DAY SIX

2. CAUSATION
General rule: if the negligence of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury/ damage to property, then plaintiff may claim
damages.
Exception: If the negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause
of the injury or damage, the plaintiff is wholly responsible for the
same and he cannot recover damages.

2.1 Definition of Proximate Cause

VDA DE BATACLAN VS MEDINA
On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a
certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite,
on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur,
ConradoSaylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including
the driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan
Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara,
sated to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from
the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called Visaya,
apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the
driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind
the four last mentioned. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning,
while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it
fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best
way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the
three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara
and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans
and moans from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from
Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the bus.
There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the
passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and
the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or

shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four
passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the
body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for
help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers
inside the bus were removed and duly identified that of Juan
Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in
her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the
present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of
P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City
for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in
the claim in the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al
was their burning by reason of the torches which ignited the
gasoline.
Held: No.
In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same,
we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back,the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to
the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had

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DAY SIX
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area
where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the
bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor
were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this
aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a
large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and
yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
Proximate cause- that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

Petitioners: PHOENIX Construction Inc., and Armando U. CARBONEL

Respondents: The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Leonardo
DIONISIO
On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about 1:30AM,
respondent Dionisio, a marketing man, was driving home from a
dinner meeting where he had a shot or two of liquor. He had just
crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights
(in his allegation) suddenly failed. and while driving down the
street, his headlights were turned off. When he switched on his
headlights to bright, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2
meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that
he did not a curfew pass that night.

The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked

there by the company driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked
on the right hand side of the lane that Dionisio was driving on, but
it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It was parked askew so it
was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were
there any early warning reflector devices set anywhere near the
truck, front or rear. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the
truck, which was scheduled to be used the nextmorning.4.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC

Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by

swerving to the left, but it was toolate. His car smashed into the
truck. Dionisio suffered physical injuries, including permanent
facial scars, a nervous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.

FACTS:

HELD
CFI:

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DAY SIX

An action for damages was commenced by Dionisio in the

CFI, claiming that the legal andproximate cause of his
injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had
parked thedump truck entrusted to him by his employer
Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause
of Dionisios injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor,without his headlights
on, and without a curfew pass.
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against
Phoenix and Carbonel.

IAC:
Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFIs decision.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON Dionisios negligence was an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained
DECISION:
NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence
was not an intervening,
efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and
of Dionisios injuries was the
negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the
dump truck. Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages
must be mitigated because of Dionisios contributory negligence.
Decision modified whereby Dionisio will shoulder 20% of awarded
damages.

HELD:[Resolution of factual issues]

The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a
curfew pass. Since he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying
home, driving at a fast speed in order to avoid the police. Worse,
he turned off his headlights as he was driving down that street in
order to escape notice from the nearby police station. However,
the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did
not show that he was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to
constitute an act of reckless imprudence. Taken all together,
however, the Court drew the conclusion that Dionisio was negligent
on the night of the accident.[Note: During the period of Martial
Law, no person was allowed to be outside his home during curfew
hours, unless he has a curfew pass.]
Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them
Petitioners urge that the Carbonels negligence was merelt a
passive and static condition and that Dionisios negligence was
an efficient intervening cause, and that consequently Dionisios
negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of
the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
However, the distinctions between cause and condition have
been almost entirely discredited.
The Court quotes significantly from
Prosser and Keeton
. The following parts were quoted with emphasis:
Cause and condition So far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary
antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case,
the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone
before Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
condition remains static will not necessarily affect liability
Cause andcondition

Page 3 of 18

DAY SIX
still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is
now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all,
it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation
by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it
is not the distinction between cause and condition which is
important, but the nature of the risk and the ch aracter of the
intervening cause.

Dionisios negligence is not an efficient intervening cause

Carbonels negligence is far from being a passive and static
condition it was an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision would not have happened had the truck not been parked
askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down the street and for having so
created this risk, Carbonel must be held responsible. Carbonel
owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly situated not
to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created.
Dionisios negligence was not of an independent and overpowering
nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between
the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the
juris vinculum of liability.The Court quoted parts of
Prosser and Keeton
. With emphasis were the following: Foresseable Intervening
Causes. If the intervening cause is one which is ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other
reasons, because of failure to guard

defendants conduct to produce result, and the defendants

negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the
fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to
which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to
pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within th e scope of the
original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence.
Thus it has been held that one who leaves an obstruction on the
road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will
run into it.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of
the foreseeable negligence of others. Xxx The standard of
reasonable conduct may require the defendant to protect the
plaintiff against that occasional negligence which is one of the
ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated
One who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently
drives into it

Dionisio had contributory negligence

The court held that Dionisios negligence was only contributory,
that the immediate and proximate cause of the injury remained
Carbonels lack of due care and that consequently Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation
by the court.
Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 2080 ratio should be followed, where20% shall be borne by Dionisio,
while 80% shall be borne by petitioners.
Last Clear Chance cannot apply

against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that

reason There is an intervening cause combining with the

Page 4 of 18

DAY SIX
Petitioners ask the application of the last clear chance doctrine.
It cannot apply.

