the defendant. The sediment settled on the lots and all
forms of vegetation have died as a result, and the land tremendously diminished in
value.
Sacha del Rosario testified that her house has to close its windows most of
the time because of the dust pollution and her precious plants have been destroyed
by the cement powder coming from the constant traffic of trucks and other vehicles
carrying the product of the batching plant passing through her area.
A chemical engineer, Alexander Cruz, said that the effluence deposited on the
properties of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III and Zenaida Rodriguez has a very high PH
11.8, and the soil is highly alkaline and cannot support plant life; that pollution
coming from the batching plant can cause stomach disorder and skin problems;
that the place of Ernesto LL. Rodriguez III is bare of grass and the trees are dying,
and that there is also a high degree of calcium on the property in question.
In an order dated July 9, 1982, the trial court upon motion of plaintiffs
granted execution pending appeal it indeed appearing as alleged in the motion that
the continued operation of the cement batching plant of the defendant poses a
"great menace to the neighborhood, both in point of health and property."
On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a petition for relief which was however
denied by the lower court. On July 29, 1982, defendant filed a petition for
injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court which found the petition
unmeritorious. 2The appellate court promulgated on October 5, 1983, a decision
denying due course to defendant's petition. Its motion for reconsideration having
been denied by the Appellate Court, defendant went on appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 66097)

Held:
Since the trial court's order of November 13, 1981, denying defendant's motion to
set aside the order of default was appealable but was not appealed by defendant,
the necessary conclusion is that the default order became final. Clearly therefore,
respondent Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the finality
of the default order.
The validity and finality of the default order was upheld by the judgment of the
Appellate Court in the injunction case (which passed upon the merits of the
issuance of an order of execution pending appeal) by virtue of the principle of res
judicata and the doctrine re the law of the case.
There is no question that there were good reasons for the trial court to issue
the order of execution pending appeal. The order categorically stated that there was
a need for the closure and stoppage of the operation of defendant's (Daytona
Construction) cement batching plant because it posed "a great menace to the
neighborhood both in point of health and property." The trial court thus stated:
From the uncontroverted evidence presented by the plaintiffs, there is hardly
any question that the cement dust coming from the batching plant of the defendant
corporation is injurious to the health of the plaintiffs and other residents in the area.
The noise, the vibration, the smoke and the odor generated by the day and night
operation of the plant must indeed be causing them serious discomfort and untold
miseries. Its operation therefore violates certain rights of the plaintiffs and causes
them damage. It is thus a nuisance and its abatement justified.

Technology Developers, Inc. v. CA GR.No.94759

Facts:
Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and
export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from private
respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation
of the petitioner's plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese to bring with
him to the office of the mayor on February 20, 1989 the following: a) Building
permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other document.
Investigation report on the Technology Developers Inc., prepared by one
Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and recommendation read: Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from
the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the
people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time that the
proper air pollution device is installed and operational.
Petitioner's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent
its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not
entertained.On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander
to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage
of its operation.
Held:
This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the
residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial
Governor through channels.4 The alleged NBI finding that some of the signatures
in the four-page petition were written by one person, 5 appears to be true in some
instances, (particularly as among members of the same family), but on the whole
the many signatures appear to be written by different persons. The certification of
the barrio captain of said barrio that he has not received any complaint on the
matter 6 must be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor through
the Acting Mayor.
The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation
was made by Marivic Guina who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that

the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding houses
and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.7
Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta.
Maria, but instead presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on
March 6,1987.
While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the
then National Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit
was good only up to May 25, 1988.9 Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend
or validate its permit much less to install any device to control the pollution and
prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction
by the trial court and the appellate court correctly upheld the action of the lower
court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment
in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed however, that concomitant with
the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the
people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.

