Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND
GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR")
is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining
order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public
respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580,
entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos
Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the
Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City
Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within
which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that
their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990,
the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor
Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents'
stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North

EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the

Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31
July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July
1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, sarisari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the
private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the
Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for
contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The
motion also averred, among other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the
(petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby
Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the
dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium
referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the
structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but
independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office
admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are
indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land,
particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon
City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive
discretion and authority whether or not a certain business
establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon
grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement,
arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be
resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the
courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the

petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that
"the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for
resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the
private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that
the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt
for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite
the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional
mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squattersvendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to
create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it
(should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines . . . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to
development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently
ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the
same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health,
safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a
violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was
subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we
also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST
from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private
respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and
authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by
the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from
filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own
comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also
resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such
comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon
Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987
Constitution, thus: to
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for
contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human

rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international
treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it
or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR
theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to
make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not heretofore been
shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court,
through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that
it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any
resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way
be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other
kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative
power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that
any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as
inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines,
sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has
been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied
answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his
humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the
Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or
Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and
property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic
freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political
rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public
office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social
services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person
from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent,
human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized
and protected by it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is
human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and
inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can
be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost
all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986
Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and
in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to
look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may
have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law.
Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of
the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled
"Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their
Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International
Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of
Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the
rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon
suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods,
sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the
redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were
forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected
to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence
and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They
were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon
the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as
declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can
see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in
view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and
political rights have been determined by many international covenants
and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the
Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse
its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity
would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the
commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political
rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and
political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right
or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made
clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of
articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair
and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal
instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are
precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights
as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we
have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and
economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens
which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its
functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be
authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or
at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative
and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like
to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights
as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of
governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of
citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular
aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now
like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore,
what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we
could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that
we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights
under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human
rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we
invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with
the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of
people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to
political rights. Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse
the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated
points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights
could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2)
treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and
public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting;
and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia
that we should, in order to make the proposed Commission more
effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the
term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the
reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the
universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was
qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after
mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human

rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I

correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of
Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned
another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a
copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there
are rights specified in that other convention which may not be
specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather
than specify the rights contained in the convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the
Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us
which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of
civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the
proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be included, without
prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there
was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to
whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right.
It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific
civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this
provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of
torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving
disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it
is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and
political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are
not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen
is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on
Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every
specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and
politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human
Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the
distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International
Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains
all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to
education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the
committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of
human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a
Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and
very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are
the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases
involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking up without any
warrant of arrest, massacre and the persons who are allegedly guilty
are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots.
Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this
commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who
needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open
this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and
we will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its

own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country,
or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of
contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or
community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights
capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude,
religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for
debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right
of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the
rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is
readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that
would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights
of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting,
and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has
not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a
statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any
event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have
thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of
violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission,
taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary
shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of
Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway.
The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It
is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances

obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its
operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its
authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in
direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance
with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to
cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be
exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the
like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay
for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in
character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
InExport Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not
be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned
in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies
(including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek
from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue
the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the
judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or
by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ
of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a
pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights
and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its
findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of

financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the
petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No.
90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final
resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of
an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate
its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on
Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 901580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the
resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view
that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending
its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such
cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened
violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private
respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it
involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the
definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays
of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly,
the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency
tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start,
into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should
be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for
further proceedings.

# Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human
rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the
resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone
Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view
that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain a status quo pending
its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such
cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened
violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.
In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sarisari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private
respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it
involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the
definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR
has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays
of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly,
the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency
tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start,

into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should
be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may
not ultimately) involve human rights violations.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for
further proceedings.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183711

July 5, 2011

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN.
DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183712
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT,Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183713
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., Commanding General of the Philippine Army,
LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; Chief of the Philippine National Police,
DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
We review,1 in light of the latest developments in this case, the decision 2 dated July
17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated petitions for Habeas
Corpus,3 Contempt4 and Writ of Amparo5 filed by Edita T. Burgos (petitioner). The
assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus; denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and
partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo. 6
On June 22, 2010, we issued a Resolution 7 referring the present case to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as the Courts directly commissioned agency
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos
abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual
findings and recommendations to this Court. We found the referral necessary as the
investigation by the PNP-CIDG, by the AFP Provost Marshal, and even by the CHR
had been less than complete; for one, there were very significant lapses in the
handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-CIDGs failure to
identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five
abductors of Jonas, based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. 8 We
held:
Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case,
we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive
and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to
exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the
Rule on the Writ ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings,
we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the
handling of the investigation - among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify
the cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of
Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based
on the information provided to the petitioner by no less than State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who were possibly
involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria
Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and
an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of
Intelligence Service of the AFP. No search and certification were ever made on
whether these persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such
as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow
through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the
cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads
provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead
investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to
pursue these aspects of the case.

We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been made by

the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas
was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA
guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a
follow-up investigation to determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante
and @KA ENSO. These omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP
has yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its
representation before the CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant
documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO.
While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by
the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly
leaves much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo requires.
Following the CHRs legal mandate, we gave the Commission the following specific
directives:9
(a) ascertaining the identities of the persons appearing in the cartographic
sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their whereabouts;
(b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and
locations of the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be
involved in the abduction of Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine
Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
(Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military
Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings
and investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead
allegedly provided by State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the
possible abductors;
(c) inquiring into the veracity of Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla
unit RYG;
(d) determining based on records, past and present, as well as further
investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO;
and
(e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction,
that may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in
addressing an enforced disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CAs dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President
Macapagal-Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity from suit. 10
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June
22, 2010 Resolution.11 In this Report, the CHR recounted the investigations
undertaken, whose pertinent details we quote below:
On June 26, 2010, the CHR issued Resolution CHR IV No. A2010-100 to intensify the
investigation of the case of the Burgos enforced disappearance; and for this
purpose, created a Special Investigation Teamheaded by Commissioner Jose
Manuel S. Mamauag.
xxx
In compliance with the directive mentioned in the above-quoted En Banc Resolution
of the Supreme Court, the Team conducted field investigations by: (1) interviewing
a) civilian authorities involved in the first investigation of the instant case; b)
military men under detention for alleged violations of Articles of War; c) Security
Officers of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City; d) two (2) of the
three (3) CIDG witnesses; e) two (2) eyewitnesses who described to the police
sketch artist two (2) faces of a male and female abductors of Jonas Burgos; f) RebelReturnees (RRs); g) officers and men in the military and police service; h) local
officials and other government functionaries; and i) ordinary citizens; (2) inquiring
into the veracity of CIDG witnesses Lipios and Manuels claims that Jonas was
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG;
(3) securing case records from the prosecution service and courts of law; (4) visiting
military and police units. Offices, camps, detention centers, and jails and requesting
copies of documents and records in their possession that are relevant to the instant
case; (5) searching for and interviewing witnesses and informants; and (6) pursuing
leads provided by them.
S. Emails "Star-Struck"
38. Pursuing the lead mentioned in the anonymous e-mail, which was attached to
the Burgos petition as Exhibit "J", "that the team leader (T.L.) in the Jonas Burgos
abduction was a certain Army Captain, (promotable to Major), a good looking guy
(tisoy), and a potential showbiz personality known otherwise as Captain Starstruck," the Team requested the CHR Clearance Section, Legal Division for any
information leading to T.L. or to all Philippine Army applicants for CHR clearance
whose ranks are Captains or Majors promoted during the years 2007 to 2009.
39. Sometime in November 2010, the Team was able to track down one CHR
clearance-applicant who most likely possesses and/or matches the information
provided in the said lead. But when his photo/picture was presented to the
eyewitnesses, they failed to identify him.

40. Undaunted with the negative identification, the Team suspected that the "team
leader" might not have participated in the actual abduction inside Hapag Kainan
Restaurant, the scene of the crime, but most probably was in one of the "three cars"
allegedly used during the operation while giving orders or commanding the actual
abductors.
41. In relation to the above suspicion, the Team has theorized that officers below
the rank of Captain might have perpetrated the actual abduction.
42. The Team explored this possibility and focused its attention on the officers of the
7th ID, PA, namely: Lt. Vicente O. Dagdag, Jr., the S-4 of 65 IB who executed an
affidavit relative to the alleged stolen Plate No. TAB-194; 2Lt. Rey B. Dequito of 56th
IB, the witness against Edmond Dag-Uamn for the alleged crime of murder; and 1Lt.
Usmalik Tayaban, the Team Leader with the 56th IB who issued a Custody Receipt in
connection with the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in Angeles City relative to the
2006 Emerito Lipio abduction case against the police and military personnel.
T. Face-book account
43. Google search of the names of the above mentioned individuals yielded
negative result except for 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, whose name was connected to a
social networking site, the Face-book account of PMA BATCH SANGHAYA 2000.
44. In the Facebook account Sanghaya, the contents of which is categorized as
"PUBLIC" or open to public viewing, it appears that "Malik" Tayaban is a graduate of
the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Batch Sanghaya of 2000. Other leads were
also discovered, such as the following: vernacular description of "tisoy" which was
mentioned by one of the users in the "comment portion" of the account which
incidentally was also mentioned in the anonymous e-mail as the "team leader"
(T.L.); the picture of a man sporting a "back-pack", which was also mentioned by
witness Elsa. Per Elsas account, the person in the cartographic sketch was wearing
a "back-pack."
45. Aware of the intricacies of the above-mentioned leads, the Team caused the
reproduction of all pictures in the Facebook account for future reference; and
requested the NBI (Burgos) Team for a copy of the PMA Sanghaya Batch 2000 Year
Book, also for future reference.
U. The PMA Year Book
46. Through the efforts of the NBI (Burgos) Team, the Team was able to get the PMA
Year Book of Sanghaya Batch 2000 and the location of one important eyewitness in
the abduction.
V. JEFFREY CABINTOY

47. On December 1, 2010, the Team together with the NBI Team were able to locate
Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey), one of the two (2) eyewitnesses who provided the police
cartographic artist with the description of two (2) principal abductors of Jonas
Burgos. Jeffrey narrated in details (sic) the circumstances that happened before and
during the abduction.
48. On December 7, 2010, the Team and Jeffrey went to the place of incident at Ever
Gotesco Mall, Quezon City to refresh his memory and re-enact what transpired. In
the afternoon of the same date, the Team invited Jeffrey to the CHR Central Office in
Quezon City, where he was shown for identification twenty (20) copies of colored
photographs/pictures of men and the almost two hundred forty-four (244)
photographs/pictures stored in the computer and lifted from the profiles of the
Philippine Military Academy Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000.
49. Jeffrey pointed to a man in the two (2) colored group pictures/photographs, that
he identified as among the 8-man group who abducted Jonas Burgos. For record and
identification purposes, the Team encircled the face that Jeffrey identified in the two
pictures; then he affixed his signature on each picture. Also, while leafing through
the pictures of the PMA graduates in the Year Book of Sanghaya 2000 Batch, the
witness identified a picture, with a bold and all-capitalized name HARRY AGAGEN
BALIAGA JR and the words Agawa, Besao, Mt. Province printed there under the
capitalized words PHILIPPINE ARMY written on the upper portion, as the same
person he pointed out in the two group pictures just mentioned above. Immediately
thereafter, the Team caused the production of the photo identified by Jeffrey and
asked him to affix his signature, which he also did.
50. After examining each of these pictures, Jeffrey declared that it dawned on him
that based on his recollection of faces involved in the abduction of Jonas Burgos, he
now remembers the face of a man, other than the two (2) faces whose description
he already provided before to a police sketch artist, who was part of the 8-man
group of abductors. And he also confirms it now that the person he is referring to
was indeed seen by him as one of those who abducted Jonas Burgos at Hapag
Kainan Restaurant of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
51. When asked how certain he was of the person he identified, considering that the
printed copy of the photo lifted from the Face-book Sanghaya Account was taken
sometime in the year 2010; while the picture appearing in the computer was lifted
from the PMA Sanghaya 2000 Batch Year Book, Jeffrey replied "Ang taong ito ay
aking natatandaan sa kadahilanan na nuong una siya ay nakaupo na katabi sa
bandang kaliwa nang taong dumukot at natapos silang mag usap lumapit sa akin at
pilit akong pinipigilan na wag daw makialam at ang sabi nya sa akin ay "WAG KA
DITONG MAKIALAM KASI ANG TAONG ITO AY MATAGAL NA NAMING SINUSUBAYBAYAN
DAHIL SA DROGA" kahit pa halos nagmamakaawa na nang tulong ang taong
dinukot; at matapos nuon ay sapilitan na nilang binitbit sa labas ang biktima." ( I
remember this man for the reason that at first he was seated at the left side of the
person abducted; and after they talked, he approached me and was preventing me
forcefully saying not to interfere and he said to me: "DONT YOU INTERFERE HERE

