Recommended Security Guidelines

Recommended
Security Guidelines
for Airport Planning,
Design and Construction
Revised:
June 2001
DOT/FAA/AR-00/52
Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security
Office of Civil Aviation Security
Policy and Planning
Federal Aviation Administration
Washington, DC 20591
TECHNICAL REPORT
DOCUMENTATION PAGE
2. Government Accession No.
1. Report No.
3. Recipients Catalog No.
DOT/FAA/AR-00/52
4. Title and Subtitle
5. Report Date
Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning,

Design and Construction
June 2001
6. Performing Organization Code
AAR-510
7. Author(s)
8. Performing Organization Record No.
Richard Lazarick, Robert Cammaroto

9. Performing Organization Name and Address
10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

William J. Hughes Technical Center
Building 315
Atlantic City International Airport, NJ 08405
11. Contract or Grant No.
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Recommendations & Guidelines

U.S. Department of Transportation
800 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20591
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
ACP-100
15. Supplementary Notes
Prepared in cooperation with a broad-based committee.

16. Abstract
This report was developed under the auspices of the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning,
and the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ. This supercedes the 1993 document
DOT/FAA/CS-93-1 Recommended Security Guidelines for New Airport Construction and Major Renovations,
and is intended to provide airport architects, planners, designers and engineers with guidelines and
recommendations that address numerous changes in aviation security concepts, technology, threat environment and
operational requirements which have occurred in recent years.
It has long been recognized that most airports in the United States were built prior to the development of today's
extensive security regulations, and that their designs have often proven to be incongruent with many basic security
requirements. This document has been developed to assist in the design of security-based requirements at the
earliest possible stages of planning. It features checklists useful to the airport operator, designer and engineer, and
to the FAA prior to the approval of security construction plans.
The recommendations contained in this document have been developed by a Committee of more than 100 persons
and organizations with broad technical expertise from FAA, airports, aircraft operators, consultants, architects,
engineers, fire code officials, law enforcement organizations, government agencies such as FBI, INS, and Customs,
private corporate volunteers and industry trade associations such as the Airport Consultants Council, Airports
Council International, American Association of Airport Executives, and Regional Airline Association, among
others. The recommendations reflect the Committees best judgment not only on the current emphasis on the need
to identify critical security requirements and to incorporate them prior to and during the planning and design of
new or expanded airport facilities, but also their best cumulative judgment as to the short and long term
development of regulatory requirements which will have an extensive effect on how security technology and
design will evolve and how they will be applied in the airport's operational environment.
17. Key Words
18. Distribution Statement
Security Design Construction Guidelines

Airport
Design
Recommendations
Airport planner Security
Engineering
Planning
Architect
Open
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified
Unclassified
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)
21. No. of Pages
22. Price
192
Reproduction of completed page authorized
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Recommended Security Guidelines for
Airport Planning, Design and Construction
June 2001
i
THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK
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ii

NOTICE
NOTICE
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of
Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government
assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
This document does not contain regulatory language. It is not intended to suggest that any recommendations or
guidelines contained herein might be considered as mandatory requirements to be imposed upon airports or airlines,
nor are these recommendations and guidelines intended to suggest any specific or general criteria to be met in order
to qualify for Federal funding. There are recommendations and guidelines contained in this document that might be
considered highly beneficial in one airport environment while being virtually impossible to implement at another
airport. The purpose of the document is to provide as extensive a list of options, ideas, and suggestions as possible
for the airport architect, designer, planner and engineer to choose from when first considering the security
requirements in the early planning and design of new or renovated airport facilities.
This document provides numerous references to and citations from other government and industry sources. These
are not intended to be modified by this document in any way, and are generally intended to refer to the most current
version of such external resources, to which the reader should go for detailed information.
This document is also available in electronic/digital format. The electronic version contains an extensive array of
hypertext links throughout, cross-referencing the reader among various inter-related sections and concepts. To
obtain a copy of the document in electronic form, please contact the security coordinator at:
Airport Consultants Council (ACC):
703-683-5900
Airports Council International (ACI):
202-293-8500
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE):
703-824-0500
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iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This document is intended to bring to the attention of the airport planning, design, and engineering community the
serious security concerns which must be considered for incorporation into an airport design at the earliest possible
planning stage, in order to bring the most efficient and cost-effective security solutions to bear. An undertaking as
extensive and comprehensive as this document requires the participation and cooperation of a wide range of aviation
security professionals, contributing their time, experience, knowledge and insight so that those who follow may
learn from the experiences of the past and anticipate the needs of the future.
There were over 100 persons who attended meetings and participated in document reviews. A few chaired
subcommittees which drafted entire new sections, most participants rewrote outdated material, submitted technical
documents, edited drafts, and brought real-world perspectives to the table, advising the Committee on ideas that
would, and would not, work in an operating airport environment. This document is not intended to be the final
definitive word on airport security design; it is meant to be used first as a primer on the security issues important to
airport design, and then as a check-list of some of the more important things one must consider when deciding
which of the many concepts offered are appropriate to their design and to the airport's requirements.
We wish to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of all the participating organizations and persons listed below.
Special thanks also go to:
Rick Lazarick of the FAA Technical Center, who saw the need for such a document and made it happen;
Bob Cammaroto of FAA Security who kept the Committee's efforts consistent with the FAA's regulations and
longterm security goals;
Art Kosatka of FAA who chaired the meetings and provided oversight for the compilation of the various submittals;
Suzanne Guzik of CTI Consulting who did the great bulk of the real work in editing and restructuring the document
several times as it evolved, as well as providing her extensive professional security expertise, and to
Theresa Coutu of Invision Technologies and
Michael Patrick of TAMS and Leo A. Daly, both Subcommittee Chairs who took on enormous burdens in providing
two key sections of the document in the Checked Baggage section and the Security Screening Point sections,
respectively. Their respective Subcommittee members provided a wealth of insight and knowledge from both
operational and academic points of view, without which this document would be incomplete.
Ruthanne Stoll
Sam Brunetti
Lance Nuckolls
Bill Dunn
Paula Bline Hochstetler
Bonnie Wilson
Glenn Orthmann
Frank Sterling
Duane McGray
Jerry Wright
Patti Higganbotham
Mr. Jean Morrison
Jack Bullard
Craig Williams
Armen DerHohannesian
Kenneth Cox
Charlie Whidden
John MacDonald
Doug Laird
Donald Poldy
Michael Williams
Charles Flood
ADT Security Services

ADT Security Services
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Assn
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Assn
Airport Consultants Council
Airports Council Int'l-NA
Airports Council Int'l-NA
Airport Integrated Systems
Apt Law Enforcement Agency Net
Air Line Pilots Assn
Air Transport Association
America West Airlines
American Airlines
Amer. Assn of Airport Execs
A. DerHohannesian & Assoc. LLC
Austin-Bergstrom Int'l Airport
Austin-Bergstrom Int'l Airport
Barnstable Airport
BGI-International
Big Sky, Inc.
Big Sky, Inc.
BWI Int'l Airport
Marty Tasker
Kim LaForge
Michael R. Beairsto
Suzanne Guzik, Vice-Chair
Jack Plaxe
Robin Tredwell
Tom Day
Brent Henry
Alvy J. Dodson
Tom Shehan
Rick Burdette
Don Cotton
Bob Cammaroto
Art Kosatka, Chairman
Dennis Hupp
Karl Shrum
Quinten Johnson
Rebecca Tuttle
Frank Capello
Shirley R. Edwards
Ron Polillo
Ed Ocker
Cage Inc
Cape Air
CTI Consulting
CTI Consulting
CTI Consulting
CTI Consulting
Dade Aviation Consultants
Dade Aviation Consultants
Dallas Ft Worth Int'l Airport
Dallas Ft Worth Int'l Airport
FAA ACP-400
FAA ACP-100
FAA ACP-100
FAA ACP-100
FAA ACP-9
FAA ACP-100
FAA ACP-2
FAA ACP-100
FAA FSM Miami
FAA Safety and Health
FAA - SEIPT
FAA - SEIPT
______________________________________________________________________________________________
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v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Rick Lazarick
Paul Polski
Beverly Wright
Alex Kerr
Barbara Churchill
Dirk Herberz
Charles Chambers
Parker McClellan
Jim Sheppard
Lee Tillotson
Richard Duncan
Robert Cline Jr.
Scott Hyde
Marion White
Murray Cooper
Brian Krafthefer
Bob Hutnick
Paul Rodgers
Michael Fufidio
Theresa Coutu
Rick Muntz
Vince Staten
Warren Kroeppel
Michael Patrick
Michael Gearhart
Richard DeNeufville
Joe Lawless
Steve Koranda
Vincent Caponi
Mark Torbeck
Jo Edblom
Duane McGray
Tom Jensen
Jay Dombrowski
Jim Carter
FAA Tech Center AAR-510

FAA Tech Center R & D
Fed. Bureau of Investigation
Federal Express Corp.
Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood Apt
Ft. Lauderdale Hollywood Apt
Global Aviation Associates
Greater Orlando Aviation Auth
Hartsfield Atlanta Int'l Airport
HKS Inc
HTNB
HOK
Honeywell Technology Center
Honeywell Technology
Immig. & Naturalization Svc
Immig & Naturalization Svc
Intellikey
InVision Technologies, Inc.
InVision Technologies, Inc.
Jackson Municipal Apt Auth
LaGuardia Int'l Airport
Leo A. Daly Architects
Lockwood-Greene
Massachusetts Inst of Tech
Massachusetts Port Authority
Matrix Systems
Metropolitan Washington Apt Auth
Midway Airlines
Minneapolis/St. Paul Airport
Nashville Int'l Airport
National Safe Skies Alliance
Northwest Airlines
Piedmont Triad Int'l Airport
Al Graser
Nancy Johnson
Michael Brant
Joseph Duquette
Vollie Fields
Deborah McElroy
Michael Spitzer
Mark Brewer
Dan McAteer
Christer Wilkinson
Ray Blackwell
Charles Blood
Richard A. Ottele
P. Clancy
M. Moran
Lou Kirk
Brian Nasky
Archie Lind
Larry Smith
Michael Patrick
Eric Miller
Cenk Tunasar
Thomas O'Sullivan
Michael Rodriguez
Jeff Dunaway
Bob Baker
John Spencer
Pam Zaresk
Sharan Sharp
Glenn P. Johnson, Jr.
Robert Monetti
Mike Ellenbogen
Port Authority NY & NJ

Port Authority NY & NJ
Portland Int'l Airport
Raytheon
Raytheon
Regional Airline Assoc.
Reynolds, Smith & Hills, Inc
RIAC
Ross & Baruzzini
Ross & Baruzzini
Schiff & Associates
Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Airport
Sextant Technologies
Sunland Engineering
Swanson Rink
Tampa Int'l Airport
TAMS Consultants, Inc.
TransSolutions
TransSolutions
Tucson Airport Authority
Turner Associates
United Parcel Service
URS Greiner
URS Greiner
U.S. Customs
U.S. Dept of Transportation
Victims of PanAm 103
Victims of PanAm 103
Vivid Technologies
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I - OVERVIEW
Section A - Introduction............................................................................................................ 1
Section B - Applicability ........................................................................................................... 1
Section C - Purpose ................................................................................................................... 2
Section D - Background ............................................................................................................ 3
Section E - Coordination........................................................................................................... 3
Section F Changing Security Concerns and Contingency Measures................................. 4
PART II - INITIAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Section A - General.................................................................................................................... 5
Section B - Facility Protection .................................................................................................. 6
Section C - Planning Facility Protection.................................................................................. 6
1. Protection Criteria...........................................................................................................................................6
2. Physical Protection ..........................................................................................................................................6
3. Crime Prevention.............................................................................................................................................6
4. Recordkeeping .................................................................................................................................................7
5. Delegations of Responsibility ..........................................................................................................................7
6. Design Factors..................................................................................................................................................7
7. Seismic Requirements .....................................................................................................................................7
PART III - RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

Section A - Airport Layout and Boundaries ........................................................................... 9
1. General Layout ................................................................................................................................................9
a. Airside/Landside/Terminal Descriptions .......................................................................................................9
b. Airside/Landside/Terminal Security Requirements.......................................................................................9
c. Airside/Landside/Terminal Locations..........................................................................................................10
2. Security Areas ................................................................................................................................................11
a. Descriptions .................................................................................................................................................11
1) AOA ........................................................................................................................................................11
2) SIDA .......................................................................................................................................................11
3) Secured Area ...........................................................................................................................................11
4) Sterile Area..............................................................................................................................................11
5) Exclusive Use Area .................................................................................................................................11
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6) Tenant Security Program Area ................................................................................................................11

b. Security Requirements.................................................................................................................................12
c. Locations......................................................................................................................................................12
3. Vulnerable Areas (General)..........................................................................................................................13
4. Chemical and Biological Agents ...................................................................................................................15
5. Boundaries and Access Points ......................................................................................................................16
a. Physical Barriers ..........................................................................................................................................16
1) Fencing....................................................................................................................................................16
2) Buildings .................................................................................................................................................17
3) Walls .......................................................................................................................................................17
b. Electronic Boundaries..................................................................................................................................18
c. Natural Barriers............................................................................................................................................18
d. Access Points...............................................................................................................................................18
1) Gates........................................................................................................................................................18
2) Doors.......................................................................................................................................................19
3) Guard Stations .........................................................................................................................................20
4) Electronic Access Points .........................................................................................................................20
a) Automatic Gates ..................................................................................................................................20
b) Doors with Access Controls ................................................................................................................20
c) Sensor Line Gates................................................................................................................................21
d). Automated Portals ..............................................................................................................................21
e. Other Security Measures..............................................................................................................................21
1) Fencing Clear Areas ................................................................................................................................21
2) Security Lighting.....................................................................................................................................21
3) Locks .......................................................................................................................................................22
4) CCTV Coverage......................................................................................................................................22
5) Signage....................................................................................................................................................22
6. Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement ............................................................................................24
a. Aircraft Maintenance Facilities....................................................................................................................24
b. Aircraft Overnight Parking Area .................................................................................................................24
c. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Facilities...................................................................................24
d. Security Operations Center (SOC)/Airport Emergency Command Post (CP).............................................24
e. Airport Personnel Offices ............................................................................................................................25
f. Belly Freight Facility ...................................................................................................................................25
g. Cargo Area...................................................................................................................................................25
h. FAA Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and Offices ..........................................................................26
i. Fuel Area ......................................................................................................................................................26
j. General Aviation (GA) Area ........................................................................................................................26
k. Ground Service Equipment Maintenance (GSEM) Facility ........................................................................26
l. Ground Transportation Staging Area............................................................................................................26
m. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations ...................................................................................................26
n. In-Flight Catering Facility ...........................................................................................................................26
1) Catering Screening ..................................................................................................................................27
2) Catering Vehicles ....................................................................................................................................27
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3) Catering Personnel Badging ....................................................................................................................27

o. Intermodal Transportation Area...................................................................................................................27
p. Military Facilities ........................................................................................................................................27
q. Navigational & Communications Equipment..............................................................................................27
r. Rental Car Facilities .....................................................................................................................................28
s. State/Government Aircraft Facilities ...........................................................................................................28
t. Utilities and Related Equipment...................................................................................................................28
Section B - Airside ................................................................................................................... 30

1. Aircraft Movement and Parking Areas .......................................................................................................30
a. Aircraft Movement Areas ............................................................................................................................30
b. Passenger Loading/Unloading Aircraft Parking Areas ................................................................................30
c. Passenger Aircraft Overnight Parking Areas ...............................................................................................30
d. General Aviation (GA) Parking Area ..........................................................................................................30
e. Isolated/Security Parking Position ...............................................................................................................31
2. Airside Roads .................................................................................................................................................31
3. Airside Vulnerable Areas & Protection.......................................................................................................31
Section C - Landside................................................................................................................ 33
1. Landside Roads..............................................................................................................................................33
2. Landside Parking...........................................................................................................................................33
a. Terminal Patron Parking ..............................................................................................................................33
b. Employee Parking........................................................................................................................................34
3. Landside Vulnerable Areas ..........................................................................................................................34
4. Landside Facilities .........................................................................................................................................34
a. Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA) .............................................................................................34
b. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations ....................................................................................................34
c. Intermodal Transportation Area...................................................................................................................35
d. Rental Car Storage Areas.............................................................................................................................35
5. Off-Airport Emergency Response ................................................................................................................35
Section D - Terminal ............................................................................................................... 37

1. Sterile Area.....................................................................................................................................................37
2. Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP)......................................................................................................38
a. General Issues ..............................................................................................................................................39
b. Regulations and Guidelines .........................................................................................................................39
c. Essential Coordination .................................................................................................................................40
1) FAA.........................................................................................................................................................40
2) Airports ...................................................................................................................................................40
3) Aircraft Operators ...................................................................................................................................41
4) Local Community....................................................................................................................................41
d. Planning Considerations ..............................................................................................................................41
1) Level and Type of Risk ...........................................................................................................................42
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2) Operational Types ...................................................................................................................................42

3) Location of SSCPs ..................................................................................................................................43
4) SSCP Size................................................................................................................................................45
5) Integrated Terminal Planning ..................................................................................................................46
6) Future Changes in Operational Type.......................................................................................................46
e. Components of the SSCP.............................................................................................................................46
1) Enplaning Direction ................................................................................................................................47
a) Queuing Space.....................................................................................................................................47
b) Metal Detector.....................................................................................................................................47
c) Bin Pass Through ................................................................................................................................49
d) X-Ray Machine ...................................................................................................................................49
e) Personal Item Retrieval Area...............................................................................................................51
f) Bag Hand-Search Area.........................................................................................................................51
g) Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) Equipment ...................................................................................52
h) Personal Search Area ..........................................................................................................................52
i) Barriers.................................................................................................................................................52
j) Supervisors Area.................................................................................................................................53
k) Private Search Room ...........................................................................................................................53
l) Special Security Room .........................................................................................................................53
m) Personnel Private Areas .....................................................................................................................53
n) CCTV ..................................................................................................................................................53
o) Data Connections ................................................................................................................................53
p) Disabled Accessibility Clearances, Codes, and Courtesy ...................................................................54
q) Wheelchair Path ..................................................................................................................................54
r) Luggage Cart Path................................................................................................................................54
s) Concessions Goods Path......................................................................................................................54
t) Length of Response Corridor ...............................................................................................................54
2) Deplaning Direction ................................................................................................................................54
a) Travel Lane..........................................................................................................................................54
b) Security Guard Station ........................................................................................................................55
c) Exit Lane Breach Detection and Control Devices ...............................................................................55
d) CCTV ..................................................................................................................................................55
e) Integrated Systems...............................................................................................................................55
3) Components Under Development ...........................................................................................................56
a) Personal Explosives Trace Detection Arch .........................................................................................56
b) Bulk Explosives Detectors ..................................................................................................................56
c) Multidetection Tunnel .........................................................................................................................56
d) Supervisor Command Center ..............................................................................................................57
e) Remote Screening Room .....................................................................................................................57
f) Prescreening Preparation Instruction Zone ..........................................................................................57
h) Limited Application Explosives Trace Detectors................................................................................57
4) Designing for the Future..........................................................................................................................57
5) Argus .......................................................................................................................................................57
f. Personnel and Operations at the SSCP .........................................................................................................58
1) Space Needs for Equipment Operators....................................................................................................58
2) Layouts for Operational Efficiency .........................................................................................................58
3) Designing for the Process........................................................................................................................59
4) Architectural Design to Support Intuitive Processes ...............................................................................59
5) Signage....................................................................................................................................................59
6) Space for Personal Belongings................................................................................................................59
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g. SSCP Calculations .......................................................................................................................................59

1) Planning Passenger Volume....................................................................................................................60
a) Typical Peak Hour Passengers (TPHP) ...............................................................................................61
b) Busy Day/Peak Hour (BD/PH)............................................................................................................61
c) Standard Busy Rate (SBR) ..................................................................................................................62
d) Busy Hour Rate (BHR) .......................................................................................................................62
2) Calculations.............................................................................................................................................62
a) Demand Parameters.............................................................................................................................62
b) SSCP Parameters.................................................................................................................................62
c) The Effect of Demand Scale Factor r ..................................................................................................63
3) Number of Checkpoints Centralized (General Configuration).............................................................64
4) Number of Checkpoints Centralized (X-Ray + Metal Detector) ..........................................................64
5) Number of Checkpoints Holdroom (X-Ray + Metal Detector) ............................................................65
6) Queue Size ..............................................................................................................................................66
7) Other Research ........................................................................................................................................67
h. Typical SSCP Layouts.................................................................................................................................67
i. Checkpoint Technical Details.......................................................................................................................74
1) Site Preparation for Metal Detectors .......................................................................................................74
2) Site Preparation for X-ray Sustems .........................................................................................................75
j. SSCP Blast Protection ..................................................................................................................................75
3. Public Areas ...................................................................................................................................................78
a. Public Lobby Areas .....................................................................................................................................78
b. Public Emergency Exits...............................................................................................................................78
c. Security Doors vs. Fire Doors......................................................................................................................79
d. Concessions Areas .......................................................................................................................................79
e. Public Lockers .............................................................................................................................................80
f. Left Luggage Facilities.................................................................................................................................81
g. VIP Lounges/Hospitality Suites...................................................................................................................81
h. Observations Decks .....................................................................................................................................81
i. Vertical Access.............................................................................................................................................81
4. Nonpublic Areas ............................................................................................................................................83
a. Service Corridors, Stairwells and Vertical Circulation ................................................................................83
b. Airport Personnel Offices ............................................................................................................................83
c. Tenant Spaces ..............................................................................................................................................84
d. Law Enforcement and Public Safety Areas .................................................................................................84
1) Public Safety or Police Offices................................................................................................................84
2) Law Enforcement Parking.......................................................................................................................85
3) Remote Law Enforcement/Public Safety Posts/Areas.............................................................................85
4) Other Considerations...............................................................................................................................85
e. Explosives Detection Canine (K-9) Teams and Facilities............................................................................85
f. Security Operations Center (SOC) ...............................................................................................................86
g. Airport Emergency Command Post (CP) ....................................................................................................87
1) Location...................................................................................................................................................87
2) Space Needs ............................................................................................................................................87
3) Other Considerations...............................................................................................................................87
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h. Family Assistance Center ............................................................................................................................87

i. Federal Inspection Services Areas................................................................................................................88
1) Introduction .............................................................................................................................................88
2) Important Notice .....................................................................................................................................88
3) Applicable Laws and Regulations ...........................................................................................................89
j. Loading Dock & Delivery Areas..................................................................................................................89
5. Checked Baggage Make-Up Rooms & Systems ..........................................................................................92
a. Future Direction of Checked Baggage Screening ........................................................................................92
b. Philosophy ...................................................................................................................................................92
c. Applicable Regulations................................................................................................................................93
d. Concept of Operations .................................................................................................................................93
e. Critical Design Factor Peak Bag Flow......................................................................................................93
f. Explosives Containment...............................................................................................................................94
g. Checked Baggage Handling Security Options.............................................................................................95
1) EDS Equipment.......................................................................................................................................95
2) Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM) ..................................................................................................95
3) Physical Search .......................................................................................................................................95
h. Equipment Positioning and Installation Options .........................................................................................96
1) Stand-Alone.............................................................................................................................................96
2) Inline .......................................................................................................................................................96
a) EDS Equipment ...................................................................................................................................96
b) Choice of Inline Configuration............................................................................................................97
c) Exit-End Integrated .............................................................................................................................97
d) Fully Integrated ...................................................................................................................................97
i. Maximizing Inline Throughput and System Efficiency with Design .........................................................102
1) Maximizing Automation .......................................................................................................................102
2) Decision Holding Point .........................................................................................................................102
3) Baggage Handling Specifications..........................................................................................................102
4) Multitasking the Operator .....................................................................................................................102
j. Additional Checked Baggage Considerations ............................................................................................102
1) Engineering & Design Considerations ..................................................................................................102
a) Floor Loading ....................................................................................................................................102
b) Environment ......................................................................................................................................103
c) Maintenance ......................................................................................................................................103
d) Power.................................................................................................................................................103
e) Communications................................................................................................................................103
f) Baggage Search Areas .......................................................................................................................103
g) Operator Positioning .........................................................................................................................103
h) Need for Contingency Plans/Redundancy.........................................................................................103
i) Installation..........................................................................................................................................103
2) Other Possible EDS Impacts on BHS....................................................................................................104
3) Keeping Bags Sterile .............................................................................................................................104
k. Curbside Baggage Check-In Terminal Frontage ....................................................................................104
l. Remote Baggage Check-In .........................................................................................................................105
6. Terminal Vulnerable Areas & Protection .................................................................................................108
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Section E - Architecture ........................................................................................................ 109

1. Physical Boundaries ....................................................................................................................................109
2. Bomb/Blast Analysis....................................................................................................................................109
3. Limited Concealment Areas/Structures ....................................................................................................109
4. Operational Pathways .................................................................................................................................110
5. Minimal Number of Access Points .............................................................................................................110
6. Space for Expanded, Additional and Contingency Measures..................................................................111
Section F - Access Control and Alarm Monitoring Systems (ACAMS) ........................... 112
1. Power ............................................................................................................................................................112
2. Data and Communications..........................................................................................................................112
3. Security System Infrastructure ..................................................................................................................112
a. Limited Grouping ......................................................................................................................................112
b. Maintenance Accessibility.........................................................................................................................112
4. Design, Procedures and Personnel .............................................................................................................113
a. Choice of Equipment .................................................................................................................................113
b. Equipment Placement ................................................................................................................................113
1) Terminal ................................................................................................................................................113
2) Site ........................................................................................................................................................113
c. Procedures and Personnel ..........................................................................................................................113
Section G - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems .................................................... 115

1. Power ............................................................................................................................................................115
2. Data...............................................................................................................................................................115
3. CCTV System Infrastructure .....................................................................................................................115
4. Design, Procedures and Personnel .............................................................................................................115
a. Choice of Equipment .................................................................................................................................115
b. Equipment Placement ................................................................................................................................116
1) Terminal ................................................................................................................................................116
2) Site ........................................................................................................................................................116
c. Procedures and Personnel ..........................................................................................................................116
Section H - Power, Communications & Cabling Infrastructure....................................... 117

1. Power ............................................................................................................................................................117
2. Data, Communications & Information Systems .......................................................................................117
3. Cabling Infrastructure Systems& Management .......................................................................................117
a. Cabling Infrastructure Systems..................................................................................................................118
b. Cabling Management.................................................................................................................................118
4. Security of Airport Networks .....................................................................................................................118
a. Network Availability .................................................................................................................................119
b. Network Security.......................................................................................................................................119
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c. Network Accessibility................................................................................................................................119
d. Information Storage Availability ...............................................................................................................119
5. Future Rough-Ins/Preparations .................................................................................................................120
6. Telecom Rooms ............................................................................................................................................120
7. Radio Frequency (RF).................................................................................................................................120
a. Environmental Considerations...................................................................................................................120
1) Electromagnetic Environment ...............................................................................................................120
2) Physical Environment ...........................................................................................................................120
b. Regulations ................................................................................................................................................121
c. Installation Considerations.........................................................................................................................121
d. Communications........................................................................................................................................121
e. Other Considerations .................................................................................................................................121
f. Wireless LANS ..........................................................................................................................................122
g. Considerations Related to the Use of RFID Devices for Security .............................................................122
1) Antenna Pointing and Equipment Placement ........................................................................................122
2) Choke Effects Integral to Construction .................................................................................................122
3) Other Lessons Learned..........................................................................................................................123
8. Information Assurance for Airport (Re)Construction .............................................................................123
a. Threats .......................................................................................................................................................123
b. Features of Assured Information ...............................................................................................................123
c. Techniques to Provide Information Assurance ..........................................................................................123
1) Privacy...................................................................................................................................................123
2) Authentication .......................................................................................................................................124
3) Integrity .................................................................................................................................................124
4) Scalability..............................................................................................................................................124
5) Availability............................................................................................................................................124
d. Data Transport Vulnerabilities ..................................................................................................................124
Section I - Beyond Our Borders: Aviation Security Design in the U.K............................ 127
1. Roads ............................................................................................................................................................127
2. Car Parks (Parking Lots)............................................................................................................................127
3. Blast Effects..................................................................................................................................................127
4. Lighting ........................................................................................................................................................128
5. Space Requirements of the Passenger Search Area..................................................................................128
6. Screening Office Accommodation ..............................................................................................................129
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART IV - APPENDICES
Appendix A - Airport Vulnerability Assessment Model An Introduction
Appendix B - Airport Security Flow Modeling
Appendix C - Blast Analysis and Mitigation Model An Introduction
Appendix D - Checklists of Key Points from Each Section
Appendix E - Glossary
Appendix F - Bibliography
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PART I
OVERVIEW
PART I
OVERVIEW
Section A - Introduction
This document presents recommendations for incorporating sound security considerations into the planning, design,
construction, and modification of airport terminal buildings and other security-related airport facilities. It consolidates
information developed through the participation of Federal Aviation Administration, government, and aviation industry
professionals, and incorporates a wealth of knowledge. This knowledge was gained through the recent experiences of a
broad range of aviation security programs and projects at numerous United States airports, and through the continuing
efforts of government and industry to develop improved approaches to incorporating cost-effective security features
into the early planning and design of airport facilities. The information is presented here in a single document, which
may be revised and updated periodically as regulations, security requirements, and technology change.
Section B - Applicability
These guidelines are provided for consideration by aviation user-agencies (airport operators, aircraft operators, airport
tenants) as well as airport planners, designers, architects, engineers and consultants engaged in airport facility planning,
design or construction projects, but the reader must be aware that these recommendations may not represent the only
approaches available. Recommendations included in this document are intended to bring a wide range of security
considerations to the attention of those persons planning and designing projects both at existing and new airports. Some
of the recommendations contained in these guidelines will have broad application at many diverse airport facilities,
while others will only apply to a limited number of airports, facilities or security situations. All airport planning, design
and construction projects, whether having security-specific components, equipment or features or not, should be
reviewed against these guidelines for applicable considerations and coordination since any airport projects successful
conclusion will affect current and future physical and procedural security requirements.
Certain portions of this document will also outline many of the procedural aspects necessary to the operational
process being described, extending well beyond the proposed design and construction concepts. These are integrated
here with the express purpose of acting as a brief tutorial in an area otherwise little known to the designer/architect.
It is very important to understand the complexities of the entire process and the alternatives they offer to the
operator, and thus to the designer, before a design can appropriately accommodate the space allocation, queuing,
equipment, power, and communications requirements, and other such needs. It is further hoped that this document
will serve to facilitate meaningful discussion between the designers, the airport and the aircraft operators, to help
them to know and understand the terms, concepts and needs, and to apply the information in a cost-effective manner
to meet the requirements of each unique site and situation.
Section I-B Applicability Checklist
Airports
New
Existing
Expanding
Users
Airport Operators
Aircraft Operators
Airport Tenants
Planners
Designers
Architects
Engineers
Consultants
Projects
Planning
Design
Construction
Renovation
Assessment
Facilities
Terminals
Cargo/Freight
Police/Fire
Maintenance
Catering
Tenant and Other On-Airport Facilities
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PART I
OVERVIEW
Section C - Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide early guidance to those responsible for and affected by the planning and
design of airport facilities. Use of this document at the start of the airport planning and design process will help to
ensure that security needs are adequately considered. More importantly, this document contains checklists to ensure
the coordination, consideration and inclusion of security features in an efficient and effective manner. Security features
that have been factored into initial airport facility design are more likely to be cost-effective, better integrated and more
operationally useful than those superimposed on existing structures through add-ons or change orders. Likewise,
security features which have been coordinated early in the planning and design process with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and other appropriate regulatory bodies, as well as with airport tenants (aircraft operators,
catering, concessions) and end-users (law enforcement, public safety and regulatory agencies, and airport operations
and maintenance personnel) will likely be more well-received and accepted, and thus more widely used and successful.
The guidelines attempt to identify key security concerns and concepts that should be factored into the planning and
design of airport facilities. Essential considerations include the need to:
1. Restrict access to the Air Operations Area (AOA), Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) and secured areas,
which are defined in U.S. CFR 14 Part 107 (hereinafter referred to as Federal Aviation Regulation 107, or FAR 107);
2. Control the flow of people from landside to airside and from airside to landside;
3. Provide for efficient security screening of persons and property into sterile areas as described in U.S. CFR 14
Part 108, (hereinafter referred to as Federal Aviation Regulation 108, or FAR 108); including consideration for
queuing space during peak loads;
4. Separate critical areas;
5. Protect vulnerable areas and assets;
6. Protect aircraft, people, and property;
7. Address blast mitigation measures;
8. Provide adequate space for checked baggage Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) and devices;
9. Provide adequate space for trace detection equipment at screening points;
10. Provide adequate space for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations such as robots and threat containment
vessels.
The guidelines identify specific airport areas requiring special attention in the planning process, and are intended to
result in systems that will not hamper operations, cause undue economic burdens, or turn airports into armed
fortresses. At the same time, the guidelines must not be interpreted to mandate specific requirements to be met by
any airports. There are numerous solutions to any one physical security problem, and the architects, planners, and
designers are urged to examine and consider all potential avenues before selecting the solution that best addresses
their airports needs in a responsive and cost-effective manner.
Users of these guidelines are reminded that the application of physical security equipment and structures (barriers, access
control, screening and detection equipment) is fully effective only if augmented and supported by similarly effective
human procedures. These include ID systems, challenge procedures, personnel security training and procedures,
maintenance training and procedures, as well as constant oversight and vigilance. Appropriate early coordination during
planning and design with airport law enforcement agencies, fire code officials, building code officials, model code
officials, operations and maintenance personnel, and other end-users must occur for effective and efficient airport security.
This document recognizes that no security system is foolproof, and the guidelines include several recommendations
on ways of minimizing injury and damage in the event of a successful criminal or terrorist attack.
Section I-C Purpose Checklist
Identify Key Concerns & Concepts in order to:
Restrict access to the AOA, SIDA & secured
areas
Control the flow of people
Provide efficient security screening
Separate critical areas
Protect vulnerable areas & assets

Protect aircraft, people & property
Address blast mitigation measures
Provide space for EDS & trace devices
Provide space for EOD operations
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PART I
OVERVIEW
Section D - Background
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (PL 101-604) mandated that the FAA work with the aviation
industry to develop guidelines for airport design and construction to allow for maximum-security enhancement. This
legislation was influenced by recommendations made by the Presidents Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism and recognizes that the designs of many existing airport structures frequently do not accommodate the
application of appropriate security measures.
A careful review of the prevalent threat environment and consideration of minimum applicable standards prior to
finalization of plans will help to determine an airports most appropriate security posture. Such a review may also
help to reduce a later reliance upon labor-intensive procedures and equipment. Inclusion of airport security expertise
early in the planning process will result in a better-coordinated and more cost effective approach to security.
There are numerous advantages to incorporating security concerns into the airport planning and design at the earliest
phases. Timely consideration of such needs is almost guaranteed to result in cost effective, less obtrusive, and more
efficient security systems. Such systems are less likely to engender passenger complaints or employee resistance.
Proper planning can also result in reduced manpower requirements and consequential reductions in airport and
aircraft operator overhead expenses.
Newly available technological tools such as vulnerability/risk analysis and bomb blast analysis programs can reduce
guesswork and minimize certain expenditures in new structures. (See Appendix A and Appendix C)
Section E - Coordination
For new construction or extensive renovation, airport facility planners and designers should encourage the early
involvement of Airport Security Committee and/or consortium members. These include the affected aircraft
operators and tenants, fire code officials, building code officials, and local FAA civil aviation security and other
regulatory officials. Their role is to assist planners and designers to factor the appropriate security and safety
perspective into designs for immediate security concerns and to accommodate anticipated long-term expansion and
regulatory changes where possible. Early security-oriented reviews of design plans can alert project managers to
potential integrated security approaches, which are highly effective as well as operationally and economically
suitable. Local security officials can also assist planners by providing current assessments of the local security
environment. These assessments should focus on prevalent sources of threat, past history of criminal/violent
activities likely to impact airport security, and could include recommended countermeasures.
Careful attention must be given to coordination with the regulatory requirements found in FAR 107, FAR 108, and
FAR 109, and the sometimes-overlapping areas of control and managerial jurisdiction spelled out in the respective
airports Airport Security Program (ASP).
Careful consideration should be given to the needs of law enforcement, security, and safety support personnel during
airport facility planning, design, or renovation. Planners and designers are urged to coordinate with local and federal
law enforcement and life safety agencies, K-9 and EOD response elements, and, where relevant, local
representatives of Federal Inspection Service (FIS) agencies.
The specific needs of FIS facilities (Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service, Public Health Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service) are addressed in Guidelines for Federal Inspection
Facilities at Airports. At the time of publication of this document, the FIS agencies anticipate publication of an entirely
new series of security guidelines and recommendations to supersede their existing 1994 document. The reader should refer
to the most current FIS Guidelines when accommodating those agencies requirements in an airport design. For related
information contained within this document, see the Federal Inspection Services Areas section on page 88.
Section I-E Coordination Checklist
Get the early involvement of Airport Security Committee
Assure FAR and ASP requirements are met
Consider the needs of law enforcement, security and safety support personnel
Reference Guidelines for Federal Inspection Facilities at Airports where FIS areas are involved
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PART I
OVERVIEW
Section F - Changing Security Concerns and Contingency Measures

Airport planners and designers are also strongly encouraged to consider the potential impact changing security
concerns and security and safety contingency measures can have on airport facility design. Planners and designers
should consult with airport security coordinators, aircraft operators, and FAA security representatives to ensure
designs facilitate the implementation of local airport and aircraft operator contingency measure requirements.
The FAA created the Aviation Security (AVSEC) Contingency Measures at the outset of the Gulf War in the early
1990's, and further amended their provisions a few years later. Intended to provide airport operators and aircraft
operators with reasonable expectations as to anticipated threat, they have not been amended since that time, up to
and including the mid-CY 2001 publication of this document.
The publication of this security guidelines document roughly coincides with the FAAs issuance of an entirely
rewritten series of aviation security regulations [FAR 107 and 108], revised and upgraded to reflect many of the
changing security concerns of industry over the past 10 years. However, changes to contingency measures as local
and individual responses to specific threat information cannot be anticipated except as a review of past history.
Consequently, this FAA/security industry committee expects that these security construction guidelines reflect the
substance of those rewritten regulations.
This committee believes the issuance of the revised regulations and the development of updated contingency
measures will provide the industry with a milestone to revisit the language of this document to assure that it remains
consistent with evolving FAA requirements.
Section I-F - Security Concerns & Contingency Measures Checklist
Consider potential impact of contingency measures and emergency plans
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PART II
INITIAL PLANNING AND
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
PART II
INITIAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Section A - General
Planning for security should be an integral part of any project undertaken at an airport. The most efficient and costeffective method of instituting security measures into any facility or operation is through advance planning and
continuous monitoring throughout the project. Selecting, constructing, or modifying a facility without considering
the security implications of the general public and airport personnel can result in costly modifications and delays.
Physical security programs should be administered based on applicable federal, state, and local regulations and
policies to ensure the protection of the general public, airport personnel, and assets (including information systems).
At a minimum, a physical security program should include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
A physical security survey to evaluate the security of an existing airport or a comprehensive security prospectus
evaluating a new facility or site;
Periodic inspections to ascertain whether a security program and its implementation meet pertinent federal,
state, and local standards or regulations;
A comprehensive and continuing security awareness and education effort to gain the interest and support of
employees, contractors, consultants, and visitors; and
Implementing procedures for taking immediate, positive and orderly action to safeguard life and property
during an emergency.
Once a project has been identified, the airports planning and design team may consider consulting experts in the
field of civil aviation security. Such expertise is available from several sources, including FAA, professional
associations and private consultants. The team should coordinate with the appropriate federal, state and local
security personnel. The coordination should continue through the contracting process, actual construction,
installation and training. Appropriate personnel should be provided with all pertinent information, including
timelines, status reports and points of contact.
To ensure there is a systematic approach to acquiring and analyzing the information necessary to support decisionmakers in the protection of assets and the allocation of security resources, all security specialists should refer to the
applicable federal, state, and local requirements and standards referenced in this guide.
Section II-A General Checklist
Advance Planning
Continuous Monitoring
Physical Security Program
Physical security survey
Periodic inspections
Continuing security awareness/education
Emergency procedures
Consult with Experts in Aviation

Coordinate with Security/Regulatory Personnel
Refer to Regulatory Requirements & Standards
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PART II
Section B - Facility Protection

The extent of facility protection should be examined by the local security consortium based on the results of a
comprehensive security prospectus of the new facility or security survey of the existing facility to be renovated.
High priority should be placed on protection of the aircraft from the unlawful introduction of weapons, explosives,
or other threatening articles.
Perimeter protection (fences, gates, patrol) is the first line of defense in providing physical security for personnel,
property, and information at a facility.
The second line of defense, and perhaps the most important, is interior controls (e.g., access control, checkpoints).
The monetary value and criticality of the items and areas to be protected, the vulnerability of the facility, and the
cost of the controls necessary to reduce that vulnerability will determine the extent of interior controls.
The cost of security controls normally should not exceed the monetary value of the item or areas to be protected,
unless necessitated by criticality, continuity of operations, or national security. In the case of protecting aircraft and
passengers, the criticality is generally more than sufficient to justify reasonable and well-designed security systems.
Section II-B - Facility Protection Checklist
Security Consortium Review
Perimeter Protection First Line
Interior Controls Second Line

Cost Analysis
Section C - Planning Facility Protection

The objective of planning facility protection is to ensure both the integrity and continuity of operations and the
security of assets.
1.
Protection Criteria
The security consortium at the airport may offer recommendations on the level of normal protective service on a
case-by-case basis and consider the following:
a. Facility location, size, and configuration;
b. Known threat(s) specific to the airport and/or to the airlines serving it;
c. History of criminal or disruptive incidents in the area surrounding the facility, but not primarily directed
toward airport operations;
d. Extent of exterior lighting;
e. Presence of physical barriers; and
f. Other locally determined pertinent factors, such as general aviation (GA), commercial operations, etc.
2.
Physical Protection
Airports and aircraft operators provide normal and special protection through a combination of: mobile patrol or
fixed posts staffed by police or other security officers, or contract uniformed personnel; security systems and
devices; lockable building entrances and gates during other than normal hours of occupancy; and cooperation of
local law enforcement agencies. The degree of normal and special protection is determined by completion of a
physical security survey and crime prevention assessment, and/or by use of one of several vulnerability
assessment models, such as the one referenced in Appendix A.
3.
Crime Prevention
The local police department collects and disseminates information about criminal activity on or against property
under the control of the airport, provides crime prevention information programs to occupant and federal
agencies upon request, and conducts crime prevention assessments in cooperation with appropriate law
enforcement agencies.
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PART II
4.
Recordkeeping
In addition to physical protection and other protection and prevention criteria, airports may also have a need for
keeping records of incidents, personnel access, or other activities. Some of the records (such as personnel
access) may need to be maintained automatically and/or electronically. In such cases, these recordkeeping needs
may affect designs and equipment locations as well as require considerations for secure data storage and should
be coordinated early in the design process.
5.
Delegations of Responsibility
At facilities where the airport (via an FAA-approved ASP required under FAR 107) has delegated protection
authority for a designated portion of the facility to a tenant or aircraft operator, virtually all protection
responsibilities may be transferred to the tenant or aircraft operator, including procurement, installation,
maintenance of physical security equipment and systems, and procurement and management of any guard
contracts. Normally, the airport will retain responsibility for law enforcement, monitoring of alarms, requests
for criminal investigations, and fire and facility safety and health inspections. This type of agreement between
airport and aircraft operator is known as an exclusive use area agreement, or in the case of other airport
tenants, a tenant security program. There may also be Letters of Understanding among nearby jurisdictions to
provide assistance to each other during emergencies, but typically these are simply promises to give aid, not
delegations of authority.
6.
Design Factors
It is imperative that security systems and procedures are considered from the design phase on, so that conduit
runs and system wiring, rough-ins, heavy-duty materials, reinforcing devices, and other necessary construction
requirements are provided in the original plans.
7.
Seismic Requirements
This section provides information referencing various state and federal legislation addressing seismic safety.
While much seismic engineering and mitigation guidance exists in the form of state and local codes, directives
and ordinances, these requirements focus only on acts that are currently in effect, not those being proposed for
future planning and design needs.
The existence of these laws does not necessarily indicate that they fully meet their intent, or that they
necessarily accomplish their objectives. Some are considered more or less effective than others, and even some
weaker ones may be enforced to a greater extent than others. Architects, Engineers and Contractors should
refer to further resources for information or expert opinion about the appropriateness and effectiveness of any
specific seismic requirement as it affects their airport design. It is also important to note that the burden of
conformance may rest solely on the Architect, Engineer and Contractor and to remember that the guidelines and
regulations supporting the implementation of individual acts often contain the most important detail.
In recent years enforcement of the earthquake protection requirements in the Model Codes for nonstructural
building components has also become commonplace. Model Codes provide for nonstructural, infrastructure
elements of the building design, such as electrical enclosures, control consoles, conduits, cable trays, etc.
Architects, Engineers and Contractors are relied upon to know, understand, design and install earthquake
protection in accordance with the requirements of these Codes.
It is important to note that all of the Seismic Laws and the Executive Orders apply to virtually all new
construction that is federally owned, leased or regulated or other new construction that receives federal
financial assistance through loans, loan guarantees, grants or federal mortgage insurance. Additionally,
several states require seismic mitigation in the design of all projects.
When designing a project, it is important to meet the federal, state and local code and standard elements
applicable to the project location. Although the following list is not intended to be comprehensive and
complete, as an aid to the designer, the FAA recommends that the following sources of information be checked
to determine the requirements to be applied.
1) Public Laws 95-124 and 101-614 "The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 as Amended"
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June 2001
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PART II
2) Executive Order 12699 of January 5, 1990 "Seismic Safety of Federal and Federally Assisted or
Regulated New Building Construction"
3) Executive Order 12941 of December 1, 1994 "Seismic Safety of Existing Federally Owned or Leased
Buildings"
4) ICBO (International Conference of Building Officials) "Uniform Building Code," 1994, and
amendments to include the 1994 NFPA-13 Standard for Building Fire Sprinkler Systems
5) BOCA (Building Officials Code Authority) "National Building Code"
6) SBCCI (Southern Building Code Congress International) "Standard Building Code"
7) Section 13080 of the Corps of Engineers Guide Specifications with Fire sprinkler Sections 15330,
15331, and 15332 revised in March 1995 to unequivocally require seismic bracing on the small
diameter piping.
8) Various State Building Codes, e.g., California, Washington, Alaska, Missouri, New York, etc., which
may require mitigation elements in addition to the national standards.
Section II-C - Planning Facility Protection Checklist
Ensure Integrity & Continuity of Operations
Ensure the Security of Assets & Facilities
Protection Criteria
Facility Location, Size & Configuration
Known Threats
History of Incidents
Amount of Lighting
Presence of Physical Barriers
Local Pertinent Factors
Physical Protection
Mobile Patrols
Guard Stations
Security Systems
Lockable Access Points
Local Law Enforcement Support
Crime Prevention
Recordkeeping
Exclusive Use Area Agreements
Tenant Security Programs
Letters of Understanding
Design Factors
Conduit Runs
Architectural Conflicts
Wiring Requirements
Heavy-load Equipment
Effects on Passenger Flow
Construction Equipment Needs
Large-size Material Delivery
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PART III
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
PART III
Section A - Airport Layout and Boundaries
The first step in the integration of security into airport planning, design or major renovation is the analysis and
determination of the airports general security requirements, layout and boundaries. These decisions are critical to
the efficient, safe and secure operation of an airport. While existing airports may not have great leeway in
redesigning the general layout, adjustments to the location or type of boundaries for security areas may be beneficial
and easily rolled into adjacent construction projects. Periodic review of an airports boundary system and locations
are recommended to assure that the airports needs are met, particularly since aviation security needs, requirements
and surrounding environments are frequently changing.
1.
General Layout
The general layout of an airport consists of three (3) major areas generally referred to in the industry as Airside,
Landside, and Terminal. While the terminal area generally lies on the boundary of the airside and landside (as
may other buildings), due to the nature of its use and the special requirements that apply to airport terminals, it
is best treated for security purposes as an area of its own.
a.
Descriptions:
1) Airside The airside of an airport is defined as the nonpublic portion where aircraft operations occur.
Typically, the airside is separated from other areas of the airport by fencing or other boundaries and
includes runways, taxiways, aprons, aircraft parking and staging areas and most facilities which service
and maintain aircraft. For operational, geographic, safety, or security reasons, other facilities may be
located within the airside as well. The airside generally includes areas to which certain security
requirements apply under FAR 107; e.g., the AOA, SIDA and secured areas.
2) Landside The landside of an airport is defined as the remainder of the airport property not considered
airside. Typically, the landside is outside of the airside fence or other boundaries and includes all
public areas. Facilities which are always located landside include patron and other public parking
areas, terminal and public access roadways, rental car facilities, taxi and ground transportation staging
areas, and any on-airport hotel facilities.
3) Terminal An airport terminal is defined as the building where the processing of commercial
passengers and boarding of the aircraft occurs. Larger airports or those with general aviation areas
often have more than one terminal. For purposes of this document, the term terminal typically refers
to that main building or group of buildings where the boarding of public, scheduled commercial
aircraft occurs or from which persons who have passed through a security screening process will
proceed to boarding facilities located elsewhere on the airside. When considering FAA mandated
security provisions, it is important for planners and designers to differentiate the commercial terminal
from the general aviation terminal where charter and private passenger activity typically occurs.
b.
Security Requirements
Each major area of the airport (airside, landside, terminal) has its own special requirements.
Airside/landside requirements and operational parameters should be carefully considered when planning
and designing a new airport or facility. Not only the requirements, but also the barrier and boundary
measures which must delineate airside from landside, may have major effects on the facilitys efficiency,
employee and public accessibility, and overall aesthetics.
It is internationally recognized that maintaining the integrity of airside/landside boundaries plays a critical
role in reducing unauthorized access to, attacks on, or the introduction of dangerous devices aboard,
passenger aircraft. Effective airside security relies heavily on the integrated application of physical barriers,
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PART III
identification and access control systems, surveillance or detection equipment, the implementation of
security procedures, and efficient use of resources.
Most U.S. airports were built prior to the implementation of a 1989 amendment to the Federal Aviation
Regulations FAR 107 (then FAR 107.14, now FAR 107.201) requiring access control systems capable of
controlling access to critical secured airside areas. Planners and designers are urged to carefully consider
the operational impact that the design of airside and public/landside areas have.
1) Airside - The airside, by nature, must be nonpublic in order to maintain proper commercial aviation
security. Further information on those security requirements is contained in the Security Areas section
on page 11. In addition, for the airport to obtain certifications required for operations, the airside must
be able to maintain required operational clear areas, have adequate emergency response routes and
response times, and have in place required safety measures. For further information on these
operational design requirements, contact the local FAA Airports District or Regional Office.
2) Landside - The landside, since it is does not typically directly affect the operation of aircraft, has less
stringent security requirements than the airside. However, some clear area and communication
requirements may still affect landside design and layout, such as airside fence/boundary clear areas,
aircraft approach glide slopes, communications and navigational equipment locations and noninterference areas, and heightened security clear areas in the terminal area. Further information on
these requirements and their effects on the landside are contained in the Security Areas section on page
11. In addition to these airside requirements, the landside in general must meet the local jurisdictions
standards for public safety and security, which may result in special security requirements that will
interface with the airports overall security and fire safety system.
3) Terminal - The terminal is typically the one area of the airport with the most security, safety, and
operational requirements. Many of these requirements are closely tied to the location of Security Areas
within and in close proximity to the terminal. In addition, since the terminal usually straddles the
boundary between airside and landside, it must also meet those requirements of each respective area.
c.
Locations
1) Airside By definition, the airside is located on the aircraft side of the fencing or other barrier separating
it from the public. However, the choices as to where this fencing or barrier may be located due to the
surrounding environment are sometimes the most critical decisions in designing or renovating an airport.
Aside from the determining factors involved in Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement on page 24,
the following factors should be considered when determining airside boundaries and orientation:
a) Dangerous or hazardous areas that could affect the safety or security of a parked or moving aircraft;
b) Concealed/overgrown areas that could allow persons or objects to be hidden that might endanger
aircraft or critical airport systems;
c) Adjacent facilities having their own unique security concerns and provisions, e.g., correctional,
military or other facilities that could affect or be affected by the proximity of airside operations;
d) Natural features, large metal structures/buildings or electronics facilities that might affect ground
or aircraft communications or navigational systems; (Reduced or limited communications can
endanger not only aircraft and airport personnel safety, but also limit security response capabilities
and information availability during emergency as well as routine situations.)
e) Adjacent schools, parks or community facilities that might affect or be affected by the proximity
of aircraft and the related safety and security concerns. (While certainly safety concerns exist, the
increased possibility of airside penetrations and/or vandalism is a security concern.)
2) Landside Since landside includes all non-airside areas, location is determined by the airside
boundary. Within landside, factors affecting the location of facilities are discussed in Facilities, Areas
and Geographical Placement on page 24.
3) Terminal The terminal should be located centrally on the airport site when possible. This not only
provides for efficient aircraft access to most runways and facilities, but can benefit terminal security as
well. A centralized terminal buffers the terminal from outside-airport threats and security risks due to
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10

