THE SOCIAL OCCUPATIONS OF MODERNITY:

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY

IN DURKHEIM, TARDE, BERGSON AND DELEUZE

DAVID TOEWS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the

00
degree
Doctor
Philosophy
for
the
of
of
requirements

University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy

August 2001

For Barbara and Sarah

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Page
3

DECLARATION

ABSTRACT

PROLOGUE - Occupations

INTRODUCTION - Social Ontology: Occupations,Modernity and The

Contemporary

PART I-

THE SOCIAL WHOLE AND THE SOCIAL PART

Ch. 1- Durkheim's Conception of the Social Necessity of Modernity

21

38
39

Ch. 2-

Social Quantity and Difference

67

Ch. 3-

Tarde's Ontology of the Social Particular

84

Ch. 4-

The Sociologisms of Durkheim and Tarde: A Comparative

Evaluation

113

PART II - THE OUTSIDE

132

Bergson's Social Thought as an Alternative to Sociologism

133

Ch. 6- DeleuzianSocialPhilosophy:TheHorde andRevolutionaryDesire

179

CONCLUDING CHAPTER - Social Need as Occupational: Toward an

Ontology of Modern Time and Space

224

BIBLIOGRAPHY

269

Ch. 5-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was developed and written with funding from a number of sources
including a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities
ResearchCouncil of Canada(SSHRC). I would like to thank my supervisors at
the University of Warwick: Peter Wagner (Sociology Dept.), who provided me
first
few
days
from
in
through to
very
my
with outstanding guidance every aspect
the end; and Keith Ansell-Pearson (Philosophy Dept.), who provided me with
invaluable suggestionsand careful readings.
A number of individuals read portions of this thesis and provided me with
de
Charles
Beistegui,
Fine,
Miguel
Robert
constructive criticism, particularly
Turner, and Mike Neary of Warwick University, and Matt Brower of the
University of Rochester, N. Y. The collegiality of all those associated with the
Doctoral Program in Philosophy at Warwick, particularly John Appleby and the
Philosophy,
Warwick
Journal
The
Pli:
of
as well as all those
editorial collective of
Centre,
Jones,
Social
Theory
Francis
Warwick
the
especially
associated with
Secretary, and Angelos Mouzakitis, helped me greatly. I would also like to thank
Andrew Wernick of Trent University, Canada, who believed in my project from
its very beginning.

My family and friends in Canada,the U. S., England, and Holland, provided me

throughout with indispensible support and encouragement, financial and
Anna
Boldt,
Registered Psychotherapist, of
my
mother,
otherwise, especially
Nanaimo, British Columbia, Canada,who inspired me to think the outside.

DECLARATION

This thesis is all my own work and contains all original material, and has not been
for
degree
at any other university.
a
submitted

ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the relationship between occupations and the ontology of the
social. I begin by drawing a distinction between the messianic and the modern as
in
concentrated the affective transformation of vocation into occupation. I then, in
the Introduction, sketch an ontic-ontological contrast proper to the modern, between
modernity, as the collective problematization of social diversity, and the
contemporary, as the plural ground of need which provides a source for these
distinction
I
that
this
problematizations. argue
will enable me to shed new light on
the occupational as a distinctly modern event.
In Part I, I begin by providing a reading of Durkheim in which I argue that the
but
longer
by
is
be
to
no
occupational
means of the
understood ontologically,
theorization of society and social types. This kind of theorization, exemplified in
Durkheim's concept of solidarity, contains a fundamental ambiguity between this
concept's ontological senses of original diversity and of unity in diversity.
Durkheim's thought is thus first intelligible in terms of an implicit evolutionary sense
of coherenceor `needof wholeness.' However, the explicit evolutionary framework
and its central typological difference between the mechanical and organic is an
it
fail
because
that
to
the
addressesprimarily a
attempt
must
ambiguity
resolve
distinction of obligation rather than a distinction of need. Obligation is shown to be
distinction
facticity
the
and
obscures
of need. I then
a concept of
which overcodes
go on to argue that sociality can be better accounted for in terms of a continuity of
in
is
becoming
a perspective of modernity purged of the
social
revealed
which
in
`solidity'
this
terms
to
tendency
continuity
such
metaphorize
as
modernist
(Durkheim) and `flow' (Tarde). This perspectiveis the irreducibly plural perspective
by
lies
in
I
Part
I
the
suggesting,
conclude
a sense of
contemporary, which,
of
merging with a social outside.
In Part II, I turn to investigate the outside by discussingthe social thought of Bergson
is
Bergson's
Deleuze.
thought
presented as an alternative to the deductiveand
because
it
Tarde,
Durkheim
of
and
attempts to critically
approaches
sociologistic
duration
However,
I
the
of
social
continuity.
argue that the notion of
smooth
affirm
`open society' that Bergson presentsis still too tied to a model of rare spirituality and
henceto the messianicperspective. I then proceed to a social-theoretical analysis of
Deleuze's oeuvre, in order to show how he uses elementsof a thought of continuity
from Tarde (microsociology) and from Bergson (multiplicity), but that he is able to
transcend the family-model-centeredness of Tarde and the rare-spiritual-modelcenteredness of Bergson, by theorizing non-modelled figures of transformative
affective multiplicity inscribed within the actual, ie. `full particularities'.
In my concluding chapter, I show how the intellectual trajectory which takes us from
Durkheim to Deleuze can be analysed as a movement from a doctrine or relatively
image
towards
of
social
social
notion
externality
a
more
active
of the outside.
passive
In particular, I am concerned to show how this image of the outside can be rein
be
terms
that
thought of as
a
can
of
movement
of
occupation
contextualized
always combining a senseof the contemporarywith a senseof modernity.

PROLOGUE:
OCCUPATIONS

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto

honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the
physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science,into its
paid wage-labourers(Marx and Engels 1982: 11).

One can think of the halo... as a zone in which possibility and reality,
indistinguishable.
become
The being that has
potentiality and actuality,
its
has
its
that
consumedall of
possibilities thus receivesas
reached end,
is...
fusional
This
insofar
a
possibility.
act,
supplemental
as
a gift a
is
it,
in
but mixed and dissolved in a
form
or nature not preserved
specific
imperceptible
This
birth
trembling of the finite that
residue.
without
new
indeterminate
limits
its
and allows it to blend, to make itself
makes
displacement
is
the
tiny
that every thing must accomplish in
whatever,
the messianicworld (Agamben 1993: 55).

Why does Marx speakof halos in relation to `the bourgeoisie', which is, after
him
for
the most natural emblem of modernity? There is something about the
all,
included
in
in
elements
of
which
are
every case, every stage,of transformation
nexus
from tradition to modernity that has a structure antithetical to that of halos. As

Agamben points out, the halo is evidenceof whatever is made, of accomplishments,

it
in
as were, this world; but which are at the sametime something sui generis,
somethingperfect, somethingwhole, or at least intrinsically worthy, as Marx says,of
honour and awe. Modernity brings about a destruction of the halo, but a preservation
of the form; a preservationof the occupation, but a destruction of its capacity to
constitute original, intrinsically valuable action.
This is all from the point of view, as Agamben puts it, of the messianicworld.
Marx and Engels were concerned,in the Communist Manifesto (1982) in which this
quotation appears,to a large degreewith establishingthe outlines of a stagetheory of
history, in which modernity is a progressiveaccomplishmentof the bourgeois and
working classes. Perhaps,however, as with Walter Benjamin's conception of
history, the spiritual impulse which dominatesin the messianicworld is not
completely alien to the modern world. As Benjamin puts it, "the class struggle,
by
influenced
is
fight
for
Marx,
historian
is
the crude and
to
a
which always present a
material things without which no refined and spiritual things could exist" (1973: 246)
And, indeed, for Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, the rising paradigm of
"the society of jobholders" in the post-industrial societieswhich succeedsthe
be
labour
and
could
still
construed primarily as a signification of
paradigmsof work
the loss of the creative locus and the intrinsic worth of action: "to let go... to
individuality,
individually
the
still
sensedpain and trouble of living, and
abandon...
dazed,
in
functional
behavior"
`tranquillized,
'
(1998: 322).
type
a
of
acquiesce
Marx's heading of `class struggle' is intended as a way of expressingthe raising of
the occupational into the context of the problem of consciousnessand selfinto
that context by which is revealed the intrinsic capability of the
consciousness,
know
itself
labour
to
agent
as
occupational
which has the potential to become `for-

itself or revolutionary. For Marx, occupation cum labour is the key social
transformation within capitalism that containsthe meansto its overthrow. The
becomes
labour
distinguished
from and emphasizedover the
thus
problem of
problem of occupation. Perhapsone could define `vulgar' Marxism by the way it
seesthis relation as a victory for labour through an at least conceptualovercoming of
the occupational. Nonetheless,the 20th-century has forced us to recognizethat such
could never be more than a hollow victory becausethe occupational level of
socialization has been continuously problematic, unmitigated by class consciousness,
and resistantto periodization.
It is as if the occupational has beento capital and labour what in 20th-century
ineliminable
has
been
to
epistemology
an
and current philosophy ontology
ground
know
We
shall
never
whether or not Marx
of concernover modernist optimism.
is
There
did
hesitate
this
enough of a question over it, at any
optimism.
really
over
rate, to suggestthat the social and the philosophical registers are probably neither
identical nor in opposition with one another as Marx often suggested. Rather, the
A
in
they
that
curiously
parallel.
are
constant
critical social theory
suggests
evidence
is that occupations- the social needsof work, labour, activities, practices,
be
held
broadly
to
the
cutting edge,the creative and the
at
are
considered
destructive edge, of modernity. The glow of prestige that still often surroundsthe
like
the chancethat philosopherscan still seizeupon to make a role for
occupational,
themselvesas philosophers, indicate for us that Marx was exaggeratingwhen he said
that the occupation could ever be completely `stripped' of its halo, or that philosophy
could ever be completely surpassed.Even in Marx's own theorization of capital,
is
is
final
but
the
of
primary
surely
significance
separation,
never
rather always
what
the interface, in abstract labour, in social practices, of myth and machine. At any rate

if
it
it
is
does,
think
as
at
all
continues,
we
modernity,
patently an initiative which
still needsto be enactedoccupationally; and occupation is, as we seemto be able to
infer, a pursuit which is in searchof a halo - or at least somerecognition larger than
mere pay. If in this sensethat which is for-itself is to become,once more, in-itself, it
is then no accident that at the sametime philosophy is still required to sort out the
distinction between ontology and epistemology in order to clear room, as it were, for
ontology. Thus, we could say that, in modernity, philosophy is as much a need as
occupation, inasmuch as philosophy, or at least someway of distinguishing between
existencesand essences,is precisely neededin order to account for the enigma of an
occupational mode of socialization which has becomean end in itself but which can
no longer be conceived as a processrevolving around distinct valued vocations.
Perhapsone of the most important points causingthis confusion is that it is an
between
describe
the
the messianicand the modern
to
to
relationship
error
ourselves
as a transition, especially when by transition is understood succession. Far from
capturing the essenceof modern dynamism and change,surely `transition' and
`succession'rather denotea quite rigid imposition of the perspectiveof one world
be
denoted
here
is
What
the perspectiveof the messianicworld
would
upon another.
imposed upon modernity, a point of view centeredin and sustainedby concernsover
that which is yet to come and hopesfor the recovery of that which is lost. On this
basis one can only infer a negative, phantasmatic,`end-of' definition of modernity,
as when Gianni Vattimo speaksof an accomplishednihilism in terms of the `end of
here
(1991).
danger
follow
The
for
deracinated
to
this
modernity'
moment
a
languageof teleology - is the obfuscation of modernity as a variety of meansand
problems which needto be specified. Of course, on the other hand, againstthis
danger,the theory of history of the Communist Manifesto, qua the organization and

is,
in
historical
be
It
any
materials, cannot read
simple way as objective.
selectionof
in large part, a function of the inclusive internal trajectory of Marx's careerin social
thought, from his philosophical investigations to his social theory of capital.
The orientation of critical social thought points to the opening of at least one
major possibility: modernity can be interrogated, in the multiple modesin which it
for-itself`pure',
both
inso to speak.
as
and
exists, as an unforeseenmovement,
But this possibility must come together with a necessarytwo-fold qualification,
namely, that this interrogation cannot be conceived as the outcome of any
`overarching' or `underlying' motivations, such as the `high' motivation to establish
`low'
for
basis
the
motivation to
theory
or
statements,
an objective social
policy
as a
bring
(or
that
vice versa).
the
can
philosophy
camaraderie
gain
great pleasureand
Rather, it has to be conceivedas an attempt which needsboth philosophy and social
theory to work towards a more accurate,flexible, and contemporary definition of
social practices.
The greatesttemptation at such a juncture of questionsconcerning modernity
has perhapsbeen the impulse of positivism, or broadly speakingthe impulse to posit
inasmuch
it
by
be
`pure'
that
as
unify
experience
would
would
one modernity
help
determine
to
that which
select
and
us
constituting a set of criteria which could
In
1958
Arendt
the
to
social
and
our
practices.
about
ask
and
ought
we can
determination
the
contemporary
projects
of
social
scientific
case
against
summarized
human
life
itself,
"the
that
conditions
existence
of
she
noted
succinctly when
`explain'
the
plurality,
can
what
and
earth
never
mortality,
worldliness,
and
natality
for
the simple reasonthat they never
the
of
who
we
are
or
answer
question
are
we
has
(1998:
Arendt
been proven correct.
11).
condition us absolutely"

10

However, today, after the critique of positivism, in a situation in which we

have also pushedthe critique of knowledge itself to its limit, we have arrived at a
general `post-modern' point of view. Here it has, indeed,begun to seemdesirableto
turn againtowards understandingthe organization of our social practices. Thus we
might now add the following qualification: such determination is undesirablenot so
much becauseit purports to do somethingto all of life - to totalize, to explain - that
it is unable to do. Rather, our perspectivetoday is more that the unduly narrow
perspectiveevoked here, together with the stunted architectureof social systemsthat'
results from it, are increasingly revealedto be intimately related to a retrospective,
nostalgic orientation - "the presen'e of the past in a presentthat supercedesit but
is
(1995:
75).
This
lays
in
Auge
it,
"
Marc
the
to
an orientation
still
words of
claim
through which one attemptsto alleviate the needto place determinableproblems in
the context, not just of life-as-a-whole, but more specifically in life-as-it-faces`non-places',
leading
to
the
thus
or pockets of comfort and security,
rise
of
onward:
in the airport, the shopping mall etc., in non-symbolizedspace,by which the image
(Auge
As
is
1995).
future
the
the
of
contractual
process
relations
conflated
with
of
Auge puts it, "try to imagine a Durkheimian analysis of a transit lounge at Roissy!"
(1995: 94). This complex of `super-modernity', is, in Auge's reckoning, today the
longer
just
is
the
that
no
at
cutting-edge,
of marginal studiesof culture, but
problem
in
terms of the usual broad definition of the study of
taken
of anthropology
humankind (1995).
The problem of occupations,spilling over as it naturally does into the
is
formulation
defining
the
the
occupying
of
space,
a
social
of
of
problem
of
problem
practicesthat is no longer a problem of social fact but rather a problematization per
in
inherent
all problems that pressupon us in the urgent terms of the actual se

11

in
that
themselvesthe very essenceof the
problematizations
are
each
unexpected
perspectiveof modernity in- and for-itself, ie. multiple modernities. Today these
personaland impersonal problematizationsowing to the brutal continuity of the
actual, thesejarring distinctions we createbetween placesand non-placesfor
example,these are such that they rise above determination-orientedways of posing
the problem of social life. But this is certainly not becausethe actual is shaped
through them into total institutions that dominate our lives to an oppressivedegree,
as if the latter were absolutepowers, born as such simply through their longevity or
persistenceof existing. Already in the 1950sSartre decriesa pervasive "spirit of
" in which "man pursuesbeing blindly by hiding from himself the free
seriousness,
project which is this pursuit. He makeshimself such that he is waitedfor by all the
tasks placed along his way" (1994: 626). It is surely no accident that the
contemporary 1950swestern vocational model of social life had begun to crack
but
just
industry,
the
the
transformation
the
post-war
of
of
wars
of
under
pressurenot
historical
felt
development
increasingly
had
it
became
that
this
to be related
that
and
decade
later
is
back
Just
to
and
a
ontology
ontology.
a full-blown western
somehow
cultural preoccupation,though now, perhapsquite predictably, one related rather
increasingly to a `lightnessof being,' as Kundera put it, which could then feel just as
difficult to adjust to as the heavy hand of institutions (1984).
Our occupationshave becomemore and more intimately and consciously
related to our questionsconcerning ontology. They have proven themselves
increasingly co-extensivewith our entire social lives, amenableand a familiar sight
in non-placesas well as the usual places. In this they have becomepursuits that are
but
image
the
and
necessary
occasionally
sufficient,
as
of the total
never,
with
always
institution, such as that of the old-model `full-time job', always necessaryand always

12

sufficient. Now our contemporaryoccupationscan be among the most serious

life
at the same time as being the least seriousof such aspects.
aspectsof social
Make no mistake, in both of these simultaneously heavy and light aspectsthey are
necessary,as well as sufficient in the context of the case. But they can, for us, as
Sartre seemedto prophesize,precisely never again be the only serious side of social
life, the only source,guarantee,or `base' of a rational sufficiency. Of course,
however, we have learnt this not from an existentialism which dawns once and for all
after the dark age of the war, but rather from ontological studieswhich over the
whole 20th-century gradually increasein richness,variety, and precision of
approach.
Occupationsare today specifically and immediately significant, but will never
is
irreducible
diversity of
be
This
the
a result of
again generally and vaguely so.
both
traverse
placesand non-places. To be sure,both places
occupationswhich now
and non-placesare subordinateto the general and vague category of spaceas that
by
is
which constituted the activity of occupation. But I would suggestthat it would
be simplistic to conceive of occupationsas the spatial modalities of practices. That
is
by
is
which constituted something not necessarilyits essentialfeature. This is the
casehere: from the perspectiveof the question of social practices, as distinct from
the perspectiveof an anthropology of supermodernity,but from within its historical
has
to be posed as a question of something other
the
space
question of
point of view,
than space,and not, as we might suspect,just as an abstractbinary opposition
between attributes of placenessor non-placeness.We must be able to do justice to a
diversity of media of practicesas well as a diversity of practices.
That which must help us to frame the question of space,that which gives the
latter meaning, is movement. The relevanceof movementto questioning individuals

13

emerges,more than ever today, vis-a-vis occupational change. The question of the
becomes
it
then
more
and
more,
as
ought to be, a properly ontological
occupational
questionconcerning social practices. There is one key philosophical approachtoday
into
the context of social practices. However, this approachsees
which setsontology
this processof contextualization as primarily a way of analysing and clarifying the
background
social
of certain recognizablepolitical positions. For example,for
CharlesTaylor, "ontological questionsconcernwhat you recognize as the factors you
will invoke to account for social life" (1990: 181). According to Taylor, "any good
ontological thesis" is simply a way to "structure the field of possibilities in a more
is
is
Forme
(1990:
183).
that
too hasty in this
there
something
perspicuousway"
in
`recognition',
`possibility'
the
terms
something
and
which
results
privileging of
of
debates
between,
to
tendency
the
to
a
question
of
of
ontology
as
question
a
reduce
Taylor puts it, "atomists" and "holists" (1990: 181). I do not believe that one can
in
`position'
the
to
the
of
concept
political
order to show how any
ontological
extend
level.
deeper
has
a
given political position
In my view it is the relative indeterminacy of the occupational, not a relative
determinacy of political positions, that gives rise to the question of ontology. The
frequent
it
involves
the
ever
more
mode
of
change
evokes
and
occupational
a shared
is
that
the
as
such,
means
occupational
concern
which,
precisely not reducible
social
to a set of positions. Similarly, for earlier thinkers the vocation involved an element
for
be
that
them
the
vocation
meant
could
not
reducible to a merejob.
of value which
But what is perhapseven more to the point, contra Taylor, is that for theseearlier
thinkers the value of one's vocation was precisely a value derived directly from its
constituting a sourceof self-existential illumination in the face of the perceivedly dehumanizing effects of analytical proofs of various types of existence. As Johann

14

Fichte put it in The Vocation of Man at the very beginning of the 19th-century,"that
determination
being
the
and
of my being outside myself, the expression
causeof my
determined
by causesoutside it - that was what repelled me so
further
of which was
(1987:
italics.
Author's
).
20.
original
vehemently"
For such a romanticist as Fichte, the project of classifying beings involves the
over-determination of being, and this involves the constitution of an outside which is
essentiallyunderstood asthe observed,or as the fragmentedelementsof a gaze
which diverts attention from the question of value. That is why Fichte holds that

final
his
is
the
the
and
purpose
of
sensible
world,
man not a product of
beyond
in
it.
His
be
time and
goes
vocation
existencecannot attained
is
he
is
he
know
He
what
and what
must
spaceand everything sensible.
to make of himself. As his vocation is lofty, so his thought too must be
have
limits
He
to
sensibility.
all
of
must
an
above
able rise entirely
home,
his
being
is
his
there
to
this;
at
necessarily
where
obligation
thought will also be at home (1987: 114).

For the apparently cold and merely comparative concept of position, thus, a Fichtean
humanistic
the
substitute
warm
and
more
might
concept of
conception of vocation
home.
But would not this latter proposition involve simply a replacementof a valueWould
both
Taylor's
term
one?
a
not
conceptions,
and
value-loaded
with
neutral
Fichte's, in this sense,refer the ontological question of the occupational ultimately to
the question of value? It is becauseoccupationsare related to our questions
have
that
traditionally defined occupationsmore as
we
concerning ontology

15

vocations than as transitions, successions,or mechanicalchanges. But we add to

definitions of occupations,inasmuchas we comparethem and contrastthem with
vocations,the aura of value, use-value,the `highest values', or even indeed
exchange-value,the simulacral condition of `communication'. I believe this focus
upon value is outdated and misleading, but perhapsmore importantly, that it doesnot
do justice to our practicesof modernity. It is only from a retrospectivepoint of view
that occupationscould, with such means,be determined, even if only in terms of the
minimal essenceof being the `origin of modern diversity'. This is illustrated
particularly clearly in Fichte's approach to philosophy. Fichte's approach is novel to
the extent that he explicitly relates\the question of ontology to the question of
vocational form and movement, but Fichte's aim is to use this novel ontological
problematic as again only another way to capture, re-integrate, own, and dominate
the outside, and thus not at all to think the outside: "this form, this peculiar
movement, this thinking, in harmony with each other, this persistence of all those
essential properties amid a variety of accidental changes, are mine so far as I am a
being of my species" (1987: 13). And, in Fichte's words,

I want to have an inner peculiar power to expressmyself in an infinitely

just
like
forces
those
manner,
of nature, a power that expresses
varied
itself just as it expressesitself for no other reasonthan simply that it
expressesitself in that way; but not, as with those forces of nature, that it
just happensto occur under those external circumstances(1987: 21).

Such a necessaryarticulation of being from a gratuitously personalpoint of view

shows that any Fichtean conception of diversity could never transcendegoism,

16

kind
a
of nostalgic desire of nature. What is implied is a
anthropocentrism,and
sequenceof separationfrom one's sensible,familiar surroundings,then a nostalgic
desire-being,
of
and eventually a kind of return to a discovered
articulation
Such
`home'.
a point of view might have been laudable two hundred
vocational
years ago, but today it would be seenas sedentary,impractical, and untenable.
I think that what is at stakein modernity for us, for our questionsconcerning
ontology, is an element that our own senseof the contemporary impressesupon us,
and this element is an occupational event of a rather different nature. This event is
not essentiallya processof self-grounding amidst a project of classifying nature and
determining the categoriesof being. However, what is intriguingly continuous with
older conceptionsis that our occupational event still takes place by constituting and
involving a senseof an outside. Without being deterministic, our contemporary
Value
is
a
structure
not
essentially
of
possibility.
occupational event nevertheless
have
increased.
hand,
On
have
decreased
than
they
the
the
more
other
expectations
is
decreasingly
dialogue
a
mode
of
event
with a
contemporary occupational
description of what is essentially a static position. It is also decreasinglya cyclical
home.
for
And yet the contemporary
departure
work and return
movement of
is
life,
that
through
which
one
puts
one's
qua affectsoccupational event still
latter,
directly
in
in
the
the
plurality
of
at stake the social milieu, and
motivations, all
this, at least for me, still makes it a movement of modernity. But it is today a
flexible
constitutes
and
reconstitutes
which
a
outward
variety
of
movement
practices
do
they
precisely
when
not apply themselvestoward a return to
which are stronger
the same.
Thus, in my view, ultimately, today, it is for practical reasonsrelating to the
indeterminacy of boundary constitution, and no longer primarily for normative-

17

identity reasonswhich could be upset by simulation, that our occupationscannot be

determinedvis-a-vis what is as if what is is only what appears. Occupations,have,
as Marx put it, `lost their halo', which meanswe have lost the belief that being and
appearanceare not always already identical. This meansthat their contours,just like
those of a waiting lounge filled with lap-top users,can no longer be understoodas
signs or hypothetical determinationsof what would be intrinsically worthy action,
since in any caseas such they would be, after all, if `would be' made any sensehere,
only enactmentsof hope and concern for, in Agamben's formulation, whatever.
Surely we have passedthe point in which that naivete would go unchallengedthat
would consist in assumingthat in a perfect world occupationswould appearas
infinite
happily
trivial
variety of practices, or as the mode of random
whatever, as a
information linkage among agentsof a `cyberdemocracy'. We now just as often tend
to link the practical with a senseof problematization in which we feel ourselves
`unplugged,' or wandering outside of our usual links to standardresources. I would
contestthe cyberneticist notion that we more than ever tend to link the practical with
the informative in the illusory interiority of simulated environments. The latter, in
fact, can be read as only a last-ditch attempt to over-code or unify in someway the
in
fated
it
this
to
than
sense,
which
was,
offer
more
an
attempt
could
practical,
deliver.
On the other hand, to be sure,the concernsof philosophy and occupation
have beenconverging for a long time now. Indubitably, a new kind of ontological
investigation will be required to account for this odd new symbiosis between
philosophy and occupation which contrasts so sharply with the rigid separation
betweenthem assumedby the ancient Greeks. Despite our new modalities of
practice, the problem of the social as an ontological problem pressesupon us, and is

18

due
do
to
to
to the distinctions we continue to
guaranteed
continue
so,
virtually
make, as the Greeks did, betweenour motivations and our occupations. But these
distinctions, for better or worse, are no longer establishedin external political arenas,
for
in
in
that
any
situations
matter
or
which it might be supposedthat ideally
philosophers,politicians, soldiers, and workers could mingle and determine their
differences. Rather, thesedistinctions are now intrinsic to our practicesand are
formulated `in the courseof the job', so to speak. If certain corporate interestshave
aimed to create a public illusion that there is no longer any possibility for this even in
the course of our practices,but at the sametime have privately held on to the
distinction betweenthe managerand the managed,henceforth the problem has
becomeone of preventing the conflation of our motivations and our occupationsat
the same time as preventing their alienation. This has beenthe raison d'etre of the
in
despite
theory
the decline of the
continues
social
which
occupational point of view
industrial inflection this discussionused to have.
If here and now it is true that there can be no pre-establishedsocial agenda,
desire
for
informal
fellowship,
it
is
a
an
of
spirit
of
a
question
nor even
also true that
have
have
the
to
managed
as
come
misgivings about this situation.
managersas well
But to seeonly a form of universal alienation here would be to distort the real
is
Alienation
only a problem where a messianicperspectivedominates: in,
problem.
for example,the `early Marx'. What kind of purchasecould such a conception have
in an increasingly post-managerialworld? There is, of course,the apparent
alternative of `self-management.' But perhapsthe solution of `self-management' is
only a novel type of a more traditional processthat has an essentially messianic
structure: individual purification in anticipation of the ever-to-come manifestation of
a judging, God-like power; but with the difference that this time the God-like power

19

is `change' consideredabstractly as an inevitable force, and the `judgment' is rather a

selectionof the strong over the weak.
In the question of the definition of our social practices,for me there is only
one real source of continuity and only one real priority that social theory, in our
contemporaryperiod, has to continually address: this is the complex problem, quite
contrary to that of alienation, of our tendencyto confusethe real, pressing,synthetic
problem of the conflation of our motivations and our occupationswith the
theoretical, deferrable, hypothetical problem of the immanenceof both in the
constitution of an impersonal, social modernity. Our problem today is to a large
have
itself,
difficulties
to
the
the
when
situation we seem
extent one of
of perspective
arrived at seemsto have eliminated any chanceof seeingthings anew. Every
in
investigate
is
distinct
to
that
needed
order
and
perspective
problem requires a
becomes
formulate
So
to
the
that
problem
part of the
even
address
problem.
problem.
We have arrived at a unique, unforeseencomplex of issues: to addressthe
bad impulsive faith of self-purification, or more generally the conflation of our
being
to
today,
avoid
need
we
overly frightened of
motivations and our occupations
Marx's warning that this conflation is accomplishedand that the differential
is
have
What
to carefully and
collapsed.
agency
we
need
conditions of social
brings
that
this
the
new
possibility
problem
of a new perspective
positively examine
infor-itself
the processof the constituting of problems, as
and
upon modernity as
problematization; the question of how the sourcesof theseproblems, our affective
individual
hence,
limited
that
traditionally
to
see
cognition
and
we
as
multiplicities,
in
have
function
to
the
of constituting, the
ultimately, mere possibility, might actually
actual processof problematization itself, a new post-vocational senseof occupational

20

continuity; the question of whether this continuity, as a partly impersonal, partly

unconscious,synthesizing process,could be encounteredin a senseof exteriority that
by
be
different
from
that
any
would
which older `realistic' social facts were
identified; and finally the question of whether or not there is any new meanshere to
for
based
theory
social
a
new
plane
of
consistency,
asserta new paradigm,
upon the
pursuit of understandingthe explosion of social diversity.

21

INTRODUCTION

SOCIAL ONTOLOGY:
OCCUPATIONS, MODERNITY, AND THE CONTEMPORARY

Occupationsare intimately related to the question of a new modern attitude to

life. The study of them thus cannot begin with any simple way of thinking about
(and
in
history
There
theory
the
of
philosophy
and
social
not
social existence.
are,
between
latter,
history
in
the
the
the
relations
of
rivalrous
a point
coincidentally
below)
important
for
become
the unusual
some
precursors
significant
which will
The
Emile
the
to
problem
of
occupations.
case
penetrate
of
outlook required
Durkheim's thought, grounded as it is in his seminal The Division of Labour in
Society, is of key importance. Durkheim will always play a role in helping us to
think through the relation between occupations,modernity, and social ontology.
Hence, Durkheim's thought will play a central role in this thesis.
Above all, it was Durkheim who submergedhimself into a life-long study of
the reasonsfor the fact that to identify ready-madeimages of objectified modernity,
imagesthat dependupon manifestation at somepoint, is not a possible option in the
images
definition
Such
by
movements.
modern
always be `out of date.'
study of
will
`Manifestation' and `modernity' are at odds with each other. This is Durkheim's
great ontological thesis, the operation that for him links the occupational with the

22

paradigm of philosophical rationalism. Modernity has a reality that is more real,

more felt, more powerful, than any object. Objectifications will always lead us
away, not towards, a rapprochementwith our real sensesof modernity, those senses,
those affects, that are inescapable,as well as culpable. But now, for Durkheim, also,
an objectification is a way of perceiving a resemblancein an image through a mode
of contemplation in which each consciousnessblends into others and action has
collapsed into itself and becomemerely mechanical. The division of labour, the
for
him,
becomes
then,
a surpassingof this mechanical mode
systemof occupations,
and a bearing towards an organic wholenesswhich would become,precisely,
is
is
here
infor-itself.
What
that Durkheim seesmodernity as
meant
modernity
and
an evolving and expanding organic paradigm, not as an omnipotent force. This is
formations
Durkheim
that
claims
social
of modernity and of tradition
evident where
can, will, and do co-exist.
Here we ought to, for the time being, turn away from investigations of the
way our practices presupposeutilizations and confrontations of the messianic
into
for
identification, inter-subjectivity, and
investigations,
example,
perspective:
deconstruction. All of thesethree styles of social investigation - for example in their
Freudian/diagnostic,Habermasian/communicative,and Derridean/post-structuralist
formulations - all three of theseapproachesassumethat the task of social inquiry is
to open the presentto an interrogation. They thus unduly privilege the messianic
is
My
aim not to undermine the messianicperspective. Rather, I aim to
perspective.
investigate what will be at stakeonce we are to switch, as the pure perspectiveof
invites
do,
it
is
instead
`time
to
thinking
to
us
of
as
occupied'
modernity
of an
`historical present which we must open'. There is no question of elimination here.
The question will involve the past and the future in addition to the present. But it

23

its
have
dangers,
own
and its own benefits, and perhapsalso its own intellectual
will
harbingers.
Above all, there will be an affinity here with the thought of Bergson and his
successors,since it was Bergson's project to formulate a method of intuition that
might finally become adequateto `real time. ' Furthermore, in his The Two Sources
figure
here,
Bergson finally
Morality
Religion,
text
that
prominently
of
will
and
a
contextualized his project explicitly against,though as informed by, the Durkheimian
irreducible
`social
intuiting
to
of
openness'
process
an
problematique, with a view
that takes place as if it were a volcano constantly erupting underneathDurkheimian
involve
Bergson's
Understanding
thought
re-reading
social
will
categories.
Durkheim. As we shall see,Bergson's attempt to move beyond Durkheim does not,
in fact, result in a clear break with Durkheim. I do not meanthat I believe Bergson
in
his
be
incorrect
be
to
philosophical analysis of the power of creative
shown
will
destruction of social openness,or that this will not necessarilyinvolve a turn away
from the model of Durkheimian sociology. Rather, there is a certain theoretical
insufficiency in Bergson's critique of Durkheim. This insufficiency lies in the fact
that the notion of `opening', no matter how irreducible and effective it is,
neverthelesstends to presupposerather than usefully re-theorize what Durkheim
in
ie.
labour
`the
division
society',
our occupations. I have thus come to
of
called
believe that it is necessaryto go back to reproblematizeDurkheim's conception of
labour
`division
in
of
a
essentially
society'. Philosophy and social
as
modernity
theory must advanceby seizing the opportunity to theorize rather than merely
by
the
constituting socially-necessarydivisions which
assume occupationswhich,
fracture and thus problematize the `full' labour of the historical present,transcendthe

24

subjectof knowledge and his or her domain of presence. In this, thesedisciplines

must pick up certain key and salient threadsof the Durkheimian project.
To be sure,there is a difficulty inherent in the `positivist' side of Durkheim's
approach. Despite his rationalism, his strategy is to take the social as a phenomenon,
facts.
he
But
fact.
At
to
time
the
social
modern
wants
unveil
same
as a social
is
better
today,
tend
to
above all an unsettling process.
recognize
modernity, as we
I
Indeed I would hold that modernity is, in fact, not a phenomenon. For example, this

is recognized in various critical approachesto the subject. The main insight of

`critical theory', for instance,has precisely beento explain why phenomenahave to
take only a secondary,illustrative part in the social theory of modernity. Critical
theory has made it its own raison d'etre to addressthe potential problems of
by
by
the
abuse,
totalization
and
particularly
use
created
objectification and
Heideggerians,of descriptive phenomenology(see,eg., Adorno 1973). The only
its
`community
'
in
is,
theory,
theory
neglect,
not
of
my view,
shortcoming of critical
if
(see,
but
is
even
negatively
so
still
phenomenological,
which post-Heideggerian
its
but
1991),
Nancy
1988;
Blanchot
rather neglect of taking any stepstowards
eg.,
(see,
Tarde
1903;
Bergson
1977; Deleuze
eg.,
social
ontology
non-phenomenological
here,
latter
Durkheim
1984).
I
For
1988;
Guattari
1984;
the
argue
and,
as
will
and
in
investigative
direct
decline
has
to
the
possibility
proportion
an
risen
as
perspective
in the paradigm of experience. If `survival in the outside' is our new social paradigm
be
to
thoroughly
confronted and challengedwith all our critical
needs
one
which
forces
begin
by
that
should
perhaps
we
seeingthe world
and material
recognizing
only vis-a-vis the presenceand absence,the negation, or even the deconstructionof
`phenomena' has communicatedto the new paradigm, if not its method, its aim: get
interiorizing
from
branches
the
the
the
storehouses,
contemplation,
of
offices,
away

25

and get to the things themselves,to the locale, to the basics: the message,which far
from being contradicted is much rather clarified by these movementsis not so much
`get back' as `get out'. Vattimo, whose project is a rather intellectualist style of
analysis of the raison d'etre of postmodernthought, seesthe latter embeddedin the
perspectiveof Nietzsche, whosework, according to him "fundamentally possesses
this meaning... [that] the call that comesto us from the world of late modernity is a
call for a taking leave" (1991: 29). This shift that would be at stakefor a nonby
in
just
Gilles
Deleuze
is
terms
as
sharp
phenomenologicalsocial ontology put
life?
it
is
"
he
"why
to
the
own
question
of
our
a
primitives, when
return
when asks:
(1988: 209). What is at stakeis a biscourse of `pure' modernity as a fully practical
discourseof actors: the event of social relevanceas a temporally inclusive, always
but
from
from
the point
to
tradition
transformation
modernity,
always
problematical
for-itself.
inand
of view of modernity
For when this pure, living senseof modernity is our point of view, we no
longer conceive ourselvesand our modernity as situated in `the historical present,' a
if
life
future
Rather,
for
provide
can
still,
needed,
alibis.
present which roots and a
intimately involves needand living need is a fully contemporary question. It is,
indeed, the question of the contemporary itself. Need will tend to clarify, in each
case,the necessarycharacteristicsof modernity. To speakof modernity in- and foritself is never to speakof a new unity, such as to saythat we have `arrived at a full
modernity' - this is precisely never the case. Rather, `the contemporary' has come to
in
denote
is
link
the
to
the
ways
which
modernity
usefully
able control or not control
in the presentbetween feeling and practice which guides our senseof need. This
clarity is the richness,the `fullness' of the contemporary, and its distinction from
modernity.