Hernandez v. NPC GR.No.145328

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation began the
construction of 29 steel poles in connection with its 230 kilo-volt SucatAranetaBalintawak Power Transmission Project. These poles, each of which was
53.4 meters high, were to support overhead tension cables that would pass through
Dasmarias Village, Makati City, where petitioners homes were located.
Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding
that electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could cause a range
of illnesses from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech, Representative Francis
Joseph G. Escudero denounced the cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored
safety and consultation requirements. An explanation was demanded by
Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella, chairperson of the House Committee on
Energy. Respondent admitted that it was still negotiating with petitioners, and that
it had come up with four options to address the problem: transfer the line, maintain
a 12-meter distance from the village, construct an underground line, or reroute
along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway. These negotiations resulted in an
impasse.
On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Napocor. Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily
restraining it from energizing and transmitting high-voltage electric current
through the project. This Order was extended from 2 days to 18 days.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
with Prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint, on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1
of Presidential Decree No. 1818 .
While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court ordered the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Napocor from installing high
voltage cables and from energizing and transmitting high-voltage electric current
through those cables.
On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial courts Order on the ground that
Section 1 of Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions against
infrastructure projects. It further cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93
dated March 15, 1991, and March 5, 1993, respectively.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in PD

1818 should not be applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the right to
health and safety was hanging on the balance.
Issue:
The issue was whether the trial court may temporarily restrain or
preliminarily enjoin Napocor from constructing and operating the 29 steel poles or
towers, notwithstanding Presidential Decree 1818?
Ruling:
In a unanimous Decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario,[6] the
Court granted the Petition. It held that the prohibition contained in Presidential
Decree 1818 extended only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders
against administrative acts, in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. It did not cover controversies involving questions of
law, as those involved in the instant case.
What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the untimely frustration
of government infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies.
Otherwise, the greater good would suffer from the disruption of the pursuit of
essential government projects or the frustration of the economic development effort
of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was not meant to be a blanket prohibition
that would disregard the fundamental right to the health, safety and well-being of a
community, guaranteed by the Constitution.
Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited the courts from
issuing injunctions against administrative acts involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court declared
that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts in cases involving questions of law.[8] The instant
controversy involved questions of law.
Petitioners raised the issues of whether there was a violation of their
constitutionally protected right to health, and whether respondent had indeed
violated the Local Government Code provision on prior consultation with affected
communities. These questions of law removed the case from the protective mantle
of Presidential Decree 1818.
Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction found
legal support in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,[12] which merely
required a probable violation of the applicants rights and a tendency to render the
judgment ineffectual. In the case at bar, there was adequate evidence on record to

justify the conclusion that the Napocor project would probably imperil the health
and safety of petitioners.
First, petitioners presented copies of studies linking the incidence of
illnesses, such as cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.
Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a provision
that power lines should be located within safe distances from residences because of
the danger concomitant with high-voltage power.
Third, documents on record showed that respondent had made
representations that it was looking into the possibility of relocating the project, and
that it had even undertaken a series of negotiations and meetings with petitioners.
These documents and negotiations suggested that their health concerns were far
from imaginary. If there was indeed no cause for concern, it would not have come
up with options to address their woes. Neither would Representative Escudero
have fired away strong words of censure in his privileged speech.
While it was true that the issue of whether the transmission lines were safe
was essentially evidentiary in nature and pertained to the very merits of the action
below, the Court found that the possibility of health risks from exposure to
electromagnetic radiation was within the realm of a scientific scale of probability.
It held that there was sufficient basis on record engendering a cloud of doubt over
the danger posed by the project upon the lives of petitioners. Indeed, probability
was enough for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy. In contrast, injunction
as a main action was resorted to when one needed to establish absolute certainty as
basis for a final and permanent injunction. Pending the final determination of the
trial court on the main case, it was prudent to preserve the status quo.
The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance of PD 1818 did
not suggest an unbridled prohibition on the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining orders. What these circulars prohibited was the
indiscriminate issuance of court injunctions. They simply enjoined judges to
observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in issuing temporary
restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary injunction, so as to avoid
any suspicion that these measures were for considerations other than the strict
merits of the case. Thus, there was nothing in the circulars that would tie the hands
of the courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.
This Decision did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor
project, which was aimed at the common good of the people. But the Court
recognized, too, that the primordial concern should be the far-reaching irreversible
effects to human safety, rather than the economic benefits presumed by respondent.
Of what use would modernization be if it proved to be a scourge to an individuals
fundamental right, not just to health and safety, but to the preservation of life itself
in all of its desired quality

Legazpi v.CSC GR.No.72119

Facts:
Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil S

Citizen Valentin Legaspi requested from the Civil Service Commission information on the civil
service eligibilities of sanitarian employees in the Health Department of Cebu City.