PART III
distance. A fundamental concept in security planning, distance provides the flexibility for the airport
operator to put in place systems, measures or procedures which will detect, delay, and allow for a
response to meaningful penetration. In addition, a centralized terminal can also minimize the
communications interference that might be caused by adjacent, non-airport facilities.
Section III-A-1 General Layout Checklist
Analysis of General Security Requirements
Airside
Nonpublic
Maintain airside/landside boundaries
Maintain security clear areas
Adequate emergency response routes
Required safety measures & clearances
Landside
Public safety & security
2.
Terminal
Maintain public/nonpublic boundaries
Maintain security area boundaries
Meet required security regulations
Personnel safety & security
Security & Safety Considerations
Separate dangerous or hazardous areas
Minimize concealed/overgrown areas
Effects on/by adjacent facilities
Natural features that might allow access
Prevent communications interference due to
natural features, buildings & equipment
Public safety & security concerns
Security Areas
The ASP required under FAR 107 will contain specific descriptions of the following specific areas; they are
described below to acquaint the reader with the general differences between them.
a.
Descriptions:
1) Air Operations Area (AOA) - That portion of the airport designed and used for landing, taking off or
surface maneuvering of aircraft, and adjacent areas, but not including SIDAs or secured areas.
2) The Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) - Those areas of the airport, sometimes smaller than
the AOA and often focused near the terminal and the passenger aircraft boarding facilities, which
generally require more stringent security provisions than the AOA. Display of airport-issued identity
badges is required in this area, as well as detailed employment histories and other checks of individuals
who have unescorted access to the area.
3) Secured Area that portion of an airport identified in the FAA-approved airport security program in
which the most definitive levels of access control and security training are required under FAR
107.201. Generally, this area includes a portion of the landside, and encompasses the passenger
handling facilities at and around the passenger terminal. An airport may have several unconnected
secured areas, which may include baggage makeup areas, movement areas, safety areas, etc.
4) Sterile Area That area of an airport, generally within the terminal, to which access in controlled by
the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security program. It is typically
where passengers wait to board departing aircraft or persons wait to meet arriving aircraft.
5) Exclusive Use Area That part of an AOA for which an aircraft operator has agreed in writing with
the airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility under an approved security program.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Area an arrangement permitted under FAR 107.113. The airport
operator and a tenant (other than an aircraft operator regulated under FAR 108 or 129) may enter
voluntarily into an agreement in which the tenant assumes responsibility for certain requirements under
FAR 107; however, only the airport operator may provide law enforcement support. Under a TSP, the
airport must take on the inspection and compliance role normally performed by the FAA. The FAA, in
turn, will oversee the airports conduct of the program.
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b.
Security Requirements
1) AOA The airport operator is required to control and prevent access to the AOA; control movement
within the AOA; and control unauthorized penetrations of the AOA. FAA regulations do not specify
how to accomplish this, but rather, leave the solution to the local authorities, subject to FAA approval.
2) SIDA Described above, the airport operators have the responsibility to secure these areas and prevent
or respond immediately to access by unauthorized persons and vehicles. SIDAs may lie within AOAs;
a secured area is by definition always a SIDA, in that all SIDA requirements under FAR 107 must be
met within a secured area.
3) Secured area Each such area must independently meet all the requirements placed upon it by the
Airport Security Program, including control of access, challenge procedures, law enforcement officer
(LEO) response, display of ID, etc., particularly where the various secured areas may not enjoy
common boundaries or access points.
4) Sterile Area The aircraft operator must use adequate facilities and procedures to screen persons and
property to prevent or deter the carriage aboard aircraft of any explosive, incendiary, or deadly or
dangerous weapon on or about each individuals person or accessible property. In addition, the aircraft
operator must prevent or deter the carriage of any explosive or incendiary in any checked baggage
brought into the sterile area.
5) Exclusive Use Area The area in which the responsible signatory aircraft operator must perform
security control requirements as listed for the airport operator. The aircraft operator, not the airport,
may control access, and movement within that exclusive area. Specific requirements and conditions
must appear in the FAA-approved written agreement between the airport operator and the aircraft
operator.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Area The tenant must enter into a written agreement with the airport
and the FAA, subject to a tenant-area-specific security program approved by FAA that states the
security systems, measures or procedures to be provided in that area. The tenant may not assume
responsibility for law enforcement support, and his agreement must be exclusive to one tenant, not
shared among several tenants.
c.
Locations
1) AOA
In most cases, it is advantageous to align the AOA boundary with that of other boundaries or physical
barriers. Typically, the location of the AOA is a major portion of the area within the fence or other
barrier that defines the airside/landside boundary of the airport. Exceptions to this may occur when
electronic or natural barriers such as rivers are being used to delineate boundaries. Since the AOA is
required to have a distinct, securable boundary line, see the section on Boundaries on page 16 for more
information.
When allocating AOA space, and since the AOA requires less specific security measures than SIDAs
or secured areas, consider the security and cost benefits that will result from locating general aviation,
cargo facilities, maintenance, and other facilities outside those critical areas, and instead locating them
in the AOA. This will facilitate implementation and may reduce the cost of access control and
ID/badging measures for such areas. Locating most nonterminal areas outside of the SIDA may also
reduce the amount of man-hours needed for badge issuance, background checks, security training and
badge revalidations. Further discussion on Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement is included on
page 24.
2) SIDA
In general, SIDA layouts should be held to the smallest manageable size as would provide the level of
protection sought for the area or facility. It is the area that requires the greatest continuous procedural
attention from employees, and should therefore limit the number of access points to the extent
possible.
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3) Secured Area
Although this generally includes quite broad portions of the landside and terminal, it is desirable to
locate secured areas contiguously or as close together as possible to maximize use of response
personnel, utilize common areas of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance coverage, and
minimize requirements for redundant boundaries and electronic access controls. Where there are
several unconnected secured areas - baggage makeup areas, movement areas, safety areas, etc. - each
may require separate but integrated electronic controls.
4) Sterile Area
Similarly, sterile areas, like any other controlled area, require by definition that there be physical,
financial and manpower resources dedicated to providing that control. Therefore, they, too, should be
held to an operational minimum so that appropriate surveillance and control resources can be
concentrated where necessary, rather than dissipated throughout less security-related sites. Sterile areas
may also include various revenue generating facilities, particularly concessions, which may be
impacted by periods of heightened threat. Consequently, designers and planners should allow
flexibility within sterile areas such that the added security measures during those times will have the
least possible negative impact.
5) Exclusive Use Areas
As described earlier, the exclusive use area is the result of a written agreement between the aircraft
operator, airport and approved by FAA that delineates very specific areas for which the operator agrees
to assume many of the airports security responsibilities. Therefore, the same caveat would apply in
their ability to maintain appropriate levels of security by keeping the area to be monitored and
controlled to an operational minimum.
6) Tenant Security Program (TSP) Areas
Where tenants other than air carriers elect to undertake their own security program under FAR 107,
such areas should be constrained to the tenants immediate boundaries and sphere of influence, and
should accommodate security requirements for contiguous boundaries with other tenants and/or the
airport and airlines. The tenant may not assume any responsibility for the terminal.
Section III-A-2 Security Areas Checklist
AOA
Align AOA boundary with fences
SIDA
Part of AOA
Smallest manageable contiguous size
Secured Area
Separate GA, cargo, maintenance, and other
facilities from secured areas
3.
Sterile Area
Minimize size to help surveillance and control
Exclusive Use Area
Minimize areas to be monitored/controlled
Tenant Security Program Areas
Vulnerable Areas (General)

a.
The basic concepts of security risk management dictate that the security system provide the appropriate
level of security to all of the assets to be protected, in light of the perceived threat to these assets.
Therefore, at the facility planning stage it is prudent to consider all of the assets (or targets of a terrorist or
criminal attack), considering their relative value (or consequence of loss). There are many possible high
value assets at an airport to consider, such as: aircraft (with or without passengers); air traffic support
facilities (tower, radar, weather, communications); terminal building, public, employees; fuel storage;
critical infrastructure (power, water, communications) and roadway or vehicle accessways.
b.
One of the fundamental concepts for airport security is the establishment of a boundary between the
public areas and the area controlled for security purposes (such as the AOA, secured areas, SIDA,
tenant security areas and exclusive areas). Since barriers and controls are required to differentiate these
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areas and to limit access to them, this may lead to the assumption that anyone or anything found in the area
is authorized. This suggests a common vulnerability that presumes that once inside the controlled area, an
intruder may expect to move about without encountering additional controls. With access to many of the
valued assets, the intruder may perceive the opportunity to carry out a variety of criminal or terrorist acts.
For example, if an intruder breaches the fence line (considered to be easily and quickly achieved), he would
have no further physical barriers to control access to aircraft, the baggage makeup area (BMA),
maintenance facilities, and other areas. The security measure that is most often depended upon to protect
this situation is the challenge procedure. Other security measures including but not limited to ramp patrols,
CCTV, personnel surveillance or intrusion detection sensors, should be considered.
c.
Other means of achieving unauthorized access exist, such as through emergency exits (for example, from
public side to the secured area) or piggybacking on access controlled doors. New construction designs
should minimize the number of emergency exits that lead to the secured area from public areas. Some fire
codes allow the use of delay egress hardware on emergency exit doors. Where authorized for use by fire or
building code officials, delay egress hardware should be considered for use as a deterrent to discourage
unauthorized, nonemergency use of emergency exit doors. Where necessary, these doors should be
supported by comprehensive surveillance (such as CCTV) on both sides of the door for alarm assessment.
Ideally the airside surveillance would include an intruder tracking capability to allow for directing the
response force. Attentive planning and incorporation of appropriate surveillance or control devices can
significantly improve the identification and control of piggybacking, as well as the deployment and
efficient use of manpower resources to respond to anomalies.
d.
Another area of vulnerability is breach or unauthorized entry into the sterile area. Experiences at several
airports in recent years have resulted in highly publicized, and at times costly and massively inconvenient
security reactions. At the planning stage, breach identification and control can be cost effectively incorporated
into the airport design, whereas retrofit actions are usually difficult, costly and can be aesthetically
undesirable. Any open boundary between the public side and the sterile area is a candidate for breach.
Typically the breach will occur either through the screening checkpoint or via the exit lane (bypassing the
security checkpoint). From the planning and design standpoint, the most significant consideration for
implementing a physical breach control system are: 1) source and location of breach identification alarm
generator; 2) location of physical barriers which respond to the breach alarm; and 3) sufficient separation
distance between 1 & 2 to allow safe and sure closure prior to intruders further penetration which could result
in terminal evacuation. Other concerns such as fire and safety cases must also be considered.
e.
All public access facilities, within which large congregations of people are customary, suffer from a
fundamental vulnerability to terrorist bombing or armed attack. [See Appendix A] This vulnerability can be
reduced significantly at the planning and design stage. For the threat of large vehicle bombs, the primary
blast mitigating consideration is separation distance. This consideration is directly opposed by the
passenger convenience consideration of minimized transit distances. [See charts in Appendix C].
Innovative designs that satisfy both passenger convenience and separation distance for blast mitigation
should be sought, including potential facility design to minimize large congregations of people close to
points of vehicle access or drop-off, or to redirect or otherwise mitigate blast effects.
f.
The threat of an armed attack on the terminal as well as the threat of an abandoned article containing an
explosive device raises attention to another form of vulnerability. As long as there is a public side within the
terminal, where congregations are expected, there are limited means by which a security system can prevent
an attack. To assure that large improvised explosive devices (IED) or terrorists with weapons do not enter the
terminal requires moving the point of screening to the front door. Here again, architects and designers may
seek innovative designs that can accommodate all of the passenger convenience issues, as well as providing
screening of all people and items before entering the terminal (creating a sterile terminal), to significantly
reduce this vulnerability. Many other issues that may not be readily apparent require that a front door
approach be carefully considered in close coordination with aircraft operators, the airport authority, and FAA.
g.
A fundamental vulnerability also exists at any facility using a badge identification system that grants access
privileges to employees and others. These insiders have legitimate needs to access the portions of the airport
controlled for security purposes, and are allowed access to those areas, and in some cases to the workings of
the security system itself. However, threats from insiders, acting alone or in collusion with outsiders, pose a
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criminal and terrorist threat to airports. The need to inspect badged individuals and their possessions as they
cross the security boundary, using their access privileges, may increase in the future. At the planning and
design stage, consideration can be given to consolidate and minimize the number of access points that
employees use to gain access to their work site in the secure area. Provisions for screening equipment at these
locations would enable future inspection capability with significantly less impact. The same locations may
also be considered as sites for inspection of deliveries of commercial goods.
h.
There are numerous areas in and around an airport, its terminal building complex, support facilities, utility
tunnels, public roadways, parking lots, maintenance areas, cargo and general aviation facilities, commercial
and industrial buildings, etc., which while not necessarily seen to be a target of terrorist activity, might still
be in the path of such an attack, or at the very least might be subject to common crime such as theft or
vandalism, and thus might require varying levels of security protection. These may or may not fall under
the jurisdiction or responsibility of the airport, but it is important to look at the entire airport environment,
make those determinations, and bring every affected entity into the early planning discussions, if for no
other gain than to establish early on where the lines of responsibility lie. The airport must also keep careful
records of these determinations, and consider putting those agreements and lines of demarcation in writing,
possibly as conditions of the lease, or into exclusive area or tenant security agreements.
Section III-A-3 Vulnerable Areas Checklist

Vulnerability Assessment (see Appendix A)
Consider all assets, targets, and their relative
value/loss consequence
Aircraft
Communications
Support Facilities
Terminal
Public and Employees
Fuel Areas
Utilities
Roadways and Accessways
Storage Areas
Establish a security boundary between public and
controlled areas
Barriers
Patrols
Surveillance/CCTV
Sensors
4.
Minimize means of unauthorized access

Controls
Emergency Exits
Delays
Piggybacking
Surveillance/CCTV
Plan for breach control measures and procedures
Physical Barriers
Separation Distance
Reduce bombing/armed attack vulnerability
Blast Mitigation
Separation Distance
Minimization of Large Congregations
Placement of Screening Checkpoint
Minimize vulnerability from employees
Minimize numbers of employee access points
Capability for Employee Screening
Consider vulnerability of adjacent areas
Chemical and Biological Agents

At this writing, concerns are being expressed in some quarters about the potential use of nonconventional means
to attack civil aviation. The possibilities for such attacks include the use of chemical or biological agents to
attack persons in an aircraft in flight, as well as in public areas of airports, or persons in areas controlled for
security purposes. Recent events of this type that have given rise to such concerns include biological agent
attacks on persons traveling on the Tokyo subway system in 1995. Incidents such as this demonstrate that while
such attacks are feasible, they are difficult to conduct and offer little promise of a predictable result.
Historically, FAAs focus has been the protection of persons and property aboard aircraft from conventional
methods of attack, e.g., armed hijackings and improvised explosive devices. In direct support of that focus, FAA is
concerned with the security of sterile areas within terminals. In contrast, the design of terminals and cargo
facilities, with intent to mitigate chemical/biological agent lethality, and to facilitate emergency response to such
incidents, is not an area in which the FAA has developed unique expertise. Rather, other federal departments and
agencies have gained greater experience in that arena. These agencies include the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Energy (DOE) for guidance
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relating to response to such incidents. Guidance relating to building design considerations regarding attacks using
chemical or biological agents may also be obtained by contacting these agencies. Local authorities may provide
additional resources or suggest other references. An excellent resource is the National Domestic Preparedness
Office of the Department of Justice, phone (202) 324-9025, e-mail address: ndpo@leo.gov.
Section III-A-4 Chemical & Biological Agent Checklist
Contact Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
Department of Energy (DOE) for guidance.
5.
Boundaries and Access Points

To delineate and adequately protect the AOA, SIDA, and other security areas from unauthorized access it is
important to consider boundary measures such as fencing, walls, or other physical barriers, electronic
boundaries (e.g. sensor lines, alarms), and natural barriers in the planning and design process of an airport.
Access points for personnel and vehicles through the boundary lines, such as gates, doors, guard stations, and
electronically controlled or monitored portals must also be considered. In addition, there are other security
measures which should be part of the design that enhance these boundaries and access points such as clear
zones on both sides of fences, security lighting, locks, CCTV systems and signage. [Note: the term clear zone
regarding clear areas around fences has been a security term for many years, and is not to be confused with the
term which has now become known as the runway protection zone which refers to the clear safety area
beneath the aircraft approach to the runway.]
The choice of an appropriate security boundary design is not only affected by the cost of equipment,
installation, and maintenance, but also by the more important aspects of effectiveness and functionality.
Certainly the highest consideration in an effective boundary measure is its ability to prevent unauthorized
penetration. Thus, any access points though a boundary line must not only be able to prevent access, but
differentiate between an authorized and an unauthorized user. At an airport, access through boundary lines, is
often quite frequent, and must be quick in order to prevent unacceptable delays. In addition, if a boundary
access point is not user-friendly, it may be abused, disregarded, or subverted and thus, pose a security risk and
possible financial liability to the airport.
Regardless of boundary location or type, the number of access points should be minimized for both security and
cost efficiency. Proper planning and design can often create fewer, more functional and maintainable access
points that will benefit the airport in the long run.
Various boundary/barrier and access point types as well as security measures which can enhance them are
described below:
a.
Physical Barriers
Physical barriers can be used to deter and delay the access of unauthorized persons onto nonpublic areas of
airports. These are usually permanent barriers and designed to be an obvious visual barrier as well as a
physical one. They also serve to meet safety requirements in many cases. Where possible, security fencing
or other physical barriers should be aligned with security area boundaries.
1) Fencing
a) For airports, chain link fencing is typically 7 feet of fabric with one additional foot of height
comprised of 3 strands of barbed wire on top, and is normally the most suitable and economic
physical barrier for securing the airside, although this may vary somewhat with airport-specific
conditions and topography. It is also readily available through a large variety of sources and is
easily and cheaply maintained. The fence itself is low-maintenance, provides clear visibility for
security patrols, and is available in varieties that can be installed in almost any environment.
Barbed wire, razor wire and other available toppings increase intrusion difficulty. For locations
with aesthetic concerns, there are also a large variety of decorative yet functional styles available
as well as opaque styles that limit public visibility of service, storage or other nonaesthetic areas.
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b) Fencing is available in several designs that are difficult to climb or cut as well as those which are
provided with motion, tension or other electronic sensing means. For fences with sensors, there are
other elements to the security system for monitoring of the sensors and response to intrusion
alarms. See the Security Operations Center section on page 86
c) When utilizing fencing as a security boundary, care must be taken to ensure that the provision of
fencing does not conflict with the operational requirements of the airport. Access points will need
to be made in the fence to allow the passage of authorized vehicles and persons. While the number
of access points should be kept to a minimum, adequate access points must be planned for routine
operations, maintenance operations, and emergency operations. For further information on fencing
access points see Gates on page 18 or Guard Stations on page 20.
d) To assist in surveillance and security patrol inspection, keep fences as straight and uncomplicated
as possible, this will also minimize installation and maintenance costs.
e) Effectiveness of fencing in critical areas can be improved by anchoring or burying the bottom
edge of the fence fabric to prevent it from being pulled out or up to facilitate unauthorized entry.
Use of concrete mow strips below the fence line and/or burying the bottom of the fence fabric can
also deter tunneling underneath the fence by persons and animals. Mowing strips may also reduce
security and maintenance man-hours and costs.
f) For safety or operational reasons (e.g. presence of navigational systems) some sections of
perimeter fencing may not be able to meet standard security specifications. Special surveillance or
detection measures may need to be applied to improve the safeguarding of these areas.
g) More specific information on fencing materials and installation, including the use of barbed wire
outriggers, is available in FAA Advisory Circular 107-1, Aviation Security Airports; Advisory
Circular 150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities; and
Advisory Circular 150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying Construction of Airports, among others.
2) Buildings
Buildings and other fixed structures may be used as a part of the physical barrier and be incorporated into
a fence line if access control or other measures to restrict unauthorized passage through the buildings or
structures are taken at all points of access. Whether those points are located on the airside or landside
boundaries, or perhaps through the middle of such buildings, may be dependent upon the nature of the
business being conducted inside, and the level of continuous access required by those personnel.
3) Walls
Walls are one of the most common types of physical barriers. Various types of walls are used for
interior security boundary separation as well as exterior. In addition, walls play an important part as
visual barriers and deterrents.
a) Interior Walls
When interior walls are to be used as security barriers, consideration should be made as to not only
the wall type and construction material, but also to the walls height. When possible, security walls
should be full height, reaching not just suspended ceilings, but complete floor to ceiling or slab.
Interior walls may be used as part of the security boundary, with appropriate attention paid to
maintaining the integrity of the boundary and the levels of access control to a degree at least equal
to that of the rest of the boundary.
b) Exterior Walls
While not typically as economically affordable as chain link fencing, the use of exterior walls as
physical barriers and security boundaries is frequently necessary. Walls provide less visibility of
storage or secured areas and can be matched to the surrounding architecture and buildings. In
addition, some varieties of exterior walls are less climbable and thus more secure than security
fencing or other barriers.
Walls of solid materials should not have hand or foot holds that can be used for climbing, and tops
of walls should have barbed wire or other deterrent materials. Blast walls are not necessarily good
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security fences, although appropriate design can aid in incorporating features of both, spreading
the cost over more than one budget.
As in the case of interior walls, exterior building walls may also be used as part of the security
boundary as long as the integrity of the secured area is maintained to at least the level maintained
elsewhere along the boundary.
b.
Electronic Boundaries
In the case of boundaries which are monitored by electronic sensors, motion detectors, infrared sensors,
etc., it is clear that these are intended to serve essentially the same security functions as other detectors, but
are simply employing other technologies, usually with somewhat higher maintenance costs. Typically they
will be used in conjunction with other technologies such as alarms, CCTV, or other reporting and
assessment methods. Nonetheless, there are appropriate places for using such applications, especially where
normal conduit and cabling might be impractical, or where excessive trenching might be required.
c.
Natural Barriers
Natural barriers may include bodies of water, expanses of trees, swampland, dense foliage areas, cliffs, and
other such areas. With FAA approval, natural barriers may be incorporated into the security boundary of an
airport in lieu of standard physical barriers. Use of natural barriers may be necessary or advantageous at
airport in areas that cannot structurally support physical barriers or fencing, or where use of fencing or
physical barriers would cause conflict with aircraft navigation, communications, or runway clear areas
beneath approach paths.
Natural barriers may also include the concept of using time and distance from the terminal or critical
facilities to be protected. Time and distance is the concept that if an unauthorized entry were to occur at
that location, the amount of time, the distance that exists, and the high level of visibility would reduce
significantly the likelihood of the intruder reaching the critical area without detection and/or intervention.
FAA may approve the use of time and distance in lieu of actual physical barriers in many areas, but
generally in conjunction with other complementary security systems, measures or procedures. In addition,
time and distance may be considered as an enhancement to standard physical barriers/boundaries when
those barriers or boundaries are relatively removed from the critical areas they are protecting.
d.
Access Points
Typically there are access points through fencing or other barriers for both vehicles and pedestrians. Access
points through buildings or walls are typically doors. In either case, guard points or electronic means or
controls may be also used. In all cases, the access point type and design may be the determining factor in
the effectiveness of the security boundary and control in that area. So, in all cases, the number of access
points should be minimized and their use and conditions closely monitored.
1) Gates
a) While the number of access points should be kept to a minimum, adequate pedestrian and vehicle
access points must be planned for routine operations, maintenance operations, and emergency
operations.
i) Routine Operations
Routine operations gates at an airport are typically those used by police patrols and response
teams, catering, fuel and belly freight vehicles and tugs, scheduled delivery vehicles, and
ground service equipment and maintenance vehicles.
Most airport gates used for routine operations are typically high-throughput and should be
designed for high-activity and long-life. These gates will take the most wear and tear, and
should be designed to minimize delays to users.
SIDA, secured area, AOA, and other security boundary gates that are high-throughput are the
most likely candidates for automation and electronic access control. See Electronic Access
Points on page 20 for further information.
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ii) Maintenance Operations

Maintenance operations gates at an airport are typically those used by the airport, tenant and
FAA personnel to perform nondaily maintenance to remote grounds or equipment. Typical
maintenance tasks include mowing, utility service, navigational and communications
equipment maintenance.
These gates, unless high-throughput or jointly used for routine operations, are typically nonautomated, nonelectronic.
iii) Emergency Operations
Emergency operations gates are those gates used by on-airport and off-airport fire and police
emergency vehicles to respond to emergency situations, especially those involving an aircraft.
Airport emergency operations gate controls may be remoted to an adjacent or distant
emergency response facility; they are frequently used for mutual aid vehicle access and for
emergency exercises.
Capability for emergency vehicles to crash through frangible mounts of emergency operations
gates, particularly those located near an emergency response facility, should be considered
during the gate design, as should alarms on those gates. Consider special paint markings to
identify the frangibly mounted fence or gate sections to approaching response vehicle drivers.
b) Gates should be constructed and installed to the same or greater standard of security as any
adjacent fencing in order to maintain the integrity of the area.
c) All gates should be equipped so that they can be securely closed and locked should enhanced
security conditions require it. Swing gate hinges should be of the non-liftoff type or provided with
additional welding to prevent the gates from being removed.
d) Security provided by gates can be improved if they are designed and installed with no more than 46 of ground clearance beneath the gate. Where cantilever (slide) and/or rolling gates are used,
consideration should be made during planning and design to curb heights, wheel paths, potential
obstructions and drainage issues throughout the full path of the gate and in its adjacent areas. Proper
drainage grading, planned gaps in curbs, installation of concrete channels or mow strips below the
gate path, and use of bollards to prevent obstructions within the gate path and protect gate equipment
are all design considerations which may prolong the efficient operation of a slide gate.
e) If tailgating entry is a concern at unstaffed vehicle access points, the first response is usually a
procedural one rather than design, since it is the responsibility of the person authorized to use the
gate to be certain tailgating does not occur. However, if a fence design solution is desired, an
automated two-gate system (also known as vehicle entrapment gate) is one method that could help
prevent tailgate entry. Such gates are separated one vehicle length apart and are sequenced so
that the second gate does not open until the first has fully closed. Time-delayed closures are a
viable alternative; sensor arrays have also been used to successfully monitor vehicle movement
and assist in detection of tailgate entries. Tailgating and reverse tailgating (where a vehicle
enters a gate opened by an exiting vehicle) at automated gates may also be reduced by use of a
security equipment layout that provides space for waiting vehicles to stop, which obstructs, or at
least deters other vehicles from passing through. CCTV may deter breaches at those facilities, and
may provide an improved response when breaches occur. Additionally, CCTV may provide a
visual record that can be used to document breaches that become the subject of investigations.
f) More specific information on gate materials and installation is available in FAA Advisory Circular
107-1, Aviation Security Airports; Advisory Circular 150/5360-13, Planning and Design
Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities, and Advisory Circular 150/5370-10, Standards for
Specifying Construction of Airports, among others.
2) Doors
a) To prevent unauthorized access to the airside, doors leading from unsecured areas of the terminal to
the airside, and which are under visual control of authorized personnel, are best kept to a minimum.
Nevertheless, where they are necessary, electronic devices or closely controlled lock and key may
best control these doors. It may, however, be preferable to include the use of electronic control
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devices in order to minimize labor costs and to be able to track personnel using specific doors to the
AOA. The use of the term devices here means CCTV cameras and/or cardreader/pinpads.
b) Unsupervised emergency exit doors providing egress from the terminal to the airside should be
avoided if possible. If essential, these doors should be equipped with audio and visual alarms.
Consider mounting a police-blue lens (to differentiate security from fire alarms), preferably located
on both sides of the door, which can be monitored from a supervised location such as an airport
security control center. Consider the possibility of CCTV cameras on both sides of certain high risk
or high traffic doors. The use of frangible devices or covers over emergency exit activation bars
deters misuse. Some codes allow for special locking arrangements for emergency exits that provide
delays of up to 45 seconds, depending on local fire and life safety codes, as long as reasonable life
safety is assured. Building codes establish specific performance requirements for doors with delay
egress hardware. Each airport must work with local fire and building code officials to determine the
best systems allowable to accommodate both emergency and security needs. See also the Emergency
Exit section on page 78 for information regarding NFPA fire codes on emergency exits.
c) Passenger gates, aircraft loading walkways and other devices used for aircraft loading must be
capable of being locked or otherwise secured in order to prevent unauthorized access to the airside
and parked aircraft.
3) Guard Stations
Manned guard stations to control access into a security area may be necessary at some airports. The
purpose of such guard stations is to provide a point of entry at which personal identification can be
established and persons and vehicles can be permitted to enter according to local security program
requirements.
a) Until security program requirements have been satisfied, such devices as turnstiles, roll gates, or a
remotely operated drop arm barrier gate must be used to impede onward passage through the
guard station.
b) The provision of a sheltered checkpoint station is recommended for gates secured by security
personnel. The shelter can be designed to permit maximum visibility over the immediate area of
the gate and to provide easy access for the guard to carry out the duties of inspecting vehicles and
their contents.
c) Sufficient space should be provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for further inspection
without blocking access for those following. Dependable and instant communications from these
stations to a central location must be installed, maintained, and frequently tested.
d) It is essential to provide communications between any sheltered security checkpoint station and
the airport security services office, as well as to provide a duress alarm by which emergency
assistance may be summoned.
4) Electronic Access Points
a) Automatic Gates
In cases where gates are automated and induction loops are used on the airside side of gates for
free vehicle exit, ensure the loop is located so as to minimize the possibility of objects being
thrown or pushed from the public side to activate the loop. Additional access control measures,
such as microwave, infrared or other vehicle sensors or CCTV monitoring may be desirable in
addition to loops where space is limited or additional security is desired.
Consider means of protecting access control devices (such as card readers or other monitors) serving
exterior vehicle gates to reduce possible physical damage from passing vehicles. Properly placed
curbing, bollards, and highway railing are useful for this purpose. Consider also protection of
equipment from weather elements, including protection from extreme heat or cold inside equipment
enclosures, which can affect the operation of electronic and mechanical components. Heaters and/or
fans are available as standard options for most access control devices, housings and operators.
b) Doors with Access Controls
There are numerous technologies available for controlling access through doors (magnetic stripe,
Weigand, proximity, Smart card, etc.) and there are numerous ways of implementing their use at
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PART III
any kind of doorway wooden doors, glass, metal, single or double doors, roll-up doors, or indeed
at electronic barriers where there is no physical door at all. The designer should take into account
any existing systems the airport might wish to retain and integrate with new systems, and whether
newer advances in technology might suggest a complete or partial replacement of the old systems
in order to provide better security and security management. An extensive discussion of this issue
is found in the RTCA document Recommended Standards for Airport Access Control Systems,
and recent technological advances may provide additional solutions.
c) Sensor Line Gates
Sensor line gates and/or electronic gates function as typical access controlled gates, except that a
sensor line (microwave, infrared, etc.) is used instead of a mechanical barrier. Depending on the
electronic sensor technology used (see the section on Electronic Boundaries on page 18 for further
information), sensor line gates may be comparable in cost to mechanical ones.
The use of sensor line gates is typically the most feasible as a second, interior boundary where
delays due to the mechanical operation of a physical gate are not feasible, where space limited, or
where additional vehicle monitoring is desired. Sensor line gates are most often used to control
vehicle access into a secured area or in cargo or maintenance areas where time is critical.
d) Automated Portals
Automated access portals are designed for high-throughput, performing access control and/or
providing sensing technology in a high-speed, multi-user fashion, yet also providing a positive
means of access denial of unauthorized persons. They typically provide an unobstructed pathway
with the capability of preventing access if multiple or unauthorized persons attempt to enter.
Where these are employed, the delay induced by door opening/closing is eliminated. These portals
are designed to replace high-throughput doors where piggybacking is a concern or to add
additional explosives, drug, or weapon sensing technology to high-throughput areas.
There are also portals and sensing technologies under development that are sensitive to the
direction of the intruders movement, and automatically provide photographs of security violators,
and/or detain unauthorized individuals. As technology advances, the capability and affordability of
automatic portals will increase and should be evaluated for high-throughput and/or special-use
access point locations.
e.
Other Security Measures

1) Fencing Clear Areas
a) Security effectiveness of perimeter fencing is materially improved by the provision of clear areas
on both sides of the fence, particularly in the vicinity of the terminal and any other critical
facilities. Such clearance areas facilitate surveillance and maintenance of fencing and deny cover
to vandals and trespassers.
b) Suggested clear distances range from 10 to 30 feet, within which there should be no climbable
objects, trees, or utility poles abutting the fence line nor areas for stackable crates, pallets, storage
containers, or other materials. Likewise, the parking of vehicles along the fence must also be
prevented. In addition, landscaping within the clear area should be minimized or eliminated to
reduce potential hidden locations for persons, objects, fence damage, and vandalism.
c) There have been cases in which individuals have gained access to passenger aircraft by scaling or
crashing through perimeter fencing. To deter or delay attacks, sufficient distance should be
maintained between the perimeter fencing and aircraft parking areas.
2) Security Lighting
Lighting of the area on both sides of gates and selected areas of fencing is highly recommended. Not
only is lighting beneficial for security inspection, but also to assure fence/gate signage is readable and
that cardreaders, keypads, phones, intercoms, and/or other devices at the gate are visible and usable.
Similarly, sufficient lighting is required for any area in which a CCTV camera is intended to monitor
activity; reduced lighting or sensor activated lighting may be considered in areas which have minimal
traffic throughput in the off-peak hours.
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PART III
3) Locks
Advanced new electronic key technologies should be considered as well as the time-honored deadbolt
lock, built-in door handle lock, or padlock and metallic key to secure a portal, particularly those that
are low-risk, low throughput, or significantly distant from the main areas of concern or from the central
control station. This often also involves other procedural requirements such as a key management
system and the difficulties of recoring at numerous locations and the reissuing of keys when they are
lost or stolen. The most important consideration in such investments in airport equipment is total life
cycle costs, not merely the initial capital cost. This is a concept that should carry over into any
equipment procurement process.
4) CCTV Coverage
a) While gates, like all other access points, should be kept to a minimum and, where physically and
economically feasible, they should be considered for treatment with access control and CCTV
monitoring, it is recognized that certain low-traffic gates, maintenance access points and gates
well removed from the principal areas of security concern may be candidates for greater reliance
on time-and-distance considerations.
b) Further information on CCTV Systems and coverage is contained in the Closed Circuit Television
(CCTV) Systems section on page 115.
5) Signage
a) FAA requires signage on certain security boundaries and access points. Specifics on wording and
size should be found in the local ASP. Signs should be located such that when standing at one
sign, the observer should be able to see the next sign in both directions.
b) The use of signage, even in some non-required locations, provides a deterrent by warning of the
boundary as well as for notification of the consequences for violation.
c) Many locations with access control or CCTV equipment may warrant signage for either
directional or legal purposes (e.g. Alarm will sound if opened, Authorized personnel only,
Notice: All activities in this area are being recorded via CCTV, etc.)
d) While signage for security purposes should be designed to draw attention, it should be coordinated
with other airport signage for style and consistency when possible.
Section III-A-5 Boundaries & Access Points Checklist
Boundary Choice Factors
Equipment Cost
Installation Cost
Maintenance Cost
Effectiveness
Functionality
Physical Barriers
Align with security area boundaries
Fencing
Typically 7 chain link fabric + 1 barbed
wire
Fence designs are available which are
difficult to climb or cut
Motion, tension or other electronic
sensing means available
Allow access points for vehicles and persons
In critical areas, anchor or bury the fence
bottom
Keep lines straight and noncomplex
FAA References include:

Advisory Circular 107-1
Advisory Circular 150/5360-13
Buildings
May be used as a physical barrier
May be incorporated into a fence line
Assess security access points
Interior Walls
Security walls should be full height, floorto-ceiling or to slab
Exterior Walls
Aesthetic designs available
Minimize hand & foot holds that can be
used for climbing
Consider topping walls with barbed wire
or other deterrent materials
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PART III
Electronic sensors
Motion detectors
Infrared sensors
Stand-alone or used with other barriers
Natural Barriers
Bodies of water
Expanses of trees
Swampland
Dense foliage
Cliffs
Other areas difficult to traverse
Natural barriers may provide time and
distance protection
Access Points
Minimize the number of access points
Gates
Plan for routine, maintenance, and
emergency operations:
Patrols
Emergency Response Teams
Service Vehicles and Tugs
Delivery Vehicles
Maintenance Vehicles
Design for high activity/long gate life

Gate hinges should be non-liftoff or have
welding to prevent removal
Automate/Monitor gates as necessary
Reduce ground clearance beneath,
typically to no more than 4-6 inches
Two-gate systems can help prevent
tailgate entry
Doors
Avoid unsupervised emergency exit doors
to the AOA
Automate/Monitor doors as necessary
Coordinate hardware with building and
fire codes
Guard Stations
Manned access control and search

capability
Provide sheltered checkpoint station
Provide adequate secondary inspection
space
Dependable communications required
Electronic Access Points

Automatic Gates
Locate induction loop to minimize
objects
from
the
public-side
activating loop
Consider
bollards
to
reduce
equipment damage by vehicles
Protect of electronic equipment from
weather and temperature
Doors with Access Controls

Numerous technologies available
See RTCA Recommended Standards
for Airport Access Control Systems
Sensor Line Gates

Function as access-controlled gates
Reduced delay time for access
Higher risk due to lack of barrier
Automated Portals
Designed for high-throughput
Can include screening technologies
Direction sensitive capabilities
Can detain violators
Fencing Clear Areas
Both sides of fence; from 10 to 30
No obstructions
Minimal landscape
No climbable objects
Security Lighting
Both sides of gates and fencing is
highly recommended
Locks
Various key technologies available
Consider total life cycle costs, not
just initial capital cost
CCTV Coverage
CCTV can be used to enhance
detection and/or response
Signage
FAA-required signage
Deterrent signage
Instructional and/or legal signage
Coordinate style with other airport
signage
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PART III
6.
Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement

When determining the security requirements of all airport facilities, examine the interaction and relationships
among the various areas, the types of activity within each area, the flow of public and employee traffic to and
through each area, the flow and type of delivery and maintenance traffic, potential needs for and frequency of
security escorts, and the manner in which each such area is addressed in the airports ASP.
Each airport is different and there are no specific requirements which state that an airport facility must be built
at a specific spot, or use a specific security method or construction style. There are some basic
recommendations, guidelines, and concepts which may be useful if building a new airport or renovating an
existing one. These concepts may also be useful in providing designers with a background on the various
facilities and how they interact. The following sections deal with various types of facilities that are found at
airports. While all facilities are listed here, those that are specifically Airside or Landside facilities are simply
referenced and are fully discussed within those respective sections. Discussion for each facility includes basic
facility information, its security related requirements, and recommendations regarding the facilitys airside,
landside, or both (airside and landside portions) placement and proximity to the terminal.
a.
Aircraft Maintenance Facilities

Aircraft maintenance facilities may be landside, airside or both. Typically the aircraft operator or independent
company running the maintenance facility will be responsible for security, although their access controls may
also be incorporated into the airports alarm and reporting system. This decision would be dependent to some
degree on the proximity of the facility to the airports own areas of security interest, passenger enplanement
facilities, and the agreement between the airport and aircraft operator as to the demarcation of responsibilities.
b.
Passenger Aircraft Overnight Parking Area

See the Passenger Aircraft Overnight Parking section on page 30 under Airside.
c.
Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Facilities

ARFF stations and their equipment are a requirement of U.S. 14 CFR Part 139, Certification and
Operations: Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers. Thus, these facilities are clearly critical to an
airports operations. Typically, even in a multistation scenario, the primary ARFF station may be located
straddling the airside and landside boundary. This positioning may be necessary for a variety of reasons,
but public access to the ARFF station is needed, as well as for mutual aid responders and for ease of
landside access to the ARFF station for the fire fighters themselves.
Positioning of the ARFF station must consider emergency response times and routes. Thus, stations are
often located centrally on the site for minimum response times to all site locations. ARFF vehicles may
need landside access for remote incident response.
Modern ARFF stations include a large training classroom that is often used for training of airport tenant
employees and for related activities. This means that portion of the ARFF station may be accessible without
requiring persons to pass though access controls. However, other portions of the ARFF station must be
controlled to prevent unauthorized access to the airside.
Similarly, another area of an ARFF station that may be open to public access is the ARFF administrative
office so that persons having business with the officers can do so without having to go through access control.
d.
Security Operations Center (SOC)/Airport Emergency Command Post (CP)

There are no hard and fast rules for these locations most are in or attached to the main terminal. In all cases
they should be located behind secured lines. The designer must be certain to discuss alternative proposed
locations with all departments who will use the SOC and CP. Indeed, secondary satellite locations may be
valuable for those instances when the primary SOC or CP is out of service. While ease of access to the
airside is one primary consideration, there are numerous other concerns such as sufficient operating space
for police and other support personnel, central location for ease of dispatch to any point on the airport;
technical considerations such as cable routing for all necessary equipment, and limited public access if the
area also provides such services as paging, lost and found, traffic adjudications, etc.
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For a full discussion on these areas and their contents, see Security Operations Center on page 86 and
Airport Emergency Command Post on page 87 under the Terminal section.
e.
Airport Personnel Offices

Most personnel and administrative offices typically have landside and/or public access during business
hours. During nonbusiness hours they are usually secured, and may be included in the airports overall
access control system, particularly if located within the terminal complex. In addition, some personnel
offices, such as airfield maintenance or operations, may be completely airside.
Since most airport personnel offices are located in or near the terminal, and are secured (nonpublic) at least
part of the time, see Airport Personnel Offices on page 83 under the Terminal Nonpublic Areas section.
f.
Belly Freight Facility

Belly freight facilities share many of the same security requirements as standard cargo areas, and in many
airports may be part of one joint cargo facilities or area. However, some airports maintain a completely
separate area for belly freight that will be traveling in passenger aircraft rather than cargo planes. One of
the primary differences between most dedicated belly freight facilities and cargo facilities is that the belly
freight facility may not need to be attached to or adjacent to an aircraft ramp. Since most belly freight is
handled via tugs, a belly freight facility can be located either adjacent to the terminal where its aircraft
operator aircraft are or at any point along a service roadway which connects to the terminal. A standard
cargo facility on the other hand may need to handle direct plane cargo where the plane actually pulls up to a
fixed or movable loading bridge.
The added flexibility in the location of a belly freight facility, as well as the fact that it can be separate from
the general cargo facility, enables a belly freight facility to be designed with potentially higher or stricter
security levels. Since belly freight usually involves smaller quantities of public airfreight and U.S. mail,
belly freight facilities can be designed which have the potential for 100% EDS screening of cargo, as well
as have more flexibility than direct cargo to plane cargo operations in that the facility can be either
landside or airside and still be isolated from critical passenger aircraft areas.
A facility for shared cargo screening, including belly freight and regular cargo, should be considered.
g.
Cargo Area
1) Basic security controls to air cargo, especially cargo carried in passenger aircraft, are generally applied
either prior to the cargo's arrival at the airport, or at the physically separated cargo processing areas.
Thus, although not a primary issue of security concern to the airport planner/designer, cargo handling
and control must be considered in the overall allocation of space and manner of transit from cargo
make-up to aircraft loading. This might include space for bulk pallet inspection facilities, and secure
cargo-holding areas.
2) Examining cargo items and reviewing associated documentation in the presence of the shipper or the
indirect aircraft operator is not always feasible at the airport. To be effective, those measures would
normally be applied prior to the cargos arrival at the airport. Planners would be well advised to
consider providing a secure environment which would allow aircraft operators to comply with the
current requirement to prevent tampering with, or adding anything to, the cargo after is has been
accepted but before it has been transported; i.e., cargo holding areas.
3) Federal and/or local authorities may develop and disseminate information that would require preplanning by the airport or the aircraft operator to carry out additional security measures intended to
respond to an elevated threat. As part of this process, cargo security should be considered. While
airmail is also a consideration, in no case is it handled by the airlines until the United States Postal
Service (USPS), which typically has its own facility and security requirements and procedures, has
processed it. Once again, however, where the Postal facility is not remote, but well within the airports
sphere of concern, the designer must determine the space, power, storage, lighting and other
architectural needs by meeting with USPS early in the process. Security tools available to respond to
such threats include additional x-ray machines, decompression chambers, and explosives trace
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detection systems. Availability of such tools at a predesignated airport location would allow the
threatened parties to efficiently apply the measures when necessary.
a) When cargo buildings are included, as part of the barrier between landside and airside, care should
be taken to ensure that they protect against unauthorized airside entry.
b) All cargo facility receiving and dispatching access points should be capable of being locked when
not in use. In cargo buildings where the doors must be kept open for ventilation, various types of
lockable ventilating grills have been used to deter unauthorized entry of persons or vehicles.
Electronic intrusion detection systems (augmented by appropriate alarm assessment and response
capabilities) may be considered as well.
c) Personnel doors used by employees as primary entrances to, and exits from, cargo buildings
should be located so that they can be controlled and secured when required.
d) Security for cargo to be loaded on passenger aircraft would be improved if facilities supporting
such activity were located within the secured areas.
e) The lifetime of cargo fencing exposed to vehicle misuse in high traffic areas may be extended
through the use of properly placed curbing, bollards, or highway railing.
h.
FAA Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and Offices

While clearly the responsibility of FAA to determine the site and layout, it is not at all unusual for the
tower and its administrative offices to be immediately above and part of the main terminal complex, often
being served by the same elevators and stairwells. Clearly, it behooves the designer to determine the
associated security needs early on. Where the tower is within the terminal complex, its security is likely to
be interfaced with the airports system, noting that the tower will require 24-hour protection. Where the
tower is in a remote location, it still requires significant levels of protection as one of the airports most
critical operational facilities.
i.
Fuel Area
Fuel farms are normally placed in as remote a location of the airport as possible, usually with underground
hydrant systems feeding fuel to the ramp areas. Security fences should surround the fuel tanks, and should
be access controlled whenever possible to monitor all movement even authorized traffic. Where distance
precludes hard wiring to the main system, there are wireless technologies as well as freestanding electronic
locking mechanisms available.
j.
General Aviation (GA) Area

See the General Aviation (GA) Parking Area section on page 30 under Airside.
k.
Ground Service Equipment Maintenance (GSEM) Facility

Many airports today maintain specialized areas for the storage and maintenance of ground service
equipment (baggage tugs, push-back vehicles, refueling trucks). These areas are often referred to as Ground
Service Equipment Maintenance (GSEM) facilities and may also be used to service and maintain other
airport and maintenance vehicles. As with other maintenance facilities, these areas may be landside or
airside depending upon their needs, and the amount and frequency of landside/airside travel.
As with other service and maintenance areas, particular attention should be paid to material and vehicle
parking/storage areas and assuring they do not compromise airside fencing clear areas or security.
l.
Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA)

See the Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA) section on page 34 under Landside Facilities.
m. Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations

See the Hotel and On-Airport Accommodations section on page 34 under Landside Facilities.
n.
In-Flight Catering Facility

On-airport facilities for in-flight catering service may be located landside, airside, or may be a boundary
facility with portions of both. Due to the nature of the facility, as well as its typical placement near the
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PART III
passenger terminal, security needs and choices may require substantial amounts of coordination both
architecturally and procedurally.
The following are critical architectural and design considerations for catering facilities:
1) Catering Screening Will food, drinks and/or other catering materials/equipment or even personnel be
screened for weapons/explosives? If so, at what point in the preparation process?
While screening at catering facilities is not a requirement, consideration for both safety and/or future
potential requirements should be made during the design or renovation of catering facilities. If
screening is desired or will be a possibility, space and electrical accommodations should be made not
only for screening equipment, but also for related access control and CCTV equipment as well as for
areas and pathways for potential explosives resolution and disposal. Further information on screening
equipment and design considerations can be found within the Checked Baggage section on page 92.
2) Catering Vehicles Will catering vehicles remain completely airside? If not, will they be searched
prior to use and/or airside entry or sealed at the catering facility?
The design of catering facilities which keep catering vehicles completely airside and/or secured from
public access is advantageous to airport security. However, if the entire catering facility is not airside,
this requires the facility to have an airside/landside boundary somewhere within the facility. With
incoming catering raw materials arriving from landside, this is not only a security challenge, but also
an operational challenge. Early coordination between airport and catering tenant is urged to determine
a solution that is agreeable to both. Coordination with the FAA should also occur to assure that any
pending regulations or requirements can also be considered.
3) Catering Personnel Badging Will catering food preparation personnel be badged? If so, with what
access and what level of background checks?
This is important to assist in determining whether those areas might require additional perimeter
controls and rough-ins for additional access controls and CCTV coverage.
Currently at most airports, only those personnel needing unrestricted airside access are required to be
badged or have any type of background check. Since food preparation areas may be landside, catering
preparation personnel may not require badging or background checks. These personnel have direct
access to food trays and other containers that are loaded directly onto passenger aircraft, and which
may be used to conceal dangerous items. Particularly where catering screening is not occurring, this
can be a security risk and/or concern. The results of badging considerations will not only affect
operational and police procedures, but will also affect building architecture to accommodate access
control equipment and other security requirements.
o.
Intermodal Transportation Area

See Intermodal Transportation Area section on page 35 under Landside Facilities.
p.
Military Facilities
Some airports may have adjacent or on-airport military facilities such as reserve, National Guard or active
duty units. Since each of these situations is unique, and since these facilities are often at least partly airside,
detailed coordination between the airport, the FAA, and the military facility must occur for both design and
procedure. Typical areas of coordination include access control, badging and background check
requirements, areas of access, security patrol boundaries, security response responsibilities, and joint and/or
shared security system data and equipment. Proper coordination should also occur to assure that the
security and safety of such military facilities is not compromised by the placement of airport CCTV and
access control equipment.
q.
Navigational & Communications Equipment

Since the placement of navigational and communications equipment is typically driven by functionality,
not security, most airports typically have equipment both airside and landside. Where equipment cannot be
included within the airside, it should be at a minimum fenced for both safety and security. In addition,
electronic monitoring and/or controlling of access to critical equipment may be desirable.
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PART III
r.
Rental Car Facilities

See the Rental Car Storage Areas section on page 35 under Landside Facilities.
s.
State/Government Aircraft Facilities

Some airports may need to include areas for government aircraft facilities. For the most part, these facilities
should be given the same considerations as GA/Fixed Base Operator (FBO) areas. However, because of
their nature, these facilities are typically isolated from other GA/FBO areas and require stricter, and more
extensive, security measures. In many cases these areas will have their own, independent security/access
control/CCTV system, as well as their own monitoring and security personnel.
t.
Utilities and Related Equipment

Design and location of utilities and related equipment and service areas should be coordinated with security
and fencing design to minimize security risks and vandalism potential. While it is beneficial from a safety
and vandalism standpoint to locate utility equipment airside when possible, maintenance contracts and
service personnel badging and access may require utilities to be landside. Special emphasis should be given
to aboveground electrical substations.
Where underground service ducts, storm drains, sewers, tunnels, air ducts, trash chutes, drainage structures,
and other openings providing access to the airside or other restricted area, security treatments such as bars,
grates, padlock, or other effective means may be required to meet practical maximum opening size
requirements. For structures or openings that involve water flow, consider the direction of flow, type, and
size of potential debris, and frequency and method of maintenance access required for debris removal as
well as the potential for flood and/or erosion during heavy flow/debris periods in the security treatment
design.
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PART III
Section III-A-6 Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement Checklist

Facility Placement Considerations:
Interaction and relationships among areas
Types of activity within each area
Flow of public/employees to/through areas
Flow and type of delivery traffic
Flow and type of maintenance traffic
Need for and frequency of security escorts
How each area is addressed in the ASP
Each Airport is Unique
Facilities:
Airside, Landside or Both
Security the responsibility of the facility
See the Airside Facilities Checklist
ARFF Facilities
Either Airside or Both
Consider response routes and times
Facility may require public access
SOC/CP
Secure location
Consider alternate/back-up locations
Ease of airside access
Sufficient operating space for personnel
Central location for dispatching
See Terminal Nonpublic Areas Checklist
Consider security needs
Flexible Placement
Terminal Access (via roads) required
Consider freight screening needs
Cargo Area
Typically Airside or Both
Screening and inspection needs
Secure cargo-holding area
Postal facility inclusion possible
Doors must be lockable and controlled
Consider fence protection measures
FAA ATCT and Offices

Landside or Airside
May require airport security controls
Fuel Area
Landside or Airside
Typically remote from terminal
Safety and security fencing required
Consider access controls to area
GA Areas
GSEM Facility
Landside or Airside
Consider airside travel frequency
Maintain fencing clear areas
GTSA
See the Landside Facilities Checklist
Hotels and On-Airport Accommodations
Landside, Airside or Both
Typically adjacent to terminal
Catering screening measures
Catering vehicle actions
Catering personnel badging
Military Facilities
Substantial coordination required
Navigation and Communications Equipment
Airside and Landside
Driven by functionality
Control access to critical equipment
State/Government Aircraft Facilities
Both airside and landside
Security typically independent
Coordinate security requirements
Locate airside when possible
Control access
Secure access points and equipment
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PART III
Section B - Airside
Despite the fact that airside areas are beyond security barriers and control lines, there are still additional security
guidelines and concerns that can enhance and increase the security of these areas.
1.
Aircraft Movement & Parking Areas (Ref. FAR 139)

While the location of aircraft movement and parking areas is typically dictated by topography and operational
considerations, the placement of the airside/landside and respective security boundaries must be considered.
The most important of these considerations is the placement of security fencing or other barriers. The following
sections discuss security concerns for both normal aircraft movement and parking areas as well as the aircraft
isolated/security parking position:
a.
Aircraft Movement Areas

Normal aircraft movement areas include all runways, taxiways, ramps and/or aprons. While there are no
specific security requirements that state how far within the airside/landside security boundary these items
must be, there are other operational requirements that will affect security design.
First and foremost among the non-security requirements are the FAA safety and approach runway
protection zone requirements. While the specific distance requirements vary by runway, taxiway and/or
aircraft class and wingspan (See A/C 150/5300-13), they all share the same types of requirements noted
below. While these are not security related areas, their location, orientation and boundaries may have
security implications (i.e., fencing, communications/interference, lighting, sight lines, etc.) They include:
Object Free Area; Building Restriction Lines; Runway Protection Zone; Runway Safety Area; Glide Slope
Critical Area; Localizer Critical Area; and Approach Lighting System.
b.
Passenger Loading/Unloading Aircraft Parking Areas