26

The `contemporary' has come to include the future in the presentrather than
to comparethe future with the past. That is to say, we have here a supple category
which gatherstogether a future that is immediately felt without needof any
intermediary objects of attraction, without need of intervening `phenomena',or
inferior
be
here
that
that
superior there.
or
which will
vague signs of
which was once
The contemporary, for us, tends more and more to denotea concatenationof
disjointed relations whose minimal condition of coherenceis a `we are the future'
'
become
by
denotedin the outward-projected energy which social encounters
events.
The extent to which these eventsare controlled or not controlled is a useful measure
in
Or
other words, the contemporary,especially our
of contemporary modernity.
it
inasmuch
the
provides a sourceof a novel
as
contemporary
contemporary, or
sociality for us, denotesthe possibility of a critical perspectiveupon the varieties of
become
heading
has
Here
the
of
realism,
veiled
social ontology, under
modernity.
is
for
But
this
social
ontology
very
reason
gathering potential
perhaps
and obscure.
to be revealedas more than ever the pre-eminent problem of modernity vis-a-vis the
contemporary.
Again, the essenceof that `networking' - voluntary or coerced- which we
for
does
the
to
of
a
universal
model
social
status
relations
not
seeing
rise
are perhaps
lie in a `work-a-day' anxiety to meet the demandsof external pressures. Rather, the
key to understandingcontemporary modernity must surely be the realization of the

' We might consider that, for many of the up-and-coming youth of our western cultures, the 1980s
rave culture and the 1990sclub and festival cultures have held an increasing centrality of interest for
their sophistication of organization which is at the sametime a (dis)organization; and we might
fruitfully consider how this festival culture is particularly attuned to events, such that, when it
becomespolitical - inasmuch as it might help, for example, to provide the current phenomenonof
`anarchist' protest at world trade meetings with its unforeseenmodel of social and political interaction
intertwined
The
inextricably
become
the
the
the
the
political
and
aspect
relation
aspect
of
of
event
between (dis)organization and festival eventswas suggestedto me by Arun Saldanhain his
presentationof his paper "(Dis)organization and the postcolonial politics of silence in Goa" at the

27

fact that `networking' representsa decline in the modernist paradigm of `experience'

and a rise in the new modernist paradigm of `survival in the outside'. Indeed, social
eventsare less and less documentedwith a view to experience. According to Kroker
and Weinstein, "ours is a time of non-history... [where] nothing is ever really
experienced,only processedthrough the ether-net of virtualized flesh, like an
invisible acid rain of neutrinos blasting through the earth's crust" (1994: 136). We
judgement,
less
deliberate
through
experience
and
and
rely
actions understood
on
`leanness',
that comes
the
the
stoical
almost
on
more
creativity-through-necessity,
from being outside. The important distinction here is that modernismis always an
attempt to over-code the ontological challenge of the contemporary,while we can
think of modernity as the critical, problematic edgewhich challengestheseovercodings and in the processimbuesthe contemporarywith a particular critical
zeitgeist.
Is the spirit of our times then basedin a new and precariousbalancebetween
believe
identity
identity?
do
Cultural
became
I
so.
not
a
and
cultural
networking
large-scaleproblem, a specific type of `problem of modernity', around the middle of
the 20th-century. At that time there seemedto be growing a stronger and stronger
tendencyof the individual to becomeseparated,through various factors of an
increasingly mediatized society, from his or her cultural context. This relative
identity
shared
problem
causes
a
major
of
and a re-questioning of
separation
individuality. The problem of identity, as such, seemsto be a fixed, universal
its
problem of modernity, since proper redressis basedin registers of experience,and
experienceis a neutral, universal fact - or seemsto be. There were debatesover the
factual versus the hermeneutical sides of experience. But these debateswere
International Social Theory Consortium SecondAnnual Conferenceat the University of Sussexin
Brighton, UK, July 5-8,2001.

28

irreversible
by
long-term
`postmodern' realization
the
more
and
seemingly
eclipsed
that the `capacity for experience' neededto participate productively in society could
by
it
distributed
be
throughout
the
to
societies
merely
supposing
equally
world's
not
be the essentialgrist of human nature.
For it hasbeen the casethat a very different kind of problem of modern
difference gradually has come to the fore over that of cultural difference and has
latter.
This simultaneously newer and older
been
the
confusedwith
sometimes
from
is
that
our own cultures vis-a-vis a gradual
separation
complete
of our
problem
dissipation of the 19th-centurymodel of civilization as a higher-order family of
human beings: the problem of `pure difference.' Here is precisely where the
fill
for
difference
to
the
this apparent
attempts
account
cannot
problem of cultural
fascism,
kinds
projects
of
and
peculiar
of undesirable
void with various
totalitarianism, and various other conformisms. The first half of the 20th-century'
difference,
between
by
two
dominated
these
this
orders
of
while the
confusion
was
frustration
itself
has
half
times
to
sense
of
at
great
extricate
a
with
struggled
second
from it. It seemeda very seriousassertionindeed in the 1960swhen Herbert
Marcuse, in One Dimensional Man, singled out "the threat of an atomic catastrophe"
domination
force
unification
and
world
of
unwanted
under
as a new contemporary
the nefarious heading of the pursuit of the mastery of nature, and when he claimed
that "advanced industrial society becomesricher, bigger, and better as it perpetuates
the danger" (1986: ix). However, Marcuse did not seemto notice the full
implications of the fact that the driving force of an unwanted homogenization and
begins
longer
in
here
become
in
to
a
society
precisely
particularized,
no
conformism
(1986:
defense
but
in
he
identity
"the
structure"
rather what
claim,
called
mode of an
ix).

29

One could claim with somejustification that it is precisely becauseof a

growing and compelling internal distinction between modernity and what has now
becomeclear is only one of its contingent attributes, ie. universality, that modernity
is no longer conceivable, in grand style, as a leviathan, or a `monolith dominating
it
is
interesting
little
identities'.
In
this
context,
when Carl Schmitt points out
our
that the reception of Hobbes's symbol of the leviathan has always wavered between
firstly taking it as the man-beastpeculiarity that it appearsas and secondly taking it
as a referenceto a reasonedpolitical position on the apparentlyuniversal question of
whether or not to have an authoritarian state. According to Schmitt,

humanitarian
[of
the 18th-century] could
the
enlightened
although
conceive of and admire the stateas a work of art, the symbol of the
leviathan as applied to the state appearedto his classical taste and
bestiality
feeling
or as a machine turned into a Moloch
as a
sentimental
that lost all the powers of a sensiblemyth and at first representedan
externally driven lifeless `mechanism' and then an animate `organism' of
driven
from
(1996:
62).
organism
an
within"
a political contrast,

Perhapsit is precisely becauseof the bloated and conspicuousnature of

defense
`the
is
institutions
that
today
structure'
modernity
such as
modernist
force
beast
(which
taken
as
a
particular,
as
a
of uncritical
as a
much more often
is,
)
it
rather than as a transparent,neutral and
modernism undoubtedly
universal fact of progress.
But the question here is this: if modernity is now revealedto be a project of
the particular, is there room only for fear and loathing or is there not also now a new

30

and more sober opportunity to analysedifferences relative to particularities as

distinct from differences relative to abstractuniversalist identifications? While
efforts have been made to account for the problem of cultural identity within social
theory as a classic problem of the theory of the modern, the problem of `pure
difference', a contemporary problem of the theory of the modern, has, in fact, lacked
2
due
lagging
behind
Is
this
to
theory
simply
social
a social-theoreticalcontext.
changesin the real? I think it is rather becausethe vast majority of social theories up
to now have relied more or lessupon a classical ontology of the social in which
social forms are determined in the last instanceby referenceto a `reality' that by
definition cannot include the future. Social theorists seemto have an inbuilt bias
Social
have
the
theorists
the
contemporary.
of
against
either pointed to
perspective
apparentlyobjective structural characteristicsof societiesand/or what seemto be
patternsdiscernedin the numerical, extensive quantities of these characteristics,or
they have pointed to the more or less open interpretation of the hermeneutical
in
in
to
the
the
symbolic
phenomena
communication
of
actor
relation
situation of
socio-cultural contexts. Despite the internal strugglesbetween such approaches,they
have in common a deliberately narrow focus upon what could be called `the
historical present.' Everything earlier than the subject-mattersthey can theorize is
thrown into the general, amorphouscategory of `tradition. ' Everything beyond these
social subjects is either too prone to error to study, or `postmodernism'. The
itself
eludes social theorists.
contemporary
Our task, sinceMarx, is understandingsocial occupationswhich, quite
images
is
to
the
to
give
rise
of
modernity
which
specify
variations
simply,
- such as
2 There have of coursebeen a number of social-theoretical studies of the uncritical responses,such as
the responseof totalitarianism, to the problem of pure or non-cultural difference (seein particular
Arendt 1973), but studies of the more critical responseshave been left to philosophers who only study

31

that of the outside - which link feeling and practice. The contemporary, inclusive of
the plurality and contingency that Arendt speaksof, is this ground of ontology (1998:
11). My argument, in short form, will be this: if the doctrine of the externality of the
is
in
find
in
Durkheim,
substantialterms the agent of the
social, such as we
destructionof the plurality of modernities, the image of the outside which we can
trace out of it is the always accompanying,but irreducible creative agent: the image
labour,
the
of
and all pursuits which we recognize
modernity work,
par excellenceof
is
feel
My
to raise occupationsout of their
aim
activities
and
as
occupations.
as
division
labour
become
in
has
the
analysis
of
of
all too
an
which
stasisas mere units
demonstrate,
to
perhapsmore sharply this time, that they are the very
and
managerial
processesof the dynamic transformations of contemporary modernity.
In my view, the common elementsof these processescan helpfully be
introduced and the processusefully reconstructedby meansof drawing a certain
trajectory of social thought from Durkheim through Gabriel Tarde and Henri
Bergsonto Gilles Deleuze. For eachof thesethinkers contributes something
but
in
broader
in
the
their
also
something
context,
essential
own
contemporary
picture, to the understandingof this process. This particular trajectory as a whole
less
illustrative
is
of
a
group
of
scholars
who
more
or
agree,
not
assemblage certainly
is
far
disagree,
this
to
one
another's
premises
as
we
shall
see,
with
or even agree
from the case! The trajectory and the thesis as a unit is rather illustrative of a
destructive
in
inclusion
the
the
the
creative
and
agents
modern
of
mutual
principle of
social ontology, of the simultaneity of the over-bearing necessityand the underdetermined contingency of casesof modernity. In a sense,I privilege Durkheim,
becausein my view his novel linkage of occupationsand social ontology provides
the contemporary intellectual conditions under which the concept of community simply may or may
not be disavowed (seeBlanchot 1988 or Nancy 1991).

32

the most natural and provocative starting point for my analysis. But it is through a
critical re-examination of the social theory of Durkheim, only in the comparative
light of the uncompromising and varied internal challengesto the latter provided by
Tarde,Bergson, and Deleuze, that we can, in my opinion, best show how these
elementscan be reconstructedto exhibit the processof modern becoming that
occupationsdisplay.
Right from the initial inception of Durkheimian thinking, there was already a
kind of basic, internal conflict which over time gradually developed: between a
highly novel and successfulDurkheimian social philosophy and its own quite
become
doctrinaire
is
It
to
a
attempt
sociologism.
unfinished
unsuccessful,
well
known that the Durkeimian school's institutional objectives were concretely
hamperedby what could be called their interest, an interest which explains their
disciplinary tactics and which is necessaryto help explain the unusual strength of
their positions with respectto epistemology, scientific methodology, metaphysics,
ideas
I
behind
In
the
the
theory.
compose
chapter
one
a
careful
analysis
of
and moral
interest of Durkheimian classical sociology using one of the key terms of Durkheim
himself. as being directed primarily and positively towards an avowal of social
`solidarity'. As we shall see,`solidarity' in the Durkheimian meaning is tantamount
to a metaphysical and external substance. At the sametime, however, it is a key term
in a metaphorical kind of rhetoric indicative of Durkheim's investment in his strategy
facts.
The
focussing
social
consolidated
words solidarity and consolidated
of
upon
`solidity',
have
to
the
the
of
relating
notion
and this strategic
sameroot meaning
even
intentionally
is
fully,
consonantwith Durkheim's ontological
symmetry of meaning
conception of sociology. They refer alike, one on the side of ontology, one on the
basis,
it,
he
As
know,
in
to
the
of
sociality.
as
sees
we
methodology,
ultimate
of
side

33

the event of its communication such a doctrine easily proved unacceptable,as we

might say,to all but the converted: the institutionalisation of Durkheimianism in
France,though collectively sought, proved to be individually basedin its material
successes.Taken, as Durkheim took his doctrine, as itself a kind of sufficient reason
for a nascentmode of French political socialization in the Third Republic, it proved
to be completely chimerical.
But we can and we must distinguish betweenthe important insight and the
innovative methods which lead to a doctrine and the doctrine itself. We can and
this hasbeen done and done well - analysethe clash between a more or less
complete doctrine and the disciplines which it makes nervous by its very formulation
and-which it indeed attemptsto colonize (economics, human geography,history, and
psychology to name only a few). However, I would assertthat what is also important
but unaccountedfor thus is the felt creativity of thought which leads to a new
paradigm and how this mode of the conceptualizationof the doctrine clasheswith
philosophy, if we understandthe latter as a discipline that has a special interest in the
criticism and careful production of creative conceptualizationsof a higher-order,
systematicnature. Thus I presumethat there is a creativity of thinking, a
Durkheimian social philosophy, which can be analytically isolated for these purposes
of contrast. For on the more sociological side of social epistemology and
methodology, a close and problematic relation of nascentsociology with philosophy
would have to be a matter of assumptionin any account of the continuing echo of
Durkheimian premisesin the contemporary social sciences. It would be hard, if not
impossible, to question this assumptionfrom within these discourses. A safe option
be
to think of Durkheimianism being transported, as it were, acrossvast fields
might
of disciplinary changeon the back of the internal and external philosophical

34

criticisms of the sociology of knowledge and sociological epistemology. But anyone

would have to admit that this metaphor,which ultimately concealsan ahistorical
perspective,would have severelimitations if there should arise a need to ask such
questionsas how this Durkheimian social philosophy arises in the context of
competition and cooperationwith other contemporary intellectual models.
This needto set Durkheim's thought into the context of creative social
thought dovetails with the need to understandDurkheim's affirmation of modernity
in- and for-itself and the needto criticize his positivistic side. For there arisesa
problem with Durkheim's affirmation of this pure senseof modernity which becomes
one of conflict between a social part predisposedto `mechanical' inter-relations, the
theory of which Gabriel Tarde develops,contra Durkheim, into a theory of creativeimitative practices; and the social whole, which Durkheim makes it his businessto
defend, contra Tarde, as a vital plane of existenceindifferently constraining and
influential over all of the practicesof the social subject. There is then also a problem
of inconsistencyin Durkheim stemming from his rhetoric of solidarity/solidity, but
also a problem with Tardian rhetoric which reacts againstthe former. The problem
disjunction
Tardian
dominate
Durkheimian
this
the concernsof the
versus
of
will
first part of this thesis.
The first part will contain four chapters. These chapterswill naturally have as
their subject-matterthe classical social theories of Durkheim and Tarde. Tarde and
Durkheim can be understood as rivals in a common project of the founding of
is
in
France.
My
aim to work towards a position in which I may formulate
sociology
a comparative evaluation of their main sociological ideas. My goal is to identify a
major error that I think they sharein common, namely, the error of aiming to
formulate a `pure sociology'. As we shall see, `pure sociology' is sociology that

35

takes for granted that the question of the social is a question of isolating the nature of
social substance,in order to determinewhether the essenceof the social lies in the
be
for
it
to
seem
a
or
occupations
vehicle
whether
emanates
external constraint which
from the nexus of motivations involved in the socializing self. My plan in chapter
four is to clearly show the exact reasonswhy any such attempt at a `pure sociology'
issue
into
This
dissolve
the
to
of
will allow me separate
mere sociologism.
must
`pure sociology' from the issue of `pure modernity', to show how the latter, as an
intrinsically ontological question and at the sametime an intrinsically social
dependent
is
upon pure sociological postulates.
question, neverthelessnot
The secondpart will deal with one way in which, in the trajectory of thought
from Durkheim and Tarde to Bergson and Deleuze, there emergesa way of thinking
is
independent
about
modernity
of the axioms of
which
and
socially
ontologically
both philosophy and sociology, and which therefore injects new life into and a new
image
latter.
This
the
thinking
the
rallies
around
of
of
way
rapprochementamong
the outside. The image of the outside is of central significance, in different but
Deleuze's
in
Bergson's
and
work.
related ways,
After my discussion of pure sociology and sociologism, I will be able to
begin
discussion
into
focussed
Bergson's
forward
thought,
to
social
part
of
a
move
two. I shall investigate how Bergson identifies the weaknessof Durkheimian and
Tardian sociologisms as the way they oppose eachother to form a kind of
focus
be
incompleteness.
The
will
upon the way
conundrum of completenessversus
Bergson, and Deleuze following Bergson, pose fundamental challengesto the
do
from
but
invented
by
Tarde
Durkheim
the
they
this
also upon
way
and
categories
for
inescapability
how
basic
the
to
the
account
social-theoretical problem of
within
judging.
in
individual
knowing,
Basically,
to
thinking,
the
and
my
relation
social
of

36

aim, roughly from chapter four onwards,is to show that the apparentcontradiction
between `opening' and `closing' can be solved but that it has two major solutions
which must be somehow set into cooperationwith one another. Bergson's solution is
one which intimately involves his whole philosophical work and particularly his
critique of the spatial metaphor of time. But my discussionof Tarde and of Bergson
will necessarilyinvolve simultaneouslybeginning to introduce the secondsolution,
which is my own attempt to link the concept of the outside with the concept of
occupation.
My overall aim, then, in

part

two, is to show how the image of the outside is

in fact introduced by Durkheim into social theory as its primary point of perspective,
and that this image necessarilydevelopswithin social theory and peculiarly always at
a critical tangent to sociologism. Thus, Bergson and Deleuze can be understood
from within a perspectiveintrinsic to social theory, as long as the qualification is
is
that
philosophy
an essentialpart of their approachbecauseit aids them
understood
in challenging the tendencytowards representationalclosure in sociology. It is the
developmentof the image of the outside, from a mere passiveexteriority towards a
more active senseof modern movement,that defines the trajectory that I will trace
betweenthe thought of Emile Durkheim and Gilles Deleuze, and Gabriel Tarde and
Henri Bergson are read as key intermediaries in this connection.
In the concluding chapter I aim to have finally arrived at a position from
which to sketch a positive analysis of the dynamic process of social occupations as
transformative variables of modernity. I will do this by meansof relating the process
to the term, or terms, of the problem of the outside, that the latter has been shown to
in
generate Part II. We shall seethat it will be possible to identify at least three
levels of the social register of the outside. Each of these levels I will derive from

37

producing a novel theoretical comparison among the sourcesDurkheim, Tarde,

Bergson, and Deleuze. Thesethree analyseswill not standon their own as isolated
aspectsof the problem. Rather, they only exist as mutually implicated. Thus, I
attemptto draw an outline of the play of their inter-relation. My aim is to have
becomeable to explicitly outline the social metaphysicsof the outside and the
conceptsthat we use in our practicesof constituting this metaphysics. If successfulI
have
been able to display the dynamic and transformative processof the social
will
occupationsof modernity.

38

PART I

THE SOCIAL WHOLE AND THE SOCIAL PART

39

CHAPTER ONE

DURKHEIM'S CONCEPTION OF
THE SOCIAL NECESSITY OF MODERNITY

The Division of Labour in Society can be consideredthe cornerstoneof Emile

Durkheim's sociological project and a classic of social theory. It containshis first
and most long-lasting formulation of the western sociological problematique: the
question concerning the relationship betweenthe existenceof society and the essence
first
What
this
concerns
chapter is this relationship as set by Durkheim
of modernity.
into the context of a theory of occupational differentiation. I am interestedin
Durkheim's reconceptualizationof modern occupationsas the basic elementsof the
social whole. My basic dispute with Durkheim will be that he did not recognize the
full, radical implications of the fact that the social whole in itself has a reality that is
only virtual in relation to its particular actual cases. The social does not exist as a
totality brought about in a compulsion of social need as if it were, by virtue of this,
over and above manifestedoccupations. Rather, I will argue that the social is simply
a term for occupationsconsideredfrom the virtual point of view of their particular
and actual necessity,ie. their `event of need'. Everything will thus first dependupon
an investigation into the necessityof social occupations,their provenanceor lack
thereof in human needsand obligations. In this first chapterwe shall therefore be

40

exploring the extent to which modernity is a social necessity,leaving the creativity

and culture of modernity as a critical issueto be dealt with mainly in subsequent
chapters.
We may begin by noting that modernity has often been describedfrom the
apparentlyopposite point of view of human contingency. Indeed, Durkheim himself
fully acceptedthat the progressof modernity involves an increasing contingency.
Even in the primary text that the readeris referred to in this chapter, in the Division
of Labour. Durkheim's aim was to show how the progressof modernity loosensthe
ties that bind simply-structured communities. In modernity an unlimited creation of
strong new social intersectionsand intensities takes hold. The humanworld becomes
more and more legally, materially, technically, and ethically complex.
However, rather than merely proliferating in an infinite processof
complexification, for Durkheim this vast web of differentiations congealsinto
various complex stratifications. According to Durkheim these stratifications exert a
force of constraint which in effect restructuresour whole human experienceinto a
just
Thus,
taking modern stratifications for granted as
than
modern one.
rather
objects of sociological description, Durkheim argued that the division of labour is not
just the structure but is also the primary, unconsciousmotivating factor of modernity.
Durkheim's way of thinking is therefore potentially quite radical in that it requires an
attempt to conceptually encompassboth the effect and the causeof modern society.
Modernity and society are subsumed,as it were, into a differential, structural, social
it
has
is
be,
Durkheim's
Insofar
thinking
to
ontology.
as
ontological,
paradoxically,
focussedupon the human necessityof relations which in their own terms display an
increasing contingency. Indeed it is the mark of ontology to attempt to include an

41

accountof both necessityand contingency. However, its primary insight

in
its
has
source
a certain claim of necessity.
neverthelessalways
`Radical,' for me, would entail the relevance of a social theory to a global
falls
Durkheim's
realities.
ontology
plurality of contemporary social
short of
becoming radical in this way because,as we shall see,it is not sophisticatedenough
to deal with the illusion of completeness. For Durkheim, to the contrary, the
appearanceof the contours of various modem social phenomenaas vast, grand, and
`solid,' as overarching the individual in their superior complex being, is something
that we have to simply affirm if sociological comparisonsare to resonatewith
is
do
For
that
there
sense
can
no common
anything other than affirm
common sense.
being.
is
deny
The
the
complex
metaphor
a
of
a
superior
of
solidity
or
existence
leading
one to affirm the obviousnessof such an
at
calculated choice aimed
existence.
With this metaphorof solidity and its intimations of fertility and grandeur
Durkheim chose a way to make sociology popular which, we could say, involves
making an appealto the individual's senseof the sublime. And, indeed, againstthis
decidedly
dimension
involves
this
metaphorical
are made most of
approachwhich
the external criticisms of most sociologies. Criticisms againstthe `meta-narrative' of
inevitable
in
modern
society
complete
are
perhaps
a
potentially
an over-arching,
hand,
On
the
to repeatthis criticism
other
contemporary age of plurality.
increasingly involves little more than unwittingly testifying to the influence of
Durkheim upon many sociologies. How could it be translatedinto any positive
insight into how the contemporary is or is not related to the critical convergenceof
modernity and society?

42

A serious internal criticism of Durkheim's involvement with the metaphor of

solidity is yet to be made,a criticism which could show how Durkheim's approach
diverts attention from the particular involvements of the division of labour in the
individual
is
lives
below
What
I
social
of
actors.
will present
an argumentto this
effect. I stressthat Durkheim's ontology of society was `too metaphorical' to the
extent that it did not recognizeits own stark implication that everything that is
liberating but also newly constraining about the developmentof modernity results
from the contributions of actual, particular social occupations. Rather than calling
for an alternative postmodern microsociology I am claiming, in large part, that
Durkheim neglectedto investigate social occupations in their own terms. For it is a
little observedfact that we can still be vitally interestedin the question of social
occupationsin our own contemporary situations. Naive observersthink that social
occupationsare subordinateto changesin the world of work and that the question
has becomemoot becauseit is a question concerning what it is to experiencea kind
is
is
Against
the
this,
socialization
on
wane.
my
which
point of view
of work-a-day
that the question of social occupationsrather concernswhat it is to becomesocially
creative, and what is necessaryin this, even in a `postmodern' era.
When we ask what it is to be socially creative we are not just asking,
human
about
what constitutesour
practices.
sociologically or quasi-sociologically,
We are asking further about why our practices occupy us. It is specifically
during
dimension
to
take
strange
us a
which we forget our
occupationswhich
in
directly
become
which
encounter
and
we
an active
practices and ourselves and
differentiations'.
is
in
`vast
It
that
our occupationsthat we personally
web of
part of
have social feelings which can be good or bad. These factors far exceedthe
significance of empirical evolutions in the world of work. Often counterposedto

43

work-basedsocial criticism is identity-based social and cultural theory. Thesetwo

approachesvie against eachother to explain the effect of difference in modem
society. But due to the peculiar way occupationsunfold it is they, precisely as
distinguished on the one hand from our jobs and on the other from our identities, that
explain the coherenceof thesedifferentiations, and therefore explain what we can
still say about the coherenceand impact of modem societies. Everything thus
dependsupon whether we can grasp the real significance of occupations for our
social existence. Strangely, our occupationsseemto become more like social
creationsand open up more social feelings the more they help us to transcendour
human experienceand statesof affairs - including our metaphors.
Modernity and the Metaphor of Solidarity-Solidity
Modernity, for Durkheim, cannot be defined as a more or less complete
phenomenonwhich comesto act upon and transform social existenceat a certain
is
initially
like
latent theme of all forms
in
history.
Modernity
rather more
an
stage
of social existencewhich at various significant points in the development of those
becomes
Those
line
collectively
more
explicit.
societies
a
cross
at which an
societies
impressed
individual
becomes
the
upon
consciousnessof
unavoidable necessity
in
the
overall
of
social
existence
other than the static terms of
nature
negotiating
tradition. In Durkheim's view, modernity is that perspectiveupon social existence
blueprint
instances
highlights
basic
the
of
society's
case-specific
various,
of
which
is
This
the meaning of Durkheim's famous
transformation.
collective existential
is
between
distinction'
It
the
the
organic.
a matter of demechanicaland
social
between
de-historicizing
the
transition
tradition and modernity. From
or
periodizing
the `mechanical' or the bare material of the gathering of the similar and the primal
dense
`organic'
the
or a
and complex entity
action of communication, we arrive at

44

that is less and less capableof being conceived or manipulated from any individual
viewpoints. Modernity is thus conceived as a kind of social transcendenceof the
human condition: "becausesociety surpassesus, it obliges us to surpassourselves.1-53
The vehicle for this, this entity which comesto be tantalizingly outside us, modern
society, seemsto increasingly solidly cohere as a single organism which absorbsreal
human
its
as
vital organs. At the core of Durkheim's lifelong
particular
practices
thinking, as at the core of his original thesis, is a concernto account for this
increasing modern externality of the social so as to make possible a better
understandingof the social anomie apparently causedby it.
What I intend to show in this chapter is that there is a certain confusion in
Durkheim's conception of this externality causedby a certain use of spatial or
division
labour,
in
his
theorization
the
of
of
and that this
physical metaphor
by
how
his
be
be
thought
showing
remedied
can
productively
confusion might still
re-organizedaccording to a non-metaphoricalconception of social occupations.
Durkheim himself certainly did not believe that his central distinction between
in
it
it
that
to
solidarity
a
and
organic
was
simple
one
or
solidarity
regard
mechanical
On
be
be
the
to
to
confusion
easily.
contrary,
avoid
sure,the project
possible
would
inherent
itself
just
in
study
will
contain
an
complexity,
order to be
of sociological
describing
distinction.
its
For
lifelong
Durkheim,
this
to
the
object
of
adequate
is
key
the
to this complexity. For him, this
and
society
convergenceof modernity
discipline
that
every
phenomenon
any
aimed at understandingthe
connection creates
in.
been
interest
it
has
difficult to find
In
has
taken
an
addition,
always
social
ever
difficulty
is
this
the
these
to
significance
and
convey
of
social
phenomena,
concepts
one of Durkheim's major preoccupations.

3 On Morality and Reli 'gon,

163.

45

It is clear that Durkheim's choice of focus and terminology lies in the theory
of the emerging `organism', which in the Division of Labour already guides every
facet of Durkheim's way of thinking the social. The notion of `organism' captures
Durkheim's way of simplifying our understandingof complexity non-reductively.
Given this focus and this terminology, it is perhapseasyto supposethat Durkheim
in
this
social and modem confluence essentially terms of an analogy with
understood
the emergenceof a biological organism. My view is that this supposition, if
in
interpretation
distortion
the
too
of
certain
could
cause
a
emphasized much,
Durkheim's thought. Durkheim understoodthe birth of an organism as an event
4
is
for
him,
level
Nature,
difference
the
a
of nature.
primarily on
which makes a
is
biological.
includes
Therefore,
the
the
the
that
analogy clearly
social and
reality
beyond
it
includes
because
category-identity
goes
a
sense
of
which
not metaphorical,
description. Perhapsthe expressionis not even analogical. Analogies are generally
direct comparisonsmade for heuristic purposesand thus have no needof relying
in
links
`nature'
'
Durkheim's
`nature.
Indeed,
terms
third
case,
such as
upon explicit
the terms comparedby indicating a common operative plane which cannot be known
in an unmediatedway but only in the terms of an unfolding of that which comes to
in
just
if
is
Durkheim
It
of
evolution
perceived
a
model
as
unfolding
nature
not
exist.
in biological conceptions and then simply transposedthis intellectual model into
be
it
`organism'
I
Rather,
to
the
think
call
notion
more
accurate
of
would
sociology.
in Durkheim evidence of ontology rather than analogy. One can, with best precision,
interpret Durkheim's way of thinking as a way of thinking ontologically which, as a
intimate
happens
its
being
to
thinking
an
effect
a
of ontology,
consequenceof
connection in his thinking of the existenceof the biological and the existenceof the
a According to Durkheim sociology regards "social facts as explicable naturally." In order to
distinguish this idea from positivism, however, Durkheim would warn us that "we should... hesitateto

46

social. Moreover, this perspectiveexplains why Durkheim never makeshis points

by relying upon a direct comparisonof features of the biological and the sociological
and insteadprefers to make general comparisionsbetweentheir methodologies,as
well as betweentheir methodologiesand those of other scienceswhich have a stake
in the field such as psychology. Durkheim's methodological concernstake their cue
from original observationsof what he called `social fact' as well as from previous
intellectual models.
However, I neverthelessbelieve that there is a metaphor at work in
Durkheim's thinking of the convergenceof modernity and society, and that it is a
metaphorwhich createsan unsurountable obstacleto any refinement of his social
thought in general. For Durkheim, modernity and society converge in the form of a
metaphorical code. This metaphorical code is a `solidarity' which regardlessof
degreeof compositional complexity is neverthelessalways characterizedby the basic
feature of having more or less `solidity. ' In Durkheim's own words, solidarity is
"the way in which men are solidly linked to one another" (1984: 126). The metaphor
that createsa stumbling block for the continued influence of Durkheim's thought and
which confuseshis ontological insight is therefore not biological but rather physical.
Inclusive of the mechanicaland the organic, the physical and spatial
is
heading
the
metaphor of solidarity-solidity
under-which Durkheim's whole
understandingof social ontology is organized. We must ask then if it would be
possible to criticize this heading and still preservethe original contours of
Durkheim's core sociological problematique. This is doubtful. We are unlikely to
be able to avoid taking up a fundamental critique of his seminal sociological
thinking. One strategy of such an avoidancewould be to simply criticise Durkheim

term [sociology] naturalistic" (1982: 159).

47

for using a metaphor as opposedto more precisetechnical meansof expression. But

one's criticism would only have a significant effect if it could explain why the
metaphoris used. We ought to ask what kind of difficulties it glossesover and this
should give us our clues as to the usageof expressionand also asto whether and how
the situtation ought to be remedied.
I would contend that the imprecision inherent in the concept of solidaritysolidity lies not so much purely in the descriptive aspectof the fact that it is a
metaphor. As a metaphor it is a groundlessdirect comparisonbetween the social and
the physical. But the problem is not so much the making of a leap to description on
the basis of something groundless. It is not a groundlessnessper se that ought to
concernus. Metaphors used descriptively can lead to all kinds of equivocations.
Metaphors also cannot be avoided easily and probably have to play all sorts of roles
in social thought. But the problem in this caseis rather that the equivocation here is
formulation
kind
the
enables
of assertionwhich
of Durkheim's most important
also a
defended
in
the Division of Labour. "To create
conceptions
and most passionately
betweentwo or more people a feeling of solidarity" is Durkheim's fundamental
conception of the division of labour's "true function" (1984: 17). Since any society
is pre-defined for Durkheim as constituted by some form of solidarity, and for him
the division of labour is argued from factual reality to be a particularly modern
is
labour
division
the
thus positioned within an argument which will
of
phenomenon,
have to either confirm or disprove its role as the `true' or underlying reality of the
modern social world. There is a claim of theoretical argumentation to be dealt with
here with respect to the true correspondenceof a theory with social reality. What is
is
issue
not simply another example which supports a linguistic theory that asserts
at

48

the witting or unwitting usageof metaphor in language. The stakesare more

immediate than that.
If it cannot, almost by definition, be the subject-matterof an objective theory,
be
help
theories
theorized
to
such
can
can
nevertheless
and
metaphoricalusage
illuminate certain aspectsof the strategiesof theoretical argumentation. In this case
even a loose, superficial metaphorical analysis revealswhat we might call a certain
`vision of the sublime' inherent in Durkheim's conception of the social. But in this
fall
`postmodernism'
in
have
and
rise
we are probably all too
seen
age which we
familiar with the limitations of such analysis. I am convinced that such analysis,
linguistic
its
framework
has
be
in
it
to
to
the
of
conclusions
restricted as ultimately
theory, cannot fully explain the theoretical passionsabout certain social feelings that
in
truth
classical social theory. To shapean effective
claims
shapesuch grandiose
directly
by
how
to
the
claims
showing
our
challenge
of
such
criticism we ought meet
is
justified
truth
on the samegrounds as that upon
claims
skepticism about such
just
is
in
this
to
they
case
on
ontological
and
say
not
asserted,
which
are
which
linguistic grounds.5 This would not be so pressingif it were not for the fact that in
the presentday it continuesto be common - and perhapseven necessary- to think
t

do
in
Furthermore,
society.
when
we
so,
our
modern
ontologically about
contemporary period, we tend to think of society existing very negatively and
`constant
both
liberating
of
and
oppressive
phenomenon
change'.
a
confusedly as
On the one hand, this contradictory opinion of society is a sure sign that the central
issue of society remains the issueof modernity. On the other hand, what needsto be

5 My distinction between the ontological and the linguistic here is intended as one of emphasis,not
exclusion, I am well aware that a certain tradition, namely that which links thinkers such as
Heidegger and Derrida, has seenin linguistics an uncritical assumptionof a link between logos and
factual.
I agree
to
the
the
or
ontology
ontic
or
an
ontology
restricted
an
unnecessarily
ontos, uncritical
with them on this point, but I differ with them as to how our ontological investigations ought to
proceed after this criticism.

