People of the Philippines vs. M.

Mapa
G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
En Banc
Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A.
4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a
home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused
admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated
that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of
appointment. In his defense, the accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang,
stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace
officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to
illegal possession of firearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated that the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . .
. possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument
or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms,
or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons,
municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered
"when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted.
People v. Mapa
Prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition of appointed secret
agent of a public official.
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm or any instrument,
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except
when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the
law. It was decided that construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be
any clearer; there being no provision made for a secret agent.
Case Digest: People vs Nazario
Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4,
Series of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond
located at Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question
of failure to pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure
if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous
and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto
Held:
1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus
he comes with the term Manager. He was the one who spent money in developing and
maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get
any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated Beginnin
and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it cant be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of nonpayment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a
retroactive penalty
The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married
only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or
September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the
property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of
Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when
Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the
spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the

dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law
is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to
apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not
necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow,
Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

CALTEX vs. PALOMAR

FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex conducted a contest entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, wherein one had
to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will
dispense in a specific period. Its purpose was to encourage patronage for its oil products.
The contest mechanics involved no fee or consideration and no purchase of Caltex products
to be made. Instead, entry forms are available upon request at each Caltex station where a
sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. On
October 31, 1960, Caltex sent a formal letter to the Post master General that contained a
copy of the contest rules and mechanics, justifying its position that the contest does not
violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
However, Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating that the
contest scheme falls within the scope of the Anti-lottery Provision and declined Caltexs
request for clearance.
On December 7, 1960, Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no
consideration involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a
lottery. However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise,
which was equally banned by the Postal Law. Moreover, he did not only deny the request of
Caltex but also threatened that if the contest was conducted, a fraud order shall be issued.
As a result, Caltex filled the petition for declaratory relief.

Caltex argued that their contest is not a lottery; that under prevailing jurisprudence, lottery
consists of the following elements:
a. consideration;
b. prize;
c. chance
Furthermore, Caltex insists that their contest is not a lottery because the first element,
consideration, is missing. Said element is missing because participants are not required to
pay anything theres no consideration on the part of the participants.
Palomar assailed the petition as he argued that the same is not proper. He insisted that he
was merely applying the law and that there is no legal issue at all; that there is no need for
the courts to call for a construction on the statute in question.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief;
2. Whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law.
HELD:
1. Yes. The petition is proper.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the
applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to
person whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or
validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions:
A.
B.
C.
D.

There must be a justiciable controversy.

The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Construction of a law is in order if what is in issue is an inquiry into the intended meaning of
the words used in a certain law. As defined in Blacks Law Dictionary: Construction is the art
or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law
with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
2. NO. According to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears
to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any
requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a

prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration
which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance,
but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind
is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.