Phoenix is presumed negligent for

employees properly and adequately

The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported
into our jurisdiction by

Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence

on the part of his employer Phoenix

Picart vs. Smith

in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was

not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in
which the dump truck if parked when away from company
premises. It is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the
part of Phoenix. Decision modified as to the allocation of award of
damages.

but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found

its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function
was to mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or
rule contributory negligence. The common law notion of last
clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who
had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly,
it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery
by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article
2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The Court believes that there is no general concept of last clear

chance that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical
terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiffs or the
defendants was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or
physics. Chronology of plaintiffs and defendants negligent acts or
omissions is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into
account.

Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent

act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community.

failing

to supervise

its

BELARMINO VS EEC
FERNANDO VS CA
FACTS: November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the
Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of
Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the
septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won.
November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.
o The bodies were removed by a fireman.
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he
expired there.

The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they
entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master.
o Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty,
they were presumed to be the ones who did the reemptying.

Page 5 of 18

DAY SIX
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died
from "asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body
and intake of toxic gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and
the needy, the ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the
proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages
HELD: NO. CA affirmed.
Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case:
o Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence
Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position
of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to
another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences
o The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience and in
view of the facts involved in the particular case
o Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring
of the suggestion born of this provision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist

Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

o
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
o Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event
should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in
Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning
signs for the protection of the public
o While the construction of these public facilities
demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary
requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of
those requirements
Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely
to happen unless one removes its covers
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily
prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant
risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an
old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to
take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate
cause of the accident.
Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was
due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot
demand damages from the public respondent.

RAMOS VS C.O.L REALTY

Facts:

Collision incident, parties are: Toyota Altis sedan owned by

COL Realty, driven by Larin, with passenger Estela; and
Ford Expedition, owned by Ramos, driven by Rodel.

Page 6 of 18

DAY SIX

Collision occurred along Katipunan and R. Matanda St., see

image:

MeTC

dismissed

the

case.

RTC

affirmed

the

dismissal.

CA modified holding that while the Altis negligent

for

crossing

Katipunan

despite

the

concrete

barriers, relying on the certification of MMDA that

such act is prohibited due to the ongoing road
construction in the area and that the Altis still
crossed Katipunan through the broken cracks in the
barricade, it held that the Ford Expedition was
contributorily negligent for driving the car at a
high speed (given that the Altis rotated 180
degrees upon being hit) through a busy intersection
despite the ongoing road construction.

Hence the appeal.

The Altis, driving at 5-10kph, was trying to cross Katipunan

Ave. from R. Matanda from the left (going to Blue Ridge),

ISSUE:

and has already crossed the center lane of Katipunan,

Whether or not the Ford Expeditions speed in driving along

when the Ford Expedition (heading North) hit the rear right

Katipunan despite the ongoing construction makes it liable

door of the Altis, sending it turning 180 degrees towards

the direction it came from.

Estela suffered injuries. COL Realty demanded payment for

repairs of the Altis and costs of the medical service to
Estela. Ramos refused.

COL Realty filed suit against Ramos in the MeTC QC for

damages under quasi-delict.

Ramos denied liability, arguing that the Altis was in

the wrong for crossing Katipunan despite the
concrete barriers installed thereon to prevent cars
from crossing it. Ramos further argued he wasnt in
the car when the accident happened, and has
exercised

due

diligence

supervision of Rodel.

in the

selection

RULING:
NO. The Altiss violation in crossing Katipunan despite the barrier is
the proximate cause of the collision.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by

the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent,
the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that
the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury
of which complaint is made.

and
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case,

Page 7 of 18

DAY SIX
Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda

the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in

constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover,

Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own

it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any

negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,

recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the

he cannot recover damages.

accident.
Thus it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and

contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat

continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,

Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate

produces the injury, and without which the result would not have

cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has

occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is

relevance only in the event that Ramos (the Expedition

that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by

owner)

setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and

damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will

continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection

have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his

with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain

favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in

immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of

this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate

the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the

respondents

person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary

proximate result of the accident.

seeks

to

liability

recover

for

from

Aquilinos

respondent

negligence

whatever

which

is

the

prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect

at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

If

Aquilino

heeded

the

MMDA

prohibition

against

crossing

Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not

have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the
MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to
expect that the accident would be a natural and probable
result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing
is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of
the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for