49

mademore clear is what kind of contemporary societiesare linked with this present
type of modernity.
I think it is becoming clear that the latter phaseof `postmodern' discourse
has
been
its
`linguistic
turn'
really
only a steptoward coming to a better
with
increasingly
be
`constant
to
surmise
of
what
we
change.' Thus, it is
understanding
possiblenow to seethat modernity remains as much more of an ontological issue for
is
issue.
linguistic
It
therefore very possible that modernity hasbeen
than
a
us
issue
all along. For surely our pressingneedto gain
social
ontological
primarily a
precision in our individual and collective assumptionsabout `change', which we
always understandas social change,continuesto overshadowany phasewe may
have gone through in the recent past in which we have debatedwhether society is or
is not more than a narrative of modern progress. Modernity has always been more
about an urgency of clarifying and explaining ontologies than about simply asserting
is
denying
The
the typically modem view also on
them.
pluralism
same
or
insights
from
long
Having
extensive
a
postmoderncritique of
gained
methodologies.
linguistic usagewe should at least be able to recognizethat we have absolutely
defending
by
`postmodernism'
`postmodernism'
to
replacing
or
either
gain
nothing
linguistic
by
`ism.
'
Deconstruction
theory
themselvescannot
and
with some other
help us to avoid the trap of replacing a linguistic truism about `metaphoricalusage'
investigative
`constant
Further
innovation
truism
about
change'.
ontological
an
with
is now required. We are being challengedto investigate what we meanby constant
latter
tends to summarizeour current way of thinking about
the
changeand why
do
in
is
bring
A
to
this
to
our current questions
my
view
modern society. sound way
to bear upon the classical formulations of the existenceof society such as
Durkheim's. I am convinced that the latter contain important clues as to why we

50

think of that which persistsand has reality in society as changeand why this seems
so contradictory and difficult for us to conceptualizegiven that we tend to rely upon
classicalterms.
In this way, it ought to be a key concern of social theory today to exposein
social theoretical terms the conceptionswhich independentlyunderlie Durkheim's
sublime vision of the externality of the social. This is what I intend to pursue. For
the equivocation implied by the metaphor of solidarity-solidity is not simply between
theseterms, `solidarity' and `solidity'. It is not simply the `sublime' connection
between society and some senseof physical constancyand grandeur that must
level
is
To
that
on
of
concernus.
remain
analysis to miss an important contemporary
here
I
am
precisely
not
asserting,contra Durkheim, that the
of
concern.
point
is,
the
social
as one might say, `something that we cannotbelieve in. '
externality of
Such assertions,both pro and con, lead nowhere. Rather, as I intend to show,
Durkheim presentsan equivocation which lies between two background concepts
which underpin the metaphor of solidarity-solidity: the concept of needand the
concept of obligation. The `solidity' which Durkheim thinks of as `solidarity' is
is
describe
It
the understandingof necessityin
to
a
certain
necessity.
meant
Durkheim that causesthe confusion which leadsto the metaphorical solution. In
in
Durkheim
to
significant
advances
any
more
our
studies
of
make
order
we shall
have to return to the issue of necessityover which, in his thought, philosophy and
diverge.
sociology
Durkheim's understandingof necessityhas two sides,that of need and that of
obligation. Obligation, for Durkheim, is the key explanation of `solidarity': as
Durkheim will put it in the Rules of Sociological Method, "in reality, as far as one
fact
in
history,
back
the
of associationis the most obligatory of all, becauseit
can go

51

is the origin of all other obligations" (1982: 130). Furthermore, in Durkheim's view,
"all that is obligatory has its origins outside the individual" (1982: 130). Therefore,
for Durkheim, this exteriority of obligation signifies obligation's suitability as a
commonly recognized notion available for the formulation of the social-theoretical
conceptof solidarity. For Durkheim does not hesitateto draw the rather dramatic
conclusion, basedupon the premise of exteriority, that "as all societiesare born of
other societies,with no break in continuity, we may be assuredthat in the whole
courseof social evolution there has not been a single time when individuals have
really had to consult together to decidewhether they would enter into collective life
together, and into one sort of collective life rather than another" (1982: 130). The
is
deduction
thus
solidarity
a
matter
of
supplementedby
existenceof social
in
inference
based
historical
But
I
than
that
study.
upon
will argue
observationrather
Durkheim's way of thinking solidarity is deducednot from obligation itself but
rather from a premise of need; the role of obligation is only to help to explain this
special social need or, in what amountsto the samething, to offer a proof that a
social need exists by appealto the facticity, articulation, or ontic aspect,of the
it
is
in
Thus,
this way that the main theme of the Division of
existenceof obligation.
Labour (1984), the theme of how the primary need of sociality can be differently
in
in
types
of
societies
and
especially
modem society,
articulated various
foreshadowsand complementsDurkheim's argumentsin the later Rules of
Sociological Method (1982) defending social ontology by appealto `constraint' and
`obligation'. The Division of Labour is thus of primary importance for me, since it
posits and propounds the basic doctrine of sociology that the Rules only develops in
methodological precision and flexibility: that the possibility of a plurality and
typology of solidarities follows from one essentialfeature of obligation: that it is

52

basedin types of human need; the division of labour is in design a result of one such
type of need.
Already in the first few lines of the Division of Labour, for Durkheim `need'
refers to a necessityof any relations becoming a durable sourceof human life by
being persistentand structured in various ways (1984: 11). In Durkheim's thought,
needis conceptually composedby blending the notions of structure and source. For
example,at an early point in the text in which he explains his basic conception of
society Durkheim adducesthe example of conjugal solidarity (1984: 18). Marriage
is a prime example of solidarity. In addition, the persistenceof marriage goesto
show that solidarity is not necessarilya fusion of similarities but is also likely to
between
of
connection
prevail under conditions
subjectswho otherwise differ
6
in
its
The
context is calculated to highlight the special
example
profoundly.
methodological advantageof conceiving sociology's object as solidarity since it
seemsto show how solidarity is a highly inclusive and yet very specifically social
phenomenon. This is at least the explicit meaning of the example. However, I
it
has
implicit
is
that
that
that the
another,
more
meaning,
suggest
and
would
insofar
it
as
stemsfrom a kind of human need,proves that
existenceof marriage,
solidarity, or structure and constancyin human life, in certain forms, can be a need.
This senseof need is taken to make the persistenceof types of solidarity readily
6 In the Durkheimian view this difference is very much one of a power imbalance, and marriage is
consideredto be a kind of imperfect corrective to this imbalance. The difference in question is thus
thought of especially as a hierarchical genderdifference discriminatory against women, though it
could also be, for Durkheim, a racial/cultural difference biased against strangers. It is interesting to
note that Durkheim holds that marriage falls into a class of rituals that can act as a kind of imperfect
corrective or defensemechanismagainst a threat of violence inherent in casesof the proximity of
unequal subjects. As Mike Ganepoints out, there is here implied a little known theory that Durkheim
holds that at a certain point in human anthropology, due to a fear of blood and a desire to overcome
this fear by instating the abstractand misogynist principle of blood relations, women became
"subjects minoris resistentiae." Strangersare also held to be treated, traditionally, in a similar
fashion. Gane persuasivelyarguesthat Durkheim never fully problematized his perception of women
and that a tendency to misogyny led Durkheim to be particularly uncritical on the question of gender
(seeGane 1992: 109; 85-132). In my opinion, this does indeed seemlikely to be the case,and if so,

53

understandable. Durkheim is here dependingupon us understandingthat thefeeling

of wholenessthat marriage ostensibly provides for its participants is such a need. We
are supposedto intuitively understandthat a feeling of wholenessis for married
7
in
life.
However, in his
people a neededsourceof constancyand structure
illustration Durkheim downplays the significance of the conditions under which
8
into
in
first
being
in
the
the
marriage comes
place and
role of attraction this genesis.
Surely the latter is an essentialpart of the definition of marriage, a part the existence
or lack of existenceof which in marriage will always standto problematize any
complacentunderstandingof this institution as an effect of natural needs.
At first glance, this neglect of attraction in social formation may not seemlike
difficulty
for
is
insightful
in
Durkheim.
And
there
a
certain
much of a
novelty
implying that society, particularly as shapedby the division of labour which is
traditionally explained in terms of the creation of wealth or the predispositionsof
talent, is rather basedin human need. What "confers value upon" the division of
labour, what provides a "reason for its existence," is for Durkheim "the fact that it
is
here
for
(1984:
15).
But
is
Durkheim
at
stake
needs"
what
not
meetscertain
is
(1984:
is
What
"goods
15).
the
at
stake
of
civilization"
not specifically
wealth, or
defined needswhich as such result from the division of labour. Rather, there is only
in
kind
one
of need which can, the Durkheimian perspective,be construedas the

we would have to say that it would weaken Durkheim's theory of solidarity even further. However, it
is not my aim here to argue this point.
Durkheim's study Suicide also supportsthis view in a negative way inasmuch as one can find therein
a reaffirmation of what Durkheim calls "the prophylactic virtue" of married family life.
Conspicuously, Durkheim makesa point of arguing that a contemporary increasein the suicide rate
according to certain statistics must be regardedas "independent of marital status," and this even
despite a lengthy discussion in which Durkheim points to "changes... in the constitution of the family
which no longer allow it to have the samepreservativeinfluence as formerly" (1966: 377). One
family
if
be
have
impact
the
to
really
can
simply
and
shown
no
statistically
upon the
why,
wonders
suicide statistics, why then it should warrant an extendeddiscussion as to its changing statusas a
sourceof social cohesion.
8 As Ganepoints out, for Durkheim, "the two sexes,reflecting the forces of the division of labour, are
`impelled towards' each other but come to desire each other only under determinatecircumstances,
`only after having enteredinto relations' with one another" (1992: 99).

54

division
labour,
is
the
the need of sociality. In other words, all
that
source of
of
and
particular needsare supposedto arise from this concretely universal, socialexistential need.
For Durkheim, when solidarity arises as a need,needdefines the wholeness
of a society, and needthen provides a meansto outline the boundariesof the society
in its totality so that it can be comparedand contrastedwith other types of society.
But for Durkheim this dependsupon our acceptingthat need sometimeshas a special
fact
from
itself
that
this factual pressurealone arises
us
as
and
upon
way of pressing
in every casethe demandsof obligation. For a big part of Durkheim's argument here
is to adduceobligation as a fact in support of his understandingof society as a
in
short as a unique entity and
special,non-psychological, non-biological entity therefore as an entity with a necessaryexistence. Just as he needsto prove the
he
find
to
of
sociality,
needs
or
a sourceof obligation.
existenceof a social need need
This double strategy indeed has resulted in a certain novel and even insightful
distinguishes
in
What
Durkheim's
Durkheim's
theoretical
result.
symmetry
sociological approachis that `obligation' is not a logical a priori duty simply based
but
is
initially-posited
anthropological
premise
of
need,
rather understood as
upon an
an experiencedmanifestation of need's real but not always clearly visible
from
in
diverges
Sociology
this
philosophy at precisely
point his
archeology.
thinking. He comesto locate the theory of obligation in a sourcewhich is quite
outside its provenancein moral philosophy and intellectual history.
However, if, as I have argued above, need cannot be construedas the sole
if
structure,
other aspectssuch as attraction play an essentialrole,
social
source of
then need's connection with obligation is not as symmetrical as Durkheim would like
least,
for
line
Durkheim
Such
the
that
to
to
a
of
criticism
at
very
shows,
suppose.
us

55

indicative
his
to
throughout
career
obligation
as
refer
of the existenceand structural
integrity of whole societiesand of the disciplinary importance of sociology is an
by
is
that
shaped
appeal
a reliance upon a tautology evident in the
undoubtedly
theoretical interdependenceof his conceptsof need and obligation. Need, qua the
is
the
the
of
sourceas well as
structure of
whole society, a constantforce proved by
the fact of obligation, since obligation, for Durkheim, is the main evidence that such
less
have
more or
stability dependingupon the force of
societiesactually exist and
is
be
At
to
the
time,
obligation
proven
effective as a necessaryconstraint
same
need.
by the reasonthat in order to hold such societiestogether in a coherentform, the
things that go to make them up could not be otherwise. But this coherenceis nothing
but the constancyof the force of need expressedin experiential terms, in terms of
knows.
'
it,
As
`everyone
Durkheim
supposedly
put
rather dogmatically, "he
what
who speaksof obligation speaksat the sametime of constraint" (1984: 13).
Durkheim is here assumingrather than explaining his most basic subject-matter,
social solidarity.
The notion of solidarity, as the term which provides a focus for thematizing
the `solidity' of this constraining necessity,can therefore be said to constitute
nothing more than a metaphoricalaffirmation of a tautology. Supplementaryto this I
initially argued that the metaphorical figure of solidarity-solidity is calculated to
invoke a senseof grandeur in the continuity of the social. What we must seek out,
therefore, is why such social feelings are linked with a conception that accountsfor
the issue of necessityby meansof a doctrine of the externality of the social, and how
be
for
in
immanent
less
feelings
dogmatic
accounted
may
a
and
more
such social
way.

56

Externality

versus Objectification

What remains at issueis the statusof the notion of `the externality of the
social' as a concept presumablyreferring to an entity independentof individual
experiencesand statesof affairs. It might seemto many that the most pressing
questionis whether or not this externality is an effect of some sort of alienating
objectification that can be eliminated or alleviated in someway. However, I will
arguethat Durkheim correctly discoveredthat the externality of the social is real, and
doesrefer to an independentor sui generis social being, and that the latter is not
related in any essentialway to what is known in social theory as `objectification. '
We will see,as a result, how Durkheim differentiates sociology from pursuits such as
political economy and managementstudiesin general.
To begin with, it should be made clear that Durkheim's sociological approach
was never to take an `objective reality' for granted and then measurethe extent and
strength of whatever determinesit. This would require supposingthat Durkheim
independent
fact,
he
in
In
society's
existence.
simply posited
was never a positivist
this sense. Rather than argue for the existenceof some objective society, Durkheim
for
from
the existenceof the social per se.
solidarity
crafted an argument
Let me recapitulate briefly some relevant points from what we have already
seenin regard to the argument from solidarity. The main thrust of this argument is
that it resolvesthe factual observationof obligation with a deductive reasoningbased
is
by
The
resolution
of
need.
accomplished
meansof the
an
assumption
upon
physical metaphor of `solidity', a metaphor which describesthe repeated
juxtaposition of individual facts and the reasonsfor their obligatory, needful
in
`structural'
implies
This
terms.
that society as the
quasi-spatial
or
association
kind
has
this
repetition
a.
of independenceas a moulding or shaping force in
whole of

57

humandevelopment. It is characterizableas the latter to the extent that it somehow

auto-selectsfrom the material universe the elementsthat go into making up those
various tangible organic designsfor human living that are necessaryand unavoidable
in the long-term perspectiveof human existence. This is really a spatial, even
architectural metaphor describing a certain durability.
However, in reverseorder the implied ontological argumentbecomesmore
independent
durability
the
the
the
obvious:
of
social proves
coherenceof the various
instancesof its design which proves its superiority over its own transient and
its
its
proves
necessity
contingent materials which
which proves existence.
Moreover, the physical metaphor involved here createsthe illusion that social facts
are transparentlyknowable once the spatial structure of the featuresthat one wants to
know are retraced. In addition, for the Durkheim of the Division of Labour, one
cannot do this retracing without detecting and following the movement or birth of a
society from the mechanicalto the organic. Thus, the knowable essenceof a society
is, from the beginning for him, identical with the progressof its modernity. One
cannot fully know a society defined as solidarity unless one witnessesits modern
from
know
What
type
to
solidarity
can
one
of
another.
we
about
pains
growing
in
it
if
define
as solidarity, consists the movement of modernity. For
society, we
Durkheim everything applied to the social, both ontology and epistemology, goes
back to the definition of organic solidarity.
Now becausehe involved organic solidarity so inextricably in his central
definition of modern society, Durkheim's social ontology and social epistemology
are misleading and as we have seenrely upon hidden tautologies and groundless
metaphors. I could admit that it may not be possible to avoid tautology when dealing
interesting
if
instead
However,
it
be
the
the
of
social.
externality
of using
would
with

58

an overly-specific metaphorof more or less solid connectivity we could say that the
externality of the social is what humanssimply refer to as `the outside'. One of the
aims of Part II and my concluding chapter is to socially account for `the outside.'
For `the outside' must be distinct from other geographicalreferencessuch as `the
environment' precisely to the extent that it is a social distinction. We refer to an
`outside' precisely when we think, not just of human geography,but more
specifically of our human strugglesboth for social freedom and social inclusion
involved in that geography. Indeed, these social struggleswould therefore be the
explanation for `constantchange' and what we collectively call `modernity.'
Durkheim understood `constantchange' as a social necessitystemming from the
necessityof the division of labour. Occupations,in this sense,are, in his way of
thinking, the basic agentsof modern change.
Up to the presentwe have had only a vague intimation of what is at stakein
the notion of `the externality of the social.' However, we have now at least come to
in
the Durkheimian
see
more
precisely
occupations
point
at
which
we
may
why
are
a
factor
in
thinking
not
a
contributory
emphatically
objectifying processes. It
of
way
might be easyto musunderstandDurkheim on this point and to accusehim of
absurdity for his claim that the social could exist independentlyof the very
individuals that go to make it up. However, absurdity only enterswhen one assumes
that existenceincludes manifestation at somepoint. It is true, as we have seen,that
Durkheim believes `obligation' comesto us in a factual way in key social
experiencesand statesof affairs. But `obligation' is understoodby Durkheim only as
a kind of facticity of thesemanifested,experiencedsocial realities; it is an important,
general fact but it does not define the form or content of the social positively by
its
fact.
inheres
in the social
For
Durkheim
status
as
a
general
virtue of
obligation

59

but
kind
facticity.
The distinction,
rather
generality
as
a
of
neutral
not as a passive
fine
it
be
but
is in fact a highly important one for
to
this
a
one,
put
way, appears
understandingDurkheim's social theory, for if attendedto correctly it can show us
just exactly why we must attack Durkheim's theory of obligation on grounds of
ambiguoustautology rather than on grounds of vagueness. The `constraint' of the
is
important
facticity
for
Durkheim but as an
this,
the
of
ambiguous
social, and
for
him
it
is
facticity
sufficient to define the social and thus he
not
allegedly neutral
have
have
To
the
to
transcend
this
to
ambiguity.
end,
attempted
we
seen
can claim
how he believes that that which is required for this transcendenceis to connect
fully
for
in
to
social reality. Durkheim wants to
order
account
obligation with need
is
for
That
sociology.
why, perhapsrather countera
social
ontology
provide
intuitively, social need is not a manifested, experiencedfact for Durkheim but is
in
key
his
a
need
of
sociality,
a
of
portion
of
social
an
assertion
premise,
rather a
his
is,
from
be
following
To
this
portion
of
analysis
sure,
on
ontological analysis.
this premise, deductive, and the form of deduction can indeed make Durkheim's
hard
to assail.
theory
seemvery
social
The subject-matterof his attention, social reality, for Durkheim, lies
in
his
fact.
Later
between
the
the
and
career,Durkheim turned
premise
somewhere
(I
Labour
Divison
his
`spatial
from
the
of
of
arguments'
will cover these
away
`emblematology',
in
in
detail
turned
towards
two)
and
more
an
a
chapter
arguments
theory of symbolism in the formation of societies(Gane 1992: 61-84). But even
f

there what was suggestedby Durkheim was not that the manifestation of emblems is
it,
As
Durkheim
to
the
societies.
put
of
manifestation
equivalent
if the moral force sustainingthe believer does not come from the idol he
him
he
from
he
is
it
is
the
outside
of
emblem venerates,still
as
adoresor

60

well aware. The objectivity of its symbol only translates its externalness
(Durkheim, quoted in Gane, 1992: 80. Italics mine.)
Thus, the later Durkheim cannot be said to have modified his basic premise that the
is
fundamentally
irreducible
the
to the manifestationsassociated
social
externality of
with it. The latter cannot therefore be understood as more than, for him, ontically
necessaryobstaclesor codings which societiescan, nonetheless,in casesof creative
practice, critically and massively surpassin ontological terms. What is interesting to
lay
in
is
how
in
Durkheim's
thought
this
the division of labour, in
creativity
early
me
the way the division of labour provokes a need of wholeness,a social need. For in
this Durkheimian way of thinking, the social occupation is in this real sensesocial
fact
before
before
in
itself,
important
In
the
the
and
premise.
an
sense,the
reality
Division of Labour had to be written before the concept of emblematismcould be
formulated. It is the externality of the social, as grounded there in occupational
Durkheimian
all
of
sociology.
grounds
social need,which

Durkheim's claim as to the independentexistenceof the social apart from

individuals is therefore not as absurdas it seemsat first glance. For Durkheim never
initially
that
and continuously thereafter for him go to
occupations,which
argued
in
independently
the
themselves,
the
social,
are
manifested
of
of
reality
make up
individuals. He rather arguedthat occupationsare the focal point, the creative and
inexorable
locus
Thus,
need
of
a
specifically
of
an
social
existence.
essential
Durkheim's social theory certainly does not entail the supposition that `occupations'
from
items
for
be
`individuals
manifested
apart
such
as,
example,
who
can somehow
are occupied', or an `occupationalevent.'
We have now seenthat the independenceof the existenceof the social
does
in
include
Durkheim's
thought,
not, any stageof
properly speaking

61

manifestationat somepoint. Durkheim is never a positivist, at least not in any

essentialway. Durkheim's social thinking has a factual side, an empirical side which
conceptually encompassessocially-related manifestation, and to this he identifies
only `obligation' as of key relevance. Even then obligation is not simply de facto
obligation but is a `needed' or `structural' obligation. It is thought of as only a
framework for a social reality which is irreducible to the framework. This
ontological way of thinking does,therefore, require supposingthat this sort of social
existenceis superior to, or `over and above' a merely individual existence. Beings
will be categorizedand preferred in accordancewith their relative proximity to the
main needof sociality. But this superiority is not an empirical superiority. It has to
be a non-empirical superiority for Durkheim. Thus, what is superior and what is
inferior cannot be pre-defined. Durkheim holds that individual existence,that which
is objective and apparently isolated in social modernity, is in truth dependentupon
social existence. But this social existenceis a zone of indeterminacy from the point
of view of the individual. It is a wholly other, larger reality that is not dependent
upon contextualized individual existence. The superiority of the social is an
ontological superiority only.
But from what we know about Durkheim's social theory, this senseof
ontological superiority cannot be taken to dilute the force of his belief that
occupationsare for him the elementsnot just of a zone of indeterminacy but more
specifically of a social whole which exists independentlyof individuals. What this
is
describe
he
that
this senseof the superiority of the social
means
can only
metaphorically. We are supposedto take the concept of `solidarity' as a kind of
master-emblemof this superiority of social existenceover individual existence. Of
course, as I have shown, there is an inherent weaknessin Durkheim's concept of

62

solidarity. Indeed, there are problemswith his whole theorization of the social.
However, these problems do not include the problem of objectification, if the latter is
understoodto include the notion of manifestation at somepoint. Objectified
phenomenaare manifestedand appearas empirically isolated in relation to other
objects. Occupations,for Durkheim, are precisely never isolated phenomena.
Indeed, it is perhapsa more acute problem for Durkheim that due to his ontological
approachto the social via the theory of occupationshe will have difficulty in
specifying particular empirical occupations. But certainly they are not `piecesof an
objective reality' or even of an ideology which makes a claim on such a reality.
How then, could a Durkheemiandeal with the more empirical issue of the fact
that occupationscontinue to run the risk of being `objectified' as work and labour?
Indeed, we can here broadenour perspectiveto include contemporary social reality.
`Objectification', or somethinglike it, is the modus operandi of the identifications
relied upon in managementand self-management. The working and labouring
subject has no freedom to changethe managementand self-managementsystem.
Attempts have for a long time been madeto isolate subjectivity at someextreme
in
revolutionary point which non-work and non-labour might be at least notionally
incorporated into the processof work and labour and a more socially responsible
social whole established. At the sametime we have seenfrom practice that this is
idealistic and impossible, and not just due to endemic class conflict, but due more
generally to the fact that the working and labouring subject's class identity is
weakened,or at least mediated,by the necessityof occupational differentiation, as
difference
by
difference.
This point has even becomea
and
as
gender
race
well
textbook truism in the sociology of work: "gender, ethnic and occupational
divisions, mediated by the interpretative processesof individual and social

63

interaction, ensurethat heterogeneitynot homogeneity is the historically constructed

norm at the level of social groups and individuals" (Grint 1991: 152).
Despite its drawbacks,Durkheim's way of thinking is neverthelessuseful for
dispelling the grip of this `objectification' conundrum. He showedalready in the
19th-centurythat the reality of these divisions alone is evidenceenoughof the
impossibility of any revolutionary objectification of non-work and non-labour, ie. a
social revolution, from the limited perspectiveof work and labour. Today, it seems
that Durkheim was correct to the extent that social opinion appearsto have come to
acceptthe fact that strength-in-recognition on the shop-floor cannot and should not
be assumedto carry with it the sameat home. In the end, it is likely that the sphere
labour
domestic
the
the
sphere
of
and
and
work
can only be harmonizedas such
of
from the objectifying perspectiveof managementand self-managementwith the
support of govermentswhich value managementefficiency above all else. And then
be
would
always
a matter of attaining a degreeof
such a politics of compromise
harmony that would probably become more unsatisfactoryto more citizens the more
its compromiseswould be able to take effect. A controversy-freepolitics would, in
fact, be likely to have the inadvertent effect of provoking general instability; as long
it
be
for
it
a
source
of
pessimism
various agentsof human
as continues will certainly
liberation.
Surely it has gradually becomeclearer since the days of classical social
theory that `objectification' is a less compelling issue in society than the `division of
labour.' This is all the more clear when we consider the class subjectivity which was
different
to
modesof such objectification. The enduring,
supposed accompany
is
despite
change
occupational
changewhich goes on
class
essentialsocial
subjectivity. That is not to supposethat class subjectivity and objectification do not

64

important
importance.
is
is
have
Rather,
that a certain sense
no
what
really occur or
of occupationalexistencecontinues amidst the decline of these classically work9
centredways of thinking about social practices. There is a lack of conceptualtools
today which might help us to specify the modernity, the social impact upon
individuals, of this working as well as non-working occupational existencethat
continuesamidst ongoing occupational change.
Conclusion
This is what I take Durkheim's main insight to be: occupations delimit an
is
the
not an effect of objectification, since objectification
social
which
externality of
includes manifestation at some point and occupations are not a part of manifestation
or vice versa. Occupations are rather a social need and social need always exceeds
human
According
Durkheim,
`grounds'
the
to
though
even
manifestation.
social
or
intricately
dynamic,
increasingly
is
and
socialized, social occupations
modern,
world
are still able to generate for individuals a sense of coherence related to social need.
Durkheim argued that this coherence was a function of what he called `solidarity. ' I
have argued that this is a mere tautology and that `solidarity' explains nothing in this
is
is
in
from
It
diverts
that
at
stake
socialization.
which
attention
regard and actually
himself
Durkheim
thematize
that
to
admits cannot
which
a physical metaphor used
be physically manifested. With this critique of Durkheim, then, we have opened up
the possibility of a broader viewpoint from which we can see, more clearly than
Durkheim did, just exactly why the criterion of modernity cannot be derivable from
the objectives of management and organization, nor indeed from any politicallatter
is
because
This
the
the
work against
case not
economic conceptions.
,
`solidarity' but rather because the latter are defined within a perspective in which

9 On this decline, for a neo-liberal point of view seeRifken 1995; for a more critical, post-marxist
Gorz
Vaneigen
1983.
1967
1982;
for
of
view
see
and
a
radical-anarchist
point
see
point of view

65

social practices are summedup and criticized according to the extent to which they
are manifestedin themselvesas objective occupations. The criterion of modem
is
but
socially
not
manifestation
practicesconsidered
rather occupation.

This chapter,then, has also servedto point our way forward. What has been
is
by
the
that they must involve
of
occupations
non-manifestability
suggested
alternatively some other senseof reality. It was correctly proposedby Durkheim, in
my view, that for social ontological reasonswe must use some sort of indirect
method of analysing social practices. But then, as I seeit, he confusedthis issueby
introducing his metaphor of solidarity into the apparentgap between social concepts
and social reality. All he was warranted in assertingwas that the division of labour is
in
it
is
left
Thus,
the
to
the
to us
modern
externality
of
social.
some
now
related
way
to investigate how strong and motivating this `outside' really is that is createdduring
the occupying moments of modern social practices. If the outside is that intrinsic
part of social occupationswhich meansthat they are precisely not manifested,then
indeed it must be worthy of investigation. The outside,that vital and yet ominous
by
division
labour
the
created
modern
of
senseof social externality
must be
but
is
directly
that
somehow
sensed
not
observed.
something
What we have to deal with socially, therefore, and what I have formulated, is
is
because
That
criterion.
we must assignexistenceto the occupation
an ontological
basis
immediate
human
individual
their
the
the
of
and
on
constitution,
outside
and
involves
that
the
though
strictly
must
say
speaking
occupation
we
a
even
transcendenceof subjective human experienceand objective statesof affairs. In
contrast, managementand most political economy works with mediated generalities
that are indifferent to their human origins and therefore assumesthat the outside is

66

merely the relative difference between objectives. Much of mainstreamsociology,

following Durkheim, counterposesto this an idea that the power of the social is
irreducible to thesebusinessobjectives becauseit involves a power of solidarity, a
power of the group,and its inherent morality. But the theory of this social wholeness
is, as it indeed should be, basedupon our ontologically-sensitive attention to the
division of labour and specifically our occupationsas the agenciesof social change
and therefore as seriousinternal challengesto social integrity. And even from the
most simple of such social-ontological observationsit should be clear that in
involve
individual strugglesfor wholenesswhich are
actuality social occupations
`not
always
yet' achieved. The persistentnotion of an outside gives us an intuition
of this fundamental incompleteness. That the struggle implied by the notion of the
outside must be manifestedcreatively is our intuition of the constitutive feature of
modernity. We have thus reachedthe limits of the social necessityof modernity, but
we have neverthelessconfirmed that there must always be a certain intensity of this
be
linked
must
always
social necessitywhich
with social needsand thus connected
with social occupations.

67

CHAPTER TWO

SOCIAL QUANTITY AND DIFFERENCE

The managerialoutlook on the world has been suspectedby many of having a

strong will to quantify and control"every aspectof society. However, in my view,
is
what more specifically characteristicof managementand organization and most of
political economy is a concernto do with the manifestation of social phenomena. By
`manifestation'
I
the
term
am calling attention to something other than an
using
is
bias.
in
Quantification
the social sciencesthat is
a
generic
approach
empirical
disputed even in managementstudies,whereasa focus upon manifestation much
betrays
a concernto seekout signs and opportunities of the
more specifically
optimization of social reality.
The ways of sociology and practical philosophy are certainly unifiable only to
the extent that ontology is taken to be the paramount questionwith respectto the
it
Ontology
to
attempts
avoid
what
seesas concernsthat are peripheral to
social.
includes
in
is
This
the
manifestation,
which
existence.
usual understanding mixed
Ontological
the
of
appearances.
contingency
approachesto the social are
with
in
common sociology and practical philosophy. Thesedisciplines attempt to deal
from
However,
necessity.
a perspectivesuch as this which sees
primarily with

68

manifestationas a false problem, it is neverthelesspossible to see quantification as

an important part of social ontology.
In the Division of Labour Durkheim saw quantification as a key component
in his argument from solidarity for the existenceof society. As I have argued above,
the argumentfrom solidarity relies solely upon a tautology between the background
conceptsof need and obligation and thus standsor falls dependingupon whether we
acceptthis tautology. But Durkheim, of course, did not seeit that way. He believed
he could support his equation and the structural description of human needthat is
basedupon it by meansof a causalargument. It thus remains for me to show how
this causalapproachdoesnot support Durkheim's theory. I will not arguethat his
invalid
is
logically
or that causalargumentscan never be madeto
causalargument
but
theory
rather that Durkheim's argument is contextually unsound.
support social
This is because,for reasonsthat I believe even Durkheim himself would ultimately
have to accept,a quantitative argument can only account for the degreesof spatial
dimension and not the basic types of structure of human need. Moreover, there are
two distinct notions of difference implied in the latter two categories,and we shall
seethat the lack of a rigorous distinction betweenthesetwo orders of difference is at
the root of Durkheim's error. Thus, my argument will conclude that Durkheim
issue
dimension
is
how
bound
instrinsically
the
to
see
of
spatial
neglected
up
with
social occupations. This neglect was causedby his focussing his attention instead
upon an investigation into an erroneoussupposition that spatial arrangementand
rearrangementmight be an objective causeor condition of the existenceof society.
Social Quantity
Durkheim's main causalargument for the existenceof society finds the cause
in
of solidarity the phenomenonof population density. Population density is indeed

69

is
that
an objective phenomenon
physically measurableusing a statistical method. It
is obviously related to the social in someway. What Durkheim seesas its impact is
that, according to him, increasesin population density inevitably lead to a struggle
for existencewhich determineschangesbetween types of solidarity. For Durkheim,
is
density
thus a quantitative phenomenonwhich can be said to determine
population
qualitative social changein general. Durkheim thus hasto understand`population
density' in a very broad way. And I believe it is a way which includes and confuses
the issuesof quantity changeand quality change.
The main focus of what I seeas Durkheim's confusion over social quantity
has nothing to do with merely counting the individual membersof a population and
whether or not this is possible and the extent of its accuracyand whether or not it
reflects factual reality. Rather, it hasto do with a question of theoretical principle
concerningwhether or not measurablespatial changehas the capability to determine
in
between
Durkheim
what
called mechanical and the organic types
a change nature
believed
Durkheim
that what he called mechanical social relations are
of solidarity.
in essencespatial relations between `segments' of the population. In Durkheim's
way of seeingthe social world, a population is a mosaic of formal `segments'. A
is
individual
the
the
a
section
of
population
membersof the population.
segmentof
It is defined externally as a potential organ of society or by its potential for
integration, and internally as a collective consciencecontingent upon the degreeof
its
According
to Durkheim, therefore, segmentshave no
members.
resemblanceof
have
intrinsic
dissolve
if
it
happens
to
that these individual
and
reality
necessary,
resemblancescome to be sharedto a significant degreewith those of other segments.
Instead of appearingas a collapse of the social need for the role that these segments
dissolution
is
fulfill,
the
the
of
segments
rather characterizedas a dissolution
might

70

of participatory boundarieswhich createsthe conditions for a struggle between

contendingsocial participants over a natural need for society which endures.
The essenceof social struggle is thus for Durkheim a struggle for substitution
which looks like a kind of natural selection. As Durkheim claims, "specialization
cannot fail to be the outcome" (1984: 212). The struggle appearsto be between
segmentsof the population and it may be necessaryto speakin terms of segmental
strugglebut becausesegmentshave porous boundariesthe struggle is actually among
the membersof those segmentswho find themselvesinvolved in an identityin
the
of
challenging reorganization
roles society that needto be fulfilled. Indeed,
we might seeevidenceof such a phenomenontoday in the difference betweenthe
apparentlyobjective managerialconception of job redundancyand the ways in which
the reality of these firings have an impact beyond the objective factors to include
in
identity
issues
society. In his day Durkheim could still feel
core
and value
justified in making use of a certain common rhetorical optimism: "the segmentary
organ that triumphs, if we may speakin those terms, cannot be sufficient to
undertakethe larger task that now falls to it in the future saveby a greater division of
labour" (1984: 212). Nonetheless,the hard truth that Durkheim discoveredthat is
probably still true today is that a segmentin itself and its basis in resemblanceor in
`what one is used to' is only a relative human needwhereassociety as a focus for
organizing different distributions and identities is, very likely in some sense,an
absolutehuman need. The processbegins in an inflexible segmentaryorganization
that has little overall coherenceand limited diversity and moves toward a modem
has
greater overall coherenceand diversity but comesto
organization which not only
dynamic,
though metaphysicalreality in itself which the membersof any
exist as a
population can still recognize as stemming from their social needsbut to which they

71

if
by
feel
become
bound
They
this as their
absolute
obligation.
as
an
nevertheless
involving
become
of concentrationwhile at the
practices
vertically more and more
sametime horizontally more and more interrelated with those of others, and thus
becomemore and more social occupations. "A break in the equilibrium of the social
massgives rise to conflicts that can only be resolved by a more developedform of
the division of labour: this is the driving force for progress" (1984: 212).
In my view, there is a great amount of accuracy in Durkheim's theory of
is
because
However,
Durkheim's
to
reasoning
a
significant
extent
weak
modernity.
his causalargument, as a statistics-basedargument, fundamentally appealsto a
individual
degree
the
the
membersthat go to make up the
quantity of
of
varying
is
inconsistent
his
density
fact
therefore
and
with
argument with
social
of population
labour
in
division
basis
the
the
to
of
need. In the overall argument,the
of
respect
division of labour is explained by the necessaryexistenceof types of structure of
human need. The main thrust of the argument is that modem structuresof difference
tend to becomea human priority over traditional structuresof resemblancewithout
development
is
latter.
Human
therefore a tendency
the
completely eliminating
toward a modem progressdefined by differentiating externalization which are
historically `solidified' into forms of social existencewhich are more and more
flexible, coherent, independentof the individual, and organic. In the causal
division
labour
directly
link
is
to
the
to
therefore
of
more
argument, an attempt made
the dissolution of primitive organization. The main argument dependson this link.
The way Durkheim outlines his theory of this changeis therefore consistentas a
strategyof argumentation.
However, if we consider this move as a theoretical strategy, I think there is in
Durkheim a fatal inconsistency stemming from a confusion over the relation of space

72

and quantity. It is the issue of this relation in particular that the metaphor employed
in the overall argument completely glossesover. In the causalargumentDurkheim
assumesas a premise that an increasein the number and physical concentration of
individual personsis a direct causeof the duplication of roles among various societal
segments. But why do not increasesin population density simply result in the spatial
modification of the samesegmentaryorganizations? Durkheim implies to the
contrary that primitive organizationsrequire their own unique, static spaces,and
there seemsto be no justification on his part of this assumption. Indeed, in this
lie
inspiration
his
the
to
seems
of
unexaminedpremise
notion of solidity.
The problem is that before\ve can accept any argumentto do with a struggle
for substitution we must acceptthat social role duplication (the duplication of
traditional ways of fulfilling social needs,) and indeed a relatively unlimited
multiplication, occurs spontaneouslyalong with increasesin population density.
Here we have to acceptthat populations spontaneouslygroup together into unique
segments. We also have to acceptthat these segmentsare somehow originally
differentiated
indubitably
Durkheim
therefore
spatially.
partitioned posits the
existenceof static spacesas the original sites of traditional organizations. For
Durkheim, the traditional is traditional becauseof its lesserproximity to a juncture in
itself
is in fact a problem, and to the feeling of
that
sociality
which one might sense
sociality as a feeling of needwhich first gives rise to this juncture. Durkheim's
conception of the static nature of traditional sites is linked with his assumptionthat
these sites are containersof a finite number of human members. Any new members
it
full
must
spill
segment
over, as were, acrossthe partitions of the segments. He
of a
has to explain the dissolution of bordering segmentsand what he is attempting to
suggestis that a spatially-motivated exclusion acrosspartitions - not a needbut

73

dissolution.
this
causes
much rather an over-abundance-For according to Durkheim
the more this excretion occurs the more redundancyor inter-segmentalmembership
duplication occurs: this has the net result of making bordering segmentsmore and
more alike and their borders unnecessary.But why doesDurkheim supposethat
intra-segmental spatial solutions are not found that can addressspatial problems?
The whole problem that I am addressingin my critique of Durkheim is this
have
We
that
spaces
are
static
containers.
social
would
no
unjustifiable supposition
accountof why thesecontainerswere originally differentiated, of how they acquired
their contents and why.
Two criticisms can therefore be asserted. On the one hand, from an empirical
point of view, Durkheim seems to unjustifiably suppose that segmentary societies
have no indigenous mechanisms for controlling and directing population growth.
Here Durkheim would respond that he is not claiming that social resemblances can
be explained spatially but rather that spatial techniques must be explained socially.
But there are probably many spatial techniques which would factor into the
constitution of a segmentary society which he does not explore, and therefore until
investigate
the extent of these we cannot accept that the sole significance of
we
spatial social change is to cause role duplication and a resulting progress of social
modernity.