SINCE WE HAVE BEEN DOING SOME SURVEILLANCE ON THIS MAN FOR SOME TIME
ALREADY BECAUSE OF DRUGS" despite that the man was already pleading for help,
and after that, they forcibly dragged the victim outside.)
52. When asked if he could identify the picture of Jonas Burgos, Jeffrey affirmed that
the person in the picture is the person referred to by him as the victim of abduction
and his name is Jonas Burgos. He further stated that he learned of the victims
name when he saw his picture flashed on TV and hear his name. When asked if he is
willing to execute an affidavit on the facts that he has just provided, he answered
yes and at that juncture the Team assisted him in the preparation of his
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" based on his personal knowledge and in a language known
to him. After which, the Team asked Jeffrey to read, examine and determine whether
all the information he just provided are reflected in his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" and
Jeffrey answered yes. Thereafter, Jeffrey affixed his signature after being sworn to
before a lady CHR lawyer and a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon
City.
W. Daguman confirmed Tayabans and Baliagas actual affiliation with the military
and their assignment at the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th ID
53. On December 10, 2010, the Team went to the Bulacan Provincial Jail to visit
Edmond Dag-Uman and asked him to identify his former Company Commander at
the 56th IB, 71 ID, Lt. Usmalik Tayaban and to identify the pictures.
54. Edmond Dag-uman identified the encircled in the picture as LT. HARRY A.
BALIAGA, JR., and the man with a receding hair as LT. USMALIK TAYABAN, his former
Company Commander.
55. When asked if he was willing to reduce in writing his precious statements and
those that just mentioned, he replied "BAKA MAPAHAMAK AKO NYAN! (That might
endanger me!). Following a lengthy discussion on the pros and cons of executing a
sworn statement and the assurance of the Team to exclude his statements that are
critical to the military establishment, it dawned on Dag-uman that his statement
would be of help to the Commission in bringing his case to the proper authorities for
review and appropriate action, that he eventually expressed his willingness to do so.
56. After which the Team immediately went to a "Computer Caf" nearby to encode
the "Salaysay", then the printed copy was presented to him for his determination
whether he is in full accord with the contents therein. Edmond spent about thirty
(30) minutes reading it and changed the word "Charlie" to "Bravo" and then affixed
his initial on it. He also signed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" after being sworn to
before a team member authorized to administer oath.
X. Second visit to ELSA AGASANG and her Supplemental Sworn Statement

57. On January 26, 2011, the Team along with witness Jeffrey went to Bicol to meet
witness Elsa. The aim was to help Elsa recall the faces of those she saw in the
abduction by showing to her recently-acquired pictures of suspects.
58. For the first time they would re-unite, after almost four years since that fateful
day of April 28, 2007, when both of them had the experience of witnessing an
abduction incident, which rendered them jobless and unsafe.
59. The Team told Jeffrey to sit in front of Elsa without introducing him to her. After
about half an hour into the conversation, she expressed disbelief when she realized
that she was facing in person he co-worker that she knew very well.
60. On January 29, 2011, Elsa executed her Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay
affirming her Salaysay given before PCI Lino DL Banaag at the CIDU, Quezon City
Police District Office, Camp Karingal, Quezon City; and corroborating the material
allegations contained in the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jeffrey.
On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR submitted the following
findings:12
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government
have been fully determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28,
2007 the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and
a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the
ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
xxxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa
Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and
Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY
AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the
two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he
was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000
and group pictures of men taken some years thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper
Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga,
Jr. Dagumans Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a
Company Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with
Serial No. 800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik

Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and brought to
the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said
camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and Daguman
did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look pensive, probably
because of the pathetic plight they are in right now. It came as a surprise therefore
to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of
Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.
Moreover, when the Team asked how Jeffrey how certain was he that it was indeed
Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas abduction,
Jeffrey was able to give a graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow
by blow account of the incident, including the initial positioning of the actors,
specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented him from
interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified
the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While
Lozada refuses to include her identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay for fear of a backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt.
Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were involved in counterinsurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she was under the care of the battalion
from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. Lozadas
involvement in counter-insurgency operations together with Lt. Fernando was
among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose
investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was
documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008.
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for
what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some
police and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with
the requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP
but ipso facto created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were
responsible for the abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable,
if not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds support in the
disputable presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and
Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the
requested documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the
cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has
claimed that one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits
the description of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt.
HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the
theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas.Baliagas true identity

and affiliation with the military have been established by overwhelming evidence
corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-uman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate
under the 1987 Constitution. Of particular importance are the identities and
locations of the persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the allegations that
CIDG Witnesses Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes are AFP enlisted
personnel and the alleged participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the
abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case for Murder and Attempted Murder was
dismissed by the court for failure of the lone witness, an army man of the 56th IB to
testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and
Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the
cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others,
identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona
otherwise known as ERAP FIVE.
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General
(TJAG) turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the socalled "Erap 5" abduction on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a
fishing expedition per its Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his
present whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the
Commission decided to pursue the same and determine the whereabouts of the
other members of the "Erap 5" on its own time and authority as an independent
body.
Based on the above-cited findings, the CHR submitted the following
recommendations for the Courts consideration, viz: 13
i. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ), subject to certain requirements,
to immediately admit witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program under Republic Act No.
6981;
ii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice (DOJ) to commence the filing of
Criminal Charges for Kidnapping/Enforced Disappearance and/or Arbitrary
Detention against 1LT. HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. of the Philippine Army, as
Principal by Direct Participation in the abduction of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos on
April 28, 2007 from Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City;
iii. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to cause the filing of Obstruction of
Justice against Emerito Lipio y Gonzales; Marlon Manuel y de Leon; and Meliza
Concepcion-Reyes for giving false or fabricated information to the CIDG and

for their willful refusal to cooperate with the CHR Team in the investigation of
the herein enforced disappearance;
iv. To DIRECT Cavite Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco to appear before
the Supreme Court and to divulge his source/informant as the same does not
fall under the privilege communication rule;
v. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG RC, NCRCIDU, Atty. Joel Napoleon M. Coronel, to
explain his Memorandum to the CIDG-CIDD stating that "the witnesses were
reportedly turned over by the Bulacan PPO and Philippine Army to the CIDG
for investigation," considering that said witnesses were not under police or
military custody at the time of the supposed turn-over in the evening of
August 22, 2007 and to identify the PNP officer who directed the CIDG
operatives to fetch Emerito G. Lipio in Bulacan and the two other CIDG
witnesses for tactical interrogation;
vi. To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or
refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of
Jonas T. Burgos, particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary of
Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3)
other enlisted personnel mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion
of the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the
instant consolidated cases, including a certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer
involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
(b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon
City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said
covert military operation, including their respective Summary of Information
and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and men
assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division
from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary
of Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels
who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and
copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them,
if any;
vii. To DIRECT the PNP-CIDG to comply with its mandate under paragraph (3)
of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En Banc Resolution
promulgated on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases;
viii. To DIRECT Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., the Philippine Armys 56th Infantry
Battalion in Bulacan and 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay in Laur,
Nueva Ecija to produce the living body of the victim Jonas Joseph T. Burgos
before this Court;
ix. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review and determine the probable
liability/accountability of the officers and enlisted personnel concerned of the

Philippine Armys 56th IB and the 7th ID, relative to the torture and/or other
forms of ill-treatment of Edmond M. Dag-uman, while he was in detention at
Fort Magsaysay sometime in October 2005, as part of the collateral
discoveries in the conduct of this investigation;
x. To DIRECT the Department of Justice to review the case filed against
Edmond Dag-uman alias DELFIN DE GUZMAN with the Regional Trial Court
Branch 10 in Malolos City docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1844-M-2005 and
186-M-2006; and the legal basis, if any, for his continued detention at the
Bulacan Provincial Jail in Malolos City; and
xi. To DIRECT the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to
study the probable liability of Adelio A. Asuncion, former Jail Warden of
Bulacan Provincial Jail for his failure to account the records of the inmates
more specifically the records of turn-over Edmond Dag-uman from the 7th ID.
Pursuant to our June 22, 2010, the CHR furnished the petitioner with the copy of its
report, which the petitioner apparently relied upon in filing a criminal complaint
against Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and other members of the military. 14
OUR RULING
A. Amparo
After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our findings in
our June 22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR
findings that Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army is one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to
hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case
and refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the present
Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution. The CA
shall continue with the hearing of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence
previously submitted, the proceedings it already conducted and the subsequent
developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall rule
on the merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Baliaga be
impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA). This
directive to implead Lt. Baliaga is without prejudice to similar directives we may
issue with respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in
future investigations.
We also note that Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) failed and/or refused
to provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and
thereby disobeyed our June 22, 2010 Resolution. To recall, we issued a Resolution
declaring the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency tasked with the
continuation of the investigation of Jonas abduction and the gathering of evidence,
with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court.

In this same Resolution, we required the then incumbent Chiefs of the AFP and the
PNP to make available and to provide copies to the CHR, of all documents and
records in their possession and as the CHR may require, relevant to the case of
Jonas, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.
In its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR recommended, for the Courts
consideration:15
vi. To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, and the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their failure and/or refusal to
provide the CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos,
particularly the following: (a) Profile and Summary of Information and pictures of
T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army) and three (3) other enlisted personnel
mentioned in paragraph (1) of the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court En Banc
Resolution issued on 22 June 2010 in the instant consolidated cases, including a
certain 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of
the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007; (b) copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in
Kamuning, Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved
in that said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of
Information and individual pictures; and (c) complete list of the officers, women and
men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division
from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who
surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their
Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.
Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any person who
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished
for contempt, viz:
SEC. 16. Contempt. The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who
refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwise
disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for
contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine
Acting on the CHRs recommendation and based on the above considerations, we
resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent
Chief of Staff, AFP,16 to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in
contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.
B. Habeas Corpus
In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy
evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the

abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, we resolve to set aside the CAs
dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus
returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to
the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No.
99839).
For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the
habeas corpus petition and require him together with the incumbent Chief of Staff,
AFP; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding
Officer of the 56th IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano to
produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not be released from
detention.
The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in light of the evidence
previously submitted to it, the proceedings already conducted, and the subsequent
developments in this case (particularly the CHR report) as proven by evidence
properly adduced before it. The Court of Appeals and the parties may require
Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund Dag-uman, Melissa
Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon Manuel to testify in this case.
C. Petition for Contempt
In dismissing the petition, the CA held: 17
Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view
thereof, the rules in criminal prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents
constitutional rights inevitably come into play. As held in People v. Godoy:
In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioners
allegations, said circumstantial evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that
is required to establish the guilt of an accused in a criminal proceeding, which is
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas
Corpus proceeding, is Section 16, Rule 102, which provides:
Sec. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. - A clerk of a
court who refuses to issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or
a person to whom a writ is directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make
return of the same according to the command thereof, or makes false return
thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to
deliver to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a
true copy of the warrant or order of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved

the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a proper action, and may also
be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied]
In Montenegro v. Montenegro,18 we explained the types and nature of contempt, as
follows:
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a
manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity."7 The power to punish contempt is inherent in all
courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings,
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and,
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
xxx
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the
nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed
against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature;
but if to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis supplied]
We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of
the charge filed by the petitioner against the respondents and that the charge is
criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return constitutes improper
conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the
administration of justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy, 19 which the CA cited, we
specifically held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.
A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes
some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely
falling under either proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the
use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that
criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt
proceeding. We have consistently held and established that the strict rules that
govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; that the
accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and
that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. 20
Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the
defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the

