De Ocampo vs Florenciano

DOCTRINE: Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the
Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where
there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be
granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo (Petitioner) and Serafina Florenciano (Respondent) got married on April 5, 1938 and as a result of
such union, they begot several children. Sometime in March 1951, Ocampo discovered that his wife was maintaining
illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. He sent his wife to Manila to study beauty culture. Again, Ocampo discovered that
aside from Jose Arcalas, Serafina was going out with several other men. Serafina left Ocampo after she finished her
study and since then the two lived separately.
After Ocampo caught his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelsom Orzame on June 18, 1955, he signified
his intention of filing a petition for legal separation. Serafina conformed to his intention provided that she will not be
charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation but the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it holding there
was confession of judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription which was AFFIRMED by the
Court of Appeals.
CAs decision:
With regard to the defendants adultery with Jose Arcalas, the husbands right to legal separation had prescribed
because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff discovered her infidelity
(art.102,NCC).
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, after discovery of such, the husband expressed his wish to file a petition for
legal separation which the defendant had readily agreed to. Before the fiscal, the defendant even reiterated her
conformity to the legal separation and admitted having sexual relations with Nelson Orzame. The Appellate Court had
interpreted such facts as a confession of judgment under Art.101 and thus, legal separation could not be decreed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a decree for legal separation should be granted

HELD:

Yes. As the Court understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the
defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession
of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or
files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiffs demand.
Supposing the statement of defendant constitutes a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the
adultery independent of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her
confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendants confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the
separation will immediately confess judgment for the purpose of preventing it.
The fact that the defendant like also to be legally separated from her husband, is not an obstacle to the successful
prosecution of the action. When the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the
commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. However, the Court of Appeals did not
find collusion.
There would be collusion if the parties had arranged by making it appear that a matrimonial offense had been
committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence of
grounds therefor.
According to the evidence presented in the instant case, the offense of adultery had really took place. The defendant
could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her
husband request the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In connection to this, collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense
and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it (Williams vs. Williams, Rosenweig vs.

Rosenweig). And proof that defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, it not by itself collusion (Pohlman vs.
Pohlman).
The plaintiffs failure to actively search for the defendant and take her home (after the latter left him in 1952) does
not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It was not his duty to search for her to
bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husbands petition, the Supreme Court hereby REVERSED the decision being
appealed and decree a legal separation between the spouses. Cost against Serafina Florenciano.

Cotoner vs Revilla
DOCTRINE
FACTS
ISSUE
HELD

Laperal vs Katigbak
DOCTRINE: All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive
but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the
case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of
substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the
singular source of income.

FACTS:

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as

separate or paraphernal property of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak.
The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that
its improvements and income are conjugal assets of the
Spouses Katigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them
brought properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation
rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in
question was registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak
married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that her
mother was the one who bought the property for her and had
placed it only in her name as the practice of her mother in
buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her
children. The husband having no interest with the property
only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his wife.
In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by
the trial court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and

jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such

amount. A month after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed
a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of
property and separate administration which was granted by the
court and was sought for annulment by the Laperals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.
HELD:
YES. All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not
conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively
to the husband and wife. In the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the
wife. At the time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as admitted,
the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy considering the singular source of
income.

Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a

paraphernal property of the wife.
Ching vs CA
DOCTRINE: The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the
petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired
the stocks with his exclusive money.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the
petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for
and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit
of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private
respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said
Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of
Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia
that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and
her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver
that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks
under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered
only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.

According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the
pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or business.
ISSUE: Whether or not 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the
loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
HELD:
NO. The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitionerhusband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of
the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the
said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where
she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of
the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and
the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from
the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

Aguete vs PNB
DOCTRINE: It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract.

From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan
facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in
the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.

FACTS:

Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the
Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB,
Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte.
The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000
from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as
security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the
lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no
knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the
mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul
the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property
(after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners
but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
YES. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare
the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife
did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract.
From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit
from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal

partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
DIO vs DIO
DOCTRINE:
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.

FACTS:
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner
filed an action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing
psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent
failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had
abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping
sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times
become violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their marriage void ab
initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only
be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later
altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued
after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD:
YES. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article
148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be
present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of
the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and 45 are governed by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a
need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of
annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and

respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under
Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be made by agreement between
the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

MODEQUILLO vs BREVA

DOCTRINE: All existing family residences at the time of the effectivity

of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under
the Family Code
FACTS:

ThesheriffleviedonaparcelofresidentiallandlocatedatPoblacionMalalag,
DavaodelSuronJuly1988,registeredinthenameofJoseMondequilloanda
parcelofagriculturallandlocatedatDalagbongBulacan,Malalag,Davaode
Suralsoregisteredinthelattersname. Amotiontoquashwasfiledbythe
petitionerallegingthattheresidentiallandiswherethefamilyhomeisbuilt
since1969priorthecommencementofthiscaseandassuchisexemptfrom
execution,forcedsaleorattachmentunderArticle152and153exceptfor
liabilitiesmentionedinArticle155thereof,andthatthejudgmentsoughttobe
enforcedagainstthefamilyhomeisnotoneofthoseenumerated. Withregard
totheagriculturalland,itisallegedthatitisstillpartofthepubliclandandthe
transferinhisfavorbytheoriginalpossessorandapplicantwhowasamember
ofaculturalminority. Theresidentialhouseinthepresentcasebecamea
familyhomebyoperationoflawunderArticle153.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
NO. The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family
home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in
1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it
provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not
mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that
all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said
article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and
are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home

under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the
judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This
does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

Astotheagriculturalland,trialcourtcorrectlyruledthatthelevytobemade
shallbeonwhateverrightsthepetitionermayhaveontheland. Petitionwas
dismissed.
LUCASvsLUCAS
DOCTRINE:Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test.