Some spatial techniques such as many solutions to population density

that we see in Asia would likely even problematize our whole conception of
modernity, particularly if our conception had no cultural dimensions and rested upon
'
premature conclusions about the social significance of space.

On the other hand, one can asserta theoretical criticism. This is the criticism
that Durkheim confused spaceand quantity, and in my view it is the more serious
' One example that comesto mind is that of compartment-hotelsin Japanwhich representan internal
or organizational spatial responseto a spatial problem.

74

part of the problem. If we think of social changeas a breaking up of traditional static

social spaces- as differentiation - we nonethelessneedto account for why, in the
first place,numbers of similar actors do gravitate together and reproducetheir
segmentof the population in close proximity. Durkheim simply posited the
existenceof the `horde' and basedhis theory upon this unexaminedpremise (1984:
126). The theory of social segmentsdoes not constitute the necessaryexplanation
for the positing of the horde. It simply takes as its point of departurean apparent
`solidity' of their formation at an arbitrary point. Durkheim therefore attemptsto
introduce a quantitative argumentto supplementthis theme of his main structural and
he
introduces
but
is
actually
argument,
what
only nominally a quantitative
qualitative
argument. It is not fully a quantitative argument if it attributes no significance to the
individuation of elementsand the operationsbetweenthem that result in the setsof
elementsin question. Durkheim is actually only interestedin the dissolution of
differences
between
he
discrete
sets,
in
is
interested
only
agents, ie.
ready-made
thosewith more or less completeboundaries. Durkheim therefore does not seemto
have much faith in quantity at all. In the end, there is little to distinguish his position
from the naive position that quantity in general provides somekind of `solidity'.
The Perception of Difference
I would tend to link thesetwo possible criticisms. A primary problem as I see
it is that we are left with no explanation on the part of Durkheim for the role of
in
the original creationsof societies. Durkheim would
gravity
and
mutual attraction
have us believe that this is "a moot point" (1984: 25). For Durkheim it is simply
life,
it
becomes
inevitably
"social
lasting,
tends to assumea
that
wherever
axiomatic
definite form and becomeorganised" (1984: 25). Why does Durkheim posit such a
he
I
the
that
accept
cannot
simplistic
explanation
was simply enamoured
premise?

75

form
he
the
experiencedin founding a new school of thought. Putting
with
of power
the questionthis way is again to ignore the reasonsfor this new kind of power,
motivated as it was by the kind of grandiose social convictions that were commonly
displayedby nearly all of the classical social theorists.
As we have seen,Durkheim's main theme from the outset of his work hasto
do with a fundamental connection he draws between modernity and society. In the
Division of Labour he proposedthat modernity can and should be conceived as
progressive,as a matter of positive social need,rather than as something merely
negative or merely new and unsettling to various traditions. Nonetheless,for
Durkheim, modernity is highly complex. What is interesting is that for Durkheim
modernity arises precisely when lines are blurred and borders are crossedbetween
kinds
differences,
level
feelings
the
of
on
of
segmented
of inferiority and superiority,
exclusion, inclusion, and between correspondingspatio-temporalsituations. This
be
heart
issue
difference
to
the
the
at
seems
of
perception of
of classical
Durkheimian social theory.
Durkheim set these feelings and situations into the context of a theory of
modern social movement which he derived from studying the division of social
labour. According to Durkheim, individuals who perceive differences among
themselvesare motivated to becomeinnovators of cooperative movementsand to
oblige each other to sustainthese movementsas projects of socialization. From this
arisesincreasingly formal, regular, and persistant patternsor social structures. New,
ever-increasingly stratified societiesare the overall result. For once a certain social
implies,
is
is
inherent
Durkheim
in
it
there
experienced,
a
repetition
regularity
which
begins again to createborders betweengroups of individuals. In Durkheim's way of

76

thinking, modernity, with all the social repetition that emergesfrom it, paradoxically
is inextricably interwoven with a perception of difference.
Furthermore, Durkheim goes so far as to claim that social repetition causes
segmentaldifferences. As the latter emergethey becomeadded,cumulatively, to old
disappeared.
have
This `bare' repetition of the same
completely
oneswhich
never
differencesunderminesthe bonds of obligation to the extent that there arisesa need
in
of wholenesswhich acted upon results new obligations that come to standbeside
he
had
With
Durkheim
this
that
obligations.
was
satisfied
old
arrived at a description
of the developmentof modern social complexity. To find a solution to this
complexity, the whole question of evolutionary timing and of `anomie', seemsto
have beenthe most pressing question for him. But from our perspectivetoday we
have easily seenthat there is something strongly doubtful about this problematique.
What is primarily doubtful is not so much the call for `solidity' in itself, nor
but
in
familiar
things
those
strange
are
still
as political or
metaphoricity generalis
doubtful,
What
really
and perhapsmuch more disturbing,
quasi-political rhetoric.
is the conception of modern necessitywhich lies behind them which is guided by the
figure of a `needof wholeness'.
The `needof wholeness' is for Durkheim that which explains both how
innovation
how
towards
social
apart
and
and
people are pulled
people are pushed
together and away from further social innovation. It is supposedsomehowto
in
difference,
for
two
types
therefore
these
and
essence,supposesthat
of
account
these differences are the same. The early Durkheim, the Durkheim of the Division of
Labour and the Rules, wants to prove that there is one seamlesssocial ontology,
by
in
the
the
the
need
of
negative
and
wholeness,
which
connects
positive
unifed
life.
have
insufficient
how
But
and misleading was
we
seen
utterly
modern social

77

Durkheim's attempt at a causalargument from population density in support of this

proof. What is much more coherentand compelling in the early Durkheim is the
insight that one can still gain from a perspectiveon society which is fundamentally
ontological.
For despitean ever-advancingmarch of modernity, contingency, and
individuality which is obvious to all, Durkheim's perspectiveprivileges necessity,
where the need of wholenessis socially speaking at least arguably still a veritable
universal need. Only a veritable universal need can supply the senseof necessity
which proves the independentexistenceof the social. In Durkheim's view, only
independent
justify
the
the
existences
of
social
can
proof of
a sociology. For
Durkheim, then, individualities are only transitory moments in a greater processof
social necessity. According to Durkheim, in modernity we seean increasein
contingency and individuality but therefore also a correspondingincreasein the need
intrinsically
therefore
a
proliferation
of wholenessand
of
complicated social circles.
In his way of thinking, social ontology can help to explain and thus perhapsmitigate
the
`anomic' dangersof this complexification.
Durkheim could therefore still be said to have fashioned in his early writing
careera compelling attempt to ground the effects of modernity in the development of
is
feeling
life
But
there
that shortens
sociology.
nevertheless
an
and
unsettling
social
our praise of Durkheim, one which comes from our common contemporary
perception that the `needof wholeness' seems,in this way of thinking, to be all too
ready to engineer `solutions' to the perception of difference. NonethelessI think that
there is a real problem that needsto be actively addressed,and that is that the needof
wholeness,the motivation of social totalization, is taken, too often by its harshest
its
as
sentimental adherents- and classically by Durkheim, which
critics as well

78

his
makes work so instructive - as `the one' explanation which somehow accounts
for both large ruptural social differences and small differences made by social
repetition. The lack of any unity, of even any potential `normal' unity, betweenthese
latter two social aspectsis a point which so many subsequenttheorists will, not
surprisingly, begin to insist upon.
However, almost as if he already sensedthis shortcoming, after The Rules
Durkheim's writing began to take on the burden of explaining how the needof
wholenessis implicated in social psychology, specifically in the formation of models
that are collectively followed by membersof societies,and in the emblematismthat I
already mentioned above (p. 51). In this later period Durkheim came to rely upon a
theory of collective effervescencefor his account of social innovation. As Stephen
Lukes puts it, "from the first publication of The Rules onwards, the focus of
Durkheim's attention shifted... to what we might call the cultural or ideational
dimension of social reality, and what Durkheim himself called `collective
representations"' (Durkheim 1982: 6).
The theory of collective effervescence,as found in Durkheim's last major
Forms
Religious
Life,
The
Elementary
the
of
constitutesDurkheim's
monograph,
theory of the genesisof collective representations(1961). Collective representations,
for Durkheim, are mental statesand ideasthat cannot be held individually and can
only be held in common in a society. The theory of collective effervescenceattempts
to account for how these collective mental statesand ideasarise. However, we need
not go far into the theory in order to show clearly that it still only accountsfor the
into
forms
life
have
being.
In
of
collective
which
already
come
repetition of
Durkheim's own words, it explains only how a novel ideal, a social model, can be
"added' to the reality of a collective life which is already given (1973: 195. Italics

79

).
mine. Thus, we may immediately seethat if we are seeking an explanation and not
merely a further description of Durkheim's positing of the need of wholeness,then
we have run into an unsurmountableobstaclein Durkheim's thinking. In my view, it
would not be too strong to say that the theory of collective effervescencecan only
mystify rather than clarify the provenanceof the need of wholenessfrom which,
accordingto Durkheim, necessarymodern societiesemerge.
Becauseit is strictly an empirical notion, the notion of `effervescence'takes
us further away from, rather than closer to, an understandingof how the need of
wholenessis involved in our various ongoing social occupations. Durkheim held the
satisfaction of the need of wholenessas a background idea which defines the end of
social innovation, but he also therefore implicitly took wholenessto be an activity
that one can pursue since social innovation meansnothing without including a sense
in
of pursuit, even where as the majority of casessuch pursuit is not goal-directed.
In this implicit aspectof Durkheim's thinking lies an important insight which reveals
the properly occupational meaning of social existence. But it is, ironically, an insight
which the preeminent theorist of the Division of Labour did not and could not
develop, since there is no way of connectingthe pursuit of an occupation
experientially with obligation in the way that one can think of the connection
betweenthe need of wholenessand obligation experientially. Thinking about our
experiencesrequires reflection upon eventswhich have already happened.
`Effervescence' seemsto have been selectedas a concept by Durkheim later in his
careerprecisely becauseit is, in principle, an historically observablecollective
" But our occupations,which are much more pervasively
experience.
and
immediately our social subject-matter,are clearly not historically observable

80

collective experiences,or are so in only a very partial way. Rather, occupationsare

in
incorporating
that,
composed such a way
so many different kinds of feelings and
perceptionsover the courseof a day, we could never believe that they could be
by
wholly explained referenceto obligations which come from the past. But then nor
could they be explained by some collective sensationfrom the immediate past which
we might describeas effervescence,since the latter would still be no more then a
mere generalization basedupon experience,no matter how `close' to the presentit is.
If we had to rely only upon experience,upon reflection `at the end of the day'
for example, our occupationswould appearrather simply as blank spacesof memory
amidst an incoherent mix of activities without any clear internal boundaries. Any
immediately
them
appearas over-generalizations.
would
generalizationsabout
Hence the famous `silence' of the worker who hasjust returned home. In the same
in
just
ignorance
inherent
this
experience
creates
as much a problem for the
way,
concept of the `needof wholeness'. This concept includes, as a hidden premise, or
as a kind of blind spot, that social individuals perceive differences amongst
themselves. We can only presumethat Durkheim supposedthis perception of
difference to be simply primary, obvious, and unproblematic. But if we take it to be
it
is
be
in
based
to
means
supposed
which
experience,the
concept,
an empirical
is
in
important
difference
For
surely meaningless.
an
sense,experience
perception of
is difference, or a kind of difference, whereasdifference itself is not exhaustedby
is
there
therefore
nothing about experienceper se which can provide
and
experience,
difference.
in
Experience
simply
purchase
upon
every casetakes
a
critical
us with
the perception of difference for granted. Hence, if the `need of wholeness' cannot be
left as an intuitive proposition but rather has to be set into the context of a richer
11By this I mean that it is conceivable that we have all had someintimation of such a phenomena
occurring, ie. we can shapean hypothetical description of it in our minds and comparethis description

81

theory of social occupations,the perception of difference must also find its sourcein
the sameoccupational context, and does not necessarily have to be related to some
other context, such as the context of symbolism and of the sign.
Therefore, from the point of view of developing the theory of social
occupations,we needto confirm only two aspectsof the later Durkheim. Firstly,
Durkheim seemedto recognize in his later period the need for an account of social
innovation in that he beganto formulate a theory of social model formation.
However, secondly, from the fundamental premisesof the theory that he formulated,
the theory of collective effervesence,we can confirm that the need of wholeness
in
be
for
his
to
taken
research
granted, and perhapseven more and more to
continues
be taken as a given. Therefore, despitehis move towards making an account of the
`cultural or ideational dimension' of social reality, Durkheim actually formulated an
in
his
later work which added nothing profound
the
the
of
social
genesis
accountof
to his earlier thought, and in fact only supplementedhis earlier assumptionswith a
theory to do with one of the effects of social genesisin the field of social psychology.
He did not, in the end, vindicate his whole project and defenceof sociology but only
12
it.
complicated
So where doesthis needof wholenesscome from? From where emergesthis
intial impulse to socialize? Durkheim will only suggestthat it comesfrom the
have
already establisheda solid network of obligations,
of
societies
example
which
is
from
in
fact
to
the
say,
example
of
societies
are
which
which
already constituted.
But surely a principle of social genesiscannot be derivable from already constituted

against our experiences.

12I would just clarify my position here: whether or not this complication proves, in its own way,
productive or unproductive is not my concern. Here I am only concernedwith Durkheim's theory of
occupational difference. My claim is only that there are difficulties in the early theory which are not
addressedby the moves made in the later theory and that this is unfortunate. I do not mean by this

82

factual,
from
the
of
experiencedreality. As I
point view of
societiesconsideredonly
is
last
Durkheim
in
this
tautological
the
and
unacceptable.
answer
chapter,
showed
developedsome important conceptsand an orientation to the subject-matterof the
for
its
in
is
to
necessity,showing us
challenging
us
account
significant
social which
that needand obligation are linked in the genesisof the social, but he nevertheless
brings us no further toward understandingthis social genesisin itself and therefore
is
influential
interesting
be
That
the
and
upon us.
which
social should
why
interesting and influential upon us is likely to involve us in some form of social
innovation. But becauseDurkheim connectedneedwith obligation tautologically,
he
barred
himself
formulated
basis
theory
that
then
a
of
social
psychology,
upon
and
from incorporating any positive account of social innovation.
Conclusion
Essentially, Durkheim relied upon us somehowto intuitively understandhow
in
innovation,
addition to obligation, must rely upon a need of wholeness.
social
This intuitive understandingis supposedto include, as if automatically, a perception
in
have
fundamental
Durkheim
difference.
In
over
seen
a
confusion
we
addition,
of
the issue of social quantity. Now thesetwo major confusions, the first over the need
be
issue
be
to
the
the
quantity,
can
over
of
social
shown
second
of wholenessand
isolated
We
these
two,
to
to
apparently
are ready summarize
related one another.
in
This
effect,
only
one
confusion.
one confusion
constituting,
confusions as rather
is over the basic issue of difference. Durkheim's causal argument in the Division of
Labour rests on an assumptionthat social difference is ultimately a kind of spatial
difference between social groups with more or less complete boundaries,a difference
different
in
But
theory
the
a
quite
vein,
of organic solidarity,
of repetition.
that the later theory in itself has a lesservalue. I only mean that it has no more than a marginal
relevance to this thesis.

83

difference
arising from the sourceof the structure of
presupposesa perception of
organic solidarity in a needwhich is, in large part, a symptom of a social
incompleteness,and this links this kind of difference with the affective origins of
social rupture. Two kinds of difference, of completenessand incompleteness,of
it
in
by
closednessand openness,exist, as were, side side Durkheim's social thought,
with hardly any mention at all of the apparentcontradiction.
Henri Bergson, late in his career, made a suddendiversion from philosophy
into social theory, and it was precisely to take up this challenge left behind by
Durkheimian social thought. If we consider Bergson's relevancehere, we have an
addedreasonfor attempting to take advantageof Gabriel Tarde's contemporary
it
is
because
in
its
Durkheim,
a
although
neglected
and
critique
own
useful
critique of
has
do
to
with the fact that Bergson's critique of
right, our main motivation
Durkheim could not have been fashionedwithout it. I will thus turn to an
investigation of the social thought of Tarde immediately in the next chapter.

84

CHAPTER THREE

TARDE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL PARTICULAR

It is now time to move positively beyond Durkheim in order to searchfor

relevant explanations for the relation between social creativity and social
be
investigation
A
to
start
an
will
of Durkheim's
occupations. good place
contemporarytheoretical opposition in the form of the writings of Gabriel Tarde. In
Tarde we shall seehow the primary mode of actualization of the individual struggle
for wholenessinvolves a certain understandingof social genesisas model formation.
From Tarde's point of view it will become clear how arbitrary it was for Durkheim to
formation
to the end of overall social solidarity. And
the
model
role
of
subordinate
indeed, I will agreewith Tarde that model formation should not have a lesser
theoretical statusthan the term of solidarity, particularly if the latter concept contains
have
is
key
I
This
shown
above.
a
part of the reasonwhy
as
confusion,
an essential
for
in
begin
the plural without appealingto
to
social
genesis
account
we must now
`solidarity'.
is
look
This
that
turn
to
of
such
as
why
we
must
now
any generic model
Gabriel
Tarde, the thinker of social quantity
Durkheim's
the
of
antagonist,
at
work
13
formation
par excellance. In chapter one I
and the social significance of model

13In many ways, Tarde's oeuvre is also worth studying in its own right. Tarde's writing has been
neglectedfor some time now, and many of his books and essayshave gone out of print. However,
very recently there has been revival of interest in his work. A particularly strong current here is the
Eric
Alliez, a fine philosopher and Deleuze scholar, who has been at the centre of a concern
project of

85

focussedupon the formulation of the `needof wholeness' only becauseit was

necessaryto fashion a preliminary account of the ontological statusof the social
whole. Now that we have found that this statusof the social whole is intimately
bound up with its particular modes, ie. social occupations, and that at the sametime
the `social whole' is actually always and essentially fractured into `that which is
closed' versus `that which is open,' it has becomeobviously necessaryto focus upon
the perception of difference implied by the need of wholenessin order to work up a
critical account of the ontological statusof social occupationsas particulars.
Precisely because`the whole' is always fractured, there can be no other kind
of theory of the particularity of social occupationsthan a differentialist theory. I
believe Durkheim should have developedthe implications of this, and admitted that
`the externality of the social' is not a seamlessentity, instead of compounding his
problem by taking the route of correlating social ontology with the representations
and operations of social psychology. The existenceof the latter relationship, by
definition, can only account for an alleged social interiority and cannot account for
the perception of difference, the fractured outside, that the social occupation takes as
its primary function to generate,and which social ontology absolutely assumes. In
this chapter we shall seehow Tarde perceivedthat in Durkheimian sociological
theory there is no satisfactory account of this presumedsocial motivation towards
wholeness,and that therefore the problem with respectto social wholenessas a given
is a false problem.
On the other hand, in Tarde's view, social parts are not to be consideredmere
`atomic' fragments which have an innate tendencyto assemble. Social parts still, for

to re-publish Tarde's writings in France. As a result, most of Tarde's work, including several obscure
writings, after a long hiatus are now being re-published with special introductions pointing to his
contemporary relevance. For detailed referencesseemy review article "The renaissanceof
philosophie tardienne" (Toews 1999: 164-173).

86

him, must relate in someway to a kind of production of a sort of social whole, to a

is
but
is
processwhich necessary which never quite fully achieved: the production of
a `civilization', for example. Thus, for Tarde, that which is particular about social
forms hasto be the product of an aspiration or attraction, ie. a desire constituting the
`provisional
this
are
constructed
precisely
social
elements
which
as
particular
social
whole' is constructed. Tarde will thus show how any `pure sociology' must place
its
innovation
the
of
account of social existence. The concept of need
centre
social
at
it
formation
but
be
the
this
cannot
explain
of models which are
of
account,
may part
do
followed.
Accomplished
societies
not automatically provide a model of
actually
individuals
for
The
`solidarity',
to
to.
aspire
need of wholenesscould
wholeness,a
its
is
in
by
What
be
result.
needed
order to understandthe
simply
explained
never
is
deepening
Tarde,
to
a
of our understandingof the
according
social scientifically,
logic
imitative
in
in
their
terms
terms of model
of
of
currents,
of
societies
existence
formation, rather than in terms of any models already formed. The end-point, the
into
is
facts
`reality',
a
quasi-objective
no longer of interest.
consolidation of social
What Tarde calls for is an ontology of the particular and the dynamic in social
formation.
It will be recalled from chapter one that Durkheim relied upon a flawed
his
in
metaphor of solidity-solidarity as the theme which
of
support
causalargument
defines the overall coherenceof social forms. We saw that it was flawed becauseit
in
the
terms of a quasi-spatial,quasimetaphor
ultimately merely rephrased
quantitative theory of `segments.' As we saw, Durkheim's theory of segmentsbegs
the question of the geo-historical origins of so-called `primitive' or `mechanical'
formations.
for
formation
At
boundary
Durkheim,
the
the
time,
same
of
social
complex modern organic social systemsis a dynamic processthat, via the division of

87

labour, distinguishesmodem societiesin structure and in nature from mechanical

onesand thus revealsthe perspectiveof sociality as a necessary,whole, but nonmanifestedreality. However, for Durkheim, even though the necessityand
metaphysicalnature of the social, its principle of reality, is increasingly revealed as
modernity progresses,the formations of modernity still find their principle of
actuality, as Durkheim's misguided attempt at a causalargument shows, in the
initially,
juxtaposed
least
in space.
that
they
are, at
supposition
It is difficult to seehow, in the Durkheimian view, mechanicaland organic
isolate
(1984:
121).
To
Durkheim's
Durkheim
as
claims
co-exist,
societies
is
perspectiveupon social space to exposea strange,ultimately metaphorical feature
of Durkheimian thinking. Let me suggestthat we could think of the co-existenceof
the two opposing types of societiesin question, the one traditional and the other
modern, as the co-existenceof strata. I am not particularly referring to the concept
of statistical stratification of subsequentempirical sociology, but rather to a feature
basic
layering
Durkheim's
the
of
ontological
view
structural,
or
archeological
of
of
is
is
in
is
Durkheimian
forms.
What
that
the
remarkable
view
modernity
an
social
in
formed
distinguished
new
strata
are
a
solidification
which
and
ahistorical moment,
from more establishedstrata. At the sametime, Durkheim, after a certain ontological
fashion, distinguisheswith respectto the real the metaphysical from the actual.
Thus, with Durkheim we have a view of the metaphysical as grand form or as
form
his
Because
the
as
spatially-detailed
or
as
stratified.
and
actual
monumental,
is
spatial and physical, Durkheim's monument can
metaphor
of
actuality
principle or
only be understood as `solid' or what we might call monolithic.
To be sure, Durkheim's work is remarkable for the original and influential
distinguishes
he
the metaphysicaland the actual with a view to making such a
way

88

distinction enabling for the progressof sociology. However, if Durkheim thus

moved sociology toward a more sophisticatedstudy of social structures,this
distinction, in my view, still puts too much faith in the givennessof `mechanical'
societiesas spatially and empirically isolated composites,and too much credencein
the idea of the modernity of `organic' societiesas a need arising when through
isolation
is
duplication
felt as difference and a lack of wholeness.
their
proximity and
Durkheim's formulation of modernization is still too much imbued with a notion of
the organic transcendenceas a deterritorialization which is successive. There is not
enoughof an attempt to critically

this deterritorialization to the premisethat

`relate
mechanicalsocietiesderive their structural coherencefrom resemblancesrather than
from, as in the organic case,needsarising from difference. For Durkheim does not
sufficiently follow up a line of reasoningthat this implicit relation points to, namely,
that there is a close relation betweenresemblanceand `primitive' social formation.
He ignores his own implication that resemblanceis essentially involved in the
ignores
He
the suggestivenessof this that so-called
space.
production of social
be
deterritorialization
to
their
able
produce
societies
must
own
mechanical
or
be
could
not
merely `primitive', undeveloped,barely
metaphysicalreality and
is
that
co-extensivewith manifested social actuality.
simply
which
materialistic, or
Instead of positing a consciencecollective as the sum of the perceptionsof
formulation
in
further
tells
mechanical
society,
a
which
us nothing
resemblance a
from
how
these
they operate,one could say with
resemblances
come
or
about where
he
have
justification
that
to
taken the ontology of so-called mechanical
ought
some
societiesmore seriously.
In his seminal, but perhapsneglectedbook The Laws of Imitation Gabriel
Tarde takes up, in particular, perhapswhat is the most obvious theme of the

89

insufficiency of Durkheimian sociology. He takes up Durkheim's neglect to

investigatethe origins and operationsof the social resemblancesthat the theory of
the consciencecollective and the later theory of the symbolic can only presuppose.'4
Durkheim had arguedthat mechanicalsocieties,those in which social psychology
originates,have this statusbecausethey are bound by the resemblancesbetweentheir
inside members. Tarde's attack does not initially dispute this but rather askswhy it
is that resemblances- including, crucially for a critical stanceagainst Durkheim,
duplication resemblances- may come about also betweenthese so-called segments.
Tarde raisesthe question of apparently fortuitous resemblancesbetweenwhole,
widely-dispersed communities. In chapter one we saw that Durkheim had simply
assumedthat duplication resemblancesoccur and that the latter are primarily
for
certain membersof the segments(p. 63). Tarde askson what basis a
significant
fortuitous resemblancebetween `small segmentswithin larger segments'is assumed
ignored
in
favour
then
of the supposedlyessentialresemblancesthat
and
quickly
bind together the whole group. Tarde thus adducesthe social theoretical role of
descriptive homology and exposeshow it is diminished in favour of what he argues
is a no-lessdogmatic reliance upon functional analogy (1903: 40).
More generally, however, Tarde is suggestingthat to take such a line of
criticism is to criticise the very premise of the group as a starting point for
sociological analysis. One could say then with considerablejustification that Tarde's
aim is to strike right at the heart of the mainstreamsociological project. What
Tarde's problem is meant to indicate is that resemblanceis a phenomenonwith a
14Noted for his colourful rhetoric and occasionallinguistic ambiguity (seeTarde's own self-criticism
in 1903: xiii), Tarde once averred that "there are few truths as useful as Mr. Durkheim's errors"
(Tarde quoted in Gane 1988: 76). To be sure, in The Laws of Imitation (1903) Tarde does not state
explicitly that he is taking up a criticism of Durkheim's theories, but this can neverthelessbe inferred
without too much difficulty. Interestingly, debatesbetween Durkheim and Tarde were frequently of a

90

in
much wider provenance the social world than merely in so-called traditional or
mechanicalsocieties,and that therefore any segmentaltheory could not possibly
satisfactorily account for social resemblancesas a whole. If Durkheim has not fully
accountedfor social resemblances,therefore, Durkheim has no right to move to a
definition of society as basedin primitive cultures which then become modernized
through functional differentiation. There would be a whole range of phenomenaof
social resemblancesready for anyoneto point to with the power to upset this
narrative of the emergenceof a monolithic modernity.
For Gabriel Tarde, "resemblances between communities which are separated
by more or less insurmountable obstacles," ie. Durkheimian segments, can and
should be explained, "through the common possession of some entirely forgotten
primitive model" (1903: 46). Tarde thus elaborates in The Laws of Imitation, in
direct counter-position to Durkheimian sociology, a theory of social formation
through model formation. Modernity will no longer be viewed as a monumental,
floating
but
the
of
moment
of
change
symbol
within
societies
general,
rather as an
but
irreversible
specific
and
of
small
changes that bring about the
series
open-ended
Tarde
fall
back
of
societies.
will
not
upon an hypothesis
evolution and multiplication
force
in
is
immanent
in
a
general,
optimistic
which
of
creation
all
of pan-genesis
how
but
the resistance of the social particular
show
will
rather
particularities
becomes a model and as such defines the social, from a micrological perspective, as
one force of continuity among others. He thus argues that the original social group is
born in this model formation, and in the way this resistance of the social particular
acquires consistency, for Tarde, particularly via the model of the family (1903: 287).

person-to-personnature at sociological conferencesin the early 20th-century. For an illuminating

transcription of one such debateseeTarde 1969: 136-140.

91

My aim in this chapter is to learn from Tarde's alternative theory of model

formation, to seekout its strong and weak points, and to adapt his insights to my
differentialist, occupationaltheory of the social. If social theory is to avoid falling
back into a metaphoricalDurkheimian realism it will be essentialto specify how
in
being
that agencywhich has the capacity to
occupationsconsist precisely
incorporatethe perspectivesof the social whole as well as the social part. If `modern
society' consists in a need of wholenesswhich is generatedby its own, immanent
processof differentiation, it is clearly difference that lies at the root of a pure
sociology, and the social part would consist in the perception of social difference.
The theory of the relation betweenthe social part and the social whole would be a
theory that would have to deal primarily with the issueof social variation. Any
theory of the relation betweenthe social part and the social whole would have to at
least begin as a differentialist one. And yet social needs,the ontological perspective,
must be incorporated. In the last chapterI discussedhow the social whole exists on
the basis of the perspectiveof that which is necessaryin particular social relations.
Someheadway towards this goal was achieved,but it has now becomeclear that any
further progresswill dependupon our investigation into the extent to which social
difference must play a foundational, rather than a secondaryrole in social ontology.
It is thus the burden of the presentchapterto show to what extent we could say that
particular social relations, rather than constituting solutions to mere contingent needs
in
themselves
are
a
constitutive
element the genesisof the social
of particulars,
precisely becausethey are neededto explain the original becoming of the whole.
The Perspective of Science
Tarde's critique of Durkheim strikes right at the core of Durkheim's
definition of the social fact. We have seenhow Durkheim's definition of the social

92

fact can be illuminated by reference to his conception of need and of obligation and
his archeological metaphor which for him links the two. Durkheim's image of
sociology is shaped by his perception of a monolithic modernity in which
philosophical speculation can and must be overcome by an archeological,
sociological attunement to the ground of need. This is not conceived as an external
or merely empirical or scientistic critique of speculative thinking but rather, if we
take seriously his Division of Labour in Society, as the absolute presupposition, the
metaphorical meta-occupation of all the particular occupations of society. Tarde will
begin by questioning the scientific basis of what he sees as Durkheim's sociological
pretensions. However, Tarde will not end up by espousing any sort of skeptical
position. Rather, he will take very seriously and positively Durkheim's idea of a
pure sociology, and he will even retain, to a certain extent, the analogy between
sociology and archeology.

One must be careful in reading Tarde not to confuse his initial problem of the
his
idea
of a pure sociology. Tarde's attack on
with
nature of social resemblances
the Durkheimian social fact points out that Durkheim assumessocial resemblances.
But with this Tarde is not taking a critical view of an illegitimate assumption,or of
in
is
He
rather pointing out, a theoretical mode, that the social
resemblancesper se.
fact of social resemblancesmust be put into the more general context of the theory of
is
He
pointing out that, according to an activist conception of
scientific method.
himself
Tarde
would endorse,resemblanceis a necessaryconstruction
sciencewhich
is
In
this
the
view, resemblance internal to modernity rather
of
scientific method.
than prehistorical in relation to it, and there is no major distinction possible between
idea
The
and
scientific
resemblances.
of a monolithic modernity
resemblances
social

93

contrastedwith a chaotic set of traditions will have to begin to crumble, as he seesit,

under a sophisticatedtheory of science.
Tarde's conception of the scientific method is, admittedly, a curious and
innovative one. His view of scienceis particularly influenced by his interpretation of
Leibniz's principle of continuity and Leibniz's perspectiveof composition. One of
Tarde's early essaysis entitled "Monadologie et Sociologie" (1999). Eric Alliez has
recently argued that all of Tarde's work can and should be read through the prism of
this essay(Alliez 1999). 1think Alliez is clearly correct in this, since as we shall see,
Tarde's main work, The Laws of Imitation, is shot through with implicit references
to the Leibnizian point of view. At the same time, as Gilles Deleuze has pointed out,
the outcome of Tarde's rapprochement with rationalist philosophical speculative
thinking is highly original (Deleuze 1994: 313-14). In Deleuze's view, Tarde was
less
to
complete micrological social metaphysics.
able outline a more or

I will treat Deleuze's view of Tarde extensively below. For the purposesof
the presentchapter, it should suffice to begin by presentingthe elementsof Tarde's
appropriation of Leibniz. I will then discussthe Tardian social-philosophical
in
that
emerge the processof this appropriation. My basic argument with
concepts
be
Tardian
thought
to
that although Tarde presentsa brillant and
social
will
respect
useful argument with respectto the conditions of a pure sociology, this will
have,
for
him,
do
to
more
with a project of re-linking the image of social
ultimately
thought with the ontology of the spontaneousmodem social person, with the theory
it
it
has
than
the
to do with providing a method for
of
avant-garde, as were,
objectively understandingthe particular currents of contemporary social modernity.
There is a certain impersonality about Tarde's system,but this impersonality resides
implicit
in
Tarde's
stand against subjectivist intellectual property, which results,
only

94

aswe shall see,from a distinction he draws betweenthe historical particular and the
social particular. There is no evidenceat all that Tarde should be seenas attempting
to effacethe ideas of the creative, spontaneous,social person, and in fact a number of
core aspectsof his thought point in the opposite direction.
Repetition
I mentioned above that Tarde's point of attack upon Durkheim's conception
of the ultimate social fact is Tarde's problem of resemblance. In fact, Tarde's
problem of resemblance is a rephrasing of Leibniz's problem of continuity, or what
the empiricists called the problem of uniformity.

This problem is the battleground

for all debates over the notion of coherence. Empiricists such as Hume investigate
the phenomena of coherence for a uniformity which should be the condition of truth
and knowledge but conclude that we can only be profoundly skeptical about whether
or not we can ever truly and objectively know what uniformity in itself, this
condition, is. Leibniz, on the other hand, holds precisely the opposite opinion that
we can, in fact, know exactly what constitutes coherence and uniformity.

The

knowledge,
for
is
Leibniz,
this
to
to seek for the conditions of
according
condition
uniformity in the constitution of continuity.

