PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (FINALS)

1. J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing

GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983
Facts : Petitioner, retired Justice JB .L Reyes filed a petition to respondent, Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, the city mayor of manila that on
behalf of anti-bases coalition sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on october 26, 1983 from
2.00 to 5.00 in the afternoon, starting from the luneta, a public park, to the gates of united states embassy, hardly two blocks away.
Once there, and in an open space of the public property, a short program would be held.
On october 20, 1983 the petitioner filed a suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
because due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the
organization to hold a rally. On october 25, 1983, the answer of respondent mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general
eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october 19, suc permit was denied.
Issues :
1. Whether or not holding a rally in front of the US embassy would be applicable or a violation of Ordinance no.7295 of the city of
manila.
2. Whether or not the denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly was justified by clear
and present danger.
Ruling : The petition was granted. The Supreme Court granted the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally. The
court found that there was no clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest that would justify the
denial of the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably assembly.
Our country is signatory of the Vienna Convention. It is binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its Article 22 that the receiving
state is under a special duty to take appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for
the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.
2. Taada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization for being violative of
provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes legislative and
judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored nation and national treatment, require that nationals and other
member countries are placed in the same footing in terms of products and services. However, the Court brushed off these
contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be
read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing provisions
in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesnt rule out foreign competition.
States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.
Facts:

This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade Organization, particularly when
President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the
establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), International
Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the
Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to
promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!

In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. It becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute
Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce XII of the 1987
Constitution? NO!
Petitioners Contentions:

Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism are violated by the
so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in parts of WTO Agreement
o
This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related investment measures), TRIPS
(Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o
shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital
is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.

Ruling:

These provisions are not self-executing

o
Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Sec. 1
and 13:
o
A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o
A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o
An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the
WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o
Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO,
decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o
Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing 24% in 10 years
o
Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing countries at 13% in 10
years
o
Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10 years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o
Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only
perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion

Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress? NO!

A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject
to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations & limitations imposed by treaty
stipulations.

3. Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC

(G.R. No. 113191) 18 September 1996;
Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two summonses
were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except
for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government
Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and,
in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred
the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable
decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary
party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case
Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the
specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Banks
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by
the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. "One of
the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and
processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an
organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in
their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction
would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver
of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. There are two conflicting concepts of
sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,

without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private
act or acts jure gestionis.
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only
be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by
its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over
which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic
immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct
of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help
keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded,
the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded.
In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and authority to
so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court,
it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international organization
sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the
Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the
courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just
sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued
because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo
City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and
memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to
intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of
sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their
private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their
own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."
4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under special circumstances, so allowed and
entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the
order or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case. When an
adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.
(DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)
4. LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to
the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that
the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not
only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the acts must be done in official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered

by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely a statutory
right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
5.Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia
G.R. No. 153675
FACTS: Juan Antonio Muoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the offense of accepting an advantage as agent
in violation of Section 9 (1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hongkong. He was also charged with seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hongkong. Warrants of arrest were issued against
him. The DOJ received a request from the Hongkong Department of Justice for the provisional arrest of Muoz. The NBI later on
arrested him on the basis of a warrant issued by the RTC, Manila. The order was declared void by the CA, but its validity was
sustained by the SC. In the meantime, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC a petition for his extradition. He
applied for bail which was initially denied but which was reconsidered later, granting the petition for bail. There was a motion to
vacate the order but it was denied, hence, a special civil action for certiorari was filed alleging that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, Muoz maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
ISSUE: Is a prospective extraditee entitled to bail? Explain.
HELD: Yes, in view of recent developments, in international law. The following trends in international law cannot be ignored, such as:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20 thcentury, has gradually attained
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding
duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of the Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of
human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded
towards the second half of the past century.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, Philippine authorities
are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (Govt. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v.
Hon. Felixberto Olalia, et al., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance
to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty, and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While
not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members
of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951) the Court, in granting bail to a
prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the
land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the
Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty,
and due process.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that the Court has
an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and
Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, it was held that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is available only in criminal proceedings, thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion
or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. In cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in
extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. (Govt. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region,
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, Gutierrez, J).

6. G.R. No. L-35645

May 22, 1985

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC.,
respondents.
FACTS:

Sometime in May 1972, the United States organized an auction by invitation for the repair of its equipment and facilities in at
the US Naval Station Subic Bay in Zambales, which was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the US.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received
from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company;
the company, thereby, complied.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director for Contracts Division of the
Navy Department of US, saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance on a repair contract and that the projects had been awarded to third parties.