FACTS:

Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and
attached several copies of his personal documents.
Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the petition,
he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then filed a
Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the petition
was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him as
respondent.
Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed a
Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be
sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.
After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing
to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case
and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own which
the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling
on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects
of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should
not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing order.

HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these socalled procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation
has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for
the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e.,
the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible
sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as
evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that
the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides
for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample
exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good
reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA
testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any,
which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a
prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.

Court order
Constitution.

for

blood

testing

equivalent

to

search

under

the

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a
paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must
be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required,
but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing
in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the
court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the
court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing
on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

ABADILLA vs TABILIRAN
DOCTRINE: Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated.
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge Tabiliran on
the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and corruption unbecoming of
a judge. With respect to the charge on gross immorality, she contended that the
judge scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during
subsistence of his marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Tabiliran and Priscilla got
married in May 1986. On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful
conduct, petitioner claims that the judge caused his 3 illegitimate children with
Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate affidavits
stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or

oversight when in fact, he knew these children cannot be legally registered as

legitimate. The judge averred that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of her wife in 1966 when he married Priscilla hence the
cohabitation was neither bigamous nor immoral. However, as early as 1970,
based on the record, Priscilla had begotten her 3 children (1970, 1971 and 1975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 children can be considered legitimate.
HELD:
NO. The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between Tabiliran and Teresita. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other, are natural.

UnderArticle177oftheFamilyCode,onlychildrenconceivedandborn
outsideofwedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionoftheformer,
werenotdisqualifiedbyanyimpedimenttomarryeachothermaybe
legitimated. Reasonsforthislimitation:
1)Therationaleoflegitimationwouldbedestroyed;
2)Itwouldbeunfairtothelegitimatechildrenintermsofsuccessionalrights;
3)Therewillbetheproblemofpublicscandal,unlesssocialmoreschange;
4)Itistooviolenttogranttheprivilegeoflegitimationtoadulterouschildrenas
itwilldestroythesanctityofmarriage;
5)Itwillbeveryscandalous,especiallyiftheparentsmarrymanyyearsafter
thebirthofthechild.

CALDERON vs ROXAS
DOCTRINE: Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during
the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of
the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because
they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action,
and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon
the result of the main action.20 The subject orders on the matter of support
pendente lite are but an incident to the main action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon and private respondent Jose Antonio F.

Roxas, were married on December 4, 1985 and their union produced four children. On
January 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The trial court issued an Order granting petitioners application for support
pendente lite. respondent filed a Motion to Reduce Support. The trial court rendered its
Decision declaring null and void the marriage, awarding the custody of the parties
minor children to their mother, ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxas to provide
support to the children, and dissolving the community property or conjugal partnership
property of the parties. Petitioner through counsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the
Orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was a proper petition to assail the order of
support pendent lite

HELD:
The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendente lite and support
in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on
the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage, and are therefore interlocutory.
They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of
the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other
incidents as child custody, support and conjugal assets.
The Rules of Court provide for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite
which may be availed of at the commencement of the proper action or proceeding, or
at any time prior to the judgment or final order. On March 4, 2003, this Court
promulgated the Rule on Provisional Orders which shall govern the issuance of
provisional orders during the pendency of cases for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, annulment of voidable marriage and legal separation. These include orders
for spousal support, child support, child custody, visitation rights, hold departure,
protection and administration of common property.
Petitioner contends that the CA failed to recognize that the interlocutory aspect
of the assailed orders pertains only to private respondents motion to reduce support
which was granted, and to her own motion to increase support, which was denied.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available during the pendency of
the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights
and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action, and they are ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. The
subject orders on the matter of support pendente lite are but an incident to the main
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

GRANDE vs ANTONIO
DOCTRINE: Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by
law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that
time already married to someone else.Out of this illicit relationship, two sons
were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the
children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change
of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to
cause the entry of the name of Antonio as the father of the aforementioned
minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the
correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental
authority over the minors; granting the primary right and immediate custody over
the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion
was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the
part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Offices of the Civil
Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering Antonio to deliver the
custody to their mother; Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes
consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken
in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion
for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it
decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her motion was
denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD:

The petition is partially granted

CIVIL LAW Filation
Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this
modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing
successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which
now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his
or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to
Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary public
under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of

parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his

children's surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use
the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent)
or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no
legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where
there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word
"may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children.