PHIL NATIONAL RAILWAYS VS VIZCARRA

FACTS: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express
train of defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from
San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus
of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Hagonoy, Bulacan,
from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio
Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of
August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express
train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers,
eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered
physical injuries.
Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive
engineer, HonorioCirbado, in operating its passenger train in a
busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights,

Page 8 of 18

DAY SIX
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for
Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their Answer
traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as
affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus
driver, Romeo Hughes.
ISSUES:
Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit
Incorporated and HonorioCabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine
National Railways was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles, or whether or both were negligent? Could either of the
companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine National
Railways be held accountable for the collision because of
negligence?
HELD:
It was established that the weather condition was characterized
with intermittent rain which should have prompted the train
engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also, the train reached
Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating
that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30
kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30
kilometers per hour when it was approaching the intersection, it
would probably not have travelled 190 meters more from the place
of the accident.
All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete
and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer was negligent
who, moreover, despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-avisthe weather condition including the presence of people near the
intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he
slackened his speed and applied the brakes. These considerations
were addressed to the trial judge was in a better position to assign
weight on factual questions. Having resolved the question of
negligence between the train engineer and the bus driver after
collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter
thus commands great respect especially so in this case where

respondent court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the

court of origin.

DRA LEILA DELA LLANA VS BIONG

FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan delaLlana was driving and his sister, Dra.
delaLlana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Cal
imlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the car across the
Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal lightturned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed the cars rear
end,violently pushing the car forward.Dra. DelaLlana suffered
minor wounds. The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000
identified the truck driver as Joel Primero who is an employee of
respondent Rebecca Biong. In the first week of May 2000,
Dra.delaLlana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of
hernneck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as dayspassed by.
Her injury became more severe. On June 9, 2000, she to suffer
from
a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve
running to her left arm and is required to undergo serious
medication to alleviate her condition. Thus she demanded from Biong
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This made her
sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. delaLlana but was reversed by the
CA.

ISSUE:
Whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llanas
whiplash injury

HELD:

Page 9 of 18

DAY SIX
Dra. delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of
evidence
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or
omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some
person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict
case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized
society imposes upon its members, or which arise from noncontractual relations of certain members of society to others. 29
Based on these requisites, Dra. delaLlana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless
driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise. 30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are
established, this Court can then proceed with the application and
the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.31

Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth
paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employees
act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held
liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is
essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible
evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence. 35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation
between Joels negligence and Dra.delaLlanas whiplash injury
rests on Dra. delaLlana. She must establish by preponderance of
evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced
her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would
not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra.delaLlana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of
evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and the whiplash injury. In other words,

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DAY SIX
Dra. delaLlana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or
the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the
ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below
ndeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court shows that Dra. DelaLlana did not present
any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly
shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident
and Dra. DelaLlanas injury. Her claim that Joels negligence
causes her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in
this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public
knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices
and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
basis of the parties pieces of evidence and their corresponding
legal arguments.

UMALI VS BACANI
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana
plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric
Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live
electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the
electric post and the other fell to the ground. The following
morning,
barrio
captain
Bueno
of
San
Pedro
saw
CiprianoBaldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but
the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he
was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a
small boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P.
Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went
to the place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with
it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.

In sum, Dra.delaLlana miserably failed to establish her cause by

preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our
solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of
the case binds us to rule against Dra. delaLlanas favor. Her claim,
unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on.

Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of

quasi-delict or tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric
Plant because the proximate cause of the boy's death electrocution
could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a
fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall
and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on
the part of his employee CiprianoBaldomero who tried to have the
line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of the
child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.

2.2 Tests of Proximate Cause

Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to
a fortuitous event- storm; (2) WON boys parents negligence
exempts petitioner from liability.

2.2.1 Cause in fact

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

2.2.2 Effectiveness of the cause (sine qua non) but for

rule
2.2.3 Substantial factor test
2.2.4 Foreseeability Test

(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a

series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the
AEP resulted in the death of the victim by electrocution. First, by
the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana
plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground

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DAY SIX
which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the
electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees
of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have
easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the
electric line would be endangered by banana plants being
blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to
eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second,
even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm of May14,
1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming
a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act
they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see
if they had been cut. Third, employee CiprianoBaldomero was
negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he
was already madeaware of the live cut wire, he did not
have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger
to life and property, and that he should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the
live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what
was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line,
obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could
endanger life and property.