charges beyond reasonable doubt.21 The presumption of innocence can be

overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the
satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that
precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not
sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact
to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty a certainty that convinces and
satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. 22
For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt
for filing false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of
Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of the time of
the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not provide a direct link
between the respondents and the abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had a hand in the abduction of
Jonas, and consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their returns to
the Writ of habeas corpus denying custody of Jonas.
However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative
findings presented to us by the CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors
of Jonas, have given a twist to our otherwise clear conclusion. Investigations will
continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a
definitive result is achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional
evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only
conclude that the CAs dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional, i.e.,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner
find this step warranted by the evidence in the proceedings related to Jonass
disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may transpire.
To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus proceedings and
to directly identify the parties bound by these proceedings who have the continuing
obligation to comply with our directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the
PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case without need of
naming their current incumbents, separately from the then incumbent officials that
the petitioner named in her original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for
possible responsibility and accountability.
In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
who is no the longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines, she should now
be dropped as a party-respondent in these petitions.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE
to:
I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)

a. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of

the Court of Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same
Division that decided the habeas corpus petition;
b. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R.
No. 183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the
Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the
Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army at
the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades
Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms
the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T.
Burgos should not be released from detention;
c. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the
Court of Appeals which shall continue to hear this case after the required
Returns shall have been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30)
days after the case is submitted for decision; and
d. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties,
separate from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the
dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as partyrespondent.
II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioners petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100230, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may
be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this Court
has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria MacapagalArroyo as party-respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the
contempt charge against her.
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and
G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with
respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in
future investigations and proceedings;
h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file
their Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a nonextendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.1avvphil

i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010
Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show
cause and explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt
of this Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to
submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents requested by the CHR,
particularly:
1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason
Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all
reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a
lady officer involved in the counter-insurgency operations of the 56th
IB in 2006 to 2007;
2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning,
Quezon City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives
involved in that said covert military operation, including their
respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and
3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th
and 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January
1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of
Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and
rebels who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding
pictures and copies of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases
filed against them, if any.
These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our
examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the
advisability of their public disclosure.
j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in
representation of their respective organizations, separately from the original
respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;
k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security and
Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and

l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the
latter may investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 182484

June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.

ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL
TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff
of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA.
LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to
Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against the
Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of RTC Br. 5,
Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the
Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP
Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18 th Division, and the
spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the
"private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of BuruangaMalay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga,
Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz,
Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John Does numbering
about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the
registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located
at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they
were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos
and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering
120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents'
security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations
of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are
the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed
property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the
private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry
cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records
and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as
shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by
the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his
report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they
acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex
'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of
the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the
plaintiffs were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since
1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4,
2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land
in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein
prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police
Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a
result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D',
Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the
land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of
January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however,
sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with
bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John
Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered
the premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex
'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly
reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex
'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April
19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no

settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G',
Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they
were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the
same, under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to
the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is
enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993
as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus,
it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical
possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they
were ousted therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by
analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et
al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs
from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must
be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized
at the same time in two different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the
land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as
shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135,
rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made
to the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built
structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4,
Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry
thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of
defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.)
[sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed
men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents.
These armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their
homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible
entry happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the
defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the
plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their
pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and
reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner,

hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic)
situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are
irrelevant to the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their
actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 2006 6."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC,"
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge
Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February
2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond.
The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was
actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on
12 March 2007 after the private respondents had complied with the imposed
condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an
Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order 10 a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively
take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu
City, a Petition for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of
the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of
Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and
for Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition
last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a
writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the
issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most
importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed
land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual

allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge
shot guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in
dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the
defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the
defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put
up by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed
men trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion.
One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years
old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing
them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were
reported by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists
trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and
MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a
blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against
women and children, which is aggravated by the use of highpowered weapons.
[]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and
unlettered petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons
have under their employ armed men and they are influential with the police
authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute
by defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the
property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are
persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in
the case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is
submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired
men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants. 13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they
maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession
of real property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property

involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the case should be originally cognizable by

the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC
decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal
and could not have validly issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data
fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with
respect to content and substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out
of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the
Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now
assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body
of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition. The CA petition,
however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which indicates to
us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated
assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present
petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months
from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in
point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight
(8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days 15 from receipt of
the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion
for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached
"Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court" 16 ("Certificate
of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO
VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent
photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard
against any insidious argument that the present petition is timely filed because of
this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day
reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited
by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order
that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the
previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of
the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no
life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot
therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not
even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows. 17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very
least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed
in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA
did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in
the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic
since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions and the Sheriff is
determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF
JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the
petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance 19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because
it held that the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE
HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a
PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto;
(underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to
this date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the
appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners'
intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of
their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating
the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to
hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order to mislead
us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the
Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the
present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same
parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and
before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that are both
improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that can

sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the
combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule
46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of
Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and
possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where
there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the
recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in
an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special
civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their
processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful
and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of
the case; it may also constitute direct contempt." 20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in
violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in
relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five
(5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis
of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a
cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or
misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over
these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691 amendment,
based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property
involved; the law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the
property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion
interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a
plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the recovery of
ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to
when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which
jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial
courts,depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the

complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no
jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been
filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that
are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of
the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for
the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the
petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the
factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private
respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private
respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts
(firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod
regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of
the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident
involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating
that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente,
was accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except
to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty
and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of
Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The

Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates
what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that
the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the
forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings
are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown
judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties'
positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed
commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a
dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that
was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the
RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate
court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents
involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the
petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to thepersons of
the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely propertyrelated and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek
redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may
lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our
action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling
independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the
ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc
on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point
the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the
remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders
that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because
of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners'
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum shopping;
and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari
and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of
deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the
writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice
to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue

when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present
case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for
rules on the institution of separate actions, 24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal
actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo
with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action. 26 These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ
of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no
point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence
of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger
or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar,
however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion
in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on
the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved
party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government
office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the
data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the
act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that
the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners
and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents,
furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of
the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the
investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing
expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had
in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights,
the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully
in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189434

April 25, 2012

FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government,Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 189505
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
These two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure pray for the reversal of the 2 April 2009 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.1 The anti-graft court granted the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed by respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and
declared all assets and properties of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the government.
On 17 December 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed a Petition for Forfeiture 2 before the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the forfeiture law, Republic Act No. 1379 (R.A. 1379) 3in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14.4 The petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
0141.
Respondent Republic, through the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought the declaration of Swiss bank accounts totaling USD 356 million (now
USD 658 million), and two treasury notes worth USD 25 million and USD 5 million,
as ill-gotten wealth.5 The Swiss accounts, previously held by five groups of foreign
foundations,6were deposited in escrow with the Philippine National Bank (PNB),
while the treasury notes were frozen by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

Respondent also sought the forfeiture of the assets of dummy corporations and
entities established by nominees of Marcos and his wife, Petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, as well as real and personal properties manifestly out of
proportion to the spouses lawful income. This claim was based on evidence collated
by the PCGG with the assistance of the United States Justice Department and the
Swiss Federal Police Department.7 The Petition for Forfeiture described among
others, a corporate entity by the name "Arelma, Inc.," which maintained an account
and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York, and which was purportedly organized for
the same purpose of hiding ill-gotten wealth. 8
Before the case was set for pretrial, the Marcos children and PCGG Chairperson
Magtanggol Gunigundo signed several Compromise Agreements (a General
Agreement and Supplemental Agreements) all dated 28 December 1993 for a global
settlement of the Marcos assets. One of the "whereas" clauses in the General
Agreement specified that the Republic "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal
Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars
(USD 356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided
certain conditionalities are met xxx." This Decision was in turn based on the finding
of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey that the deposits in the name of the
foundations were of illegal provenance. 9
On 18 October 1996, respondent Republic filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings (the 1996 Motion) pertaining to the forfeiture of
the USD 356 million. The Sandiganbayan denied the 1996 Motion on the sole ground
that the Marcoses had earlier moved for approval of the Compromise Agreements,
and that this latter Motion took precedence over that for summary judgment.
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a manifestation claiming she was not a party to the
Motion for Approval of the Compromise Agreements, and that she owned 90% of the
funds while the remaining 10% belonged to the Marcos estate. 10
On 10 March 2000, the Republic filed another Motion for Summary Judgment (the
2000 Motion), based on the grounds that: (1) the essential facts that warrant the
forfeiture of the funds subject of the Petition under R.A. 1379 are admitted by
respondents in their pleadings and other submissions; and (2) the respondent
Marcoses pretrial admission that they did not have any interest or ownership over
the funds subject of the action for forfeiture tendered no genuine issue or
controversy as to any material fact.
In a 19 September 2000 Decision, the Sandiganbayan initially granted the 2000
Motion, declaring that the Swiss deposits held in escrow at the PNB were ill-gotten
wealth, and, thus, forfeited in favor of the State. 11 In a Resolution dated 31 January
2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier ruling and denied the 2000 Motion.
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in rendering the later
Resolution, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. In
G.R. No. 152154 entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan (for brevity,
the "Swiss Deposits Decision"),12 this Court set aside the 31 January 2002
Sandiganbayan Resolution and reinstated the 19 September 2000 Decision,
including the declaration that the Swiss deposits are ill-gotten wealth. On 18
November 2003, the Court denied with finality petitioner Marcoses Motion for
Reconsideration.

On 16 July 2004, the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (2004
Motion) to declare "the funds, properties, shares in and interests of ARELMA,
wherever they may be located, as ill-gotten assets and forfeited in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 1379 in the same manner (that) the
Honorable Supreme Court forfeited in favor of the petitioner the funds and assets of
similar Marcos foundations such as AVERTINA, VIBUR, AGUAMINA, MALER and
PALMY."13 Petitioner contends that: (1) respondents are deemed to have admitted
the allegations of the Petition as regards Arelma; and (2) there is no dispute that the
combined lawful income of the Marcoses is grossly disproportionate to the deposits
of their foundations and dummy corporations, including Arelma. Ferdinand Marcos,
Jr., Imelda Marcos, and Imee Marcos-Manotoc filed their respective Oppositions.
Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a Motion to Expunge on the ground that the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 0141 had already terminated.
On 2 April 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed Decision granting
respondents Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 14 It found that the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 0141 had not yet terminated, as the Petition for Forfeiture included
numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and Supreme Court had not
yet ruled upon. The Republics 1996 Motion was merely held in abeyance to await
the outcome of the global settlement of the Marcos assets. Further, this
development had prompted the Republic to file the 2000 Motion, which was clearly
limited only to the Swiss accounts amounting to USD 356 million. Thus, according to
the Sandiganbayan, its 19 September 2000 Decision as affirmed by the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 152154, was in the nature of a separate judgment over the Swiss
accounts and did not preclude a subsequent judgment over the other properties
subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture, such as those of Arelma. 15 The
Sandiganbayan held as follows:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment dated July 16, 2004 of petitioner is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Partial
Summary Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the assets, investments,
securities, properties, shares, interests, and funds of Arelma, Inc., presently under
management and/or in an account at the Meryll (sic) Lynch Asset Management, New
York, U.S.A., in the estimated aggregate amount of US$3,369,975.00 as of 1983,
plus all interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or
specific day that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the
possession of the Republic of the Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.16
On 22 October 2009, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed the instant Rule 45 Petition,
questioning the said Decision.17One week later, Imelda Marcos filed a separate Rule
45 Petition18 on essentially identical grounds, which was later consolidated with the
first Petition. The grievances of both petitioners boil down to the following issues:
1. Whether the forfeiture proceeding, Civil Case No. 0141 with the
Sandiganbayan is criminal in nature, such that summary judgment is not
allowed;