Security recommendations for parking passenger aircraft for loading and unloading at or near the terminal,
including aircraft parked at loading bridges, should include consideration of the distance to fence/public
access areas; distance to other parked aircraft awaiting loading or maintenance, minimum distance
recommendations for prevention of vandalism, thrown objects, etc.), and visibility of the areas around the
parked aircraft to monitor for unauthorized activity.
c.
Passenger Aircraft Overnight Parking Areas

These areas are generally the same, or not far removed from, the arrival and departure gates. Where an
aircraft must be moved for some operational reason to a parking area other than the airlines maintenance
or service facility, the design of its security environment should receive the same attention, since its status
as a passenger carrying aircraft has not changed, only the time spent in waiting. Where such areas are
relatively remote, they should be well lighted, with no visual obstructions.
Security of aircraft during overnight or maintenance parking is the responsibility of the aircraft operator.
Where exclusive area or tenant security plans exist, they should include considerations of these
requirements.
d.
General Aviation (GA) Parking Area

1) It is advisable to the extent possible to exclude general aviation areas from the SIDA of the airport.
However, this is not always possible, as in the case where international general aviation flights, which
would include charters, private and corporate flights, must be directed to the International Arrivals
Building (IAB) which is almost always found within or attached to the secured area at the main
terminal complex. The limited security resources of an airport operator should be focused on the
critical passenger aircraft operator areas.
2) Taxiways leading to the general aviation areas should, if possible, be planned to avoid ramps used by
passenger aircraft operators.
3) General aviation tenants should always be a part of the planning process for security related matters
that may affect their operation.
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PART III
4) Airport security costs rise in proportion to the number of facilities to which access must be controlled.
Consideration should be given to the security related consequences of diminished or diluted asset
protection because it compromises the systems effectiveness. If possible, general aviation facilities
should be significantly removed from the critical passenger loading area that requires additional
security measures.
e.
Isolated/Security Parking Position

1) ICAO Standards require the designation of an isolated security aircraft parking position suitable for
parking aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference, to remove and examine
cargo, mail and stores removed from an aircraft during bomb threat conditions or which for other
reasons needs isolation from normal airport activities. This location is also referred to as a
Hijack/Bomb Threat Aircraft Location or hot spot in many Airport Security Programs. Planners
and designers are urged to gather input on ideal locations for these positions from those security or law
enforcement agencies that will respond to such incidents. (Reference ICAO Annex 17).
2) The isolated parking position should be located at the maximum distance possible (ICAO Annex 14
advises the allowance of at least 328 feet or 100 meters) from other aircraft parking positions,
buildings, or public areas and the airport fence. If taxiways and runways pass within this limit they
may have to be closed for normal operations when a threatened aircraft is in the area.
3) The position should not be located above underground utilities such as gasoline, aviation fuel, water
mains, or electrical or communications cables.
4) Such parking areas would ideally be located to eliminate the possibility of unauthorized persons
physically reaching or being able to launch an attack against the aircraft. Likewise, consideration
should be given to the parking areas visibility to public and press areas. Areas visible from major
roadways should also be avoided to prevent roadway obstructions and accidents due to onlookers.
5) Use of CCTV to view the suspect aircraft and surrounding area may be beneficial to emergency
response and/or negotiations personnel.
6) Consideration should be given to adjacent areas in which emergency response agencies (both
personnel and vehicles) can enter and be staged during the incident. Communications, utilities and
facilities, victim isolation, treatment and/or interview areas, and other features may be accommodated
based on the respective airports Emergency Plan as required under FAR 139 and coordination with
local agencies. The areas capability for cellular, radio and other wired or wireless methods of
communication should also be considered.
2.
Airside Roads
Roads located on the airside should be for the exclusive use of authorized persons and vehicles. Placement and
quantity of airside roads should not only consider standard operational and maintenance needs, but also
emergency response needs and access to crash sites and isolation areas. Perimeter roads should be airside and
providing clear view of fencing. Airside roads are for the use of maintenance personnel, emergency personnel,
and security patrols (an ICAO Recommendation).
Where landside roads must be adjacent to airport fencing, a clear area adjacent to fences should be established.
3.
Airside Vulnerable Areas & Protection

Although this topic is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is a useful reminder here that the airport
designer, in concert with security and operations leadership, must consider such things as NAVAIDS, runway
lighting and communications equipment, fueling facilities and FAAs own air traffic facilities when developing
an overall integrated security plan, as well as meet the specific and unique security requirements for each such
area. There is no single plan that appropriately or adequately covers all these issues; it becomes the job of the
architect, space planner, and designer to meet with all interested parties to suggest a balance among all these
concerns.
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PART III
Section III-B Airside Checklist

Aircraft areas must be secured
Factors influencing boundary locations:
Runways, taxiways, ramps and/or aprons
See A/C 150/5300-13
FAA safety and operational areas:
Object Free Area
Building Restriction Lines
Runway Protection Zone
Runway Safety Area
Glide Slope Critical Area
Localizer Critical Area
Approach Lighting System
Passenger Aircraft Parking Areas
Safe distance to fence/public access areas
Safe distance to other parked aircraft
Safe distance recommendations for
prevention of vandalism
Maintain visibility of areas around parked
aircraft to monitor for unauthorized activity
Exclude GA from the SIDA
Distance GA from terminal area
Coordinate with tenants

See ICAO Standards Annex 14 & 17
At least 100 meters from other aircraft and
structures
Ensure separation from utilities and fuel
Use CCTV to view the aircraft and
surrounding area
Accommodate emergency staging area
Avoid public viewing/proximity to area
Airside Roads
Restrict access to authorized vehicles
Perimeter roads should be airside
Perimeter roads should provide unobstructed
views of the fence
Positioning of roads should consider:
Patrols
Maintenance Access
Emergency Access and Routes
Maintain fencing clear area
Airside Vulnerable Areas
NAVAIDS
Runway lighting
Communications equipment
Fueling facilities
FAA ATCT
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PART III
Section C - Landside
Landside areas accessible to the public are the most difficult to control or monitor from a security standpoint because
they must remain accessible to the traveling public and service personnel. Public areas of airports are not subject to
federal security inspections, but during implementation of crisis contingency plans they can be expected to be affected
by special security measures to prevent criminal acts. Prudent use of CCTV and other technologies should be
considered in monitoring areas of concern, in consultation with airport law enforcement, the airport security
coordinator, operations personnel, and other local crime control interests. CCTV should be considered for coverage of
terminal curbside areas, parking lots/garages, public transportation areas, loading docks, and service tunnels.
In considering the security needs of public areas (normally a local responsibility), it is readily apparent that current
trends in terminal design are focused on facilitating passenger throughput and generating revenue. Many medium
and large-sized terminals now feature large expanses of retail concessions that provide an important source of
airport revenue. Such areas are vulnerable targets and are difficult to secure, but basic tenets of physical security
remain applicable. Access is always a primary concern, and when designing terminal areas one must recognize that
doors, windows, and gates should not exceed the number required for safe and effective operations.
Consider incorporation of life safety (emergency medical equipment) and/or duress alarms in public and restroom
areas and/or at locations where airport personnel deal directly with money, baggage, ticketing, and/or disgruntled
persons. In addition, emergency phones/intercoms in public areas and parking should also be considered. When
possible, life safety, duress alarms, and phones/intercoms should be complemented by CCTV surveillance to assist
emergency dispatch personnel.
1.
Landside Roads
When planning landside roads, bear in mind their proximity to security fencing, considerations of potential airside
access where elevated roadways may provide access or threat to adjacent areas of the terminal, or apron and/or
nearby aircraft. When security levels are raised, consider the possibility of having to screen vehicles before they
reach the terminal. This can be accomplished with temporary inspection stations positioned on the approach roads,
but that will require conduit and rough-ins at those locations for power, communications and security data lines.
2.
Landside Parking
a.
Terminal Patron Parking

1) During high-threat periods, it is reasonable to assume that special security measures could prohibit the
parking of unauthorized vehicles close to, beneath or on top of the terminal to minimize injury or
damage from a vehicle bomb. Therefore when space permits, consider allowing a safe distance
between parking lots and any terminal or operational buildings. A standard Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) setback chart, along with a blast analysis and mitigation model as found
in Appendix C, can aid determination of such distances.
2) Underground parking facilities and rooftop parking areas overlooking the passenger loading area may
also be subjected to special security measures during a high threat period. Designs should
accommodate the possibility of permitting vehicle access only after a detailed inspection process, or of
closing them off, or of segmenting them to control access only by authorized personnel such as
employees or other known entities.
3) Consider providing sufficient space in parking areas to facilitate the movement of vehicular security
patrols.
4) It is important to maintain close coordination with the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) and to
remain aware of any constraints placed upon the airport through the ASP, the Emergency Plan, and any
contingency plans. In addition, the Ground Security Coordinator for each airline can assist in being
certain their contingency measures have been considered at the design and planning stage.
5) General security of parking and toll areas includes the need to consider cash-handling operations, and
the potential for criminal activity such as robbery, assault or auto theft, and thus the potential for
CCTV, lighting, intercoms, and duress buttons to be integrated with the main airport security system.
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PART III
b.
Employee Parking
Protection of employee parking areas, and the employees who use them, is no less important than that of
parking areas for the traveling public, and should be treated similarly, especially where they are either
remotely located or accessible to vandalism. Employee areas may, however, be designed to include the
security provided by the same access control system used throughout the airport. Different parking lots can
be considered as separate zones, keeping unauthorized use to a minimum.
3.
Landside Vulnerable Areas

Although this topic is addressed elsewhere in this document, it is a useful reminder here that the airport
designer, in concert with security and operations leadership, must consider such things as utility tunnels and
culverts; communications cables; catering facilities, fuel lines; and storage areas for service and maintenance
vehicles when developing an overall integrated security plan, as well as meet the specific and unique security
requirements for each such area. As noted for airside vulnerable areas, there is no single plan that appropriately
or adequately covers all these issues. Again, it becomes the job of the architect, space planner, and designer to
meet with all interested parties to suggest a balance among all these concerns.
4.
Landside Facilities
a.
Ground Transportation Staging Area (GTSA)

1) As airports have become more efficient at moving larger numbers of people in the same amount of time,
the need for taxis, limousines and charter buses at airports has increased. In order to mitigate congestion
at the terminal, many airports have moved towards remote GTSAs where these vehicles wait until
needed. Sometimes because of the number of vehicles needed, there are multiple staging areas or levels.
2) While airport planners and designers are urged to consider this GTSA concept, they are also
encouraged to consider the security and safety implications and plan accordingly.
3) Security and safety concerns at GTSAs are similar to that of any area where large groups of people,
particularly those expected to be carrying cash are waiting, such as bus stations. They include:
a) Personal safety of the drivers from outside thieves or assailants
b) Personal protection of the drivers from other drivers
c) Deterrence of vandalism, theft or other illegal activity
d) Possibility of terrorist or other criminal assault
4) Planning and design measures which may be considered to assist in meeting these concerns include:
a) Limitation of concealed areas or locations
b) Provision for open stairwells
c) CCTV surveillance of the area
d) Duress alarms in restroom and/or public areas to reduce police/emergency response time
e) Structural design/layout that minimizes or distributes congested driver waiting areas
f) Provisions for a remote police substation or presence in the vicinity
g) Sufficient night lighting
b.

Airport hotels are often found within or attached to the main terminal building. From a security perspective
they are typically treated no differently than any other commercial activity at the airport. This includes the
need for design considerations where the possibility exists for persons to exit from the hotel on or near the
airside, or to pass contraband from windows. While direct sight lines to active aircraft movement areas are
often a feature of hotel advertising, it is not a particularly desirable amenity when viewed from the security
point of view that considers bullet trajectories from a close-in, publicly accessible, private hotel room.
There may also be typical security design elements to accommodate the hotels cash-handling activities and
vendor/supplier traffic at all hours of the day.
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PART III
c.

As cities and airports expand, modes of transportation to/from airports are changing from the standard car,
taxi or bus to faster, more efficient mass transit systems. This system of transferring from one mode of
transportation to another in order to reach a destination is termed intermodal transportation. Currently many
airports either have or have planned for an intermodal transportation area. The most prevalent type at this
time is the light rail system.
When planning, designing or renovating an airport, alternative modes for moving people in and out of an
airport must be considered. When such intermodal alternatives are being considered, security and safety
concerns must also be part of that consideration. For example, there is a need to provide adequate standoff
distance between transit station and the airside to prevent the transit vehicle from being used as a means for
attack.
d.
Rental Car Storage Areas

Rental car storage areas are always landside, and often are well removed from the terminal and possibly the
airport itself. However, as these areas use not only security features such as fences and gates, but also
access control and/or CCTV systems, the considerations for compatible equipment and/or alarm response
connections with those of the airport should be made.
In addition, where these areas are located adjacent to security areas or fencing, bollards, curbing or other
structures should be planned and designed to prevent vehicles from being parked and stored in locations
that would violate the 10 security clear areas. The requirement to maintain this security clear area may also
need to be incorporated into the respective tenants lease agreement.
5.
Off-Airport Emergency Response

While many on-airport emergencies (fires, medical, injuries, traffic accidents) will be responded to by onairport response personnel, local codes, agreements, or unusual situations may require the response of offairport emergency or law enforcement personnel. In addition, some airports primary response personnel (such
as for structure fires) may be by off-airport organizations, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units.
As such, both procedural and design-related coordination must occur, particularly where off-airport response
personnel may need to enter security areas. Where special procedures or design elements may be required,
assure that they are coordinated with the FAA during the preliminary design.
Features associated with off-airport emergency response which can be incorporated into an airports design
include:
a.
The use of special agency-only badges, PIN numbers or card readers that provide emergency personnel
access without the need to badge individual persons.
b.
Installation of a vehicle ID system that will allows emergency vehicles access to security areas.
c.
Incorporation of screening checkpoint bypass routes that provide direct sterile area access for badged or
escorted personnel without the need to disturb or distract the public checkpoints. These bypass routes
may be the same routes used by normal airport service personnel, but must also be sized/dimensioned to
provide quick, unobstructed access for medical and fire equipment.
d.
In order to facilitate quicker response or to keep airport and off-airport emergency personnel advised of
incidents, a linked notification system and/or procedure is advised. This will minimize confusion, and allow
for added coordination with less risk of secondary incidents and delays. This may be beneficial to offairport emergency services requiring access through passenger checkpoints, major off or on-airport traffic
incidents delaying airport patrons, on-airport structure fires or medical incidents needing to be cordoned-off
from public access, and on-airport emergency landings or crashes which could become off-airport traffic
problems.
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PART III
Section III-C Landside Checklist

Monitor areas of concern:
Terminal curbside areas
Parking lots/garages
Public transportation areas
Loading docks
Service tunnels
Consider life safety measures:
Duress alarms
Emergency phones/intercoms
Medical equipment
Landside Roads
Minimize proximity to AOA/security fencing
Pre-terminal screening capability
CCTV monitoring for security/safety
Landside Parking
Terminal Passenger Parking
Allow significant distance between
parking lots and terminals
Consider CCTV, lighting, intercoms, and
duress alarms for toll plazas
Emergency phones/alarms
Employee Parking
Airport access control potential
Terminal
Utilities
Communications
Catering facilities
Fuel equipment and lines
Storage areas
Loading docks
Landside Facilities
GTSA
Security and safety concerns include:
Driver safety
Deterrence of vandalism, theft or
other illegal activity
Possibility of terrorist or criminal
assault
Planning/design measures may include:
Limitation of concealed areas and
locations
Provisions for open stairwells
CCTV surveillance of the area
Duress alarms in restroom and/or
public areas
Structural layout that minimizes or
distributes congested driver waiting
areas
Sufficient night lighting
Possibly connected to terminal
Treated no differently than other
commercial areas
Limit direct line of sight of aircraft
Maximize distance to AOA
Mass transit and light rail systems may
require secured transitions
Provide adequate standoff distance
between transit station and the AOA
Protect vehicles and workers
Potential tie-in to airport access controls
Maintain AOA fencing clear areas
Consider access routes, methods and needs
Design features may include:
Special badges, PIN numbers or card
readers for emergency access
Emergency Access to terminal areas
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PART III
Section D - Terminal
Airport terminals are transition areas in the airport security plan: transition from landside security concerns and
measures to airside security concerns and measures; transition from land based transportation systems to air based
systems; transition in the flow and focus of passenger movement; and transition in the focus and management of airport
operations. This transition function and responsibility of airport terminal planning and design means the participants in
this process must accommodate the variety of activities on both the landside and airside while allowing efficient and
secure methods for transition between them. Due to the inevitable complexity of meeting the functional needs of the
owners, operators, and users of a terminal facility, a combination of transition strategies will be required. Successful
planning and design processes includes the participation of Airport Security Committee, fire protection and law
enforcement personnel, tenants, FAA security officials, and operators in developing the appropriate strategies to meet
the current security requirements and provide the flexibility for future adaptation. This section provides information on
many of the concepts and methods involved in terminal facility security planning and design.
1.
Sterile Area
In this document, the term sterile area refers to the area between the security screening station and aircraft to
which access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an approved security
program. The primary objective of a sterile area is to provide a holding area capable of preventing persons from
gaining access to weapons after having passed through security screening and prior to boarding an aircraft.
a.
All potential access points (doors, windows, gates, etc.) to sterile areas must be lockable or controlled to
prevent bypassing of security screening. Consider limiting the number of access points (e.g. doors, gates,
stairwells, etc.) when designing facilities that will incorporate sterile areas.
b.
If unmonitored, access points such as doors and gates must prevent the reentry of any person to the airside
or the unlawful introduction of any unauthorized person or object. Doors must also comply with local fire
and life safety codes, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements, etc. Begin discussions with
local building and/or life safety code officials early to resolve special design circumstances.
c.
Sterile areas should be designed and constructed to prevent the passage of articles from nonsterile areas.
For example, avoid links or connections between sterile area restroom plumbing, air vents, drains, utility
tunnels or other fixtures and restrooms in non-sterile areas to limit the possibilities for passage of articles
from one area to another.
d.
When planning the construction of nonsterile or public access suspended walkways or balconies over or
adjacent to sterile areas, it is critical to ensure that they will not facilitate the passing or throwing of items
into sterile areas.
e.
During planning and layout of sterile areas, consideration must be given to personnel, maintenance and
concessions needs. Specific items for consideration include:
1) Personnel and employee access into the sterile area;
2) Emergency response routes and pathways -These routes should be nonpublic, easily accessible, never
blocked by boxes, bins, or other hazards, and provide clear, quick access for any emergency equipment
needed (stretchers, wheel chairs, explosives detection/transportation equipment, paramedic equipment).
Routes for off-airport response (emergency medical services (EMS), fire) should also be considered.
3) Concessions deliveries and supplies - Concessions and other airport tenants typically receive deliveries
at all times of day. These deliveries are often from companies whose delivery personnel change
frequently and cannot reliably be given keyed or badged access into the sterile area. Where possible,
deliveries of this type should be limited to a nonsterile area and screened via appropriate hand search,
explosives or x-ray detection methods. Concessions are often located within the sterile areas. Develop
strategies for concessions deliveries, concessions storage areas, concessions employee access routes,
and concessions space flow which maintain adequate security levels, prevent obstructions and patron
queuing areas near or in security checkpoint areas, and minimize the occurrence of unbadged and
unscreened delivery and concessions personnel within the sterile area. All such screening should take
place well removed from passenger screening areas.
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PART III
f.
During construction or modification of facilities, provisions should be made to ensure that any individual
who has not undergone screening is prevented from contact with a screened individual, in the sterile area
before boarding. (ICAO Annex 17)
g.
Security of sterile areas is improved, and maintenance and inspection facilitated, by designs to deter the
concealment of deadly or dangerous devices. Built-in fixtures, such as railings, pillars, benches, ashtrays, etc.,
designed to deter and/or hinder the concealment of weapons or dangerous devices are widely available.
Section III-D-1 Sterile Areas Checklist

Security Considerations:
Potential access points must be lockable or
controlled
Limiting the number of access points
Doors must comply with local fire/safety codes
Begin discussions with local code officials
early to resolve special circumstances
2.
Prevent the passage of articles from non-sterile

areas
Planning and Layout Considerations:
Personnel access into the sterile area
Emergency response routes and paths
Concessions deliveries and supplies
Limitation of concealable locations
Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP)

FAAs security screening checkpoint (SSCP) requirements were established in 1973 to deter aircraft hijacking
and improve the safety of the traveling public. Since then, a great deal of experience has been gained regarding
layouts, equipment, operations, and how different designs allow or encumber appropriate reactions to security
risk events. Further, security risks and the means to combat them are continuously being redefined in response to
events that have occurred, as well as anticipated future threats. This section is intended to record some lessons
learned from experience, and to present new ideas and technology shaping the future of SSCP design.
Planners, architects, and engineers may use this section to identify and assist in answering a series of key questions:
What issues need to be addressed in SSCP design?

What regulations and regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over the SSCP at the airport, how do they
define what is secure, and what guidelines are available for the design of SSCPs?
Who are the key people to talk to in the design process?
What elements of airport planning need to be considered in determining SSCP location and
characteristics, and how much space should be allocated for checkpoints?
What are the component parts of SSCPs, how are they staffed, and how do they work?
What are some examples of successful SSCP designs, and what ideas are being developed for the future?
What are other general technical details that should be considered in SSCPs?
This section will address the above questions in the following sections
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
General Issues
Regulations and Guidelines
Essential Coordination
Planning Considerations
Components of the SSCP
Personnel and Operations at the SSCP
SSCP Calculations
Typical SSCP Layouts
SSCP Technical Details
SSCP Blast Protection
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PART III
a.
General Issues
SSCPs are a critical element of airport terminal security design, and must be included in planning,
design, and engineering considerations from the conception of the project, including early conversations
with airport and aircraft operator representatives. FAA documents, many of which are non-public,
describe performance requirements of security screening checkpoints, including airport and aircraft
operator responsibilities.
As defined in the FAR, security screening is intended to prevent or deter the carriage aboard airplanes
of any explosive, incendiary, or a deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individuals person or
accessible property. SSCPs play a vital role in the screening of visitors, delivery traffic, concessions
delivery personnel, passengers, employees, and their carry-on or personal items. A key challenge in a
successful terminal design is the satisfaction of this role, without imposing overly burdensome real or
perceived obstacles to the operation of the airport. This will avoid a host of problems for the airport and
airlines, including congestion, delays, expensive and complex operations, and unnecessary security risks.
Further, there is a need to design with an awareness of the importance of queuing space with regard to
wheelchairs and other handicapped assistance equipment.
Among the general issues to consider are:
How to define a sterile area: Security regulations listed below should be reviewed thoroughly.
Also, safety and security issues for a particular project may extend beyond satisfying these
regulatory criteria, and should be discussed with the airport and aircraft operator representatives;
Minimal interruption to traffic flow of air-travelers and others passing through the terminal from
non-sterile areas to sterile areas. This should be considered both in terms of actual delays, and a
perception of unhindered flow of access to the gates;
Effective deterrent to potential trespassers, both in terms of actual detection of contraband of any
kind, and of creating the maximum perception that security measures are effective;
Effective deterrent to unauthorized breach of exit lanes at SSCPs for entry into sterile areas;
Designs which promote screening personnel effectiveness and pride;
Designs which are cost-effective for the airlines to operate, in terms of equipment, maintenance and
personnel required;
Designs which use space efficiently and effectively, allowing more space to be available for
operational or revenue-generating uses;
Flexibility to accept highly specialized equipment that has constantly changing engineering requirements;
Need for flexibility, both in day-to-day operations, and in long-term changes in passenger load,
equipment use, and operations, including the increasing use of electronic media;
Effective and secure handling of goods and services other than individuals, required to cross from
non-sterile area to sterile area;
Protection of the SSCP equipment and staff personal belongings when the checkpoint is not in use.
b.
Regulations and Guidelines

The Federal Aviation Regulations governing airport security and passenger SSCPs include:
FAR 107
Airport Security
FAR 108
Airplane Operator Security
FAR 109
Indirect Air Carrier Security
FAR 129
Foreign Air Carrier Operations
There are also FAA advisory circulars that offer more specific technical advice and recommendations,
support documentation such as the RTCA Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems, and
international agreements that relate to services provided on aircraft operators from other countries, and to
airport design in other countries.
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PART III
These include:
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO):
Annex 17-4.5
Measures relating to airport design
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC):
DOC 30 - Security Measures at Airports - 2.1.3, Airport planning requirements
Such documents should be reviewed thoroughly, particularly FAR 108. While the regulations do not
define the technical requirements that govern design of SSCPs, they define what must be accomplished
by the design in regulatory terms. They also provide information about how other jurisdictions approach
terminal security. Virtually all FAA regulations can be obtained on the FAA web page, www.faa.gov.
Nonpublic documents such as an individual security plan are available only to those with a need to know,
from the FAA or from the regulated parties.
The airport, as a public institution that is part of a city, state or other governmental entity, may have other
security requirements than those mandated or governed by the FAA. They may also be subject to local,
city and state building codes, mutual aid agreements with local law enforcement, or a joint military
presence on the airport which could strongly affect all areas of security design, from perimeter barriers to
SSCP design, since these determine who enters the secured areas, and where and how.
c.
Essential Coordination
Key individuals in the FAA, airport operations, aircraft operator operations, screening companies and
screeners should be consulted at various stages of the SSCP design process. Local community
representatives or officials may be involved as well.
1) FAA
An FAA Civil Aviation Security Field Office (CASFO), or CASFU (Field Unit) supported by an
FAA regional office, will have jurisdiction over the regulatory compliance of each airport security
project. When federal funds are involved, the FAA Airports District Office will also participate in
the coordination process. There will be an FAA person assigned who can help clarify general
requirements. The designer should generally not contact the FAA person directly unless asked to do
so by the airport. The airport operator also has an FAA-approved security program that will provide
more specific guidance as to how security requirements will be accomplished at the airport. The
designer should initiate direct communication with the airports security contact person, generally
titled the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC) as the best source of information.
FAA will ultimately require a review of the security project at several design stages, and will review
the SSCP design for regulatory compliance.
The FAAs Integrated Program Manager for checkpoints, based at FAA headquarters, is an
additional resource.
For FAA-funded projects, the design must be approved by the FAA Airports District Office (ADO).
2) Airports
FAR 107 governs airport security responsibilities. The airport will identify a contact person for the
various components of the project. This person may be an outside consultant. The designer should
coordinate early with that designated security person. Depending on whether the project is focused on
planning or on architectural development of the plan, the designer will need to coordinate their design
with the airport, and with a contact person representing the airlines requirements. A compromise may
need to be reached between the airports desired use of floor space for level of service criteria, and the
aircraft operators needs for adequate security screening. The designer will benefit from participating in
discussions with all parties to understand the needs of both airport and aircraft operators.
In many cases, an airport is being planned well before contracts have been signed between the
airport and the aircraft operators. Sometimes the aircraft operator tenants, or their anticipated levels
of service, change after the design process has started. In all cases, provide generous space in the
beginning of the project planning for SSCPs, so that as the design is refined there is adequate room
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PART III
for change or expansion. Security equipment and operations now in the developmental stages are
likely to require more space than what is built today. Areas that allow flexible layouts in terms of
mechanical and electrical connection, structural support, and alternative layouts will be of greatest
benefit in both the short and long term.
The location of the SSCP relative to concessions and other airport services should be resolved early
in the process through conversations with the airport representative, as this will affect airport
operations and revenue. Plan for the possible temporary modification and possibly the location of
SSCP operations during heightened security periods. Under certain conditions a SSCP may be
limited to use by ticketed passengers only. In this case it will enhance the airports ability to provide
good service if the SSCP is positioned (or can be moved) so that at least some concessions are
located on the nonsterile side of the SSCP.
The airport contact person will represent the airports space needs, if any, in terms of providing law
enforcement personnel support at the SSCP, as well as CCTV coverage, duress alarms, etc. The
airport facilities manager should be included in the process.
3) Aircraft Operators
Aircraft operators bear the responsibility for operating SSCPs as described in FAR 108, and should
be directly involved in SSCP planning.
Either an aircraft operator or airport may be the client. In the latter case direct designer
communication with the aircraft operator may sometimes be difficult, especially if the aircraft
operator tenants have not yet been identified, so the designer must rely on the guidance of the airport
contact person for information regarding the aircraft operators SSCP needs. Otherwise, the aircraft
operator representative should be a regular contact point for the designer.
Note that the aircraft operators often form a group with one aircraft operator identified to represent
them to the airport. The representative aircraft operator then leases the space, and staffs or contracts
to staff the SSCP and equip it, and bears that cost. The costs are subsequently distributed among the
aircraft operators by contractual agreement. Where possible, the aircraft operators should be
encouraged to include a representative from the screening company as part of the design process.
The designer may need to balance the needs of different parties within the aircraft operator
organizations. The management may see that limiting the cost of the SSCP is often critical.
Simultaneously, the SSCP supervisors and those directly responsible for the performance of the
SSCP may feel that certain space requirements, amenities, layout, and equipment are critical to the
satisfactory fulfillment of their duties. The designer should meet with representatives of both
viewpoints before making planning, design, and engineering decisions. Layouts that provide
effective operations with a minimum of equipment, staffing and operational flexibility, particularly
during high threat periods, while promoting a good work environment, will benefit all parties.
4) Local Community
Most airport design projects involve issues of community concern and acceptance. The architect,
planner, or engineer should be prepared to assist the airport client in preparing material required to
inform or build consensus within the community. In some instances, television and other journalists
have carefully followed the development of particular SSCP design improvements.
Local law enforcement, building code officials, and fire code officials should be solicited to interact
in the development of the SSCP design.
d.
Planning Considerations
Each airport and airport terminal building is unique in terms of physical conditions and operational
requirements. Therefore, no single SSCP solution will work for all airports, or possibly even within the
same airport. This section is intended to provide information regarding where and how large a SSCP
should be for a variety of conditions.
The location and size of the SSCP depends, among other things, on the level and type of risk that are
present or anticipated, the type of operations at the airport, the passenger loads, and the character of the
overall design of the airport.
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PART III
1) Level and Type of Risk

a) The level and type of risk associated with an airport will influence the location and size of the SSCP
and can be identified in part by conducting an airport Vulnerability Assessment. (See Appendix A)
b) Airports in, or with mass transit from, dense urban areas may experience more traffic by people
with no real business in the airport. Also, they are more likely to attract a potential malefactor
simply because they concentrate people in one place. Airports with international flights offer an
opportunity for greater publicity for an illegal act. Therefore, these airports will be seen as being
at a somewhat higher level of general threat. The result may be more types of equipment and
greater staffing in the SSCP and elsewhere, with the resulting need for more space.
c) Airports in rural or less densely populated areas do not necessarily provide less desirable targets
for terrorism. Indeed, one common and well-founded antiterrorist theory holds that any security
system is only as good as its weakest link. In this context, any airport, large or small, which
provided low levels of security because it considered itself to be a less desirable target, might be
accomplishing exactly the opposite result by becoming an easy entry point into the broader
national aviation system for persons and baggage which present a higher threat. Certainly the
SSCPs at these airports may require simpler equipment and less space and staffing due to the
lower passenger loads and lower throughput, but the designer should not be misled into
believing that lesser levels of security are therefore appropriate.
d) The most frequent violators of SSCP procedures may not be terrorists, but persons who may be
late for a flight, or persons with less malicious intent. Therefore, the potential for terrorist
activity is not the only factor that may create the need for a SSCP capable of handling genuine
security violations, just as the population density around the airport is not the sole determinate
of risk. The designer should seek actual assessed risk information from the airport client, to
include the servicing law enforcement agencies, and consider consulting with a security expert.
e) Determination of vulnerability may affect the location of the SSCP. Some airports may want to
install a permanent zone of security screening at or near the entrance wall of the terminal, so
that all interior spaces beyond that point are sterile. Others may choose to allow unscreened
access further into the terminal, but may require that space and utility connections be available
for temporary installation of SSCPs at the entry of the terminal during periods of elevated
threats or other risk-associated events.
f) Airports are required by the FAA to react to temporary threats through a predefined contingency
plan. The FAA can identify different levels of threat for any airport, depending on the perceived
risk of a threatening event. The designer should ascertain from the airport what steps it might be
required to take, and assure that capacity is provided for them.
g) One increasingly common temporary measure relates to the location of the SSCP relative to
concessions. Some airports prefer to locate the SSCP on the nonsterile side of concessions, both for
the convenience of waiting passengers and for revenue concerns. However, in the event that the
airport may be required to allow only ticketed passengers into the sterile area, the airport operator
may request the designer to provide space and electrical connections for the SSCP to be temporarily
relocated on the sterile side such that previously airside concessions are then in a nonsterile area.
2) Operational Types
a) Airports can be characterized as Origin and Destination (O&D), Transfer/Hub, or a combination
of the two, with regional and commuter traffic participating in all three.
b) In O&D operations, the passenger and meeters/greeters move from the front door of the terminal
to the gate and vice versa, with stops in-between for concessions, rest stops, etc. In this case, the
passenger and others always pass through the SSCP.
c) In Transfer/Hub operations, transfer passengers frequently move from gate to gate in the hubtype airport without ever passing through the SSCP. If concessions are in the sterile area, this
pattern is reinforced. If they are in the nonsterile area, there may be an incentive for a passenger
to go outside of the sterile area, and reenter through the SSCP, burdening it with added traffic
that might otherwise not be necessary.
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PART III
d) In airports with no regularly scheduled passenger service using aircraft of more than 60 seats,
security screening may not be required. If flights from such airports deplane into a sterile area at
a transfer/hub airport, then the passengers may be screened at the departure airport in
anticipation of entering the transfer/hubs sterile area. An exception, as noted earlier, is the
international transfer passenger who must be delivered to the international arrivals building, no
matter what the means of arrival or city of origin.
e) The above three scenarios may each be supported by various orientations of the SSCP.
Transfer/hub operations benefit from a SSCP that is located so that passengers can move among
gates along multiple concourses without being re-screened. On the other hand, O&D operations
may suggest SSCPs be located near individual holdrooms, especially if there are few flights a
day, in which case the checkpoint could be closed down during much of the day. Very small
airports often screen directly before boarding a flight, and provide little or no holdroom space;
these SSCPs may be located directly at the door to the airside.
f) Terminals handling international traffic with connections to domestic and international flights
may benefit from SSCPs located near the front door of the terminal, allowing international
passengers to use ticketing functions without being re-screened.
3) Location of SSCPs (Relative to operational type)
Five basic types of SSCPs can be identified, related to their operational type. The two in the widest
use in the United States are the Sterile Concourse Station SSCP and the Holding Area Station SSCP.
a) The Sterile Concourse Station SSCP plan is usually considered the most desirable from the
standpoint of passenger security facilitation and economics. It is generally located in a
concourse or corridor leading to one or several pier(s) or satellite terminal(s) and permits the
screening and control of all employees, passengers, visitors and deliveries passing beyond the
SSCP, and is well suited for transfer operations. It thus can control access to a considerable
number of aircraft gates with a minimum amount of inspection equipment and personnel. Pier
and satellite terminal concepts are well suited for application of the Sterile Concourse Station
SSCP since the single-point entrance connector element facilitates isolation of boarding areas.
This configuration enables connecting passengers to move between concourses and to
concessions without leaving the sterile area, and without being subjected to multiple screening
processes. In general, the more individual SSCP locations that must be installed to serve
multiple locations within an airport, the more redundancy that must be built in to each to handle
their individual peaks. The centralized approach in this example creates efficiencies in staff
and equipment. However, in the event of a security breach, locating and isolating the suspect
may be difficult. In extreme cases a security breach may lead to total airport shutdown. Zoning
the building into areas that can be closed off in the case of a security breach can mitigate this.
Sterile Concourse Station SSCP (Transfer/Hub)
Air Operations Area
Air Operations Area
Sterile Satellite
Concourse or
Terminal
Sterile
Concourses
SSCP
Roadway
Entry
Landside
Nonsterile
(Ticketing)
Roadway
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PART III
b) In the Holding Area Station SSCP plan, screening is carried out at the entrance to an area
designed to hold passengers awaiting a specific flight. Walls or suitable barriers usually define
this area, and access points must be appropriately controlled. Access points leading from this
area to aircraft loading walkways or ramps must remain locked or monitored until boarding
begins, by which time, inspection or screening of passengers and carry-on baggage has been
completed. Holding Area Station SSCPs must be secured when not in use to ensure sterility is
maintained, or searched prior to use. An advantage of the Holding Area SSCP plan is that it may
require fewer personnel and that the SSCPs need only be staffed during the screening process.
However, staffing needs to account for passenger arrival patterns, and seating for passengers
who arrive prior to security personnel should be considered. In case of a security breach,
restoration is relatively easy in the Holding Area Station SSCP plan, and operations at other
gates/holdrooms will not be affected. This plan is more likely to benefit small airports with
fewer gates and more limited screening requirements.
Holding Area Station SSCP (O&D)
Air Operations Area
Sterile
Concourse
Sterile Mobile
Hold Room
Air Operations Area

Sterile Hold
Room
SSCP
Nonsterile
(Ticketing)
Roadway
c)
Entry
Landside
Roadway
The Boarding Gate Station SSCP plan, more commonly utilized by small regional airports,
features the screening of passengers and their belongings immediately before boarding at a
station established at the gate(s) leading to an aircraft. In this case, the gate may be a door
leading to an aircraft loading walkway or to a ramp area from which the aircraft will be
accessed. As the screening and boarding processes are so closely linked, staffing and equipment
must be sufficient to prevent flight delays. Boarding Gate Station SSCPs need only be staffed
while screening is in progress but must be secured when not in use. This approach is usually
more beneficial to smaller airports with limited screening requirements. Another advantage of
this plan is that it affords the least opportunity for the surreptitious transfer of weapons or
dangerous devices to passengers after screening.
Boarding Gate Station SSCP (Small Airport)
Air Operations Area
Air Operations Area

SSCP
Nonsterile
Roadway
Roadway
Entry
Landside
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PART III
d) Mobile Station SSCPs have also been employed at some airports, affording greater flexibility in
meeting short-term increases in passenger throughput.
e) The Sterile Terminal Station SSCP might be used in airports with high-perceived security risk
by installing SSCP at the entrance points to the terminal. This approach requires 100%
screening of visitors, passengers, employees, and their baggage, and any deliveries through the
front door. The advantage is a much more secure terminal facility, but among its disadvantages
is that it requires a great deal of additional equipment, staff and queue space to accommodate
the increase in the amount of people and baggage to be screened. Additionally, in the case of a
breach in security, locating the suspect could be very difficult, as the entire terminal would need
to be searched and rescreened.
Other problems associated with this approach include persons carrying deadly or dangerous
weapons, but who may do so in accordance with FAA regulations. The Sterile Terminal SSCP
Plan, or other terminal plans in which the screening process is encountered prior to arrival at the
ticket counter must accommodate this situation.
Sterile Terminal Station SSCP (High Risk)
Air Operations Area
Air Operations Area
Sterile
Terminal
Building
Roadway
SSCP
Roadway
Entry
Landside
4) SSCP Size
While vulnerability assessments and operational characteristics, including level of service, play a
large role in determining the location of SSCPs, it is the current and anticipated passenger loads that
ultimately provide the specific information with which the SSCP can be sized and designed.
Calculations for this are located in the SSCP Calculations Section on page 59.
Remember that staff amenities such as a coat room or lunch room, will be in addition to the size
requirements developed from passenger loads.
For general planning purposes, except at very low activity airports where manual search procedures
may be employed, a SSCP will generally include a bare minimum of one walk-through metal
detector and one x-ray device. [Note: Although the FDAs full technical definition of an x-ray
inspection system, its shielding and its enclosure refers to a cabinet x-ray, this document will use
the more convenient abbreviated term x-ray throughout.]
Such SSCPs would require a minimum of 150 square feet, plus space for queuing on the nonsterile
side and any required waiting space on the sterile side. This does not include an exit lane, if required,
room for personal belongings, private screening room, or other features described elsewhere in this
section. It also assumes a fairly small length of baggage belt exiting from the x-ray machine, and a
small retrieval area.
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PART III
A two-lane SSCP layout with an additional lane for screening of disabled persons, with an 8 wide
exit lane, would require a minimum of about 1,200 SF. This would include a security desk, but not
space for queuing or a private screening room or personal belongings. Also note that this is based on
an efficient use of space designed around the concept of a closely controlled and tightly spaced
SSCP by an integrated security systems provider. A more open or loosely spaced two-lane SSCP
may require approximately 100 additional square feet. These numbers include only space
requirements up to the end of the SSCP equipment, and not a buffer zone before entering
mainstream concourse traffic. A three-lane SSCP layout would range from 1,500 SF to 1,700 SF for
similar criteria. A four-lane SSCP layout would range from 1,750 SF to 1,950 SF. Note that the two,
three, and four-lane SSCP layouts all incorporate 8 exit lanes because they are based on a
componentized system. Note also that the overall area required may need to be somewhat larger to
incorporate other components listed elsewhere in this section
5) Integrated Terminal Planning
Successful planning, architectural, and engineering design rests on a governing concept. SSCP and
the related flow of people and goods throughout the airport should be a governing force in that
integrated concept. However, it must also serve the larger idea of the layout and design of the
building. The planner, architect, and engineer must look at all of the above planning considerations
thoroughly and consider how the overall flow of people and goods to and from landside and airside
is best accomplished. Early discussions with aircraft operators and the airport, in order to understand
and develop the best flows through the building, are essential in understanding and designing the
right SSCP for each terminal project.
6) Future Changes in Operational Type
At the time of this writing, some airports are not required to have SSCPs, based on the size of the
aircraft being operated and other criteria. However, changes in the governing regulations or in the
nature of airline service to the airport could cause the small airport to meet criteria that impose
requirements for SSCP screening. The designer should ascertain the current and potential
requirements before beginning the planning and design process. Close and early coordination with
the airport, the aircraft operator, and FAA is recommended.
e.
Components of the SSCP

SSCPs are usually made up of components that are similar from one installation to the next, whether they
are pieces of equipment or areas of floor space required for an operator or for pedestrian flow. Some
components are nearly universal, such as metal detectors or space for queuing. Others are used more
sparingly, such as explosives trace detection equipment or motion-detecting exit-lane alarm devices. The
intention of this section is to provide a checklist of items that the designer may wish to incorporate into
an overall SSCP design.
While fairly simple conceptual drawings follow, it underscores the point that all elements of the system,
no matter how seemingly insignificant such as tables and chairs, have a design component requiring an
allocation of dedicated space.
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PART III
1) Enplaning Direction
The following diagram shows typical components of a SSCP that may be part of the screening
process in the enplaning direction as an individual moves from non-sterile to sterile areas. A detailed
description of each component follows.
Simplified Plan View of a SSCP Metal Detector & X-Ray Area
h
f/g
i
e
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Queuing Space
Metal Detector
Bin Pass-Through
X-ray Machine Cabinet
Personal Item Retrieval Area
Bag Hand Search Area
Explosives Trace Detection Equipment
Personal Search Area
Barriers
Other Areas and Components (not shown in

this diagram):
j. Supervisors Area
k. Private Search Room
l. Special Security Room
m. Personnel Private Areas
n. Closed Circuit Television
o. Data Connections
p. Disabled accessibility codes/clearance
q. Wheel-chair Path
r. Luggage Cart Path
s. Concessions Goods Path
t. Length of Response Corridor
a
a)
Queuing Space
For guidelines to determine the size of the queuing area refer to the SSCP Calculations section on
page 59. Be aware of specific path of travel conflicts: queue should not interfere with other traffic
patterns or cross-traffic patterns. In some airports an attended station before the queue may be
required to check for tickets if only ticketed passengers are allowed through. The SSCP layout can
affect the queue dramatically. For example, a secondary row metal detector can significantly
reduce queue buildup and the space required for queuing.
b) Metal Detector
The metal detector is a walk-through arch for detection of any metallic items carried by the
individual. Depending on the arrangement, two rows of metal detectors may be desired (primary
and secondary rows), with space for crossing traffic and decision-making between the two.
Control of this in-between space is difficult, but important. Barriers, sometimes with automatic
gates that physically guide people, have been implemented in some SSCPs. Access to the metal
detector may also be restricted in some applications to one person at a time by automatic gates or
other devices. At least a one-meter distance (per ICAO) should separate nearby metal detectors
from each other and from x-ray machines. The secondary row metal detector has the major
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PART III
advantage of reducing queues by eliminating the procedure of people passing two or three times
through the primary detector while others wait. It does not at this time appear to increase overall
throughput rate, which is still governed by bag-screening times.
Data connections may be required to a supervisors desk or to a remote screening room. Metal
detectors are highly subject to electromagnetic interference, both in the immediate vicinity (wiring
in metal doors, poor shielding on wires between equipment, on gates, in conduit, overhead
lighting, duct work and power transformers) and at longer range (motors of passing trains). Metal
detectors are calibrated according to FAA guidelines. Attempts to recalibrate equipment on an adhoc basis to prevent spurious alarms from electromagnetic interference are a major source of
inaccuracies in the screening process. Therefore, eliminating interference problems is a key aspect
of checkpoint design. Also refer to the RF Section on page 120.
Width: Allow 33-36,

allow 6 between side-byside metal detectors.
Depth: Allow 24
Height: Allow 88
Weight: Approx. 100 lbs.
Power: 115/230 VAC, +/15%, 45- 65 Hz, 30 VA
Max.
Front view
Side view
Typical Metal Detector
Data: RS-232C interface

for connection with
terminal, computer, or
external modem; RS-232C
interface for network
connection with other metal
detectors. Place transmit
sides of side-by-side
detectors together,
receive sides separated.
This data is intended for use in

initial space planning only. It is
based on the SMD600 Multi Zone
unit by Ceia. Inside dimension of
metal detector is not ADA
complaint. Another means for
ADA compliant passage must be
provided.
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PART III
c)
Bin Pass Through

An area, generally a small table top, for small bins into which people put personal items that may
set off the metal detector. This process is called divesting. Where possible, people should be
required to pass all objects through either the metal detector or the x-ray machine. The alternative
is to pass the item to security screeners who would then physically inspect the items. Some bins
are being developed specifically for use on the x-ray machine belt. Divesting often takes a
considerable portion of the time spent going through a SSCP. It can be a source of irritation to
those in queue behind a person who is divesting slowly. One successful experiment designed
podiums for the bins several feet before the metal detectors and bin pass-throughs. This appears to
encourage people to begin to divest well before the metal detector, and therefore to speed up the
process.
Width: allow 15
Depth: allow 24
Top view
Side view
Height: ADA compliant
Typical Bin Pass-Through Table
d) X-Ray Machine
Space requirements for x-ray machines include space for loading bags onto conveyor, area for xray equipment, area for the operator, area for conveyor exiting the equipment; and areas for
secondary inspection. (See the Bag Hand-Search Area on page 51) The x-ray machine is the
largest and heaviest component of the SSCP. Floor structure must be provided or reinforced to
support the weight, and electric power provided.
Transparent or louvered barriers can help to prohibit access to the bag by the passenger
immediately after the bag exits the machine. The intent is to allow the screener to remove
potentially hazardous bags before the passenger does. Future designs may incorporate a shunting
device to keep people from retrieving their bags if they do not pass the x-ray inspection.
Typically monitors are mounted where an operator reviews them, controlling the rate at which the
images flow by. Interpreting the information it presents requires the most concentration and
training from the screener. An ergonomic, distraction-free environment for the screener is highly
desirable. Design interior lighting to avoid screen glare on monitors, and design the operating
space so that bright sunlight through windows does not wash out or produce glare on monitors.
The exit conveyor often has two sections, a slow-running section just exiting the x-ray, and a
faster conveyor to carry bags to where they will be retrieved. A faster and longer second-section
conveyor may be beneficial because it can put bags further past the metal detectors. This is
beneficial because people tend to congregate where the bags end up, and that can impede flow if it
is too close to the metal detectors. In general, the location at which bags from the x-ray machine
end up should be planned carefully in relation to overall flow issues, including especially where
people will be exiting primary and secondary row metal detectors.
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PART III
Exit Conveyor
Width: Allow 40
Depth: D: Allow 110
Shunting Arm
L1: Allow 24 for table
L2
L2: Allow 72 for slide

Barrier
Add 48 for high-speed exit

conveyor section.
Height: Allow 55
Conveyor
Weight: Allow 1,400 lbs, on four castors

for tunnel and conveyors.
X-ray Machine
Tunnel
Monitor(s)
D
Conveyor
Power: Standard 120 V, 60 hz., 16 amp

line; power cord is under exit
conveyor on back end of
machine. X-Ray and metal
detector should be on different
lines or phases to remove
Opening for conharmonics.
veyor & bags
Data:
H
Conveyor Belt
Depends on wireless vs. wired

system, check with design.
L1
W
Top view
Front view
Note: This data is intended for

use in initial space planning
only. It is based on the 522 unit
by Rapiscan.
Typical Layout for SSCP X-ray Equipment
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PART III
e)

An area in which persons wait to retrieve their bags that are exiting the x-ray machine, usually
consisting of a bed of rollers at the end of a conveyor, sometimes with a small table for bags to sit
on. This area can generate a queue space requirement because during and after retrieval persons
may need to spend time gathering and arranging their personal items, or they may pause to wait
for other members of their party. This area also should remain in view of people who are going
through the metal detector or otherwise being searched. In all cases, endeavor to keep bags within
a line of sight of their owners, to increase their level of comfort, to reduce theft, and to aid security
personnel to reconcile passengers and baggage in the event of problems or disputes.
Table
Queue
Area
Rollers at End
of Conveyor
Belt
Allow space for at least one or two

people to stand at table while
collecting bags and waiting for travel
partners. An even more generous
allowance of space for this queue is
recommended, since if a bag is held
up in the x-ray machine process, that
person and all following must wait
here for their bags.
Top view
Personal Item Retrieval
f)
Bag Hand-Search Area

Bags or other belongings that are identified as suspicious may need to be searched. By law, the
bags owner must be present for the search. A table, sometimes directly at the end of the bag
retrieval area, and sometimes set some distance away and/or to the side, should be planned for this
activity.
Width: Allow 24
H
W
Top view
D
Side view
Depth: Allow 48
Height: Comply with
codes
Bag Hand-Search Area
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PART III
g) Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) Equipment

Explosives trace detectors (ETDs) detect tiny amounts of particle and/or vapor residue of
explosives on bags. The process requires space for the machine, which usually sits on a tabletop;
the bag being screened, which usually has to be opened; the machine operator, and the bags
owner, who must observe the process. The trace detection area may share space with the bag handsearch area. There should be room for a small queue of bags and bag owners.
Table with
room for bag
search
Typical Design Considerations:
Equipment
Width: Detector + Pump allow 22.5
D
Depth: Allow 12.5

Height: Allow 12.5
Weight: (not a structural concern)

Power: 110/220 VAC; DC power options
available
Top view
Side view
Typical Area for Trace Detection Equipment
Note: This data is intended for use in

initial space planning only. It is
based on the IONSCAN 400 unit
by Barringer Technologies Inc.
h) Personal Search Area

The personal search area is an area in which a hand wand or other manual method is used to
resolve alarms for people who have set off the metal detector(s). It must be directly accessible
from the last metal detector that a person goes through. It should be located so that it does not
disrupt the flow of traffic departing from the SSCP. The personal search area is public and is
distinct from the separate room for private searches. One of the challenges of SSCP design is
ensuring that the person who has set off the metal detector remains under control and is firmly but
courteously guided to a personal search area without feeling unduly restrained from free
movement or being separated from personal belongings.
i) Barriers
Barriers prevent passage of nonscreened items or people from nonsterile to sterile sides. Newer
SSCPs may also include barriers in the SSCP system as a way of guiding people through the
process in a more controlled way. Some barriers may include automatic doors that may be
programmed to open or close to allow or prevent passage. Many barriers are 8 tall between exit
lanes and entrance lanes and are glazed for maximum sense of openness. Barriers between
nonsterile and sterile spaces that are not as well monitored might be as high as 12 feet, or should
be floor to ceiling when possible. The degree of public exposure and visual monitoring can affect
how physically secure, and perhaps how high these barriers must be. The guiding principle should
be to eliminate the passage of people or goods from nonsterile areas to sterile areas except through
monitored SSCPs or other controlled devices/processes.
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PART III
j)
k)
l)
m)
n)
o)
Two other barriers should be considered. The first would block off the SSCP when it is not in use,
to prevent contraband from being placed during off-hours to facilitate a later breach of security. It
also protects equipment and property from vandalism and theft. The second barrier type may be
incorporated into the airport design to allow portions of the facility to be sealed in the case of a
security breach, thereby reducing the numbers of people and flights affected.
Supervisors Area
A supervisor, who at a minimum may need a desk with a computer monitor and other
communication equipment, typically monitors each contiguous group of SSCP lanes. The
supervisors desk should have good visual contact with all activities in the SSCP area and promote
clear visual and audible communication between the SSCP personnel and the supervisor. Provide
telephone and data connections as well as pathways for current or future security duress/covert
alarms. In some installations, the supervisors area is just beyond, or to one side of the SSCP.
Often there is a podium for the supervisor at the edge of the SSCP before the sterile area, and may
be raised for better visibility and communication.
Private Search Room
The private search room is an area for searches that must be conducted in private at the request of
the passenger. The private search room should be large enough for three people: the detainee, the
searcher, and a witness. Consider that at least one of these persons may be within a wheelchair.
The room should be in close proximity to the SSCP, have a covert duress alarm, and be accessible
to the disabled. Also consider treating the room with acoustic isolation materials.
Special Security Room
Consider that security searches may result in complicated or confrontational situations. All SSCPs
should have some space set aside for a private area to resolve these situations. Larger installations
may have a dedicated room for law enforcement officials to use as a staging area and/or for
conflict resolution.
Personnel Private Areas
SSCP personnel typically need an area to keep personal possessions. The security operator may
also require space for staff training and meetings as well as minimal office space.
CCTV
Cameras increase a public sense of security, but primarily serve to record activity throughout the
airport, deter burglary, and capture visual records of security breach perpetrators. Images captured
on CCTV are sometimes sent instantly to designated monitors throughout an airport to facilitate
recognition of a perpetrator. In this application, correct placement of one or more cameras in the
SSCP area is critical. For example, a camera that can only show the back view of a person
breaching the SSCP is of very limited value, as opposed to a camera that displays a persons face
and other identifying characteristics. Additionally, CCTV can monitor unmanned SSCP areas for
greater security.
Data Connections
Connections from security equipment to LANs, phone lines, and remote screening rooms, from
equipment to supervisors desk, from supervisors desk to other selected points in the airport. In
the near future, data from all x-ray and trace machines will be collected automatically. Many new
airports install an information infrastructure, to which the SSCP data may be linked. The security
infrastructure may be a separate system from the data infrastructure, with firewalls between them.
A consistency of network protocols and termination equipment will facilitate the usage of
information. This will be an increasingly important element in SSCP design, and should be
considered carefully.
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p) Disabled Accessibility Clearances, Codes, and Courtesy