He relies here on a kind of implicit

contrast between the ideas of coherence and continuity.

In this view, whereas the

imply
deep,
to
a
mysterious uniformity of a general
coherence
seems
of
notion
investigated
if
be
carefully
continuity
can
seen as in itself
surface of continuity,
deeper
the
a
uniformity of particulars. The investigation of
surface
of
actually only
continuity, then, ought to provide a means to penetrate deeper behind the premise of
coherence.

The human point of view is admittedly split, according to Leibniz, along the
lines of the distinction between deduction and induction. But it is not an exclusive,

95

shatteringsplit, since for Leibniz the particular point of view, or the point of view of
the particular, has to include the deductive point of view in a latent, unconscious
form. The deductive point of view can never be fully known since it includes all the
the past,presentand future, but it neverthelesscan and has to be constructedin
particular casesas they unfold. Sensitivity to a continuity of particulars, for
future
in
the
the
to
the
trace
the present,is thus all the
of
past
and
example,
sensitivity there can be toward particulars. For empiricists such as Locke this would
constitute a fallacious and uncritical acceptanceof the scholasticdoctrine of innate
ideas. But it is one thing to reject a doctrine of innate ideasand quite anotherto
innate
ideas
how
doctrine
the
of
arisesalways in the context of the
recognize
development
latter
in
The
the
the Tardian view,
continuity.
of
approach,
problem of
is a pre-condition for the developmentof a modern, sociological outlook on the
is
The
continuity
precisely a problem of modernity as
problem of
world.
distinguished from a doctrine of tradition. But it perhapswould be fair to say that it
is a problem which, at least initially, leadsto a rationalistic optimism rather than a
skepticism.
Tarde's appropriation of Leibniz's problem of continuity is presentin the
in
form
fortuitous
he
Durkheim's
to
the
the
sociology
poses
of
problem
of
challenge
have
had
As
Durkheim
seen,
assumedthat some sort of
we
resemblances.
social
duplication of functions occurs among so-called segmentalsocieties defined as
societieswhich coherevia the resemblanceof their members,and Tarde points out
that there is nothing to distinguish a `duplication of a function', in this context, from
any kind of `resemblance',and that therefore Durkheim has explained nothing about
why and how segmentalsocieties,and therefore any societies, should be the focus of
before
Instead,
key
Tarde,
to
attribution.
according
we can speakof
ontological
a

96

duplication
resemblance and
we must examine the notion of repetition. In Tarde's
view, "every advance in knowledge tends to strengthen the conviction that all
resemblance is due to repetition" (1903: 14). The notion of repetition grounds our
understanding of resemblance and duplication.

What is real in resemblance and

duplication is the repetition that they bring about.

Repetition is always the repetition of particulars. In Tarde's words, "the

relation of universal to particular... is precisely that of repetition to variation" (1903:
7). And furthermore, "repetition exists... for the sakeof variation," and not vice
lies
(1903:
7).
Herein
the main source of agreementbetween Tarde and
versa
Leibniz. For Leibniz, precisely becausecoherenceis basedin continuity, and
it
is
to
continuity only attributable particulars, cannot be attributed to any uniform,
generalcategories. Similarly, for Tarde, becauseresemblanceis basedin repetition,
and repetition is only attributable to particulars, a structural principle of resemblance
cannot be attributed to what he takes to be a general `mechanical' type of society
over other `organic' types.
Now, actually, we have seenthat in Durkheim generality has a specific
limited place and is not for him sufficient to define a social category. Generality, in
does
is
interesting
is
fixity.
What
Tarde
theory for why this
propose
an
short, not
should be so, one which differs from Durkheim's evolutionism. According to Tarde,
"as soon as a new sciencehas staked out its field of characteristicresemblancesand
it
repetitions, must comparethem and note the bond of solidarity which unites their
does
But,
fact,
the
as
a
matter of
mind
concomitant variations.
not fully understand
nor clearly recognisethe relation of causeand effect, except in as much as the effect
resemblesor repeatsthe cause,as for example,when a sound wave producesanother
sound wave, or a cell, another cell" (1903: 6). Now while Durkheim does not

97

attribute an absolutefixity to the social types, he neverthelessdoes explicitly

attribute to them, as we have seen,a relative solidity (p. 39). In Tarde's view,
insteadof firm, `solid' types of societieswe ought to think of reproductions of
societieswhich exhibit similar compositions. In the words of Tarde, "at all times and
placesthe apparentcontinuity of history may be decomposedinto distinct and
separableevents, eventsboth small and great, which consist of questionsfollowed by
solutions" (1903: 156). The problem of continuity brings to light, for Tarde, a
compositionalperspective, a perspectiveupon `things' as certain repeatedgatherings
of elements,as particular eventswhose unity is no greaterthan that of complex,
problematic compositions.
In this compositional perspective,`similarities' are seen,not simply as
constructions,or as purely subjectively necessaryas opposedto absolutely or
objectively necessary,but rather as intrinsic and constitutive as opposedto extrinsic
and merely passively perceptual. It is important to note that, like Leibniz, Tarde
feels no needto draw from this any skeptical conclusion that we cannot therefore
know with certainty whether or not societiesexist at all or that `societies' are only
the degreeof any given aggregationof individuals. Rather, the full, overall necessity
of the existenceof the particular via repetition and/or continuity is upheld by both
Tarde and Leibniz. As Tarde puts it, "repetitions and resemblances...are the
differences
themes
the
of
and variations which exist in all phenomena"
necessary
(1903: 6). And it follows from this, in Tarde's view, that nor are "the crude
incoherenceof historic facts... proof at all against the fundamental regularity of
social life or the possibility of a social science" (1903: 12).
For Tarde, repetition, not coherence,is the primary concept of a pure
sociology, and the problem of repetition is derived from the problem of the

98

resemblanceof particulars. Clearly the concept of repetition can be seenhere to have

evolvedtoward a sociological perspectiveand far away from any purely
philosophical doctrine of innate ideas. In his later work, one could say, Durkheim
accountedfor innate ideasas symbols perceived by the individual but necessarily
basedin the common consciousnessof social resemblancesrather than in individual
psychology. But even such `emblems', as Durkheim saw them, in the Tardian view
are now to be explained in an evenmore pure sociological fashion by examining the
featuresof the processof social repetition that underlie the `social facts' that are
repeated. For Tarde it is repetition that clearly underlies the Durkheimian theory of
social resemblances. For the perspectiveof repetition, as a scienceof particulars, in
this view brings the social fact back into the context of history.
But by the same token Tarde is not completely dismissing the Durkheimian
approach. For Tarde, history does not mean a history of the historians. Rather, what
Tarde proposes to do is to take Durkheim's archeological metaphor and demetaphorize it. That is to say, he claims to find in the sociological perspective a
methodology that has actually been unwittingly and independently clarified by
archeologists who have "unconsciously adopted" a similar scientific outlook (1903:
89). Archeology has clarified sociology's scientific modus operandi because it
reveals that "social science must deal exclusively with a multitude of homogeneous
facts, " which, as such, are too mundane, too much a part of the very fabric of social
be
historians"
"carefully
by
(1903:
13). Thus, it is
the
to
concealed
not
continuity,
is
distinguish
he
interested
in,
Tarde
to
the
that
means
clear
particularity
a social
particularity, from an historical particularity, but at the same time save concrete
from
its
in
fate
the hands of what he takes to be Durkheim's
social particularity
inattention to the composition of apparently `solid' continuity.

99

According to Tarde, historical particularities are exceptional and unique,

"violent eventswhich are in themselvesdissimilar," and from their viewpoint history
is a mere aggregationof such events (1903: 91). But "below the surface,in some
way, of the violent and so-called culminating eventsthat are spokenof as conquests,
invasions, or revolutions, the archaeologistsshow us the daily and indefinite drift and
history,
true
the stratifications of successiveand
the
of
piling up of
sediments
contagion-spreaddiscoveries" (1903: 91). Thus, Tarde's transformation of
Durkheim's archeological analogy is basedin his conviction that particulars are not
necessarilyunique, historical particulars. Instead, Tarde affirms the particulars of
uniformity, reproduction, and duplication; he questionswhy they should be ignored.
He affirms the particulars of repetition. But it should also be clear that, on the other
hand, if it were not for Durkheim's importation of an ontological perspectiveinto
sociology this social `solidity', this mode of the continuous reproduction of social
facts would perhapshave never come to light. In the end, however, the Tardian
is
`solidity'
to
the
that
gives
substance
position
and
only an
position complements
deployed
in
support of a social typology which once
a
metaphor,
ontic attribution,
facts.
the
to
threatens
social
real
composition
of
obscure
again
Against Intellectual

Property

Now, as I have already anticipated above, for Tarde, social repetition is

formulated as a theory of imitation. Tarde must therefore affirm, however, that
imitation implies the event of "an original act of imagination" (1903: 43). The latter,
including everything social that is supposedto come of it, is deducedfrom Tarde's
human
it
from
"desire",
Tarde
as
somtimes
also
puts
or
positing of a necessary
"organic wants" (1903: 44). According to Tarde, "every organic want is experienced
in the characteristic form which has been sanctionedby surrounding example" (1903:

100

44). Imitation is thus how we experiencethe social, although it is not its only
defining feature. For "every social resemblance"is only a kind of precedentwhich is
setby "that initial act of imitation" of an original act of imaginationor innovation
(1903:44). The tendencyto imitate is a "form of a desirewhich I myself hold to be
innateanddeep-seatedand from which I deduce.. the laws of social reason,
all
namely,desirefor a maximum of strong and stablebelief' (1903: 50).
We are thus coming closer to a position from which we might understand
what might be meant by imitation for Tarde. Imitation is for Tarde neither simple
mimicry nor even a varyingly-structured mimetic tendency in society. Imitation is
for Tardc neither an effect or a cause of the social. If a cause is to be found it is to be
sought in a long, forgotten chain of innovations originating in pre-history, the vast,
irreversible, continuous series of innumerable and imperceptible social changes
which compose "the subject" of imitation (1903: 43). 'Imitation, ' in Tarde's usage
of the term, is not an imitation of a discrete, perceived, coherent innovation with a
clear beginning and end. Rather, imitation is understood by Tarde as the premimetic, or the 'original', operation of the compositional perspective within social
formation. Imitation is a 'current', to use Tardc's expression: "all these streams and
currents of belief and desire which flow side by side or contrary to one another in
society, quantities whose subtractions and additions are regulated by social logic... all
arc derived from imitation" (1903: 150). An imitation involves a particular social
movement in itself, a quantity, without necessarily implying the involvement of a
particular manifested quality that can be described as the subject or object of that
movement in historical retrospect. Imitation is indeed for Tardc the subject of pure
social change.

101

For Tarde, from a certain perspective,imitation is primarily a kind of

continuouscurrent of social changewhich is also a composition. That is to say that
as imitation flows in its repetition or copying of a model all social changebecomesa
following, it is a gathering or coming together of certain `like-minded' imitators,
flow
imperceptible
together
create
a
seamless
of
which accumulated
changes. That
which seemedto Durkheim to be a clear and distinct social fact is according to Tarde
desire.
flow
Social facts are createdby humans,but
of
composedof a complex
rather than implying that the social is created and led by geniuses,which implies a
is
leadership,
Tarde
that creativity is rather defined by many
means
model of
what
followings of many impersonal currents of innovation. A creative individual
becomesa social model only insofar as he or she is immediately constituted as a
subjectof imitation. Herein lies one of the peculiarities of Tarde's thought: it is the
creativity, the desire, and not the imitation, that actually by degreesconstitutesthe
beliefs
together
the
that hold the latter
with
strong
social
uniformity
resulting
together.
Thus, Tarde proposesthat we conceive of the social as a systemof
impersonal movements. However, that does not meanthat personsare not involved.
In fact, personsare highly involved in Tarde's system. Persons,especially creative
hoc
kind
in
and
ad
a
spontaneous
way,
a
of primal anarchy of
persons,make up,
However,
Tarde.
to
according
while each personal
social growth and change,
initiative is therefore radically discontinuous,the `primal' anarchy this implies could
therefore never be manifestedas any sort of perceivable, coherentphenomenon. It is
a virtual anarchy, not an empirical anarchy. As a virtual, flowing reality, the social
directly
be
as a set of personal initiatives but only traced in their
cannot perceived
imitations. Herein lies a key limit to what we should understandas the

102

`impersonality' of Tarde's understandingof the social. For just as easily we could

for
initiative
is
is
because
Tarde
it
This
theory.
a
personal
call a radically personalist
individual
historical,
by
the
traced
and the manifested
experiencing
not
observing
in
but
by
thereof,
a
group,
rather
observing the transmission of
actions
either alone or
the social in that which is partly consciously and partly unconsciously createdand
be
kick-start
level
high
A
to
creativity
required
any
of
personal
would
repeated. very
Nor
trajectories.
these
can we conclude that what are referred to as
given one of
imitations-repetitions might be better describedas habits, either, becausehabits are
is
behavior.
Repetition
not accessibleto experience,or to
patternsof experienced
indicates
Repetition
the ontology, not the experience,of the
any normal empiricism.
particular.
Consideredfrom the virtual point of view of the whole of the social, from its
ontology, imitation is the necessarytheme, the principle of social continuity, of many
in
imitative
is
illustrated
innovations.
For
Tarde,
the
the substanceof
current
original
in'
its
it
is
looking
hand,
On
`outside
the
the
composition.
of
other
social continuity,
is
imitation
is
for
Tarde,
true
that
a
primarily
composition
which only
equally
imitation,
for
independent
candidate
one
one
and
secondarilya current; very often,
interfere
indicating
invention,
another,
with
relations of
conflict
and
will
coherent
it,
first
instance,
in
led
"we
As
Tarde
inter-dependency.
the
to copy
are
puts
spiritual
from others everything which seemsto us a new meansfor attaining our old ends, or
ideas"
for
(1903:
207).
In
the
old
our
or
a
new
expression
satisfying our old wants,
begin
do
however,
"we
instance,
that
the
time
to adopt
this
same
we
at
second
innovations which awaken new ideasand new ends in us" (1903: 207). Herein, in
this latter perspective,is affirmed the `inside looking out' of composition, the
discontinuity,
the
equally
essential
resistance,or power to change
of
perspective

103

direction, of the social particular. Furthermore, in this latter instanceof social

conflict, according to Tarde, substitution is the result, and in this lies the possibility
of what I referred to earlier as `duplication resemblances.' But for Tarde there is no
necessityto seetheseduplications as function or role boundary crossings,and
thereforeas the meansto dissolving and re-forming groups, as Durkheim does.
Resemblances,for Tarde, canjust as easily be fortuitous and only parallel to one
another. This leadsto the perhapssurprising but at least, for Tarde, consistent
is
that
the
conclusion
group not a useful starting premise for sociology.
According to Tarde, imitation is a personal current or force which is inside an
impersonalcomposition. The soAl is the flow of many personal movementsof
desire,of many model formations, which then become contractedinto stablebeliefs
which make the social appearto coherein certain formations. But theseformations,
once formed, do not then interact to createanother, higher typology of social facts.
Rather, desire and belief are poles of a common social spectrum. Their content is not
important
as
as the fact that they indicate pure or virtual social quantities, which is to
say degreesof social change,which are analytically isolated at the points in which
societiesswitch directions this way and that, according to movementsof imitation
which are either accumulative or substitutive. According to Tarde, there is no
ontological coherenceof the social apart from the consistencyof these flows. And
depend
for
him
it
is
flows
the
that
these
absolutely
case
upon personalpreference
yet,
and personal creativity. Perhapsthe central characteristicof the social that Durkheim
had referred to as a basic feature of the definition of a social fact and the starting
point of sociology was social regularity, or continuity. Tarde does not disagreewith
this. He only disagreeswith the premise of the static, pre-defined group of
resemblances. In this context it would be a red herring, and an error, to aver that

104

Durkheim did not attribute fixity to theseprimitive social types. For one must
issue
issue.
is
here is stasis, `solidity', or
is
kind
fixity
What
at
at
of
specify what
fixity.
fixity,
general
relative
not absolute,
On the other hand, what Tarde proposesas a positive alternative to social
typeswill likely not satisfy many of his readers. In Tarde's view, the social
"regularity to which I refer is not in the least apparentin social things until they are
resolvedinto their severalelements,which it is found to lie in the simplest of them,
in combinationsof distinct inventions, in flashes of genius which have been
into
lights"
(1903:
3). Thus, a major aspect
commonplace
changed
accumulatedand
in
is
Durkheim,
it
Tarde's
to
that
that
theory,
contrast
of
placed
entails a certain
as
of
ideation
thinking
the
to
of
and
power
of
as forces of social
optimism with respect
change. At times Tarde is capableof putting this point very bluntly: "let us explain
thesechangesthrough the more or less fortuitous appearance,as to time and place, of
certain great ideas, or rather, of a considerablenumber of both major an minor ideas,
birth;
ideas
and
anonymous
usually
of
obscure
are
generally
of
which are
which
illustrious,
but
seldom
are
which are always novel.
abstruse;
which
simple or
Becauseof this latter attribute, I shall take the liberty of baptising them collectively
inventions" (1903: 2). It should be noted that theseTardian inventions, these novel
ideas,thesepersonal moments of creativity with direct social ramifications, have to
be prior to and irreducible to the actions of individuals. Thus, perhapscontrary to
imitation
is
for
Rather,
Tarde
type
as
of
action.
not
meant
a
sense,
common
imitations, the media of inventions, are the social as such. Tarde is similar to
Durkheim in that he believes the making of adequateformulations of the ontology or
is
both
for
existence
a
priority
sociology and the main criterion of
social
ground of
any useful sociological concepts.

105

In Durkheim's casethe ground is the need of solidarity, and in Tarde's case

the ground is the social desire inherent in the point of view of imitation. Tardian
imitations are direct, immediate, single, and personal perspectives- ontological
windows, as it were - which in overview directly constitute the totality of social
for
illusion
They
the
the
purpose
explaining
of
of the
resemblances.
are conceived
individual
resemblances.Here, one could say with some
completenessof
justification, Tardian conceptscan serve a salutary critical function. However, the
in
imply
be
that
then
this
an
ontology
alternative
would
grounded
sameconceptsalso
necessityof an incomplete and continuous social existence. As Tarde reminds us,
"this is idealism... if you chooseto call it so; but it is the idealism which consistsin
its
ideas
historian"
history
through
those
the
the
through
of
actors,
not
of
explaining
(1903: 3). According to Tarde, the philosophy of history supposesthat "there is a
fundamentalcontinuity in historic metamorphoses"(1903: 2). However, in Tarde's
"can
be
"the
true
reduced to a chain of ideaswhich
change
of
social
causes"
vew,
in
but
distinct
be
themselves
to
are
which
and
sure, very numerous,
are,
discontinuous,although they are connectedby the much more numerousacts of
imitation which are modelled upon them" (1903: 2). The study of imitation is an
history
facts
digs
to reveal the radically singular
the
of
underneath
archeology which
historical
continuity.
compose
particulars which
Thus, it would be too facile to say, as a quick formula, that for Tarde what is
basic in the experienceof society and constitutive of all imitation is the perception of
is
idea'.
Such
`having
However,
not
a
statement
untrue.
an
of
a personalmoment
the relationship in a statementsuch as this between `having' and `thinking' rather has
to be understood as a part of the wider relationship between social resemblancesand
latter
itself
be
the
and
should
recognizedas a part of the even
creativity,
personal

106

wider relationship betweenrepetition and difference. For Tarde, the existenceof

sociologicaldifference, the difference of the social particular, is primary and is
explainedby the highly personal creativity inherent when models are formed by a
kind of anarchic or spontaneousinvention throughfollowing.
I would say that the link implied here between having and thinking
constitutes,in effect, a theory profoundly against the notion of historical intellectual
for
property, and profoundly
an archeological theory of interiority in which the social
particular is concentratedand determinedin the having and thinking of a particular
social person. In other words, while the personality is for Tarde the agencyof social
creationand existence,this is true not for an individual psychological personality but
is rather true only insofar as the personality is a sociological personality.15 This is
similar to saying that the sociological personality, the super-ego,as it were, is
independentof psychological individuality, or the ego. But in contrast to this
Freudian understanding,Tarde's notion of the sociological personality is one of
absolutely rather than relatively spontaneouscommunion with social movement in
itself in `thinking' as the pure perception of `having'. Tarde's notion is perhapsmore
like `capital', taken as the whole of the social pursuit and as a sufficient reasonfor
his
from
Thus,
perspective,Tarde can ask "how and why did human
social change.
by
its
initial
to
all,
unless
course
at
virtue
of
certain
come
run
genius
causeswhich, in
its
by
it
from
torpor,
original
also
stirred
one
up,
one, the deeppotential
arousing
human
the
soul? And were not these causescertain primordial and capital
wants of
inventions and discoverieswhich beganto spreadthrough imitation and which
inspired their imitators with a taste for invention and discovery" (1903: 42)?

15SeeTarde's note on his own turn from individual psychology toward social psychology in 1903:
145.

107

In my view, Tarde's understandingof the social does not go far enough

towardsaccountingfor the influence of needupon thesepursuits and these changes.
It revertstoo much much away from the concept of concrete social needtowards the
deductionof a pure necessityon the part of the provenanceof social changeas
stemmingfrom an abstract sociological personality. If Tarde's aim is to break down
the dogmatic Durkheimian social fact, "and other verbal palliatives of... ignorance of
the real groundwork of things," (1903: 1) what he is then challengedwith is having
to find someway to account for personalcreativity which is, at the sametime,
irreducible to historical intellectual property, or as Tarde puts it, "let us... ward off
the vapid individualism which consistsin explaining social changesas the caprices
of great men" (1903: 2). Of course, one agreeswith this. But what Tarde also
appealsto is the possibility of a social ontology, alternative to that of Durkheim, that
desire
in
be
based
the
pursuit
of
and the formation of social
spontaneous
would
is
fully
in
is
1
Tarde.
This
think
problematized
not
need
where
models.
This model formation, which he speaksof as imitation, would constitute the
bond
is
for
bond
This
based
Tarde.
in the continuity
therefore
social
social
primary
desiring
But
would not this ontology of the social particular
particulars.
of radical,
becomefor Tarde a doctrine itself, perhapseven as an ideology of `spontaneity', no
longer to be taken merely as a critical problem stemming from the apparentnecessity
is
indubitably
discovers
What
Tarde
that there exists a pure
of social resemblances?
is
just
inasmuch
it
as
unconscious
as
conscious
which
change
as
of
social
perception
help
to
to
constitute the entire, unlimited possible range
and
accompany
out
stretches
based
differences.
Any
social
ontology,
upon repetition, assumessocial
of social
difference. But if therefore the positing of Durkheim's consciencecollective is
be
illegitimate
to
an
way to make conceivablethe unity of social
shown
rightly

108

groupsand make possible common sensecomparisonsbetweensegmentsof social

resemblances,precisely becausethose resemblancesimply a repetition which cannot
be taken for granted, on the other hand Tarde's pure processof production and
reproduction,of inextricably and immediately linked invention and imitation, if
taken as a positive fact, is surely just as mysterious. In Tarde's own words, "there is
nothing more mysterious, one may say, than such reproductions. 1 admit this: but
is
have
there
this
mystery,
nothing clearer than the resulting
once accepted
when we
series. Whereas,every time that production does not meanreproduction of self, we
in
both
dark"
(1903:
6).
Thus,
Tarde and Durkheim are for a
though
the
are entirely
\
individuality,
i-ejection
our
naive
and
of
affirmations
of
sociological problematization
both thinkers unfortunately come to a dogmatic conclusion, the one affirming a
transcendentexternality of the social and the other affirming instead an immanent,
impersonaltransmission of personalcreativity.
Conclusion
Tarde is perhapsunique among social theorists becausehe formulates a
theory of personal creativity, indeed a theory of radical human contingency, one
which explodesthe myth of a monolithic modernity. At the sametime, remarkably,
Tarde's social theory is neverthelessontologically grounded in the necessary.
Tarde's point of departurefor his own positive social theory is the necessary
he
deduces
from
Durkheimian premisesof social resemblanceof a
existence
be
in
has
brilliantly
difference
He
to
the
touches
primary
social.
of
which
perception
in
issue
is
that
contemporary society, that which
most
pressing
which
on exactly
troubles us about Durkheimian `solidarity', and that which we seemto continually
One
ongoing
about
our
modernity.
might now put the question like
misunderstand
this: why can we not affirm that society positively exists, or has certain particular

109

human
individual
beyond
the
condition, without subordinatingthe socially
effects
useful conceptsthat we can derive from such casesof the existenceof the social to
criteria limited by the needsof a myth of a transcendentcollectivity? Why do we
appearto needto formulate the existenceof a social substance?PerhapsTarde's
imitation
is
identical
is
formation,
ie.,
insight
that
model
with
most profound
with the
creationof those socially useful concepts,and therefore that, at least from this point
fact
imitation
the
essential
of the social. However,
constitutes
of view,
defend
in
have
to
this point of view Tarde must
that
order
seen
paradoxically, we
formula.
imitation
Social metaphysicsarisesone
the
to
metaphysical
of
a
status
raise
more time.
In the next chapter I aim to make clear why Tarde must introduce his own
social substance,one located in the field of ideation, over againstthat of Durkheim's
have
We
already seena hint of the reason: for
quasi-physical social substance.
Tarde ideasare actual, even, to a certain extent, empirical. For to support such a
theory Tarde must make a compromise: ideas can be said to be actual only insofar as
they are related to an imitation, a following, or a tracing of an invention, and this
ideas
be
ideas
flow
If
can
only
metaphysical.
of
as real,
essentially social essence
discontinuous, effective particulars in the social world, the social is nonethelessthe
metaphysicalconcept of their existenceand the status of this `flow', or continuity
is
discontinuous,
thus also metaphysical.
the
among
Nevertheless,despitethis major concessionto social metaphysics,Tarde has
he
in
has
my
openedan opportunity to theorize the
view:
point,
one
major
won
Tarde,
According
to
the
particular.
whereassocial sciencemust
social
ontology of
be
facts
there
the
of
social
can
also
a positive social
repetitions,
particular
study
ideas
in
the
the
of
social particular themselves. Indeed, he
philosophy which affirms

110

believedthat "social sciencemight be as advancedas the other sciences,and... social

philosophy is actually much more so than any other philosophy" (1903: 13). Thus,
the net effect of Tarde's social theory is therefore the creation of a new image of
philosophical thought, one which is identified as a pure sociology. This has a
future
for
the
of sociology and philosophy. It inscribes an
profound meaning
in
between
them
the
precisely
at
point
essentialcooperation
which Durkheim
believedthey must diverge. This freeing-up of social thought from the constraintsof
social sciencewhile neverthelessin close cooperation with those constraints surely
indeed
innovative
be
the
and
salutary aspectsof Tarde's critique of
one
most
must
of
Durkheimian sociologism.
His return to metaphysicsnotwithstanding, my responseto this Tardian
position, however, is to ask about specifics. Why it would not be much more logical
to saythat all that we can speakof in terms of a pure perception of social changeis a
pure or deductive perception of the processof division, of a problem-based
differentiation, which is experiencedin occupations. Why is there something that
is
Why
there someperson which must be
the
change?
of
occupy
moment
must
occupied? Does not modernity reveal that the social consists rather in the notion,
is
in
being
image
to
say,
a plurality of pure social
outside,
which
and
of
sense,
immanence
have
Surely
transcendence
nor
a monopoly on the
neither
occupations?
duration and spaceof the social. Even though Durkheim tends toward taking the side
it
is
focus
Durkheimian
the
transcendence,
precisely
upon occupations,even
social
of
the occupationsimplied by inventions and imitations, that Tarde can have no
have
have
For,
I
Durkheim
to.
argued,
as
as
although
we
seenabove raised
response
this point but then neglectedit, occupationsare surely exactly those processesduring
is
involved,
in
the
to
the
the
of
social
as
such
revealed
person
consistency
not
which

III
manifestedappearances,nor on the contrary in an unextendedself which multiplies
but
in
drama
rather
a
of externalization, of `going
and organizesappearances,
outside'. From this perspective,Tarde seemsagain to want to locate the consistency
in
in
interior
logic
`having'.
flux
Rather, is
the
the
an
experience,
an
social
of
of
of
forget
the
the
the
occupation
makes
social
which
us
our having
ground of
not
through our attraction to difference in itself and our attendantmovement outside?
Does not the occupation include and even embraceour future which has never been
experienced?
PerhapsTarde's sociology of modernity, though it redressesan imbalance by
immanence,
is
the
of
neverthelessnot ontological
neglectedperspective
exhibiting
investigation
into
fully
have
Perhaps
to
modern
society
ontological
a
would
enough.
incorporate a more full account of desire constraints which are not inherent even in
the operationsof unconsciouscreativity. Indeed, I think that Tarde's criticism of
Durkheim's premise of the basisof the social fact in need is not sufficient grounds
for a rejection of Durkheimian thought becauseit does not go far enough sufficiently
to deal critically, for example,with the doctrine of social constraint. As we have
distinction
between
historical
Tarde's
the
critical
and sociological
cost
of
seen,
investigation is that he must posit that social constraint is a construction only of the
On
hand,
be
the
to
and
resemblance.
other
of
repetition
sure,
scientist's perception
Durkheim confused social numbers,and the attendantpressuresand constraints
he
though
spatial
constraint,
even
cleverly avoided
placed upon social members,with
the inherent problems with this by attributing the processof boundary construction to
But
one error cannot correct another.
of
solidarity.
notion
a metaphorical
Thus, in order to look into this further, in the next chapter 1 proposeto
compareTarde's and Durkheim's approachesto the question of sociology. With this

112

begin
to more positively specify the limitations of `pure
comparisonwe may
in
We
then,
the following chapter, be in a position
shall
sociologism.
sociology' or
to begin to appreciatewhy and how Henri Bergson came to recognize late in his
careerthat there is an element of truth but also an element of error in the positions of
both Tarde and Durkheim. He grappled with the consistencyof social movement
betweenits apparentpoles of attraction and constraint, and explicitly attemptedto
avoid sociologism, the positing of either a self or a social externality.

113

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SOCIOLOGISMS OF DURKHEIM AND TARDE:

A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION
1

However directly inaccessibleour object of understanding,the social,

becomesby taking on its essentially occupational character,we can nevertheless
benefit from a theoretical as well as a practical rationale for studying it. My aim is
ideas
Durkheim
Tarde
to summonup an explicit
the
to
and
of
use
main
now
theoretical context for the theory of social occupations. Essentially, in this chapter,
broadly-defined
derivation
is
focus
for
this
upon only one
error of Durkheim and
my
Tarde which I believe can be found to dominate in both of their works. Each offers
individual
insights
into
the nature of the social. Nevertheless,they each
considerable
fall into a similar error which results in a significant distortion of the processual
life.
The source of this error is no less than a guiding
realization of modern social
idea which is common to both of their writings, namely, the idea of a `pure
in
Tarde
Durkheim
rivals
a common attempt to achieve a `pure
and
were
sociology'.
is,
'
Pure
precisely, organized primarily with a view to the
sociology
sociology.
it
be
Thus,
the specific task of this chapter to support
the
must
social.
ontology of
the theory of occupations,which 1 conceive as a social ontological theory, by

114

be
the
the
to
that
approaches
study
social
of
must
all
ontological
not
showing
conceivedas `pure sociology'.
Pure Sociology and its Two Perspectives
There are two perspectiveswhich vie against each other to becomethe
dominant focus of pure sociology. The first kind of approach is exemplified by
Durkheim's discussion of his methodology in the Division of Labour. It has perhaps
beentempting at times to seethis early part of Durkheim's work as a sourceof
in
Durkheim
But
functionalism
sociology.
attemptedto rebut such a
abstract
sterile,
his
first
book.
he
it,
in
As
"the word
in
the
of
major
pages
put
opening
view advance
function is used in two somewhatdifferent ways. Sometimesit designatesa system
from
it
At
divorced
living
their
times
other
effects.
expressesthe
movements,
of
between
these movementsand certain needsof
existing
relationship
corresponding
the organism" (1984: 11). He then goes on to make perfectly clear that he favours
the latter understanding(1984: 11). Therefore, given that for Durkheim it is not
in
the extent to which "`results' or
to
empiricism,
ordinary
possible employ an
`effects' cannot satisfy us either, becauseno idea of correspondenceis evoked", thus,
for
is
know
important
is
"what
to
us
whether this correspondence
rather simply
is
(1984:
Thus,
Durkheim
is
for
it
11).
in
what
not
calling
consists"
exists, and what
but
functionalism,
theory
systems,
social
rather a grounded social
of
or a
an abstract
ontology.
But nor doesthat which is `purely sociological' in Durkheim come from
fact
he
from
in
Rules
disciplinarity
the
that
the
to
attempted
scientificity,
or
sheer
domain
(see
is
facts
1982).
It
the
of sociology
easy
and
specify the criteria of social
to conceive such specifications as being also an integral part of a merely empirical
in
Durkheim
`pure
Rather,
partakes
sociology' precisely and exclusively
approach.

