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G.R. No. L-23000

November 4, 1967

MATEO J. PABULARIO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE HONORABLE POMPEYO L. PALARCA, City Judge of Iligan City, respondent-appellant.
Alfredo C. Caballero and Cecilio Luminarias for petitioner-appellee.
Dominador L. Padilla for respondent-appellant.

ut instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum if the wilful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death,
according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation
to the individual wilful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.

Thirdly, regardless of whether the issue adverted to above should be decided in the affirmative or in
the negative, the proper procedure for the lower court was to reserve the resolution thereof until after
the case has been heard on the merits, when decision is rendered thereon, there being no question
that the court has jurisdiction and can properly try the defendant for damage to property and serious
or less serious physical injuries thru reckless negligence. It may not be amiss to add that the
purpose of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a
single act; or one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by
prescribing the imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each
of the aforesaid crimes, which, put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious
offense.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in complexing several felonies resulting from a single act; or
one which is a necessary means to commit another, is to favor the accused by prescribing the
imposition of the penalty for the most serious crime, instead of the penalties for each of the aforesaid
crimes, which, put together may be graver than the penalty for the most serious offense.

Fourthly, from the viewpoint both of trial practices and justice, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether
the prosecution should split the action against the defendant by filing against him several
informations, namely, one for damage to property and serious and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless negligence, before the Court of First Instance, and another for slight physical injuries thru
reckless negligence, before the justice of the peace or municipal courts. One thing is, however,
certain. Such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of
justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation of

substantially the same evidence before two different courts, the municipal court and the court of first
instance. Worse still, in the event of conviction in the municipal court, and appeal to the court of first
instance, said evidence would still have to be introduced once more in the latter cour

Herein petitioner-appellee has not advanced any reason, and we find none, to warrant a departure
from the foregoing ruling.
It should be noted, also that, assuming for the sake of argument only, that the information under
consideration alleges two (2) different and separate offenses, it does not follow that the municipal
court of Iligan City had no jurisdiction to hear the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 1509-AF,
inasmuch as the offense of damages to property amounting to P397.00, through reckless
negligence, and that of multiple slight physical injuries, through reckless negligence, above referred
to, are within the jurisdiction of the said court. Again, the order denying the motion to quash and the
orders denying the motions for reconsideration, even if hypothetically erroneous, were not null and
void
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
dismissing the petition in said Case No. 582 of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and
denying the writ therein prayed, with costs against petitioner-appellee Mateo J. Pabulario. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur.

During the preliminary investigation, counsel for the accused asked that the charge of slight physical
injuries be excluded from the complaint on the ground that being a light felony it could not be made
part of a complex crime.

G.R. No. L-19648

February 28, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PEDRO MACABUHAY, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for the plaintiff-appellant.
Romeo Maghirang for the defendant-appellee.

The question is whether the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence as described in
the complaints filed in the Justice of the Peace Court is the same as, or necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in, the crime of damage to property thru reckless imprudence. An offense
necessarily includes another when some of the essential elements of the former, as this is described
in the complaint or information, constitute the latter, and an offense is necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter
(Section 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court).

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Pedro Macabuhay of the crime of "SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES, LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE" (Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as follows:
The appellant cites the case of People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513, wherein it was held that a person
prosecuted for, and convicted of, damage to property through reckless imprudence, could again be
prosecuted for physical injuries through reckless imprudence produced on the same occasion. But
therein it does not appear that the information for damage to property also described the offense of
physical injuries, both caused through reckless imprudence.

The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a
distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.27
In Manzanares v. People,28 this Court convicted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries when he was found driving the
Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney.
Likewise, in Pangonorom v. People,30 a public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed
to slow down and hit a swerving car. He was found negligent by this Court.

Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.
Petitioner did not exercise extreme precaution as he drovevery fast before and upon reaching
intersection. He may be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from the left side.
He cannot be held only for simple negligence.

The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the
offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not
clearly manifest.35
Since element number 2 is not present.
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of
the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do
so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition
born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. 36
The motorist was not traveling within the speed limit and did not do all that was possible to
avoid hitting another vehicle. The place of the incident was an intersection, and it is not
uncommon that another vehicle may be coming from either direction to use that street.
As it is in fact used by a jeepney
The presence of another vehicle is predictable, thus respondent is expected to exercise due
diligence as driver. This is not an emergency situation too suddenly to avoid, to exempt
respondent from his liability.

petitioner had been negligent, and his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.41 In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be
shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the
causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.42