2. Whether petitioner Republic complied with Section 3, subparagraphs c, d,

and e of R.A. 1375;
3. Whether Civil Case No. 0141 has been terminated such that a motion for
partial summary judgment may no longer be allowed; and
4. Whether in this case there are genuine, triable issues which would
preclude the application of the rule on summary judgment.
I. Forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature
Petitioner Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. argues that R.A. 1379 is a penal law; therefore a
person charged under its provisions must be accorded all the rights granted to an
accused under the Constitution and penal laws. 19 He asserts that the Marcoses were
entitled to all the substantial rights of an accused, one of these being the right "to
present their evidence to a full blown trial as per Section 5 of R.A. 1379." 20 He relies
on the 1962 case, Cabal v. Kapunan, 21 where the Court ruled that:
We are not unmindful of the doctrine laid down in Almeda vs. Perez, L-18428
(August 30, 1962) in which the theory that, after the filing of respondents' answer to
a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be
amended as to substance pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected
by this Court upon the ground that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature. This
doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding, and
has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein, particularly
their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
This argument fails to convince. Petitioner conveniently neglects to quote from the
preceding paragraphs of Cabal, which clearly classified forfeiture proceedings as
quasi-criminal, not criminal. And even so, Cabal declared that forfeiture cases
partake of a quasi-criminal nature only in the sense that the right against selfincrimination is applicable to the proceedings, i.e., in which the owner of the
property to be forfeited is relieved from the compulsory production of his books and
papers:
Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment
of fine or imprisonment against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in
rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where the person
using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture
proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be civil and in the nature of
proceedings in rem. The statute providing that no judgment or other proceedings in
civil cases shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is applicable
to them. In some aspects, however, suits for penalties and forfeitures are of quasicriminal nature and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the purposes of
* * * that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is

one against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his breach of the laws
which has to be proved to establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited.
xxx

xxx

xxx

As already observed, the various constitutions provide that no person shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition
against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies
only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil
in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not
a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
(Emphasis supplied.)22
The right of the Marcoses against self-incrimination has been amply protected by
the provisions of R.A. 1379, which prohibits the criminal prosecution of individuals
for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which they are
compelled -- after having claimed the privilege against self-incrimination -- to testify
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise. 23 Since this cases inception in
1991, petitioners have participated in the hearings, argued their case, and
submitted their pleadings and other documents, never once putting at issue their
right against self-incrimination or the violation thereof. 24
More importantly, the factual context in the present case is wholly disparate from
that in Cabal, which was originally initiated as an action in personam. Manuel C.
Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged with
"graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and
gentleman, dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and
liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts." 25 In contradistinction, the
crux of the present case devolves solely upon the recovery of assets presumptively
characterized by the law as ill-gotten, and owned by the State; hence, it is an action
in rem. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court settled the rule that forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature. 26 Proceedings under
R.A. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture
of the properties illegally acquired in favor of the State. 27
As early as Almeda v. Judge Perez,28 we have already delineated the difference
between criminal and civil forfeiture and classified the proceedings under R.A. 1379
as belonging to the latter, viz:
"Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in
rem or in personam. If they are under a statute such that if an indictment is
presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, they are criminal in
nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the
statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered
as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the
wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under
statutes which specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the

forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for and
recovered in a civil action."
In the first place a proceeding under the Act (Rep. Act No. 1379) does not terminate
in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally
acquired in favor of the state. (Sec. 6) In the second place the procedure outlined in
the law leading to forfeiture is that provided for in a civil action. Thus there is a
petition (Sec. 3), then an answer (Sec. 4), and lastly, a hearing. The preliminary
investigation which is required prior to the filing of the petition, in accordance with
Sec. 2 of the Act, is provided expressly to be one similar to a preliminary
investigation in a criminal case. If the investigation is only similar to that in a
criminal case, but the other steps in the proceedings are those for civil proceedings,
it stands to reason that the proceeding is not criminal. xxx. (citations omitted)
Forfeiture cases impose neither a personal criminal liability, nor the civil liability that
arises from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The liability is based solely on a
statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired
properties.29 Executive Order No. 14 (E.O. No. 14), Defining the Jurisdiction Over
Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand Marcos,
authorizes the filing of forfeiture suits that will proceed independently of any
criminal proceedings. Section 3 of E.O. 14 empowered the PCGG to file independent
civil actions separate from the criminal actions. 30
Thus, petitioners cannot equate the present case with a criminal case and assail the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan on the bare claim that they were deprived of
a "full-blown trial." In affirming the Sandiganbayan and denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration in the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court held:
Section 5 of RA 1379 provides:
The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be open to the public, and during
which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the
satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired the property in question.
And pursuant to Section 6 of the said law, if the respondent is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then
the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.
xxx

xxx

xxx

A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily discloses that the word "hearing"
does not always require the formal introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the
parties are given the occasion to participate and explain how they acquired the
property in question. If they are unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that
they lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such
property forfeited in favor of the State. There is no provision in the law that a full
blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the forfeiture of the
subject property. Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the

court is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property
in question even in a summary proceeding. 31
As forfeiture suits under R.A. 1379 are civil in nature, it follows that Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court on Summary Judgment may be applied to the present case. This is
consistent with our ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision upholding the summary
judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan over the Swiss deposits, which are
subject of the same Petition for Forfeiture as the Arelma assets.
II. Republic complied with Section 3 (c), (d), and (e) of R.A. 1375
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. argues that there are genuine issues of fact as borne by the
Pre-trial Order, Supplemental Pre-trial Order, and the Pre-trial Briefs of the parties.
He laments that the Republic was unable to meet the necessary averments under
the forfeiture law, which requires a comparison between the approximate amount of
property acquired during the incumbency of Ferdinand Marcos, and the total
amount of governmental salaries and other earnings. 32 While the Petition contained
an analysis of Ferdinand Marcoss income from 1965 to 1986 (during his
incumbency), there was purportedly no mention of the latters income from 1940 to
1965 when he was a practicing lawyer, congressman and senator; other earnings
until the year 1985; and real properties that were auctioned off to satisfy the estate
tax assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 33
Petitioner Marcos, Jr. implores us herein to revisit and reverse our earlier ruling in
the Swiss Deposits Decision and argues that the pronouncements in that case are
contrary to law and its basic tenets. The Court in that case allegedly applied a
lenient standard for the Republic, but a strict one for the Marcoses. He finds fault in
the ruling therein which was grounded on public policy and the ultimate goal of the
forfeiture law, arguing that public policy is better served if the Court gave more
importance to the substantive rights of the Marcoses.
In accordance with the principle of immutability of judgments, petitioners can no
longer use the present forum to assail the ruling in the Swiss Deposits Decision,
which has become final and executory. Aside from the fact that the method
employed by petitioner is improper and redundant, we also find no cogent reason to
revisit the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141, which this
Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision found to be thorough and convincing. In the
first place, using a Rule 45 Petition to question a judgment that has already become
final is improper, especially when it seeks reconsideration of factual issues, such as
the earnings of the late President from 1940 to 1965 and the existence of real
properties that petitioners claim were auctioned off to pay the taxes. Secondly,
petitioners never raised the existence of these earnings and real properties at the
outset and never mentioned these alleged other incomes by way of defense in their
Answer. In their Answer, and even in their subsequent pleadings, they merely made
general denials of the allegations without stating facts admissible in evidence at the
hearing. As will be discussed later, both the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court
found that the Marcoses unsupported denials of matters patently and necessarily
within their knowledge were inexcusable, and that a trial would have served no
purpose at all.34

R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be
presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. 35 The elements that must
concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender
is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of
money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be
applied, the relevant period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer
served in that position. The amount of the public officers salary and lawful income
is compared against any property or amount acquired for that same period. In the
Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by
the Marcoses "were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate
salaries as public officials."36
For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:
(a) The name and address of the respondent.
(b) The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or
employment which he has previously held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his
incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by
the Solicitor General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and
incomes from legitimately acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or
not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his
incumbency.37 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e
above, because the latter allegedly never took into account the years when
Ferdinand Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing lawyer, a
trader and investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a
haphazard rehash of what has already been conclusively determined by the
Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. The alleged
"receivables from prior years" were without basis, because Marcos never had a
known law office nor any known clients, and neither did he file any withholding tax
certificate that would prove the existence of a supposedly profitable law practice
before he became President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits Decision:

The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:
xxx

xxx

xxx

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his

Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action
of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady
who ruled with FM (Ferdinand Marcos) during the 14-year martial law regime,
occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the
peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978
to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements.1wphi1
xxx

xxx

xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report
of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President
from 1966 to 1976 was P 60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P 100,000 a year;
while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human
Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P 75,000 a year.38
The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner
Imelda Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from
which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the Answer
consisted of general denials and a standard plea of "lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" what the
Court characterized as "foxy replies" and mere pretense fairness dictates that
what must be considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries
of the spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as
their Income Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing
the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in
paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986
issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976
1977-1984
1985

at P 60,000/year
at P 100,000/year
at P 110,000/year

P 660,000
800,000
110,000
P 1,570,00

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985

at P 75,000/year P 718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's
combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P 30,833.33.
Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to
U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing
during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had
an equivalent value of $304,372.43.39
The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are
summarized in Schedules A to D submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule A
showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php 16,408,442.00 or USD
2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:
Income Source
Official Salaries
Legal Practice
Farm Income
Others
Total

Amount
P 2,627,581.00 11,109,836.00 149,700.00 2,521,325.00 P 16,408,442.00 -

Percentage
16.01%
67.71%
.91%
15.37%
100.00%

The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less
coincided with the Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what
appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing "Legal Practice," which
accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this
anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented "receivables from
prior years" during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor Generals
findings:
In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from
practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he
was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his
Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy to
the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less
the P 10.65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no
documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on
record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As
previously stated, his net worth was a mere P 120,000.00 in December, 1965. The
joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons
of their kleptocracy.40
In addition, the former President also reported a total of Php 2,521,325 which he
referred to as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations" under "Other
Income" for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from any
deposits that may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital
gains tax returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that
there are no records pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City,
Manila, Quezon City, and Tacloban.

The Balance Sheet attached to the couples ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net
worth of Php 120,000, which covered the year immediately preceding their
ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the combined salaries of
the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in
power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D,
computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until
1984 in the total amount of USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal
practice is real and valid.41 The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the
spouses total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable to
account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the Marcos
spouses from 1965 to 1984.
Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to establish
the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the
Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries
as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger
deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts
deposited in the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different
countries. Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this presumption when they
merely presented vague denials and pleaded "lack of sufficient knowledge" in their
Answer.
In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the Sandiganbayan
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as these issues have
long become the "law of the case" in the original Petition for Forfeiture. As held in
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic: 42
Law of the case is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon
subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been previously
raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding
instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the facts on which
the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact,
petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the issues
identical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. 43 He
may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues long laid to
rest and established as the law of the case.
III. Civil Case No. 0141 has not yet terminated

Petitioners next argue that the "law of the case" doctrine should be applied, not to
the ruling affirming the forfeiture, but to the grant of the summary judgment over
the Swiss accounts as affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits
Decision. They contend that since the Courts Decision mentioned only the deposits
under the five Swiss foundations, then the Republic can no longer seek partial
summary judgment for forfeiture over the Arelma account. And since the said
Decision has long become final and has in fact been executed, they insist that the
Sandiganbayan has lost its jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners are under the mistaken impression that the Swiss Deposits Decision
serves as the entire judgment in Civil Case No. 0141. Just because respondent
Republic succeeded in obtaining summary judgment over the Swiss accounts does
not mean it is precluded from seeking partial summary judgment over a different
subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture. In fact, Civil Case No.
0141 pertains to the recovery of all the assets enumerated therein, such as (1)
holding companies, agro-industrial ventures and other investments; (2)
landholdings, buildings, condominium units, mansions; (3) New York properties; (4)
bills amounting to Php 27,744,535, time deposits worth Php 46.4 million, foreign
currencies and jewelry seized by the United States customs authorities in Honolulu,
Hawaii; (5) USD 30 million in the custody of the Central Bank in dollar-denominated
Treasury Bills; shares of stock, private vehicles, and real estate in the United States,
among others.44
In the enumeration of properties included in the Petition, the Arelma assets were
described as "Assets owned by Arelma, Inc., a Panamanian corporation organized in
Liechtenstein, for sole purpose (sic) of maintaining an account in Merrill Lynch, New
York."45 Paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture states:
59. FM and Imelda used a number of their close business associations or favorite
cronies in opening bank accounts abroad for the purpose of laundering their filthy
riches. Aside from the foundations and corporations established by their
dummies/nominees to hide their ill-gotten wealth as had already been discussed,
several other corporate entities had been formed for the same purpose, to wit:
(1). ARELMA, INC (T)his was organized for the sole purpose of maintaining
an account and portfolio in Merrill Lynch, New York.
(2). Found among Malacaang documents is a letter dated September 21,
1972 by J.L. Sunier, Senior Vice President of SBC to Mr. Jose V. Campos, a
known Marcos crony (See Annex "V-21" hereof). In the said letter, instructions
were given by Sunier to their Panama office to constitute a Panamanian
company, the name of which will be either Larema, Inc. or Arelma, Inc.,
or Relma, Inc. this company will have the same set-up as Maler; the
appointment of Sunier and Dr. Barbey as attorneys and appointment of
selected people in Panama as directors; the opening of direct account in the
name of the new company with Merrill Lynch, New York, giving them authority
to operate the account, but excluding withdrawals of cash, securities or
pledging of portfolio; and sending of money in favor of the new company
under reference AZUR in order to cut links with the present account already
opened with Merrill Lynch under an individuals name.