(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff

(parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants' (petitioners) lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's
liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well
defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the

service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile

occasion of their functions.
2.2.5 Natural and probable consequence test
2.2.6 Ordinary and natural or direct consequence test

2.3 INTERVENING CAUSE

RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO.
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work, transporting iron rails
from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon
in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this
work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay
upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side
pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to
the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the
car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were
also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the
water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted
or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg,
which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to
what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it.
In two particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued
his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the
car instead of along the boards, either before or behind it.

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DAY SIX
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work
after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the
severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear
that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers
of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a
general prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against
walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load.
On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience
of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary
cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident,
and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing under review was the displacement of the
crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event
giving occasion for damages that is, the sinking of the track and
the sliding of the iron rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. In order to enforce the liability
of an employer for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that
a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. The responsibility of
an employer to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine
known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellowservant of the employee injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.

TAYLOR VS MANILA ELCTRIC CO.

FACTS: Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he
received the injuries that gave rise to this complaint. On
September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12
years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant to
visit one Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on
inquiry, the boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and
reached the place where the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30 fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for explosion
of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The boys
picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they
met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to Manuels house
and performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and
found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied it on
the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The
substance exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck, burns on
Manuel, and loss of Davids eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company
for damages.
Issue: Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the
children to be exposed to the harmful substances
Held:
Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by
the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the
absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery
of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the
inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the
caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the
fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were
found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in
an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not
have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled
around thereon without the express permission of the defendant,

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DAY SIX
and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the
defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses.
Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth,
boys here will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to
congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything
which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will
draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet
draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic
influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner
knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for
pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly."
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's
property without defendant's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries
incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such
injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are
of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable
to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we
are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating
cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible
for the injuries thus incurred.
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the
general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of

another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the
rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only,
and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of
the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which
he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation.
His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed
by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final
success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a
match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what
he was about.
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient
capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which
he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the
cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his
experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the
necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would
have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act;
and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the
direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so
that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was
the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted
the injury

TEAGUE VS FERNANDEZ
Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes

Page 14 of 18

DAY SIX
FACTS: The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the
Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the
corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was
owned and operated by Teague. The said second floor was
unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and
although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it
had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fireescape ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was
indicated on the wall.
October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for
surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute
(across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted Fire! Fire! and thereafter, a panic
ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to
calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The
panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the
exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing
and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes
Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and
several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceaseds
five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute.
CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was
however, reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was
negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based
primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi
building. The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in the
fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one
stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters

each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had
a second stairway under construction.
The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire
at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of Fire!, Fire!; (4) panic in the
Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus
projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since
there intervened a number of independent causes which produced
the injury complained of. According to the petitioner the events of
fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence
HELD:
It is true that the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the
building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway available.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance
is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in
the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the
statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. To consider the
violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does
not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the
proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance

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intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways
instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such
violation.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

MCKEE VS IAC
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an International
cargo truck, Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by
Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh along
MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,
Pampanga. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh
McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother
of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc,
on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old
Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida
Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car while
Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded
with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos,
was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the
other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted
from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The
boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so,

his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of
the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977
before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga. While an
Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court.
CFI rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the
aforesaid criminal case finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property. Upon the other hand, the two (2) civil cases
were dismisse and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
CA reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering
defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants damages. The
decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings
that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence
which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that
the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants
(private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and
supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these
defendants did not allege in their Answers the defense of having
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising the said employee.
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the
facts was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of
which the respondent Court, reconsidered and set aside its earlier
decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's judgment. A motion to
reconsider this Resolution was denied by the respondent
Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the findings of respondent court is supported by
evience

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DAY SIX
RULING:
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid
running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where
they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several
meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of
the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what
is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence."
Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane
of the car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible
in the given situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above
test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it
cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
collision. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having
a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have

reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default

that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent,
was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the
same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of
the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The
entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted
in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given
by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go
back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to
the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary
measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued
at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence
becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50
meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck,
2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck
could pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to
spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk which could
have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man
finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the
car instead of meeting it head-on.
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself
said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour
along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a
bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the
Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We
cannot give credence to private respondents' claim that there was
an error in the translation by the investigating officer of the truck
driver's response in Pampango as to whether the speed cited was
in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes that
official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof
to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private
respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture.

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Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence
in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care
necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of
the resulting accident.
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear
chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the
party injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown
that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof. 56

SC RULING: In the light of recent decisions of this Court, the

indemnity for death must, however, be increased from P12,000.00
to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE
while its Decision of 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos.
69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00
each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now

rule, that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert
ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the
proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver,
the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of
their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees. 60The answers of the
private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not
interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29
November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which
dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution
of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual moorings.

Page 18 of 18