115

in the extent to which he attemptsto construct an identity, not just a mere

but
correspondence an existing, sui generis,purely tautological correspondence,
betweensocial causeand social effect. We have seenin chapter one that that which
is implied here is an argument for an exclusive relation of necessitybetweenthe
down
breaks
barriers,
in
the
need
which
quasi-spatial
a
social
and the
sourceof
social
structureof this event as a unique and modem kind of quasi-temporal durational
constraint over individuals.
The first kind of `pure sociology' is that tendency in sociology which seeksto
kind
is
`pure
itself
in
The
tendency
of
sociological'
second
ground
need.
desire
`desire
by
Here
Tarde.
to
to
the
align
seeks
oneself
one
with
as
exemplified
invent', or the decomposition of the grounding in need for the sake of new
does
involve
Perhaps
this
surprisingly,
perspective
a
somewhat
not
compositions.
forces
idea
that
there
the
or constraintswhich tend to make
are
rejection of
`individuals' inessentialin comparisonwith the larger social whole. Desire is not an
is
for
desire
is
it
Tarde
individual
that
the
since
what
peculiar
about
attribute of
"completes and is part of the logical need for unification" (1903: 150). Rather than
is
does
desire
Tarde
individual
put at stakethe agency of desire as
what
assuming
located in a personal self with a problem which surpassesthe personality becausethe
invent.
how
have
As
I
is
to
shown in chapterthree, in
problem a social problem of
Tarde there is a strong senseof the larger impersonality of the social existing
The
`impure'
implicit
the
criticism
of
sociology
personal.
constructively alongside
in this secondperspectiveconsistsnot in the rejection of the notion of a force of
impersonality but rather in the rejection of the notion that such a force could lend the
Instead,
is
externality.
of
quasi-spatial,
quasi-temporal
what
any
sort
whole
social
between
but
desire
ideational
is
nevertheless
personal
quantitative
continuum
seen an

116

form
belief.
it,
impersonal
force
in
As
Tarde
the
of
puts "desire and belief they
and
are the substanceand the force, they are the two psychological quantities which are
found at the bottom of all the sensationalqualities with which they combine; and
when invention and then imitation takes possessionof them in order to organiseand
(1903:
145-6). As Tarde seesit,
the
them,
they
quantities"
real
social
also are
use
"the simplicity of such principles equalstheir generality, and I grant that it is much
follow
down
lay
them,
than
to
to
them through the
to
them
prove
and
even
easier
labyrinth of their particular applications. [But] their formulation is nevertheless
in
his
(1903:
In
this
sense,
and
own terms, Tarde has "tried, then, to
necessary"
x).
outline a pure sociology" (1903: x).
Durkheim agreesthat what is interesting is "what social phenomenaare when
(1982:
in
55).
However,
Durkheim's view, there
elements"
stripped of all extraneous
is no purity in locating the substanceof the social in desiring-imitations since the
latter are operative so far away from their source in need, and are conversely so far
impossible
labyrinth
Tarde
into
to
that
the
so
of,
as
make
speaks
a consolidated,
gone
structural definition of their part in social existence. In Tarde's perspective,on the
implicate
justification
is
hand,
to
there
such a senseof sociological
simply no
other
for
insofar
`Pure
Tarde,
it
is
linked
in
sociology'
as
ontology.
with
strategy social
be
described
as a necessaryattunementor alignment
any sort of method, can only
inasmuch
become
desires
forceful
flux
they
the
the
which,
as
particular
of
with
follow,
immediately
innovatively
they
the
constitute the
new models
pursuits of
in
form
beliefs.
for
Thus,
the
of
the
provisional
of
societies
wholeness
senseof
Tarde, beliefs, which provide the social with `wholeness' in particular casesof
desiring-imitations, are actually always immediately connectedwith the

117

multiplicitous social particulars of desire. They could not be just `ideals' or general
ideasheld in abstraction.
What is `purely sociological' in both Durkheim and Tarde does not come
from abstractionor generalization. Nor does it come from a reflection upon the
transcendentalnature of certain sociological categories. The term `pure', here,
should not be understoodin a Kantian or quasi-Kantian sense. What is at stake is
`strategical' rather than `critical. ' Durkheim and Tarde eachhave a strong senseof
strategywhich guides their work. Strategyis disciplinary in the caseof Durkheim
inter-disciplinary
in the caseof Tarde. But this only goes to show that, in fact,
and
the issue of disciplinarity is not of key significance. What is important is that each
thinker's strategy develops in a dialogue with that which he posits as a key social
substance.Each thinker is thus bound to link his strategy with the very nature of the
social substancehe arguesfor. This link, then, between strategy and social
substance,will be our provisional definition of `pure sociology'.
Pure Sociology, Metaphor,

Sociologism

1think there is enough evidenceto saythat the groundings and alignments of

Durkheim and Tarde can be organized into two basic sociological perspectiveswhich
grant ontological significance and analytical emphasisto certain featuresof the
social. The first perspectivetargets the featuresof constraint, obligation, endurance
and concentratesits ontological deduction of the necessaryexistenceof the social
feature
the
central
of social externality. The secondperspectivetargets
upon
attraction, play, spontaneity and emphasizesthe ontological necessityand centrality
by
first
Durkheim, is primarily deductive
The
the
self.
perspective,exemplified
of
inasmuch as it generatesa strong, circular conception of the features it privileges,
interpret
to
tending
the other perspectiveweakly as basedupon insignificant
while

118

epiphenomena.The secondperspective,exemplified by Tarde, is primarily critical

and intuitive, combining an effective criticism of the tautology involved in the first
position with a radical intuition of the relation between the positive features
neglectedin the first position and social becoming, while tending to dismiss the
featuresemphasizedin the first position as objectifying or derivative.
How can we formulate a seriousevaluation of the pursuit of a `pure
sociology', an evaluation that can take into serious account the featuresof both kinds
of approach? Above all, a serious account must evaluatethe pursuits of Durkheim
and Tarde in ontological terms. Thus, we must ask whether the goal to establishthe
is
the
substance
an appropriate way to pursuethe ontology
social
nature of
ultimate
of the social. Certainly, a social ontology needsto be inclusive. But does it needto
be universal as well? 1 think that the searchfor substancesleads away from
inclusivity and toward an ideal universality which will always fail to be absolute.
Thus, in my view, it should be clear that the criteria of ontology cannot be positive,
or linked with certain featuresover others. In my view herein lies the common error
of Durkheim and Tarde. We ought to ask whether any kind of `pure sociology' can
outline an effective relation betweensocial space-timeand social existencewithout
becoming too dogmatic on either of the sidesof stasisor dynamics.
Now we are in a position perhapsto make a significant theoretical criticism of
Durkheim and Tarde. If we ask what is common in these mutually-opposed
facts.
interesting
Durkheim
find
of
conjunction
and Tarde both
attempts,we
an
becomedogmatic at certain points in their social ontologies. Thesepoints are those
in which they link the substanceof the social with an agencywhich they suppose,
rightly or wrongly, to be a certain locus of creative originality: the self in the caseof
Tarde and the horde or simple group in the caseof Durkheim. At this point each

119

thinker doestwo things. First, they immediately inject temporality into the locus by
supposingit to be creative. Secondly, but with less promising effect, they
additionally assumethat the locus they have isolated has certain spatial properties,
including, for example, spatial difference. Durkheim perhapssank deeperinto this
error than Tarde did becauseDurkheim thought that such spatial properties could
play a causalrole in social genesis. But this obvious error only helps to illuminate a
more subtle, common error, namely, that eachthinker assumesthat spatial
characteristics,whether causalor not, are always unproblematically linked with
temporal change. They speakof spatial characteristicsof the social in temporal
terms such as `change', `continuity', `current', `persistence'.
At first glance this might not seemlike a big problem. Why do we needto
worry about specifying what spatial featuresthe social has, if indeed it has any?
Why cannot we be content with this loose, `strategical' way of thinking about `social
space'? Perhapswe can, but then we would at least have to admit that we have no
reasonto assumethat such terms could be used to describeany aspectof real space.
Moreover, it does not help to answerthat what is being referred to in ontologically
oriented social thought such as this is social rather than physical space. What could
`social space' be, given that the term `social' is already immediately impregnated
with a fundamentaltemporality? How can spacebe describedin terms of time?
Would we not, with `social space', have simply formulated another contradictory
term of analysis?
At the crucial junctures of their attempts at `pure sociology', as a result of the
`pure sociological' requirement to posit a creative locus, both Durkheim and Tarde
each provide a classical example - and furthermore theseare examplesthat are
otherwise supposedto be opposedto one another - of what can only be describedas

120

a temporal metaphor of space. The one relies upon the metaphor of `solidity' and
the other upon the metaphorof `fluidity'. In this, `pure sociology' necessarily
becomesa mere sociologism.
Two Criticisms of Sociologism

The essenceof sociologism, as I would now define it, lies in this reliance
upon a variety of temporal metaphorsof spaceas proof that the social exists and is
life
in
of
modes
of
social
variety
which subsumethe
manifested a corresponding
individual.
From this definition, l will
the
comparatively short-lived
existenceof
but
there
three
that
criticise
sociologism,
one
can
as I will argue, only
ways
show
are
the last two are real, effective criticisms that we can learn from.
The first and most common way of criticising sociologism is the external
individual
from
the
the
of
of
point
view
and accuses
comes
criticism which
banal
lacking
formulating
`common
truisms
and,
as
a
result,
of
of
sociologism
from
doctrine,
is
to
this
It
position,
rely
upon
a
enough,
such as that
probably
sense'.
in
for
`the
'
to
`human
the regularities of
that
order
account
sacred',
of
nature, or
of
social practices. However, despitethe numerous and obvious difficulties in
least
doctrine,
the
truth
the
not
a
of which would be an at least
such
of
maintaining
for
metaphors,
presentpurposeswe needonly
explanatory
reliance
upon
equivalent
it.
is
in
This
is
intrinsically
defect
that
such
a
position
unable
recognize one relevant
to specify its object of criticism, such as whether the object of criticism is the idea of
is
it
in
latter.
the
or
a
certain
whether
practice
of
general
awareness
sociological
It is extremely important for our purposesthat we attempt to understandthe
defined
practices of the classical project of sociological
elusive motives and carefully
is
highly
in
if
As
1
such
an
understanding
chapter
one,
relevant,
argued
awareness.
immediate
it
to
still
since
we
share
own
social
awareness,
with
a
our
not essential,

121

is
Sociologism
a certain becoming dogmatic of theseclassical
senseof modernity.
types of sociological awareness. Even today it supplies the public with echoesof a
discourseagainstwhich a sufficient attack is merely that which can be seento be
dealing only with another kind of discourse as discourse. Such attacks can easily
by
their
and
vagueness appearingto directly addressthe
conceal
own naive realism
terms, or the `deconstruction' of the terms, before them. This is why sociologism is
undesirable:it distracts attention from the social needsand desiresthat most
instead
to
to
attracts obscurantisttypes of criticism.
and
sociology attempts attend
Over againstthese ill-informed types of criticism, but informed by their attempts and
their deficiencies, l think we must attempt to formulate effective internal criticisms
of sociologism.
Firstly: a problem of hollowing, or false transcendance. Sociologism begins
from being againstthe idea of spaceas an exclusive property of the private
individual, but on the grounds of ontology rather than political economy. It wants to
fundamental
in
its
the
the
nature of social existence.
address problem radically at root
But it also seessocial existencefundamentally imbued with creativity and thus with
for
its
In
time
to
time.
non-private activities, it fails to address
eagerness appropriate
the relation betweentime and spacein social existence. Instead it comesto rely upon
does
It
its
this
to
temporal
space.
communicate
of
metaphors
criticism of the
various
its
idea
to
alternative
communicate
of a social reality that
and
appropriation of space
life
death
individual.
the
that
the
temporally
of
and
supercedes
of
encompassesand
What is involved here is primarily an ontological approachto the necessityof social
latter
floating
the
to
somehow
over and subsumingprivate
as
spaceswhich wants see
both
in
It
to
time.
therefore
a
mystery
attributes
real spaceand time
or proper space,

122

itself which is matchedonly by the apparentprofundity of the questionsraised by the

notion of a sui generis social space.
In Durkheim, for example,we have seenhow an `insight' into the necessity
is
linked
fact
with a theory of spatial social segments.
of society as a sui generis
Sociologism comes from the theoretical pursuit of a `pure sociology' which aims at
features
the
of social existence,and thus the
essential
providing an outline of
questionsraised as to the provenanceof social spacein social existenceare addressed
theoretically. But also in Durkheim we have seenhow a certain distinction is
initially implied and then comesto be developed between his theory of `organic
first
is
implied to be metaphysical
his
The
theory
segments.
of structural
need' and
be
They
level
be
to
the
the
to
contrasted
are
on
and
actual.
of theory: the first
second
is implied to be non-spatial and the secondto be spatial. Together they are supposed
to accountcomprehensivelyfor one reality of modernization. But what is spatial
cannot provide, on its own, an explanation for what is non-spatial, and what is nonits
for
explanation
on
own,
a
reciprocal
cannot
spatial
provide,
what is spatial. Such
a tautology will obscurethe social meaning of the actual as obligation and thus as
intimately involved in social necessity. At the sametime it will introduce an
assumptionthat the actual, now a sphereof quasi-spatialrelations, somehow,
somewhere,constitutes a sui generis movement of social creativity.
To come to rely upon a temporal metaphor of spaceis to implicitly separate
into
from
insight
the
of
social
necessity
spaces
one's theory of
ontological
one's
those spacesand to come to rely upon an increasingly hollow formulation of the
latter. As we have seenabove, Durkheim's attempt to unify his theory by developing
his
ineffective.
is
its
This
theorization,
aspect
of
and
aspect
a causalargument weak
is
insignificant
in
fact
in
being
to
the
theoretical
that,
choice,
comparison
a
order
of

123

to developa concrete,grounded social ontology, Durkheim must actually bifurcate

his theory, with the result of creating parallel theories, one purportedly to do with the
non-spatialand one purportedly to do with the spatial. There is, in fact, no way to
unify such theories as parts of a coherent ontological problematic except by meansof
using an overarching metaphor which is an emblem of that which is mysteriously
false
is
hollow,
in
both.
This
transcendence. They are, in fact, only
creative
a
theoriesof certain quasi-spatial effects of social creativity. The power of the
metaphorof `solidarity' is only its appealto a senseof the mystery of social
creativity, and it is only a quasi-spatial metaphor. It is, to be precise, a temporal
metaphorof space.
Furthermore, Durkheim's opposition from within the project of `pure
sociology' makes almost exactly the samemistake. The only difference between
Tarde and Durkheim on this point is that Tarde did not attempt to draw out an
explicit causalargument for imitative currents. But he did not needto make such an
in
order to end up with exactly the samekind of
argument
attempt at a causal
ontological bifurcation of social theory which requires the samekind of metaphorical
invention
is
kind
Tarde's
of
a
of creativity of the self which has a
concept
solution.
mysterious effect of inspiration upon others. It does not createex nihilo but is rather
following,
kind
formation
'
kind
`model
through
a
of model of fashion. By
of
a
`follow',
influence
to
or to appropriate for one's
creatively selecting some cultural
follow
for
development,
to
model
others
as well and in this
own
one createsa
imitation a social current comes into being. One can thus have an influence on
from
live
one's own time.
many generationsapart
agentswho
However, Tarde's notion of invention, or what I have describedas `model
formation through following, ' is neverthelesssystematically separatedfrom his

124

theory of imitative currents. Moreover, this confusing bifurcation is a necessary

consequenceof his approach. For even if imitative currents are not intended to refer
to solid space,they are still intended to refer to quantifiable social flows. The
sociological idea of quantity, without solidity, is flow. The idea of flow, or to use
Tarde's term `current', makessenseonly in referenceto an idea of space,even if
Over
in
to
on the other side of the equation, the notion of
only pure changes space.
invention has to remain `a flash of genious', an element of mysterious creativity.
Sincethe agentsof invention-imitation have no spatial solidity and therefore no
spatial contact or proximity whatsoever,only the idea of a flow or current, which
is
idea,
linked
temporal
a
can remain to link invention and
when
with creativity
imitation if they are to retain a senseof quantifiability.
In Tarde's thinking there is no contact or proximity that is presumedto take
boundaries
between
is eliminated so that the problem
The
problem of
place
agents.
of the social part within social processescan take pre-eminenceover the allegedly
false problem of the social whole. Durkheim's idea was of a kind of `worldly space'
boundaries
him
solidarity
made
see
enduring
of
which
as intrinsic to the social
he
because
boundaries,
Just
but at the same
this
sense
rejects
of
question.
exactly
time wants to keep quantity central to the social question, what Tarde generatesis an
kind
in
`outer
temporal
space'
of
alternative
metaphor of a
which the question of
boundariesis left completely behind but in which the idea of spacenevertheless
remains important. Tarde's idea is that of an unlimited reservoir of flows or currents
imitative
bond,
distinguish,
in
together
agents
re-bond
and
a constantly
which
fluctuating social eternity. This kind of notion of a flux is still just as hollow and
falsely transcendentas that of Durkheim, however, becausethe more we affirm the

125

`reality' of the description, the more we must supposethat what it meansto be

socially situated comes from some fundamentally mysterious creativity.
Secondly: a problem of flattening, or false immanence. The reliance upon a
temporal metaphorof spacecreatesthe unfortunate effect that social time can only be
conceivedflatly in terms of general moments which separatetraditions from effects
of modernity. Durkheim's distinction between `mechanical solidarity' and `organic
in
his
first
is
formulated
major work and remains as the primary insight
solidarity'
which guides his entire subsequentwork (1984). The first category refers to
traditional sociality, the secondrefers to modem sociality. As we have seen,the
transition betweenthe traditional and the modem is de-historicized in Durkheim's
thought. The main link to history he retains is a vague sensethat the division of
labour which he believes spurs on the transition between tradition and modernity has
acceleratedin relatively recent times. At the sametime, Durkheim's explanation of
the division of labour, and indeed of modernity in general, is evolutionary, not
duplication
deals
It
the
and substitution of functions
gradual
with
revolutionary.
basedin social need and a resulting complexification basedon the necessary
forms.
It dealsmainly with the
new
social
evolutionary co-existenceof old and
by
this complexification. But nowhere is there
caused
of
society
exteriorization
explained the time of this exteriorization process,which is the modem creative social
processpar excellance.
On the one hand, it appearsthat Durkheim has conceived time as immanent in
discovers
inasmuch
he
a sui generis creativity of the social in its
as
sociality
becoming complex and modern via the division of labour. And for Durkheim thus,
generally,

126

the guidelines in relation to which [time] is divided and organized are

fixed by the movementsof concentration or dispersion of society (1973:
218).

On the other hand, there is another sensein which it seemsfor him that time is
simply a flat backdrop againstwhich actors play out a struggle over their social
boundaries.
In Durkheim's
their
of
roles
and
problems
accompanying
needsand
words,

the rhythm of collective life dominates and embraces the varied rhythms
it
from
lives
the
results; consequently the time
which
of all
elementary
which it expresses dominates and embraces all particular durations. It is
time in general. For a long time the history of the world has been only
(1973:
history
218).
the
society
of
another aspect of

If Durkheim does not attribute generality to social types he neverthelessdoes

is
It
there
time.
to
simply one time which expandsas
seems
attribute generality
boundary
all
needs
and
all
accommodates
changes.
modernity expandsand
As we have seen,Tarde attacksDurkheim's conception of a monolithic
linking
Tarde
the
However,
of modernity with the senseof a
only attacks
modernity.
individual
be
to
to
that
external
appears
actors.
monolith as a phenomenon
Modernity is still highly active in Tarde's conception of society. For Tarde,
however, modernity is not really consideredwith respectto the `whole of the
be
be
innovative
Tarde's
to
aggregation
said
an
of
modernity could only
process'.
ideas sustained,concentrated,and fluctuating in the imitative spacebetween

127

individuals, in what Durkheim called `negative solidarity' (1984: 75-77). Modernity

for Tarde is not an objective phenomenonwith an organic nature of its own. The
immanent
in
for
Tarde,
conceived
as
are
a social substanceof
momentsof modernity,
ideaswhich in themselvesare the radical particulars of social continuity which lend
form to history and to the infinite varieties of imitation. Thus, in Tarde's thinking,
ideas
innovation
imitation
time
time
and
particularity,
and
and
a
of
of
a
we might see
however
For
Tarde
here
but
following
there
two
times
are
not
and continuity.
and
his
history
identical.
does
In
have
its
is
time
view,
not
own,
simply
which
only one
overarchingtime.
For Tarde, all time is social and archeological. Rather than describe an
increasing alienation between traditional forms and modern forms as Durkheim does,
Tarde simply collapses them into one spontaneous social cosmos. In Durkheim,
become
In
institutions
this
though
process,
modern.
must
are
everything social
increasingly divided and differentiated, time is gradually expanded, homogenized,
kind
freedom
for
to
of
quasi-spatial
as
a
reservoir
of
modernizers
accessible
and
diversity. Not unlike Durkheim, in Tarde's conception, modernization is a "growing
between
barriers
individuals
the
all
customary
whom
of reciprocal
of
resemblance
imitation have been broken down, and who imitate one another more and more
freely... and yet more and more necessarily", and this "makes them feel with a
injustice
(Tarde
irresistible
1903:
the
of
privilege"
power
growing and, eventually,
xxiv).

However, in Tarde, everything social is already modern in principle; the

imitations
have
been
is
of
which
always
acceleration
an
acceleration of progress
it,
from
"far
Tarde
As
in
human
smothering their true
puts
taking place
society.
originality",

the progressive resemblance of individuals "fosters and favours it"

128

(1903: xxiv). The traditional is merely improved by modernization, not

revolutionized, in Tarde's way of thinking.
This need not obscurethe fact that Tarde is very pro-modern according to his
is
"what
Tarde
Indeed,
that
claims
contrary to personalpre-eminence
own standards.
is the imitation of a single man whom people copy in everything. But when, instead
few,
borrow
from a hundred, or
or
after
a
after
one
person
we
of patterning one's self
ten thousandpersons...the very nature and choice of theseelementary copies, as well
astheir combination, expressesand accentuatesour original personality" (Tarde
1903:xxiv). Modernity, for Tarde, is accompaniedby an increasing desire for living
in a novel way, a desire for difference and a maximum of spontaneouspersonal
innovation. Social change,for Tarde, is immanent in a social substancecomposedof
radical social particulars. But theseradical particulars are already posited from the
is
Tarde's
Consequently,
conception that of a `false immanence' inasmuch as
outset.
time has to be posited as a pre-establishedcontinuity which accompaniesthe social
`current'. Time does not changesignificantly when any new particular social
innovation occurs. Time is the flat, grey, impersonal continuity of otherwise
discontinuous archeologically-discoveredsocial facts. Time plays a role only as an
for
`current',
is
the
the
concept
super
model
which
or
actually only a
over-arching
his
Tarde
`pure sociology', to
attempts,
aiming
at
spatial metaphor with which
thematize social diversity.
Conclusion
Sociologism can be defined as one dimensional social ontology justified
We
by
temporal
to
of
space.
can now conclude that
metaphor
a
recourse
primarily
the usageof such a metaphoris the element which must be held in common in the
is
This
`strategies'
`pure
the meansof `pure
of
sociology'.
opposed
various, even

129

link
however,
is
The
to
that `pure
substance
and
strategy.
end,
sociology's attempt
sociology' cannot be maintained as a project without becoming sociologism. The
is
it
that
confuses social time and social space. The
main problem with sociologism
interwoven heterogeneity,the virtual confluence, of social time and social spacein
in
is
ignored,
glossed
over
sociologism. The types of
our actual occupations
sociologismwe have analysedimply a common model of time that is so generalas to
be indifferent to social change. In addition, they imply different notions of space
falsify
in
different
insight
into
our
ontological
ways
our
each
which nevertheless
do
by
for
They
this
positing a substanceof the social and a
need
social existence.
locus of social genesisand an intrinsic connection between substanceand locus.
This connection can only be strategicaland thus it can only be metaphorical. But in
it
in
have
to
qua
metaphorical
criticize
order to mount an
no way
we only needed
effective criticism. Rather, we need only point out that the theoretical evidence
be
it
does
from
there
that
can
no privileged locus of social
exposition,
our
shows,as
if
furthermore
in
'
in
`group.
And
`self'
the
the
we
or
concur that we
change,either
cannot leave this question as a mere matter of theoretical preference,we must then
be
be
If
there
that
there
social
substance.
can
no
can
also
no social substance,
admit
there can still be metaphor,but the metaphorhas been shown to be arbitrary and of
little consequence.Thus, it is not necessaryto criticize the use of metaphorsper se,
but it is necessaryto ask if they might be used, as they have been by Durkheim and
Tarde, to gloss over a major theoretical problem.
As I have already suggestedin many places above, I think the contemporary
formulate
basically
human
to
theory
a
us
ontological
still
requires
practices
of
social
from
but
in
`Pure
a
similar
notion
ends
sociology'
starts
a
problematic.
social
its
in
forecloses
terms,
the possibility of re-opening the
own
sociologism which,

130

question. It attemptsto finally answer what cannot be finally answered. For there is
somethinginevitable about the needto formulate a social ontological problematic.
This is not simply becausehuman practices are social, a persuasiveand realistic
tautology, but a tautology nonetheless. But nor is it becausepractices are inherently
self-creative,basedon an intuition or an idealistic reflection upon the flux of our
existence. Rather, for me social ontology is required becausethe social, our
in
its
become
this,
tend
to
and
occupations,
vital state,the social is
practices,
inaccessibleto direct observation. In our occupationswe somehow, somewhere,
have
been
in.
`state'
`process'
Social ontology
`outside'
the
the
or
we
move
of either
is thus of a central, eternally recurring importance. To answerthe social question on
the basisof any particular set of spaceand time bound observationswould be like
trying to do literary criticism by watching someonebecome embroiled in reading a
is
in
The
that
of
all
practices
side
which,
constituting a social
novel.
occupational
diversion, there is engendereda socially significant feeling and a personally relevant,
but complex, and thoroughly social concept of the externality of the social. In my
fully
for
have
`outside'
by
this
than
accounting
of
other
way
no
we
would
view,
analysing social practices ontologically.
But not all ontological approachesto the social needto be formulated as a
`pure sociology'. From the shortcomingsof Durkheim and Tarde we can learn an
important lession, namely, that it is a mistake to supposethat the sourceof social
key
be
isolated,
for
be
if
it
then
of
significance
our social
would
could
genesis,
having
learned
from
is
I
What
the excessesof sociologism we
that
propose
practices.
is
for
in
in
left
that
that
affirm
significant
may
which
social
a position which we
are
in
is
important
is
indeed,
that
generally
social
matters,
simply
which
and
ontology,
full occupation. This is what `full occupation' meanstoday: that the drawbacks of

131

`pure sociology', evaluatedcomparatively, have confirmed that what is neededfor

in
is
to
organize
phenomena
our understandingaround the
neither
social occupation
is
desirable
in
is
that
social
occupations
not, on the
what
mantle of social stability,
into
intuition
leap
hand,
the
to
stream
of
courageously
our
of social change.
other
`Full' social genesisis rather an occupying movement which temporarily dissolves
the fracture between `that which is closed' and `that which is open' by meansof
image
temporary,
of the `externality of the social'. The
socially-useful
generatinga
for
interior
of
significance
only
self
are
an
and
of
reflection
perspectivesof group
is
this
and
past
movement,
experience
only one aspectof
upon a past experienceof
disjointed
in
Therefore,
intrinsically
is
movement.
complex,
need
what
we
a
what
order to surpasssociologism effectively, to reopen the question of social ontology
futurally-inclusive,
is
immanent,
phenomenology of social
effectively, an
by
is
to
an analysis of the space-timeof
one
guided
say,
occupations,which
be
dualistically
Time
trajectory.
space
should
not
analysed
and
as
occupational
but
locus,
rather as parallel aspectsof a variety of
separateaspectsof one creative
lend
the social their peculiar colour
and
as
social
qualified
are
which
social quantities
inasmuch as they are socially involved, somehow, somewhere. What is of interest in
`somehow,
is
this
somewhere'.
sociology now only

132

PART II

THE OUTSIDE

133

CHAPTER FIVE

BERGSON'S SOCIAL THOUGHT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SOCIOLOGISM

It might be said that philosophy in turn of the century and early 20th-century France
for our purposesis best understoodas a kind of neutral reservoir of intellectual talent
from which a new science- sociology - wanted to recruit much-neededintellectual
capital. Becauseof the tendencyto inflate their vision of social sciencewith
Durkheim's social philosophy, the Durkheimians did not pose a direct challengeto
mainstreamphilosophy in France,but simply drew upon it as a resource. It has been
shown that the majority of the Durkheimians were recruited precisely from the
mainstreampool of neo-Kantian rationalist philosophers (Besnard 1983). However,
thinkers such as Celestin Bougle, Paul Lapie, and Dominique Parodi, who were at
the core of participation in the Annee Sociologique as well as of the defenceof the
tenetsof the Durkheimian doctrine, had no problem, ideological or institutional, in
remaining philosophically based. Durkheim himself, trained as a philosopher like
the others, continued to describehimself as a `rationalist' even at a very key
his
in
Sociological
Rules
Method (1982: 33).
the
of
preface
of
explanatory moment
Besnard's studies show that Durkheim actively recruited scholarsfrom within
from
disciplines
far
(1983:
11-39). But at the same
than
more
any
other
philosophy,
time, Durkheimian sociology sat well, probably too well for its own institutional

134

has
Karady
established,with establishedphilosophy (1983: 71-89). The
good, as
discipline of French philosophy never appeared`purist' or threatenedto the point of
desiringto wholly exclude the development of the sociological movement from its
domain.
Thus, I think the issue of fluctuations in the boundariesof the philosophical
discipline vis-a-vis fluctuations in the boundariesof the new discipline of sociology,
is
large
issue
the
a
part, really explains little by itself about
of recruitment
of which
the emergenceof the project of sociological awareness. For example, if we want to
if
Durkheimian
to
there are any
the
we
will
ask
movement
want
understand
philosophical grounds which explain why the Durkheimians did indeed want to
distancethemselvesfrom establishedphilosophy. At this point, such a question
ceasesto be a question of cross-boundarymovement. In my view, too many thinkers
have simply taken Durkheim at his word, have succumbedto his repetitious
formulations, that his motivation to createa sociological paradigm was purely
sociological.
Alternatively, it is sometimestempting to offer a quasi-psychological
decline
for
today's
of sociology which consists in supposingthat
relative
explanation
by
delusions
untenable
classically,
of grandeur. But why
sociology was motivated,
have such delusions, such as that of Durkheim, been so compelling for so many
inside
discipline
thinkers,
the
and
outside
of
sociology,
while
of
social
generationsof
latter
if
Moreover,
has
the
to
the
to
tended
surely
answer
suffer?
question,
sociology
it could be answered,would have to do with specialization more than with crossdisciplinarity. The latter indubitably rests upon the successof the former.
Intellectual workers in academiahave traditionally felt compelled on the one hand to
form small groups of specializationsand on the other hand to oppose eachother for

135

the sakeof lending to their special pursuits a critical or cutting edge. If delusions of
in
in
do
this
they
arise
context
of
success
would
enlarging the group
grandeur arise,
delusions
its
Such
would therefore rest upon a
while preserving special principles.
tacit assumptionthat effective difference is measuredby productivity stemming from
oppositionand competition. More to the point, one ought to recognize that one
identify
delusions.
just
Thus, the
to
simply
any
such
assumption
such an
would need
assumptionthat difference is subordinateto productivity could not be purely
be
individually
least
not
psychological since it is, for sure,
could
psychological, or at
in
kind
of absolute presupposition western societies even today.
a
The net effect of our productivity paradigm indeed has been that the social
indeed
large
of
society
every
member
at
who acceptsthe
and
sciences,sociology,
basic assumptionsof the former, have necessarilytended to forget the basic paradox
is
It
this paradox that we must understand
them
together.
ties
all
of modernity which
in order to begin to understandBergson's resistanceto sociologism. The paradox
issues,
irresolvable
key
fact
in
the
that
such
as
many
social questionstend to
consists
be, are neverthelessimpossible for anyoneto set aside, as one might attempt to do for
the sakeof concentrating, in a vulgar modernist mode, strictly upon
in
broader
Of
terms,
social
or
upon
work
productivity.
course,
verifiable/falsifiable
long
inherent
have
in
this
thinkers
the various
seen
paradox
as
purely
many social
hermeneuticsand/or critical hermeneutics(eg. Gadamer 1994; Habermas 1984;
1987; Giddens 1990; Touraine 1995) and deconstructive modes (eg. Derrida 1978;
Lyotard 1988; Nancy 1991) with which we approach social questions. Historical
1995)
(Foucault
(eg.
Hobsbawm
Hill
1991;
and
cultural
materialists
materialists
1991a; Bourdieu 1977) have interpreted it in terms of class struggle or of the circuits
former
The
two
capital.
approachesstressthe ethical problems of
and
of power

inter-subjectivity, but then tend to either posit an abstract-functionalist notion of an

ideal situation of communicative action, revive the abstracttheorization of structure
andagencyin holistic-reflexive terms, or affirm an abstract-eschatologicalnotion of
a newjustice and a new community to come. In contrast, the two latter approaches
haverestedupon objectivist illusions, the first upon the illusion of unmediated(or
insignificantly mediated) class group agency and the simplistic model of power as
domination, and the secondupon the determination of the cultural product vis-a-vis a
cultural `field' which is all-pervasive and virtually devoid of agency.
However, it has been shown recently that there can be a non-objectivist
alternativeto hermeneuticsand deconstructionwhich is neverthelessprogressiveand
not intrinsically a postmodern or cultural-theoretical approach: one can classify and
historicize the different modalities of the paradox to createthe useful effect of
broadening,decentering,and specifying our understandingsof modernity (Wagner
1994). Faithful to the paradox as such,this perspective has, in part, had the effect of
confirming that there must be something more immediate and vital in the paradox
than merely an historical lessonas to why we need to approachsociality with a
has,
interpretations.
least,
It
become
the
of
at
very
variety
apparentthat without a
theorization of modernity even an interpretive-historical approach cannot fully grasp
Kant's observation that the paradox createdby thesetypes of troublesome social
longevity
but
from
from
their
their inescapability
rather
questionscomes not
(Wagner 2001). It is becauseof inescapability that human reasonsimply fails to
render our powers of knowledge such as explanation, interpretation, and critical
faculties.
into
In the samestroke,
reflexivity
uncontroversial, automatic
inescapability motivates us to attain stable, systematic answersto our social
questions,but then tends to push this attainability decisively out of reach. For the

137

formulated
kinds
difficult
these
are
of
questions
with a view to eliminating,
more
inescapability
in
their
order to switch the focus to
containing, or glossing over
from
the
the ground of need,and then
strays
more
one
narrow, solvable questions,
the more all of our questionstend to lose their internal animus as well as their
is
Bergson's
We
that
thought
see
shall
aimed precisely at
contextualrelevance.
his
in
his
final
that
this
tendency,
strategy,
and
years, comesto be aimed
countering
implicitly as a critique of the formulation of `anomie' by meansof illuminating a
interpretation
in
Durkheimian
the
of the paradox.
particular shortcoming
Durkheim's interpretation of the Kantian paradox is certainly a sophisticated
holds
inescapability
Durkheim
in question
that
the
the
that
paradox.
one
affirms
involves a constitutive externality of social relations which derives from a social
describe
it
is
to ourselvesas something
that
that
we necessarily
so powerful
need
sacredand beyond our direct knowledge. However, he is neverthelessoptimistic that
certain of the vicious effects of this, particularly those which create obstaclesto the
be
innovation
in
through
can
mitigated
societies,
our
of
social
rational organization
theory and practice. Rather than eliminate the paradox we can alleviate it. In
comparativereflection upon the social structuresof morality and religion we can
falling
human
though
reason
which,
short of providing
elaboratea genealogyof
be
that
capableof rendering the sacredobsolete,can nevertheless
solutions
would
help to develop a therapeuticunderstandingof the problems that a scientific
modernity generatesof skepticism and general anomie.
The key difficulty with Durkheim's perspectiveupon social theory which
does
lie
in
distinction
from
it
the
above
mentioned
not
ones
a
more recent
marks off
betweengrand, all-encompassingtheory versus modest, situatedtheory. The
difficulty rather consists,as I suggestedin chapter four above, in Durkheim's implied

138

link betweenstrategy and substance,in that for Durkheim modernity is not a

intensities
but
is
problem
rather a monolithic perspective
paradoxical
constellationof
division
by
the
of labour in society, which he
generated a single substantialproblem,
theorizesas an overarching problematic of `institutions' by virtue of its essenceas an
inescapableexternalization process. Durkheim's insight was to conceive a kind of
division
labour)
inescapable,
(the
of
as
an
collective problematization
ontologicallysignificant processof externalization.
Durkheim's error was to supposethat it follows from this that only one
fact,
have
involved
in
In
division
is
this
the
as
we
seen
process.
above,
of
problem
labour in society as Durkheim expressesit is so general as to be, in fact, not a social
is
he
theorizes
rather simply the very processof modern
problem at all: what
socialization itself! Given this difficulty, we can supposethat it must have appeared
to Durkheim that the only way to salvageany critical edgewas to posit one side of
the `problem' as normality and the other side as pathology. But the latter division
lies
Herein
important
another
confusion.
yet
and
modality
only causesmystification
have
distortion:
taken a processwhich he describesin
Durkheim's
to
tautological
of
for
in
the
terms
same
process
problematical terms.
as
an
explanation
operational
In this context, Gabriel Tarde begins to emphasizethe phenomenonof
imitative repetition over social externality and the flow of desire over the stability of
far
is
from
Tarde
if
Durkheim
is
that
It
the
away
as
of
of
as one
position
as
systems.
be
in
kind
believing
hold
to
that
ought
sociology
rooted
some
of pure
while still
can
held
intrinsic
Tarde
deduction.
However,
that
the
even
aim of social
sociological
desire is to attain; if not a complete explanation of society, neverthelessa maximum
Durkheim's
(1903:
Tarde's
belief
147).
and
projects were very much
of stable
both
began
from
but
they
to
nevertheless
other,
within philosophy and
opposed each

139

subsequentlycameto feel a need for an organic interdisciplinarity organized around

what might be called broadly the perspectiveof social thought. They both believed
this broad perspectivecould enablethem to advancetoward the goal of inventing
sociological paradigmswhich they thought might be able to develop a better
understandingof, if not to completely answer, those ultimate questionspointed to but
neglectedin contemporary philosophical neo-Kantian rationalism.
In this way, in the context of early 20th-century philosophy in France,
researchsurrounding the Kantian paradox is transformed, from the starting point of a
by
inescapability,
and
meansof sociological deductions
of
rationalist affirmation
therefrom, into a program of researchinto sociality. Bergson's point of attack will
becomeprecisely this reliance upon deductive ontological arguments. From
Bergson's point of view, a deductive approachallowed Durkheim and Tarde to
simply posit the social problems of the creative agent rather than explain them by
penetratingto the problem of the practical processof creativity itself with its subis
`pure
It
this
sociological' legacy of
of
action.
problems of memory and
rationalism, with its espousalof purely metaphoricalunderstandingsof time and
become
for
de-emphasizedin favour of
`problems
to
the
that
social'
of
allows
space,
`social problems', ie. for problems to becomedetachedfrom their specific social
instead
become
implications,
to
entrenchedin ontologically
and
ontological
desensitizedlanguage.
It is precisely in this context that Bergson arisesas yet another kind of figure
from
dismal
the
turn
away
project of analysing and
philosophy
who would make
by
the sciences,
those
are
set
aside
questions
which
apparentlyultimate
clarifying
discerning
in
in
the
the
to
of
project
effects
of
modernity
participate
rather
and
in
in
did
After
Kant,
the social sciencessuffer from
science.
art
and
not
only
society,

140

too much emphasisupon the pursuit of positive knowledge, but philosophy around
the world, in Bergson's view, beganto gradually espousea more limited and
ultimately self-defeating approach: one of merely refining theories of representation.
In order to resist this stagnationof philosophy, Bergson's basic agendabecomesone
instrument
brain
"the
of action, and not of representation"(1988:
as
an
of asserting
74). But Bergson's approachis, in my view, as I will argue we can seefrom his last
book, The Two Sourcesof Morality and Religion (1977), more than a mere
pragmatism. It is also, and perhapsmore profoundly, a significantly distinct and
both
Durkheim's affirmation of social externality and
to
constitutively rival attempt
Tarde's affirmation of personalcreativity.
This is not to say, of course,that Bergson's thought is necessarilyequally
fact,
In
is
Bergson's
these
two
thinkers.
towards
thought
and/or
critical
sympathetic
he
Durkheimianism
is
and
of
as
a
critique
more sympatheticto
oriented
particularly
Tardian thought. There are important reasonsof theoretical-intellectual rivalry for
this particular bias against Durkheim. Firstly, it is Bergson's wish not to
compromise but rather to intensify an attitude of philosophical holism (Moore 1996:
42-3). This holistic bias makesBergson more intensely a rival of Durkheim. For
Bergson this is bound up with the distinction between social theory and social
latter
is
his
best
the
that
the
approach
sense
suited to the
and
with
philosophy,
like
Bergson
holism.
This
to effect a reform of
would
why
explains
position of
it.
break
than
a
with
philosophy rather
In addition, however, Bergson holds, despite even his own emphasisupon
is
important
level
in
fact
is
Durkheim:
that
there
to
that
an
of
close
action, a premise
irreducible
be
to that of action and confronted philosophically.
must
which
analysis
In Bergson's view, despitethe importance of focussing upon the problematique of

141

action versusrepresentation,"there would still remain" a complimentary though

irreducible aspectof action "which is of a more metaphysical order - viz.: that in
pure perceptionwe are actually placed outside ourselves;we touch the reality of the
immediate
intuition.
"
(1988:
in
The
is
75)
to become
more
object
an
philosophy
in
Bergson's view, the farther it proceeds
effectively practical and action-oriented,
deference
from
together
the
the
towards
memory
with
attitude
of
of
away
constraints
longevity or the mere persistence of institutions, towards "that other extreme plane
images",
ie.
is
longer
to...
towards the problematic of the
affixed
where no action any
constitution of external reality itself (Bergson 1988: 243). Durkheim's attempt to
alleviate the difficulty of self-knowledge attainability through the indirect study of
inescapability
into
doctrine
involves
the
making
of
a
of social
social structures
for
Bergson's
Durkheim,
is
if
But
the
this
case
approach rather tends to
externality.
tilt the opposite way: towards problematizing inescapability and the metaphor of
structure in relation to the perspectives of action and memory.