(3). Also found was a letter dated November 14, 1972 and signed by Jose Y.
Campos (Annex "V-21-a" hereof). The letter was addressed to SEC, Geneva,
and Sunier duly authorized by their "mutual friend" regarding the opening of
an account of Arelma, Inc. with Merrill Lynch, New York to the attention of Mr.
Saccardi, Vice-President.
(4). On May 19, 1983, J. L. Sunier wrote a letter with a reference "SAPPHIRE"
and a salutation "Dear Excellency" stating, among others, the current
valuation by Merrill Lynch of the assets of Arelma, Inc. amounting to
$3,369,975 (Annex "V-21-b" hereof).
(5). Included in the documents sent by SBC, Geneva, through the Swiss
Federal Department of Justice and Police were those related to Arelma, Inc. as
follows:
(a) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53.145 A.R. dated
September 17, 1972, signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunier. This was
later on cancelled as a result of the change in attorneys and authorized
signatories of the company (Annexes "V-21-c" and "V-21-d" hereof).
(b) Opening bank documents for Account No. 53. 145 A.R. signed by
new attorneys led by Michel Amandruz (Annexes "V-21-e" and "V-21-f"
hereof).
(c). Bank statements for Account No. 53.145 A.R. with ending balance
of $26.10 as of 12-31-85 (Annex "V-21-g" and "V-21-h" hereof).
(d). An informative letter stating that Account 53. 145 A.R. was related
to an account opened with Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., New
York for Arelma, Inc. The opening of this account slowly made Account
53. 145 A.R. an inactive account (See Annexes "V-21-I" and "V-21-j"
hereof).46
When the Marcos family fled Manila in 1986, they left behind several documents
that revealed the existence of secret bank deposits in Switzerland and other
financial centers.47 These papers, referred to by respondent as Malacaang
documents, detailed how "Arelma, Inc." 48 was established. Attached as Annex V-21
was the Letter of Instruction sent to the Panamanian branch of the Sunier company
to open Arelma. The latter was to have the same set-up as Maler, one of the five
Swiss foundations, subject of the 2000 Motion. Annexes "V-21-c" to "V-21-j"
pertained to documents to be used to open an account with Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc. in New York.
The Swiss Deposits Decision dealt only with the summary judgment as to the five
Swiss accounts, because the 2000 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment dated 7
March 2000 specifically identified the five Swiss accounts only. It did not include the
Arelma account. There was a prayer for general reliefs in the 1996 Motion, but as
has been discussed, this prayer was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan. The dismissal
was based solely on the existence of the Compromise Agreements for a global

settlement of the Marcos assets, which the Supreme Court later invalidated. The
2000 Motion for Summary Judgment was confined only to the five accounts
amounting to USD 356 million held by five Swiss foundations.
As clarified by the Solicitor General during the hearing of 24 March 2000 in the
Sandiganbayan:
PJ: The Court is of the impression and the Court is willing to be corrected, that ones
(sic) the plaintiff makes a claim for summary judgment it in fact states it no longer
intends to present evidence and based on this motion to render judgment, is that
correct?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.
PJ: In other words, on the basis of pre-trial, you are sayingbecause if we are
talking of a partial claim, then there is summary judgment, unless there is
preliminary issue to the claim which is a matter of stipulation.
SOL. BALLACILLO: We submit, your Honors, that there can be partial summary
judgment on this matter.
PJ: But in this instance, you are making summary judgment on the entire case?
SOL. BALLACILLO: With respect to the $365 million.
PJ: In the complaint you asked for the relief over several topics. You have $356
million, $25 million and $5 million. Now with regards to the $365 million, you are
asking for summary judgment?
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honor.
PJ: And, therefore, you are telling us now, "thats it, we need not have to prove."
SOL. BALLACILLO: Yes, your Honors.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Courts discussion clearly did not include the Arelma account. The dispositive
portion of the Swiss Deposits Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which
were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank
in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002,
plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. 50
Thus, the other properties, which were subjects of the Petition for Forfeiture, but
were not included in the 2000 Motion, can still be subjects of a subsequent motion
for summary judgment. To rule otherwise would run counter to this Courts long
established policy on asset recovery which, in turn, is anchored on considerations of
national survival.

E.O. 14, Series of 1986,51 and Section 1(d) of Proclamation No. 352 declared the
national policy after the Marcos regime. The government aimed to implement the
reforms mandated by the people: protecting their basic rights, adopting a
provisional constitution, and providing for an orderly transition to a government
under a new constitution. The said Proclamation further states that "The President
shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of the people to recover illgotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime
and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of
assets or accounts." One of the "whereas" clauses of E.O. 14 entrusts the PCGG with
the "just and expeditious recovery of such ill-gotten wealth in order that the funds,
assets and other properties may be used to hasten national economic recovery."
These clauses are anchored on the overriding considerations of national interest
and national survival, always with due regard to the requirements of fairness and
due process.
With the myriad of properties and interconnected accounts used to hide these
assets that are in danger of dissipation, it would be highly unreasonable to require
the government to ascertain their exact locations and recover them simultaneously,
just so there would be one comprehensive judgment covering the different subject
matters.
In any case, the Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004
Motion as a separate judgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under
Section 5 of Rule 36:
Separate judgments.When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a
particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing
of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so
disposed of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a
separate judgment is rendered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until
the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such
conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose
favor the judgment is rendered.53
Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully
adjudicated on motion,54 and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs
sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, 55 we had occasion to rule that a careful
reading of its Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never
intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an
action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to
recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final or complete
adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayans partial summary
judgment in the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were
necessary because some facts existed without controversy, while others were
controverted. However, there is nothing in this provision or in the Rules that
prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial summary judgment on an

entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no legal basis
for petitioners contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion
for summary judgment over the Arelma account.
Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and thoroughly disposed of the
forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondents 2004 Motion is in
the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.
More importantly respondent has brought to our attention the reasons why a motion
for summary judgment over the Arelma account was prompted only at this stage. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel, 56 a case filed by human rights victims in the
United States decided by the US Supreme Court only in 2008, the antecedents of
the Arelma account were described as follows:
In 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, then President of the Republic, incorporated Arelma, S.A.
(Arelma), under Panamanian law. Around the same time, Arelma opened a
brokerage account with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. (Merrill Lynch) in
New York, in which it deposited $2 million. As of the year 2000, the account had
grown to approximately $35 million.
Alleged crimes and misfeasance by Marcos during his presidency became the
subject of worldwide attention and protest. A class action by and on behalf of some
9,539 of his human rights victims was filed against Marcos and his estate, among
others. The class action was tried in the United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii and resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the class. See Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (C.A.9 1996) . We refer to that litigation as the
Pimentel case and to its class members as the Pimentel class. In a related action,
the Estate of Roger Roxas and Golden Budha [sic] Corporation (the Roxas claimants)
claim a right to execute against the assets to satisfy their own judgment against
Marcos' widow, Imelda Marcos. See Roxas v. Marcos, 89 Hawaii 91, 113-115, 969
P.2d 1209, 1231-1233 (1998) .
The Pimentel class claims a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma
assets held by Merrill Lynch. The Republic and the Commission claim a right to the
assets under a 1955 Philippine law providing that property derived from the misuse
of public office is forfeited to the Republic from the moment of misappropriation.
See An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have
Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor, Rep. Act No. 1379, 51:9 O.G. 4457 (June 18, 1955).
After Marcos fled the Philippines in 1986, the Commission was created to recover
any property he wrongfully took. Almost immediately the Commission asked the
Swiss Government for assistance in recovering assets-including shares in Arelmathat Marcos had moved to Switzerland. In compliance the Swiss Government froze
certain assets and, in 1990, that freeze was upheld by the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court. In 1991, the Commission asked the Sandiganbayan, a Philippine court of
special jurisdiction over corruption cases, to declare forfeited to the Republic any
property Marcos had obtained through misuse of his office. That litigation is still
pending in the Sandiganbayan. (Citations omitted.)

The pursuit of the Arelma account encountered several hindrances, as it was subject
to not one, but two claims of human rights victims in foreign courts: the Pimentel
class and the Roxas claimants. The government and the PCGG were able to obtain a
Stay Order at the appellate level, but the trial court judge vacated the stay and
awarded the Arelma assets to the Pimentel class of human rights victims.
As early as 1986, the PCGG had already sought assistance from the Swiss
government to recover the Arelma assets; however, it was only in 2000 that the
Swiss authorities turned over two Stock Certificates, which were assets of Arelma.
The transfer by Switzerland of the Stock Certificates to the Republic was made
under the same conditions as the bank deposits of the five Swiss foundations. 57
Meanwhile, the Pimentel case was tried as a class action before Judge Manuel Real
of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Real
was sitting by designation in the District of Hawaii after the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the various human rights Complaints against
Marcos in that court.58 Judge Real directed Merrill Lynch to file an action for
interpleader in the District of Hawaii, where he presided over the matter, and where
the Republic and the PCGG were named as defendants. In Pimentel, the Court
further narrates how Judge Real ruled that the pending litigation in Philippine courts
could not determine entitlement to the Arelma assets:
After being named as defendants in the interpleader action, the Republic and the
Commission asserted sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604 . They moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule
19(b) , based on the premise that the action could not proceed without them
Judge Real initially rejected the request by the Republic and the Commission to
dismiss the interpleader action. They appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.
It held the Republic and the Commission are entitled to sovereign immunity and
that under Rule 19(a) they are required parties (or "necessary" parties under the old
terminology). See In re Republic of the Philippines, 309 F.3d 1143, 1149-1152 (C.A.9
2002) . The Court of Appeals entered a stay pending the outcome of the litigation in
the Sandiganbayan over the Marcos assets.
After concluding that the pending litigation in the Sandiganbayan could not
determine entitlement to the Arelma assets, Judge Real vacated the stay, allowed
the action to proceed, and awarded the assets to the Pimentel class. A week later,
in the case initiated before the Sandiganbayan in 1991, the Republic asked that
court to declare the Arelma assets forfeited, arguing the matter was ripe for
decision. The Sandiganbayan has not yet ruled. In the interpleader case the
Republic, the Commission, Arelma, and PNB appealed the District Court's judgment
in favor of the Pimentel claimants. This time the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Dismissal of the interpleader suit, it held, was not warranted under Rule
19(b) because, though the Republic and the Commission were required
("necessary") parties under Rule 19(a) , their claim had so little likelihood of success
on the merits that the interpleader action could proceed without them. One of the
reasons the court gave was that any action commenced by the Republic and the
Commission to recover the assets would be barred by New York's 6-year statute of
limitations for claims involving the misappropriation of public property. 59 (Citations
omitted)