SSCPs must meet applicable local and national codes for life safety and accessibility. Universal
design is encouraged in which all people perceive that they can use the same paths and are treated
equally. ADA compliant turnstiles are available. In some cases, SSCP design will need to
accommodate existing building requirements.
q) Wheelchair Path
Wheelchairs must pass through the SSCP without breaching security, embarrassing the persons, or
causing delays, and be reasonably accessible to the private search area. Sometimes a separate lane
with a locked door is provided. In some cases the person may be brought the wrong way through
the exit lane and hand scanned, although this is discouraged because it could impede exit flow.
r) Luggage Cart Path
A luggage cart path is an area allowing the use of passenger luggage carts on both inbound and
outbound sides of the SSCP. One suggested procedural strategy, if sufficient space is available in
the design, is to provide a cart drop-off and pick-up station on either side of the SSCP, with a
machine that dispenses a token to be used on the other side of the checkpoint to pick up another
cart. The use of luggage carts is increasing in the United States, and universally popular in Europe.
The potential impact on screener staffing and distraction should be discussed with the responsible
aircraft operator.
s) Concessions Goods Path
Where concessions goods are delivered landside that are destined for sale or use in an airside
concessions area, a concessions goods path is typically needed. In some cases the carts of goods
are brought the wrong way through the exit lane, where the cart is visually scanned. The person
then walks around and through the SSCP, and subsequently retrieves the cart after it has been
searched. The issue of paths of transfer of concessions goods requires significant thought and
consultation with the airport. Depending on the frequency of deliveries, a separate transition
strategy, such as a concessions/deliveries checkpoint, could be provided.
t) Length of Response Corridor
After the SSCP, a length of hallway may be dedicated to detection and detention of persons
attempting to breach the SSCP. In some preexisting structures, the SSCPs are located in close
proximity to boarding gates. Where this situation exists, consider adding barriers between the
SSCP and the gate, e.g., a substantial plastic or laminated glass wall or offset panels so the SSCP
can be observed while permitting an immediate LEO response to an alarm at the gate or aircraft.
In new construction, planners and designers should consider separating boarding gates from the
SSCPs by a distance adequate to provide a significant delay so as to allow for a reasonable
response to a breach at the SSCP. The distance can be dedicated to other uses further downstream,
e.g., vendor stalls, conference rooms, etc. The area might also incorporate CCTV surveillance so
that breaches may be continually monitored until the person is stopped.
In all cases, breach alarms should be installed at both existing SSCPs and at locations that may be
designed to house future SSCPs during high-threat periods. In this way aircraft, especially those
located at more distant gates, can be quickly protected by the immediate closure and locking of
access doors and loading bridges upon alarm, and avoid delays resulting from a need to rescreen
passengers or to conduct extensive security sweeps of the entire concourse/pier/terminal.
2) Deplaning Direction
The following is a list of components that may be a critical part of the SSCP in deterring security
breach attempts while allowing free flow of deplaning pedestrian traffic from sterile areas to
nonsterile.
a) Travel Lane
A travel lane should be adequately sized for deplaning traffic flow exiting the concourse. This lane
may need to be sized to also meet building egress path width requirements. The location and size
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PART III
of the exit travel lane should be considered carefully to support good flow, clear wayfinding, and
enhanced security.
Some airports have incorporated special measures, such as revolving doors or turnstiles, capable
of blocking entry from the public side while permitting egress to those departing the sterile area,
although this must also allow sufficient space for the passage of the person with baggage, as well
as accommodate the disabled.
b) Security Guard Station
A security guard station is an area, often with a table and chair or podium, for a security person to
monitor and deter people attempting to bypass the SSCP by entering the sterile area through the
exit lane from the nonsterile side. The security guard should be located to intercept traffic moving
in pass-on-the-right patterns typical in the United States. The guard station must have
unobstructed view of the exiting flow well before the point of monitoring. This will provide
quicker response and prevention capabilities to reverse flow violations.
Normal flow
through exit lane
Normal flow
through exit lane
Barrier
Barrier
Guard
Wall
Screening
Area
Wall
Screening
Area
Breach
attempt
Better: Guard can
intercept quickly
Guard
Wall
Breach
attempt
Not as good: Guard
is restricted by flow
c)
Exit Lane Breach Detection and Control Devices

A device that senses wrong way movement indicating a breach of the exit lane (detection) is called
an exit lane breach detector. Usually an alarm sounds, and cameras may record the attempted breach.
Closing doors or other physical barriers located between the SSCP and the sterile area could be
linked with the alarm (control), although these must be carefully designed for safe operation. Some
automatic closing door systems that close quickly but harmlessly when approached without proper
authorization have been developed. These detection and barrier devices improve security controls
and should be considered for inclusion in moderate to high volume traffic situations.
d) CCTV
Cameras are increasingly used to monitor the approach of pedestrian traffic attempting to enter the
secure area through the exit lane. Some cameras are programmed to record all traffic and to send
recently recorded information to predefined monitors if a breach alarm is activated.
e)
Integrated Systems
As in the nonsterile to sterile movement components, there are integrated systems available for
exit lanes. These allow video cameras, sensors, and video monitors, with supporting architectural
elements to be integrated into the overall SSCP systems, with centralized control.
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3) Components Under Development

There are numerous government and commercial entities continually involved in the development of
new technologies and concepts to enhance security. Some of them have proven their worth and been
made commercially available worldwide; others, although good in theory, have proven in practice to
be impractical or otherwise not feasible in an operating airport environment. Others are still in the
primary stages of conceptual development, or are enhanced derivatives of earlier technologies that are
being revised after field-testing.
The point is that the entire field of security technology is a dynamic and rapidly changing entity. No matter
how carefully an airport is designed to take maximum advantage of the current technology, designs must be
sufficiently flexible to meet changing needs and changing hardware. Machines may get smaller but slower;
or larger and faster, or both, requiring the entire airport security managerial infrastructure to make important
and often expensive decisions, which the designer must then accommodate. The designers task will be
easier if the original design has anticipated the need for change.
Many of these are merely notional at this writing; they may or may not prove sufficiently effective to
be implemented at airports in the future. However, they are offered so that the reader may consider a
sufficient range of flexibility in design to accommodate these or other technologies that may evolve.
Some of those new developments will likely include:
a) Personal Explosives Trace Detection Arch
Travel lane that integrates an arch (or portal) for detection of trace amounts of explosives. This
device is similar to the metal detector in terms of walking through an arch. However, it is likely to
require the person being searched to pause in the archway. One trend is that this type of
detection may be combined with metal detection to provide one walk-through unit for both.
b) Bulk Explosives Detectors
Bulk detection refers to those technologies that make a determination with regard to the presence
of explosives based on unique characteristics of a physical mass. Examples of bulk detection
technologies for checkpoint screening include EDS and nuclear quadropole resonance (NQR), as
well as other new technologies under development. Similar to x-ray screening concepts, these
explosives detection devices will require areas for loading bags onto conveyor, areas for
equipment, areas for the operator, areas for conveyor exiting the equipment and areas for
secondary inspection which may involve reuniting the person with the item being searched. EDSs
are in use for checked baggage, and there is ongoing development to make them smaller and more
efficient. In-line explosives detection scanners for checkpoints are anticipated in the future,
although for long-term design purposes it is not yet clear if this equipment is likely to be larger
and heavier than x-ray scanning equipment, or how sensitive to electromagnetic interference. NQR
could be applied as part of a detection system to screen carry-on baggage, configured as a portal
for screening people, or possibly be configured as a hand wand. All of these applications are
currently being studied to look at application of the NQR techniques in these modes of inspection.
c) Multidetection Tunnel
A future trend may be the integration of x-ray visual type searching of bags with explosives
detection and metal detection devices. Some ideas about the future of SSCP design include a short
hallway or tunnel down which a person would walk, undergoing several types of search and
detection simultaneously and invisibly. For example, part of the hall could be a metal detector, and
another could be the trace detection system. The results of the scan tests could be monitored in a
remote room. Simultaneously, the persons bags could run along a conveyor parallel to this hall,
and be scanned with x-ray and EDS technology.
A benefit of this hallway approach could be a perception of low intrusion on the passenger
experience. A potential shortcoming could be confining designs with unfriendly lighting creating
an unpleasant experience. Another challenge to this design is the inherent tendency of an enclosed
hallway to prevent a visual connection between the person and the bags that are on a separate
track. Fully or partially glazed walls could reduce this problem.
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PART III
At some point personal advanced technology scanning may be developed in an acceptable fashion
that would allow a person to walk through the SSCP without being separated from their personal
belongings and bags. In the United States, only in some Customs locations, a person may choose to
be subjected to a low-level x-ray body search in lieu of a hand-search. In the current technology, the
image of the body is a shortened and somewhat fuzzy blur, while metal objects show as hard clear
images. This image can also be used to identify concealed drugs on the body. This technology is not
currently being used in SSCPs due to concerns about privacy and civil liberties. However, products
are being developed to further reduce the specificity of the body in order to gain acceptance for more
general use. This technology may have applications in future SSCP designs, either as stand-alone
units, or as part of the multi-detection hallway design.
d) Supervisor Command Center
Some SSCP designs incorporate a supervisors post with visual control and equipment
connections that in essence becomes a command post. It may be elevated above the floor level for
better visibility. It may require a substantial amount of wiring for electronic equipment for
communication within the SSCP and throughout the airport.
e) Remote Screening Room
Portions of the screening process can be automated by use of a remote room or area where security
personnel can assess x-ray and CCTV images and monitor SSCPs. Remote screening rooms are
connected via data and communications connections to one or multiple SSCPs and may result in
benefits such as reduced manpower, less operator distraction, and better capability to share screening
personnel between multiple SSCPs during peak or sporadic periods.
f) Prescreening Preparation Instruction Zone
This zone is an area in front of the SSCP that uses architectural features, simple signage and
instructional videos, and ambassador staff to create a calming atmosphere and more efficient
throughput as well as instruct and direct passengers for efficient screening flow.
g) Automated Breach Detectors
Some automated breach detectors already exist in successful airport applications; they use various
technologies such as doppler wave, infrared and others to allow passage in the appropriate
direction while alarming if there is movement through the zone toward the sterile area.
h) Limited Application Explosives Trace Detectors
Variations of Explosives Trace Detectors which are specifically designed for the limited application
of the screening of tickets, boarding cards, documents, or other items handled by passengers.
4) Designing for the Future
Bear in mind that new technologies and new concepts are evolving constantly - larger and faster
equipment for higher throughput at crowded airports, and smaller, slower, but less expensive
equipment for smaller operations. It is important to remain as flexible as possible in the design of
SSCPs and the surrounding area available for them. The designer should work closely with the
appropriate people to find the right balance of initial cost and space use relative to future expansion
needs. Strategies for future expansion should be recorded so that when it is time to implement them,
the future project leaders can work effectively within the framework that was intended in the original
design. The need for this kind of long term design and the recording of it may be discussed with the
client as a scope of work item. Where possible, avoid designs that might limit growth and restrict
future modifications, or ones that would be so expensive or cumbersome that new technology and
innovative ideas would become impractical to employ.
5) Argus
Argus is a concept recently added to the EDS lexicon. Its name is drawn from Greek mythology; he is
the all-observant watchman with 100 eyes. In airports, it refers to a set of standards for smaller and less
expensive baggage screening devices that would be particularly appropriate for small and medium
sized airports with relatively low baggage throughput.
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PART III
Argus is not a specific machine; it is a set of criteria against which various manufacturers are designing
machines that are significantly less expensive, smaller, lighter, more user friendly, with more flexible
installation options and lower maintenance costs, and yet equally as effective as their larger
counterparts. Machines meeting Argus criteria will be certified for EDS operations; however, they
are considerably slower, which is more applicable for low throughput operations.
There are two other potential benefits of an Argus machine. First, it is configured as a one-operator
system, although additional personnel may be necessary to transport bags to and from the machine.
Second, it can be configured as a one-sided operation, for example, up against a wall, where the bags
enter and leave the machine through the same portal. This can save a considerable amount of space for
unnecessary baggage belt systems, and may allow machine placements in unique locations not
available to the larger machines.
One of the relatively short-term FAA goals for baggage screening is 100% CAPPS plus EDS for
selectees by 2004, and by the end of 2009 FAA intends to begin implementation of 100% baggage
screening. First Argus deliveries are expected in the latter part of 2002.
f.
Personnel and Operations at the SSCP

1) Space Needs for Equipment Operators
The people who staff the SSCP require space in which to operate, and space to move from place to place in
order to fulfill their duties. These spatial needs vary depending on the type of SSCP installation. Some
SSCP designs depend heavily on people to: 1) Monitor each piece of equipment and make on-the-spot
decisions; 2) Provide a human point of contact for persons with questions or difficulties; and 3) Provide
supervision. These SSCPs may require significant space for staff. Other SSCP designs may incorporate
automated instructional and control devices and remote rooms where monitoring equipment and personnel
are located. In these, the immediate checkpoint space required for staff may be significantly less. The
designer should ascertain the staff requirements for the type of design that the airport or aircraft operator
client intends to operate. If that information were not available, it would be better to err on the side of
providing enough space for a fully staffed SSCP. On the other hand, note that staff salaries are often
considered by aircraft operators to be a significant cost, and floor space in airports is usually at a premium.
Thus, the size of the space allowed for the SSCP should be considered carefully.
The actual space requirements for the operator of each piece of equipment can be evaluated by
understanding how the equipment is used. Some of this information is found in the SSCP Components
section on page 46. More refined information should be obtained as the actual SSCP equipment is specified
and laid out. Equipment manufacturers should be happy to provide information on how their equipment is
staffed. Security experts can also provide advice and professional layout assistance.
The scale of operations will have a large effect on how equipment is staffed. Very small operations in
which the pilot may also screen the bags may have no people dedicated solely to the screening process.
Small operations that do have dedicated screening personnel may still have one person doing many
tasks. Very large operations, however, may have personnel in addition to those required for specific
tasks, and those personnel may supervise the SSCP and /or assist persons being screened.
2) Layouts for Operational Efficiency
The decisions that SSCP personnel make are the decisions that determine whether an acceptable level of
detection at a SSCP is maintained or not. Good decision-making is supported by good layout design. Bad
layouts, for example, may include positioning an x-ray screener, who should be concentrating on a
computer monitor with complex visual information, such that his or her field of vision is routinely
interrupted by the activity of persons going through the SSCP. Also, screeners with this role should not
easily be able to be approached for questions or conversation by people other than other screeners. As
another example, the designer should be aware that locating the x-ray machine so that the screener
monitoring that machine is directly adjacent to a bypass lane is likely to result in that screener being
distracted by the activity in the bypass lane, or even being asked to assist with the activity in it.
A common layout for larger SSCPs at the time of this writing incorporates two metal detectors in the
primary row and one behind them, in the secondary row. While the secondary row metal detector has
proved to be effective in reducing queues, the designer may consider replacing the two primary row metal
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PART III
detectors with a single one. This should not reduce flow rate, as the action of walking through the metal
detector is one of the quickest actions that a person being screened will undertake. However, it will allow
the screener controlling the primary row of metal detectors to concentrate on one device rather than two,
greatly reducing distractions. The decision regarding whether to use one or two metal detectors in the
primary row per each two x-ray machines should be made in consultation with the client as referred to in
the Essential Coordination section on page 40.
3) Designing for the Process
As in any design problem, a good design must conform to the activity that it supports. Procedures are in
place and being further refined which outline the process that every person and bag must undergo in order to
properly fulfill the goals of the SSCP. It is critical that the SSCP layout support and enhance this process.
For example, as persons to be screened approach the line of metal detectors and x-ray machines in a
contemporary SSCP, there are three discrete components of the process that they may be expected to
accomplish, i.e., divesting (removing small personal items from pockets, etc.), placing larger items on the xray bag belt, and walking through the metal detector. The layout should respond to the fact that divesting
and placing items on the belt are each activities that take a certain amount of time. They also are activities
that should begin well before the person to be screened reaches the metal detector.
Layout designs which position small divesting bins well before the metal detectors will encourage people to
think about divesting and to begin the divesting process in time to have it completed when it is their turn to
go through the metal detector. Be aware that this would require someone to replenish bins as they are used.
This may not be economically feasible, but it may dovetail well with the concept of a person in front of the
SSCP dedicated to assisting and directing people, which may enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the
SSCP. The designer may consider conveyor belts with a somewhat longer presentation length on the nonsterile side, which would allow more time for people in line to begin placing bags on the belt.
4) Architectural Design to Support Intuitive Processes
On a very basic level, the architectural materials and lighting can play a key role in encouraging the
successful operation of the SSCP. A floor color or material, for example, creating a large entrance mat
area in front of (on the nonsterile side of) the metal detectors and x-ray machines can clearly mark the
area that is intended for queuing. By using a different floor material or color in front of (on the non-sterile
side of) the exit lane, it may become more intuitive to those on the non-sterile side that they are not
supposed to go through the exit lane. Other material, spatial, or lighting clues may be used to reinforce
the paths that the operation of the SSCP has defined as desirable.
5) Signage
Simple and effective signage can be used to direct and instruct users of the SSCP, to reduce confusion,
increase speed and level of service. Signage should be kept very simple and must be integrated with
the overall terminal signage program. Video monitors could be used to illustrate the three steps of
divesting, loading bags on the conveyor, and walking through the metal detector in much the same way
as they are used on aircraft to illustrate emergency safety procedures.
6) Space for Personal Belongings
Accommodation should be made regarding personal belongings and space set aside for breaks for the
SSCP staff. Typically, they do not have another location within the airport that they can identify as
theirs. For both practical reasons and reasons of morale, enough space should be given to secure coats
and other personal belongings. A break room or break area should be incorporated. However, this area
should not be in view of the public as persons desiring assistance may not be pleased to see staff taking
a legitimate break if they feel they should be being served.
g.
SSCP Calculations
This section presents calculations used to determine the number, size and configuration of required SSCPs.
Growth factors for anticipated future increases in traffic and the accompanying increases in expanded
terminal space should also be considered by the planner, bearing in mind that there are typically
several years lag time between conceptual terminal design and actual construction, and that FAA
estimates between 3%-5% annual passenger growth.
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The planners calculations must also adjust estimates of peak hour volumes for situations where split
operations, multiterminal operations and multiple SSCP may serve to distribute peaks, either evenly or
unevenly, throughout various terminals and/or concourses.
Similar calculations and formulas are used by International Air Transport Association (IATA) and planners
in the United Kingdoms Department of Transport document Aviation Security In Airport Development.
1) Planning Passenger Volume

Airports experience very large variations in demand levels over time which can be described in terms of:
Annual variation over time
Monthly peaks within a particular year
Daily peaks within a particular month or week
Hourly peaks within a particular day
Many airport terminals are busy for various time segments in a day, and have no traffic for some other
periods during the day. In order to determine the number of SSCPs, annual or daily demand does not
provide sufficient information. There is a need to capture the levels of demand on the SSCPs for the peak
periods during the planning day. However, the choice of the planning day is important. It is not advisable
to select the planning day as the busiest day of the entire year since that will oversize the facility,
resulting in underutilization and high design and building costs.
One commonly used technique is to identify a peak hour for which the facility is to be designed and
compute the total passenger volume for that period. The peak hour volumes typically range from 10%
to 20% of the daily volume. There are several methods to determine the design load on the SSCPs, and
the list below identifies four methods1:
a) Typical Peak Hour Passengers (TPHP)
b) Busy Day/ Peak Hour (BDPH)
c) Standard Busy Rate (SBR)
d) Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
Ashford, Norman, H. P. Martin Stanton and Clifton A. Moore, Airport Operations, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill, 1997.
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a)
Typical Peak Hour Passengers (TPHP)

The FAA suggests the planning day to be the Average Day of the Peak Month (ADPM). ADPM
represents the most common method of converting planning statistics to a daily and ultimately to
an hourly demand baseline2. The determination of ADPM requires the identification of the peak
month for the facility under consideration. Most common peak months are July and August. The
next step is to identify an average day demand profile for the peak month. This is typically
calculated by dividing the peak month demand by the number of days in the peak month.
The Typical Peak Hour Passengers denote the number of passengers for the peak hour of the
planning day (ADPM). The peak hour in a planning day can be calculated based on the actual
flight schedule for the ADPM. Typically, large airports have peak hour volume of 10 to 20 percent
of the daily volume. If the actual flight schedule is not available, the TPHP can be computed from
the annual flows as shown in Figure 1. As seen in this figure, the peak is more pronounced for
smaller airports, and as airports grow larger, the peaks flatten since there are departures and
arrivals scheduled throughout the day. For SSCP design purposes, only the annual departures
(enplanements) should be considered in the peak hour volume. If the annual volume includes both
arriving and departing passengers, one can assume that half of the total volume accounts for the
departing passengers. Greeters, family, etc., are accommodated in the formulas.
TPHP as a Percentage of Annual Flows
TPHP Percentage
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
100,000
1,000,000
10,000,000
100,000,000
Annual passengers (Logarithmic Scale)
Figure 1 FAA Recommended Relationship for TPHP Computations from Annual Figures
b) Busy Day/Peak Hour (BDPH)
IATA suggests the Busy Day/Peak Hour method for design and planning purposes. The busy
day is defined as the second busiest day in an average week during a peak month. An average
weekly pattern of passenger traffic is calculated for that month. Peaks associated with special
times such as national holidays, festivals, fairs, special events are excluded. The busy day data can
be obtained from the airport tower log. Once the aircraft movements are obtained, passenger
volumes can be plotted by time-of-day with appropriate load factor assumptions. This will lead to
the selection of peak hour and corresponding passenger volume within that 60-minute period. The
detailed security checkpoint planning will then be based upon the busy hour passenger volume.3
Take care that calculations are not skewed by airline scheduling anomalies, such as the common
practice of multiple airlines scheduling their first flight of the day at 6:59 a.m. or 7:59 a.m. in
order to be the first one listed in the reservations computers.
2
3
USDOT FAA Advisory Circular. Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities, 4/22/1988.
IATA, Airport Development Reference Manual, 8th edition, 1995.
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c)
Standard Busy Rate (SBR)

The Standard Busy Rate measure is mostly used in Europe. It is defined as the anticipated level of
demand during a busy hour. For example, some European airports use 30th busiest hour of
passenger flow for the entire year. SBR demand in practice is very similar to that of TPHP. The
IATA recommends that the extraordinarily high-traffic seen for major holidays be excluded in
selecting busy periods.4
d) Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
The Busy Hour Rate is a variation of the SBR where the volume is estimated by the rate above
which 5 percent of the traffic at the airport is handled. It is computed by ranking the hourly
operational volumes for the entire year, and then selecting the hourly volume for which 5% of all
hourly volumes is exceeded.
There are other lesser-used techniques utilized to compute the peak volume; namely Busiest Timetable
Hour, Peak Profile Hour, and several other variations.
2) Calculations
The calculations presented in this section should be used as a general guideline to determine the
number of SSCPs. In order to estimate the number of required SSCPs, the following parameters need
to be defined first.
a) Demand Parameters
P = Planning hour passenger enplanement volume. (People per hour)
T = Percentage of transfer passengers that bypass screening. E.g., 0.2 represents 20% of
passengers connecting within the secured area, who thus need not go through screening.
k = A percentage of originating passengers to represent meeters/greeters, well-wishers,
employees, and vendors using the SSCPs.
r = Demand scale factor between 1 and 1.4 to account for variability of arrival rate
through the planning hour.
L = Effective demand on the SSCP. (Includes passengers, meeters/ greeters, wellwishers, and airport employees.)
b) SSCP Parameters
S = Service rate of the SSCP. (People per hour)
f
= SSCP utilization factor. Typically between 0.80 and 0.95. This multiplier represents the
utilization factor for both the equipment and staff. It is essential in the design that the
equipment and staff is not designed to operate on full capacity. This factor accounts for
equipment breakdowns, staffing fluctuations, and other disruptions in the process.
X = X-ray belt service rate. (Bags per hour)
B = Number of carry-on bags per passenger.
The effective hourly load on the SSCPs is a function of the peak hour enplanements, the transfer
percentages within the secured area, other traffic such as the meeters/greeters, well wishers, employees
and vendors represented as a percentage of enplanements, as well as the demand scale factor r.
L = P * (1 T ) * (1 + k ) * r
Equation 1
The demand scale factor r plays an important role in determining the true peak load on the SSCPs.
Consider the following example. Assume a peak flow of P=1,600 enplaning passengers per hour,
with T=25% of passengers transferring within the secured area and other traffic (meeters/greeters,
well wishers, employees and vendors) accounting for k=15% of enplaning passengers. With a
demand scale factor of r=1, the effective hourly load on the SSCP is:
L = 1,600 * (1 0.25) * (1 + 0.15) * 1.0 = 1,600 * 0.75 * 1.15 * 1.0 = 1,380

4
Measuring Airport Landside Capacity, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Spec. Report 215, Washington, D.C., 1987.
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In this example, L=1,380 indicates a constant arrival pattern where people arrive to the SSCP with
1,380/60=23 people per minute. However, this will not be the case in many airports. Figure 2 shows
three different arrival patterns, all of which have the same arrival rate of 1,380 passengers per hour.
Passengers
Per Minute
Passenger Arrival Rate to SSCPs
50
B - Typical Arrival
C - Busy Hub Arrival
40
30
20
10
A- Constant Arrival
0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Minutes
Figure 2 Different Arrival Rates to SSCPs - All Cases with 1,380 passengers per hour
Case A assumes a constant arrival pattern where arriving passengers are spread uniformly. This
results in a constant demand on the SSCPs with 23 passengers per minute.
Case B is more realistic by assuming random arrivals where the per minute rate changes between
10 to 40 passengers per minute, with the same total of 1,380 passengers arriving in an hour.
Case C also has variation in the number of passengers arriving per minute, but also with a total of
1,380 passengers arriving in an hour. However, in this case, the arrivals peak in the middle of the
peak hour.
c)
The Effect of Demand Scale Factor r

The demand scale factor r is used to represent the effective demand on the SSCPs. This quantity
typically ranges from 1.0 to 1.5 depending on the variation in the arrival process.
i) Case A - Constant Arrival No Variation
In this case, the demand scale factor r can be set to 1.0. Case A in Figure 2 represents this.
This case is not very realistic since passengers do not arrive at the SSCP in a constant flow or
pattern.
ii) Case B - Typical Arrival Medium Variation
This case represents medium variation in the demand, and is seen in main SSCPs used by
originating passengers in medium-scale airports. In this scenario, the arrival rate is metered by
the ticketing operation. This case presents more load on the SSCPs due to randomness in the
arrival pattern, thus warrants the use of larger r, possibly between 1.0 to 1.2. Case B in Figure
2 represents this.
iii) Case C - Busy Hub High Variation
This is a typical arrival patterns for hub operations during busy bank departures. This case
warrants for the use of large r, possibly between 1.1 and 1.4. Case C in Figure 2 represents
this. The choice of large r is also warranted for large transfer operations that require security
processing.
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PART III
3) Number of Checkpoints Centralized (General Configuration)

This section presents general formulas and calculations for determining the number of checkpoints for
a centralized SSCP.
a) Required parameters
P = Peak hour enplanements
T = Transfer percentage
k = Percentage of enplaning passengers to account for other airport traffic
r = Demand scale factor between 1 and 1.5
f
= SSCP utilization factor
S = SSCP service rate in people per hour
b) Number of Checkpoints
The formula shown below can be used to determine the required number of checkpoint stations:
N checkpo int s =
c)
Example
P =
T =
k =
r
f
S
=
=
=
P * (1 T ) * (1 + k ) * r
S* f
Equation 2
1,600 passenger per peak hour.

25% of passengers transferring within the secured area.
15% of enplaning passengers to account for other traffic (meeters/greeter, well
wishers, employees and vendors.)
Demand scale factor of 1.2 to account for randomness in arrival pattern.
80%
600 people per hour.
N checkponts ( r =1.2 ) =
1,380 * 1.2
= 3.45 = 4
600 * 0.8
In this example, the demand scale factor of r=1.2 dictates 4 screening stations. To facilitate the
discussion on the effect of r, lets assume that the facility serves a uniform demand, thus r=1.
Under this scenario, the total number of required screening checkpoints is calculated as:
N checkpo int s ( r =1) =
1,380 * 1.0
= 2.875 = 3
600 * 0.8
This example shows the importance of demand pattern throughout the peak hour. If arrivals
throughout the peak hour can be assumed to follow a uniform pattern, than r should be set to 1.
However, arrivals follow a bell-curve shape throughout the peak hour, thus setting r to 1.2 is more
realistic.
4) Number of Checkpoints Centralized (X-Ray + Metal Detector)
In this common SSCP setup, a combination of x-ray belt and metal detector is used to check baggage
and passenger, respectively.
f
X = X-ray belt service rate in bags per hour
B = Number of carry on bags per passenger
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PART III
The required number of x-ray processing stations are:
P * (1 T ) * (1 + k ) * r * B
X*f
N x ray =
c)
Example
P =
T =
k =
r
f
X
B
=
=
=
=
N x ray =
1,200 passengers per hour

50% of passengers transferring within the secured area
15% of enplaning passengers to account for other traffic (meeters/greeter, well
Demand scale factor of 1.2
SSCP utilization factor of 0.9
700 bags per hour
An average of 1.5 bags per passenger
1,200 * (1 0.50) * (1 + 0.15) * 1.5 * 1.2

= 1.97 = 2
700 * 0.9
This formula results in 2 x-ray devices, which could be served by a common metal detector, and a
secondary manual search station staffed accordingly.
5) Number of Checkpoints Holdroom (X-Ray + Metal Detector)
This section presents security checkpoint sizing formulas where SSCPs are placed at the entrance of
the holdroom. In this scenario, the terminal concourse is not secured, and passengers clear security
only at the gate holdroom. It is assumed that a combination of x-ray belt and metal detector is used to
check baggage and passenger, respectively.
M = Maximum number of passengers on a departing flight handled at the gate holdroom.
T = Transfer/through percentage
f
X = X-ray belt service rate in bags per hour
B = Number of carry on bags per passenger
G = Duration of time (in minutes) that holdroom is open. This is typically reflected by the
difference between the time of arrival of the first passenger to the holdroom and the
time when the last passenger is on board.
The required number of x-ray processing stations are:
N x ray =
c)
Example
M =
T =
k =
r =
f
=
X =
B =
G =
M * (1 T ) * (1 + k ) * r * B
X * f * (G / 60)
340 passengers
10% (The percentage of through passengers that remain on board)
0% (Only passengers holding boarding ticket/cards are allowed in the holdroom)
Demand scale factor of 1.2
SSCP utilization factor of 0.9
800 bags per hour
An average of 1.5 bags per passenger
The gate is open for 50 minutes prior to the departure
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PART III
N x ray =
340 * (1 0.10) * (1 + 0) * 1.5 *1.2

= 0.918 = 1
800 * 0.9 * (50 / 60)
The formula results in 1 x-ray device, which can be served by a metal detector and a secondary
manual search station.
When the holdroom serves more than one gate with simultaneous departures, the parameter M
needs to be adjusted to represent the sum of all passengers leaving the holdroom in an hour.
6) Queue Size
The space needed for queuing in front of the SSCP and the amount of time passengers wait to be
processed are both dependent upon the SSCP processing rates. The higher the processing capacity, the
queues and wait times will be shorter. In designing the space around the SSCP, one often targets a
maximum waiting time tolerable by individuals. This time is typically in the magnitude of 2 to 8 minutes.
There is a theoretical queuing rule known as Littles Result that shows that the average number waiting in
the queue is a product of the arrival rate and the average waiting time in the queue.5 Using this result, the
equation below gives the necessary queue size.
Wtarget = The target maximum wait time in the queue. Typically between 2 to 8 minutes.
The effective demand on the SSCP is denoted by L and is described below.
Lminutes =
P * (1 T ) * (1 + k ) * r
60
The number of people waiting to be serviced by the SSCPs can be expressed as:
Q N = Lminutes * Wtarget
b) Example
Lets consider the example provided earlier that required 2 x-ray processors:
P = 1,200 passengers per hour
T = 50% of passengers transferring within the secured area
k = 15% of enplaning passengers to account for other traffic (meeters/greeter, well
r = Demand scale factor of 1.2
Wtarget = Tolerable wait time of 5 minutes
The effective demand per minute is given by L:
Lminutes =
1,200 * (1 0.5) * (1 + 0.15) * 1.2

= 13.8
60
With target maximum waiting time of Wtarget=5, the number of people expected to queue in front
of the SSCP is given by QN:
Q N = 13.8 * 5 = 69
With two x-ray machines, there will be two queues each with approximately 35 passengers.
Kleinrock, Leonard, Queuing Systems, Volume II: Computer Applications, John Wiley & Sons, 1976.
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PART III
7) Other Research
The impact of a specific SSCP layout can be analyzed in detail through analytical modeling techniques
such Network Analysis, Queuing Theory, and Simulation.6,7 The Network Analysis and Queuing
Theory approaches have the drawback of making unrealistic assumptions regarding the arrival rates
and service time distributions. Simulation however, can account for the actual system under
consideration and provide detailed information regarding the passenger waiting times, queue lengths,
and level of service in terms of area per passenger around SSCPs.
The reader is also referred to Appendix B, Airport Security Flow Modeling, for additional information.
h.
Typical SSCP Layouts

So far, this section has approached SSCP layout in terms of broad overall issues, with detail on each
component. The following section shows how the detailed components can be assembled into functional
SSCPs.
Many physical pieces of equipment, and the people to staff them, are brought together in the SSCP to
achieve the goal of enhancing air travel safety by detecting and preventing the passage of contraband. This
goal is achieved in essence by designing a set of procedures for detection and for dealing with detected
objects. The physical components and staff of the SSCP are simply the means to carry out the designed
procedure. As such, it is critical in the layout of SSCPs to understand the elements of this procedure in
order to design correctly.
While remembering that ultimately the SSCP is about, for, and run by people, it may be helpful in some
respects to think of it as an assembly line, in which certain procedures take place in an orderly, repetitive
way. The benefits of this are that security staff are less likely to make mistakes when they know exactly
what to do and in what order, people being screened are more likely to be prepared if there is a procedure
that they understand, and security supervisors can more easily monitor activities if out-of sequence
activities can be recognized against the background of a well-defined process.
Having established that the SSCP layout must be designed closely in accordance with a well-defined
process, it must be said that such a process has not at this time been fully put in place. Most SSCPs do have
effective means in place of detecting contraband. However, this goal could be achieved more quickly,
efficiently, and cost-effectively with a better-defined and more universal process. Until a more universal
process comes into use, the designer should work closely with the airport, airlines, and other parties to
understand what process will be used for security screening, and design accordingly.
A host of airport operators, aircraft operators, security services providers, airport engineers and planners,
architects and designers, and security design specialists have been working for the past several years on
various SSCP installations, and a relatively consistent model for the SSCPs being built today has emerged.
Therefore, although every installation is different, it is possible to outline a layout that demonstrates many
of the features that are in common use in new or recently remodeled installations.
While reviewing the following SSCP layouts, remember that very small and very large airports may have
operations that are not well served by them. Also, many airports were designed before the principles of
today were being applied, and these SSCPs may not have space for the different functions and best spatial
relationships.
While reviewing the following SSCP layouts, keep in mind that:
There should be consideration of at least two lanes at each SSCP to accommodate equipment
failure in one of the lanes;
Each SSCP should be capable of rapid expansion to additional lanes and/or moving to additional
locations to permit the unimpeded processing of large numbers of peak-period passengers. These
additional facilities can be closed when not needed.
Ashford, Norman and Paul H. Wright, Airport Engineering, 3rd edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1992.
Chambers, Edward V.C et. al., A Systems Analysis Procedure for Estimating the Capacity of an Airport: System Definition, Capacity Definition
and Review of Available Models, Research Memo 27, Council for Advanced Transportation Studies, The University of Texas at Austin, 1975.
7
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PART III
Layout A
SUPERVISORS PODIUM
HAND BAG SEARCH &

TRACE DETECTION TABLES
SINGLE
SECONDARY
ROW M.D. W/
GUIDE WALLS
QUEUE FOR
BAGS
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
ADA OPNG
8 HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS
TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
QUEUING
AREA
Layout A: A Typical New SSCP in the year 2000
Features of Layout A:
Two metal detectors side-by-side in the primary row provide redundancy if one malfunctions. This is a very
common layout. Usually one staff person is monitoring both primary metal detectors. If there is an alarm and the
staff person did not see which machine went off, there can be a delay while the situation is clarified. See Layout B-1
for a potential SSCP layout with one metal detector for each two x-ray machines.
A metal detector in the secondary row reduces queues on non-sterile side of SSCP by allowing those who fail at
the primary row metal detector to move forward instead of backing up and holding up the line. Note the location of
the secondary metal detector relative to the end of the conveyor belt where bags will be picked up. Avoid SSCP
layouts that require a person to go backwards from the secondary to pick up bags.
A Bin Pass-Through beside each metal detector provides a place for people to place small items. The designer
should check whether the process called for includes this, or whether all items are required to go through either the
metal detector or the x-ray machine. Bins are being developed that could allow small articles to go through the x-ray
machine. The time that people spend divesting on the non-sterile side, and the time they spend re-vesting on the
sterile side of the metal detector is significantly higher than the time spent actually walking through the arch and is
one of the larger delays that have been observed. Another part of the process that requires significant time is
unloading of bags onto the x-ray machine conveyor belt. See Layout A-1 for a possible solution for reducing
divesting and layout time.
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PART III
Layout A-1
SEE LAYOUT A FOR TYPICAL NOTES
VIDEO
MONITORS
PODIUMS
WELCOME MAT
Layout A-1: Preparation area before metal detectors could ease SSCP confusion and speed process.
Podiums with pass-through bins set beside the queues as people approach the SSCP from the non-sterile side may be
used to allow early divestiture, which has the potential to reduce delays significantly. A common delay is caused by
someone realizing late that they need to divest, and holding up the line as they do so.
A SSCP staff person would be required to replenish the bins. However, such a person could be performing several
general assistance tasks such as with strollers and wheelchairs, and provide information and instruction, thereby
significantly increasing the level of service and throughput rate of the SSCP.
Creating a welcome mat by using floor and ceiling patterns, lighting, and limited greeting and instructional
signage could ease the screening process by giving clear clues as to what is required and when.
Video monitors could be installed that illustrate, just as the videos do now on aircraft, the three basic steps of
unloading bags, divesting small objects, and stepping through the arch. By seeing it on the video, people have a
clearer idea of what is expected and have something to watch while waiting.
Potentially, longer feed conveyors could allow more people to load before reaching the actual metal detection arch.
On the other hand, be aware that most people are very reluctant to step through the arch until they see their bags
actually pass into the body of the x-ray machine.
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PART III
Layout A-2
SUPERVISORS PODIUM
HAND BAG SEARCH &

SINGLE
SECONDARY
ROW M.D. W/
GUIDE WALLS
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
8 HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS
TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
NOTE: ADA ACCESS IS
REQUIRED IN ALL
LAYOUTS
Layout A-2: Extended higher speed conveyors move retrieval point away from metal detectors.
Longer conveyors running at a fairly high speed on the exiting side of the x-ray machine could place bags further
away from the metal detectors. The benefit is that the tendency of people to stand while they put back on their
various bags and personal items, and to wait for other members of their party, would occur further down and out of
the way of the secondary metal detector and personal hand searches. The flow of people who have passed through
the primary metal detectors and are trying to walk straight on into the concourse would not be impeded.
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PART III
Layout A-3
QUEUE FOR
BAGS
Layout A-3: Angled or offset retrieval areas move process out of flow stream.
Angling or offsetting the retrieval areas may be another way to create areas for people to stand in while they put
their bags and belongings back together and wait for friends. The idea is to create clear pathways for flow, and to
create offset areas for activities that receive stopping, like eddies out of the flow of the main stream.
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PART III
Layout A-4
SUPERVISORS PODIUM
HAND BAG SEARCH &

SINGLE
SECONDARY
ROW M.D. W/
GUIDE WALLS
CLEAR
SHIELD
EXIT LANE
FAST
LANE
8 HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS
TWO PRIMARY
ROW METAL
DETECTORS
QUEUING
AREA
Layout A-4: SSCP Fast Lane for passengers without bags.

A separate SSCP lane for people without bags could provide a higher rate of throughput for the lane.
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PART III
Layout B
SUPERVISORS PODIUM
HAND BAG SEARCH &

EXIT LANE
8 HIGH MIN.
CONTINUOUS
BARRIERS
ONE METAL
DETECTOR
ONE METAL
DETECTOR
Layout B: SSCP Layout with single metal detector in primary row.
In some other countries a single metal detector in the primary row is used with a single in the secondary row. There
is some loss of redundancy if the first unit goes down, but the second can be used in that case. The benefits are, first,
that the staff person monitoring the primary row can be much more efficient because there is no confusion about
which arch in the primary row has alarmed.
Secondly, there is a significant reduction in the width needed for the overall SSCP. It is still governed by the bypass
lanes around the secondary metal detector, but there is a gain.
Thirdly, the airlines would need to buy and maintain one less piece of equipment.
The reduction from two to one metal detector in the primary row is often perceived as something that could cause
delays. However, the act of walking through the arch is by far the fastest in the entire process. It is unloading of
bags, divesting, re-vesting, and retrieving bags that govern delays.
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PART III
i.
SSCP Technical Details

The equipment used in SSCPs has unusually demanding requirements regarding building systems.
Structurally, be aware that x-ray machines and probably future EDS systems can be enormously heavy (see
Components section) and must have adequate support. When selecting SSCP locations, consider
architectural data including weight-bearing capability of floors for screening equipment.
In terms of architectural environment, consider the negative effect glare from windows, doors, or lighting
fixtures will have on CCTV cameras and/or display screens used at SSCPs when selecting SSCP locations.
Screen glare is often cited as a source of screening problems. Also consider the need for adequate lighting
to support physical searches of carry-on bags, as well as the potential problem introduced by variable
lighting in low-use areas, which may still require sufficient light for CCTV.
For electrical systems, be familiar with the following:
1) Site Preparation for Metal Detectors
Siting considerations for the installation of metal detectors can play a critical role in the subsequent
operational effectiveness of such equipment.
a) Consider the possible effects of electrical fields generated by other types of equipment such as
elevators, conveyor belts, or neon fixtures. It is not possible to recommend minimum distances
from sources of such interference because of the variable factors, to include differences in
equipment type and manufacture, which will be encountered at each location. Such information is
best obtained with the assistance of the manufacturer of the equipment to be used. Minimum
factors which need to be considered include:
i) Radio frequency on which interference is likely to be transmitted and the operating frequency
of the security equipment
ii) Strength of the signal likely to affect the security equipment
iii) The degree of interference likely to be encountered
b) Consider the location of electrical conduits in ceiling, walls and floors in the area selected. When
an alternating current travels from one conduit back through another (in many cases through
structural steel) a ground loop results and creates fluctuating magnetic fields that are received by
the metal detector. The signal of these fields may be of the same strength as the signature of one of
the prohibited items.
c) Consider the proximity of selected site to electrical transformers, switching gear, banks of
electrical circuit breakers, or the other half of the screening system, the x-ray machine.
i) When there is electrical activity nearby, voltage and phase can change and can interfere with
the metal detector. The installation of a dedicated circuit for the screening equipment is
recommended. Additional power conditioning and interference filters can eliminate some of
these problems.
ii) The metal detector should not be located any closer than 10 feet from any conduit other than
the one carrying power to the SSCP. If the conduit is beneath the floor consider centering the
archway over the conduit.
d) Interference can be caused by metal lath used in plastered walls and coils of electrical or telephone
wiring in the ceiling, under the floor and in the walls; metal tracks for suspended ceilings and the
loops of wire suspending them; decorative metal circles used in flooring, ceilings and walls; metal
hand rails with large or long loops; and metal construction studs.
e) Metal lath, tracks and studs not properly bond grounded to structural steel can reradiate various
frequencies, changing and enriching them with harmonics, creating even more serious interference
problems.
f) Fluorescent lighting, movement of conveyor or baggage belts, and movement of heavy equipment
such as a baggage train can also cause interference.
g) Metal detectors are best kept at least 10 feet from heavy metal doors and elevators.
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PART III
h) The receiver side of metal detectors should not be placed within 4 feet of any public address
speakers as coils inside the speakers create electromagnetic interference.
i) Surface vibrations can be expected to have an adverse effect upon metal detectors. Baggage carts,
subway trains, and heavy truck traffic are all common sources of vibration that could have a
negative impact.
2) Site Preparation for X-ray Systems
While x-ray systems are not as sensitive to outside interference as metal detectors, it is useful to
consider the following when determining the best location for this equipment. These recommendations
have also been used by the U.S. Marshals Service in its Court Security program.
a) Evaluate the condition of the buildings electrical system as electrical noise from one part of the
building will travel through wiring and interfere or damage electronic equipment. Loose
connections result in arcing. System evaluation could include transformers and switchboards,
bonding and grounding networks to the circuit breaker panels, the switches, the receptacles to all
of the wiring in between all of these points.
b) Ensure equipment will be served by compatible power sources. Determine what types of electrical
equipment are powered from the circuit breaker panel closest to where equipment will be installed.
If this panel has large demand loads that repeatedly turn on and off, consider selecting a different
circuit breaker panel or installing a new panel or subpanel. If the panel directory is not marked or
improperly marked, the machine could easily be connected to an incompatible power source.
c) Prior to using existing electrical circuits, determine what else shares the circuit. Installation of
dedicated circuits for x-ray machines is recommended. Depending on the distance of the circuit
between the circuit breaker box and the receptacle, radio frequency interference (RFI) will often
cause operational problems.
d) X-ray machines will not operate properly when site temperatures are too high or too low. Control of
temperature and humidity is a factor for consideration of security screening station locations. If the
x-ray machine will be exposed to elements, consider taking precautions to protect and weatherize.
In general, the designer should become fully familiar with the engineering requirements of SSCP
equipment as noted above, and design accordingly.
j.
SSCP Blast Protection

Consider the use of dividers from floor to ceiling between the deplaning passengers and the SSCP. This
could help mitigate the blast effect of the accidental detonation of a small explosive. Glass could also be
placed between the security supervisor's desk and the x-ray machine.
Section III-D-2 Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP) Checklist

Section A General Issues
SSCP are critical to overall security design
Consider SSCP from the beginning
FAA documents describe requirements
Satisfy screening without burdening flow
Issues to consider
Defining sterile areas
Minimal interruption to flow
Effective contraband deterrent
Effective breach deterrent
Cost-effective, space efficient
Flexible in equipment deployment and
operations
Screening of goods and services
Off-hour protection
Section B Regulations and Guidelines

FAR 107, 108, 109, 129
RTCA Standards for Airport Security
Access Control Systems
ICAO Annex 17.4-5
ECAC Doc 30 Sect. 2.1.3
Airport Security Program
Building and Fire Codes
Mutual Aid and Joint Military Agreements
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Section C Essential Coordination

Consult airport, airlines and community at
various stages of the process:
Assure that airport operator is a
participant in the design process
Involve aircraft operators who screen
passengers
FAA will require a review of the plan at
Preliminary and Final Design stages
FAA:
CASFO and CASFU/Regional Office
FAA-assigned contact
Airport Security Coordinator (ASC)
FAA review at several stages, including
FAA ADO for federally funded projects
Airports:
FAR 107
Contact Person (ASC)
Understand airport and airlines needs
Provide sufficient, expandable, and
flexible space
Consider location relative to concessions
Law enforcement, CCTV coverage
Aircraft Operators:
FAR 108
Communicate with and represent aircraft
operators
Section D Planning Considerations:
Each airport and SSCP is unique
Location and size of SSCP depend on:
Risk
Operations
Passenger loads
Overall design
Level and Type of Risk Contribute to Design:
Vulnerability Assessment
FAA contingency plan
Temporary relocation of SSCP
Operational Types:
O&D, Transfer/Hub, Combination
Location of SSCP relative to flight
operations
International flights may require
additional screening
Location of SSCPs:
Sterile Concourse Station SSCP Plan
Holding Area Station SSCP Plan
Boarding Gate Station SSCP Plan
Mobile Station SSCPs
Sterile Terminal SSCP Plan
Checkpoint Size:
Bare minimum of 150 SF per SSCP
Two lanes with handicapped lane and
exit lane: 1,200 1,300 SF
Three lanes with handicapped lane and
Four lanes with handicapped lane and
Section E Components of the SSCP
Most designs utilize similar components
Components in Use Today Enplaning:
Queuing Space
Metal Detector
Bin Pass-Through
X-Ray Machine
Explosives Trace Detector Equipment
Barriers
Supervisors Area
Private Search Room
Closed Circuit Television
Data Connections
ADA clearances, accessibility, & codes
Wheel-chair Path
Luggage Cart Path
Concessions Goods Path
Length of Response Corridor
Components in Use Today Deplaning
Travel Lane
Security Guard Station
Exit Lane Breach Detection Devices
CCTV
Integrated Systems
Components Under Development:
Technology/operations change rapidly
Personal Explosives Trace Detection Arch
Bulk Detectors
Multidetection Tunnel
Supervisor Command Center
Automated
Process
for Remote
Screening Room
Pre-screening Preparation Instruction Zone
Automated Breach Barriers
Limited Application Explosives Trace
Detectors
Designs for the Future:
Design for flexibility
Record strategies used for future
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PART III
Section F - Personnel and Operations at the SSCP:

Space Needs for Equipment Operators:
Designs depend on people moving to:
Monitor each piece of equipment
and make on-the-spot decisions
Provide an immediate point of
contact for questions or difficulties
Provide supervision
Provide space for a fully staffed SSCP
Layout for Operational Efficiency:
Good screening decision-making is
supported by good layout design
Bad layouts may interrupt screeners
field of vision
Screeners should not be approachable
Separate x-ray monitors and bypass lane
Common Layout - 2 metal detectors in
primary row, one in the secondary row
Design for the Process:
Every person and bag must be screened
Three discrete process components:
Divesting
Placing items on the x-ray bag belt
Walking through the metal detector
Position small divesting bins well
before the metal detectors
Consider conveyor belts with a
somewhat longer presentation length
Architectural Design to Support Intuitive
Processes:
Architectural materials and lighting can
improve operation of the checkpoint
Unique floor color or material can
create entrance mat area
Different floor material/color in front of
exit lane may discourage entry attempts
Other material, spatial, or lighting clues
may reinforce the paths of travel
Space for Staff Belongings and Break Area
SSCP Space Requirements
Screening personnel
Law enforcement officers
Security equipment and tables
Private manual search area
For manual search procedures - 1 metal
detector and 1 x-ray device minimum
Consider at least two lanes for:
Elevated security
Peak periods
Equipment failure
Queuing space should not block other

terminal circulation or screening lanes
SSCP should be capable of rapid
expansion for peak-periods
Adequate prevention of electromagnetic
or physical interference
Sufficient space so that passengers
retain line of sight with their baggage
Ability to seal off a concourse and
SSCP during nonoperational periods
Configuration and Placement of SSCP
Physical separation of persons who
have and have not been screened
Floor to ceiling barriers
Protect the security equipment against
tampering when not staffed
Ensure that unscreened persons do not
enter the sterile area via the exit lane
Guards, revolving doors, turnstiles or
electronic discriminators
Section G SSCP Calculations
Review text for full description of
calculations used to determine the number,
size, and configuration of required SSCPs
Remember to add growth factors
Adjust peak hour volume determinations for
multiple and/or split SSCPs
Planning Passenger Volume
Assure that variations over time are
considered
Choice of the planning day is important
Peak hour volumes typically range from
10% to 20% of the daily volume
Methods to determine the design load:
Typical Peak Hour Passengers
(TPHP)
Busy Day/Peak Hour (BDPH)
The Standard Busy Rate (SBR)
Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
Section H Typical SSCP Layouts
Review the text for various layouts and
diagrams
Section I SSCP Technical Details
Site analysis and preparation for x-rays and
metal detectors is critical
Section J SSCP Blast Protection
Consider strategically placed barriers for
blast protection of persons and equipment
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3.
Public Areas
a.
Public Lobby Areas (Ticketing, Bag Claim, Rental Car)

