Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Actor Network Theory. Emerged in late 70s and 80s in France. Developed
by social scientists studying scientific research. Associated particularly
with Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, John Law and a few others.
Interest in natural science raised questions about how both nature and
society should be described and understood by social scientists. Concern
that social science could not really talk about nature except as a social
construction and that natural scientists, who claimed to know about
nature, tended to write out the social from their own work. How could all
of these elements be described within one approach?
Also keen to pay attention to failure, which often happens in science. Both
success and failure should be studied in the same way, as emerging
through controversies. Symmetrical analysis.
ANT is not really a theory in a conventional sense of an instrument to
generate interpretation or a model of how society operates. It is more a
means of describing complex inter-relations involving humans and other
things. It is perhaps as much a methodology as a theory.
different means. It doesnt cut the lines through which whales and
humans come into contact.
Blok emphasises that the networks of humans and whales cannot be
generalised in terms of humans and animals but are about specific
animals and specific groups of humans. ANT needs to attend to these
multiplicities, both human and non-human.
The network of associations to the collective, common world. The social is
being remade to include non-humans, or non-social things. How ANT
became more overtly political.
Latours extension of ANT approaches to consider the relations between
science and politics, human and non-human. Argues that the way these
have been associated has been too hasty and that these relations need to
be reconfigured, or reassembled. A new idea of the social needs to be
developed.
Latour book called Politics of nature: how to bring the sciences into
democracy and in this he addresses the problem of political ecology. He
begins the book with the rather provocative statement:
What he means here is that a lot of what people call political ecology isnt,
to him, political ecology. The problem is that nobody is really doing what
he thinks of as political ecology and the reason for this is that people,
particular politicians and academics, still cling to the idea of a singular,
dehumanised nature and a plurality of cultural conceptions of it. Political
ecology as its conventionally styled is all about bringing nature into
politics. But for Latour, nature is the problem and real political ecology
has nothing whatever to do with nature. To find a solution to this problem,
what we first need to do, according to Latour, is to get out of the cave.
By the cave, Latour is referring to a story told by the philosopher Plato.
In this, humanity lives, metaphorically, in a cave unable to see the world
of reality, with its non-human laws, clearly. In this myth, the task of the
philosopher, and later the scientist, is to journey from the social, human
world of the cave to the reality outside. This fable thus creates a contrast
between the social world and science as forms of knowledge and order. It
is only Science that can gain knowledge of the reality of nature. But it is
also asserted that politics only operates within the human world of the
cave. So, in the Old Regime, politics and nature have been kept separate,
with only Science able to move between the two. Latour calls this the Two
House Collective or the Bicameral Collective.
So what Latour is interested in is a different way of conceiving of the
world, and thus also of politics and science: a real political ecology that
makes no reference to the myth of the cave. This is what he proposes in
the book Politics of nature. It should be pointed out that Latour is not
against science. In fact, as someone who has devoted much of his career
to studying what scientists do, he is keen to maintain science, or more
The trap set by the epistemology police consisted in denying to anyone who
challenged the radical externality of Science the right to continue to talk about
any external reality at all: those who had doubts about Science were supposed to
content themselves with the gruel of social conventions and symbolism. They
could never have gotten out of the prison of the Cave on their own (2004: 3839).
The meshwork
Ingold has turned his attention to how life (both human and non-human)
can be thought of in terms of lines. Like Latour and the ANT folks he is
interested in how lines and lives come to be associated and entangled.
What sorts of line? Ingold reminds us that lines can be of two distinct
types. First, they can be an unbroken, and perhaps wandering, trace that
flows. Second, they can be between a series of pre-existing points, rather
like dot-to-dot drawings.
Thinking of organisms as a locus of activity, or movement. Life is lived
along lines of movement. Also thinking about movement across rather
than along. Between points. Contrast between wayfaring along and
transport across. Tension of pause against completion of destination.
Organism as a haecceity (Deleuze). Bundle of lines that emerge as a
living being.
Meshwork: entanglement of lines of life. Life lived through lines of growth,
movement and perception. Lines through which relations happen not
between objects.
Problem of network as association of objects connected by lines between
them. Is this really what network means in ANT? The problem of
translation: network and netting.
The problem of agency and living things. How can a stone have the same
agency as an organism with a nervous system that is able to attend to the
world and actively respond to its own entanglement? A stone is assumed
by ANT to have agency so long as it becomes associated with the network
and can have effects within it.
Acting for Ingold emerges through living and attending, not from being
part of the associations of the network.
Discussion
How are scallops and their larvae brought into the social? What do they
help to define? How do they have effects on other networks? How do
they become dissidents?
How does ANT describe how the issue over scallops developed and why
the researchers attempts to improve the situation failed?
What do you think of Ingolds criticisms of ANT (as spider)? Are they
valid?
Are actor networks and meshworks compatible? What obstacles might
there be to bringing them together?
Does Ingold avoid the political? Why might this be?
How does Ingolds meshwork include semiotics? How are the different
lives entangling in the meshwork defined and differentiated? How does
the entangling change them?
Are approaches that try to explain human and non-human actions in the
same ways anthropomorphic? Is it a problem if they are?
Can we really use the same approaches to discuss the actions of scientists
and the organisms (scallops, microbes) they study? Do they really both
act in similar ways? How do we think about the agency or power of
each?
What are the political implications of taking such an approach?