The American Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and remanded the case with instructions to order the District Court to
dismiss the interpleader action. The former held that the District Court and the
Court of Appeals failed to give full effect to sovereign immunity when they held that
the action could proceed without the Republic and the Commission:
Comity and dignity interests take concrete form in this case. The claims of the
Republic and the Commission arise from events of historical and political
significance for the Republic and its people. The Republic and the Commission have
a unique interest in resolving the ownership of or claims to the Arelma assets and in
determining if, and how, the assets should be used to compensate those persons
who suffered grievous injury under Marcos. There is a comity interest in allowing a
foreign state to use its own courts for a dispute if it has a right to do so. The dignity
of a foreign state is not enhanced if other nations bypass its courts without right or
good cause. Then, too, there is the more specific affront that could result to the
Republic and the Commission if property they claim is seized by the decree of a
foreign court.60
Thus it was only in 2008 that the Republic was finally able to obtain a favorable
judgment from the American Supreme Court with regard to the different claims
against the Arelma assets. Petitioners never intervened or lifted a finger in any of
the litigation proceedings involving the enforcement of judgment against the Arelma
assets abroad. We find merit in respondents observation that petitioner Imelda
Marcoss participation in the proceedings in the Philippines, particularly her
invocation of her right against undue deprivation of property, is inconsistent with
her and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.s insistence that the properties in question do not
belong to them, and that they are mere beneficiaries. 61
Indeed, it is clear that the Arelma assets are in danger of dissipation. Even as the
United States Supreme Court gave weight to the likely prejudice to be suffered by
the Republic when it dismissed the interpleader in Pimentel, it also considered that
the "balance of equities may change in due course. One relevant change may occur
if it appears that the Sandiganbayan cannot or will not issue its ruling within a
reasonable period of time. If the Sandiganbayan rules that the Republic and the
Commission have no right to the assets, their claims in some later interpleader suit
would be less substantial than they are now." 62
IV. Petitioners sham denials justify the application of summary judgment
As already settled in the Swiss Deposits Decision and reiterated in the discussion
above as the law of the case, the lawful income of the Marcoses is only USD
304,372.43. As discussed in paragraph 9 of the Petition for Forfeiture, Annex V-21-b
states that Arelmas assets as of 19 May 1983 were worth USD 3,369,975.00. 63 The
entirety of the lawful income of the Marcoses represents only 9% of the entire
assets of Arelma, which petitioners remain unable to explain.
In their Answer to the Petition for Forfeiture, petitioners employ the same tactic,
consisting of general denials based on a purported lack of knowledge regarding the
whereabouts of the Arelma assets. Paragraph 32 of the said pleading states:

Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 59 of the Petition insofar as it alleges that

the Marcoses used their cronies and engaged in laundering their filthy riches for
being false and conclusory of the truth being that the Marcoses did not engage in
any such illegal acts and that all the properties they acquired were lawfully
acquired; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents are not
privy to the alleged transactions. 64
This particular denial mimics petitioners similar denials of the allegations in the
forfeiture Petition pertaining to the Swiss accounts and is practically identical to
paragraphs 7 to 37 of the Answer. The Swiss Deposits Decision has characterized
these as "sham" denials:
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents
of the alleged ITRs.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents
of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents
of the alleged ITRs.
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents
of the alleged ITRs.
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents
of the alleged ITRs.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that
Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and
hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for
being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30
of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts,

except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers

that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38,
39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not
privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago,
except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos
and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer
to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and
contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of
privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part
of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to
tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently
calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. 65(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, petitioners give the same stock answer to the effect that the
Marcoses did not engage in any illegal activities, and that all their properties were
lawfully acquired. They fail to state with particularity the ultimate facts surrounding
the alleged lawfulness of the mode of acquiring the funds in Arelma (which totaled
USD 3,369,975.00 back in 1983), considering that the entirety of their lawful income
amounted only to USD 304,372.43, or only 9% of the entire Arelma fund. Then, as
now, they employ what the Court in G.R. No. 152154 characterized as a "negative
pregnant," not just in denying the criminal provenance of the Arelma funds, but in
the matter of ownership of the said funds. As discussed by the Court in the first
Republic case, cited by the Sandiganbayan:

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of
the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It
was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It
is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the
words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.66
Due to the insufficiency of petitioners denial of paragraph 59 which in effect denies
only the qualifying circumstances, and by virtue of the Courts ruling in the Swiss
Deposits Decision, petitioners are deemed to have admitted the factual antecedents
and the establishment of Arelma. In paragraph 32 of their Answer, they only deny
the first few sentences of paragraph 59, while conveniently neglecting to address
subparagraphs 1 to 5 and the opening bank documents described in 5 (a) to (d) of
the Petition for Forfeiture. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Petition discusses the
establishment of a Panamanian company to be named either "Larema, Inc. or
Arelma, Inc., or Relma, Inc.;" the appointment of several people as directors; and
the opening of a direct account with Merrill Lynch. Paragraphs 3 to 5 also of the
Petition for Forfeiture detail correspondences between a "J.L. Sunier" and a letter
addressed to Malacaang with the salutation "Dear Excellency."
Regarding the averment of petitioners that they lack knowledge sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the above allegations in the Petition for Forfeiture, the
Courts discussion in the Swiss Deposits Decision bears reiterating:
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses
responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise
an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they
were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged. 67
Petitioners cannot escape the fact that there is manifest disparity between the
amount of the Arelma funds and the lawful income of the Marcoses as shown in the
ITRs filed by spouses Marcos. The Swiss Deposits Decision found that the
genuineness of the said ITRs and balance sheets of the Marcos spouses have
already been admitted by petitioners themselves:
Not only that. Respondents answer also technically admitted the genuineness and
due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as
well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the
ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was

not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief

but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the
ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying
the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their
knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial. An unexplained denial of information within the control of the
pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an
effective denial.68 (Footnotes omitted.)
We find that petitioners have again attempted to delay the goal of asset recovery
by their evasiveness and the expedient profession of ignorance. It is wellestablished that a profession of ignorance about a fact that is necessarily within the
pleaders knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all. On a
similar vein, there is a failure by petitioners to properly tender an issue, which as
correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, justifies the Republics resort to summary
judgment.
Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.69 In Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has previously discussed the
importance of summary judgment in weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense and loss of time involved
in a trial, viz:
Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may
still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A
"genuine issue", as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of
fact that requires the presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for
summary judgment rests the onus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. 70
Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet
when the relevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that those
issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment for plaintiff. 71
Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may also
call for a hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their
positions. However, the hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the
purpose of determining whether the issues are genuine or not, not to receive
evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon Development Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 72 the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter
may be resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and

admissions. This does not mean that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court
is empowered to determine its necessity.
It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the
rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact
that call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial.1wphi1Even if on their
face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a
determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
summary judgment is called for.73
Guided by the principles above indicated, we hold that under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, summary judgment is proper. The Sandiganbayan did
not commit a reversible error in granting the corresponding 2004 Motion for
Summary Judgment filed by respondent. The latter is well within its right to avail
itself of summary judgment and obtain immediate relief, considering the insufficient
denials and pleas of ignorance made by petitioners on matters that are supposedly
within their knowledge.
These denials and pleas constitute admissions of material allegations under
paragraph 59 of the Petition for Forfeiture a tact they have employed repeatedly in
Civil Case No. 0141. As discussed, the purpose of summary judgment is precisely to
avoid long drawn litigations and useless delays. 74 We also affirm the
Sandiganbayans findings that the moving party, the Republic, is now entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 2 April 2009 of the
Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. All assets, properties, and funds belonging to Arelma,
S.A., with an estimated aggregate amount of USD 3,369,975 as of 1983, plus all
interests and all other income that accrued thereon, until the time or specific day
that all money or monies are released and/or transferred to the possession of the
Republic of the Philippines, are hereby forfeited in favor of Respondent Republic of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48

February 15, 2011

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA
V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA
PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE

LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME

AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48
ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their
different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of
subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC
Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendantgovernment agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and
restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them
fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use
of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time.
It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion
schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in
exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along
the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other

minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these
LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to
set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent
industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these
rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga,
and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each
other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws
and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately
adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The
DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood
control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,

Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,

affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the
Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year
from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and
in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary
landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension
and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and
other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its
environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila
Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses
relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of
the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain
economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and
PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of
this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the
Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18,
2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the
agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that
time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be
viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch
headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial
power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is
but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies
ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008
Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the
execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of
Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully
implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of
continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted

resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require
the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of
the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the
appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner
may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the respondent
detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the
writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made
to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.
(Emphasis supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus
issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance
with the Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until
full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now
proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. 2 An
evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are
voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioneragencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation
and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by
petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties; (4)
as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the national and local
levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the
Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be
issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court
hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency
in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila
Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and
companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan
that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011.

(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the
Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors
of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systems
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bayand other minor
rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into
the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater
treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are
given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and
houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure
compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private
homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment
of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before
December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the
names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned
environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development
Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures
intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila
shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and
Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas
in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater
treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall
submit their plans and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment
facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which
shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two
concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their
respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.

(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before

September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said
works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in
Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it
has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila
Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within
the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine
life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that
purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data
as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from
agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the
list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further
ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock
in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of
the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such
measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects
and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which
shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August
2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of
days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew
per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the
treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before
June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to
undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to
prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of
violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its fiveyear plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to
apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution
Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other
pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to
ensure the successful prosecution of violators.

(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the
Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers
in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built along the PasigMarikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros,
in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the
MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the
demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as
well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not
later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila
in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open
and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February
21, 2006,3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of
these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31,
2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the
National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on
the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC
Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly
comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of
sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone

Region IV-A
8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila
are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected
monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to
December 31, 2010 vis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in
landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and
thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal
provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the
informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or
occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279
and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid
LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the
demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as
the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than
December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30,
2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies
including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation
Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the
DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and
hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement
segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal
solid waste.

On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the
said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of
compliance.1avvphi1
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before
May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has
integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure
compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of
the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully
implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically
using the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that
they have identified.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See dissenting opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Carpio

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Now the Department of Education (DepEd).

On February 10, 2009, the Court En Banc approved a resolution creating an

Advisory Committee "that will verify the reports of the government agencies
tasked to clean up the Manila Bay." It is composed of two members of the
Court and three technical experts:
Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Chairperson and ponente of MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila
Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez
Court Administrator
Vice-Chairperson
Members/Technical Experts:
Dr. Gil S. Jacinto
Former Director, UP Marine Science Institute
Dr. Elisea G. Gozun
Chair of Earth Day Network and Former DENR Secretary
Dr. Antonio G.M. La Via
Former DENR Undersecretary
Dean of the Ateneo School of Government
3

Our Decision in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned

Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA

661, 690, states: "RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted
grace period of five (5) years [in Sec. 37 of RA 9003] which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill
which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet
been set up." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory
Committee to the concerned agencies1and local government units (LGUs) for the
implementation of the 18 December 2008 Decision of the Court in this case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to submit
to the Court their plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy (OPMBCS);2
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes;3
The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in
Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater
treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the
MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the
completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;4
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan that do not have sewerage and sanitation facilities. LWUA
is further ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to
provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in
said cities and towns and the completion period for said works which shall
be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;5
The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR), shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on
areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the

assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in
Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said
areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore
and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the
aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said
undertakings;6
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list
of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further
ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock
in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011
the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with
paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the
completion dates of such measures;7
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before
June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities
they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful
prosecution of violators;8
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30,
2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they
intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree (PD)
979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast
Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine
pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators; 9
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court
on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built in violation of
RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-TullahanTenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros as of December 31, 2010.
On or before the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal
of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses,
structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for said activities which shall be fully implemented not later than
December 31, 2015;10
[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the removal
of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for
such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31,
2012;11

[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies
have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance;12
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to
the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula
which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012;13 (Emphasis supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their plans of
action and status reports? Are these plans to be approved or disapproved by the
Court? The Court does not have the competence or even the jurisdiction to evaluate
these plans which involves technical matters 14 best left to the expertise of the
concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the
Court] their quarterly reports electronically x x x."15 Thus, the directive for the
concerned agencies to submit to the Court their quarterly reports is a continuing
obligation which extends even beyond the year 2011. 16
The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively vested
in the President. First, the Constitution provides that "executive power shall be
vested in the President."17 This means that neither the Judiciary nor the
Legislature can exercise executive power for executive power is the exclusive
domain of the President. Second, the Constitution provides that the President shall
"have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices."18 Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise control or even
supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the exclusive
domain of the Executive. In the guise of implementing the 18 December 2008
Decision through the Resolution, the Court is in effect supervising and directing the
different government agencies and LGUs concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,19 it was held that the Court cannot be required to exercise
administrative functions such as supervision over executive officials. The issue in
that case was whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by law
(Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court
the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are
plainly executive and the consequent curtailment by mere implication from the
Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and remove administrative
officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly place
under the President's supervision and control.
xxx