1) Security can be greatly improved by limiting the number of access points, and taking measures to
monitor via CCTV all access points (to include conveyor belts) through which direct or indirect access
from public areas to the airside can be obtained.
2) Consider ways of both visually and physically differentiating between public and sterile or non-public
areas in terminal design to prevent entry by unauthorized persons. Security will be further advanced if
planners consider building in a capability to secure or close down areas not in use. In airports with
multiple checkpoints, each checkpoint must have an open/closed status. Closed status should eliminate
movement of all unauthorized persons and objects from nonsterile to sterile areas.
3) When selecting architectural and other built-in fixtures and furnishings (e.g., trash receptacles, benches
or seats, pillars, railings) for the terminal, planners are urged to avoid those likely to facilitate the
concealment of explosives or other dangerous devices, or those likely to fragment readily, such as
aggregated cement/ stone trash containers. This will also help reduce costs associated with monitoring
such areas during high security threat periods. Other fixtures are already in wide use and are typically
streamlined and easy to maintain. When possible, deny hiding places to those who would conceal
explosives, incendiary devices or weapons in terminal facilities. Typical hiding places in the past have
been restrooms and public lockers, closets, utility rooms, storage areas, stairwells, and in recesses
housing fire extinguisher or fire hose storage cabinets. Closets and utility rooms should be locked
when not attended.
4) If assessments by airport security officials or a prior history of incidents indicate an airport is at increased
risk of explosive attacks, planners of new facilities would be well advised to seek advice from structural
and explosives experts on methods of minimizing the effects of blast in the public areas. Computer based
blast analysis models (See Appendix C) and numerous manual reference tables and formulas are
available to provide various levels of specificity to the determination of structural data and limitations.
5) A growing circumstance involves situations where passengers might check in for an airline flight at a
remote location such as a downtown or hotel ticket office, a cruise ship terminal, or might have taken
advantage of an electronic ticketing option, in which checked baggage might not be handled in the
usual fashion at the lobby ticket counter. Architects and planners must consider accommodating the
potential requirement of maintaining the security of checked baggage arriving through non-traditional
airport processes, perhaps through such approaches as additional curbside check-in locations. This
concept is one of chain of control in which control of the baggage must be maintained throughout
the system; from the moment the passenger relinquishes it to the point where they regain it again. This
remote check-in concept is addressed in further detail in the Remote Check-In section on page 105.
6) Minimal seating in ticketing lobbies will reduce congestion, encourage passengers to proceed to the
gate areas, and facilitate the monitoring and patrolling of this area during periods requiring increased
security and search measures.
Careful consideration should be given to the needs of international or high-risk aircraft operators who
may have to apply extended security measures during the passenger check-in process. In some cases,
additional space is required to support aircraft operator interviews of passengers and x-ray or search of
baggage prior to issuance of boarding gate passes. Additional queuing space may also be required.
b.
Public Emergency Exits

1) Exiting requirements for public assembly buildings such as airport terminals are specifically established
including required widths and separation distances. Building code required exits might compromise
optimal security planning. Often, the need and location of public emergency exits will cause doors to be
located and equipped such that the public has unlocked, free access to secured areas. In all cases, these
doors must be equipped with local and/or monitored alarms that can be heard and responded to quickly
by security or airport personnel. The need and location of such emergency exits must be coordinated
closely with the local Fire Marshall and/or Code officials. Their involvement early in the planning and
design process will reduce conflicts due to misinterpretation of FAA or local building code requirements.
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2) Whenever possible the building should be designed such that emergency exits leading into secured
areas can be minimized, and such that exitways avoid moving persons from a lower to a higher level of
security area (i.e. from non-sterile to sterile or from sterile to SIDA/AOA). Likewise, exiting screened
individuals should be kept separate from unscreened individuals when possible. This may minimize the
need to fully rescreen all persons in the case of an emergency or false alarm. Designers should also
prevent the capability for individuals to be able to enter secured areas undetected during an emergency
by traveling in the reverse exiting direction through emergency exits.
3) Consider designing a system in which emergency exit doors utilize push-type panic bars with 15-30
second delays (where allowable, perhaps in conjunction with smoke or rate-of-rise detectors tied to a
central monitoring system) until the door opens. Use of delays, use of CCTV monitoring, and use of
door alarms which are tied into the ACAMS can drastically reduce incidence of false alarms and the
need for officer dispatches.
c.
Security Doors vs. Fire Doors

Security and safety sometimes do not mix well, as airport experience has shown in the security treatment of
airport fire doors leading to the secured area from sterile areas. If the door is not a fire door the answer is
simple: lock it. The problem arises when an emergency egress door allows occupants to discharge into a
secured area. Locking an emergency door is illegal In many airports, the use of delayed egress hardware
has been proposed to restrict nonemergency exit by passengers; door releases could be delayed from 10-30
seconds to as much as 45 seconds. However, local fire codes and risk management units may not allow use
of these devices. Among the examples of problems is the first-time international passenger who may or
may not speak English and would believe the door is locked, or may not understand the English signs that
advise that the door will open after the delay.
The issue is being addressed industrywide, but independently due to different jurisdictions and different fire
codes. The on-going effort seeks agreement from the fire protection and life safety professionals that there
is an acceptable way to lock the doors for security purposes that does not raise the level of risk for
passengers or visitors in times of smoke, fire or panic.
This document does not yet have a design-based solution to offer, other than the already-stated concept of
keeping the number of AOA access points to an operational minimum, and wherever possible having the fire
doors open into non-secured areas so that a delayed release is not required. The challenge to resolve this
dilemma is not an easy one, and the ultimate solutions arrived at may or may not be interchangeable from one
airport to another. Until a common solution is developed, this critical issue will require close coordination
among the planner, designer, airport and FAA security officials, and the local fire code officials.
d.
Concessions Areas
1) Concessions are a major source of airport revenue and are typically located throughout an airport
terminal facility. Typically it is advantageous to the airport to make concessions areas accessible to the
broadest possible range of visitors and passengers. As such, trends in recent years are moving towards
locating more concessions in the sterile areas, close to the passenger holdrooms or to place concessions
in one large group prior to the screening checkpoints.
2) In designs where the majority of concessions are within the sterile area, it can be advantageous to
design the concession layout in such a way that temporary, alternate locations for the screening
checkpoints can be used during heightened security periods that will remove the concessions areas
from the sterile area and minimize risk.
3) Regardless of where concessions goods checkpoints are located within the terminal (sterile vs. nonsterile), all concessions require the movement of personnel, merchandise and supplies (products, food
stuffs, beverages, money) from delivery/arrival to the point of final use. Some concessions will require
intermediate storage and processing areas within the terminal as well. The planning and design of the
delivery and personnel access routes used are very important.
4) Concessions at an airport are often varied in both function and operation. They may be as simple as a
shoeshine stand, automated floral dispensing machine or art/memorabilia display case, or as complex
as a restaurant with multiple daily deliveries from various suppliers and varied types and location of
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storage. Thus, multiple security strategies will be required depending upon the type and location of the
concession, its delivery and storage requirement, its service circulation (trash, money-handling, storage
access), and its individual security requirements (duress alarms, CCTV, ATM security, bank/money
personnel escorts).
5) Due to such a variety in concession types and operations, concessionaires or a designated
representative should be involved in the design and coordination process with the airport owner and
airport security personnel. Since concession companies and types frequently change, designers are
encouraged to plan for not only the existing, known concessions, but also for general concession space
use based on airport patterns and future trends. The needs for advertising concessions, cleaning
contractors and private (nonairport) maintenance and repair crews should also be considered in the
overall security strategy and design.
6) Critical concessions design and planning considerations include the ability to screen both personnel
and deliveries, the security badging and/or escort needs of delivery personnel, the routes of delivery
and areas of access that unscreened personnel and deliveries may have access to, and the frequencies of
that access. Since delivery personnel frequently change, and/or since some deliveries may even require
armed escort in order to complete their deliveries (alcohol, bank/ATM, U.S. Mail) the design
considerations (access point locations and types, loading dock phone, locations of concessions storage
and mail areas) which complement these procedural issues can often minimize the security risks with
proper coordination. A key security risk when deliveries are escorted into the sterile or other security
areas is that the delivery persons may be left unattended, or left to find their own way out. While this
is a procedural problem, early coordination and planning can provide for design-related solutions such
as a manned visitor/escort sign-in/out station which requires both the escort and escortee to be present
both entering and exiting. If the accommodation for such a station is not accounted for or considered in
the design phase, it is very difficult to execute later on.
7) Design elements to consider include: separate concessions storage areas in public or non-secured/lowrisk areas, design/use of a separate loading dock/concessions screening area for personnel and/or
packages, location of concessions and/or public mail areas outside of security areas, simplification and
shortness of the delivery access routes and the quantity of security access points which must be used
(an escort-friendly design), visitor/escort sign-in/out stations, and careful planning of which
concessions should be within security areas based on their delivery and personnel requirements.
e.
Public Lockers
Public lockers have historically been used to conceal explosive devices in airports and other transportation
terminals around the world. From a security viewpoint, the required location for unmonitored public
lockers is within sterile areas beyond the security screening stations.
1) If placement in sterile areas is not possible, consider locating lockers so as to minimize the damage or
injury that could result from an explosion. Some airports have constructed blast barriers around lockers
in areas accessible to the unscreened public. There are locker designs that vent explosions upward
rather than outward, requiring the architect to examine the surrounding ceiling and support structures.
2) Consider structural design styles that would vent explosive forces away from congested locations to
minimize damage and injury. EOD response personnel are a good source of advice on this topic. Also
consider the need to provide supervised storage facilities in lieu of lockers in the event of increased
security measures.
3) Public storage lockers can be designed to facilitate search of these lockers under bomb threat
conditions. An evaluation of various available locker designs is recommended to ensure that the
lockers selected will facilitate an EOD search with master keys or an electronic release. Consider also
potential space for an x-ray inspection of lockers or their contents.
4) Consideration may be given to surveillance cameras and video recorders for the locker areas.
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f.
Left Luggage
Left luggage facilities (primarily in the public areas of the terminals, before passenger screening) should be
provided with appropriate x-ray/EDS equipment to verify baggage before storage. CCTV surveillance and
duress alarm provision should also be considered. If the facility deploys a sterile terminal operational mode,
then such equipment is clearly not required. It should be noted that in some sterile terminal schemes only
checked luggage is screened on entry and thus such facilities should not accept hand luggage that has not
been screened.
g.
VIP Lounges/Hospitality Suites

Some airports feature VIP lounges and/or airline hospitality suites, both of which are frequently located
beyond security screening stations in sterile areas. Security considerations for both types of facility should
recognize the need to restrict unauthorized access to the secured areas, air operations area and other areas,
as well as the need for space for monitored baggage holding facilities while passengers may be otherwise
occupied for several hours.
h.
Observations Decks
Outdoor terminal observation decks are strongly discouraged in today's security environment. Where they
already exist, it is recommended they be closed to public access unless the architecture allows a practical,
effective and unobtrusive way to fully enclose or isolate the public from the airside, and particularly from
the secured area. There may be alternate opportunities to provide public areas for viewing of airside
activity, particularly in newer terminals that employ significant expanses of glass windows.
i.
Vertical Access
Restrict the traveling public from access to the airside though elevators, escalators and stairwells, which
may otherwise provide them appropriate access to public spaces (e.g., an elevator which goes up to a VIP
lounge, but not down to an airside access point.).
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Section III-D-3 Public Areas Checklist

Public Areas
Limit the number of access points
Monitor all access points and conveyor belts via CCTV
Visually differentiate public and secure or restricted areas
Build in a capability to secure areas when not in use
Select furnishings and accessories which avoid the concealment of explosives
Seek advice from structural and explosives experts on minimizing the effects of blast
Ticketing Lobby
Minimal seating in ticketing lobbies will reduce congestion
Consider the needs of international or high-risk aircraft operators with extended security measures
during the passenger check-in process
Additional queuing space may be required
Some exit requirements have specific widths and separation distances
Coordinate locations closely with the Fire Marshall and/or Code officials
The emergency exits leading into secured areas should be minimized
Exits should avoid moving persons from a lower to a higher level of security area
Exiting screened individuals should be kept separate from unscreened individuals
Consider emergency doors with push-type panic bars with 15-30 second delays (where allowable)
If the door is not a fire door, lock it.
Emergency egress door (fire door) may not be locked
Keep the number of access points to an operational minimum
Wherever possible have fire doors open into nonsecured areas
Coordinate with planner, designer, airport, and fire officials
Concessions Areas
Trend towards more concessions in sterile areas, close to holdrooms
Design to accommodate moving concessions (or screening points) during heightened security
Some concessions require storage and processing space
Need delivery and personnel access routes
Consider type of concession, delivery, storage, moneyhandling and security escorts, ATM security
Design elements for concessions include:
Separate concessions storage areas in public or nonsecured/low-risk areas
Separate loading dock/concessions screening area
Location of concessions and/or public mall areas outside of security areas
Simplification and shortness of the delivery access routes
Lockers:
Public Lockers belong within sterile areas beyond the security screening stations
Consider locating lockers to minimize the damage or injury from an explosion
Blast barriers around lockers in areas accessible to the unscreened public
Consider supervised storage facilities in lieu of lockers
Storage lockers can facilitate an EOD search with master keys or an electronic release
Put beyond security screening stations in sterile areas
Restrict unauthorized access from suites to the secured areas
Provide space for monitored baggage holding facilities
Observations decks are strongly discouraged - Where they exist, they should be closed to public access
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4.
Nonpublic Areas
a.
Service Corridors, Stairwells and Vertical Circulation

1) Terminal design responds to the variables of its program and operation. Secure sterile areas and similar
zones of security may not strictly adhere to horizontal or vertical configurations. Service corridors in
an airport not only serve to enhance aesthetics by concealing service and delivery personnel, but
actually can increase airport efficiency by providing clear, unobstructed pathways where airport
personnel can quickly and efficiently traverse the terminal without risking delay or inconvenience due
to the often hurried, and preoccupied airport passenger. Thus, service corridors may transit a portion or
the entire length of the terminal. Where possible these corridors should not cross boundaries of secure
areas. If crossings are unavoidable, these transitions should be minimized and controlled.
2) Service corridors may also be used to minimize quantity and type of security access points. If access
by similar personnel or tenant areas (such as airline ticket offices or concessions storage areas) are
grouped into a common service corridor prior to entering a security area, then only one or two security
points are needed rather than one per tenant.
3) The planning and design of airport non-public service corridors should also consider their placement
and use by airport emergency personnel and law enforcement. While use of service corridors by
emergency and law enforcement agencies is not a security requirement, proper corridor placement and
design characteristics can enhance response times as well as allow for private, nondisruptive transport
of injured persons or security detainees. As aviation laws are changing to make flights safer, there is
greater potential for in-flight violations (threats, violence, public disturbance) that increasingly require
security escorts of persons for questioning and/or holding. Law enforcement trends encourage use of
an accessible nonpublic corridor/pathway from the boarding/deplaning gate area to the police area
and/or police parking area.
4) Vertical circulation and stairwells are more difficult to control than corridors. They typically provide
access to not only multiple floors, but often multiple security levels as well. In particular, fire stairs
typically connect as many of the buildings floors/levels as possible. Since they are located primarily to
meet code stated separation requirements and provide efficient egress of the facility, they are not often
conveniently located with regards to security boundaries or airport operation. Thus, additional nonfire
stairs, escalators and elevators are often needed as well.
5) When coordinating stairwells and vertical pathways, care must be taken with regards to security
treatments and boundaries. Since many of these vertical pathways function as not only emergency, but
also service pathways, the quantity and type of security treatments should be minimized. In addition, as
with any fire exit, allowable door equipment and delays must be carefully coordinated with the local
code and building officials.
b.

Airport personnel will require office space throughout the terminal facility depending on the offices
function. Types of airport personnel offices typically located within an airport terminal include
administrative and aviation department offices, maintenance department offices, law enforcement,
badging/ID offices and security force offices and substations, as well as airline and tenant (including
government agency) offices.
1) Office areas are best located close to the primary activity of the personnel within the office. Thus there
may be various office areas, within various security areas, depending upon the preferences of the
airport and the airports design. Office areas should be located and connected via corridors and vertical
circulation as necessary to minimize the amount that the office personnel will need to cross security
boundaries in their daily activities. Likewise, office spaces should be planned with their need for
visitors and public access in consideration, as well as the likelihood that those visitors might be
inadvertently left unattended or unescorted.
2) Considerations should be given as well to the use of satellite police, ID or first aid offices that allow
for easy public access and possibly more efficient response times.
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3) Other than the considerations of whether office areas are within security areas, or how frequently
office personnel will cross security boundaries, the security of the office areas themselves is often a
security concern. When airport authority/administration offices are located within a terminal, these
areas are often desired to be equipped with security equipment and/or patrols. Since it is typically more
cost effective and efficient to use the same security system, these areas usually require security door
treatments, duress alarms, and connection to the airport operations center and monitoring equipment.
4) Additional potential design considerations within airport personnel office areas include: security of
airport personnel and financial records, security of access control and badging/ID workstations,
security of ID badge stock and records, safe and money storage areas, and computer server and
equipment areas, especially for security-related facilities such as the access control system.
c.
Tenant Spaces
There is no fixed rule on whether tenant spaces might require tie-in to the access control system. This
necessitates early discussions with each tenant, and perhaps a representative of the tenant community as a
whole, to look at such protection requirements as money-handling operations, overnight operations, late
night or early morning concession deliveries, etc.
d.
Law Enforcement & Public Safety Areas

ICAO Standards (Annex 17), FAR 107, FAR 108, and other regulatory guidance encourage the provision
of supporting facilities for security services at airports serving civil aviation.
1) Public Safety or Police Offices
a) Office space for airport security or law enforcement personnel should be provided in or near the
terminal building, and be sized after thorough discussions with police officials.
b) Police facilities in the terminal complex should be planned to allow public access to a controlled
greeting area which will be protected with considerations to mitigate the effect of a detonated
device and/or small arms fire. This might include ballistic materials, laminates, window tinting,
and concrete bollards/planters to prevent vehicular penetration.
c) Satellite police facilities can be distributed throughout the terminal to reduce vulnerability to a
single point of attack.
d) Physical infrastructure should include adequate space (in no particular order) for:
i) Briefing/work room
ii) Training classroom/offices
iii) Property/evidence room(s)
iv) Conference roomscan be part of command post/operations room(s)
v) Holding cells
vi) Possible satellite locations
vii) Private Interrogation/Witness Statement room(s)/area
viii) Physical fitness area in conjunction with lockers, showers, and restrooms
ix) General storage areas
x) Secured arms storage
xi) Kitchen/lunchroom facilities
e) Areas requiring access for public and tenants but protected with adequate controls are:
i) Administrative offices
ii) Security ID badging
iii) Lost and found
iv) SIDA/tenant training rooms
v) Medical services
f) Consideration must be given to electrical, fiber optic and other utility supply and routes to/from
the police areas. Special considerations should be given to the amounts of supply conduit in order
to accommodate future expansion in this era of rapidly increasing security requirements.
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2) Law Enforcement Parking

Providing quickly accessible parking for law enforcement is invaluable to improving response
capabilities. When possible, parking should have direct landside/airside access with dedicated spaces.
Consideration should also be given for helicopter pads (when applicable) to be located in secure roof
or site areas.
3) Remote Law Enforcement/Public Safety Posts/Areas
a) In large facilities, remote areas, or where minimized response time is a concern, consider the use
of remote law enforcement posts or substations. Such locations should be securable, equipped with
communications and emergency equipment, and contain a concealed duress alarm when possible.
b) When security personnel are deployed to outdoor posts, shelters are needed to provide protection
against the elements. Shelters should permit maximum visibility over the immediate area as well
as easy access for guards to carry out their duties.
c) If the terminal building is larger (over 300,000 square feet of public area or with large open
distances of 2,000 feet or more), storage areas for tactical supplies and equipment should be
located in tactically identified areas.
4) Other Considerations
a) Communication/Dispatch facilities, equipment repair areas and other relocated support functions
near the police functions should be located away from high threat areas and be considered for
protection and control purposes.
b) Many airports, because of size, activities, budget(s), and political or joint working arrangements
with local police organizations, may combine or contract out some security activities. This does
not lessen their need for operational space and equipment, and emphasizes the requirement to have
in-depth discussions with the security and police officials well before designing their space.
c) Some airports prefer to maintain control of their un-issued ID badge stock, access control paper
records, master keys and key control systems, and the ID badging office itself by putting them
behind a card reader to monitor who has access to the system and its records, especially during off
hours. While this is specifically neither an FAA nor police requirement, it is prudent to consider
providing secured portals and card readers for any facilities where the client may wish to have
workstations with security system access, particularly where the ID badge and personnel data may
be kept.
d) Storage: Many police agencies now use bicycles and other pieces of equipment that need
protection and inventory accountability. A secure room or facility, large enough to store these
items should be planned.
e.
Explosives Detection Canine (K-9) Teams and Facilities

1) When an airport has K-9 teams in residence, appropriate accommodations for the dogs and handlers
must be provided. The design will to some degree be dependent on local weather conditions, number
of dogs, and the layout of the airport. If there is no on-site K-9 operation, but the airport has on-call
access to teams from other jurisdictions for emergencies, it would be prudent to specify a noncritical
area that could be easily diverted for temporary K-9 use.
2) There are no specific technical requirements, but a good rule of thumb is a 4-foot by 8-foot indoor pen
per dog, attached to an outdoor fenced exercise run. Plumbing and drainage is important; the concrete
floor can be epoxy coated for ease of cleaning. Fresh air circulation is also important, as is a dry
environment, without mildew or other dampness that can affect a dogs health.
3) The investment in dogs and their training is large; their area should be secured, and sufficiently
isolated from casual public contact. A separate room for veterinarian services should also be provided
for health care, grooming, etc.
4) The primary consideration is to provide a relatively "normal" canine housing environment. Dogs spend
the majority of their time not actually performing explosives detection duties, but either in waiting for
an assignment or in training exercises. This environment would include an administrative area that
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houses the dogs handlers. While a set-aside training area would also be helpful, it is common for K-9
teams to undertake training exercises at such areas of the airport as parking lots, cargo ramps, baggage
make-up and bag claim areas, to maintain a realistic training environment.
5) The designer must consider providing as much isolation as possible from airport noise and odor
sources, especially jet fuel fumes, since the dogs sense of smell is critical to its mission. The
administrative area should also have secured storage for live or dummy explosives test and training
items; these areas should be coordinated with ATF regulatory requirements for storage of explosives.
Also consider reasonable proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units, as well as
adequate parking nearby for K-9 transport vehicles.
f.
Security Operations Center (SOC)

A Security Operation Center (SOC) is an area that is typically the central point for all airport security
monitoring and communications. Just as each airport is unique in its layout and security requirements, each
airports SOC is unique in its features, staffing, and method of operations. Likewise, from airport to airport,
the title of the area serving as a SOC may vary. The most common of these titles include: Airport
Communications Center, Airport Operations Center, and Security Control Center.
1) An SOC can provide multiple communications options to the airport operator including police, fire,
rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert, off-airport emergency assistance and a secure
communications channel. The SOC can serve as the point of integration of all security features and
subsystems of the airport security system. Complete and timely detection information can be received
at the SOC and used to initiate a prioritized and semi-automated assessment and response.
2) A successful SOC typically consist of multi-bay console, video displays, monitors, controllers, and
communications connections (telephone, intercom, and radio), all of which have significant design
implications for floor space, cabinet space, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths.
Rear access to console facilitates easier installation, maintenance and update of console equipment and
systems.
3) Connecting all airport security sensors to the SOC facilitates verification of the operability of each of the
sensors. Sensors can periodically be commanded to go into alarm states, with the response checked by the
SOC. This feature could effectively guard against an adversary tampering with or disabling the sensors.
4) The SOC location will have a significant effect upon its utility. Ideally, it would be located close to the
Airport Emergency Command Post, and in a secure area. From the standpoint of cabling
interconnections, a relatively central geographic location serves to maintain reasonable cable lengths to
all the detection devices in an airport security system that report alarms to the SOC. In addition, if a
facility or facilities other than the SOC handle the airports nonsecurity communication functions
(information, paging, telephones, maintenance dispatch, etc.), co-location or geographical placement of
the SOC and the other facilities should be considered such that cabling, equipment, maintenance, and
emergency operations can be installed and operate in a cost-effective manner.
5) Other communications functions, equipment and operational areas may be co-located with the SOC.
Consider the merit and operational impact of consolidating the following functions within or adjacent
to the SOC:
a) Airport Emergency Command Post
b) Information Specialists for customer information lines, courtesy phones, airport paging
c) Airport Police and/or Security Department
d) Monitoring of public safety, duress or tenant security alarms
e) Access terminals for law enforcement informational systems such as CAD, NCIC or others
f) Fire Alarm monitoring
g) Weather Monitoring/Radar/Alert systems
h) Landside/Terminal Operations
i) ID Badging Department
j) Maintenance Control/Dispatch or Alarm Monitoring (includes energy management of HVAC systems)
k) Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information Display (BIDS) systems
l) Direct phone lines to ATCT tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
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m)
n)
o)
p)
g.
Automatic Notification System for emergency response recall of personnel

Airport Radio Systems
Airport Personnel Paging System
Recording Equipment
Airport Emergency Command Post (CP)

An Airport Emergency Command Post (CP) is a central location from which command and control of a
specific activity is conducted. This facility will support an airports Crisis Management Team during a
crisis such as a hijacking, a hostage-barricade situation, or an aircraft disaster. The space and equipment
needs of a CP will vary in accordance with the size, activities and resources of the individual airport. All
airports consider the importance of designating airport space, either on a fully dedicated basis or with the
capability to be rapidly converted and organized as a CP, such as conference or meeting rooms.
1) Location
a) Site selection for CP needs to emphasize communications capabilities, convenience, security,
facilities, and authorized access.
b) In the event that CP operations have to be moved, plan for an alternate site capable of supporting
the basic elements of operation.
c) A location allowing the CP to have a direct view of the airside and the aircraft isolated parking
position is desirable, and may be facilitated by the use of CCTV equipment. The CP location
should be sound proof.
d) A Mobile CP is a viable option at many airports, but will still require allotments of support space
and a coordinated communications infrastructure.
2) Space Needs
An ideal Command Post configuration would consist of space sufficient to support the needs of the two
basic elements of the Crisis Management Team: the Operational Group (which includes the Key
Decision-Makers), and the Negotiators. The designer and planner are referred to the requirements of
the Airport Emergency Plan and the Airport Security Program to determine the optimum number of
persons to be accommodated; information found in Advisory Circular 150/5200-31A, Airport
Emergency Plan, can assist.
3) Other Considerations
a) In some cases, the use of raised flooring is an option to provide for the flexible installation of
ducts and cable paths, and for additional equipment during an incident or a future reconfiguration
of the room.
b) Command Post electrical power must be uninterrupted, which is accomplished by a dedicated
uninterrupted power supply within the Post itself or by being linked to a "no-break" power source.
c) Vehicular access to the CP would be useful.
d) Sufficient controlled vehicular parking areas on either the landside or the airside, and in close
proximity should be provided for support vehicles (fire, catering, off-airport mobile
communications vehicles, etc.) and key CP vehicles.
e) Consider the placement of an Executive Conference Room adjacent to the Command Post for
executive briefings and conferences.
f) Provide space for kitchenette and rest rooms.
h.
Family Assistance Center

In the case of an accident or incident, or even in lesser cases of extended weather delays and cancellations,
consider designated space, or space easily converted from other noncritical applications, for use as a Family
Assistance Center. This would require communications, private space, perhaps limited space for cots,
access to public bathrooms, and should not be directly accessible to the media. See also the National
Transportation Safety Boards family assistance documents at its internet web site, www.ntsb.gov; they can
be found at www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1999/SPC9903.htm.
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i.
Federal Inspection Service (FIS) Areas

If terminal planning includes provisions for a Federal Inspection Service (FIS) area, there are a series of
security design requirements to be met that, while not technologically unique, may require some additional
planning and design features to accommodate FIS specific policy and procedural needs. Typically its facilities
are located to serve FIS functions in the international arrivals building or areas, and are designed toward very
different law enforcement and security situations not usually encountered in daily domestic traffic.
The FIS agencies publish a separate document (cited below) that provides their additional security design
guidelines required within their operational spaces. As of this writing, that document is scheduled for a
major update. Check with local FIS representatives to assure use of the most current version, as well as to
coordinate requirements with the FIS agencies in early design discussions. FAA Advisory Circular
150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities, also provides information
relating to the FIS agencies.
1) Introduction
The FIS agencies have a responsibility to ensure that there are adequate countermeasures in place
within the Physical Security System (PSS) of the FIS area to maintain border integrity. Critical
enforcement issues require the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs
Service (USCS) to ensure the FIS PSS is secure and sterile to prevent the smuggling of aliens,
terrorists, criminals and contraband into the United States. This includes criminal or terrorist acts
within the FIS area.
The basis of the Airport Border Integrity Antiterrorism Program (ABIAP) is the application of a sound
risk management methodology. This is accomplished by identifying risk factors associated with
national security, terrorism, alien or drug smuggling and other criminal activity and applying realistic,
cost-effective countermeasures that enhance the integrity of the PSS. The task of ensuring border
integrity at airport Ports of Entry (POE) has become increasingly complex with the rapid political,
social, economic, and technological changes taking place today. At the same time, there are limited
resources for border integrity.
The prevalence of intercepted terrorists, criminal aliens, and alien and drug smugglers through the air
POEs highlights the dilemma of balancing the needs of facilitating legitimate traffic against strict
enforcement mandates. To tighten border enforcement at air POEs while facilitating legitimate traffic,
which promotes commerce and tourism, there must be a viable traffic management system. The PSS is
an intrinsic element of the system and balances enforcement and facilitation.
An integrated border integrity management system is essential for the FIS agencies to exercise their
border integrity responsibilities in the FIS area. Due to the dual mission of the FIS agencies to enforce
the laws of the United States while expeditiously facilitating arriving passengers, it is necessary for the
FIS agencies to place the maximum amount of staff on the Primary Inspection Lines (PIL) at air POEs.
The corridor and gate area in the FIS area of air POEs cannot be physically inspected and patrolled by
INS or FIS agency personnel to ensure that alien and contraband smuggling, including drugs or
explosive devices, or terrorist or criminal acts do not occur in and out of the FIS area without reducing
staffing on the PIL.
The border integrity management system integrates technology as a "force multiplier" to enhance
border management capabilities and reduce the opportunity for smuggling, terrorism, or criminal acts
in the FIS area. By installing an integrated border integrity management system, the FIS agencies can
effectively monitor the border integrity of the FIS area from a centralized location, the Joint Agency
Coordination Center (JACC). This allows the FIS agencies to maintain maximum staff on the PILs to
promote a rapid facilitation of the aircraft operators passengers through the FIS processing instead of
reducing PIL staff and assigning personnel to perform roving security patrols throughout the FIS area.
2) Important Notice
Facility planning and design approval shall be the joint responsibility of the APHIS, USCS, FWS,
PHS, and INS. INS, in consultation with PHS, represents PHS at locations where PHS has no staff
assigned. When it is FAA funded, FAA must approve the design.
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All new or remodeled facilities impacting the FIS area at airports-of-entry require written prior
approval.
Approvals granted by USCS are in writing and executed for each facility by the appropriate Customs
port director on behalf of headquarters.
All approvals for APHIS, INS, PHS, and FWS shall be obtained from their national headquarters.
Local representatives of these agencies are not authorized to grant final approval for drawings on new
or remodeled facilities.
The USCS and the INS have prepared documents that provide technical standards for airport
authorities, operators, contractors, or architects planning new or remodeled airport facilities in the FIS
area. These technical standards should be obtained prior to any facility design.
The U.S. Immigration And Naturalization Service document, entitled Technical Standards For INS
Passenger Processing At AirPorts-Of-Entry, may be obtained from the INS, Headquarters and
Engineering Division, Office of Administration, 425 I ST., NW, Room 2060, Washington, DC 20536.
Telephonic inquiries can be made at (202) 514-3110; Fax (202) 514-0579.
The USCS document, entitled Technical Standards For Customs Passenger Processing At Airports
may be obtained from the U.S. Customs Service, Office of Finance, Fixed Assets Services Group;
6026 Lakeside Blvd., Indianapolis, IN 46278.
3) Applicable Laws and Regulations
There are a number of statues, rules and regulations which have specific application to the INS,
Customs and other FIS processes at airports, and that often can create additional, and sometimes
differing, security requirements to be coordinated early with the security design team. Those in force at
the time of this writing are found in the Federal Inspection Service Area Laws and Regulations section
of Appendix F; the reader should take note that all such rules, regulations and statues are subject to
change, especially where changing levels of security are concerned.
j.
Loading Dock & Delivery Areas

Loading docks and delivery areas are very active areas at airport terminals. Maintenance personnel,
vendors and suppliers, delivery vehicles, and many others use this area daily. Many of these people are not
badged or known to the airport security personnel or system. Of necessity, this area must provide access to
points of delivery within the terminal. These could be tenants, concessionaires, airlines, or airport staff.
Control of this area and the people and goods being brought into the terminal facility requires a well
thought-out security strategy. Depending on the locations of the dock areas and potential delivery
recipients, various methods of security control may be implemented.
1) Security strategies should allow efficient functioning of the area and be relative to the location and
access of the dock and the risk assessment at the particular airport. Access control of doors, personnel
monitoring by badged airport delivery recipients, screening of delivered merchandise, and CCTV
monitoring are all potential methods of control.
2) In addition to the security concerns regarding personnel and materials entering the terminal via the
loading dock, the safety and security of the loading dock area itself is also a concern. Since large
delivery trucks and vehicles are frequently left unattended, parked directly adjacent to the terminal
building, considerations for controlled and/or physical vehicle inspection may be warranted. In
addition, general CCTV monitoring of the area can alert security personnel to vehicles that have been
left for extended periods. A parking area that is distanced from the actual loading dock/terminal
building for extended parking of service and delivery vehicles should be considered.
3) Another advantage of controlling vehicle access to the terminal loading dock is the reduction of
unnecessary cars and vehicles which may attempt to use the loading dock area as a general parking
area. The fewer and more controlled the vehicles are which are left unattended adjacent to the terminal,
the safer the terminal will be from risk of vehicle bombs. In addition, during heightened security
conditions, physical inspection of all delivery vehicles approaching the terminal might be required. As
such, considerations for at least temporary vehicle inspection points should be made.
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Section III-D-4 Nonpublic Areas Checklist

Non-Public Areas
Service corridors should not cross boundaries of secure areas
Service corridors may be used to minimize quantity of security access points
Tenant areas can be grouped into common service corridor
Consider corridor placement and use by airport emergency personnel and law enforcement
Fire stairs typically connect many of the buildings floors/levels as well as security areas
Stairwells and vertical pathways may require security treatments and boundaries
Office areas should connect via corridors and stairs to minimize the need to cross security boundaries
Office spaces should be planned to accommodate visitors and public access
Consider the use of satellite police, ID or first aid offices
Tenant Spaces
Some tenant spaces might require tie-in to the airport access control and alarm system
Consider tenant money-handling, overnight operations, early morning concession deliveries
Public Safety or Police Offices
Office space for airport law enforcement in the terminal
Public access area protected with ballistic materials, laminates, concrete bollards, etc.
Include adequate space (in no particular order) for:
Briefing/work room
Training classroom/offices
Property/evidence room(s)
Conference roomscan be part of command post/operations room(s)
Holding cells
Possible satellite locations
Private Interrogation/Witness Statement room(s)/area
Physical fitness area in conjunction with lockers, showers, and restrooms
General storage areas
Secured arms storage
Kitchen/lunchroom facilities
Areas requiring access for public and tenants but protected with adequate controls are:
Administrative offices
Security ID badging
Lost and found
SIDA/tenant training rooms
Medical services
Consider electrical, fiber optic and other utility supply and routes to/from the police areas
Law Enforcement Parking

Provide quickly accessible parking for law enforcement with direct landside/SIDA access
Remote Law Enforcement/Public Safety Posts/Areas

In large facilities, consider remote law enforcement posts or substations
For outdoor posts, shelters are needed
In large terminals, tactical supply storage should be located in specially identified areas
Other Considerations
The location of Communication/Dispatch facilities
Location of equipment repair areas
Relocated support functions near the police area
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Dogs/K-9 Teams
If there is no on-site K-9, specify non-critical area for temporary K-9 use
Rule of thumb: a 4- by - 8-foot indoor pen, attached to an outdoor fenced exercise run
Plumbing and drainage is important; the concrete floor can be epoxy coated for ease of cleaning
Fresh air circulation, dry environment, without mildew or dampness
The dog area should be secured, and sufficiently isolated from casual public contact
Provide areas for veterinarian services and training activities
Isolation from noise and odor sources, especially jet fuel fumes
Secured storage for explosives test and training items; coordinated with ATF
Consider proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units
Consider multiple communications options to police, fire, rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert,
off-airport emergency assistance and a secure communications channel
Locate close to the Airport Emergency Command Post (CP), in a secure area
For cabling interconnections, a central geographic location maintains reasonable cable lengths
SOC has implications for floor space, cabinets, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths
Rear access to console for maintenance and update.
Consider space requirements of consolidating all functions within the SOC:
Information Specialists for customer information phones, paging;
Airport Police and/or Security Department
Fire Alarm monitoring
Landside/Terminal Operations
ID Badging
Maintenance Control/Dispatch (includes total energy management of HVAC systems)
Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information (BIDS) systems
Direct phone lines to ATC tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
Airport Radio and Personnel Paging Systems
Recording Equipment
Plan an alternate site capable of supporting the basic operation.
A direct view of the airside and the isolated parking position is desirable.
Space Needs
Space for Crisis Management Teams Operational Group and Negotiators
Refer to Airport Emergency Plan and Airport Security Program for optimum space
Advisory Circular 150/5200-31A on airport emergency planning can assist
Raised flooring is an option for installation of ducts and cable paths.
CP electrical power must be uninterrupted
Vehicular access to the CP necessary
Controlled parking for support vehicles and key CP vehicles
Provide space for kitchenette and rest rooms.
Family Assistance Center designated space in the case of an accident or incident.
FIS Areas
FIS areas are designed toward very different law enforcement and security situations
FIS agencies publish a separate document that provides their additional security design guidelines
required within their operational spaces
Reference FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5360-13
Access control and badging
Package screening
CCTV
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5.
Checked Baggage, Make-up Rooms & Systems

Note: Certain portions of the following section will outline many of the necessary procedural aspects of the
checked baggage process, in addition to the proposed design and construction concepts. These are integrated
here with the express purpose of acting as a brief tutorial. It is very important to understand the complexities of
the entire process and the alternatives they offer to the operator, and thus to the designer, before a design can
appropriately accommodate the space allocation, queuing, power and communications requirements. It is
further hoped that the tutorial will serve to facilitate meaningful discussion between the designers, the airport
and the aircraft operators, to help them to know and understand the terms and concepts, and to apply them in a
cost-effective manner to the requirements of each unique site and situation.
a.
Future Direction of Checked Baggage Screening

The FAA has publicly announced its intention to eventually require the screening of all checked baggage
through the use of explosives detection systems (EDS). The transition to this approach across the entire
domestic civil aviation system is expected to be gradual, as the system moves towards the 100% screening
goal. Some factors impacting the rate at which a transition might occur include equipment development and
availability, funding, and an appropriate regulatory foundation.
The actual implementation of a plan to achieve a required 100% EDS screening of checked baggage may
be several years away. The potential impact for renovation or new construction is a need for increased
space for the queuing, screening, and resolution processes, as well as for the necessary equipment and
power sources. While the techniques and technology may ultimately vary from location to location, the
application of such measures would probably require that architectural planning and design account for
certain common factors. These include:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
Adequate space allocation for equipment

Queuing space
Adequate power sources
Communications and environmental equipment
Adequate floor loading
Appropriate facilities where passengers and their baggage can be reunited for the purpose of alarm
resolution
Persons seeking additional information may view the FAAs website at www.faa.gov or contact the FAAs
Office of Public Affairs, 800 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20591. For regulated parties,
additional information can be obtained through local FAA Civil Aviation Security offices, principal
security inspectors, and federal security managers.
b.
Philosophy
1) The primary security concern for baggage handling, acceptance, conveyance and screening facilities is
to prevent the introduction of explosives or other dangerous devices onto aircraft by way of checked
baggage. Major baggage-related challenges include the need to consider:
a) The requirement to inspect baggage prior to conveyance as checked luggage.
b) That matching passenger with baggage is necessary for international flights and may be necessary
as an alternative measure for domestic flights.
c) The need to keep all baggage secure from contamination, i.e., the introduction of dangerous items
or material after acceptance and/or inspection.
d) The need to resolve suspect bags that have been identified through security inspection or found
unattended.
2) When these operational needs are factored in to the design of airport facilities, these security issues can
be met in a more efficient and cost effective manner. To do so, a number of steps can help guide the
design and development.
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c.
Applicable Regulations
The type of airline operation must first be determined. Once the type of operation is known, the applicable
regulatory references should be reviewed to establish current and potential requirements. This research
should include discussions with aircraft operators, the airport, and local law enforcement agencies
regarding their individual security policies and procedures.
1) Domestic, Scheduled Routes and Public Charters by U.S. Airlines
FAA regulations and guidance documents should be thoroughly reviewed, including FAR 108; the Air
Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP) for tenant airlines; the airports own security program;
any applicable FAA policy guidance such as the FAAs most current Position Paper on Checked
Baggage Security, and any proposed or pending notices of proposed rulemaking.
2) International Routes
Determination of any security requirements for aircraft operators serving international routes are quite
similar to those imposed upon aircraft operators serving domestic routes, while there are certain
additional requirements and restrictions that the designer should discuss with the aircraft operators
serving these routes. Each aircraft operator will differ somewhat in the manner in which it implements
its security requirements.
If there are no current or future operations by FAR 108 governed aircraft operators anticipated at the
facility, then review the requirements of each tenant aircraft operator Foreign Air Carrier Model
Security Program (FACMSP).
d.
Concept of Operations
In the past, the function of a baggage handling system was basically to move baggage from the ticket
counter or curbside check in area to the bag room, where baggage was sorted and distributed to
individual flights. The introduction of an EDS screening capability into the baggage handling process
adds another level of complexity to the operation.
Prior to designing systems with an EDS capability, it is absolutely necessary to prepare a concept of
operations for the proposed installation. This concept must define the baggage screening requirement,
the process by which the baggage moves from baggage check-in to the EDS, the process of EDS
screening, the process of handling baggage believed to be suspect, and the process by which
passengers and their suspect bags are rejoined to facilitate baggage resolution.
After determining design options, modeling can be used to test the viability of any inline design
options by identifying the true operational impact on the baggage handling system (BHS)
e.
Critical Design Factor Peak Bag Flow

1) The eventual goal for both the FAA and other international organizations is 100% screening of
checked baggage. In order to avoid premature obsolescence, the ability to do this should be included in
any new construction or major renovations. On an interim basis, alternative screening options are
allowed. To match the most suitable interim measure(s) with the project, the primary deciding factor is
the size of the operation. The peak hour bag flow should be determined both for current operations and
near-term (5-10 years) projected levels. Additional information on bag flow should be gathered to
pinpoint the flow throughout a peak day. This information can be used to model the bag flow with
various configurations.
2) The best design option to accommodate security will consider many operational and procedural
factors; however, of prime concern is the number and type of bags that must be screened. These two
factors should be viewed both separately and in the context of their inter-relationship. For example, an
anticipated high level of baggage to be screened will dictate the provision of sufficient space and
equipment to accommodate large numbers of bags over a given time period, while the type of baggage
may vary among airlines or airports based on the nature of passengers being served. A commuting
domestic business traveler is likely to carry routine items in smaller carry-on luggage, while travelers
to less developed parts of the world often carry complex, highly compacted and irregular luggage
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requiring very time and labor intensive screening procedures. Various combinations of these factors
must be considered, as they will drive different design and procurement decisions.
a) Domestic Airlines
i) Near term - Checked bags belonging to selectees identified by Computer-Assisted
Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS). Check with local airlines for average number of
passengers selected, or actual bag count if available.
ii) Long term Phase-in of 100% baggage screening at an FAA certified level of explosives
detection is to begin, provided equipment is available. The list of equipment or alternative
procedures available for use may be obtained from the affected aircraft operators or the airport.
b) Foreign Aircraft Operators
Since the methods of identifying passenger baggage requiring additional screening (selectee
bags) varies from airline to airline, check with tenant airlines to determine both the total peak
number of bags expected as well as the total number or percentage of bags that need to be
subjected to a higher level of detection. Until such time as screening of all checked baggage is
required, FAA requires that selectee bags be cleared by a certified EDS or bag match.
3) Establishing the peak throughput for screening is the first step.
a) Domestic Airlines
Prior to 100% screening, peak bag throughput is determined by multiplying the peak number of
originating baggage times the airlines average CAPPS-generated selectee rate. All transfer
baggage that has not been subject to FAA-approved security measures must also be included. For
purposes of this discussion we shall assume that a minimum of 25% of these bags will alarm at the
first level of inspection. For inline systems where alarm resolution is not done at this first step, the
baggage will be subject to further inspection by a succeeding level of EDS. The actual percent of
alarms can be greatly affected by local conditions and designers should obtain an estimate from
the airline(s) using the system.
For 100% screening applications all originating bags will be screened and approximately 25% of
these will need to be routed to a succeeding level of EDS. All transfer baggage that has not been
subject to FAA-approved security measures must also be included. Again, the actual estimate of
alarms should be established through communication with the airline(s).
b) Foreign Aircraft Operators
All originating bags will be screened with EDS equipment. At the least, selectee bags and alarms
from first level screening must be routed to EDS. The percent of alarms and selectees vary widely
among aircraft operators and markets, and therefore must be determined through communication
with the airline(s).
4) Other aspects of the operation which affect bag load should be considered, including:
a) Typical advance arrival time for check-in of the passenger group
b) The timeframe and number of transfer bags to be handled
c) Minimum connect times
d) Duration of the peak period(s)
f.
Explosives Containment
Under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for potential "suspect" bags (i.e. those which give such
an indication when screened by whatever arrangement of x-ray and/or EDS equipment is deployed at that
location, and cannot be cleared), to be placed and transported in an explosives containment device (threat
containment unit, or TCU) to a safe location for examination/disposal. If this option is selected, access
routes either from the baggage handling area, or from the public areas, as appropriate, need to be identified
and clearances and turning radii verified.
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g.
Checked Baggage Handling Security Options

1) Explosives Detection System (EDS) Equipment
a) Domestic Airline Operations
i) The FAAs interim goal is to screen all selectee bags at an EDS level of detection. Larger
operations will usually use EDS; smaller operations may use explosives trace detection
equipment. Some aircraft operators have small operations at very large airports, which could
allow for a different approach than for a large operation. Sharing of EDS is encouraged;
consult the aircraft operator for details.
ii) At the time of this publication, and for the interim period until 100% checked baggage
screening is possible, FAA is considering the following guidelines for equipment deployment:
(a) For operations with less than 10 selectee bags per peak hour trace detection only;
(b) For operations with greater than 10 selectee bags per peak hour Certified EDS and trace
detection.
During the interim period, 100% inline checked baggage screening could be established
using adaptive intelligent processing in a multi-level approach. However, all selectee
bags must be screened at an EDS level of detection. Multi-level screening involves any
system which routes bags that do not clear inspection by one machine to a second
machine for further evaluation. The advantages are:
(1) To put infrastructure in place that will allow for 100% checked baggage screening at
certified levels in the future, helping to avoid the expense of retrofitting.
(2) To screen the most bags at the highest available level of detection
iii) Noncertified systems are utilized in a few existing facilities to screen selectee bags, but are no
longer allowed for additional sites under current rules and security programs.
b) Foreign-only Aircraft Operator Operations
ICAO recommends 100% checked baggage screening by the end of CY 2002, but does not require
screening at an EDS level of detection.
2) Positive Passenger Bag Match (PPBM)
a) Domestic Flights
Prior to 100% screening of hold baggage by EDS, airlines may use PPBM as an alternative to
EDS screening of selectee baggage. Provision should be made for this procedure in both domestic
and international terminal design. This could involve multiple areas of the terminal, including bag
makeup rooms, ticket counters and gate areas. Check with each airline to determine its
requirements for PPBM procedures.
b) International Aircraft Flights
PPBM is used in all international flights. Provisions should be made in international terminals to
accommodate the PPBM procedures, equipment or communications needs that the tenant aircraft
operators employ in the facility. Check with each airline to determine its PPBM procedure.
3) Physical Search
All airlines will require an area for physical search of checked baggage. Depending on the details
contained in the affected aircraft operator security program, space and power provisions should be
made to accommodate trace detection equipment in the area designated for physical searches of
baggage.
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h.
Equipment Positioning and Installation Options:

Once it has been determined that the type and size of the operation requires screening equipment, the
physical positioning must be evaluated. The number of machines required and size of the equipment will
dictate this choice in many cases; however, during the interim period, other considerations and user
preferences may control the decision.
Configuration is a critical consideration and should be planned carefully. The ongoing operating and
maintenance costs, flexibility of the system and throughput are dependent upon configuration. Both
centralized and decentralized configurations should be evaluated.
1) Stand-Alone
a) This configuration has a freestanding bulk EDS and trace system, without connection to other
machines or to a baggage handling system. Bags are manually transported to and from the
machine from the ticket counter or skycap areas. This is typically seen in a ticketing lobby but can
be placed further down the screening line. Walls, partitions or stanchions are often used to
establish the boundary of the screening area. Typically, the considerations for this option include:
i) Egress and ingress paths of passengers and bag handlers
ii) Minimizing interference with general passenger and public flow in the area
iii) Maintaining distance from other passengers so as not to interfere with the screening process
iv) Conducting any trace detection or physical search in an area that affords privacy. The contents
of an open bag should not be visible to the public.
b) Space and design requirements for this option include:
i) The actual machine footprint, height, weight and maintenance clearances. (See the Typical
EDS Requirements chart on page 101)
ii) Operator workspace size and location
iii) Space for passengers to queue while waiting for bags to clear and/or bag tags to be issued
iv) Power, cabling and conduit requirements
c) There are a number of advantages associated with this configuration. The first is integration cost.
This is the least expensive method of providing checked baggage screening at an airport from an
initial project cost perspective. The primary operational advantage is that it eliminates the need to
reunite a passenger with his or her baggage for further inspection by trace or physical search,
because the person is present during the screening process to resolve any alarms. Stand-alone
configurations also allow for sharing of machines by airlines in a terminal with decentralized bag
handling. This is one means of achieving efficiency and lowering costs for multiple airlines with
low volume traffic in either large or small airports when centralized bag handling is not an option.
d) Disadvantages: This stand-alone option is not always feasible because of the passenger service
preferences of the airline(s), annual operating costs, and/or throughput requirements. The
limitations of hand loading bags into EDS equipment may reduce overall operational throughput
capacity for the highest throughput systems under the highest load conditions. Since that
manpower required to move bags to and from the machines may be a costly long-term element of
security if skycaps are employed, this configuration can be the most expensive option.
It is unlikely that the goal of 100% checked baggage screening could be accomplished in any sizable
operation with presently available equipment.
2) Inline
a) EDS Equipment
EDS equipment can be connected to a BHS at the input end, exit end or both. System design
considerations that apply universally include:
i) Limiting/filtering luggage size
ii) Bag tracking
iii) Preventing bags from slipping, rolling or flipping in transit
iv) Choosing an adequate decision point
v) Ability to reconcile passengers and their baggage for alarm resolution
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vi) Providing space for physical and trace inspection

vii) Life cycle costs
viii) EOD access points and clearance space
b) Choice of Inline Configuration
The choice of inline configuration will drive the total number of machines, number of operator
stations and space allocation. See the Typical EDS Requirements chart on page 101 for
approximate space requirements for various typical equipment types.
c) Exit-End Integrated
This is initiated at the passenger check-in point in the lobby or at curbside where skycap service and
an outbound belt are available. Bags are manually fed into the EDS; cleared bags are automatically
transported onto the outbound BHS. The primary benefit is the ability to avoid the need for later
reuniting passengers and baggage for additional trace or physical searches. The decentralization of
the screening function eliminates the potential for creating bottlenecks or otherwise interfering with
the BHS. The disadvantages can be additional labor for bag loading, interference with passenger
flow in the ticketing lobby, low throughput with manual loading, space constraints and more
difficulty and operational complexity in load sharing with multiple machines.
d) Fully Integrated
An important part of a fully integrated system is referred to as adaptive intelligent processing,
which may use only EDS or EDS plus noncertified equipment, particularly those with a complex
belt design requiring the system to remain aware of the constantly changing position and status
of each bag as it traverses through. Such a system can also intelligently adapt to rapid changes in
airline operational requirements, system down time, changing aircraft schedules, or securityrelated events that may require a swift system response.
Adaptive intelligent processing can be used to maximize the number of bags subjected to certifiedlevel inspection. This method involves active communication within various levels of the bag
handling system so that, in addition to selectee bags, other bags can be routed for screening at the
highest-level of detection as that capacity becomes available on a bag-by-bag basis.
If noncertified systems are employed, the baggage handling system (BHS) routes bags to
noncertified machines as the first level in the screening, and then on to certified EDS for any
alarmed or selectee bag. Using adaptive intelligent processing, the BHS senses any availability of
EDS equipment and may then bypass lower level screening to route bags directly to the FAAcertified machines (EDS) whenever they are available. This process maximizes the number of
bags screened in the higher certified mode.
One can also employ adaptive intelligent processing in multi-level approaches with all bags being
run through certified machines that may operated in non-certified detection modes to increase
throughput, based on the number of bags waiting in a queue. All bags that alarm at level one, and
all selectee bags (by CAPPS or any other method) at this first level of screening would be sent to a
manned, FAA-certified EDS machine for further inspection. In both scenarios, bags must be
tracked to ensure that selectee bags are subject to screening at certified levels. And as the designer
can begin to see, while automated, integrated systems can be quite efficient, they can also make
significant space configuration demands.
Full integration involves conveyor belts feeding into and out of the certified or non-certified
explosives detection devices, as well as diverters and additional belts and areas to handle suspect
bags. The machine can be placed behind the airline ticketing counter at the lobby level or in the
bag makeup areas before or after sortation, where baggage is tracked and routed. This option
allows the most flexibility and highest throughput capacity. The main goal in this design is to
maximize throughput capacity while minimizing bag transit time and life cycle costs, while
maintaining required detection capabilities.
The configuration options currently in use are as follows:
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HUB SCREENING
FOR ONE OR MORE AIRLINES
In this design the BHS first diverts outbound checked luggage to an area that houses the scanning equipment. This
Hub is located prior to the sorter system. Within the Hub, the scanning equipment is clustered together and fed by a
dedicated, intelligent baggage distribution system. If cleared, the bag goes into the sortation system. If not, it may be
routed to the next level of screening or reconciled with the passenger. A terminal complex may require one or more
Hubs to handle bag flows and space limitations. A Hub minimizes impact on the BHS system. The concepts
lifecycle costs are significantly reduced compared with most other options because the number of operators is
reduced. Regardless of the specific type or combinations of systems deployed, this design minimizes total security
infrastructure investment while maximizing operational flexibility and robustness. Both bag load sharing and
diversion around systems or BHS systems with maintenance failures are easily accomplished. The ability to easily
distribute the luggage to available machines in the system allows for utilizing the full system capacity during peaks.
This leads to a requirement for less equipment and infrastructure. This design also allows for easy implementation of
new technologies in the future. A possible disadvantage is that this configuration is dependent upon reliable bag
tracking capability. Even if bag tracking were not planned for other purposes, it would be needed to support the
security system.
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SORTER SCREENING
FOR ONE OR MORE AIRLINES
This concept takes advantage of the BHS master sorter and positions security equipment after the baggage enters the
sorter. All checked bags are tracked on to the sorter and then diverted to scanning equipment placed either on side
loops off of the sorter or in the center of a circular, racetrack sortation system (similar to Hub screening but with the
sortation function incorporated). After screening, the luggage is returned to the sortation system with the bag
security status updated for each bag. Essentially, the sorter functions as a large queuing conveyor coupled with
security system logic that distributes the luggage load. This design also allows for fewer systems and flexibility for
dealing with out-of-service equipment, new technology and changing security threat levels. This configuration
requires a reliable tracking system.
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LINEAR AND PARALLEL INLINE SCREENING FOR DECENTRALIZED BAG HANDLING