Bergson's conception of action vis-a-vis external reality has to do with his

desireto position a holism of life, a kind of vitalism, over against the dogmatic
holism of sociologism. What are the meansof this new problematization, if memory
is its past and action its future? We shall seebelow that Bergson makes significant
However,
Bergson
be
Durkheim.
Tarde's
will
of
not
satisfied merely
critique
use of
to seekan alternative to the notion of structure as Tarde doeswith his theory of
imitation. Bergson's interest is in mobilizing Tarde's idea of social formation as
illuminate
help
is
to
that
to
an
aspect
of
action
model
a
attraction
common
(1977:
209-66).
Because
kind
`dynamic
theactions
religion'
of
as
a
characterizable
that go to make up our social practices are always already dynamic, there emerges
help
for
deductions
transcendental
the
which can
us to map abstract
need
neither

142

limits for our desiresby meansof theories of representation,nor an indifferently

in
does
defacto
the
thing
same
a
way. In Bergson's
passiveexternal reality which
is
be
there
of
motivation
some
mode
generic, and thus
nevertheless
which
must
view,
inescapable,in every caseof action, which is not for example a contingent rational
intention.
is
Bergson's
to say that with
solution
of
purpose
an
arbitrary
stimulus or
in
there
passive
element,
not
which `we place'
emergesa necessary
every action
ie.
he
`we
`outside'
(1988:
in
but
75). But
are
placed',
an
as
says,
which,
ourselves
in contrastto, for example,Auge's non-places(see 1995), Bergson's notion of the
for
be
to
an
extended
not
continuum
provide,
constituted
outsidewould
understood
the sakeof an ultimately-finite quantity of contractual relations, but rather an
for
the multiplicity of social
coherence
ontological
unextended,virtual point of
practicesand experiences.
Here is implied a `coherence'that no architecture could provide. In contrast
to the environmental or dwelling-related necessityof architecture, Bergson's image
intimate
is
differently
is
that
necessity
the
or
advanced
quite
outside of a more
of
inescapable.
By
image
does
the
the
to
means
of
such
an
of
sense
one
without,
related
foundation
illusion
hand,
transcendental
to
or
the
a
one
appealing
of reality
on
`beyond these illusory walls in the real world', or on the other hand, lapsing into an
idealism which affirms only the concept of `another world out there that is more real
in
in
latter
thing
to
the
The
to
the
same
contrast
outside
than this one'.
amount
for
forms
is
these
of
provision
a sedentary,negative unity,
question which not one of
but rather could only be understood as a new principle of ontological coherence
have
begun
diversity
that
to
the
see
practical
the
practices
modern
of
active
amidst
idealistic
borders.
longer
No
both
would ontology
realistic and
uselessnessof
Pure
invoking
concept.
a
causal
priority
or
a
more
general
perception
either
require

143

and the outside would be produced only in parallel processesable to provide each
other mutual support without mutual conflation.
For most of his career,much dependedfor Bergson upon establishing his
theory of pure perception. We will naturally want to examine it carefully for clues to
the provenanceof the outside. However, our first step must be to recognizethat we
in
find
cannot
such clues an examination of the theory of pure perception which is
discern
to
philosophical consistencyand soundness,as it appears
solely
undertaken
in its own explicit terms in Matter and Memory. For this could only reproduce rather
than begin to explain the apparentmystery of the metaphysicsthat Bergson claims, at
that point in his writing career,that the outside evokes. Moreover, one would be
follow
Bergson's
to
own path towards an
arbitrarily and unproductively refusing
interdisciplinary attempt to account for this metaphysicsin his later writings.
Particularly in his Two Sourcesof Morality and Religion (which was unintentionally
his
last
book),
beyond
his
Bergson
the constraints
widened
ambit
unfortunately
and
board
in
take
to
on
a perspectiveof social thought in
order
of philosophical analysis
the light of sociology's contemporaryclaims to have openedthe way to explaining
the social origins of metaphysicalbeliefs and practices. In this way, the outside
image
by
be
Bergson
the
to
social
offered
of
as
an
recognized
aimed at
ought
both
formulation
in
Kant's
the
transforming,
stroke,
same
of
critically
`inescapability' and Durkheim's formula of `constraining externality.'
Bergson's Philosophy and Postmodernism
Today we find ourselvesin a position in which our modern beliefs and
been
deeply
have
it
is
by
being
far
from
challenged,
rather
said,
supported,
practices,
interdisciplinarity and by postmodernismmore generally. Thus, I think it will be
inevitable now for enthusiasticcomparisonsto be raised betweenBergson's thought

144

it
be
the casethat this will become even more tempting
may
and postmodernism,and
oncewe exhibit Bergson's critique of the sociological account of society. For it
should be appreciatedthat, not unlike postmodernists,Bergson wanted to distancehis
link
from
the question of what exists with what we can
to
attempts
own approach
know, a classical framing of philosophy, exemplified by Kantianism, which separates
the world from thought in accordancewith an image of more or less punctual
is
for
image
linked
Bergson
idea
This
the
an
and
return.
with
separation
of spatial
measurement.Bergson was concernedabove all else with durations, and thus to
Thus,
intrusion
the
the
spatial
metaphor.
of
while one may very well find
criticize
helpful
in
interesting
thought
many ways, I think it will be useful to
and
postmodern
discussfrom the outset severalkey points of disanalogy between Bergson's thought
Bergson's
to
thus
position.
clarify
and
and postmodernism,
The key point of disanalogy here is that while Bergson's explicit aim is to
in
time
order to perceive the workings of `real time',
of
criticize spatial metaphors
his resulting theory of duration is not intended, as was the Tardian notion of `flow',
believes
Bergson
his
that
theory of
really
metaphor.
an
alternative
merely
as
duration penetratesthrough to the immediacy of time. It is easyto seehow to many
this focus could seemquite presumptious, simplistic, and even impossible at first
is
for
just
often
scorned
similar alleged shortcomings.
as postmodernism
glance,
Ithe
Bergson's turn to duration entails that he hold
position that `epistemology', the
implicitly
knowledge
that
theory
characterizes,
of
or explicitly the
pursuit of a sound
first task of traditional Kantian modern philosophy, consistsonly in the erroneous
assumptionthat we can encompassand stabilize - referentialize - our vital processes
by meansof philosophical concepts. Since postmodernismhas also been concerned
been
dissappearance
has
`the
'
Bergson's
the
termed
sometimes
of
referent,
with what

145

concernsseemas if they overlap with those of this latter development. Perhaps

Bergson's thought carries with it many of the worries that today we all have about
postmodernism.
However, Bergson arrives at this position with very different means: what is
involved in Bergson's thought cannot involve a passiveskepticism. `Postmodernists'
in
ideas
kind
for
their
a
communicating
of political and economic
are often chastized
defeatismstemming from a belief that all experiencehas become fragmented,
impossible
to politically and economically reorganize. However, in
singularized, and
duration, for Bergson, thought combineswith external reality on the condition of
irreducible
from
distinct
to objects of referencethemselvesbut
and
remaining
becoming
hand
the
merely a variable subjective perspectivewhich
other
without on
in
theories
relation to them. Quite to the contrary of
perceivesobjects and modifies
`postmodernistthinking', for Bergson there is real immediate evidenceof veritably
for
duration,
in
is
fragmented,
thought
that
solely
which
conscious
which
unbroken
ie. simulacra, exists.
To begin with, the subjectivity which is to be criticised by `postmodernists' a
becomes
fifty
forty
Bergson
to
after
unjustifiable, in this new point of
years
good
intellectual
in
history
fairly
in
point
recent
which the optimism of the
view, only at a
`social turn' in philosophy more or less comesto an end. In contrast, Bergson was
beginning
Such
this
turn.
the
of
claims regarding
at
rather writing precisely
been
justifiable
in
had,
this
often
seen
as
context,
early
on strategic
subjectivity
Kantian
These
the
strategic
steps
were
aimed
attempts
at
alleviating
earlier
grounds.
by
paradox meansof theorizational comparisonsamong societiestaken as
in
field
the
the
to
the
and
order
of
past
present,
relativize
of morality.
representatives
But, counter to many of the more vulgar receptions of postmodernthought, the most

147

features
in
fluids
these
to,
of
amount
what all
simple language,is that
liquids, unlike solids, cannot easily hold their shape. Fluids, so to speak,
neither fix spacenor bind time.. . .Fluids do not keep to any shapefor
long and are constantly ready (and prone) to changeit; and so for them it
is the flow of time that counts, more than the spacethey happento
fill
but `for a moment.' [Thus] when
they
that
all,
occupy;
space,after
describing solids, one may ignore time altogether; in describing fluids, to
leave time out of account would be a grievous mistake. Descriptions of
fluids are all snapshots,and they need a date at the bottom of the picture
(Bauman 2000: 2).

In my view, the great disserviceof this kind of theorizing is summedup by Bauman

himself when he goes on to propound what he seesas the relevance of this to social
criticism:

We associate`lightness' or `weightlessness'with mobility and

inconstancy: we know from practice that the lighter we travel the easier
and faster we move. Theseare reasonsto consider `fluidity' or
`liquidity' as fitting metaphorswhen we wish to graspthe nature of the
in
history
in
the
novel,
phase
of modernity (Bauman
many
ways
present,
2000: 2).

Essentially, for this all-too-common type of postmodern theory, flow is a metaphor

that people apply more and more as a way of understandingthe social processes

148

taking place around them. But could it really be as Bauman suggeststhat the only
descriptions
`reflect
these
to
upon'
naive
simply
of contemporary
role of criticism
form
Does
this
popular
of postmodernism simply representa mode
not
modernity?
descriptions?
From
the
such
a Bergsonian point of view
of
of
simple multiplication
sucha perspectiveprecisely missesthe point of memory, or that which governs the
relation betweenthe past and the present, as a tool of action. What we have to
its
implication
flow
the
to
with
of the reduction of reality to
metaphor of
counterpose
duration
in
is
be
the
of
reality
unbroken
which
no
way
can
snapshots
successive
For
Bergson,
"the
duration
the
succession.
of
unrolling
our
model
of
understoodon
its
in
in
the
of
an
advancing
unity
aspects
movement
of
and
others
some
resembles
the multiplicity of expanding states;and, clearly, no metaphor can expressone of
thesetwo aspectswithout sacrificing the other" (1999: 27). In contrastto the
is,
duration
Bergson,
intended
flow,
to
then,
according
not
as an
metaphorof
full
is
but
in
the
time,
of
sense
rather
a
concept
of
which
alternative metaphor
between
for
the
the
the sake of the
the
past
and
present
relation
memory governs
future.
The future is, in Bergson's famous image in Matter and Memory, the conical
body,
brain,
(1991:
if
152).
However,
the
the
and
action
of
of
materializations
point
it
from
is
dissociated
duration
entropy does not meanthat the materializations
therein
in question are merely `flowing' on and on interminably. Bergson's theory entails
is
for
him
in
There
be
the
there
process
of
escape.
that
pure
the view
can no such
image of the outside very clearly a dimension of inescapability which cannot be
theorized as a mere materialization. Escapewould entail closure. Materializations
despite
fact
depend
from
the
that
they
closure
not
upon an
attaining
are prevented
image of being outside in relation to both the past and the presentbut precisely

149

becauseof this. The future, in Bergson, is not the simple manifestation or successof
level'
discrete,
fragmented
if
it
`arrivals
a
chaotic
of
episodes
simply
actions,as
were
future
in
life.
Rather,
the
the
and
existence
of
useful
evinced Bergson's
of
vital
perspectiveinvolves neither a simple materialism nor idealism but rather a mediating
image of the exterior, the purely external, or the outside. This image is, as it were, a
by-product createdby our activities which encouragesthem and provides, not a
but
kind
local
self-justification,
rather
simply
a
of basic
utopian rationale or even a
durations.
after
all,
a
plurality
of
are,
actions
and
among
what
ontological coherence
One could indeed say that there would be nothing to stop us from conceiving
for'political
image
as a prerequisite
such an

and economic reorganization.

If it is true

that Bergson has little to say about the organization of political economy, it could
is
he
be
that
essentially and consistently optimistic about the
argued
nonetheless
its
Bergson's
conditions.
popular
main point,
of
retheorizing
positively
possibility
however, is that we would have no account of such popular durations if we did not

is
It
dialectics
beyond
the
not so much the Kantian paradox
object.
of
subject
and
go
that Bergson rejects as the false solution of dialectics. But nor could that which takes
its
immediate
despite
for
duration,
in
Bergson,
relation with thinking, ever
place
image
interior,
in
itself
thinking ego.
of
an
a
pre-dialectical
again resolve
Admittedly, here is, again, another surface similarity between Bergson's thought and
`decentering'
in
However,
to
a
mere
of subjectivity which
contrast
postmodernism.
involves a movement of deferral, duration is a point of critique against dialectics
future.
into
facing
driven
We
"ever
the
toward
are
a
which much rather emphasizes
involved
is
here
is
(1988:
243).
What
by
future
the
an
the
weight of our past"
intuition of the whole of time from a concrete perspective,which, just becauseit is
future.
it
does
follow
from
But
the
this, and nor
not
materializes
concrete and active,

150

doescommon senseallow us to believe, that the future is that point of our processes
future
is
The
is
not conceived as an end-point within a
materialized.
simply
which
for
internal
but
Bergson
rather
as
an
motivation, or a kind of
processof entropy,
`building self-encouragement',or `effort' of action.
The outside would therefore be an externality not as general or container-like
have
it
function
because
the
not
merely
would
of supporting the succession
as space,
implies
idea
is
The
in
that
succession
of
externality
concentrated
of phenomena.
describe
duration.
In Matter and Memory
therefore
cannot
succession
objects,and
Bergsonwill claim, againstthe common belief in the unity of the human pysche as a
developed
in
forget
"they
that
that an
are
which
sensations
space,
of
private
sequence
impersonalbasis remains in which perception coincides with the object perceived
itself'
(1991:
image
in
fact,
66).
An
is,
externality
of the outside will
and which
function for Bergson to support the expansionof casesof thought into a larger,
though constitutively incomplete, inter-becoming of thought and reality. Concepts
blocked within intuited successioncan therefore never capturethis externality but
be
it
(1960:
108-111).
they
may
a
upon
which
constructed
as
plane
only utilize
For Bergson philosophy is always articulated in practical, `immediate'
it
this
to
as
were, within concrete philosophical activity,
element of passivity,
relation
this inexhaustible, unlimited senseof a beyond that exists not in thought or in
thought's focus of attention. Philosophy partakesof an element of thought which
Kant first noted but too hastily conceived as a kind of universal default structure for
thought (1996). Kant thought that this structure or `condition' of thought could
determined
be
through the philosophical rigour of the transcendental
nevertheless
long
judgment,
first
to
as
and
as
we
could
agree
morality,
reason,
make a
of
critiques
decision to adhereonly to the ultimately circumstantial evidenceof thinking

151

indicatedin our apparentpower to referentialize and to know, ie. to adhereto

in
be
To
contrast to Kant, the absolute
sure,
conceptsand conceptualization.
intuition that Bergson appealsto seemsto be self-defeating or incoherent sincewhat
Bergsonwould seemto be attempting to grasp philosophically would neverthelessbe
determinations.
beyond
In Bergson's own
be
the
to
of
philosophy's
grasp
admitted
he
kind
in
"it
is
to
the
of
philosophical
method
would
advocate,
regard
only
words,
truly itself when it goesbeyond the concept" (1999: 30). Somewell-respected critics
implicitly
for
fundamental
laud
Bergson
the
to
recognizing
modem
are often ready
in
inescapability
his
Bergson
to
seem
and
even
agree
with
of
apparently
problematic
it,
As
Adorno
"the
Kant.
put
aporetical conceptsof
negativestanceagainst
just
is
(1973:
not
objectively,
cogitatively,
of
unresolved"
philosophy are marks what
153). However, such critics are often at the sametime quick to point to an apparent
lack of appreciation in Bergson of the significance of the mediating social world for
this problematic, for which reason,according to them, we must avoid the Bergsonian
"cult of irrational immediacy" (Adorno 1973: 8). But, as we shall see,it would be
is
lack
Bergson's
that
there
to
a
of
optimism
on
suppose
part that an
wrong
simply
be
in
interest
thought
the
can
and
ought
undertaken
of
social
of
problematic
explicit
fully modernizing our way of doing both philosophy and social theory. In Chapter
is
key
had
is,
Durkheim
there
that
that
a
sense
argued
of
externality
as
which
we saw
in
irreducible
to
the
objectification and, an ontological-analytical
social,
a senseof
had
Durkheim
thus already relocated the problem of the
sense,unmediated.
from
the problems of objectification an
away
society
convergenceof modernity and
implies
into
the
of
externality
which
a whole new
context of a problem
negation and
Bergson's
Once
difference.
understand
we
starting point asthis
problematic of
his
than
the
rather
older
problem
objectification
externality
of
of
work
problematic

152

beginsto appearless as a philosophical idealism and more as a productive

development
to
the
thought
to
and
of the problematic of
contribution social
difference.
The Image of the Outside and Sociology
I think Bergson's whole philosophy only begins to make senseonce the
implication is understoodthat for him ultimate reality is a multiplicity of the
durationsof thought and action within a multiplicity of material ends which sharea
he
imaging
The
in
that
the passages
outside.
outside
speaks
an
of
of
common means
it
is
in
his
is
implicit
Nonetheless,
largely
a special, central image
work.
above
becauseit has the special function of communicating his ontology. This ontology is
For
Bergson,
does
origin.
ultimate
reality
a
pre-historical
not
neither abstractnor
is
from
the
the
past only a tool of action. Thus, ultimate reality is for
past since
stem
Bergson somehow always already becoming accomplished, and is therefore
in
in
to
that
addition
an
analysis
metaphysics
of
action
requires
order to
something
becomeintelligible. Bergson has often been accusedof mysticism. But this only
is
Bergson
that
articulates not completely unimaginable, and perhaps
what
confirms
its relation to imagination and the image is the clue that we can use to develop a
better understandingof his thought. I think if we concentrateupon the image of the
find
be
illuminating
in
his
his
to
thought
novel
able
might
ways
of
we
outside
thought comparatively.
There is an image in `the outside' that is proper to this question of Bergsonian
being
also proper to other modes of thought which are concerned
while
philosophy
in
have
As
the
seen chapter one, the classical
we
paradox of modernity.
with
indeed
has
interest
interest
in
Durkheim
and
also
an
an
ontological
sociology of
be
here
To
be
the
the
call
also
outside.
sure,
outside
could
would
perceived
what we

153

in
as a necessaryexternality, relation to the living and thinking human individual, of
a constitutive sociality which is inescapablyimplied in every concept and material.
This is Durkheim's point of departure for what has been called his `conversion' from
philosophy to sociology. It is the perception of the externality of the social which
providesthe key elementwhich will lead Durkheim away from philosophy towards
his basic strategyto focus his analysis strictly upon consolidated facts of social
phenomena.
Bergson's Social Thought and Durkheimian Metaphysics
There are severalpossible points of comparison betweenBergson and
Durkheim, the first of which is disciplinary, or more precisely, methodological. I
believe I have already pointed to sufficient evidenceto assumethe existenceof a
both
to
of their works to whom disciplinary
reception
subject of philosophical
boundariesare relatively unimportant. Below I have formulated a discussionof their
is
intelligible
I
to
then
mainly as a function of the
want show
methodologieswhich
differencesbetween their respective imagesof the outside. But first I want to discuss
how their methodological dispute arisesout of a difference over social metaphysics.
As we have noted, Bergson's method is, or is at least intended to be, direct and
for
have
(1999:
As
I
Bergson
is
22).
noted,
already
no
point
of
reference
absolute
into
in
to
a perception of the movement of objects (1999: 21).
required order enter
Our habit of analysing an event by breaking it down into spatialized componentsis
indivisible
Intuition
is
the
to
the
this
apprehension
of
event.
never adequate
is
Bergson
What
concernedto convey, particularly in his writings up
apprehension.
to and including Creative Evolution is above all a method of intuition.
According to Bergson, intuition is hardly distinguishable from what he calls
former
is
become
(1999:
the
45).
to
until
able
precisely
methodological
metaphysics,

154

Metaphysicsis that form of outlook on the self and world which always claims to
dispensewith symbols and enter into a communion with the thing itself (1999:24 ).
Here is the main similarity between intuition and metaphysics. To be sure,for
Bergsonmetaphysicscan be, and has been, a rigorous science. But metaphysics,or
traditional metaphysics,has been too concernedwith furnishing the mind with static
imagesof the design of movement. For instance, it has beentoo concernedwith
duration taken as a generality, on the basis of which it then contrasts a relatively
fixed unity with a relatively static multiplicity (1999: 46). Metaphysics has merely
by
it
infinity
to
the
communicate
appealing to the multiplicity of
aims
asserted
for
it
Instead,
a
need
order
among
and
simulacra.
representations
as were,
possible
intuition operatesto enter into things themselves,not as an infinity of attempts,but
in
implies
finitude
This,
turn,
the
the existenceof a
successes.
of particular
as
duration of the unique successeswhich constitute the entirety of movement as at the
sametime a variety of qualities and a unity of direction. In short, Bergson's notion
in
in
is
intuition
that
succeeds
particular
cases
which thought becomesfully
which
of
adequateto correspondingparticular events.
If the problem of epistemology is by-passedin this manoevre, for Bergson it
is becausehe is interestedprimarily in ontology, and for him nothing exists properly
from
the reality of thesetwo-sided particulars. Bergson's analysis of
speakingapart
dualism here is not, as in traditional modern philosophy, that of a `mind' versus a
`body', or representationversus reality, but is rather that of a triangulation of the
body as a site of vibrations creative of two levels of representation,that of concepts
images
level
level.
be
To
it
the
that
the
on
objective
and
of
subjective
sure,
seems
on
is
interested
in
level
Bergson
that
the
the
particularly
surface
of conceptsto the
on
images,
he
level
"forget
the
that
too
that, if
of
when
claims
of
we
easily
neglect

155

it
be
is
can
only
a laborious, and even painful, effort to
metaphysics possible,
in
the
thought,
the
of
of
slope
work
order to place oneself directly,
remount
natural
by a kind of intellectual expansion,within the thing studied: in short a passagefrom
longer
from
(1999:
45). However,
to
to
no
concepts
concepts
and
reality"
reality
is
is
he
to
not so much a privilege of conceptsover reality but
really pointing
what
is
fact
in
basic
"duration
that
the
the making" and the
continually
rather
more
intuition of it is "not a single act, but an indefinite series of acts" (1999: 27; 46).
Bergson's primary aim is to attain a perspective in which the successof
intuition is not simply presumedto be automatic and require no effort. The `effort'
it
for
is
Bergson
though
these
played through the body, does not for him stem
of
acts,
from the body originally. Nor does it becomedeposited in a self-sufficient realm of
intention
is
likely
Bergson's
It
to locate in the body a site of
not
concept-forms.
creative originality, or in conceptsan original creative product. For if that were the
casewe could correlate bodies and conceptswith acts that have already been
bodies
discrete
for
Bergson
But
are
not
entities that are separatefrom
accomplished.
their products, and conceptsare not forms that are greater and more original than
their components. Conceptionssuch as thesetend to orient the body and concepts
faces
that
only the certainty of the present and present
a
past
within
exclusively
knowledge. Rather, I think what Bergson is interested in is an intuition that facesthe
from
future
illuminates
the
the
the
thus
of
point
present
vantage
and
and
which
past
the characterof knowledge as a contingent composite. Instead of manipulating the
interpretation of acts that have already been accomplished,in Bergson's view,
intuition"
(1999:
by
"proceed
46).
to
metaphysicsought
The distinction betweentraditional metaphysicsand intuition as a method
involves
inclusion
future
in
the
the latter. For this reason,
of
a
orientation
essentially

156

Bergsonis a thinker of the possibility of a modern metaphysics,or more precisely, a

infor-itself.
it
is
follow
If
to
and
necessary
and account
metaphysicsof modernity
for inescapablereality, as metaphysicshas traditionally attemptedto do, there
for
the
the
of
attainability,
perspective
modern
necessity
practical,
arises
nevertheless
free problem-setting in conjunction with this following. In Bergson's view we may
knowledge.
We
"attain
fluid
to
to
may
of
only
concepts,
certainties
not attain
its
in
following
all
sinuosities and of adopting the very movement
reality
capableof
be
built
Only
life
inward
thus
things.
a
the
will
progressive
philosophy
up,
of
of
freed from the disputeswhich arise between the various schools, and able to solve its
it
be
from
in
because
the
terms
released
will
artificial
expression
problems naturally,
(Bergson
"
1999:
51-2)
Thus,
the modem
posited.
are
of which such problems
`effort' in question,for Bergson, is indicative for him that creativity is the creativity
body,
the
as an agent of sense,and as conceptually engagednot with negating
of
immediately
but
inescapable,
and
or
really
sensedproblems.
with
rather
sense
Bergson is certainly not concernedwith an individual free agent who attains
is
in
The
question
a collective actualization of the ontological
effort
solutions.
distinction between metaphysicsand the method of bodily intuition, and is, as a
irreducible
to either.
sense,
matter of
We can seethat, in the Two Sources,once directed towards the question of
discerning
involve
directly
have
intuition
the
to
social
as
a seriesof
will
society,
intelligent collective movements. It is already implied as a background assumption
for Bergson that society,just like any entity, can no longer be fit into a prefor
A
Bergsonian
framework
thought.
conditions
position will
of
or set
established
have to advocateattaining to the movement of the social itself rather than to an
is
It
Bergson
had
held
in
true
that
state.
external
social
metaphorically
or
abstractly

157

his Introduction to Metaphysics that "all reality... is tendency, if we agree to mean by

tendency an incipient change of direction" (1999: 50). But social thought appears to
be structured like a progressively expanding common intelligence.

In Bergson's

is
"a
tendency,
or
acquired,
one thing, another thing the necessarily
natural
view,
being
will use to restore to it its force and to
rational method which a reasonable
it"
intelligence,
(1977:
Such
is
22).
Bergson says in the Two
opposing
combat what
Sources, is constantly intervening in the real, but presumes to be aimed at a
human
(1977:
269).
the
that
confronts
which
condition
of
overcoming
systematic
Bergson will indeed have to show that a special methodology of critical thinking
be
have
depend
human
to
to
this
will
upon
collective
purports
as
philosophy
such
intelligence for its material and for its motivation.

Philosophy will thus have to

determine
depend
"the
tendencies
the trend of a
general
which
very
upon
ultimately
development
necessarily extends over a more or less considerable
society, and whose
number of generations" (1977: 296).

To provide a framework for a timely analysis of the direction of such

tendencies- such as a nefarious, technology-driven "concern for comfort and
luxury" - is, in a sense,the raison d'etre of Bergson's final book, The Two Sources
(1977:
298).
Like
Religion
Morality
most social thought, there is a kind of
and
of
in
be
Bergson's
To
is
I
think
there
effort.
embedded
sure,
problematique
political
by
Bergson's
illuminated
be
in
deal
diagnoses
to
to
reference
particular
not a great
that book or through a reconstruction of his political views, since these are bound to
the context of contemporary society and politics. Rather, what concernsus here is
between
Bergson's method of
Sources
Two
linkage
the
announces
the general
intuition and his conception of social agency and the generalview of the social and

158

is
is
It
therein.
that
mainly for these latter reasonsthat Bergson's
contained
political
be
Sources.
Two
through
the
the
read
prism
of
should
whole work can and
However, from the outset, the Two Sourceshas also to be read in relation to a
it
in
did
to
today
than
the 1930sof a serious
that
easily
us
more
comes
recognition
difficulty with the type of approachto the question of the social that Bergson chose
for the purposeof communicating his ideas. We cannot simply proceed to read and
interpret the Two Sourcesonly in relation to Bergson's earlier work without
discussingthis problem from the outset. I would summarizethe difficulty by stating
the following fact: that we have already, indeed, a way of thinking and a recognized
term for the idea of a progressivecommon intelligence, the term `civilization. ' In
drastic
Not
least
this
the
there
notion.
with
problems
are
of these
addition,
difficulties is that we have left the 19th-century. At that time, to be sure a very
formative time for many of our categoriesof social thought, the question concerning
`civilization' and its future dominated our social and political horizons. But now we
have left even the 20th-century in which the concept of `civilization' was
demolished,not just by wars but by deeply moving critiques of its racist, sexist,
classist,and other unwarranted assumptions.
The concept of civilization was productively ambiguous in the 19th-century,
but fatally ambiguous in the 20th, becauseit was basedon a procedure of
assimilating certain advantageousparts of every social movement to the aims of
This
the
undesirable
parts.
society
and
repressing
meant that the
civil
restricted
first
in
19th-century
the
recognized
which
were
social
movements
of
could
quality
then still be judged initially by a few problem-setters. But by the next century
technical and legal problems were growing exponentially with modernization, and so
define
those
the
to
number
of
setting
and
expected
growing
what these
were

159

`judgements
might
say,
and
so,
we
were
attendant
of quality'
are,
actually
problems
increasingin occurenceand diffusion throughout societies. Actually, we have seen
that this continued far beyond the critical point in mass society where this nexus of
in
definable
`judgements
hardly
terms
of
seemed
of quality'
social movements
is
impossibly
latter
the
sedentaryand unfeasably
seemsand probably
anymore,since
individualistic, especially when contrastedwith the new productivist jargon of an
`exploitation of an opportunity', or a `creation of a demand' and so on. Thus, we
depending
to
on the quality of relevant social
of
philosophies
speak
may still need
is
judgements
link
idea
but
that
theory
that
the
are
which
and
practice
movements,
for all practical purposesforeclosed to us.
This foreclosure of individualistic judgement, along with the `postmodern'
based
it,
both
Kantian
that
the
was
upon
paradigm
complicates and
questioning of
futures
for
Bergson's
The
thought.
the
of
social
a
reappraisal
of
need
up
speeds
become
linked
have
together closer than they ever
thought
and of philosophy
social
have been,but the linkage itself has become more obscuredin darknessthan ever.
However, on the positive side, this could be understood, indeed to Bergson's credit,
departure
Bergson's
social thought and that which makesthe
the
of
of
point
very
as
latter still worthwhile reading. It is as if the Bergson of the Two Sourcesrealized, in
in
increasingly
the 1920sand 30s, that
and
mass
society
the context of an
unstable
it
have
is
to
made the culminating question of a life's
this relation paramount and
16 His work is radically exceptional for its lack of having recoursein the last
work.
image
judgement.
instance
He
theory
to
and
of
civil
subjectivity
an
of
a
practical
because
it
has
become
impossibly
become
has
to
that
this
us
closed
path
argued
increasing
(1977:
Bergson
66).
"intellectualist"
assumed
an
modem
general and
16Seein particular Bergson's commentson the problem of world peacein his "Final Remarks" (1911:
266-318).

160

find
be
but
`non-intellectualist'
to
to
a
new,
a
reality,
wanted
complexity
social
but
its
intuitive
to
nevertheless
methodically
guide
mitigate
simplicity
sourceof
least,
Bergson
At
to
though
that
the
recognize,
choseto write
ought
we
very
effects.
be
`civilization'
discourse
on
which would soon outmoded,
within a mode of
insight,
in
its
important
departure,
his
an
point
of
contains
very
nevertheless work
into what kind of method would be neededwithin the context of this imminent
decline. And this also confirms an important point for our internal reading of his
be
his
faithful
Bergson
Sources
Two
to
to
the
attempted
consistent
and
work: with
book
has
intuition
therefore
the
this
to
the
and
significance
nothing
end,
of
method of
to do with any departure from his own basic method of thinking.
Thus, on the one hand, there is no doubt that the method of intuition Bergson's holistic and socially-tending approachto philosophy - has to be
is
if
Bergson's
in
to
understand
more explicit social thought.
one
advance
understood
But on the other hand, as we shall see,in Bergson's explicit social thought we might
find new, legitimate, and constructive basesfor a critical understandingof his
has
latter
been
intuition.
The
taken within philosophy
approach
not
method of
becauseit meanstaking his social thought seriously and comparing it with
have
kinds
But
hand,
the
the
we,
on
other
of
sociology.
contemporary and rival
freedom, and indeed, the need,to perform such an analysis below.
Methodology and Ontology
The difficulty lies in finding the point of comparison. Of course it would be
just
Bergson's
thought
treat
any sociology, as say, a peculiar
to
as
absurd
`sociobiology'. Rather, we could say that Bergson's social thought contains and
features
the
of a whole class of sociologies that we might call
emphasizes essential
`microsociologies.' Thus, in my view, his social thought could be roughly but

161

effectively understood by comparing its basic features with a class of sociologies that
it opposes,which we might call `macrosociologies.' I am not saying that we have to
commit ourselvesto this dichotomous terminology. Rather, the distinction between
micrological and macrological is only a methodological ramification of a more core
dispute over the nature of social ontology. In practice, we will be aiming to compare
the ontological assumptionsof the method of intuition with those of the method of
comparison, since the latter is the method of `macrosociology.' The Two Sources
draws heavily, both in theoretical content and in quasi-anthropological style, upon
Durkheim's sociological method, as a sourceboth to learn from and to attack
polemically - particularly with respectto the central issue of Durkheim's social
ontology.
The method of comparison, as laid down by Durkheim in his Rules of
Sociological Method, has to assumea relative externality of the social, becauseit has
to take juxtaposed social phenomenaand teaseout explanationsfor their association
or lack of association,hencesocial phenomenaare inferred to be necessarilyand
intrinsically external to individuals, and this seemsto explain the long-term
persistenceof social facts beyond the lives of particular individuals (1982: 130).
Thus the method of comparison is not ontologically indifferent but rather carries with
it distinct ontological implications. Theseimplications, at least at first glance,
include, for Durkheim, the requirement of ruling out the notion of social reality being
in every casegiven immediately to the mind.
The tactical method of intuition hasto be opposedto this strategic social
had
dismissing
fact
Durkheim
the
that life as a whole is
of
short
stopped
ontology.
neverthelessthe necessary`substratum' of the social fact (1983: 95; 1982: 39).
Nevertheless,in Bergson's view, there is an ignorance on the part of Durkheim of the

162

true ontological role of life in socialization (Bergson 1977: 100-101). By the same
token, however, for Bergson this is an essential qualification of any theory of mind,
`social'
for
him
`mind'
be a special locus of
for
Bergson,
the
nor
can
neither
since
his
believes
Bergson
that
method of intuition, in contrast to the method of
ontology.
in
its
duration,
for
is
to
own
wait,
a node of association as a whole
able
comparison,
in
look
this event where phenomena are supposed to be
the
to
at
point
event,
indiscernability
between them. In
to
specify a necessary zone of
associated, and
other words, a positive social referent or relation of social atoms need not be isolable
in order for Bergson's concepts to do their work, and this is the key to how he will
attempt to avoid both psychologism and the sociological critique of psychologism.
This micrological view adduces contra Durkheim a power to dissolve and reshape
the configurations of phenomena to accord with the practical and sensible constraints
involved
observer, and these practical perceptions can and are occasionally
of an
disseminated in special events which involve certain particularly inventive observers
in
lead
the way whole societies percieve the world.
changes
who

Thus, one could say that one advantagethat Bergson's method of intuition
have
Durkheim's
strategy of the affirmation of solidarity is that
over
might
Bergson's method is able to re-insert, as it were, the `speaking-position' of the
theorist. Furthermore, Bergson doesnot just adduce a perspectiveof composition
less
isolate
free-association,
basis
then
that
or
a
subject
of
more
as does
on
and
Tarde. Bergson's method further implicates apower of composition. This is
becauseBergson's analysis essentially involves a distinction between the
how
its
the
and
virtual
reality
an
association
of
of
actuality
constant
multiplicitous
indeterminacy will be guided to shapea whole, continuous, particularizing, event.
For Bergson there is a pragmatic question to be addressed,as it were, around every

163

These
pragmatic questions are anti-deterministic not because
corner.
metaphysical
they are loaded againstthe perspectiveof metaphysicsbut rather becausethey appeal
to the relative opennessof any system as a whole which is guaranteednever to be
beyond intervention by such a system's continuous, inevitable, and simultaneous
impulse
determinism
The
is
of
and
particularization.
overall alteration
not
does
fail
for
Bergson
to remind us that the actualization of the
thus;
not
unaccounted
is
in
the
always perceived, somewhatparadoxically, as its
events
same
composition
is
Bergson
draw
But
to
most
concerned
what
attention to is that
constraining closure.
the virtual and the actual are always co-existing, not asjuxtaposed entities, but as
'7
modalities of power.
In Bergson's way of thinking, the ontological distinction between the virtual
and the actual explains the always double-sided (ie. closed and open) ontology of the
social which is only assumedby the comparative method and shows how this
is
broader
both
involves
that
than
methods. For if `closed
a
problematic
ontology
indicates
`open
is
basic
the constantly
the
society'
unit of comparison,
society'
inexplicable
to
are
solely on the premise of
succeedingchanges such societieswhich
interplay
between
inclusive
is
It
the closed and the open that
the
closed society.
forms.
The externality of the
for
the
social
particular
of
real
emergence
accounts
form
is
to
that
a
social
makes
which
closed or bounded, is only an
say,
social, which
In
Bergson's
Durkheim's
dynamic
this
view,
complexity.
attribution of a
effect of
thing-like quality to social facts (Durkheim 1982: 35-36; 60) is in error, not because
it is an objectifying attribution or `reification, ' but rather becausesuch a strategy
tends to reduce externality to the static side of an impersonal dichotomy between
dynamic complexity and static complexity, whereas for Bergson externality takes the
17For clarifying the central distinction between the virtual and the actual in Bergson's writing we are
indebted to Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonism (1988: 65).