The company sued the US and its officers in the US Navy who were responsible for rejecting their services to order the
defendants in allowing the company to perform the work for the projects, and in the event that specific performance was no
longer possible, to order the defendants to pay the damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign
sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint.

Subsequently a motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by the defendants, who included an opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ.

The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
Issue

Held

W/N US is suable? NO.

o
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person,
the state can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be
implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the
United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
W/N the trial court has jurisdiction over the case? NO.
o
The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal
nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the
United States of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises
on the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments
shall have been vacated. The Court decided that the US Government has not, given its consent to the filing of this
suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit
against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign
government without said government's consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of
his country.
o
In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the US
was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure
imperii and not for jure gestionis.

The petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed, costs against the
private respondent.
7. THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines
by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine
Realty Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his
rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot
5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign
immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its]
sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition,
petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal
Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador,
the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state,
but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken
for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said
transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal
of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the
Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to
acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is
recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.
Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still
occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and
Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first
task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall
first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young,
Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,
919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
8. USA and Bradford v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes and Montoya
[219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
G.R. No. 79253
Facts: Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy
Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also
worked at NEX JUSMAG as an activity manager. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoyas person
and belongings searched in front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.
Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:

1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for
the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and
2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s)
done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947
and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.
Montoya argued that:
(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had
committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her
authority; (b) having exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her
liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had
committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had
acted within or outside the scope of her authority.
The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.
Doctrine of State Immunity:
The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of
the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2.
This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our
resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed
to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the
rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc.,
et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or
under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United
States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal
capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.
Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held that:
. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had
to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff
or petitioner. . . . .
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of

law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. [footnotes
omitted]
In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the scope and beyond her place of official
functions. Thus she may not avail of immunity.
She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits
of exceptions. It reads:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its
civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions (Emphasis supplied).
Disposition:
Petition was dismissed.
9. Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's
class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to
the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it
the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of
discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court.
It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.
10. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
11. MMDA vs Concened Residents of Manila Bay
December 18, 2008; G.R. Nos. 171947-48 (Mickey)

Facts:
1.

January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (with Atty. Oposa as their lawyer) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manila Bay.

2.

The complaint alleges that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.

3.

That the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of:
(1)

Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2)

The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3)

The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4)

The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5)

The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6)

The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7)

The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8)

Executive Order No. 192;

(9)

The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10)

4.

Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11)

The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12)

International Law

It was shown by the respondents that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
(MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational
activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.

5.

The RTC held the petitioners and other agencies jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB
classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. And within 6 months have a concerted, consolidated
and coordinated plan for the cleanup of the bay.
The various agencies have been instructed to perform their duties including defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures
and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate
in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.

6.

The petitioners appealed to the CA contending: 1. arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate
only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general and 2. that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.

7.

CA affirmed in toto the trial courts decision as it did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing
laws.

Issue:
I.
II.

Is the cleaning and/or restoration of Manila Bay a ministerial act of the petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus?
Does sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 pertain only to specific cleaning of pollution and not cleaning in general?
*Note: It is the MMDA and DPWH together with the LGUs that are the primary agencies tasked to remove and demolish the nuisance structures
and obstructions along the bay

Held:
I.

Yes, It is a ministerial act.

a.

A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a
simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.

b.

The court said that the obligation to perform their ( based on MMDAs argument) duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are
to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts.

c.

The MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. This is provided in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924
creating the MMDA.

d.

A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform . Any
suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of
legal basis.
e.

The following agencies are therefore precluded from choosing not to perform these duties DENR, MWSS, LWUA, DA, DPWH, PCG,
DILG, PPA, DOH, DepEd, DBM and MMDA.

f.

Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or
entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds.
i.

The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila.

g.

Furthermore it is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy
of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and
marine waters.

h.

Lastly the court said that said: All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that
their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

II.

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General

a.

The Court finds for the respondents and their emphasis that Sec. 62(g) of RA 9275(Clean Water Act), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
i.

Also Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated
to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.

ii.

In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

iii.

The Court quoting the CA decision: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and
management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution
incidents.

b.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of
the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.

c.

It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on
continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus, the
Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not
be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

d.

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks
along drainage ways of the river system.
i.

If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized
structures would be on top of the list.

e.

Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other
waterways.

f.

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of
the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. They should have their waste treatment facilities or otherwise should
be forced to transfer or shutdown.

g.

The court then cites the ADB commissioned study on the garbage problem of Metro Manila in The Garbage Book which emphasizes
on the alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
i.

The Court then calls for sufficient sanitary landfills now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the
MMDA.

h.

The Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and
discharge their respective official duties and obligations.

i.

Finally they reiterate what has been said in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill

of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.