TYPICAL FOR ONE AIRLINE
Where facility space limitations do not allow for Hub or Sorter Screening, machines are run along the outbound BHS
lines. It is recommended that EDS not be placed directly on the main feeder line, but always on offshoot branches. If
the machine is on the mainline it can interfere with bag handling during out-of-service or peak load conditions. Linear
and Parallel Screening Systems can be the least efficient of the inline options. To retain flexibility, there needs to be the
ability to load share between the lines and machines. This means that a method of routing bags to other conveyor lines
or other scanning equipment should be included in the design. Examples follow:
LINEAR PARALLEL SCREENING
This occurs where machines are run in parallel, each taking unscreened bags and either clearing them back onto the
BHS or performing alarm resolution. In order to avoid being limited by the throughput of the individual machines,
there should be a diverter positioned upstream that senses the queue capacity and directs the sharing of the bag load.
Care must also be taken to have ample queue space in front of the machines to handle peak loads. This is the slowest
and most expensive option as all machines must be manned and alarm resolution accomplished on each machine.
LINEAR TANDEM SCREENING

Additional throughput can be gained by running the machines in linear fashion. This is where one or more machines
are run in automated mode and feed to a manned machine. To maximize the throughput of this configuration, the
system should also allow for routing bags directly to the manned machine whenever the queues are full on the
automated scanning equipment. Ample queue space in front of the machines is an important consideration.
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TYPICAL EDS REQUIREMENTS

At the time of this writing, there are several FAA-certified EDSs on the market, and several more in development.
Some new technologies are being downsized, while some are presenting entirely new approaches (and equipment
dimensions) to screening. The chart below is intended only to provide examples of the typical range of dimensions
the designer may have to accommodate in a typical screening point or bag makeup area. Some are stand-alone, or
can be integrated with a bag belt system, and would therefore require additional space for the belt systems leading
into and out of the machine. The designer must coordinate with the aircraft operators to determine which specific
machines will be, or potentially could be used at which locations.
Equipment Type
Length
Height
Weight
Power
Amps
96
Maximum
Width
75
80.5
7,350 lbs.
350-510V
3-phase
30A
Belt
Width
28.5
EDS model 1
Lowest throughput
EDS model 2
Medium throughput
174
75
80.5
9,350 lbs.
350-510V
3-phase
25A
28.5
EDS model 3
Higher throughput
187
95
87
16,900 lbs.
380-480V
3-phase
30A
40
EDS model 4 Higher throughput
206
78
84
8,300 lbs.
208V
3-phase
30A
29.5
Powered Infeed
Flat Infeed
72
58
39
39
29
29
577 lbs.
480 lbs.
(from EDS)
(from EDS)
Exit Ramp
73
39
29
400 lbs.
None
Luggage Positioning
Adapter
58
56
58
1622 lbs.
380 V
3-phase
24
20A
28.5
Clearances
A rule of thumb is to add 39 inches to each side of the machine footprint for maintenance access. This clearance is
typically not required at the entrance and exit ends of the machine. Additionally, some models currently require
clearances above the machines. The actual, minimum footprint will vary in size and shape depending on clearance
required to open doors and slide out internal components. Check with the manufacturers for details pertinent to their
models.
Ramps & Conveyor Belts
A. Standalone In this freestanding configuration no belts are required. Space must be allocated for both infeed
and exit ramps.
B. Exit-End Integrated Allocate space for an entrance ramp and conveyor needed to tie-into an outbound bag
handling system.
C. Fully Integrated Allocate space for conveyors as needed for the chosen design configuration. See prior
sections for descriptions of options and discussion on configuration options, queue conveyors and load sharing.
Certain models also require use of a luggage-positioning adapter in front of the EDS.
Operator Workstation
The actual console and monitors that are used to operate the equipment vary. Establish a footprint based on standard
ergonomics for any workstation with a single chair and desktop area minimally 36 inches wide. The work area is
typically multilevel to accommodate a console at desk height and raised monitors.
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i.
Maximizing Inline Throughput and System Efficiency with Design

1) Maximizing Automation
To minimize labor costs, number of operators and operating expense of the system, as many bags as
possible should be run through EDS in its automated mode. Since operational throughput (where
alarms are assessed at the machine by an operator) is typically only 40-50% of machine throughput
capacity, the system should maximize the delivery of bags to machines run in automated mode. Bags
not cleared by machines automatically can then be routed to a manned EDS where alarm evaluation
procedures can be performed.
2) Decision Holding Point
The second most important BHS design feature that can maximize throughput is the decision holding
point. The queuing conveyor where alarmed bags are held waiting for a decision is referred to as the
decision holding point. Rather than clearing an alarmed bag held at the machine, the bag can continue
on while an operator makes a decision. The EDS can continue to scan other bags while this is taking
place. In order to minimize any effect on throughput, the decision point should be located at a distance
(depending on conveyor speed) that allows 40-60 seconds for an operator decision once the bag exits
the EDS. The decision holding point can be closer but will decrease throughput proportionally.
3) Baggage Handling Specifications
The BHS should be designed to ensure that bag separation is maintained. Systems that allow bags to
roll, move and overlap can cause EDS faults that will impact throughput. Check the EDS manufacturer
specifications to ensure that bags are presented at the optimal speed and spacing, and queue belts are
appropriately sized.
Bag insert and removal sites must be carefully positioned so as not to degrade throughput. An insert point
for reintroducing bags that jammed or that require reinsertion for other reasons should be far enough
upstream from the EDS entrance queuing that stopping the conveyors belts will have minimal impact on
throughput. Removal of bags that are suspect (unable to be cleared by EDS and/or operator alarm
resolution) should be done after the decision point and as far downstream from the EDS as possible.
Designing the system so that suspect bags are automatically rerouted and deposited to a holding point for
further inspection that does not stop or interfere with the flow of cleared bags, is strongly recommended.
The baggage throughput of an EDS can be either machine limited or operator limited. The integrated
BHS/EDS design must accommodate peak baggage throughput rates as well as accommodate any
failure of EDS equipment. This normally requires crossover paths in the BHS to bypass any failed
EDS machine, and must be designed to accommodate these reduced or rerouted throughputs.
Designers should consider the use of carousels with sorting capability in lieu of using either tilt trays or
long belt runs to accommodate these needs.
4) Multitasking the Operator
Another means of increasing system efficiency and lowering cost is to have an operator positioned to
view the images from more than one EDS machine at a single console.
j.
Additional Checked Baggage Considerations

The following design and engineering issues associated with checked baggage security should be addressed:
1) Engineering & Design Considerations
a) Floor Loading
Considerations of floor loading for security devices (especially EDS) can be significant. Some
explosives detection systems available at this writing have floor loading as high as 265 psi under
the feet of the larger, heavily shielded equipment. Other similar devices may be adequately
provided for within a range of 125 psi to 176 psi, with some as low as 84 psi. Given the wide
range of possible floor loading factors, all parties to the installation project must carefully review
the devices that will be used initially, what might ultimately replace them, and what alternative
locations within the structure may be available. It may be possible to distribute the weight using
steel plates in retrofit projects where the existing structure will not support the load.
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b) Environment
The tolerance levels of any equipment or system for electrical interference, heat, cold, humidity
and particulate matter must be identified and accommodated.
c) Maintenance
i) Access at machine and belt systems NFPA clearance and parts
ii) Provision for associated maintenance space including parts storage
d) Power
i) Clean Power
ii) Backup Power Secondary supply and UPS
iii) Electrical Interference Dedicated circuits and RF reader positioning
iv) Optimum positioning of power supply conduits and outlets
e) Communications
i) Is a direct alarm or voice line to police department desired?
ii) Is a data line for remote equipment maintenance or other data transfer required?
iii) Is a voice line for operator or maintenance technician use required?
iv) Determine optimal positioning of communications cables.
f) Baggage Search Areas
The areas where alarm resolution via trace and/or physical search is accomplished with the
passenger present are referred to as baggage search areas.
i) Where should these areas be located? Issues to consider:
(a) Privacy for opening luggage
(b) Proximity to equipment or passengers most likely location (minimizes reconciliation time)
(c) Travel distance and route for transport of suspect bag to search room
ii) Space and other layout considerations
(a) Power for explosives trace detector equipment
(b) Adequate light, HVAC, security
(c) Sufficient space to accommodate at least one security person and one passenger, trace
equipment, and inspection of luggage on a surface of the correct operator height
(d) Access for local airline or EOD alarm resolution procedures that may include access by
robot retrieval units and/or threat containment units (TCU), and space for unit storage
(e) Ability to secure the area and the equipment when not in use
g) Operator positioning
i) Next to machine(s) or in a remotely located control rooms
ii) Lighting, heating, cooling and ventilation, considering machine, operator and public BTUs
iii) If operators are visibly separated from the machine, consider making CCTV images at the exit
and entrance ends of the machines viewable in the operator room
iv) Need for communication between operator and person at machine to resolve issues
v) Electronic communications between machines and operator consoles
h) Need for Contingency Plans/Redundancy
i) Positive Passenger Bag Match
ii) Diversion of bags to/from machines
iii) Recirculation of bags
iv) Adequate capacity and throughput on inline systems
i) Installation
i) Sizing the openings into the areas where equipment will be located, or timing the placement
of machines prior to construction of enclosing structures, can eliminate cost and problems
associated with getting the equipment into place. Consider including the ability to remove the
equipment, replace or relocate equipment as needed or during heightened threat conditions.
Check manufacturer specifications for necessary turning radius and other clearances.
ii) Floor loading and protection considerations during machine transit must be considered.
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2) Other Possible EDS Impacts on the Baggage Handling System

The integrated design of an EDS will likely match a specific make/model of EDS equipment. Most
subsequent substitutes or change-outs from one make/model of EDS to another may require major
alterations of the entire system, including belts, paths of travel, etc.
3) Keeping Bags Sterile
After acceptance by the airline from any location, on or off-airport, bags need to remain sterile and
secure. This is addressed further in the Remote Baggage Check-In Section on page 105. Care must be
taken to provide areas that do not allow for access by unauthorized individuals. Securing the area is
essential to prevent both pilferage and introduction of items into the baggage after screening has
occurred. Provision of separate, lockable, storage areas should also be considered.
k.
Curbside Baggage Check-In Terminal Frontage

1) The primary security goal following curbside baggage check-in is the immediate removal of bags from
public access. A curbside outbound belt is one preferred option, as is securing the area where bags are
held after acceptance so that the public does not have access. If conveyors are not available, adequate
space for storing bags in a secured, nonaccessible area is essential. Any outbound conveyor needs to be
secured or positioned to prohibit public access to the airside, the bag belt, or to the bags thereon. Other
considerations include EDS equipment placement tie-ins to conveyors routing bags to EDS equipment,
and belt entry doors which close, lock and alarm.
2) Considerations for curbside check-in include where passengers will relinquish control of baggage,
placement of personnel and workstations to tag and accept control of bags, how bags will be
transported to the sterile area for screening, placement of EDS equipment, how oversize
bags/packages/parcels will be handled, where bags will be placed for secondary screening if required
as a result of alarm(s) from primary screening, isolation area for bags requiring passenger response,
access routes for law enforcement officers (LEO), etc.
3) When designing curbside facilities, consider that there will be times of heightened security when
curbside or off-airport check-in will be suspended and all baggage will have to be processed through
interior terminal ticket counter check-in systems. This is not meant to discourage the development of
effective curbside check-in systems, but the space planner must bear in mind the implications of
having to shut them down and divert bags inside to the Airport Ticket Office (ATO).
4) Built-in elements supporting curbside check-in procedures can be designed and situated to facilitate
securing of baggage and bag tags. If curbside check-in operations utilize exterior links to baggage belt
systems, consider the need to secure these links when unattended to prevent access to secured areas.
5) Consider the need to provide adequate curbside space to preclude people from spilling into the
roadway when peak period crowds use curbside check-in.
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l.
Remote Baggage Check-In

1) There is a growing trend towards accepting checked baggage at remote sites. These sites include cruise
ship terminals, airport parking structures, hotels and train stations. Consideration should be given to
the impact, if any, of off-site screening, done by the aircraft operators. This may significantly reduce
the peak bag loads used to calculate BHS capacity and its concurrent space requirements if screening is
also conducted off-site. If contractors deliver large numbers of pre-checked bags into the system, this
practice could actually increase the peak load requirement. Such luggage must be kept sterile after
acceptance from the passenger to prohibit introduction of foreign elements and theft.
2) If bags are prescreened, design accommodations should be made to unload bags directly into the
sortation process at a point segregated from high traffic, curbside, or ATO areas. As with curbside,
access to this prescreening area must be restricted. If the luggage and passenger are not arriving at the
airport together, the need to reconcile the two becomes more complex.
3) Procedural considerations for maintaining the chain of custody for remote baggage include curbside
issues as well as the security of the facilities at the remote site, how baggage will be transported, how
baggage will be secured during transport (i.e., seals for trucks carrying bags), inventories of baggage
before and after transport, preferred travel routes, baggage transfer points, etc. The airport designer
must consider ancillary issues such as off-loading points and baggage storage areas.
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Section III-D-5 Checked Baggage Make-up Rooms & Systems Checklist

100% EDS screening goal
Planning and Design Considerations for 100% EDS screening:
Adequate space for equipment
Queuing space
Appropriate facilities for passenger/baggage reuniting for alarm resolution
Determine physical limitations of areas to be used for bag handling from proposed plans or as-builts
Determine any special requirements based on local code (ex: seismic and fire)
Check with airport, airline and local law enforcement to determine operational parameters including:
Type of operations, domestic versus international
Type of airlines, foreign aircraft operators versus domestic
Peak hourly bag flow (check current and future flight schedules)
Selectee rate
Local resolution procedures for uncleared bags
Whether remote bag check-in must be accommodated
If accommodations are needed to facilitate PPBM
Potential explosives containment needs
Special regulatory requirements unique to this airport or aircraft operator(s)
Determine which government regulations apply to the operation
Establish how bags will be screened including:
Type of equipment (choice based on selectee rate and airline choice)
Shared or common use versus airline dedicated bag handling
For operations with more than 150 selectees per week determine:
Location of EDS (curbside, lobby, bag makeup, concourse)
Integration level with BHS (stand alone, exit-end integration, fully integrated)
Configuration of full integrations (Hub, Sortation, Tandem, Parallel, Other)
Operator number and location (adjacent to machines or remote)
Location of area for reconciling suspect bags with passengers
Obtain requirements from equipment manufacturer for:
Floor Loading
Machine footprint
Maintenance clearances
Communications
Power
Installation
Environment tolerances
Throughput of equipment type
Bag handling system considerations for integrated systems:
Bags need to be tracked (bar code, RF tags, manual encoding stations)
Load distribution to minimize equipment needs
Maintaining bag separation (no rolling, flipping, slipping or stacking of bags)
FAA and ICAOs goal is 100% checked baggage screening
Conveyance of suspect bags (unresolvable by operators) to search area with ETD
Level of automation (minimizing life cycle and operational costs)
Flexibility ability to use machines at various levels (adaptive intelligent screening)
Adequate decision holding point after machines with operator threat resolution
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Handling peaks with sufficient queue belts or sorting carousel

Matching belt width of conveyor to machine if they differ
Number and types of inputs (ticket counter, skycap, recheck, transfer lines)
Existence of remote check-in (such as cruise ships)
Need for early bag storage
Accommodations for oversize items
Dog runs
Access to clear jams
Considerations for Stand Alone systems:
Location of area for uniting suspect bags with passengers
Path for transporting suspect bags
Path for manual loading and retrieval of bags
Space for passengers if they are brought to machine with bags
Physical barriers (walls, panels, stanchions) to keep public at distance from bags and machines during screening
If applicable, include provisions for:
Preventing glare from nearby windows on operator screenings
Adequate heat, light and ventilation of operator areas
Storage space for maintenance parts and supplies
CCTV for operator to view entrance and end of remote machine
Space for a Threat Containment Unit
Curbside bag belt for immediate removal of bags from public access
Secured area for bag hold after acceptance
Outbound conveyor secured to prohibit public access to the AOA
Other considerations include EDS equipment tie-ins to conveyors.
Space and equipment considerations for curbside check-in include:
Where passengers will relinquish control of baggage,
Placement of personnel and workstations to tag and accept control of bags,
How bags will be transported to the sterile area for screening,
Placement of EDS equipment,
How oversize bags/packages/parcels will be handled,
Where bags will be placed for secondary screening if required
Isolation area for bags requiring passenger response,
Access routes for LEOs
Consider the need for adequate curbside space to preclude peak crowds from spilling into roadway.
Consider potential impact of off-site screening on peak bag loads
Secured storage area needs for remotely checked bags
Bag delivery area and coordination required
Determine procedural requirements for:
Chain of custody
Bag transport
Security
Bag tracking
Storage Areas
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6.
Terminal Vulnerable Areas & Protection

Airport terminals are not isolated entities but are part of complex of integrated developments that provide the
basic and varied services of a modern airport. This integration of the terminal with other developments means
there are other areas where terminal and airport security may be compromised.
The connections from the terminal to utility services are most vulnerable in the areas of power and
communications. Primary transformers and switching gear, secondary generating equipment and transmission
facilities are points of vulnerability for terminal facilities. Design planning needs to account for these elements
and provide for their security from public tampering. Communications also is fundamental to terminal
operations and security. Voice and data switching and transmission facilities must be planned and designed to
be as secure and redundant as possible to avoid disruption. These facilities may provide unwanted access to
secure areas of a terminal through utility tunnels or ducts which enter a terminal below grade and open to
secured or service spaces.
Loading docks and delivery areas have been discussed in earlier sections in relation to providing access for
daily airport operations. The security of these areas is a strategy that must be developed in early terminal
planning.
A terminal may also be physically integrated into the overall airport. It may have walkway or bridge
connections to other terminals, hotels, parking structures or other airport facilities and structures. Security
strategies will need to be developed to control the movement of people in the enclosed corridors but also on the
other surfaces of the attachment such as roofs or interstitial spaces.
Many airports also provide people moving systems that move persons within a terminal or from terminal to
terminal. If exposed these conveyance systems can also become points of vulnerability in terminal security. The
planning and design of these systems must include the criteria of terminal security.
Section III-D-6 Terminal Vulnerable Areas and Protection Checklist

Due to the complex/multi-use function of terminals they contain the broadest range of vulnerable areas
Each airport is unique and must be evaluated for unique or increased vulnerabilities
Terminal Vulnerable Areas
Connections from the terminal to utility services in power and communications
Primary transformers and switching gear
Secondary generating equipment and transmission facilities
Voice and data switching and transmission facilities
Utility tunnels or ducts entering a terminal below grade
Loading docks and delivery areas
Walkway or bridge connections to other terminals
Hotels, parking structures or other adjacent facilities and structures
People moving systems, if exposed
Locations for person or object concealment
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Section E - Architecture
Architectural design and airport security design interact on a fundamental level in almost every aspect of the facility.
But there are certain specific instances where these two design focuses are particularly joined. These instances
typically are where the security system is collecting or monitoring information and where the system is processing
and using the information.
Security system data is collected principally at transitions of security boundaries such as doors and gates and
monitored through wall or ceiling mounted CCTV cameras or various types of screening equipment such as that
which is located at checkpoints. Security information is processed through system or network hubs in telecom rooms
and utilized in the security system control room. The architectural design of these locations must be carefully
coordinated with security system design.
In addition there are other security considerations that architectural planning and design should understand and
incorporate where possible.
1.
Physical Boundaries
Airport terminals vary in usage and configuration so the implementation of FAA mandated security measures
can take many forms in response to airport planning and programming issues. One criteria that is common to all
is the requirement for a physical boundary between differing levels of security such as between non-sterile to
sterile areas. Building enclosures and partitioning typically provide most of this separation. Large assembly type
facilities such as terminals have architectural issues of openness, spatial definition, and circulation.
Architectural planners and designers have been innovative in successfully blending the requirements to create
secure facilities.
For further discussion on specific design aspects of boundaries and barriers such as walls and doors, see the
Boundaries and Access Points section on page 16.
Areas which are unmonitored or which are accessible to unscreened public must meet higher levels of security
boundary than monitored areas such as security checkpoints. Where boundaries are solid (floor to ceiling)
security strategies are primarily concerned with access points through the boundary. Boundary surfaces must be
capable of preventing the passage of objects or weapons through the boundary.
Where the boundary surface is not the full height of the opening, the boundary must be capable of preventing
objects or weapons from being easily passed over or through the boundary and across security levels.
At security checkpoints there is more flexibility if there is a means of closure for the entire checkpoint area. In
such instances divider walls and railings must be substantial enough to direct passenger and public movement
and refuse passenger contact across the security boundary. Boundaries may also be used to contain passengers
on the sterile side of a security checkpoint for a brief distance to reduce the impacts of a security breach as well
as to provide a visual or psychological deterrent to keep unauthorized out of and away from nonpublic areas.
2.
Bomb/Blast Analysis
Bomb/blast analysis can play a critical part in the architecture of an airport terminal or other building. It is
important that considerations for blast-resistant design as well as design features that reduce risk and injury due
to a bomb blast, or limit available areas to conceal a bomb, be considered early in the design or renovation.
Both architectural methods for blast-resistance and tools for bomb/blast analysis are rapidly changing. Further
information and discussion is contained in Appendix C Blast Analysis.
3.
Limited Concealment Areas/Structures

This topic has been touched on previously Public Areas section on page 78 under Terminal. The concept is
intuitive in that wall configurations, built-in fixtures, freestanding elements, and furnishings should be designed
to deter the concealment of parcels containing explosives or other dangerous devices. This is particularly
applicable to public nonsterile areas such as ticket lobbies or baggage claim areas.
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Spaces that provide access from such public areas like storage or custodial rooms should have locking doors.
Areas that of necessity are accessible, such as restrooms, should also be designed to minimize the ability to
conceal dangerous devices.
Where structures with concealable areas are unavoidable, consider designs that are easily, quickly and safely
searchable. Coordinate furnishings and structure design with local security, search, and threat response agencies
to assure the design meets their requirements and needs. Reduced search times can minimize airport downtime,
passenger inconvenience, and negative publicity.
4.
Operational Pathways
Efficient terminal facilities do much more than move persons and baggage through the various spaces. A
tremendous amount of activity must occur in support of passenger activities for the whole to function smoothly.
Much of the support activity occurs in areas and pathways that are out of public view and which preclude public
access. Aircraft operator and airport personnel need access to the various functions of the terminal on a
continual basis and at a sometimes-hectic pace. Concessions within the terminal must have a means of
delivering supplies and materials to the various locations without impacting passenger circulation. Airport
system monitoring and maintenance functions need to occur away from passengers whenever possible.
Access to and security of service corridors and nonpublic circulation pathways requires coordination of the
architectural program, aircraft operator functions, and terminal security design. Use of corridors that provide
access to multiple levels of security in the terminal should be avoided but, if necessary, particular attention must
be placed on the control of access to the corridor. Access points should be minimized.
Vertical circulation can be particularly problematic since building functions and levels of security are often
stacked. Code required exit stairs often double as service corridors requiring particular attention to security
strategies along these corridors. Exit stairs should only egress to public areas. Automatic exits to AOA levels
must be avoided. Elevators have very similar issues. Public elevators should not cross levels of security. Service
elevators invariably access all levels. Security control of service elevators is either linked to elevator controls or
elevator lobbies. This security strategy must be coordinated but not compromised by efficient deliveries to
concessionaires and other airport tenants.
Airport police and other law enforcement entities also have need of secure nonpublic corridors. LEOs have
increasing incidences of escorting persons from aircraft or various public areas of the building to the terminal
police holding areas. This transport or escorting of persons should be along nonpublic corridors. Terminal
police stations should have direct access to the service corridor system for this transport. Likewise airport police
stations should have direct access to nonpublic parking areas if vehicular transport becomes necessary.
5.
Minimal Number of Security Portals

Architecture should be designed to group access pathways and minimize the number of security portals. This
can be done with use of service corridors & stairwells that channel personnel from various areas, prior to
entrance into the SIDA or other security area.
Architectural planning and design can reasonably develop areas of security within the terminal and develop
boundaries between them. The dynamics of airport operation require that all boundaries have strategies for
transition across or through them. The best method is to minimize the number of access points to those that are
necessary. If possible, collect nonpublic circulation prior to access through a security boundary similar to a
public checkpoint. Code-required public exit pathways should be from higher to lower levels of security when
possible. If code-required exits must egress to an area where higher security is imposed, such as from
holdrooms to the SIDA, architectural design should accommodate control and monitoring by the security
system.
Avoid any type of automatic door in a security boundary. In some instances function may require an oversized
entry such as a coiling door through a security boundary. The operation of such an entry should be interlocked
with the security system so that security clearance is required to open the door and closure is automatic after a
programmed delay.
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PART III
6.
Space for Expanded, Additional and Contingency Security Measures

Architectural planning and design typically establishes contingencies for future growth and expansions of a
terminal facility. Planning is done for expansions of public and support spaces, growth and distribution airport
systems, location of future security checkpoints and additional measures needed during periods of heightened
security. Incorporation of additional space for expansion and contingencies both reduces cost for the installation
and execution of those measures as well as minimizes the operation impact when those measures are added.
Heightened security levels may require the addition of temporary or relocated checkpoints to facilitate the
extended processing required. It could mean preparing locations for additional CCTV monitoring of landside
and airside areas. Command post areas will be activated and may require additional or remote sites. The
terminal roadway system may require the accommodation of temporary guard stations at the curbside or other
critical areas. Communications and data systems may require temporary expansion and/or remote inputs.
Concession spaces that are typically within sterile areas may need to be relocated to non-sterile areas.
Early discussions with the Airport Security Committee, security consultants, and airport planners will establish
the level of activity and types of expanded, additional, and contingent security measures to be incorporated in
architectural design efforts.
Section III-E Architecture Checklist

Architecture plays a fundamental role in all
aspects of security
Carefully coordinate locations for access points
and equipment rooms
Planning and Design Considerations
Physical Boundaries
Between different security levels
Prevent items from being passed
through/over
Deter public access to nonpublic areas
Provide visual or psychological deterrent
Bomb/Blast Analysis
Critical part of design
Perform bomb/blast analysis periodically
Minimize areas where objects or
persons can be concealed
Minimize or lock accessible spaces and
rooms
Coordinate with local security, search
and threat response agencies
Airport Personnel
Tenants
Emergency Response Routes
Delivery Routes
Security Response
Police Escorts for Holding Purposes
Minimum Number of Security Portals
Minimize numbers for cost and security
Reduces cost if personnel screening
becomes necessary
Maximizes use/efficiency of systems
Space for Additional Security Measures
Allows growth with minimal impact on
operations
Reduces installation and execution costs
Reduces
time
needed
for
additions/expansions
Consider allotting space/accommodations

for:
Temporary SSCP
Additional SSCP locations
Delivery and personnel screening
Added expansion to planned SSCP
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PART III
Section F - Access Control and Alarm Monitoring Systems (ACAMS)

Standards and guidelines for access control and alarm-monitoring systems (ACAMS) may be found in other
documents, including RTCA/DO-230, Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems. For specifics on
technologies and system types and standards, please refer to that document. This document concentrates on the
general security design philosophy and intercoordination with other airport systems needed to provide for an overall
airport-wide security strategy.
One of the major portions of an airports security strategy is its electronic ACAMS. Depending upon the airports
needs, this system may be focused primarily in the terminal, or may be airport-wide, with use by multiple tenants.
Likewise, a single security system may control multiple levels of security (airfield, sterile area, administrative, tenant).
In order to function properly, electronic security systems rely on four things: 1) electrical power; 2) cables and
connections through which security data is communicated; 3) an appropriate overall connective infrastructure of
hardware, software and security devices; and 4) proper design, procedures and personnel support to provide
adequate ability and resources to control the flow of people and information in a cost-effective manner.
1.
Power
Most airports have back-up and/or emergency power sources available. When possible, security systems should
be powered from these emergency systems so that they continue to function reliably in an emergency. However,
security systems, particularly those for airside and sterile areas, should also contain battery back-up capability.
Even though these systems may be on emergency power, battery back-up is important for use during emergency
power maintenance and down-times, in case emergency power fails, and most importantly in cases where
emergency power systems may have a limited amount or time of power availability.
2.
Data and Communications

Typically, security networks at an airport tend to be self-contained, operating independently from other airport data
communications systems, although they may run over the same fiber backbone network on separate but parallel
fibers. There are security system designs that provide interfaces with other airport data systems for such purposes
as using the first and last access reading of the day for time and attendance records. In general, however, it is much
preferred for security purposes that a security network run on physically separate dedicated and protected systems
wherever possible. (See RTCA Document DO-230 titled Standards for Airport Access Control Systems for
extensive information on electronic and performance standards to be met for access control systems.)
There are relatively few applications for security systems which depend upon networking of systems outside the
airports own environment, but it might be practical to apply this approach to such cases as where an airport
authority controlling multiple airports, or an airport with an adjacent industrial park, prefers to monitor security
from a single central location requiring external networks.
3.
Security System Infrastructure

In addition to those topics noted in Cabling Infrastructure Systems & Management on page 117, security
systems in particular should include the following infrastructure considerations:
a.
Limited Grouping
In field locations, grouping of system components (doors, gates, alarms) into a control/field panel location
should be limited to those items of similar security level, and geographic proximity. In addition, the costeffectiveness of grouping components should be balanced with the related security risk if that location/panel is
disabled due to failure or maintenance outage. In most cases, grouping tenant or administrative equipment
with FAA requirement-related (airside, sterile area) equipment is not recommended. Likewise, for FAA
requirement-related portals, grouping more portals than can be guarded/monitored by one (1) guard during an
outage should be coordinated with the airport police early in the design process.
b.
Maintenance Accessibility
To provide for ease of maintenance and quickness of repairs, locate related equipment (panels, communications
access points) on the same floor/level as the portal/equipment being controlled/monitored when possible.
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PART III
4.
Design, Procedures and Personnel

The efficient design of a security system includes not only the proper choice of equipment and placement of
devices, but also the capability for the system to be maintained and used in a manner that complements and
assists the airports personnel and procedures.
a.
Choice of Equipment
Much of this is addressed in RTCA/DO-230, Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems.
However, new technologies are continually being designed and many existing technologies continue to
become more cost-effective. In addition, airport security is becoming a specialty and many companies now
offer equipment and technologies specifically tailored to the unique needs of airports. Both airport owners
and designers are advised to carefully weigh the benefits of new technologies with the potential reliability
and maintenance security of existing technologies.
b.
Equipment Placement
While much of this has been discussed within the earlier sections of this document, a summary of types of
locations at an airport which often involve ACAMS equipment is included here for ease of use:
1) Terminal
a) Access Points
i) AOA/SIDA Personnel Doors
ii) Sterile Area Access Doors
iii) Security Checkpoint Grilles
iv) Baggage Doors and Systems
v) Loading Dock Doors
vi) Corridor/Stairwell Doors
vii) Airport/Police Admin. Doors
viii) Telecom Room Doors
ix) Maintenance and Equipment Room
Doors
x) Tenant and Concessions Doors
xi) Roof Access Points
b) Alarm Points (other than those
associated with Access Points)
i) Fire/Emergency
Exit
Doors
(particularly at secured areas)
ii) Material Storage/Safe Areas
iii) Display/Museum/Art Cases
c) Duress/Convenience Alarms
i) Security Checkpoints
ii) Ticketing/Rental Car Counters
iii) Administrative/Information Desks
iv) Companion Care/Family Restrooms
v) Police Substations/First Aid Areas
vi) Chapels
vii) Concession/Retail Cash Registers
c.
2) Site
a) Access Points
i) AOA/SIDA/Secured-area Vehicle Gates
ii) Maintenance/Personnel Gates
iii) Non-Terminal AOA/SIDA/Secured area
Doors
iv) Site Telecom Room Doors
v) Site Maintenance Area and Equipment
Room Doors
vi) Tenant Facility Doors
b) Alarm Points (other than those associated
with Access Points)
i) Material Storage Areas
ii) Parking Management/Tenant Safes
iii) Critical Equipment Cabinets/Locations
c) Duress/Convenience Alarms
i) Parking Toll Booths
ii) Parking Operator Money-Handling and
Storage Areas
iii) Public Parking/Garage Areas
iv) Ground Transportation/Taxicab Booth
Areas
v) Site Administrative/Reception Areas
vi) Tenant/Cargo Cash Register Areas
vii) Airport/Tenant Guard Booths
Procedures and Personnel

In order for the security system to be as functional as possible, it must be user-friendly. Delays due to
processing at security access points should be minimized. Likewise, the number of security access points
and frequency an employee must pass through during their average workday should be minimized. In
addition, planning for security access points in areas that can be monitored by CCTV can also sometimes
reduce police response requirements and security risk.
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PART III
To maximize the cost-effectiveness and life of a security system, not only an emergency maintenance plan,
but also a planned maintenance and outage plan should be used and maintained. Tracking equipment age,
service record, and reliability can allow airports to replace equipment prior to unexpected failure and allow
for replacement of problematic equipment and models with more reliable and cost-effective ones. In
addition, periodic upgrade and/or system evaluation can assure the best models and options are being used
for security, maintenance and operating costs.
Section III-F ACAMS Checklist
See also RTCA/DO-230 for specifics on
technologies, system types and standards
Power
Emergency power systems/battery back-up
A security network should run on physically
separate dedicated and protected systems from
nonsecurity systems
Limited Grouping
Similar Security Levels
Proximity for Maintenance
Proximity for Guard Monitoring
Design, Procedures & Personnel
Choice of Equipment
Balance cost, security, and functionality
Equipment Placement
Terminal Access Points
AOA/SIDA Personnel Doors
Sterile Area Access Doors
Security Checkpoint Grilles
Inbound/Outbound Baggage Doors
and Systems
Loading Dock Doors
Service Corridor and Stairwell Doors
Administrative Office Doors
Terminal Telecom Room Doors
Terminal Maintenance Area and
Equipment Room Doors
Tenant and Concessions Area Doors
Roof Access Points
Terminal Alarm Points

Fire/Emergency Exit Doors
Material Storage/Safe Areas
Display/Museum/Art Cases
Terminal Duress/Convenience Alarms

Security Checkpoints
Ticketing/Rental Car Counters
Administrative/Information Desks
Companion Care/Family Restrooms
Police Substations/First Aid Areas
Chapels
Concession/Retail Cash Registers
Site Access Points

AOA/SIDA Vehicle Gates
Maintenance/Personnel Gates
Non-Terminal AOA/SIDA Doors
Site Telecom Room Doors
Maintenance Area Doors
Tenant Facility Doors
Site Alarm Points

Material Storage Areas
Parking Management/Tenant Safes
Critical Equipment Locations
Site Duress/Convenience Alarms

Parking Toll Booths
Parking Management Office MoneyHandling/Storage Areas
Public Parking and Garage Areas
Ground
Transportation/Taxicab
Booth Areas
Administrative/Reception Areas
Tenant/Cargo Cash Register Areas
Airport/Tenant Guard Booths
User-Friendly Design
Minimize Access Points
Emergency Maintenance Plan
Planned Maintenance/Outage Plan
Equipment Service Tracking
Periodic Upgrade/Evaluation
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PART III
Section G - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems

The use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems in an airport can enhance and increase the level of security.
Depending upon the airports needs, this system may be focused primarily in the terminal, or may be airport-wide,
with use by multiple tenants.
Like ACAMS equipment, CCTV systems also rely on the same four things: 1) electrical power; 2) cables and connections
through which data is communicated; 3) an appropriate overall connective infrastructure of hardware, software and security
devices; and 4) proper design, procedures and personnel support to provide adequate function and cost-effectiveness.
1.
Power
Most airports have back-up and/or emergency power sources available. While not as critical as ACAMS to
maintaining security, CCTV systems should be powered from these emergency systems so that they continue to
function reliably in an emergency. Typically, since CCTV systems do not contain data storage and transaction
logs, as do ACAMS, they do not require battery backup. However, considerations for providing similar levels of
backup power as the communications backbone/network for CCTV transceivers for added reliability.
2.
Data
Since CCTV data and video signals and cables vary in type and function from that of most of the other data and
communications systems, they are often either run on a dedicated network, or combine onto the network only for those
portions transitioned to fiber. As with other security signals, CCTV data should be protected from unauthorized access.
3.
CCTV System Infrastructure

In addition to those topics noted in Cabling Infrastructure Systems & Management on page 117, security
systems in particular should include the following infrastructure considerations:
4.
a.
Use of CCTV/ACAMS Integration CCTV systems are most efficient when linked to ACAMS alarm
signals or other event triggers. This can occur at the hardware or software level, and combined
CCTV/ACAMS systems are becoming more readily available. Advantaged of CCTV/ACAMS Integration
include faster CCTV response (no manual human reaction required), automatic CCTV recording of alarms
and alarmed portals, and single-monitor CCTV/ACAMS monitoring workstations.
b.
Use of Pan/Tilt/Zoom Cameras - To minimize the numbers of CCTV cameras on a system, and to maximize their
usefulness, cameras with pan/tilt/zoom capability should be used as opposed to fixed lens/zoom cameras when
continual monitoring of a specific object or area is not required. When integrated with ACAMS, pan/tilt/zoom
cameras can be preset to multiple access points/alarms as well as used for general surveillance when not in alarm.
c.
Maintenance Accessibility To provide for ease of maintenance and quickness of repairs, cameras should
be mounted in locations with accessible ceilings/cabling route or be provided with an adjacent access panel
to non-accessible locations that allows for cabling access. In addition, a 120 VAC service outlet should be
located at or near camera locations to allow for the powering of camera testing equipment. Such outlets
reduce the risk of safety hazards due to extension cords or loose cabling.
Design, Procedures and Personnel

The efficient design of a CCTV system includes not only the proper choice of equipment and placement of
devices, but also the capability for the system to be maintained and used in a manner that complements and
assists the airports personnel and procedures.
a.
Choice of Equipment
Cameras, particularly those uses at security checkpoints, should be of the high-definition type to aid in
identification. In addition, consideration for the appropriate choice of black & white, color, auto-iris, long-range
and low-light cameras should be made based on not only daytime visibility, but also nighttime light levels and
visibility. In some critical areas, use of separate daytime and nighttime cameras may be warranted. As with
access control systems, new technologies are continually being designed and many existing technologies
continue to become more cost-effective. Both airport owners and designers are advised to carefully weigh the
benefits of new technologies with the potential reliability and maintenance security of existing technologies.
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PART III
b.
Coverage/Equipment Placement
While much of this has been discussed within the earlier sections of this document, a summary of types of
locations at an airport which often involve CCTV coverage is included here for ease of use:
1) Terminal
a) Terminal Apron
b) ACAMS Access Points
c) ACAMS Alarm Points
d) ACAMS Duress/Convenience Alarms
e) Security Checkpoint Areas
f) Public Lobby Areas
g) Roadway and Curbside Baggage Areas
h) Loading Dock/ Police Parking
i) Administrative and Tenant Areas
j) Bag Handling/Claim Areas
k) FIS Areas
c.
2) Site
a) ACAMS Access Points
b) ACAMS Alarm Points
c) ACAMS Duress/Convenience Alarms
d) Runways, Taxiways and Airfield (for
emergencies, threat periods and/or perimeter
surveillance)
e) Cargo/GA/FBO Ramps
f) Public/Employee Parking Areas

In order for the CCTV system to be as functional as possible, it must be user-friendly. Systems should not
be designed which require monitoring personnel to continuously view more than four (4) monitors. The
more simultaneous pictures an operator is required to view, the lower the success rate that they will notice a
problematic situation. In addition, planning for CCTV integration with access points and alarms can often
reduce police response requirements and security risk.
To maximize the cost-effectiveness and life of a CCTV system, not only an emergency maintenance plan,
but a planned maintenance and outage plan should be used and maintained. Tracking equipment age,
service record, and reliability can allow airports to replace equipment prior to unexpected failure and allow
for replacement of problematic equipment and models with more reliable and cost-effective ones.
Section III-G CCTV Checklist

CCTV enhances and increases security
CCTV monitoring can reduce police response
requirements
Power/Data
Powered from emergency systems
Battery backup not required
Link CCTV to ACAMS alarm signals
Use pan/tilt/zoom cameras to minimize camera
numbers and maximize usefulness
Mount cameras in locations with accessible
ceilings/cabling route
120 VAC service outlet near each camera
Choice of Equipment
Terminal
Terminal Apron
ACAMS Access Points
ACAMS Alarm Points
ACAMS Duress/Convenience Alarms

Security Checkpoint Areas
Public Lobby Areas
Roadway/Curbside Baggage Areas
Loading Dock/Police Parking Areas
Administrative and Tenant Areas
Baggage Handling and Claim Areas
FIS Areas
Site
ACAMS Access Points

ACAMS Alarm Points
Runways and Taxiways and Airfield
Cargo/GA/FBO Ramps
Public and Employee Parking Areas
Maximum 4 Monitors per Operator
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PART III
Section H - Power, Communications & Cabling Infrastructure Systems

While the power, communications and cabling infrastructure systems of an airport are seldom seen or thought about
by most airport patrons and employees, their design and efficiency play a critical part in the proper operation and
security level of an airport. These systems not only provide the basic ability for the airport to operate, but also
provide for the basic functioning of the airport security system and hold critical data and information which could
jeopardize the airports safety and security if tampered with. Thus, not only an efficient design, but also a secure
design is critical for these systems.
The combination and interconnection of these systems throughout the site is cumulatively referred to as the
Information Technology (IT) infrastructure. All the parts must be designed and installed to operate seamlessly. If
any one or combination should irretrievably fail, the security of the facility can no longer be maintained. Thus, the
design process for a well-integrated IT system must examine each of these elements at the earliest possible stages of
design, and must examine them both internally within the system itself, and externally at every point where they
connect with security or other systems, to be certain there is compatibility, inter-communicability and security
throughout. The system will only be as strong and secure as its weakest point.
Likewise, the equipment and components of the individual power, communications and infrastructure systems must
also be designed, chosen and placed in locations which allow them to be secured, and provide for reliable operation
during an emergency.
1.
Power
An airport must consider the need to assess the availability and integrity of security, operations and emergency
egress systems during power outages or disruptions. This may include the need for low voltage devices and
control systems, battery-driven remote and stand-alone devices, standard 110/220 voltage for operating
equipment such as lighting and CCTV monitors, and high amperage/ high voltage systems for such things as xrays and explosives detection equipment.
In providing that redundancy or back-up, the designer must consider such things as the location and capacity of
stand-by generators, the installation of redundant power lines to existing locations as well as to alternate
locations where emergency conditions might cause shifts in operational sites. In addition, strong consideration
should be given to the installation of power lines, or at least sufficient conduit and pull-strings, to known future
construction locations such as expanded terminal concourses.
The security of the power sources with regards to airside/landside placement, controlled access, and
tamperability via remote data access should also be considered.
2.
Data, Communications & Information Systems

The security of data, communications and information systems at an airport can be critical to an airports
operation and safety. While certainly some of the most critical data is that pertaining to the electronic security
system, the security of other data and systems such as flight information, lighting and cooling systems, and
radio communications systems can also determine if an airport is open or closed. Access to virtually any data or
systems within an airport, when in an unauthorized individuals possession, could at a minimum cause the delay
of flights or inconvenience to the public. Either of these can lead to negative publicity and/or loss of airport or
airline revenue.
The best way to avoid potential data or systems tampering is through limiting access to both data and equipment
through proper cabling infrastructure systems design and continued infrastructure management.
3.
Cabling Infrastructure Systems & Management

Cabling infrastructure systems are defined as the method by which cabling is contained, protected, secured
and/or routed from point to point. Elements within cabling infrastructure include conduit, boxes, cabletrays, and
the various means of grouping, separating and isolating cabling and its surroundings and/or other cabling.
Cabling management is the system and standards by which cabling and cabling infrastructure systems are
installed, maintained and labeled both initially and throughout the airports lifespan.
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PART III
a.
Cabling Infrastructure Systems

Planning and design of cabling infrastructure for security, communications and other airport cabling can
play an important role not only in efficient installation and aesthetics, but more importantly in system
security and maintainability. A well-designed cabling infrastructure system can reduce repair times and
costs, minimize system and equipment downtimes, and reduce the cost and length of installation time to
expand, modify or upgrade systems. As airport communications and security systems are critical to the
ability of the airport to operate, reduced repair times alone should warrant consideration of these issues.
Security measures should be taken to protect cabling. Cables, connections, and equipment should be
protected from accidental damage, sabotage and physical wire-tapping. This is typically accomplished by
placing security related cabling in conduit.
b.
Cabling Management
Whether or not an organized cabling infrastructure exists, airports like any other facility should take the
earliest opportunity possible to determine a cabling management plan. This plan should not only include
standards for what type, how and where cabling and its related infrastructure are installed, but also
standards for the labeling, color-coding or other identification methods of cabling and cabling
infrastructure. Like the use of cabling infrastructure, cabling identification and management is also
important to efficient installation, aesthetics, system security and maintainability and affects repair times
and costs, system and equipment downtimes, and the cost and length of installation time to expand, modify
or upgrade systems.
Among the issues of cabling and cabling infrastructure labeling is the determination of whether or not to
identify security cabling/infrastructure as such. This is an airport decision. There are also degrees of
identification such as identifying security cabling/infrastructure only within secured areas or equipment
rooms, using coded identification, or using a color-coded identification system that doesnt immediately
imply security to the uninitiated viewer. Security identification considerations (in no particular order) are
outlined below for the readers evaluation:
1) Use of identification reduces maintenance and repair times.
2) Use of identification can direct vandals or saboteurs to critical systems more easily.
3) Coded or color-coded identification can provide identification (at least of a limited nature) to
authorized maintenance and repair individuals without providing identification to the public or other
non-authorized individuals.
4) Color-coding allows system identification without identifying which specific access point or
communication line or piece of equipment the cable or conduit belongs to (without performing a visual
or electronic trace).
5) Color-coding or identification of infrastructure systems assists installation coordination where multiple
systems or installers are involved and minimizes mounting location and pathway errors.
6) Identification is invaluable and can reduce costs when expanding, renovating or modifying systems
and/or architectural areas.
7) Use of coded identification or generic labeling of security systems/infrastructure can be misleading
which is good for protection against vandalism and sabotage protection, but can cause installation
and/or maintenance errors.
8) Use of identification can prevent accidental damage or cabling cutting by installers and maintainers of
adjacent systems.
4.
Security of Airport Networks

As most airports move towards combining administrative, communication (radio, phone), information display
(flight, baggage, paging), mechanical (HVAC, baggage systems, environmental controls, fire systems) and other
systems onto one overall network, the concern for network and information security increases.
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PART III
a.
Network Availability
Networks supporting mission-critical communications must be highly reliable and available. In the
presence of equipment and cable faults, such as power outage of network switches and broken cables, the
communication should be designed to continue without interruption. To ensure high network availability,
airport design and construction shall take into account the potential for network redundancy. Specifically:
1) Dual (or multi-) network cabling may be considered to interconnect mission-critical computing
equipment and platforms. The dual network cables may be laid along different paths to minimize the
chances of being damaged at the same time.
2) Redundant network equipment, such as repeaters, switches, routers and power supplies, should also be
considered. Separate wiring closets may be allocated to host the redundant equipment and be placed in
a distance far apart to reduce the chances of all the equipment being damaged at once due to explosion,
fire, or some other event or natural disaster.
b.
Network Security
1) Networks should be secured from unauthorized access. Unauthorized access can take many forms:
a) Unauthorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems that normally
allow access to authorized individuals;
b) Un-authorized individuals gaining access to the network from computers or systems that normally
do not allow access;
c) Un-authorized individuals gaining access to the network through external connections such as
modems, or wire-taps;
d) Authorized individuals gaining access to portions of the network they are not authorized for;
e) Un-authorized individuals gaining access with authorized individuals passwords or access codes;
f) Authorized individuals failing to log off or re-secure their access points or computers, leaving
unauthorized individuals free, undetectable access.
2) While more a procedural than a design concept, encryption does have important design aspects for
securing a general network. The resulting multi-levels of password protection and limited access
required, including the physical design showing which controlled access points lead to and from what
secured areas, must be designed and custom programmed for network-wide security to be effective,
and must be written into the specifications and bid package. Likewise, shared vs. dedicated fiber is also
a design/cost issue, which must be examined in depth with the main telecommunications or IT
designer. For example, it must be determined whether dedicated cabling is sufficiently secure, or
whether having security data multiplexed through the main system onto a shared fiber is still
considered sufficiently "dedicated" and safe to provide the desired level of comfort.
c.
Network Accessibility
Wide-Area Network (WAN) connectivity may be part of construction considerations for Internet and/or
Virtual Private Network (VPN) access. The network cabling should take into account the need for WAN
connectivity and special cases where the airport may or may not provide shared networking services among
different airlines and airport organizations.
d.
Information Storage Availability

Storage systems for mission-critical file servers and databases must be highly reliable and available. In
presence of equipment faults, such as disk malfunctions and power outages, the storage system must
continue to function, providing information access. To ensure high availability storage systems, airport
design and construction should take into account storage redundancy and back up. The storage redundancy
may be achieved by mirroring storage devices in different locations via local area networks. This requires
the airport construction to pre-allocate separate facilities for redundant storage system equipment. The
distance between the storage system rooms shall be long enough to reduce the chances of all the rooms
being damaged at once due to, for example, explosion, or fire.
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PART III
5.
Future Rough-Ins/Preparations
This is one area where proper and comprehensive early planning can significantly reduce future construction
costs. For example, where it is known that a future terminal expansion, additional concourses and/or gates, new
buildings, or expanded or relocated security screening points will be built in the not-too-distant future, it may be
prudent to include sufficient extra conduit, pull strings, cable or fiber, terminations, shielding and other rough-in
elements to those locations in an earlier construction job. This has the added benefit of avoiding a future need
for tearing up and repairing walls or floors, digging trenches, and pulling cable.
6.
Telecom Rooms
It is beneficial to design all telecommunications rooms, termination closets, wire rooms, etc., in as short and
direct a line as possible to each other. In the case of multi-level buildings, consideration should be given to
locating the rooms such that they are vertically "stacked" immediately above each other to minimize the
distance and labor involved in making connections among them.
In addition, due to the distance limitations on certain secondary wiring technologies, specifically Cat5 cabling,
secondary telecom rooms need to be distributed throughout the terminal so as to provide adequate coverage for
both planned and future applications
There should be sufficient working space for maintenance personnel, and there should be enough room to
accommodate all reasonable future expansion requirements. This should include panel space for cable
terminations, switches and relays, remote field panels, remote diagnostic and management computer stations,
and power service with redundancy and/or emergency back-up capability as appropriate.
Special consideration should be given to providing adequate clearance to access the equipment, HVAC (some equipment
is quite heat generating) and local UPS to power equipment in the event of a power failure. At one designated main
telecom room, space should be allocated for infrastructure operating staff and system administrators to work, and have a
small maintenance and spares storage area. These rooms should have controlled access, preferably automated.
Telecom rooms that require tenant access should have a clearly defined tenant area: potentially separated from
the airport-controlled area by a physical barrier, or appropriate rack arrangement.
7.
Radio Frequency (RF)

There are three broad considerations when RF-based communications or devices are introduced to an airport
environment: 1) Is it the most efficient and cost effective way to accomplish the necessary tasks; 2) will it
require infrastructure support which is not necessary with other modes of communication, and 3) will it
interfere with other operational elements, including aircraft and air traffic communications, security operations,
or general administrative data transfers. To answer those questions, the designer must consider the sources of
RF, and the systems that might be affected by targeted or random RF emissions.
a.
Environmental Considerations include:

1) Electromagnetic Environment
a) Licensed and unlicensed equipment
b) Cell Phones
c) Portable devices such as pagers, computers)
d) Metal detectors
e) Power Generators
f) Power lines
2) Physical Environment
Physical environment can effect communications to a greater or lesser extent depending primarily on
the frequency of the system in use, and to a lesser extent on the communications protocol.
a) Weather considerations
b) Temperature
c) Rain
d) Snow
e) Dust and dirt
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b.
Regulations
In their broadest sense, regulations will have to be considered, since there are specific operational ranges of
frequencies for many different kinds of equipment, and just as many different kinds of operational
protocols for the data that is being communicated over them, any one of which may have the potential for
interfering with any other one, or with other non-RF but mission-critical communications at the airport.
1) FCC; this might include an airport information service broadcast in the AM band.
2) FAA Spectrum Management (Division Code ASR) will assist in determing the frequencies to be used
both in ATC and in airport operations, which leads the designer toward decisions on antennae
placement, cables and routing, and whether some functions might remain hard-wired.
c.
Installation Considerations
Once the RF decision has been made, there are numerous engineering aspects to be considered when
determining whether the operational benefits will outweigh the installation and continuing maintenance
costs as well as the potential liabilities inherent in the possibility of interference. These include:
1) Antenna Location, mounting, and directional/omni-directional considerations
2) Other collocated or local transmitters, including those external to the airport, which have the potential
to interact with airport RF communications systems
3) Obstructions
4) Coverage areas (and dead spots)
5) Robustness of Link
6) Time criticality
7) Mobile or Portable
8) Shielding
9) Effect, if any, on ATC communications
d.
Communications
1) Access to Main communication bus
2) Network Access Security
e.
When contemplating the safety and security aspects of the design of an airport facility, whether it is a large
new terminal complex or a simple renovation of a few gates on a concourse, one must consider the impact
on both the existing security infrastructure and on the need to integrate the present or future expansion
security requirements into the existing system. It is not a simple matter of adding another set of wires for an
additional card reader or CCTV camera; particularly where electronics and computers are concerned. There
will be such issues as electronic and software compatibility; power and data programming capacity of the
system to accommodate additional devices; aesthetic, economic and security concerns of routing new
conduit through existing public, sterile and operational spaces. It will also require appropriate coordination
and phasing to accomplish these things within the overall project management plan so that the security
design and installation is neither the cause nor the victim of construction delays. Among the important
elements which can affect, or be affected by design considerations in this context are:
1) Landside Systems: LANs, access control, CCTV, metal detectors, x-ray and EDS systems, use of RF
identification tags on bags or vehicles; radio communications of ATCT, aircraft operators and airport
operations; high voltage power distribution systems; remote and automated environmental controls; heavily
shielded, metallic or reflective structures; or antenna systems for cellular phones, taxi dispatch, etc.
2) Airside Systems: All of the above, plus the airside effects of such things as metallic fences and
reflective structures or active electronic systems on navigational aids and emergency communications.
3) Interference: It is worth repeating here that the concern is two-way new security designs can interfere with
an existing system, or can themselves be interfered with by the existing system(s). It would be prudent to
undertake a thorough engineering analysis of the potential effects on all such systems early in the design
process. While no interference is desirable, there may be instances in non-critical systems where a certain
level of interference is tolerable, or at the very least, due to cost considerations, may be manageable.
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4) Encryption: While encryption is not necessarily a solution to interference (which we shall define for
purposes of this document to include the possibility of interception and/or intentional disruption), the
designer must understand the criticality of the system and consider the need for an added layer of data
protection by encryption. This might entail the need from the designer for special wiring, antennas and
mounts, etc.
f.
Wireless LANS
One development in this area is the deployment of wireless LANs operating mainly in the 2.5GHz range.
These LAN utilize the unlicensed portion of the RF spectrum and employ spread spectrum techniques for
transmission. They have become a cost effective addition to a laptop or a PDA, and airlines have deployed
such systems in their VIP lounges. Of more serious concern for security is that some airlines/airports use
"legacy" versions of these products. In addition the cost effectiveness of such systems may encourage an
access system design to deploy these where conventional cabling is impractical. It is strongly recommended
that any security application, or application with security related data, that use these systems within this
frequency range must consider adequate protection of the sensitive data.
g.
Considerations Related to the Use of Radio Frequency ID (RFID) Devices for Security
In the future, it may be common to use RFID tags or other RFID equipment as an integral part of the security
system. In some airports, RFID is used to track selectee bags in the inspection process. Early planning and design
efforts can facilitate the successful application (or eliminate many potential problems) of RFID devices.
1) Antenna Pointing and Equipment Placement
This topic also relates to the judicious selection of electronic/electrical systems. That is, thinking
about what options exist for systems like: belts, automatic doors/gates, HVAC, power distribution,
communications, ATC, etc. as an entire system before selection. Granted much of this is dictated (i.e.
radars, communications ATCT radios, etc.) but much of it (especially inside the airport
building/terminal) is arbitrary. Related to this is placement of the equipment.
An example from experience: A major airport needed help to determine why certain trace explosives
detection equipment at certain checkpoints seemed to degrade at certain times of the day and then
return to normal performance. With a spectrum analyzer it was determined that these systems were
being interfered with by the low frequency signal emitted from the auxiliary power generation station
directly below the checkpoint. These generators would turn on mid-morning and stay on until late
evening every day, to provide extra air conditioning power. It was recommended to move the trace
equipment, which would have created other problems, or add low frequency chokes to the internal
trace systems pc power lines. The latter was done and the problem was solved.
This relates to antenna pointing in a similar way. Do not put things in a location and/or orientation that
maximizes the potential for co-site interference. By simply analyzing the details of the specifications
of each and every electronic or electrical system one can quickly determine positioning and orientation
options that fully support operational and structural requirements, but also reduce the likelihood of
mutual interference.
Antenna pointing also is strongly related to the choice of system to perform a function. In general
higher frequency systems tend to have more directional antennas and hence their radiation emission
and susceptibility can be better predicted/controlled. Also, the 'outside of the physical building' RF
environment is much more unpredictable and hence efforts should always be taken to 'isolate' as much
as possible internal-to-the-building RF from external-to-the-building RF.
2) Choke Effects Integral to Construction
This can be simple to address, but tough to implement. Modifications to construction practices that do
not increase cost or compromise structural integrity certainly can be designed into the airport, but the
decision to do so must be made early.
It is recognized, especially at the lowest electronic frequencies (such as generator resonance, etc.) that wave
lengths are very long and actually often are matched to terminal openings such as passageways for baggage
handling equipment. If one were to connect with subsurface metallic rods, I-beams, and. the metallic pillars
and beams that surround these openings, an effective RF choke can result at certain frequencies.
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3)
8.
Other Lessons Learned

The electrical and electronic environment at commercial airports is typically a complicated
electromagnetic compatibility problem. Since it is sometimes the case that things work well together
purely by chance and not by design, this may not present a problem if electromagnetic compatibility
remains constant. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case.
There is always more that can be done to improve the electromagnetic compatibility of an airport. Note
that building passages and doorways in direct line with each other also acts as an effective choke to
certain frequencies, as many frequencies are line-of-sight and will not bend around physical obstacles.
The standards for RFID tags have not been finalized, at the time of this writing. One standard would
use RF frequencies in the 13.56Mhz range; another in the 2.45Ghz range. It should be noted that this
latter range is available for unlicensed use within the United States and is currently the frequency range
of choice for a number of commercial wireless LANs already appearing in airline lounges and in use
by some airlines for bag systems using bar codes. Thus, care should be taken in the location of the RF
tag scanner for sortation or other purposes, to prevent interference from such sources. Shielding,
physical separation, together with a RF spectrum survey should be considered.
Information Assurance for Airport (Re)Construction

Although technically not a design and construction issue, this section provides an outline of concerns regarding
Information Assurance, the notion that a security system should be designed so that, once in place, it can be
reasonably assured to function unimpeded to its full design capability. These considerations fall somewhere
between design and procedural issues, and while there is little the architect, designer or security professional
can do to specifically address them in the initial design stages, they are nonetheless issues which should be kept
in mind as a design evolves when building or rebuilding critical installations.
a.
Threats
Eavesdropping or interception, as well as corruption of both content and control of data, are security threats
when the data or their vehicle (over the air or on cables) are accessible to unauthorized persons. This can be
addressed in the planning stages by such things as the placement of wiring or conduit in protected routes;
placement and orientation of antennae; or encryption of data.
b.
Features of Assured Information

In a model for information assurance, the proposed system must evaluate the following aspects of the design:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
c.
Reliability - probability that the system will perform its intended function up to/during the intended period.
Safety - reliability in respect to critical failure modes.
Maintainability - probability that a system can be made available within a specified time following a failure.
Availability - probability a system is available at the intended time.
Security - ability to satisfy the above features of assured information in the presence of the assumed threats.
Techniques to Provide Information Assurance

Again, while these issues are more properly placed in the procedural venue, the designer and architect
should keep these concerns in mind, and should consult regularly and extensively with the security
specialist or consultant so that measures and conditions which might impede the security functions are not
inadvertently designed into the project, and require later expensive change orders to correct. Unless all the
elements are addressed somewhere in the developmental process, the system will be vulnerable.
The following list covers the basics of the communications and computing infrastructure; more advanced
information assurance techniques are appropriate once there is a solid foundation. Note also that many of
these techniques satisfy aspects of multiple required features.
1) Privacy
Properly applied encryption is the most obvious means to satisfy the privacy issue. However, pervasive
encryption comes with a penalty in terms of performance, maintainability, and adaptability to changing
requirements and systems. Any encryption approach selected will need careful management (for
instance, key management) and frequent reevaluation of emerging vulnerabilities.
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Well designed Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are examples of technology that provide encryption over
certain communication channels. However, this is not the extent of the problem; the user terminals, backups,
and storage devices all might consider encryption products that are user-friendly and maintainable.
2) Authentication
Digital signatures should be carried on all communications, especially those containing sensitive
security data such as threat information or police response activity. Perform careful design of control
functions, so unauthorized people cannot affect critical operations.
3) Integrity
Use communications protocols and software packages that assure integrity and provide digital signatures.
Well designed Virtual Private Networks (VPN) are examples of technology that provide this.
Apply commercially maintained "virus scanning packages." This is not a one-time effort - the
maintenance contracts are essential, as are processes to distribute and install security patches.
4) Scalability
Upgrade and maintenance processes are a major issue; this is true not only of the information
management systems but also of the entire security infrastructure. They must be a planned part of the
architecture because threats against both the database and the physical facilities change continually,
and often not compatibly addressing the threat against one might increase the vulnerability to
another. For example, system maintenance is a particularly opportune time for someone to
unintentionally or otherwise disable existing security features.
Multilevel security and smart alarm management with multiple priorities so that a sea of concurrent
alarms does not overwhelm the human monitor are also considerations.
5) Availability
One area the early design can address is the physical separation of redundant security channels, both
communication and computing (co-located computers are subject to correlated damage, e.g., fires).
Similarly, it is valuable to consider logical separation of redundant computing/communication systems
(firewalls), opto-isolated communications, and conditioned, redundant power.
d.
Data Transport Vulnerabilities

This section pertains to data transport and not to physical transport.
1) Most telecommunications in the United States today are handled using Common Channel Signaling
(also known as "System 7"), and go through fiber optics. There is an illusion that this all amounts to a
very secure means of transporting data; it is an illusion because:
a) The protection is from RF eavesdroppers (of the microwave links of yesteryear) only.
b) Signaling via System 7 is extremely vulnerable to software "bugs", as was recently evidenced
when most of Washington DC's long distance telecommunications stopped functioning as a result
of a single mistyped symbol in the SS7 protocol code.
c) Most all fiber optic lines use Synchronous Optical Network protocols (SONET) that are managed
remotely through networks that use packet data, which, in turn, are usually straight-ASCII
formatted and hence vulnerable to intrusion and faked addresses.
2) Approaches to mitigate the issues include developing technical means to utilize this infrastructure
securely despite its inherent vulnerabilities. This can be done through a combination of:
a) Encrypting sensitive data prior to being shipped through SS7/Fiberoptics. This is the essence of
well-designed VPNs.
b) Path diversity (redundancy) - Sensitive data will be shipped through two diverse paths.
3) Communications media includes fiber optics, coax, twisted pair, and RF. Selection tradeoffs on media
include cost, performance, ease of installation and maintainability, and security. Fiber is possibly the
highest performer, and hardest on which to eavesdrop, but the rapidly changing technology landscape
suggests that the cost and performance factors outweigh security issues.
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Section III-H Power, Communications & Cabling Infrastructure Systems Checklist

Secure components of the power, communications and infrastructure systems for reliable emergency operation
Power
Low voltage devices and control systems
Battery-driven remote and stand-alone devices
Standard 110/220 voltage for operating equipment such as lighting and CCTV monitors
High amperage/ high voltage systems for such things as x-rays and explosives detection equipment
Location and capacity of stand-by generators
Installation of redundant power lines to existing and alternate locations
Strong consideration to the installation of power lines, or conduit and pull-strings, to known future
construction such as expanded terminal concourses
Security of data can be critical
Cabling Management
Determine standards for type and location of cabling and related infrastructure
Determine labeling, color-coding or other identification methods
Determine whether to identify security cabling/infrastructure
Network Availability Considerations
Dual (or multi-) network cabling to interconnect mission-critical equipment and platforms
The dual network cables may be laid along different paths to minimize the chances of damage
Redundant repeaters, switches, routers and power supplies, shall be considered
Separate wiring closets may host the redundant equipment
Network Security
Protect networks from unauthorized access by external connections
Encryption has important design aspects for securing a general network
Shared vs. dedicated fiber is a design/cost issue to be examined with the IT designer
WAN connectivity may be a consideration for Internet and/or Virtual Private Network (VPN) access
Take into account WAN connectivity
Airport may provide shared networking
Storage systems for mission-critical file server and database must be highly reliable
Take into account storage redundancy and back up
Pre-allocation of separate facility rooms for redundant storage system equipment
Put distance between storage rooms to reduce chances of all rooms being damaged
Comprehensive early planning can significantly reduce future construction costs
For future terminal expansion, additional concourses and/or gates, new buildings, or expanded or relocated
security screening points with known locations, include extra conduit, pull strings, cable or fiber,
terminations, shielding and other rough-in elements
Telecom Rooms
Design telecomm rooms, termination closets, wire rooms, in short direct line to each other
In multi-level buildings the telecomm rooms should be vertically stacked
Provide sufficient working space; accommodate known expansion requirements, including panel space for
cable terminations, switches and relays, remote field panels, remote diagnostic and management computer
stations, and power service with redundancy and/or emergency back-up capability
This area will also have additional cooling, fire protection, and dust control requirements
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Three broad considerations in using RF-based communications
Is it the most efficient and cost effective way to accomplish the necessary tasks
Will it require infrastructure support which is not necessary with other modes
Will it interfere with other operational elements, including aircraft and air traffic communications,
security operations, or general administrative data transfers
Environmental considerations include:
Electromagnetic Environment
Licensed and unlicensed equipment
Cell Phones
Metal detectors
Power Generators
Power lines
Physical Environment Concerns

Weather considerations
Temperature
Rain
Snow
Dust and dirt
Regulations - Coordinate with FCC and FAA
Antenna location, mounting, and directional/omni-directional considerations
Other transmitters that have the potential to interact with airport systems
Obstructions
Coverage areas (and dead spots)
Robustness of link
Time criticality
Mobile or Portable
Shielding
Effect, if any, on ATCT communications
Communications
Access to Main communication bus
Network Access Security
Interference is two-way
Prudent to undertake a thorough engineering analysis of the potential effects on all such systems early in
the design process
Equipment Placement
Options for belts, doors/gates, air and heating, power distribution, and communications as an entire system
Do not locate and/or orient antennas to create the potential for co-site interference.
Higher frequency systems have more directional antennas, so emission can be better controlled.
Outside the building RF environment is unpredictable, requiring internal 'isolation'.
Choke Effects Integral to Construction
At the low frequencies, wavelengths are long and can 'match' terminal openings
Subsurface metal rods, I-beams, etc. that surround these openings, can create an effective RF choke
Adjusting passageway opening size can 'better tune' the choke
Electrical and electronic environment at commercial airports rarely remains constant
There is always more that can be done to improve the EMC status
Loading bridge orientation can reduce unwanted radiation
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Section I - Beyond Our Borders: Aviation Security Design in the U.K.

The concerns about aviation security addressed in this document are not unique to the United States. Indeed, some
analysts suggest that other areas of the world, notably Europe and the Middle East, have amply demonstrated by
their relatively recent and active history of terrorist-related events that there is a significantly higher ambient level of
threat to be addressed in airport planning and design outside the United States
The United Kingdoms Department of Transport did just that in a document developed by its Physical Standards
Working Group, titled Aviation Security In Airport Development. That group addressed many of the same
planning and design issues faced by the developers of this document, and discovered both similar and dissimilar
responses. Although the UK, like most other ICAO-signatory nations, operates in a very different regulatory,
political, operational and economic environment, all either operate to and from, or inter-face daily with various
elements of the world-wide air transport infra-structure, so that even the smallest of nations could be the starting
point for introduction of destructive elements into the system, to be delivered or activated anywhere in the entire
world within a matter of hours.
Anti-terrorism concerns are almost universally viewed in a similar light, and have a universal macro-goal: no
persons or property, including aircraft and airports, should be lost to a terrorist act. Different nations have different
abilities and resources to apply to that problem, and each has different experiences from which to learn of their
successes and mistakes. We take special note below of some concepts and quantitative guideline values developed in
the UK, and trust that each of us can learn from the other.
To obtain the entire document, the reader is encouraged to contact the Director of Transport Security, Department of
Transport, United Kingdom.
1.
Roads
Among the issues addressed in the UK document, the section on road layout suggests that:
Ideally all vehicles should be kept at least 30 meters from terminal buildings, and forecourt roads should be at
a lower level than terminal buildings, thus creating a sloping ramp which would act as a blast deflector should a
vehicle bomb be detonated. Every effort should be made to achieve this but in those cases where it is not
possible, the lane or lanes closest to the terminal building should be restricted to public transport vehicles such
as buses and taxis.
Obviously, existing roadways closer than 30 meters may or may not be subject to relocation, depending on the
constraints of nearby structures and operations, including the public vehicle lanes referred to. Such a solution
requires close coordination with the architect, designer and space planner.
2.
Car Parks (Parking lots)

Again, the UK suggests that:
as a general rule, they should be located no closer than 30 meters from the terminal building. Any car parks
located closer than this should be restricted to use by staff or other authorized persons. If car parks are located
adjacent to perimeter fences or walls, a 3-meter clear zone should be maintained.
There are obvious limitations to this as well, such as airports that have either underground parking beneath the
terminal building, rooftop lots on top, or parking structures adjacent to and attached to the terminal. However,
the concept is a good one, and should be strongly considered when designing new or expanded facilities.
3.
Blast Effects
The UK document, like most blast effects exercises
make certain assumptions about the size of an explosive device which may be used to attack airport buildings
or people within them. It must be emphasized that figures quoted (in the document) have been determined as
reasonable for planning purposes in order to develop (design standards) and should not be considered to represent
the maximum size of device which could be used by terrorists. A vehicle bomb could be of almost any size,
contained in any type of vehicle. A car sized vehicle bomb is likely to contain 200kgs of home made explosive;
the high explosive equivalent is approximately 70kgs, rather than high quality military explosive.
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Such assumptions are valid as a starting point in the United States as well, and are addressed in considerable
detail in the two charts and the blast computer-based analysis and mitigation model discussed in Appendix C of
this U.S. document. The UK goes on to note that:
There are no practical measures that can be taken to strengthen a terminal structure to withstand totally the
blast of such an explosive device. Measures that can be taken are discussed (later), but the following is a
reasonable assessment of the effect on the two main types of structure from a typically sized vehicle bomb.
Distance of bomb
from building
Effect on building of modern frame construction
Effect on building of load

bearing masonry construction
Within 5 m
Severe faade damage, possible local collapse in

some buildings
Total collapse
5-10 m
Severe faade damage in some buildings near bomb
Major collapse
10-15 m
Moderate faade damage
Damage beyond repair
15-20 m
Minor faade damage
Serious, but repairable damage
20-30 m
Superficial damage
Moderate damage
Windows may be broken at distances up to 120 meters, however, the distance up to which glass falling from
buildings may occur is 60 meters. Unprotected normal, annealed glass will break and cause a hazard to the
occupants of a building for distances up to 50 meters from the seat of the explosion.
These observations are very similar to those found in the two blast mitigation charts found in Appendix C of
this U.S. document, and provide some parameters within which or beyond which the airport architect and
designer must make some serious structural and anti-blast decisions.
The UK document suggests that such decisions might include (or exclude) the use of anti-shatter film where reglazing an entire facility is impractical. This will reduce the distance at which unprotected normal annealed
glass will break and cause a hazard to the occupants of a building from 50 meters to 30 meters from the seat of
an explosion.
It should also be noted that while the UK document makes several recommendations for both permanent and
moveable bullet-proof screening in certain areas, which might also be deemed to act as anti-blast protection, a
U.S. architect or designer might find such installations to be excessive except in the case of very specific and
very high known threat and risk such as might be found in police facilities or cash handling areas.
4.
Lighting The UK document makes several recommendations regarding lighting and CCTV visibility similar to
recommendations made in the U.S. document, and reinforces a very important point in both:
Cameras and lenses need to be matched to the type of lighting installed, but the average figure of illumination
to act as a deterrent is 5 lux. While there are certainly numerous possible variants to this recommendation, the
core points remain the same: (a) cameras and lenses are of no value without appropriate lighting, and (b)
appropriate lighting is, in and of itself, a significant deterrent.
5.
Space Requirements of the Passenger Search Area

In addressing this topic, the UK queuing recommendation suggests that passengers without checked bags
should have a minimum of 0.6 m2 space per person, and space for those with large proportions of checked
baggage...should be increased to 0.8m2. While these are not unreasonable guidelines, they are based on UK
conditions and assumptions of passenger flow, utilization and processing rates of 90% or less, etc., and would
need adjustment from site to site in the United States There are numerous complex formulas available in the
U.S. to assist the designer in such calculations.
In examining the UK formulas, we discover that while they use quite similar types of data to those used in the
U.S. formulations, and indeed, quite similar formula structures, their specific values often differ significantly
from the assumptions made in the United States. For example, the formula that determines how many x-ray
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machines are needed at a gate search operation is based, among other things, on an assumption of a first call to
board the aircraft 50 minutes before flight time. The U.S. standard for domestic flights is much lower, and thus
might suggest in the same formula a need for more x-ray machines and/or more space. This also underscores the
point that UK and other European formulas tend to be biased toward international traffic, presumably lending
strength to the need for a bit more time, and perhaps more space, to clear a departure.
While in theory any such formula should remain an accurate predictor independent of the values plugged into it,
there are certain assumed UK constants that may or may not comport with U.S. constants. The U.S. reader
should look to the accepted U.S. formulas.
A similar analysis applies to the UK formula for manual search positions per x-ray machine (secondary manual
search), which in the U.S. would translate to both hand-wand and trace detection search. The mathematical
process for determination is quite similar to our own, but may be based on throughput assumptions of different
equipment, meeting different governmental certification criteria, different methods of determining the
proportion of bags requiring a secondary search, different fleet mix, and different policies and procedures which
determine the amount of time required for each such search. This is not to suggest such a formula is invalid;
only that it must be viewed and used in its proper environment.
The same holds true for the equation that determines queue area. It is a function of the maximum queue size
(passengers) and the layout of the queue, and provides results in both number of passengers and length of
queue, as well as area in meters squared, assuming a typical queue width of 1.2 meters. Again, this and other
UK assumptions are not implied to be inaccurate, but may be based on fundamentally different passenger
service operations and regulatory requirements for screening procedures. It is valuable for the designer to look
at the UK processes and to understand how they have been derived, but they may or may not apply to a terminal
design in a U.S. environment.
6.
Screening Office Accommodation

The UK document provides some suggested space assignment values to support security operations, which are
a function of the number of staff carrying out security throughout the terminal complex, e.g., central search,
staff security, access control, etc. It will also depend on the extent to which offices are located centrally or
adjacent to security points. We add that in the U.S., security responsibilities are divided among the airports and
airlines, which brings about a major consideration as to whether the space allocations are attributed to the needs
of, and within the boundaries of, space controlled by the aircraft operator or the airport, and how the controls of
those spaces are designed to accommodate throughput, ingress and egress, and necessary operational paths of
travel.
The UK suggests the following values as a guide:
Administrative Office Area
25-30m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
Operational Office
Locker room area
100m2 per 1000 passengers per hour
Rest room area
The UK goes on to state that in general, the higher the flow, the lower amount of space needed for a given
level of demand, e.g., for 1000 passengers per hour 35m2 of rest room area would be required, but only 75m2
would be required for a terminal with 3000 passengers per hour.
The above areas are typically back of house and are usually located close to the main security search
location. Additional front of house space may need to be included for confiscations/ supervisors desks (5 m2)
NOTE and a search booth of at least 2.5m by 2.5m for a full physical body search (approximately 7 m2) if these
cannot be provided as part of adjacent operational office accommodations.
NOTE: Once again, excerpts of the UK document are intended to illustrate that issues facing airport security
designers and architects are similar worldwide, but nonetheless must accommodate local differences. The reader is
referred directly to the UK document for detailed information on their formulas and recommendations.
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PART IV
APPENDICES
PART IV
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Airport Vulnerability Assessment Model An Introduction
Appendix B
Airport Security Flow Modeling
Appendix C
Blast Analysis and Mitigation Model An Introduction
Appendix D
Checklists of Key Points From Each Section
Appendix E
Glossary of Civil Aviation Security-Related Terms
Appendix F
Bibliography
DISCLAIMER
The following appendices and supplementary materials provide additional information in support of the guidelines
and recommendations contained throughout this document. Like the underlying document, these appendices are not
intended to contain regulatory or mandatory language, except as they might make occasional informational reference
to external documentary resources. This document is expected to have a multi-year useful life, and therefore might
occasionally refer to information that has since been superceded, amended or modified. In such cases, the reader is
referred to the most recent version of those resources for further guidance. The various analytical models are
presented in summary form, and are intended only as an introduction to the actual models that are available both
from government and private industry sources, each of which might approach the analytical process from somewhat
different perspectives. The object of this document is not to provide the designer or architect with a definitive
solution to each site-specific problem; nor to specifically endorse any product or approach. Rather, it is to make the
reader aware of the existence of various opportunities available for gathering additional information, and to provide
the reader with a broader frame of reference for a better-informed and balanced decisionmaking process.
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PART IV
APPENDICES
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June 2001
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APPENDIX A
AIRPORT VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MODEL
AN INTRODUCTION
APPENDIX A
AN INTRODUCTION
Section A - Summary
The model is a tool for performing a security vulnerability analysis to develop comparisons among alternative
approaches to security design measures.
The tool and documentation is free for use at any airport, but will require some specialized training of an airport
person with significant knowledge of the airports security system, policies and procedures.
Section B - Background
The FAA's 1998 Airport Vulnerability Assessment Project brought about an industry-developed airport vulnerability
assessment model that uses quantitative methods to thoroughly evaluate various common vulnerabilities found at
many U.S. airports, and the effect each might have on maintaining the security of the facility. The process selected
for use by FAA is known as SAFR, which stands for Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk.
During the last quarter of FY99, the FAA conducted field trials of an improved SAFR tool at 6 domestic airports of
varying sizes. These assessments were performed by FAA Special Agents who were trained by the contractor in the
use of this tool. The results of the field trials were very encouraging, with wide acceptance by the airport
participants. The findings from the assessment process were viewed as useful, understandable and most of all well
focused. It is available (through FAAs Civil Aviation Security office) to airport planners, designers and architects
to be used in concert with airport security personnel to assist in determining the parameters of facility design
characteristics necessary to meet various security requirements.
Section C - Anatomy of the Assessment

This structured self-assessment consists of a table-top analysis conducted by the airport community
representatives. The FAA provides specified threat scenarios for analysis. These scenarios focus on security issues
predominantly related to airport and aircraft operator security equipment and measures used against terrorist acts as
well as common domestic crime. The airport typically provides 3-5 participants in the assessment who are subject
matter experts, usually representing airport security, law enforcement, operations, aircraft operators and/or other
areas as determined by the Airport Security Coordinator. The tabletop analysis is a subjective, consensus based,
detailed but easily understandable process for examining the existing security system and the effect of potential
upgrades.
Section D - Uses of the SAFR Tool

The core of the analysis is based on standard threat scenarios common to all airports. These scenarios were
developed with the support of FAA Civil Aviation Security Intelligence and Policy, and represent viable threats to
any commercial service U.S. airport, regardless of size or location.
In addition to terrorist threats, the SAFR tool is equally capable of assessing criminal threats (thefts, assaults,
pilferage). Examples of criminal analysis are in the SAFR documentation, and can be included in the assessment
based on topics of interest selected by the airport.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix A-1
APPENDIX A
- AN INTRODUCTION
Section E - Airports Own the Tool

The FAA will provide the airport with a free copy of the tool and associated documentation. Frequent experience at
airports previously assessed with this tool has shown significant impact on the security planning process. All you
need to run this tool is a PC with Microsoft Excel (Office 97 or later version) loaded. The airports will be provided
with a copy of the tool/spreadsheet and manual. The FAAs intent is for the airport to use it independently for selfassessment. The airport could choose to involve a consultant or other professional assistance in a tabletop exercise
as it applies to the new design.
Section F - Recommendations, Not Directions

The assessment includes the identification of architectural and design measures as well as procedural and
operational security countermeasures that are appropriate considerations for ways to reduce the airports risk or
exposure to these particular terrorist threats. The FAA does not imply that these recommendations are required to be
implemented. Rather, this analysis is intended to be a part of the overall security planning process conducted by the
airport. In practice, anti-crime analyses may identify new security initiatives, some of which may be common to the
anti-terrorism recommendations.
Section G - Introduction to SAFR

The following is a brief introduction to some of the basic concepts of the SAFR analysis process, and will define
several of the key terms used in the analysis. A more complete introduction is provided with the model itself.
1.
The analysis is based on a postulated threat scenario that is considered to be viable. The fundamental calculation
for each scenario in the analysis is Relative Risk. Risk is influenced by 3 factors: 1) Target Importance, 2)
Likelihood of an attack attempt and 3) Likelihood of aggressor success in an attempt at the facility's existing or
planned defenses. Risk is the product of multiplying these values [importance x attempt likelihood x success
likelihood] The higher the values, the higher the risk to the airport.
2.
In the SAFR analysis, the likelihood of an attack attempt is analyzed by applying numeric values to the various
elements of deterrence provided by the security system, which is in part also based on the terrorists perception
of our level of security - the point at which he is most likely to attack. Therefore, visible security measures
(CCTV, patrols, publicity) tend to increase the deterrence value.
3.
Once an aggressor action is initiated, the analysis focuses on the existing security measures that can Detect,
Assess, Intercept and Neutralize the threatening act. There may be one or several Detection Opportunities along
the path the terrorists use to carry out their threatening act. Each Detection Opportunity is analyzed separately.
4.
Evaluation of the performance of the security system in terms of Detect, Assess, Intercept and Neutralize is
done with simple decisions based on a scale with delineations of Very High, High, Moderate, Low or Very
Low. Typically a small group of evaluators can reach consensus on a simple 5-element scale of this sort. The
tool's data template has locations to record the rationale for the group rating decisions, which serves to be a selfdocumenting feature, useful for later reference. Based on the ratings for each Detection Opportunity, a value is
calculated for Vulnerability and Relative Risk.
5.
Thats all there is to it! Once the baseline (the airport's existing security posture) is established, ways to improve
the security are identified and rated. The SAFR tool automatically calculates the modified vulnerability and risk
that is achieved by these improvements.
For further information on use of this tool, call the FAA Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ, Section AAR-510
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix A-2

APPENDIX B
AIRPORT SECURITY FLOW MODELING
APPENDIX B
Section A - Introduction
Successfully integrating new security equipment and/or procedures into an airport environment requires
consideration not only of the reduction in risk provided by the changes, but also the impact on airport operations.
Computer simulation models can provide airport planners and security professionals the ability to examine the
impact of new security measures before they are implemented, and thus provide an opportunity to fine-tune the
performance of equipment, procedures, and configurations before they are introduced into the airport environment.
Additionally, because flow models can be used to estimate the effects of factors such as operational throughput rates
and other performance parameters, they can be used to influence the development of new security equipment, from
concept through development to deployment.
Section B - Flow Model Alternatives

Ranges of options are available to planners requiring flow model type information. First, there are a limited number
of domain-specific airport simulation modeling tools that are configured to allow evaluation of various airport
operational parameters. Second, there are a large number of generic simulation packages that allow for the analysis
of a wide range of flow, process, and performance studies. Third, there are specialty consultants.
Listed below are the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative, and several representative examples.
Products identified below in no way represent any sort of endorsement, positive or negative.
1.
Domain-Specific Airport Simulation Models

a.
Domain-specific airport simulation models include models specifically designed and developed to assess
airport-type operations. The advantages of such models are that they are pre-configured to represent the
airport environment. They also may have pre-loaded data sets or templates that are helpful to the modeler
in setting up an accurate simulation. The disadvantages are that they often require a large up-front
investment in either time or money to set up an accurate simulation, and it can be difficult to obtain results
for questions not anticipated (and thus not pre-programmed) by the model developers.
b.
Examples include:
1) IBM's Journey Management Library - A set of reusable modules to describe passenger processes such
as: issue ticket; issue boarding pass; accept baggage; clear security; clear immigration; clear customs;
gate check-in/boarding control. (www.research.ibm.com/mathsci/oc/journey_mng.htm).
2) The Preston Group's Terminal Management System (TMS) - Terminal and apron resource optimization
software modules (www.preston.net/newtms)
c.
Additionally, the FAA funded development of an airport simulation package called the Passenger and
Baggage Flow Model (PBFM). The model is designed to simulate the flow of passengers and baggage
through an entire airport complex, from curbside to aircraft. While the effort resulted in an operational
version of the PBFM, it has yet to be fully tested and validated. More information about this model is
available through the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center Security R&D Laboratory, Telephone
(609-485-4295).
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix B-1
APPENDIX B
2.
Generic Simulation Packages

a.
Generic simulation packages are available to model a wide range of process and flow operations. The
advantages of such models are that they typically come with most, if not all, of the underlying probability
distributions, flow and path connection logic, data analysis and reporting capabilities, and other
fundamental features necessary to construct an airport-specific flow model. Additionally, because such
models are often used in other industries, enough of a commercial base is available that they are typically
well used and tested, and are frequently updated. The principal disadvantage with such models is that they
do not come with any sort of pre-programmed data or templates specific to airport operations, and thus the
burden of developing a complete and accurate simulation, including an underlying knowledge of airport
operations and data, lies with the modeler.
b.
Examples include:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
3.
@RISK by PALISADE Corporation (www.palisade.com)

Arena
by Systems Modeling Corp. (www.sm.com)
AutoMod by AutoSimulations (www.autosim.com)
DecisionPro 3.0 by Vanguard Software Corp. (www.vanguardsw.com)
Extend by Imagine That Inc. (www.imaginethatinc.com)
ProModel by PROMODEL Corporation (www.promodel.com)
Proof Animation by Wolverine Software Corp. (www.wolverinesoftware.com)
SIMPROCESS by CACI Products Company (www.caciasl.com)
SIMUL8 by Visual Thinking International (www.vtil.com)
SLX by Wolverine Software Corp. (www.wolverinesoftware.com)
Specialty Consultants
The third alternative available to planners is to use specialty consultants. The advantage of this approach is that
the consultant typically will be familiar with the models and tools available for performing flow model studies.
Additionally, the consultant should be able to bring to bear previous experience and knowledge, and quickly
and efficiently address the question at hand with minimal spin-up requirements. Consultants may also be able to
construct more sophisticated simulations using programming languages such as GPSS/H
(www.wolverinesoftware.com) or MODSIM III (www.caciasl.com). A disadvantage of using a consultant is
that the product of their effort may only be a report or briefing, representing only a snapshot of the operation as
a whole (rather than an enduring model that can be used and re-used as time goes by). The other disadvantage is
that the expertise developed in producing the flow model will reside outside the procuring airport or security
organization.
Section C - Conclusions
Flow models can be used to provide important information to airport and security planners. Any of the alternatives
above can be used to obtain good results. Selection of which alternative is best depends on the specific needs of the
planner.
The FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center will continue to support the advancement of flow model technology
as applied to airport simulations through ongoing assessments and evaluations of commercial off-the-shelf software
packages, development of specific security checkpoint flow models, data collection and model verification studies,
and other related efforts. Interested parties should inquire periodically to obtain up-to-date results of these efforts
(contact the FAA Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ, AAR-510, Security R&D Laboratory, Telephone (609-4854295).
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix B-2

APPENDIX C
BLAST ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION MODEL
- AN INTRODUCTION
APPENDIX C
AN INTRODUCTION
Section A - Background
Blast/FX was developed to meet the needs of security and engineering professionals concerned about the threat of
explosions to facilities and their occupants. Studies and statistics indicate the threat from terrorist bombing is not
likely to go away soon. The FBI reports that bombings are the most common tactic employed by terrorists,
accounting for over 75% of terrorist acts committed in the United States since 1982. A recent report by the National
Research Council also concludes, Attacks against civilian buildings pose an unquantifiable but real threat to the
people of the United States.
Blast/FX is a computer model used to determine the effects of explosives against facilities and the people in those
facilities. Blast/FX is a self-contained software package that allows you to model and analyze:
Facilities or portions of a facility that might be affected by a blast.

Explosive devices that might be used against the facility.
People in the facility.
For many engineers and designers, particularly in the United States, the need to assess the risks to buildings from
explosions represents a new, and often imposing requirement. However, by analyzing the relationships between
blast, structural response, and the response of exposed individuals, it is often possible to reduce risks to more
acceptable levels. Blast/FX allows analysts to create a representation of the structure they are concerned about, place
individuals in the facility at realistic locations, specify the explosive device(s) of concern, and estimate the effects of
such devices in terms of structural damage and casualties. This information is meant to aid in developing plans and
procedures for reducing the risks associated with such events
Blast/FX is intended for use by security and engineering specialists concerned about the threat of explosions to
facilities and their occupants. By using Blast/FX, analysts can quickly and efficiently:
Develop a model of their facility, including its relevant structural and architectural details.
Add people and assets at locations in and around the facility.
Specify explosive devices that might be of concern.
Analyze scenarios that combine facility, people, assets, and explosive devices into any number of what-if
investigations.
Blast/FX analyses can be used to answer security improvement questions, evaluate alternative designs and facility
layouts, and assist in establishing explosives threat security policies and procedures.
Section B - What It Is Used For

You can use Blast/FX to determine the damage to facilities and people caused by an explosive device.
A typical Blast/FX analysis might consist of a series of runs in which the analyst examines the extent of damage or
injuries caused by a device at a particular location. Using this as a baseline, the analyst then examines the relative
benefits of things like increasing standoff, switching to more protective types of window glass, and other
precautionary measures.
Section C - What It Produces for You

Blast/FX gives you output on building damage and personnel injuries in a variety of different forms.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix C-1
APPENDIX C
- AN INTRODUCTION
For buildings, the extent and severity of damage is shown in color-coded 2D and 3D views. Color categories quickly
let you see the percent of damage expected to the structure's components as a result of the blast. There is also a
textual summary report.
For personnel, you get similar 2D and 3D views, with persons identified as likely to have been fatally injured,
seriously injured (requiring hospitalization), slightly injured (not requiring hospitalization), and unharmed. Again,
there is also a textual summary report.
Also, for those with special interests, Blast/FX let's you examine detailed blast environment and hazard severity
information. For instance, you can examine things like the peak magnitude of the over-pressure pulse, the number of
fragments per square foot, the probability of fatal injury due to flying glass, and numerous other parameters.
Section D - The Basics of How You Use It

The basic process of using Blast/FX is simple. First, you model the part of the facility you are concerned about.
Next, you place people in the building, and then specify the type and location of the explosive device. This
information forms the basis of what's known in Blast/FX as a scenario. Once defined, you can run a scenario and
examine the results using the 2D and 3D viewers plus the text reports. You can then refine your scenario and re-run
the model as many times as you like.
Section E - More Detail

The Blast/FX model provides you with the ability to represent, in engineering and architectural terms, the
composition of a facility. This representation includes a requirement for access to data on the specifications of the
structural components that comprise the facility (wall materials and dimensions, columns, beams, and floors),
including their type, location, and other relevant details.
These components are then laid out in a 2D, floorplan-like layout. Based upon this representation of the facility, you
then develop population sets, which define the number and locations of people in the facility at a particular time.
You can specify the explosive devices of interest, including their charge weight, charge type, positioning, and if
desired, certain fragmentation parameters.
To conduct an analysis, you define a scenario consisting of the modeled facility, an optional population set, and the
location of an explosive device. Using the scenario as input, Blast/FX computes structural damage and potential
personnel injuries and fatalities. The Blast/FX model then lets you review these results in a graphical and/or textual
manner.
Section F - Who Uses Blast/FX?

Blast/FX was developed with three types of users in mind, including, but not limited to the following:
High-level decision-makers: These individuals are responsible for either setting or carrying-out policies and
procedures that affect the security posture of a facility. In conducting their job, decision-makers need to have
accurate and reliable information available on a wide variety of topics, including the potential effects of an
explosion. As such, Blast/FX was designed to produce graphics and reports that can quickly convey the
consequences of various combinations of threat and precautionary measures. Typically, it is not envisioned that
high-level decision-makers will run Blast/FX; instead, they will need to be apprised of model results, and may
direct subsequent use of the model.
Analysts: Analysts include subject matter experts in either security or engineering. Such users will understand
the threat to their facilities, and may use the model to assess the effects of scenarios they define. Analysts may
or may not play a role in collecting data and developing facility structural representations. Such users will likely
be responsible for organizing model results and presenting them to high-level decision-makers.
Blast/FX Modelers: These users will include trained support staff with a technical background in security, and a
strong engineering background. Such users will have strong, but not necessarily expert computer skills. Under
normal circumstances, these users will be responsible for collecting relevant engineering data for the facilities to
be modeled and entering the data into Blast/FX.
Additional information is available on the internet at www.blastfx.com or from FAA Technical Center, AAR-510.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix C-2

APPENDIX C
- AN INTRODUCTION
Unrelated to the Blast/FX model, the following pages show two different examples of simple blast effect estimators
that can be used to assess standoff distances or evacuation distances for different types of vehicle bombs.
ATF
Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard and Evacuation Distance Tables
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND FIREARMS
IF YOU SUSPECT UNLAWFUL POSESSION OR USE OF EXPLOSIVES OR BOMBS

CALL 1-800-ATF BOMB OR YOUR LOCAL ATF OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE
Minimum evacuation distance is the range at which a life-threatening injury from blast or fragment hazards is
unlikely. However, non life-threatening injury of temporary hearing loss may occur.
Hazard ranges are based on open, level terrain.
Minimum evacuation distance may be less when explosion is confined within a structure.
Falling glass hazard range is dependent on line-of-sight from explosion source to window. Hazard is from falling
shards of broken glass.
Metric equivalent values are mathematically calculated.
Explosion confined within a structure may cause structural collapse or building debris hazards.
Additional hazards include vehicle debris.
This information was developed with data from the Dipole Might vehicle bomb research program conducted by
ATF, with technical assistance from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Goals for Dipole Might include creating a
computerized database and protocol for investigation of large-scale vehicle bombs. The Technical Support Working
Group (TSWG) sponsors Dipole Might. TSWG is the research and development arm of the National Security
Council interagency working group on counterterrorism.
VEHICLE
DESCRIPTION
COMPACT
SEDAN
FULL SIZE
SEDAN
PASSENGER
VAN OR
CARGO VAN
SMALL BOX
VAN
(14 FT BOX)
BOX VAN OR
WATER/FUEL
TRUCK
SEMITRAILER
MAXIMUM
EXPLOSIVES
CAPACITY
500 Pounds
227 Kilos
(In Trunk)
1,000 Pounds
455 Kilos
(In Trunk)
4,000 Pounds
1,818 Kilos
LETHAL
AIR BLAST
RANGE
100 Feet
30 Meters
MINIMUM
EVACUATION
DISTANCE
1,500 Feet
457 Meters
FALLING
GLASS
HAZARD
1,250 Feet
381 Meters
125 Feet
38 Meters
1,750 Feet
534 Meters
1,750 Feet
534 Meters
200 Feet
61 Meters
2,750 Feet
838 Meters
2,750 Feet
838 Meters
10,000 Pounds
4,545 Kilos
300 Feet
91 Meters
3,750 Feet
1,143 Meters
3,750 Feet
1,143 Meters
30,000 Pounds
13,636 Kilos
450 Feet
137 Meters
6,5000 Feet
1,982 Meters
6,500 Feet
1,982 Meters
60,000 Pounds
27,273 Kilos
600 Feet
183 Meters
7,000 Feet
2,134 Meters
7,000 Feet
2,134 Meters
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix C-3
APPENDIX C
- AN INTRODUCTION
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix C-4

APPENDIX D
CHECKLISTS OF KEY POINTS FROM EACH SECTION
APPENDIX D
PART I OVERVIEW CHECKLISTS
Section I-A - Introduction
None
Section I-B Applicability Checklist
Airports
New
Existing
Expanding
Users
Airport Operators
Aircraft Operators
Airport Tenants
Planners
Designers
Architects
Engineers
Consultants
Section I-C Purpose Checklist
Identify Key Concerns & Concepts in order to:
Restrict access to the AOA, SIDA & secured
areas
Control the flow of people
Provide efficient security screening
Separate critical areas
Projects
Planning
Design
Construction
Renovation
Assessment
Facilities
Terminals
Cargo/Freight
Police/Fire
Maintenance
Catering
Tenant and Other On-Airport Facilities
Protect vulnerable areas & assets

Protect aircraft, people & property
Address blast mitigation measures
Provide space for EDS & trace devices
Provide space for EOD operations
Section I-D - Background

None
Section I-E Coordination Checklist
Get the early involvement of Airport Security Committee
Assure FAR and ASP requirements are met
Consider the needs of law enforcement, security and safety support personnel
Reference Guidelines for Federal Inspection Facilities at Airports where FIS areas are involved
Section I-F - Security Concerns & Contingency Measures Checklist
Consider potential impact of contingency measures and emergency plans.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-1
APPENDIX D
PART II - INITIAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

Section II-A General Checklist
Advance Planning
Continuous Monitoring
Physical Security Program
Physical security survey
Periodic inspections
Continuing security awareness/education
Emergency procedures
Consult with Experts in Aviation

Coordinate with Security/Regulatory Personnel
Refer to Regulatory Requirements & Standards
Section II-B - Facility Protection Checklist

Security Consortium Review
Perimeter Protection First Line
Interior Controls Second Line

Cost Analysis
Section II-C - Planning Facility Protection Checklist

Ensure Integrity & Continuity of Operations
Ensure the Security of Assets & Facilities
Protection Criteria
Facility Location, Size & Configuration
Known Threats
History of Incidents
Amount of Lighting
Presence of Physical Barriers
Local Pertinent Factors
Physical Protection
Mobile Patrols
Guard Stations
Security Systems
Lockable Access Points
Local Law Enforcement Support
Crime Prevention
Recordkeeping
Exclusive Use Area Agreements
Tenant Security Programs
Letters of Understanding
Design Factors
Conduit Runs
Architectural Conflicts
Wiring Requirements
Heavy-load Equipment
Effects on Passenger Flow
Construction Equipment Needs
Large-size Material Delivery
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-2

APPENDIX D
PART III - RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

SECTION A - AIRPORT LAYOUT AND BOUNDARIES CHECKLISTS:
Section III-A-1 - General Layout Checklist
Analysis of General Security Requirements
Airside
Nonpublic
Adequate emergency response routes
Required safety measures & clearances
Landside
Terminal
Maintain public/nonpublic boundaries
Maintain security area boundaries
Meet required security regulations
Personnel safety & security
Security & Safety Considerations
Separate dangerous or hazardous areas
Minimize concealed/overgrown areas
Effects on/by adjacent facilities
Natural features that might allow access
Prevent communications interference due to
natural features, buildings & equipment
Public safety & security concerns
Section III-A-2 Security Areas Checklist

AOA
Align AOA boundary with fences
SIDA
Part of AOA
Smallest manageable contiguous size
Secured Area
Separate GA, cargo, maintenance, and other
facilities from secured areas
Sterile Area
Minimize size to help surveillance and control
Exclusive Use Area
Tenant Security Program Areas
Section III-A-3 Vulnerable Areas Checklist

Vulnerability Assessment (see Appendix A)
Consider all assets, targets, and their relative
value/loss consequence
Aircraft
Communications
Support Facilities
Terminal
Public and Employees
Fuel Areas
Utilities
Roadways and Accessways
Storage Areas
Establish a security boundary between public and
controlled areas
Barriers
Patrols
Surveillance/CCTV
Sensors
Minimize means of unauthorized access

Controls
Emergency Exits
Delays
Piggybacking
Surveillance/CCTV
Plan for breach control measures and procedures
Physical Barriers
Separation Distance
Reduce bombing/armed attack vulnerability
Blast Mitigation
Separation Distance
Minimization of Large Congregations
Placement of Screening Checkpoint
Minimize vulnerability from employees
Minimize numbers of employee access points
Capability for Employee Screening
Consider vulnerability of adjacent areas
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-3
APPENDIX D
Section III-A-4 Chemical & Biological Agent Checklist

Contact Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) for guidance.
Section III-A-5 Boundaries & Access Points Checklist
Boundary Choice Factors
Equipment Cost
Installation Cost
Maintenance Cost
Effectiveness
Functionality
Physical Barriers
Align with security area boundaries
Fencing
Typically 7 chain link fabric + 1 barbed
wire
Fence designs are available which are
difficult to climb or cut
Motion, tension or other electronic
sensing means available
Allow access points for vehicles and persons
In critical areas, anchor or bury the fence
bottom
Keep lines straight and noncomplex
Buildings
May be used as a physical barrier
May be incorporated into a fence line
Assess security access points
Interior Walls
Security walls should be full height, floorto-ceiling or to slab
Exterior Walls
Aesthetic designs available
Minimize hand & foot holds that can be
used for climbing
Consider topping walls with barbed wire
or other deterrent materials
Electronic sensors
Motion detectors
Infrared sensors
Stand-alone or used with other barriers
Natural Barriers
Bodies of water
Expanses of trees
Swampland
Dense foliage
Cliffs
Other areas difficult to traverse
Natural barriers may provide time and
distance protection
Access Points
Minimize the number of access points
Gates
Plan for routine, maintenance, and
emergency operations:
Patrols
Emergency Response Teams
Service Vehicles and Tugs
Delivery Vehicles
Maintenance Vehicles
Design for high activity/long gate life

Gate hinges should be non-liftoff or have
welding to prevent removal
Automate/Monitor gates as necessary
Reduce ground clearance beneath,
typically to no more than 4-6 inches
Two-gate systems can help prevent
tailgate entry
Doors
Avoid unsupervised emergency exit doors
to the AOA
Automate/Monitor doors as necessary
Coordinate hardware with building and
fire codes
Guard Stations
Manned access control and search

capability
Provide sheltered checkpoint station
Provide adequate secondary inspection
space
Dependable communications required
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-4

APPENDIX D
Electronic Access Points

Automatic Gates
Locate induction loop to minimize
objects
from
the
public-side
activating loop
Consider
bollards
to
reduce
equipment damage by vehicles
Protect of electronic equipment from
weather and temperature
Doors with Access Controls

Numerous technologies available
See RTCA Recommended Standards
for Airport Access Control Systems
Sensor Line Gates

Function as access-controlled gates
Reduced delay time for access
Higher risk due to lack of barrier
Automated Portals
Designed for high-throughput
Can include screening technologies
Direction sensitive capabilities
Can detain violators
Fencing Clear Areas

Both sides of fence; from 10 to 30
No obstructions
Minimal landscape
No climbable objects
Security Lighting
Both sides of gates and fencing is
highly recommended
Locks
Various key technologies available
Consider total life cycle costs, not
just initial capital cost
CCTV Coverage
CCTV can be used to enhance
detection and/or response
Signage
FAA-required signage
Deterrent signage
Instructional and/or legal signage
Coordinate style with other airport
signage
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-5
APPENDIX D
Section III-A-6 Facilities, Areas and Geographical Placement Checklist

FAA ATCT and Offices
Facility Placement Considerations:
Landside or Airside
Interaction and relationships among areas
May require airport security controls
Types of activity within each area
Flow of public/employees to/through areas
Fuel Area
Flow and type of delivery traffic
Landside or Airside
Flow and type of maintenance traffic
Typically remote from terminal
Need for and frequency of security escorts
Safety and security fencing required
How each area is addressed in the ASP
Consider access controls to area
Each Airport is Unique
GA Areas
Facilities:
GSEM Facility
Landside or Airside
Security the responsibility of the facility
Consider airside travel frequency
Maintain fencing clear areas
GTSA
ARFF Facilities
Either Airside or Both
Consider response routes and times
Facility may require public access
SOC/CP
Landside, Airside or Both
Secure location
Typically adjacent to terminal
Consider alternate/back-up locations
Catering screening measures
Ease of airside access
Catering vehicle actions
Sufficient operating space for personnel
Catering personnel badging
Central location for dispatching
Intermodal
Transportation Area
Military
Facilities
Substantial
coordination required
Consider security needs
Navigation and Communications Equipment
Airside and Landside
Driven by functionality
Control access to critical equipment
Flexible Placement
Terminal Access (via roads) required
Consider freight screening needs
State/Government
Aircraft Facilities
Cargo Area
Both
airside
and
landside
Typically Airside or Both
Security
typically
independent
Screening and inspection needs
Coordinate
security
requirements
Secure cargo-holding area
Postal facility inclusion possible
Locate airside when possible
Doors must be lockable and controlled
Control access
Consider fence protection measures
Secure access points and equipment
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-6