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the
Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or
"rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be
investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privilege would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative
function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.20 (Boldfacing supplied)
Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in nature
and circumvent the constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme Court
members from performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Section 12,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice,21 the Court invalidated the designation of a
judge as member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which was
tasked to receive complaints and to make recommendations for the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees. The Court held that the committee performs
administrative functions22 which are prohibited under Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,23 this
Court has already emphasized that the Supreme Court should only exercise judicial
power and should not assume any duty which does not pertain to the administering
of judicial functions. In that case, a petition was filed requesting the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms and the
compensation to be paid to Manila Electric Company for the use of right of way. The
Court held that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, whose decision of a majority shall be final, to
act on the petition of Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative orquasi judicial
functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the jurisdiction granted the
Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring
the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to
oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the
proper construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts
and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would
review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if
the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of

arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would

result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could
not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes
an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court
asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of
arbitrators, which is not a court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.24
Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the establishments
and houses along major river banks and to "take appropriate action to ensure
compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the
construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic
septic tanks."25 The LGU officials are also directed to "submit to the DILG on or
before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which shall contain
the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes." 26 Furthermore, the Resolution
mandates that on or before 30 June 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in
Metro Manila should "consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires
(Maynilad and Manila Water Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions." 27 The Court
is in effect ordering these LGU officials how to do their job and even gives
a deadline for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the power of the
President to supervise LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments x x
x."28 Under the Local Government Code of 1991,29 the President exercises general
supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a) Consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general
supervision over local government units to ensure that their acts are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities; through the province with
respect to component cities and municipalities; and through the city and
municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis supplied)

The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing

executive functions. The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries by
taking over the functions of an equal branch of the government the Executive. The
Court should abstain from exercising any function which is not strictly judicial in
character and is not clearly conferred on it by the Constitution. 30 Indeed, as stated
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Noblejas v. Teehankee,31 "the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and its members should not and can not be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administration of judicial functions." 32
The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an executive
function which clearly violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in
our democratic republican government. The principle of separation of powers
between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of government is part of
the basic structure of the Philippine Constitution. Thus, the 1987 Constitution
provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;33 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines;34 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established.35
Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt to
assume or be compelled to perform non-judicial functions. 36 Judicial power is defined
under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution as that which "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The Resolution contains
directives which are outside the ambit of the Court's judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission:37
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the
fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x
And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other department in its exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. 38
Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of separation
of powers between the three equal branches of the government. In his dissenting
opinion in the 2008 case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),39 Justice Velasco
emphatically stated:

Separation of Powers to be Guarded

Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of separation
of powers which would likely be disturbed should the Court meander into alien
territory of the executive and dictate how the final shape of the peace agreement
with the MILF should look like. The system of separation of powers
contemplates the division of the functions of government into its three (3)
branches: the legislative which is empowered to make laws; the executive
which is required to carry out the law; and the judiciary which is charged
with interpreting the law. Consequent to actual delineation of power, each
branch of government is entitled to be left alone to discharge its duties as
it sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted
in Planas v. Gil, "will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative
action]." Expressed in another perspective, the system of separated
powers is designed to restrain one branch from inappropriate interference
in the business, or intruding upon the central prerogatives, of another
branch; it is a blend of courtesy and caution, "a self-executing safeguard
against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other." x x x
Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the
maintenance of the peace, insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression of
violence are the domain and responsibility of the executive. Now then, if it be
important to restrict the great departments of government to the exercise
of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally
important, that one branch should be left completely independent of the
others, independent not in the sense that the three shall not cooperate in
the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the constitution,
but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or
subjected to the influence of either of the branches.40 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined in our
Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the
sovereign powers of state in one body.41 Considering that executive power
is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines, the Judiciary should
neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the President nor arrogate
executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine itself to the exercise of
judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions of the other branches of the
government.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of

Interior and Local Government (DILG), ), Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
Department of Agriculture (DA), Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Philippine
National Police (PNP), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and
Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
2

Resolution, p. 4.

Resolution, p. 6.

Resolution, p. 6.

Resolution, p. 6-7.

Resolution, p. 7.

Resolution, p. 7.

Resolution, p. 8.

Resolution, p. 8.

10

Resolution, pp. 8.

11

Resolution, p. 10.

12

Resolution, p. 11.

13

Resolution, p. 11.

14

For instance, the Resolution orders the PPA to "include in its report the
activities of the concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names,
make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the
present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days
the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew
per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and ship-generated wastes collected from
said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes;"
Resolution, pp. 7-8.
15

16

Resolution, p.11.

For example, the Resolution directs that "[i]n its quarterly report for the
last quarter of 2010 andthereafter, MMDA shall report on the
apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and
other laws on pollution for the said period; Resolution, p. 10. (Emphasis
supplied.)

17

Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.

18

Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17.

19

131 Phil. 931 (1968).

20

Id. at. 934-935.

21

248 Phil. 487 (1988).

22

Administrative functions are "those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence." Id. at 491.
23

57 Phil 600 (1932).

24

Id. at 604-605.

25

Resolution, p. 5.

26

Resolution, p. 6.

27

Resolution, p. 6.

28

Emphasis supplied.

29

Republic Act No. 7160.

30

Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., supra note 23.

31

Supra note 19.

32

Id. at 936, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil.
600, 605 (1932).
33

Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.

34

Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.

35

Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

36

J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A

Commentary 828 (1996).
37

63 Phil. 139 (1936).

38

Id. at 156-157.

39

G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, 14 October 2008,
568 SCRA 402.
40

Dissenting Opinion, id. at 669-670. (Citations omitted)

41

S. Carlota, The Three Most Important Features of the Philippine Legal

System that Others Should Understand, in IALS Conference Learning from
Each Other: Enriching the Law School Curriculum in an Interrelated World 177
<www.ialsnet.org/meeting/enriching/carlota.pdf> (visited 5 November 2010).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It needs to
be remembered that the Court cannot run the government. The Court has the duty
of implementing constitutional safeguards that protect individual rights but they
cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to accommodate the challenged
violation."1
These are the words of Justice Anand of the Supreme Court of India, from which
court the idea of a continuing mandatory injunction for environmental cases was
drawn by the Philippine Supreme Court. These words express alarm that the Indian
judiciary has already taken on the role of running the government in environmental
cases. A similar situation would result in the Philippines were the majority
Resolution to be adopted. Despite having the best of intentions to ensure
compliance by petitioners with their corresponding statutory mandates in an urgent
manner, this Court has unfortunately encroached upon prerogatives solely to be
exercised by the President and by Congress.
On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, denying the petition of the
government agencies, defendants in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It held that the Court of
Appeals, subject to some modifications, was correct in affirming the 13 September
2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It ordered "the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34
[1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation."

The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders to
comply with their statutory mandate.2 Pursuant to the judgment above, the Court
established its own Manila Bay Advisory Committee. Upon the recommendations of
the said Committee, the present Resolution was issued. It encompasses several of
the specific instructions laid out by the court in the original case, but also goes
further by requiring reports and updates from the said government agencies, and
setting deadlines for the submission thereof.
I find these directives in the Majority Resolution patently irreconcilable with basic
constitutional doctrines and with the legislative mechanisms already in place, such
as the Administrative Code and the Local Government Code, which explicitly grant
control and supervision over these agencies to the President alone, and to no one
else. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority Resolution.
In issuing these directives, the Court has encroached upon the exclusive authority of
the Executive Department and violated the doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Resolution assigned the Department of Natural Resources as the primary
agency for environment protection and required the implementation of its
Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy. It ordered the DENR to submit
the updated operational plan directly to the Court; to summarize data on the quality
of Manila Bay waters; and to "submit the names and addresses of persons and
companiesthat generate toxic or hazardous waste on or before September 30,
2011."
The Department of the Interior and Local Government is directed to "order the
Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces
to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems" to determine if they have wastewater treatment
facilities, on or before 30 June 2011. The LGUs are given a deadline of 30
September 2011 to finish the inspection. In cooperation with the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), these local governments are required to submit
their plan for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments which are in
violation of Republic Act No. 7279. The said demolition must take place not later
than 31 December 2012.
The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is required to submit
its plans for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in areas where
needed, the completion period for which shall not go beyond the year 2020. On or
before 30 June 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires
submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees. The Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) is ordered to submit on or before 30 September 2011 its plan
to install and operate sewerage and sanitation facilities in the towns and cities
where needed, which must be fully implemented by 31 December 2020.
The Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Aquatic Fisheries and Resources
are ordered to submit on or before 30 June 2011 a list of areas where marine life in
Manila Bay has improved, and the assistance extended to different Local
Government Units in this regard. The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is ordered to

report the names, make, and capacity of each ship that would dock in PPA ports; the
days they docked and the days they were at sea; the activities of the concessionaire
that would collect solid and liquid ship-generated waste, the volume, treatment and
disposal sites for such wastes; and the violators that PPA has apprehended.
The Department of Health (DOH) is required to submit the names and addresses of
septic and sludge companies that have no treatment facilities. The said agency
must also require companies to procure a "license to operate" issued by the DOH.
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the seventeen (17)
LGUs in Metro Manila must submit a report on the "amount of garbage collected per
districtvis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and
dumpsites." MMDA must also submit a plan for the removal of informal settlers and
encroachments along NCR Rivers which violate R.A. No. 7279.
Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely
under the domain of the executive branch of the state. The issuance of specific
instructions to subordinate agencies in the implementation of policy mandates in all
laws, not just those that protect the environment, is an exercise of the power of
supervision and control the sole province of the Office of the President.
Both the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code
of the Philippines, state:
Exercise of Executive Power. - The Executive power shall be vested in the President. 3
Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. 4
In Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Executive Secretary, 5 this Court has already
asserted that the enforcement of all laws is the sole domain of the Executive. The
Court pronounced that the express constitutional grant of authority to the Executive
is broad and encompassing, such that it justifies reorganization measures 6 initiated
by the President. The Court said:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume
directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of
general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over
bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.

To herein petitioner agencies impleaded below, this Court has given very specific
instructions to report the progress and status of their operations directly to the
latter. The Court also required the agencies to apprise it of any noncompliance with
the standards set forth by different laws as to environment protection. This move is
tantamount to making these agencies accountable to the Court instead of the
President. The very occupation streamlined especially for the technical and practical
expertise of the Executive Branch is being usurped without regard for the
delineations of power in the Constitution. In fact, the issuance of the Resolution
itself is in direct contravention of the Presidents exclusive power to issue
administrative orders, as shown thus:
Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of
governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders. 7
The Courts discussion in Ople v. Torres8 pertaining to the extent and breadth of
administrative power bestowed upon the President is apt:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing
orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix
a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to

specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy.
The implementation of the policy laid out by the legislature in the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004, the Toxic and Hazardous Waste Act or Republic Act 6969, the
Environment Code, and other laws geared towards environment protection is
under the competence of the President. Achieved thereby is a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency. And since it is through administrative orders promulgated
by the President that specific operational aspects for these policies are laid out, the
Resolution of this Court overlaps with the Presidents administrative power. No
matter how urgent and laudatory the cause of environment protection has become,
it cannot but yield to the higher mandate of separation of powers and the
mechanisms laid out by the people through the Constitution.
One of the directives is that which requires local governments to conduct inspection
of homes and establishments along the riverbanks, and to submit a plan for the
removal of certain informal settlers. Not content with arrogating unto itself the
powers of "control" and "supervision" granted by the Administrative Code to the
President over said petitioner administrative agencies, the Court is also violating the
latters general supervisory authority over local governments:

Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. 9
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.(a) Consistent with the
basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over
local government units to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions. 10
The powers expressly vested in any branch of the Government shall not be
exercised by, nor delegated to, any other branch of the Government, except to the
extent authorized by the Constitution. 11
As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers is the
very wellspring from which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno has traced its origin and rationale as inhering in the republican
system of government:
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating
their exercise to the three branches of government...
In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively
analyzed the nature of executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a
formidable foresight counselled that any combination of these powers would create
a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative
and the executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of
enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of trying the causes
of individuals. 12
Nor is there merit in the contention that these directives will speed up the
rehabilitation of Manila Bay better than if said rehabilitation were left to the
appropriate agencies. Expediency is never a reason to abandon legitimacy. "The
Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the
immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of
government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the
separation of powers."13
Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act.
In G.R. Nos. 171947-48, the Court explicitly admitted that "[w]hile the
implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making

process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus." 14 In denying
the appeal of petitioners and affirming the Decision of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
stressed that the trial courts Decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside
of their usual basic functions under existing laws. 15
In its revised Resolution, the Court is now setting deadlines for the implementation
of policy formulations which require decision-making by the agencies. It has
confused an order enjoining a duty, with an order outlining specific technical rules
on how to perform such a duty. Assuming without conceding that mandamus were
availing under Rule 65, the Court can only require a particular action, but it cannot
provide for the means to accomplish such action. It is at this point where the
demarcation of the general act of "cleaning up the Manila Bay" has become blurred,
so much so that the Court now engages in the slippery slope of overseeing technical
details.
In Sps. Abaga v. Sps. Panes16 the Court said:
From the foregoing Rule, there are two situations when a writ of mandamus may
issue: (1) when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which the other is entitled. The "duty" mentioned in the first
situation is a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, requiring the exercise of
judgmentIn short, for mandamus to lie, the duty sought to be compelled to be
performed must be a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, and the petitioner
must show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right.
Discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which
he may decide the question either way and still be right. 17
The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms defined
in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official
duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by
mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. This is the end of any
participation by the Court, if it is authorized to participate at all.
In setting a deadline for the accomplishment of these directives, not only has the
Court provided the means of accomplishing the task required, it has actually gone
beyond the standards set by the law. There is nothing in the Environment Code, the
Administrative Code, or the Constitution which grants this authority to the judiciary.
It is already settled that, "If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide when and how the duty shall be performed, such duty is not
ministerial."18
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,19 the Court ruled that,

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to

perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to
control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required
to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
The Constitution does not authorize the courts to "monitor" the execution of their
decisions.
It is an oft-repeated rule that the Court has no power to issue advisory opinions,
much less "directives" requiring progress reports from the parties respecting the
execution of its decisions. The requirements of "actual case or controversy" and
"justiciability" have long been established in order to limit the exercise of judicial
review. While its dedication to the implementation of the fallo in G.R. 171947-48 is
admirable, the Courts power cannot spill over to actual encroachment upon both
the "control" and police powers of the State under the guise of a "continuing
mandamus."
In G.R. 171947-48, the Court said: "Under what other judicial discipline describes as
continuing mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue
directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to
naught by administrative inaction or indifference."
Needless to say, the "continuing mandamus" in this case runs counter to principles
of "actual case or controversy" and other requisites for judicial review. In fact, the
Supreme Court is in danger of acting as a "super-administrator" 20 the scenario
presently unfolding in India where the supposed remedy originated. There the
remedy was first used in Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India, 21 a public
interest case for corruption filed against high-level officials. Since then, the remedy
has been applied to environmental cases as an oversight and control power by
which the Supreme Court of India has created committees (i.e. the Environment
Pollution Authority and the Central Empowered Committee in forest cases) and
allowed these committees to act as the policing agencies. 22 But the most significant
judicial intervention in this regard was the series of orders promulgated by the Court
in T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India.23
Although the Writ Petition filed by Godavarman was an attempt to seek directions
from the Court regarding curbing the illegal felling of trees, the Supreme Court went
further to make policy determinations in an attempt to improve the countrys
forests. The Court Order suspending felling of trees that did not adhere to state
government working plans resulted in effectively freezing the countrys timber
industry. The Supreme Court completely banned tree felling in certain north-eastern
states to any part of the country. The courts role was even more pronounced in its
later directions. While maintaining the ban on felling of trees in the seven northeast
states, the court directed the state governments to gather, process, sell, and
otherwise manage the already felled timber in the manner its specified the Supreme
Court became the supervisor of all forest issues, ranging from controlling, pricing
and transport of timber to management of forest revenue, as well as
implementation of its orders.24

Thus, while it was originally intended to assert public rights in the face of
government inaction and neglect, the remedy is now facing serious criticism as it
has spiraled out of control.25 In fact, even Justice J. S. Verma, who penned the
majority opinion in Vineet Narain in which continuing mandamus first made its
appearance, subsequently pronounced that "judicial activism should be neither
judicial ad hocism nor judicial tyranny." 26 Justice B.N. Srikrishna observed that
judges now seem to want to engage themselves with boundless enthusiasm in
complex socio-economic issues raising myriads of facts and ideological issues that
cannot be managed by "judicially manageable standards." 27 Even Former Chief
Justice A. S. Anand, a known defender of judicial activism, has warned against the
tendency towards "judicial adventurism," reiterating the principle that "the role of
the judge is that of a referee. I can blow my judicial whistle when the ball goes out
of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the players
how to play."28
Unless our own Supreme Court learns to curb its excesses and apply to this case the
standards for judicial review it has developed over the years and applied to co-equal
branches, the scenario in India could very well play out in the Philippines. The Court
must try to maintain a healthy balance between the departments, precisely as the
Constitution mandates, by delineating its "deft strokes and bold lines," 29 ever so
conscious of the requirements of actual case and controversy. While, admittedly,
there are certain flaws in the operation and implementation of the laws, the
judiciary cannot take the initiative to compensate for such perceived inaction.
The Court stated in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: 30
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement
can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as
judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not
according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day
Hence, "over nothing but cases and controversies can courts exercise jurisdiction,
and it is to make the exercise of that jurisdiction effective that they are allowed to
pass upon constitutional questions." 31 Admirable though the sentiments of the Court
may be, it must act within jurisdictional limits. These limits are founded upon the
traditional requirement of a cause of action: "the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another."32 In constitutional cases, for every writ or remedy, there
must be a clear pronouncement of the corresponding right which has been
infringed. Only then can there surface that "clear concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests." 33
Unfortunately, the Court fails to distinguish between a pronouncement on violation
of rights on one hand, and non-performance of duties vis--vis operational
instructions, on the other. Moreover, it also dabbles in an interpretation of
constitutional rights in a manner that is dangerously pre-emptive of legally available
remedies.

The "continuing mandamus" palpably overlaps with the power of congressional

oversight.
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions,
but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
This provision pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of
which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Macalintal
v. Comelec34 discussed the scope of congressional oversight in full. Oversight refers
to the power of the legislative department to check, monitor and ensure that the
laws it has enacted are enforced:
The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of
legislation. Concomitant with its principal power to legislate is the
auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully executed. As
well stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of substantive
policy and is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it
establishes the volume and purpose of public expenditures and ensures their
legality and propriety; it must be satisfied that internal administrative controls are
operating to secure economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the conditions of
administration of remedial measure.

Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress:

(a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine
whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.

Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the
administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority
delegated to them.
Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the
oversight power connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of
Congress regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. Because
the power to legislate includes the power to ensure that the laws are enforced, this

monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution to the legislature. In cases
of executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts cannot justify the use of
"continuing mandamus," as it would by its very definition overlap with the
monitoring power under congressional oversight. The Resolution does not only
encroach upon the general supervisory function of the Executive, it also diminished
and arrogated unto itself the power of congressional oversight.
Conclusion
This Court cannot nobly defend the environmental rights of generations of Filipinos
enshrined in the Constitution while in the same breath eroding the foundations of
that very instrument from which it draws its power. While the remedy of "continuing
mandamus" has evolved out of a Third World jurisdiction similar to ours, we cannot
overstep the boundaries laid down by the rule of law. Otherwise, this Court would
rush recklessly beyond the delimitations precisely put in place to safeguard
excesses of power. The tribunal, considered by many citizens as the last guardian of
fundamental rights, would then resemble nothing more than an idol with feet of
clay: strong in appearance, but weak in foundation.
The Court becomes a conscience by acting to remind us of limitation on power,
even judicial power, and the interrelation of good purposes with good means.
Morality is not an end dissociated from means. There is a morality of morality, which
respects the limitation of office and the fallibility of the human mindself-limitation
is the first mark of the master. That, too is part of the role of the conscience. 35
The majority Resolution would, at the same time, cast the light of scrutiny more
harshly on judicial action in which the Courts timely exercise of its powers is called
for as in the cases of prisoners languishing in jail whose cases await speedy
resolution by this Court. There would then be nothing to stop the executive and the
legislative departments from considering as fair game the judiciarys own
accountability in its clearly delineated department.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, Supreme Court of India,"Judicial Review Judicial

Activism Need for Caution," in Soli Sorabjees Law and Justice: An
Anthology, Universal Law Publishing Company, (2003), at 377. Also in Justice
A.S. Anand, Millenium Law Lecture Series, Thursday, October 21, 1999, Kochi,
Kerala, available at http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17
November 2010)
2

"In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the
primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development,

and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec.
19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to
fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for
the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the
earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with
concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its
indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code
of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG,
in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty
to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall
direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited
to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las
Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor
rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed
by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be
found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying
establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water,
and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros,
and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and
other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to
provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste
water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts
and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install,
operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is
ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is
also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,

Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized

methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP
Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in
coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA
8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent
marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is
ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and
projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro
Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built
in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the PasigMarikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting
waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the
rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga,
Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies,
shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater
into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1)
year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also
ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate
criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA
9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing
laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA
9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all
licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the

treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be noncomplying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary
facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation
clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56
of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention,
waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the
school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance
of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and
healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine
archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the
General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the
water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA,
and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall,
from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this
Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED."
3

E.O. 292, Book II, Chapter 3, Sec. 11; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 1.

E.O. 292, Book III, Chapter 1, Sec. 1; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 17.

G.R. No. 166052, 29 August 2007, 531 SCRA 583.

E.O. 379 and 364 were promulgated, placing the Presidential Commission
for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as an attached agency
under the Department of Agrarian Reform.
7

E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 2, Sec 3.

G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 141.

1987 Constitution, Art. 2 on State Policies.

10

E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 6, Sec. 25.

11

E.O 292, Book 2, Chapter 1, Sec 1(8).

12

C.J. Reynato S. Puno, Separate Concurring Opinion, Macalintal v. Comelec,

G.R. No .157013, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.
13

United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co., 567 F 2d 121 (1977), citing J.
Brandeis, Separate Dissenting Opinion, Myers v. United States, US 52 293, 47
(1926).
14

P. 12, MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 15

December 2008, 574 SCRA 661.
15

Id. at 9.

16

G.R. No. 147044, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 56, 62- 63.

17

Asuncion v. De Yriarte, 28 Phil 67.

18

Meralco Securities v. Savellano, L-36748, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 804.

19

G.R. No. 162243, 29 November 2006, 508 SCRA 498.

20

A term used by Manu Nair, correspondent of The International Environment

News, describing the Supreme Court of India in the Forest Conservation Case.
Available
athttp://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/environment/
nairreportjune05.pdf. (visited 17 November 2010)
21

1996 SC (2) 199 JT 1996 (1) 708 1996 SCALE (1) SP 31.

22

Rajeev Davan, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of India, Judicial

Excessivism, available at
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/judicialexcessivism. (visited
17 November 2010)
23

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 267.

24

Supra note 20 at page 2.

25

Abhaykumar Dilip Ostwal, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of

India, Judicial Activism and Self-Restraint, available at
http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17 November 2010)
26

Justice J.S. Verma, "Judicial activism should be neither judicial ad hocism

nor judicial tyranny", as published in The Indian Express, 06th April 2007
(http://www.indianexpress.com).

27

Justice B.N. Srikrishna, "Skinning a Cat" (2005) 8 SCC (J) 3.

28

Supra note 1.

29

A phrase used by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.

130 (1936).
30

G.R. No. 115525, 25 August 1994, 435 SCRA 630, holding that judicial
inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution have been observed, is
precluded by the principle of separation of powers.
31

Vicente V. Mendoza, "The Nature and Function of Judicial Review," 31 IBP

Journal 1 (2005).
32

Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 2.

33

United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1968).

34

Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No .157013, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.

35

Paul Freund, quoting Justice Brandeis, in Law and Justice 36 (1968).