APPENDIX D
Section III-B Airside Checklist

Aircraft areas must be secured
Factors influencing boundary locations:
Runways, taxiways, ramps and/or aprons
See A/C 150/5300-13
FAA safety and operational areas:
Object Free Area
Building Restriction Lines
Runway Protection Zone
Runway Safety Area
Glide Slope Critical Area
Localizer Critical Area
Approach Lighting System
Passenger Aircraft Parking Areas
Safe distance to fence/public access areas
Safe distance to other parked aircraft
Safe distance recommendations for
prevention of vandalism
Maintain visibility of areas around parked
aircraft to monitor for unauthorized activity
Exclude GA from the SIDA
Distance GA from terminal area
Coordinate with tenants

See ICAO Standards Annex 14 & 17
At least 100 meters from other aircraft and
structures
Ensure separation from utilities and fuel
Use CCTV to view the aircraft and
surrounding area
Accommodate emergency staging area
Avoid public viewing/proximity to area
Airside Roads
Restrict access to authorized vehicles
Perimeter roads should be airside
Perimeter roads should provide unobstructed
views of the fence
Positioning of roads should consider:
Patrols
Maintenance Access
Emergency Access and Routes
Maintain fencing clear area
Airside Vulnerable Areas
NAVAIDS
Runway lighting
Communications equipment
Fueling facilities
FAA ATCT
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-7
APPENDIX D
Section III-C Landside Checklist

Monitor areas of concern:
Terminal curbside areas
Parking lots/garages
Public transportation areas
Loading docks
Service tunnels
Consider life safety measures:
Duress alarms
Emergency phones/intercoms
Medical equipment
Landside Roads
Minimize proximity to AOA/security fencing
Pre-terminal screening capability
CCTV monitoring for security/safety
Landside Parking
Terminal Passenger Parking
Allow significant distance between
parking lots and terminals
Consider CCTV, lighting, intercoms, and
duress alarms for toll plazas
Employee Parking
Airport access control potential
Terminal
Utilities
Communications
Catering facilities
Fuel equipment and lines
Storage areas
Loading docks
Landside Facilities
GTSA
Security and safety concerns include:
Driver safety
Deterrence of vandalism, theft or
other illegal activity
Possibility of terrorist or criminal
assault
Planning/design measures may include:

Limitation of concealed areas and
locations
Provisions for open stairwells
CCTV surveillance of the area
Duress alarms in restroom and/or
public areas
Structural layout that minimizes or
distributes congested driver waiting
areas
Sufficient night lighting
Possibly connected to terminal
Treated no differently than other
commercial areas
Limit direct line of sight of aircraft
Maximize distance to AOA
Mass transit and light rail systems may
require secured transitions
Provide adequate standoff distance
between transit station and the AOA
Protect vehicles and workers
Potential tie-in to airport access controls
Maintain AOA fencing clear areas
Consider access routes, methods and needs
Design features may include:
Special badges, PIN numbers or card
readers for emergency access
Emergency Access to terminal areas
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-8

APPENDIX D
SECTION D - TERMINAL CHECKLISTS:

Section III-D-1 Sterile Areas Checklist
Security Considerations:
Potential access points must be lockable or
controlled
Limiting the number of access points
Doors must comply with local fire/safety codes
Begin discussions with local code officials
early to resolve special circumstances
Prevent the passage of articles from nonsterile

areas
Planning and Layout Considerations:
Personnel access into the sterile area
Emergency response routes and paths
Concessions deliveries and supplies
Limitation of concealable locations
Section III-D-2 Security Screening Checkpoints (SSCP) Checklist

Section A General Issues
SSCP are critical to overall security design
Consider SSCP from the beginning
FAA documents describe requirements
Satisfy screening without burdening flow
Issues to consider
Defining sterile areas
Minimal interruption to flow
Effective contraband deterrent
Effective breach deterrent
Cost-effective, space efficient
Flexible in equipment deployment and
operations
Screening of goods and services
Off-hour protection
Section B Regulations and Guidelines
FAR 107, 108, 109, 129
RTCA Standards for Airport Security Access
Control Systems
ICAO Annex 17.4-5
ECAC Doc 30 Sect. 2.1.3
Airport Security Program
Building and Fire Codes
Mutual Aid and Joint Military Agreements
Section C Essential Coordination

Consult airport, airlines and community at
various stages of the process:
Assure that airport operator is a
participant in the design process
Involve aircraft operators who screen
passengers
FAA will require a review of the plan at
Preliminary and Final Design stages
FAA:
CASFO and CASFU/Regional Office
FAA-assigned contact
Airport Security Coordinator (ASC)
FAA review at several stages, including
FAA ADO for federally funded projects
Airports:
FAR 107
Contact Person (ASC)
Understand airport and airlines needs
Provide sufficient, expandable, and
flexible space
Consider location relative to concessions
Law enforcement, CCTV coverage
Aircraft Operators:
FAR 108
Communicate with and represent aircraft
operators
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-9
APPENDIX D
Section D Planning Considerations:

Each airport and checkpoint is unique
Location and size of checkpoint depend on:
Risk
Operations
Passenger loads
Overall design
Level and Type of Risk Contribute to Design:
Vulnerability Assessment
FAA contingency plan
Temporary relocation of checkpoint
Operational Types:
O&D, Transfer/Hub, Combination
Location of screening point relative to
flight operations
International
flights
may
require
additional screening
Location of Security Screening Checkpoints:
Sterile Concourse Station Plan
Holding Area Station Plan
Boarding Gate Station Plan
Mobile Screening Stations
Sterile Terminal Station
Checkpoint Size:
Bare minimum of 150 SF per station
Two lanes with handicapped lane and exit
lane: 1,200 1,300 SF
Three lanes with handicapped lane and
Four lanes with handicapped lane and exit
lane: 1,750 1,900 SF
Section E Components of the SSCP

Most designs utilize similar components
Components in Use Today Enplaning:
Queuing Space
Metal Detector
Bin Pass-Through
X-Ray Machine
Explosives Trace Detector Equipment
Barriers
Supervisors Area
Private Search Room
Closed Circuit Television
Data Connections
ADA clearances, accessibility, & codes
Wheel-chair Path
Luggage Cart Path
Concessions Goods Path
Length of Response Corridor
Components in Use Today Deplaning
Travel Lane
Security Guard Station
Exit Lane Breach Detection Devices
CCTV
Integrated Systems
Components Under Development:
Technology/operations change rapidly
Personal Explosives Trace Detection Arch
Bulk Detectors
Multidetection Tunnel
Supervisor Command Center
Automated Process for Remote Screening
Room
Pre-screening Preparation Instruction Zone
Automated Breach Barriers
Limited Application Explosives Trace
Detectors
Designs for the Future:
Design for flexibility
Record strategies used for future
Argus
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-10

APPENDIX D
Section F - Personnel and Operations at the

Security Screening Checkpoint:
Space Needs for Equipment Operators:
Designs depend on people moving to:
Monitor each piece of equipment and
make on-the-spot decisions
Provide an immediate point of
contact for questions or difficulties
Provide supervision
Provide space for a fully staffed SSCP
Layout for Operational Efficiency:
Good screening decision-making is
supported by good layout design
Bad layouts may interrupt screeners field
of vision
Screeners should not be approachable
Separate x-ray monitors and bypass lane
Common Layout - 2 metal detectors in
primary row, one in the secondary row
Design for the Process:
Every person and bag must be screened
Three discrete process components:
Divesting
Placing items on the x-ray bag belt
Walking through the metal detector
Position small divesting bins well before
the metal detectors
Consider conveyor belts with a somewhat
longer presentation length
Architectural Design to Support Intuitive
Processes:
Architectural materials and lighting can
improve operation of the checkpoint
Unique floor color or material can create
entrance mat area
Different floor material/color in front of
exit lane may discourage entry attempts
Other material, spatial, or lighting clues
may reinforce the paths of travel
Space for Staff Belongings and Break Area
SSCP Space Requirements
Screening personnel
Law enforcement officers
Security equipment and tables
Private manual search area
For manual search procedures - 1 metal
detector and 1 x-ray device minimum
Consider at least two lanes for:
Elevated security
Peak periods
Equipment failure
Queuing space should not block other
terminal circulation or screening lanes
Screening station should be capable of
rapid expansion for peak-periods
Adequate prevention of electromagnetic
or physical interference
Sufficient space so that passengers retain
line of sight with their baggage
Ability to seal off a concourse and SSCP
during nonoperational periods
Configuration and Placement of SSCP
Physical separation of persons who have
and have not been screened
Floor to ceiling barriers
Protect the security equipment against
tampering when not staffed
Ensure that unscreened persons do not
enter the sterile area via the exit lane
Guards, revolving doors, turnstiles or
electronic discriminators
Section G SSCP Calculations

Review text for full description of calculations
used to determine the number, size, and
configuration of required SSCPs
Remember to add growth factors
Adjust peak hour volume determinations for
multiple and/or split SSCPs
Planning Passenger Volume
Assure that variations over time are
considered
Choice of the planning day is important
Peak hour volumes typically range from
10% to 20% of the daily volume
Methods to determine the design load:
Typical Peak Hour Passengers
(TPHP)
Busy Day/Peak Hour (BDPH)
The Standard Busy Rate (SBR)
Busy Hour Rate (BHR)
Section H Typical SSCP Layouts
Review the text for various layouts and
diagrams
Section I SSCP Technical Details
Site analysis and preparation for x-rays and
metal detectors is critical
Section J SSCP Blast Protection
Consider strategically placed barriers for blast
protection of persons and equipment
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-11
APPENDIX D
Section III-D-3 Public Areas Checklist

Public Areas
Limit the number of access points
Monitor all access points and conveyor belts via CCTV
Visually differentiate public and secure or restricted areas
Build in a capability to secure areas when not in use
Select furnishings and accessories which avoid the concealment of explosives
Seek advice from structural and explosives experts on minimizing the effects of blast
Ticketing Lobby
Minimal seating in ticketing lobbies will reduce congestion
Consider the needs of international or high-risk aircraft operators with extended security measures
during the passenger check-in process
Additional queuing space may be required
Some exit requirements have specific widths and separation distances
Coordinate locations closely with the Fire Marshall and/or Code officials
The emergency exits leading into secured areas should be minimized
Exits should avoid moving persons from a lower to a higher level of security area
Exiting screened individuals should be kept separate from unscreened individuals
Consider emergency doors with push-type panic bars with 15-30 second delays (where allowable)
If the door is not a fire door, lock it.
Emergency egress door (fire door) may not be locked
Keep the number of access points to an operational minimum
Wherever possible have fire doors open into nonsecured areas
Coordinate with planner, designer, airport, and fire officials
Concessions Areas
Trend towards more concessions in sterile areas, close to holdrooms
Design to accommodate moving concessions (or screening points) during heightened security
Some concessions require storage and processing space
Need delivery and personnel access routes
Consider type of concession, delivery, storage, moneyhandling and security escorts, ATM security
Design elements for concessions include:
Separate concessions storage areas in public or nonsecured/low-risk areas
Separate loading dock/concessions screening area
Location of concessions and/or public mall areas outside of security areas
Simplification and shortness of the delivery access routes
Lockers:
Public Lockers belong within sterile areas beyond the security screening stations
Consider locating lockers to minimize the damage or injury from an explosion
Blast barriers around lockers in areas accessible to the unscreened public
Consider supervised storage facilities in lieu of lockers
Storage lockers can facilitate an EOD search with master keys or an electronic release
Put beyond security screening stations in sterile areas
Restrict unauthorized access from suites to the secured areas
Provide space for monitored baggage holding facilities
Observations decks are strongly discouraged - Where they exist, they should be closed to public access
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-12

APPENDIX D
Section III-D-4 Nonpublic Areas Checklist

Non-Public Areas
Service corridors should not cross boundaries of secure areas
Service corridors may be used to minimize quantity of security access points
Tenant areas can be grouped into common service corridor
Consider corridor placement and use by airport emergency personnel and law enforcement
Fire stairs typically connect many of the buildings floors/levels as well as security areas
Stairwells and vertical pathways may require security treatments and boundaries
Office areas should connect via corridors and stairs to minimize the need to cross security boundaries
Office spaces should be planned to accommodate visitors and public access
Consider the use of satellite police, ID or first aid offices
Tenant Spaces
Some tenant spaces might require tie-in to the airport access control and alarm system
Consider tenant money-handling, overnight operations, early morning concession deliveries
Public Safety or Police Offices
Office space for airport law enforcement in the terminal
Public access area protected with ballistic materials, laminates, concrete bollards, etc.
Include adequate space (in no particular order) for:
Briefing/work room
Training classroom/offices
Property/evidence room(s)
Conference roomscan be part of command post/operations room(s)
Holding cells
Possible satellite locations
Private Interrogation/Witness Statement room(s)/area
Physical fitness area in conjunction with lockers, showers, and restrooms
General storage areas
Secured arms storage
Kitchen/lunchroom facilities
Areas requiring access for public and tenants but protected with adequate controls are:
Administrative offices
Security ID badging
Lost and found
SIDA/tenant training rooms
Medical services
Consider electrical, fiber optic and other utility supply and routes to/from the police areas
Law Enforcement Parking

Provide quickly accessible parking for law enforcement with direct landside/SIDA access
Remote Law Enforcement/Public Safety Posts/Areas

In large facilities, consider remote law enforcement posts or substations
For outdoor posts, shelters are needed
In large terminals, tactical supply storage should be located in specially identified areas
The location of Communication/Dispatch facilities
Location of equipment repair areas
Relocated support functions near the police area
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-13
APPENDIX D
Dogs/K-9 Teams
If there is no on-site K-9, specify non-critical area for temporary K-9 use
Rule of thumb: a 4- by - 8-foot indoor pen, attached to an outdoor fenced exercise run
Plumbing and drainage is important; the concrete floor can be epoxy coated for ease of cleaning
Fresh air circulation, dry environment, without mildew or dampness
The dog area should be secured, and sufficiently isolated from casual public contact
Provide areas for veterinarian services and training activities
Isolation from noise and odor sources, especially jet fuel fumes
Secured storage for explosives test and training items; coordinated with ATF
Consider proximity to EOD personnel and to threat containment units
Consider multiple communications options to police, fire, rescue, airport operations, crash/hijack alert,
off-airport emergency assistance and a secure communications channel
Locate close to the Airport Emergency Command Post (CP), in a secure area
For cabling interconnections, a central geographic location maintains reasonable cable lengths
SOC has implications for floor space, cabinets, power, HVAC, fiber optics and cabling, and conduit paths
Rear access to console for maintenance and update.
Consider space requirements of consolidating all functions within the SOC:
Information Specialists for customer information phones, paging;
Airport Police and/or Security Department
Fire Alarm monitoring
Landside/Terminal Operations
ID Badging
Maintenance Control/Dispatch (includes total energy management of HVAC systems)
Flight Information Display (FIDS) systems; Baggage Information Display (BIDS) systems
Direct phone lines to ATC tower, airlines, airport mini hospital, etc.
Airport Radio and Personnel Paging Systems
Recording Equipment
Plan an alternate site capable of supporting the basic operation.
A direct view of the airside and the isolated parking position is desirable.
Space Needs
Space for Crisis Management Teams Operational Group and Negotiators
Refer to Airport Emergency Plan and Airport Security Program for optimum space
Advisory Circular 150/5200-31A on airport emergency planning can assist
Raised flooring is an option for installation of ducts and cable paths.
CP electrical power must be uninterrupted
Vehicular access to the CP necessary
Controlled parking for support vehicles and key CP vehicles
Provide space for kitchenette and rest rooms.
Family Assistance Center designated space in the case of an accident or incident.
FIS Areas
FIS areas are designed toward very different law enforcement and security situations
FIS agencies publish a separate document that provides their additional security design guidelines
required within their operational spaces
Reference FAA Advisory Circular AC 150/5360-13
Access control and badging
Package screening
CCTV
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-14

APPENDIX D
Section III-D-5 Checked Baggage Make-up Rooms & Systems Checklist

100% EDS screening goal
Planning and Design Considerations for 100% EDS screening:
Adequate space for equipment
Queuing space
Appropriate facilities for passenger/baggage reuniting for alarm resolution
Determine physical limitations of areas to be used for bag handling from proposed plans or as-builts
Determine any special requirements based on local code (ex: seismic and fire)
Check with airport, airline and local law enforcement to determine operational parameters including:
Type of operations, domestic versus international
Type of airlines, foreign aircraft operators versus domestic
Peak hourly bag flow (check current and future flight schedules)
Selectee rate
Local resolution procedures for uncleared bags
Whether remote bag check-in must be accommodated
If accommodations are needed to facilitate PPBM
Potential explosives containment needs
Special regulatory requirements unique to this airport or aircraft operator(s)
Determine which government regulations apply to the operation
Establish how bags will be screened including:
Type of equipment (choice based on selectee rate and airline choice)
Shared or common use versus airline dedicated bag handling
For operations with more than 150 selectees per week determine:
Location of EDS (curbside, lobby, bag makeup, concourse)
Integration level with BHS (stand alone, exit-end integration, fully integrated)
Configuration of full integrations (Hub, Sortation, Tandem, Parallel, Other)
Operator number and location (adjacent to machines or remote)
Location of area for reconciling suspect bags with passengers
Obtain requirements from equipment manufacturer for:
Floor Loading
Machine footprint
Maintenance clearances
Communications
Power
Installation
Environment tolerances
Throughput of equipment type
Bag handling system considerations for integrated systems:
Bags need to be tracked (bar code, RF tags, manual encoding stations)
Load distribution to minimize equipment needs
Maintaining bag separation (no rolling, flipping, slipping or stacking of bags)
FAA and ICAOs goal is 100% checked baggage screening
Conveyance of suspect bags (unresolvable by operators) to search area with ETD
Level of automation (minimizing life cycle and operational costs)
Flexibility ability to use machines at various levels (adaptive intelligent screening)
Adequate decision holding point after machines with operator threat resolution
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-15
APPENDIX D
Handling peaks with sufficient queue belts or sorting carousel

Matching belt width of conveyor to machine if they differ
Number and types of inputs (ticket counter, skycap, recheck, transfer lines)
Existence of remote check-in (such as cruise ships)
Need for early bag storage
Accommodations for oversize items
Dog runs
Access to clear jams
Considerations for Stand Alone systems:
Location of area for uniting suspect bags with passengers
Path for transporting suspect bags
Path for manual loading and retrieval of bags
Space for passengers if they are brought to machine with bags
Physical barriers (walls, panels, stanchions) to keep public at distance from bags and machines during screening
If applicable, include provisions for:
Preventing glare from nearby windows on operator screenings
Adequate heat, light and ventilation of operator areas
Storage space for maintenance parts and supplies
CCTV for operator to view entrance and end of remote machine
Space for a Threat Containment Unit
Curbside bag belt for immediate removal of bags from public access
Secured area for bag hold after acceptance
Outbound conveyor secured to prohibit public access to the AOA
Other considerations include EDS equipment tie-ins to conveyors.
Space and equipment considerations for curbside check-in include:
Where passengers will relinquish control of baggage,
Placement of personnel and workstations to tag and accept control of bags,
How bags will be transported to the sterile area for screening,
Placement of EDS equipment,
How oversize bags/packages/parcels will be handled,
Where bags will be placed for secondary screening if required
Isolation area for bags requiring passenger response,
Access routes for LEOs
Consider the need for adequate curbside space to preclude peak crowds from spilling into roadway.
Consider potential impact of off-site screening on peak bag loads
Secured storage area needs for remotely checked bags
Bag delivery area and coordination required
Determine procedural requirements for:
Chain of custody
Bag transport
Security
Bag tracking
Storage Areas
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-16

APPENDIX D
Section III-D-6 Terminal Vulnerable Areas and Protection Checklist

Due to the complex/multi-use function of terminals they contain the broadest range of vulnerable areas
Each airport is unique and must be evaluated for unique or increased vulnerabilities
Terminal Vulnerable Areas
Connections from the terminal to utility services in power and communications
Primary transformers and switching gear
Secondary generating equipment and transmission facilities
Voice and data switching and transmission facilities
Utility tunnels or ducts entering a terminal below grade
Loading docks and delivery areas
Walkway or bridge connections to other terminals
Hotels, parking structures or other adjacent facilities and structures
People moving systems, if exposed
Locations for person or object concealment
Section III-E Architecture Checklist
Architecture plays a fundamental role in all aspects
of security
Carefully coordinate locations for access points
and equipment rooms
Planning and Design Considerations
Physical Boundaries
Between different security levels
Prevent items from being passed
through/over
Deter public access to nonpublic areas
Provide visual or psychological deterrent
Bomb/Blast Analysis
Critical part of design
Perform bomb/blast analysis periodically
Minimize areas where objects or persons
can be concealed
Minimize or lock accessible spaces/rooms
Coordinate with local security, search and
threat response agencies
Airport Personnel
Tenants
Emergency Response Routes
Delivery Routes
Security Response
Police Escorts for Holding Purposes
Minimum Number of Security Portals
Minimize numbers for cost and security
Reduces cost if personnel screening
becomes necessary
Maximizes use/efficiency of systems
Space for Additional Security Measures
Allows growth with minimal impact on
operations
Reduces installation and execution costs
Reduces time needed for additions and
expansions
Consider allotting space/accommodations

for:
Temporary SSCP
Additional SSCP locations
Delivery and personnel screening
Added expansion to planned SSCP
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-17
APPENDIX D
Section III-F ACAMS Checklist

See also RTCA/DO-230 for specifics on
technologies, system types and standards
Power
Emergency power systems/battery back-up
A security network should run on physically
separate dedicated and protected systems from
nonsecurity systems
Limited Grouping
Similar Security Levels
Proximity for Maintenance
Proximity for Guard Monitoring
Choice of Equipment
Equipment Placement
Terminal Access Points
AOA/SIDA Personnel Doors
Sterile Area Access Doors
Security Checkpoint Grilles
Inbound/Outbound Baggage Doors
and Systems
Loading Dock Doors
Service Corridor and Stairwell Doors
Administrative Office Doors
Terminal Telecom Room Doors
Terminal Maintenance Area and
Equipment Room Doors
Tenant and Concessions Area Doors
Roof Access Points
Terminal Alarm Points

Fire/Emergency Exit Doors
Material Storage/Safe Areas
Display/Museum/Art Cases
Terminal Duress/Convenience Alarms

Security Checkpoints
Ticketing/Rental Car Counters
Administrative/Information Desks
Companion Care/Family Restrooms
Police Substations/First Aid Areas
Chapels
Concession/Retail Cash Registers
Site Access Points

AOA/SIDA Vehicle Gates
Maintenance/Personnel Gates
Non-Terminal AOA/SIDA Doors
Site Telecom Room Doors
Maintenance Area Doors
Tenant Facility Doors
Site Alarm Points

Material Storage Areas
Parking Management/Tenant Safes
Critical Equipment Locations
Site Duress/Convenience Alarms

Parking Toll Booths
Parking Management Office MoneyHandling/Storage Areas
Public Parking and Garage Areas
Ground Transportation and Taxicab
Booth Areas
Administrative/Reception Areas
Tenant/Cargo Cash Register Areas
Airport/Tenant Guard Booths
Minimize Access Points
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-18

APPENDIX D
Section III-G CCTV Checklist

CCTV enhances and increases security
CCTV monitoring can reduce police response
requirements
Power/Data
Powered from emergency systems
Battery backup not required
Link CCTV to ACAMS alarm signals
Use pan/tilt/zoom cameras to minimize camera
numbers and maximize usefulness
Mount cameras in locations with accessible
ceilings/cabling route
120 VAC service outlet near each camera
Choice of Equipment
Terminal
Terminal Apron
ACAMS Access Points
ACAMS Alarm Points

Security Checkpoint Areas
Public Lobby Areas
Roadway/Curbside Baggage Areas
Loading Dock/Police Parking Areas
Administrative and Tenant Areas
Baggage Handling and Claim Areas
FIS Areas
Site
ACAMS Access Points

ACAMS Alarm Points
Runways and Taxiways and Airfield
Cargo/GA/FBO Ramps
Public and Employee Parking Areas
Maximum 4 Monitors per Operator
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-19
APPENDIX D
Section III-H Power, Communications & Cabling Infrastructure Systems Checklist

Secure components of the power, communications and infrastructure systems for reliable emergency operation
Power
Low voltage devices and control systems
Battery-driven remote and stand-alone devices
Standard 110/220 voltage for operating equipment such as lighting and CCTV monitors
High amperage/ high voltage systems for such things as x-rays and explosives detection equipment
Location and capacity of stand-by generators
Installation of redundant power lines to existing and alternate locations
Strong consideration to the installation of power lines, or conduit and pull-strings, to known future
construction such as expanded terminal concourses
Security of data can be critical
Cabling Management
Determine standards for type and location of cabling and related infrastructure
Determine labeling, color-coding or other identification methods
Determine whether to identify security cabling/infrastructure
Network Availability Considerations
Dual (or multi-) network cabling to interconnect mission-critical equipment and platforms
The dual network cables may be laid along different paths to minimize the chances of damage
Redundant repeaters, switches, routers and power supplies, shall be considered
Separate wiring closets may host the redundant equipment
Network Security
Protect networks from unauthorized access by external connections
Encryption has important design aspects for securing a general network
Shared vs. dedicated fiber is a design/cost issue to be examined with the IT designer
WAN connectivity may be a consideration for Internet and/or Virtual Private Network (VPN) access
Take into account WAN connectivity
Airport may provide shared networking
Storage systems for mission-critical file server and database must be highly reliable
Take into account storage redundancy and back up
Pre-allocation of separate facility rooms for redundant storage system equipment
Put distance between storage rooms to reduce chances of all rooms being damaged
Comprehensive early planning can significantly reduce future construction costs
For future terminal expansion, additional concourses and/or gates, new buildings, or expanded or relocated
security screening points with known locations, include extra conduit, pull strings, cable or fiber,
terminations, shielding and other rough-in elements
Telecom Rooms
Design telecomm rooms, termination closets, wire rooms, in short direct line to each other
In multi-level buildings the telecomm rooms should be vertically stacked
Provide sufficient working space; accommodate known expansion requirements, including panel space for
cable terminations, switches and relays, remote field panels, remote diagnostic and management computer
stations, and power service with redundancy and/or emergency back-up capability
This area will also have additional cooling, fire protection, and dust control requirements
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-20

APPENDIX D

Three broad considerations in using RF-based communications
Is it the most efficient and cost effective way to accomplish the necessary tasks
Will it require infrastructure support which is not necessary with other modes
Will it interfere with other operational elements, including aircraft and air traffic communications,
security operations, or general administrative data transfers
Environmental considerations include:
Electromagnetic Environment
Licensed and unlicensed equipment
Cell Phones
Metal detectors
Power Generators
Power lines
Physical Environment Concerns

Weather considerations
Temperature
Rain
Snow
Dust and dirt
Regulations - Coordinate with FCC and FAA
Antenna location, mounting, and directional/omni-directional considerations
Other transmitters that have the potential to interact with airport systems
Obstructions
Coverage areas (and dead spots)
Robustness of link
Time criticality
Mobile or Portable
Shielding
Effect, if any, on ATCT communications
Communications
Access to Main communication bus
Network Access Security
Interference is two-way
Prudent to undertake a thorough engineering analysis of the potential effects on all such systems early in
the design process
Equipment Placement
Options for belts, doors/gates, air and heating, power distribution, and communications as an entire system
Do not locate and/or orient antennas to create the potential for co-site interference.
Higher frequency systems have more directional antennas, so emission can be better controlled.
Outside the building RF environment is unpredictable, requiring internal 'isolation'.
Choke Effects Integral to Construction
At the low frequencies, wavelengths are long and can 'match' terminal openings
Subsurface metal rods, I-beams, etc. that surround these openings, can create an effective RF choke
Adjusting passageway opening size can 'better tune' the choke
Electrical and electronic environment at commercial airports rarely remains constant
There is always more that can be done to improve the EMC status
Loading bridge orientation can reduce unwanted radiation
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-21
APPENDIX D
Section III-I Beyond Our Borders: Aviation Security Design in the U.K. Checklist
None
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix D-22

APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY*
*For the purposes of this document only these definitions are not to be taken as regulatory in nature. They are for
the purpose of clarity as they are used in this document, and are subject to change. Other definitions may apply in
other contexts.
ABIAP
Airport Border Integrity Antiterrorism Program
A/C
Advisory Circular
ACAMS
Access Control and Alarm-Monitoring System
Access Control
A system, method or procedure to limit and control access to areas of the

airport. FAR 107 requires certain airports to provide for such a system.
ACCSP
Air Carrier Standards Security Program (ACSSP or SSP) - the detailed,

nonpublic document an aircraft operator regulated under FAR 108, must
implement in order to meet FAAs minimum security standards. FAA must
approve the document in order for it to be valid.
Adaptive Intelligent Screening
This method of EDS baggage screening involves active communication

between the levels of screening and bag handling system so that, in addition to
selectee bags, other bags are routed to EDS equipment or screened at the
highest-level detection equipment on a bag-by-bag basis.
ADA
Americans with Disabilities Act
ADO
(FAA) Airports District Office - the office responsible for approval of airport
projects involving federal grants assistance and enforcement of FAR 139
airport certification processes.
ADPM
Average Day Peak Month
Air Carrier
A person or company undertaking directly by lease, or other arrangement to

engage in air transportation. Also known as Aircraft Operator.
Aircraft Loading Bridge
An aboveground device through which passengers move between an airport

terminal and an aircraft. (Often referred to by the brand name Jetway)
Aircraft Operator
A person or company undertaking directly by lease or other arrangement to

engage in air transportation. Also known as Air Carrier.
Aircraft Stand
A designated area on an airport ramp intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
Airline
An air transportation system including its equipment, routes, operating

personnel, and management.
Airport Command Post
An area that is set aside to house or facilitate the command and control of a
particular activity.
Airport Operator
Any person or organization operating an airport.
Airport Ramp
Any outdoor area, including aprons and hardstands, on which aircraft may be
positioned, stored, serviced, or maintained.
Airside
Refers to those sections of an airport beyond the security screening stations and
restricting perimeters.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-1
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
AOA
Air Operations Area - That portion of the airport designed and used for
landing, taking off or surface maneuvering of aircraft, and adjacent areas, but
not including SIDAs or secured areas.
APHIS
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (U.S. Department of Agriculture)
ARFF
Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting - A term used to identify the facility,
operation or personnel engaged such activities.
ASC
Airport Security Coordinator - An individual designated by an airport

operator to serve as the primary contact for FAA for security-related activities
and communications.
ASP
Airport Security Program - The Airports written program, approved by

FAA, which outlines all relevant security policies, procedures and system
features that the airport intends to meet.
ATC
Air Traffic Control
ATCT
Airport Traffic Control Tower
ATF
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (U.S.)
ATO
Airport Ticket Office - A place at which the aircraft operator sells tickets,
accepts checked baggage, and through the application of manual or automated
criteria, identifies persons who may require additional security scrutiny. Such
facilities may be located in an airport terminal or other location, e.g., curbside
at the airport. It would not include skycap operations that only accept checked
baggage, nor would it include locations performing the same full range of
functions but located off the airport.
AVSEC
Aviation Security Contingency Measures
Baggage Claim Area
Space, typically located in the passenger terminal building, where passengers

reclaim checked baggage.
Baggage Makeup Area
Space in which arriving and departing baggage is sorted and routed to

appropriate destinations.
BDPH
Busy Day/Peak Hour Calculation method for screening point peak volume.
BHR
Busy Hour Rate Calculation method for screening point peak volume.
BHS
Baggage Handling System
BIDS
Baggage Information Display Systems
BMA
Baggage Makeup Area
Boarding Gate
That area from which passengers directly enplane or deplane the aircraft.
BOCA
Building Officials Code Authority
CAD
Computer-Aided Dispatch
CAPPS
Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System
Cargo
Any property carried on aircraft other than stores or baggage.
Cargo Area
All the ground space and facilities provided for cargo handling. It includes
airport ramps, cargo buildings and warehouses, parking lots and roads
associated therewith.
Carry-on Baggage
All property remaining in the possession of passengers that is to be handcarried onto aircraft for transportation.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-2

APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
CASFO
Civil Aviation Security Field Office - The FAA office responsible for the Civil
Aviation Security activities within a specific geographic area of an FAA Region.
CASFU
Civil Aviation Security Field Unit
CCTV
Closed Circuit Television (System)
Certificate Holder
An aircraft operator subject to FAR 108 holding an FAA operating certificate and
engaged in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations (or both).
The term is also sometimes applied to a certificated airport, which refers to an
airports operational certification by FAA pursuant to FAR Part 139
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
Checked Baggage
Any property tendered to or accepted by a certificate holder from a ticketed

passenger for transportation in the cargo/baggage hold of an aircraft.
Civil Aviation Security Division
The FAA office responsible for the Civil Aviation Security activities for an
entire FAA region.
Concourse
A passageway for persons between the principal terminal building waiting area
and the structures leading to aircraft parking positions.
Consortium
An FAA-encouraged airport security committee made up of persons and

organizations having a direct interest in the security decisions being made and
their impact on the airport security environment. Participants might include
airlines, concessions, other tenants, FBOs, and FAA representatives, among
others. A consortium is an advisory panel and a broad-based resource for airport
security matters; it is not empowered to make decisions or issue directives.
CP
Airport Emergency Command Post Location on an airport where

coordination and management for airport emergencies occurs.
Crisis Management Team
A group of individuals involved in managing a crisis to prevent, or at least

contain, a crisis situation from escalating, jeopardizing safety and facilities,
attracting unfavorable attention, inhibiting normal operations, creating a
negative public image, and adversely affecting the organization's viability.
Curbside Check-in
An area normally located along terminals vehicle curb frontage where

designated employees accept and check-in baggage from departing passengers.
Designed to speed passenger movement by separating baggage handling from
other ticket counter and gate activities. Allows baggage to be consolidated and
moved to aircraft more directly.
DOE
Department of Energy (U.S.)
Downstream
Refers to airport areas beyond security screening checkpoints.
ECAC
European Civil Aviation Conference
EDS
Explosives Detection System - a system designed to detect the chemical

signature of explosive materials, where the FAA has tested the system against
pre-established standards, and has certified that the system meets the criteria in
terms of detection capabilities and throughput.
EOD
Explosive Ordnance Disposal - To render safe either improvised or

manufactured explosive devices by the use of technically trained and equipped
personnel.
EMS
Emergency Medical Services
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-3
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ETD
Explosives Trace Detector As used in this document, a device that detects

tiny amounts of particle and/or vapor forms of explosives. In a different
context of passenger scheduling, ETD means estimated time of departure.
Exclusive Use Area
That part of an AOA for which an aircraft operator has agreed in writing with
the airport operator to exercise exclusive security responsibility under an
approved security program.
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.)
FACMSP
Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program - an FAA-approved security

program as required by 14 CFR Part 129.25. The FACMSP is the security
program most often used by scheduled passenger or public charter foreign air
carriers landing in or taking off from the United States.
FAR
Federal Aviation Regulation (U.S.)
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.)
FBO
Fixed Base Operator
FCC
Federal Communications Commission (U.S.)
FDA
Food and Drug Administration (U.S.)
Federal Security Manager
FAA agent who is the local point of contact for aviation security at Category X
airports.
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.)
FIDS
Flight Information Display Systems
FIS
Federal Inspection Services (U.S.) - APHIS, FWS, INS, PHS, USCS
FWS
Fish and Wildlife Service (U.S.)
GA
General Aviation - That portion of civil aviation that encompasses all facets
of aviation except aircraft operators holding a Certificate of Conveyance and
Necessity from the FAA and large aircraft commercial operators.
GSEM
Ground Services Equipment Maintenance (Facility)
GTSA
Ground Transportation Staging Area Location where taxis, limos, buses

and/or other ground transportation vehicles are staged prior to the terminal.
Hijacking
The exercising, or attempt to exercise, control over the movement of an aircraft

by the use of force, threats, or other actions, which if successfully carried out,
would result in the deviation of an aircraft from its regularly scheduled route.
Hub
An airline terminal and airport used to transfer passengers to and from a large
number of connecting flights.
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning
IATA
International Air Transport Association
IAB
International Arrivals Building
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization - a specialized agency of the

United Nations whose objective is to develop the principles and techniques of
international air navigation and to foster planning and development of
international civil air transport.
ICBO
International Conference of Building Officials
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-4

APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
ID
Identification Use of methods such as badges, signs or markers to identify

persons, vehicles and/or property.
IED
Improvised Explosive Device
Incendiary
Any substance that can cause a fire by ignition (flammable liquids, gases, or
chemical compounds).
INS
Immigration and Naturalization Service (U.S.)
Interline Baggage
Baggage of passengers subject to transfer from the aircraft of one operator to

the aircraft of another in the course of the passenger's travel.
Isolated Parking Position
An area designated for the parking of aircraft suspected of carrying explosives

or incendiaries to accommodate responding law enforcement and/or EOD
personnel in search efforts.
IT
Information Technology
JACC
Joint Agency Coordination Center (FIS)
K-9
Canine Team Dog teams used for explosives or other material detection.
LAN
Local Area Network
Landside
That area of an airport and buildings to which the public has access.
LEO
Law Enforcement Officer - An individual authorized to carry and use

firearms, vested with such police power of arrest as determined by Federal Law
and State Statutes, and identifiable by appropriate indicia of authority.
Metal Detector
An electronic detection device approved for use by the FAA to detect metal on
the person of people desiring access beyond the screening point. May be walkthrough or hand-held type.
[also: magnetometer]
NAVAID
Navigational Aid
NCIC
National Crime Information Center
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NQR
Nuclear Quadropole Resonance
O&D
Origin & Destination Airport operational type (as opposed to Transfer/Hub)
Off-Airport Facility
Refers to a passenger or cargo transport terminal at an urban population center

at which processing facilities are provided prior to arrival at airport.
PBFM
Passenger and Baggage Flow Model
Perimeter
The outer boundary of an airport, also a boundary that can separate areas
controlled for security purposes from those that are not.
PHS
Public Health Service (U.S.)
PIL
Primary Inspection Lines (FIS)
PIN
Personal Identification Number
POE
Port of Entry - for Customs and Immigration requirements.
PPBM
Positive Passenger Bag Match a generic term for any FAA-approved

method used to match the passenger who has boarded an aircraft to the
baggage that the passenger has checked for carriage aboard that aircraft. The
intent is to ensure that a passengers checked baggage is flown only if the
passenger is actually on board that flight.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-5
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
PSS
Physical Security System
Public Area
That portion of the airport which includes all public real estate and facilities
other than the air operations area and those sterile areas downstream of security
screening stations. (see also, landside)
RF
Radio Frequency
RFI
Radio Frequency Interference
RFID
Radio Frequency Identification
RTCA
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
Sabotage
The intentional and willful damage or destruction of civil aviation-related

goods or property, either on the ground or in the air.
SAFR
Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk (see Appendix A of this document)
SBCCI
Southern Building Code Congress International
SBR
Standard Busy Rate Calculation method for screening point peak volume.
Security Screening
A systematic examination by detection procedures or facilities (electronic or

physical search) of persons and property for the purpose of detecting weapons
and other dangerous devices and to prevent their unauthorized introduction into
sterile areas or onboard aircraft.
Security Parking Area
An aircraft stand where aircraft threatened with unlawful interference may be

parked pending resolution of the threat. Also known as hot spot
Secured Area
That portion of an airport identified in the FAA-approved airport security

program in which the most definitive levels of access control and security
training are required under FAR 107.201. Generally, this area includes a portion
of the landside, and encompasses the passenger handling facilities at and around
the passenger terminal. An airport may have several unconnected secured areas,
which may include baggage makeup areas, movement areas, safety areas, etc.
Security Program
Measures adopted to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference.
Selectee
At this writing, this term refers to certain persons whose baggage is selected
for further scrutiny by any of a variety of criteria and processes.
Should
For the purpose of this document, this word is defined as a recommendation or

that which is advised but not required.
SIDA
Security Identification Display Area Those areas of the airport, sometimes

smaller than the AOA and often focused near the terminal and the passenger
aircraft boarding facilities, which generally require more stringent security
provisions than the AOA. This area requires display of airport-issued identity
badges, which in turn require detailed employment histories and other checks
of individuals who have unescorted access to the area.
SOC
Security Operations Center
SSCP
Security Screening Checkpoint - A checkpoint area established to conduct

security screening of persons and their possessions prior to their entering a
sterile or secured area.
Sterile Area
That area of an airport, generally within the terminal, to which access is

controlled by the inspection of persons and property in accordance with an
approved security program. They are typically located where passengers wait
to board departing aircraft, or persons wait to meet arriving aircraft.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-6

APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
Taxiway
A paved surface over which aircraft taxi to and from a runway, a hangar, etc.
Terminal
A building or buildings designed to accommodate the enplaning and deplaning

activities of aircraft operator passengers.
Threat
A threat is any indication, circumstance or event with the potential to cause

loss of or damage to an asset. It can also be defined as the intention and
capability of an adversary to under take actions that would be detrimental to
U.S. interest. There are six primary sources of threats: Terrorist, Criminal,
Insider, Foreign Intelligence Service, Foreign Military, Environmental; as
defined by the CIAs Analytical Risk Management Program
TCU
Threat Containment Unit - any of a wide variety of devices intended to be

used to contain wholly or in part the blast effects of an explosive device. TCUs
may be stationary, or may be part of a system by which an explosive device
may be transported.
TMS
Terminal Management System
TPHP
Typical Peak Hour Passengers Calculation method for screening point peak
volume.
TSP
Tenant Security Program - An arrangement permitted under FAR 107.113.

The airport operator and a tenant (other than an aircraft operator regulated
under FAR 108 or 129) may enter voluntarily into an agreement in which the
tenant assumes responsibility for certain requirements under FAR 107;
however, only the airport operator may provide law enforcement support.
Under a Tenant Security Program (TSP) the airport must take on the inspection
and compliance role normally performed by the FAA. The FAA, in turn, will
oversee the airports conduct of the program.
UK
United Kingdom
UPS
Uninterruptible Power Supply
USCS
United States Customs Service
USPS
United States Postal Service
Vulnerable Area
Any facility or area on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or otherwise

rendered inoperative would seriously impair the functioning of an airport.
VPN
Virtual Private Network
WAN
Wide-Area Network
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-7
APPENDIX E
GLOSSARY
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix E-8

APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTE:
FAA and other sources/agencies listed below periodically update many of the documents referenced in this
bibliography, as well as many rules, regulations, statutes and codes. These updates sometimes change the entire
document, but more often the changes are only in segments as new information becomes available. The reader
should be certain when seeking guidance from such referenced documents that he/she is obtaining the most current
version from the source. Further, it is possible that due to the constantly changing nature of the industry and the
regulatory environment that some portions of the updated guidance may differ or conflict with the recommendations
offered herein.
Section A - Advisory Circulars

The latest issuance of the following advisory circulars may be obtained from the Department of Transportation,
Utilization and Storage Section, M-443.2, Washington, D.C. 20590: [Also see the FAA internet web site at
www.faa.gov]
1.
00-2, Advisory Circular Checklist - Contains a listing of all current advisory circulars.
2.
107-1, Aviation Security-Airports - Provides guidance to those individuals and organizations who have
responsibilities under FAR 107. Provides recommendations for establishing and improving security for
restricted or critical facilities not covered in FAR 107. (Civil Aviation Security Program: Airport Policy and
Guidance supercedes 107-1 as of June 2001)
3.
108-1, Air Carrier Security. Provides information and guidance on the implementation of FAR 108, Airplane
Operator Security.
4.
109-1, Aviation Security Acceptance and Handling Procedures-Indirect Air Carrier Security. Provides guidance
and information for use by indirect aircraft operators when accepting and handling property to be carried by
aircraft operators or by the operator of any civil aircraft for transportation in air commerce.
5.
129-3, Foreign Air Carrier Security. Provides information and guidance on the implementation of sections
129.25, 129.26, and 129.27 of FAR 129.
6.
150/5200-31A, Airport Emergency Plan
7.
150/5300-13, Airport Design
8.
150/5360-13, Planning and Design Guidelines for Airport Terminal Facilities. Furnishes guidance material for
the planning and design of airport terminal buildings and related facilities.
9.
150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying Construction of Airports
Section B - Government Reports and Regulations

Government reports may be obtained from the National Technical Information Services (NTIS). Springfield,
Virginia 22151. In general, they may also be obtained from the originating government agency, and they are often
also available on the agencys internet web site.
1.
Aircraft Hijacking and Other Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation -- Statistical and Narrative Reports. Office
of Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation Administration, issued annually.
2.
Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation (current year). Office of Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation
Administration, issued annually.
3.
FAR 107, Airport Security
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix F-1
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
4.
FAR 108, Airplane Operator Security
5.
FAR 109, Indirect Air Carrier Security
6.
FAR 129, Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S. Registered Aircraft Engaged in
Common Carriage
7.
FAR 139, Certification and Operations: Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers
8.
Report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, February 12, 1997.
Section C - Miscellaneous Reports

(Where publication dates are not shown, the publication or document is typically updated regularly, or annually, and
should be reviewed in its most recent edition)
1.
Airport Planning Manual - Master Planning, Part 1. International Civil Aviation Organization.
2.
Crisis Management Manual, Office of Civil Aviation Security, Federal Aviation Administration.
3.
ECAC DOC 30 Security Measures at Airports
4.
Handbook for Security Glazing. Naval Facilities Engineering Command.
5.
International Standards and Recommended Practices Security Aerodromes - Annex 14 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operations. International Civil Aviation
Organization.
6.
International Standards and Recommended Practices Security - Safeguarding International Civil Aviation
Against Acts of Unlawful Interference - Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
International Civil Aviation Organization.
7.
National Fire Codes NFPA 101 - Life Safety Code. National Fire Prevention Association.
8.
National Fire Codes NFPA 416 - Standard on Construction and Protection of Airport Terminal Buildings.
National Fire Prevention Association.
9.
National Fire Codes NFPA 417 - Standard on Construction and Protection of Aircraft Loading Walkways.
National Fire Prevention Association.
10. Protection of Assets Manual. Merritt Corporation. Updated Monthly.

11. Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. May 15,1990.
12. Report of the Safety Review Task Force on Domestic Aviation Security Regarding Security of Airport
Perimeters and Air Operations Areas. U.S. Department of Transportation. March 1987.
13. RTCA/DO-230, Standards for Airport Security Access Control Systems.
14. Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful Interference. International Civil
Aviation Organization.
15. Technology Against Terrorism - The Federal Report. Congress of the United States, Office of Technology
Assessment. February 1991.
16. Terrorism in the United States - Terrorist Research and Analytical Center. Counter Terrorism Section, Criminal
Investigative Division. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Annual.
Section D - Federal Inspection Service Area Applicable Laws and Regulations

(In effect at the time of publication)
To ensure that all international passengers arriving in the United States are properly inspected to determine their
admissibility to the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), in conjunction with the United
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix F-2

APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
States Customs Service (USCS), is responsible for the border integrity oversight of the Federal Inspection Service
(FIS) area at air Ports-of-Entry (POE).
1.
Section 233(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

Section 233(b) of the INA requires the transportation line or their agent, the Airport Operator, to provide and
maintain at its expense suitable landing stations, approved by the Attorney General...[and that] no such
transportation line shall be allowed to land any alien passengers in the United States... unless such stations are
thereafter maintained to the satisfaction of the Attorney General.
2.
Title 8 part 234, section 4 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR): International Airports for Entry of Aliens.
Title 8 part 234, section 4 of the CFRs entitled International Airports for Entry of Aliens, states in part,
[i]nternational airports for the entry of aliens shall be those airports designated as such by the Commissioner
[of INS]. An application for designation of an airport as an international airport for the entry of aliens shall be
made to the Commissioner [of INS] An airport shall not be so designated by the Commissioner [of INS]
without such prior approval and designation, and unless it appears to the satisfaction of the [INS] Commissioner
that conditions render such designation necessary or advisable, and unless adequate facilities have been or will
be provided at such airport without cost to the Federal Government for the proper inspection and disposition of
aliens, including office space and such temporary detention quarters as may be found necessary. The
designation of an airport as an international airport for the entry of aliens may be withdrawn whenever, in the
judgment of the Commissioner, there appears just cause for such action.
3.
Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

Section 235(a)(3) of the INA states that [a]ll aliens (including alien crewmen) who are applicants for admission
or otherwise seeking admission or readmission to or transit through the United States shall be inspected by
immigration officers.
4.
Section 271 of the Immigration and Nationality Act

Section 271(a) of the INA states [i]t shall be the duty of every person, including the owners, masters, officers,
and agents of vessels, aircraft, transportation lines, or international bridges or toll roadsto prevent the landing
of such alien in the United States at a port of entry other than as designated by the Attorney General or at any
time or place other than as designated by the immigration officers. Any such person, owner, master, officer, or
agent who fails to comply with the foregoing requirements shall be liable to a penalty to be imposed by the
Attorney General of $3,000 for each such violation, [and] (b) [p]roof that the alien failed to present himself
at the time and place designated by the immigration officers shall be prima facie evidence that such alien has
landed in the United States at a time or place other than as designated by the immigration officers.
5.
Presidential Decision Directives

The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) series is used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national
security matters. See Appendix 1 for pertinent PDDs that are applicable to the Border Integrity Antiterrorism
Programs.
a.
Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council (PDD/NSC) 29--Security Policy Coordination

(27 September 1994)
The PDD 29 directs that security policies, procedures and practices be adapted to current economic,
political and military conditions and that security policies and services realistically apply to the actual
threat.
b.
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 9, Alien Smuggling:

The PDD 9 states that [t]he U.S. government will take the necessary measures to preempt, interdict and
deter alien smuggling into the U.S. Our efforts will focus on disrupting and dismantling the criminal
networks, which traffic in illegal aliens. We will deal with the problem at its source, in transit, at our
borders and within the U.S. We will attempt to interdict and hold smuggled aliens as far as possible from
the U.S. border and to repatriate them when appropriate. We will seek tougher criminal penalties both at
home and abroad for alien smugglers. We will seek to process smuggled aliens as quickly as possible. At
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix F-3
APPENDIX F
BIBLIOGRAPHY
the same time, we will also attempt to ensure that smuggled aliens detained as a result of U.S. enforcement
actions, whether in the U.S. or abroad, are fairly assessed and/or screened by appropriate authorities to
ensure protection of bona fide refugees.
c.
Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Policy on Counter-terrorism

The PDD 39 states, in part, that [i]t is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond
vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur
domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such
terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate
means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend
and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate
such attacks.
d.
Presidential Decision Directive 62, Combating Terrorism

The PDD 62 creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century.
It reinforces the mission of the many United States agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it
also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from
apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security (and therefore border
integrity), enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of
America's economy. The directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that the threat of
terrorism in the 21st century is met with the same rigor as that of military threats in this century.
e.
Presidential Decision Directive 42, Organized Crime

The PDD 42 declared international crime a threat to the national security interest of the United States. The
President ordered the Departments of Justice (of which INS is a part), State and Treasury, the Coast Guard,
National Security Council, Intelligence Community, and other federal agencies to step-up and integrate
their efforts against international crime syndicates and money laundering.
In response to the PDD 42 a comprehensive package of legislation was formulated to substantially assist
U.S. law enforcement agencies in their efforts against drug traffickers, terrorists, and other international
crime syndicates as well as to counter money laundering. The International Crime Control Act of 1996
("ICCA") was sent to the United States Congress on September 27, 1996. The ICCA was devised to
enhance the United States ability to go after violent international criminals by vigorously investigating and
prosecuting them, taking their money, and depriving them of their ability to cross America's borders and
strike at its domestic institutions.
f.
The White House International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) dated May 12, 1998
The ICCS addresses the increasing threat by providing a framework for integrating all facets of the Federal
government response to international crime. This first-ever strategy reflects the high priority accorded
international crime by the Federal Government and builds on such existing strategies as the National Drug
Control Strategy and the Presidential Directive on alien smuggling, counter-terrorism and nuclear materials
safety and security. ICCS initiative 6 entitled Border Law Enforcement states, in part that a program shall
be developed to enhance border law enforcement through the deployment of advanced detection
technology and investment of new resources.
g.
Presidential Decision Directive 63, Protecting Americas Critical Infrastructure

PDD 63 builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection. In October 1997, the Commission issued its report calling for a national effort to assure the
security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as
telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.
PDD 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce
a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. The President's policy sets a
goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, and
significantly increased security to government systems by the year 2000.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
June 2001
Appendix F-4


Recommended Security Guidelines

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2. Government Accession No.

3. Recipients Catalog No.

Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning,

8. Performing Organization Record No.

Richard Lazarick, Robert Cammaroto

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

Federal Aviation Administration

11. Contract or Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Recommendations & Guidelines

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

Prepared in cooperation with a broad-based committee.

18. Distribution Statement

Security Design Construction Guidelines

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)

21. No. of Pages

THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Airport Consultants Council (ACC):

Airports Council International (ACI):

American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE):

THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Recommended Security Guidelines for

ADT Security Services

FAA Tech Center AAR-510

Port Authority NY & NJ

Recommended Security Guidelines for

PART II - INITIAL PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

PART III - RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

6) Tenant Security Program Area ................................................................................................................11

Recommended Security Guidelines for

3) Catering Personnel Badging ....................................................................................................................27

Section B - Airside ................................................................................................................... 30

Section D - Terminal ............................................................................................................... 37

2) Operational Types ...................................................................................................................................42

Recommended Security Guidelines for

g. SSCP Calculations .......................................................................................................................................59

h. Family Assistance Center ............................................................................................................................87

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Section E - Architecture ........................................................................................................ 109

Section G - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Systems .................................................... 115

Section H - Power, Communications & Cabling Infrastructure....................................... 117

Recommended Security Guidelines for

THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Protect vulnerable areas & assets

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Section F - Changing Security Concerns and Contingency Measures

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Consult with Experts in Aviation

Section B - Facility Protection

Interior Controls Second Line

Section C - Planning Facility Protection

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Recommended Security Guidelines for

Vulnerable Areas (General)

Recommended Security Guidelines for