164

important senseof non-generalcomplex reality that Durkheim pointed to only from

the metaphysical interplay that we can transformatively intuit betweenvirtual
opennessand actual closedness. Durkheim's strategy is, for Bergson, tantamount to
deliberately ignoring how social facts come into existence,to ignore Becoming for
the sakeof identifying Being.
Bergson's Conception of Social Agency
Bergson leavesus in the Two Sourceswith a new ontological distinction
betweenclosednessand opennesswhich provides a philosophical solution to
Durkheim's social ontological dilemma. Each society must recognize its closed and
open sidesas co-existing in order to account for the complete and vital existenceof
that society. Thus, indeed, there is a notion of fundamental struggle located at the
core of every society's overall existencethe explanation of which is precisely made
impossible if one is to simply posit from the outset, as Durkheim does, a
intimated
distinction.
Rather,
is much more
the
struggle
normal/pathological
less
framework
for
thus
much
a
mere
and
convenient
sensually
synthetic,
continuous,
in
The
this: the overall reality of the society as a
consists
struggle
social analysis.
intuited
immediately
is
directly, by the
`given
the
to
mind'
or
whole virtual,
freely
sympathizewith the problems that society has
and
who
understand
participants
been formed to deal with, but at the sametime this reality is necessarilyperceived as
external to everyone's actual activities, creating the reality and the perception of
bodies
be
done,
them
to
constricting
and
what
constraining
must
resistant
creating
divisions of labour. Thus, sometimeswe think that society is alive and vital and
is
it
dead
think
and gone, and more often than not
equally correctly sometimeswe
today these sentimentstend to be schizophrenically simultaneousand creative of a
`postmodern' vertigo. Bergson showsus the way to the heart of the problem:

165

societyhas never conformed exactly to either of these attributes but consists exactly
in the continuity and changing logic of senseeffected by their interplay.
To be sure, for Bergson, the model formation which guides and conditions
cooperation,sympathy, and gregariousnessis not the only mode of social
instinct
has
In
an equally potent social role to play,
addition,
natural
actualization.
connectinghuman reality to the whole universe. In Bergson's view, the overall
virtual reality of particular societiesin formation, perceived in actuality as external,
has its sourcesin thesetwo modes. Bergson's idea of model formation was inspired
by Tarde. As we have seen,Tarde had thought that there is no social reality outside
imitation
invention,
between
the
and
opposition,
of
currents of
persons;he had no
beyond
institutions
these micrological developments. Tarde
persist
accountof
which
had therefore raised model formation to the status of an ultimate social fact contra
Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method, which had emphasisedthe externality of
the social. Actually, Bergson eschewsboth of these positions as `sociologisms'.
Bergson's idea of model formation is not merely a `reality' but a power which
struggleswith natural instinct by setting problems or challengeswhich can only be
solved by overcoming habit through the organization of new social movements,thus
but
to
complexity
also creating the macrological effect of
micrologically adding
externality.
Nevertheless,Bergson is significantly influenced by Tarde's critique of
Durkheim. This critique consistsof an attack upon the way Durkheim posits as the
basic unit of sociological analysis,with little or no explanation, a primary `horde'
individuals
is
of
who resembleone another and
which a spontaneousgrouping
through their `mechanicalsolidarity' sharea collective consciousness.For Tarde and
Bergson this meanstaking too much for granted the subject-matterof sociology. In

166

contrastto Durkheim, they conceive the primary subject-matter of sociology rather

as modelsthrough which people are attracted to one another creating a social subject.
For Bergson, in particular, the key to social thought, far from taking such models for
dynamic
discern
formation of these models.
is
the
the
to
means
of
granted, rather
The `models' that are formed are not simply imitated - not functions of pure
is
function
but
that
as
which appealing and generative in social
rather
resemblancesbecause
is
inspiring
They
the
creativity
of
so
problem-setting
movements.
are
and
is
leads
following
this
to particular social
a
and
created
as
result,
a
attractive and
formations. Bergson attributes to the social model a relative universality which does
in
it
does
Tarde's
family
have
the
specific
sociological
as
postulation
a
content
of
not
becomes
for
for
Bergson even more emphasized
just
but
this
reason,
model
perhaps,
as a general criteria of the social.
If this relative universality inherent in Bergson's conception of the social
it
determined
does
have
content
qua
model,
neverthelesslends itself to
a
not
model
is
It
leaders
key,
initiation.
that
charismatic
of
examples
religious
privileged
certain
he
it,
Bergson
to
sees
prime examplesof agentsof the
as
supply
with,
come
formation of these primary social models. Herein Bergson privileges a certain type and a rather unconvincing one at that - of social agency. He appealsto mystics as
be
to
the
change
overall
social
capability
of
occasionally concentratedin
evidence of
the influence of certain singular and well-placed visionaries. I think it would be fair
to argue,however, that the statusof Bergson's claim here need not be granted any
less sociological statusthan, say, Max Weber's analysis of charisma: it can be taken
for
isolated
is
that
type
sociologically specific and not
of agency
as only one
insight
level.
It
Nor do I
this
certain
sociological
contains
a
on
exhaustivepurposes.
believe it involves a special,covert ontological attribution. For Bergson what is

167

deducedis rather the definite historical existence of a type of model formation that
has `inspirational' and `opening' consequencesfor society as a whole: the kind of
major changehe believes in has a kind of rare, almost eschatological structure. But
his appealto spiritual leadershipis not exactly a normative prescription, for tellingly,
Bergsoncreatesno rigid definitions which could become conceptual obstaclesto the
further expansionand updating of this notion of model formation according to the
reality of the leadership,or lack thereof, of contemporary social movements.
What is important for Bergson is the way model formation, along with other
factors, is able to have a transformative role in socialization and, most importantly, in
between
distinction
closednessand opennesswhich would otherwise be
actualizing a
formation
instinct
Bergson
this
then
model
contrasts
with
only abstract.
natural
which he takes to explain the force of the closure of societiesunder the habits and
repetitions which, causinga social pressurewhich is neverthelessalso a losing of
sight of the practical aims of society, make a reliance on the force of moral
for
increasingly
necessary the survival of particular social formations. In
obligation
Bergson's view, model formation exacts"another kind of obligation", which
"supervenes,above and beyond the social pressure" (1977: 33). According to
Bergson, this makes model formation a prime aspect of human, as distinct from
(1977:
35).
anthropology
social,
What is the morality of culture, as distinct from the morality of society?
According to Bergson, men have attemptedto account for a power of transcendence
have
deduced
"a
they
through
the existenceof God and
which
via priori reasoning",
the communion of Reason,using the languageof religion and the languageof
hand,
(1977:
On
have
33).
been
the
there
sometimes
other
offered
philosophy
for
"love
for
family,
love
the
morality
explanations
of
culture
as
one's
psychological

168

for one's country, love of mankind" (1977: 38). But all of theseapproachesare
incorrect since they are all too intellectualist. For Bergson "it is through an excessof
intellectualism that feeling is made to hinge on an object and that all emotion is held
to be the reaction of our sensoryfaculties to an intellectual representation"(1977:
40). Cultural morality, or the `morality of aspiration,' as he sometimescalls it,
it,
in
just
be
taking
representationally,after the fact, but must also,
cannot explained
for
be
accounted through an analysis of what motivates those who
and primarily,
initiate the creation of it, ie. the exceptional mystics who founded the great religions
and philosophies (1977: 34). Bergson observesthat "the saintshave their imitators";
but he asks"why do [these] great moral leadersdraw the massesafter them? They
have
They
they
no need to exhort; their mere existence
receive.
ask nothing, and yet
is
Such
precisely the nature of this other morality" (1977: 34. Italics
suffices....
is
formation
).
The
the
then,
of
model,
not simply the institutional conferral of
mine.
is
but
rather the constitution of a special,
sainthoodupon an exemplary person
its
has
kind
in
the saint. What
which
center
of
of
social
existence
gravity
unforeseen
kind
is
this
the
of aura around the saint which signifies that his or her
saint
marks
in
influence
his
her
the
that
only
exactly
and
or
consists
appeal
existencehas for
others. According to Bergson, then, only such exemplary souls are able to mediate
life,
it
the
claim,
and
and "transfigure it". (1977: 33)
social
give
vibrancy
and expand
This alternative morality is not just one of a special kind of existenceper se but
incarnated
in
"exceptional
for
is
Bergson
men" (1997: 34). Examples
rather clearly
Bergson provides are "the saints of Christianity the sagesof Greece,the prophets
...
besides"
(1977:
kind
Arahants
Buddism,
34).
This
Israel,
others
and
of
and
of
of
in
incarnate
be
in
"must
a privileged personwho becomesan
morality, other words,
is
(1977:
34).
Here
"impersonal
formulae"
the
to
the
essential
contrast
example"
of

169

demands arising from social pressure, and/or a priori conceptions of philosophy and
theology (1977: 34). In Bergson's words, "the generality of the [impersonal, social
law,
in
that of the [personal, cultural
the
universal acceptance of a
morality] consists
imitation
(1977:
in
34).
of
a
model"
a common
morality]

Thus, for Bergson, "whereas natural obligation is a pressureor a propulsive

force, complete and perfect morality has the effect of an appeal" (1977: 34). Here
Bergsonattemptsto explain:

As a matter of fact this personality takes shape as soon as we adopt a

ideally
longing
to
the
resemble, which
generates the form, is an
model;
incipient resemblance; the word which we shall make our own is the
have
heard
(1977:
35. Italics
ourselves
within
word whose echo we
mine. ).

Admittedly, there is here involved an obscurenotion of imitation that is hardly fully

developedby Bergson. Nevertheless,we can clearly seehere what appearsto be the
key relevanceof personality for this kind of morality that Bergson has set in his
it
is
And
the morality, or the wholenessor completenessthat accompanies
yet
sights.
imitation
this
the realization of
and which is the sine qua
non-natural obligation of
non of this morality, this wholeness,which remains central to Bergson's analysis, no
is
in
how
the
model-formation.
personal
crucial
matter

[For] the personmatters little. Let us merely make the point that,
first
distinctly
it
the
the
the
more
potent
was
more
morality
whereas
broke up into impersonal obligation, on the contrary the latter morality,

170

intelligence
first
dispersed
to
general
among
precepts
our
which
gave
at
its allegiance, but which did not go so far as to get our will in motion,
becomesmore and more cogent in proportion as the multiplicity and
its
into
merge
more
completely
of
maxims
man's unity and
generality
individuality (1977: 35).

Thus, it is not a cult of personsor saintsthat Bergson is appealing to. Rather, he

located
in
to
the
a complete morality
possibility of cultural anthropology as
appeals
in action, indeed, a morality that would become complete only inasmuch as it
becomesidentical with the actions of individual men. But this completenesswould
is
individuality.
Rather,
"principle
a
of action" one of
not support sheer,egoistic
Bergson's primary concerns,one which "here takes the place of the natural
obligation" (1977: 35).
This raisesthe question of the social, or non-social, statusof this morality of
by
it
be
Bergson
that
matters
suggesting
could
complicates
said that
exemplarity.
being
instead
is
"human
of
merely social" (1977: 35). It
this morality properly
in
implicated
but
it
has
the
social
claim
of
closed
society,
an
social,
now
remains
dimension
Bergson's
the
stress
which
of
upon
analysis seems
anthropological
added
to lead. However, Bergson is more clear when he distanceshimself from any
doctrine of human nature, humanism or "love of humanity," or indeed any "altruism"
(1977: 36). Indeed, any objectification of this morality would be "too vast, the effect
too diffuse" (1977: 36).
Therefore, the subject of this morality of exemplarity is neither the object of a
human or social claim, ie. a mere substratumof instinctive, natural activity, or an
be
a
subjective,
principled
of
self-willing,
which
would
merely
affective expansion

171

an intellectual conceit, according to Bergson. The problem that Bergson counterposesover againstthe Durkheimian question concerning social facts is rather simply
this: "how comes it that the men who have set the example have found other men to
follow them? And what is the power that is in this casethe counterpart of social
" (1977: 39). In responseto his own question, Bergson comesto this
pressure?
instinct
have
Beyond
"ve
choice.
no
and habit there is no direct action
conclusion:
on the will exceptfeeling" (1977: 39. Italics mine.). The raison d'etre of the new
morality of open society, then, is the emergenceof "unsuspectedtones of feeling",
into
"draw
this music that we may expressit in action" (1977:
them
which
us after
40). Therefore, creative emotion, hereafter, is the focus of Bergson's analysis of the
has
insofar
bond.
Creative
a
purchase
only
emotion
as it has an affect on what
social
Bergson calls "the activity of life" (1977: 54).
Now this contradicts Durkheim in several interesting ways. Primarily, there
is Bergson's rejection of the primacy of the problematic of social ontology as taken
to pertain specially to a discipline of sociology. According to Bergson, what is
always important is the "generative effort of life" (1977: 54), which will always
like
have
biologist"
"eve
(1977:
54), who will
the
to
that
right
proceed
a
guarantee
it
in
"that
tendencies
the
are,
as
were,
organic
which
social life have
maintain
in
beginning"
(1977:
be
56).
To
is
"it
for closed,
the
they
were
what
sure,
remained
fundamental
in
is
that
the
and
structure,
original
moral
societies
man
simple
made"
(1977: 56). Social solidarity is a biological fact for Bergson, a fact of nature. Now it
is too little appreciatedthat this is true for Durkheim as well. Bergson, however,
does implicitly recognize this. The problem with Durkheim for Bergson is that
Durkheim allegedly does not notice the key event of what Bergson calls the "passing
from social solidarity to the brotherhood of man" (1977: 58). And according to

172

Bergson"between the first morality and the second,lies the whole distancebetween
reposeand movement" (1977: 58). In other words, there is an interval which is
intution
distinct
impersonal
the
the
cuts
across
essences
of
enactedas
and the
personal,making it in effect adequateto human life itself. On a narrower plane it is
hard not to seein this Bergson's particular way of conceiving a necessary,but
antagonisticrelation between sociology and philosophy. For Bergson refusesto
follow Durkheim into an affirmation of the radical symmetry of social fact and
sociology.
For Bergson, every society is constantly compelled to struggle betweenthese
implicated
`two
sources'- society and culture - with their two apparently
mutually
but not really mutually opposedexplanations,of social actualization. Bergson's
is
harmonized
his
thus
with
method of intuition, his
conceptionof social agency
image
his
duration
of the outside which for him, taken together,
and
conceptionof
end any need for a static social ontology.
Continuity

in Bergson's Thought

Bergson thus made an intuitive connection between the writings of Durkheim

implying
integrating
Tarde,
that neither was exactly right about the
their
work,
and
in
Social
between
the
the
consists
rather
ontology
social.
of
movement
ontology
their insights. This goes to showjust exactly how there is a fundamental continuity
betweenBergson's philosophical thought and his social thought. In the broader
have
Bergson's
to comparethis odd
thought
simply
we
as
a
whole,
context of
his
here
earlier
writings
and
particularly
synthesis
with
apropos
would
sociological
be his manifesto for philosophy in an Introduction to Metaphysics- in order to see
how closely linked the main ideas are. The problem of the appearanceof external
intuition
in
book
is
immediate
this
earlier
given philosophicallyreality versus

173

informed sociologically-thick description in a much later, final writing. On the level

direct
is
between
the duality in the book on
there
a
continuity
of solutions,
metaphysicsof following reality versus free problem-setting and the duality in the
Two Sourcesof natural instinct versus model formation. Theseare exactly the same
classof inclusive disjunction, motivated by the sameinterest in ontology and
is
in no way an anomaly with respectto the core
Sources
Two
Thus,
the
creativity.
is
in
fact
development
it.
Bergson's
thought,
and
a
of
of
But what is this essenceof this new development? I believe that the
lies
in
his attempt to provide a
Bergson's
thought
primarily
social
significance of
new, more positive and modern image for philosophy as a de-centeredthinking of
it
in
in
but
the
challenge provides the way of a critique of
also
continuity,
Durkheimian sociologism on the level of the image of thought as a non-objective,
links
instinct
In
that
the
externality.
nexus
natural
non-subjective
and model
formation Bergson is writing about a new, nonjudgmental way of conceiving the
linkage between theory and practice, one which is based in an image of thought
in
different
is
between,
by,
though
shared
utilized
ways
philosophy and
which
longer
In
this
can
no
philosophy
remain a purely intellectual
view,
sociology.
derives
from
image
intellectual
its
Or
appeal
an
rather,
of opening up what
pursuit.
has becomeclosed, which is itself properly a social distinction, indeed a social
struggle.
On the other hand, according to Bergson's point of view sociology hasto requestion its committment to social gregariousnessand the premise of the group. The
Durkheimian doctrine of the externality of the social perceivesthe social facts which
are explained by thesepremisesas existing outside ourselvesand takes this
irreducible
proof
of
an
as
uncontroversial
sociality. Bergson does not
perception

174

disagreethat the image of the outside exists and has prime relevanceto the question
it
into
doctrine.
be
believes
Rather,
he
but
that
the
a
cannot
made
of social ontology,
bears
image
the
a relation, via a problematic continuity, to external
outside
of
social
interprets
Durkheim
be
than
that
assumed.
simply
must explained rather
constraint
doctrine
is
the
then
the
as
obligation;
sociological
social
of
constraint
an apparent
basedupon a common senseappealto the existenceof obligation, which supposedly
is
deny,
then correlated with this alleged
the
social
space
of
character
and
no one can
inevitability of obligation (1982: 130). Bergson points to the obvious inconsistency
here: obligations are simply not capableof stabilizing social phenomenain a
formation,
between
so
such
correlations
external
spatially condensed,relatively
is
"obligation
formations
For
Bergson,
are
arbitrary.
obligations and existing social
in no sensea unique fact, incommensuratewith others, looming above them like a
have
In
Bergson's
(1977:
20).
view,
as
we
seen,obligations
mysterious apparition"
limited
force
be
the
struggles,
a
model
which
of
with only
can the modulations of
from
being
focus
keep
to
the
the
subject
attracted
other, rival
to
social
of
success,
for
be
dynamic.
has
has
It
to
Social
to
as
something
accounted
continuity
models.
be internally explained, not assumed,as one doesboth when one simply refers to its
is
to
that
refers
a
process
of symbolism
characteristicof externality, and when one
is
forms.
for
It
in
based
this
be
that
these
reason,
also,
to
social
upon
supposed
Bergson's view, morality and religion do not, as Durkheim proposed in The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, provide the object of a stable sociology that
higher-order
for
Concepts,
foundation
its
in
the
concepts.
of
object
can observe
Bergson, are not products of morality and religion. Rather, morality and religion are
initiation,
formation
to
the
the
of
models,
necessity
the
of
to
necessityof
witnesses
the
to
of
minds
mystery of creation.
closing
the
opening
and
to
continual
and

175

The Durkheimian position of sociological reduction was quite popular among

the contemporary- especially the young - philsophical elite in France. This view
held that the social domain, with its various legal and technical extensions,ought to
be understoodasthe proper depository of the problems that philosophy has
traditionally taken as its right to investigate. We should understandBergson, as a
being
thinking,
new
mode
of
as
ambitious
pressedto provide a means
purveyor of an
of countering the tendencyhere towards Durkheimian sociological imperialism,
its
key
insights.
Thus, we can derive
of
creative
while neverthelessrecognizing one
from the Two Sourcesa questionthat has two irreducible sides: what is this
irreducible form of social externality that even the limit-case of pure thought,
in
discipline
it
is
the
of philosophy, needsand absolutely presupposes;
embeddedas
but conversely,what is this philosophical attempt to transcendthe investmentsand
Bergson's
the
work points to the hypothesisof there
social
context?
of
constraints
being only a single and samesynthesisinvolved in both of these pursuits, the
intelligence
image
cases
of
modern
converging and
of particular
synthesisof an
in
Outside-which-is-opened,
into
being
their
own
an
without
coming
a function of
function
being
interiority,
but
is
a
rather
of
continuity,
or
and
extension
so coits
duration
the
critical movements.
of
extensivewith
Understanding such a question raised by Bergson's Two Sourcesrequires
key
Bergsonian
as
a
creative rival of Durkheimian
philosophy
understanding
from
is
here
There
to
us
prevent
recognizing how
nothing
sociology.
incommensurablethesetwo rival approacheswill become once they become
be
It
for
did,
Bergson
thought.
to
should
noted,
social
as
even
establishedparadigms
his credit, that there is nothing in his own analysis to prevent sciencefrom setting up
frames of referencewithin which it can provide opportunities for the indirect

176

duration.
is
just
for
It
Bergson - and here he differs
the
that
of
effects
of
observation
from Tarde - the reference points of science ought not to be confused with the
process itself or with the philosophical concepts that aim to combine directly intuitively - with this process. Another objection might be raised that a Bergsonian
believing
has
become
that
thus
to
then
philosophy
entail
point of view must
rearticulated within the field of the mystical agent of social creation. Bergson is a
be
little
for
to
there
philosophy to gain by Bergson's
seems
philosopher, and

`spiritualistic' move in the Two Sources. Indeed, it would have to be admitted that
there is necessarilya question left open as to whether Bergson's social thought
his
duration,
theory
of
philosophical
of
a reorganization
requiresa reorganization
that he would thus have not had time to addressin its full ramifications for
long
Sources
before
Two
Bergson's death.
the
published
was
not
philosophy, since
But just from the latter book alone it would be hard to arguethat Bergson's move
toward social thought in his later years has nothing to do with a motivation to
encouragethe project of pragmatismto embracea modern mysticism. Bergson's
thought does have to do with a concernto recognize how a spiritual tendency in
harmonized
be
life
could
with the principle of a sustainablemodernity, or
modern
in
is
`mysticism'
But
perhapsa misleading term
plurality of modernities, openness.
it
because
his
thought
to
seemsto suggestthat Bergson was interested
when applied
in religion for its own sakeand as an end in itself. Bergson does not seekto
for
example, a modern religion centeredaround a principle of openness.
establish,
Rather, it is much more characteristicof Bergson to ask, as he did, "is the distinction
between the closed and the open, which is necessaryto resolve or remove theoretical
be
little
help
It
if
to
the closed society
of
would
us
practically?
utility
problems, able

177

has always been so constituted as to shut itself up again after each momentary
opening" (1977: 271).
In my view, what ought to be recognized as intervening here is continuity
added to externality, Bergson's social thought added to Durkheim's premise, the
human
into
being
though
contingent
of
an
outside
which
upon
action, could
coming
neverthelessserve as the necessaryontological image of those samemodem
practicesconsideredas sociality per se. I think something like this is indeed implicit
in Bergson's thinking. However, Bergson himself choseto account for the openness
constitutive of the outside by referenceto a significantly modified Tardian
`significantly
because,
I
the
models.
say
of
social
attraction
modified'
conception of
for Tarde, desire is an automatic, unconscious,micrological occurencein which the
kind
is
of remainder amidst a flux of attractions.
self constituted negatively as a
Bergson rather choosesto maintain a link between ontology and a kind of rare
creative originality constitutive of relative cultural universalities, a `grand
from
for
to
social
models
could
only
stem
which
come
call
a total
originality', which
reconfiguration of our social practices, models such as we find in the pantheonof
saints.
Certainly in his earlier work, Bergson holds that durations are the provenance
intuitive
imaginative
function
he
that
as
an
method,
an
a
so
much
of
method
not
hopes might be inspiring of a modern and mature philosophical activism. The
intuition of duration is interpreted by him as aproject. This self-interpretation is
including
by
Creative
Bergson
(1983).
Evolution
to
and
up
actively promoted
Bergson then does not produce any major work until he publishes the Two Sources.
Despite the gap in time, I would argue that his analysis of sociality, religion, and
implicitly
linked
broken
is
with, not
wildly away from, the
morality nevertheless

178

earlier analysis of the passivesynthesisof externality effected in duration. If the

Two Sourcesis to be read as a natural extension of Bergson's philosophy as I believe
it must, then I think that what we can learn from Bergson is a useful way to
reformulate the paradox of modernity. This distinction would lie betweenthe acts of
imagination and myth-making required to re-open, re-constitute, and refresh the
social bond by refreshing our senseof common `attainability', and the image that
everyoneneverthelesstakes as an `inescapable' starting point for their social projects
is
and which therefore the proper subject of a sociology: an outside which supplies
the possibility of there coming into being many durations of being.

179

CHAPTER SIX

DELEUZIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY:

THE HORDE AND REVOLUTIONARY DESIRE

Sexuality and love do not live in the bedroom of Oedipus, they dream instead
of wide-open spaces,and causestrangeflows to circulate that do not let
themselvesbe stocked within an establishedorder (Deleuze and Guattari 1984:
116).

When we read Bergson's social thought in the Two Sourcestoday, to a considerable

in
it
it
`dated',
the
that
sense
constitutes a responseto a set of pre-war
extent seems
be
It
circumstances. must read, to a significant extent, as a timely diagnosis of the
dangerof continuing, given contemporary modern conditions, to believe in a unified,
in
his
being.
final
Bergson
this,
returns
social
work, to the Kantian
substantive
is
formulation
interplay
His
this
the
of
paradox
upon
as
emphasis
an
paradox.
between closednessand openness. Perhapsthis work even seemsto still be tinged
from
divorced
that of the messianicworld,
completely
not
with a perspective
have
it
in
towards the open. As we have seen,
to
the
seems
sympathy
particularly
Bergson finds the two sourcesof closednessand openness- social constraint and
brought
into
interplay
desire
by
the
sustained
social and personal
personal
-

180

by
spiritual models, which are, after all, far more models of
presented
challenges
opennessthan they are of closedness.
There is, however, a more recent reading of Bergson which re-opens someof
the social and political issuesraised in that book. This reading has been led by Gilles
Deleuzeand Deleuze's attempt to develop, using Bergsonian concepts, a more
intrinsically modern account of social plurality. As we shall see,whereasBergson
attemptsto think the outside as sustainedexemplary openness,Deleuze attemptsto
think the outside as the production of an impersonal field of social modernity. We
for
is
important
is
Deleuze
that
see
a mode of virtual co-existencelocated
shall
what
in particular modernization initiatives which purportedly makesthese particulars
`full', or devoid of any needto import sensefrom the limited or concreteuniversality
of a model. Deleuze does not work with any concept of a `needfor initiation. '
Writing well after the war and the reconstruction of Europe, with these `full
begins
demand
in
Deleuze
to
that critical thinkers ought to
again
mind,
particulars'
less,
substancethan Bergson was willing to
assumevis-a-vis sociality more, not
attribute. Arguably, with Deleuze we will have come as close as perhapsis possible
to a perspectiveof modernity in- and for-itself.
Desire and Culture
UnderstandingDeleuze's social philosophy requires a knowledge of how
Deleuze negotiatesbetweentwo essentialmovementsto do with thinking the social.
Firstly, there is the project of classical social theory, with its consensusagainst
its
internal
debateover whether or
of
sociality
and
explanations
purely psychological
be
associatedwith an apparent externality of the social
should
existence
social
not
life
and of cultural creativity. Secondly, and
processes
of
with
or
rather
world
importance,
is
there
the explicitly anti-social-theoretical stanceof
perhapsof greater

181

Deleuze's greatestinfluence, Bergson, with his suggestionthat the social exists for
the thinking individual in accordancewith intuition somewherebetween interiority
its
departure
Deleuze's
takes
thought
point
of
somewhere
social
and exteriority.
betweenBergson and classical social theory, and it is one of the primary aims of this
his
to
position.
chapter clarify
One highly relevant sourcefor the social thought of Deleuze is the work of
Gabriel Tarde. Tarde had a significant influence upon Deleuze and was himself a
thinker situated very much between classical social theory and Bergsonian
becoming
lies
in
Tarde
Durkheim,
thought
that
tension,
With
social
philosophy.
instead
However,
individuation.
in
of seeingthis tension as
often conflict, with
decisive,beginning among the conditions of a `horde' and thus before any
individuation, for Tarde becoming social is problematic and begins as individuation.
In Tarde's view, becoming social involves the constitution of a rule of fashion which
in
"The
the
intimate
in
rule
opposition
with
of
custom.
or
rule
tension,
conflict,
sits
by
blossoming
in
the
things
is
distinguished
fashion
of
of certain great
every order
of
it
is
deduced
from
Though
(1903:
342).
individualities"
free
social, not
and
individual premises,Tardian thinking indeedtends to emphasizethe significance of
particular agentsof social change.
However, for Tarde, as for Deleuze, such individualities are not what is really
do
They
`the
the
they
in
only
products
of
are
social;
not
social'.
at stake speaking of
by themselvesilluminate many of the most important elementsthat go into the
indeed,
is
Tarde,
For
the
the
production
of
social
a process
the
social.
production of
becoming
their
to
difficult
the
of
persons
on
part
way
sacrifices on
of the making of
by
familial
their
to
their
Individuals
individuals.
gains
sacrificing
make
able
only
are
follow
distant
innovatively
in
identities
to
and
more
greater
models:
order
roles and

182

In the beginning the family... was the only social group, and... every
in
lessening
its
importance...
by
change
resulted
subsequent
constituting
new and more ample groups which were formed artificially, at the
families,
the
side
of
and which reducedthem to mere
of
social
expense
physiological expressions;but that, finally, such dismemberedfamilies
tended to aggregateinto a kind of enlarged family that was both natural
family
like
the
except that the physiological
original
and social
characteristics,which were transmitted through heredity, existed mainly
to facilitate the transmissionthrough imitation of the elementsof
civilisation, and not vice versa" (1903: 287).

Thus, for Tarde, becoming social in no way involves the coming about of an anarchy
of isolated, `fashionable', individuals who `celebrate' their own self-centered
individuation
in
implicates
It
the progressionand expansionof
rather
achievements.
down
its
family
the
to
model
of
straight
natural primitive origins. Indeed,
a cultural
for Tarde, it implicates the individual in a `vacillating struggle between custom and
fashion which lasts until the ultimate triumph of the former" (1903: 343). Becoming
individuation,
but
it
begins
then moves on to ultimately becomea
thus
as
social
larger cultural force.
There is a certain paradox in Tarde's thinking of social becoming. Here we
have seenthat Tarde assumesthat the family is the original starting point of sociality.
On the other hand, the point of view of Tarde is that of desire, specifically desire for
distant
desire
to
a
model and as thereby significant for new
as
attraction
modernity,
formations
`artificial'
or
social
made of single individuals.
and progressive

183

However, whatever social progresscomes about, the family, for Tarde, is always
for
interactions,
if
certainly
as
a
model
customary
as a
physically,
not
reinstated,
is
in
In
Tardian
for
`tradition',
the
short.
understanding,
modernity
a struggle
model
inherent
in
family
He
traditional
the
the
social
practices.
of
model
was,
against
however, categorical that modernity could never effect a complete break with the
family model. This has important implications for Tarde's notion of desire. Due to
this familial imperative, for Tarde, desirewill never be completely anarchic. Quite
to the contrary, desire will for him always be modulated as an `attraction' which
familial
elements.
organizespotential
Now when we turn to Deleuze, it does not seemlikely that we would find him
desire
to an analysis of the sociality of
the
this
of
of
analysis
restriction
agreeingwith
is
in
be
in
in
fact,
found
interest
Deleuze's
Nowhere,
there
to
work
any
attraction.
involves
Tardian
thought
topic.
a very non-Deleuzian concept of social
social
such a
desire'.
`social
here
However,
containment
of
call
a
we
we
might
repressionwhich
it
fact,
because
was precisely a similar notion of social
come acrossa strange
for
in
from
Tarde
Bergson
Sources.
Two
the
took
that
the
use
writing
of
repression
The question thus arisesas to whether Deleuze will be able to agreewith Bergson on
this point. We shall seethat this will becomea very important problem both for the
for
his
Deleuze's
the
time
and
originality
at
same
philosophical
of
question
for
its
the
relevanceto our own question of social ontology.
and
social
conception of
Any insight into this question of the nature of desire must take classical social
theory into account. For Bergson's explanation of sociality, which depends
intelligible
inasmuch
it
is
Tarde,
that
as
only
constitutes an
of
significantly upon
by
Durkheimian
`external'
the
the
to
social
of
as
necessitated
model
rival
attempt
be
dependent
Bergson's
thought
thus
to
social
comes
upon the
constraint-obligation.

184

Tardian concept of desire. Henceforth, his thought becomesinterwoven with

classicalsocial thought. The possiblity of this convergencedependsentirely on
Tarde, in the way Tarde emphasizesthe socially progressive feature of imitationbecause
this allows Tarde to researchsocial repressionfrom the point
attraction and
of view of incorporation rather than externalization. It makespossible an attempt at
immanent
a non-Durkheimian,
account of social repression.
There are two meansby which Deleuze is influenced by Tarde: through
direct reading as we can seefrom referencesto Tarde in Deleuze's work, '8 and
through Bergson's appropriation of Tarde. This two-fold nature of this influence
complicatesDeleuze's relation to Tarde. But the relation is well worth examining
since particularly the latter meansof appropriation, through Bergson, meansthat
Tarde will be more than just a passinginspiration for Deleuze. For Bergson is an
indispensible, main sourcefor Deleuzian philosophy. It is quite simple to formulate
a provisional, working definition of Deleuze's relation to Bergson with particular
important
The
in
to
thought.
element
social
most
shared
respect
common in
Deleuzian and Bergsonian social philosophy is the idea that becoming social means
becoming conscious beyond one's ego of one's situation in something like an `open
is
Part
Bergson's
to
phrase.
of
what at stake is a senseof reality felt
society', use
immediately and emotionally. Part of what is at stake is an intuition of the limits of
in
In
Deleuze's
this
to
sense.
social
words, "if man accedesto
philosophy attaining
the open creative totality, it is... by acting, by creating rather than by contemplating.
In philosophy itself, there is still too much alleged contemplation: Everything
happensas if intelligence were already imbued with emotion" (1988a: 112. Italics
`becoming
Bergson,
).
Deleuze
sees
social',
with
as the need to dispersethe
mine.

18Of particular importance is a long footnote in Difference and Repetition (1994: 313-4).

185

ego in an `open totality' which then enablesaccessto free emotional currentswhich

for
fashioning
the
creativity,
particularly
motivate
of higher-order concepts.
Bergson emphasizedopennessand processthroughout his work. But
in
for
Sources,
Two
Bergson, every philosophical motivation
the
particularly
becomesattainable only by meansof various socially-originating affects as that
through which such attributes as `openness'and `process' may exist. Bergson's
social thought is in this sensea kind of social justification or `rendering timely' of
Bergson's philosophical thought. However, in the Two Sources,indeed his last
important work of thought, he still saw this conjunction of tendenciessustainedby
objects of desire which initiate a variety of social subjectivities. Thus, despitehis
emphasisupon opennessand process,Bergson's conception of the social is still
heavily involved with a notion of the socially creative force of mystical, charismatic,
leaders.
involved
is
It
thus
still
spiritual
with the reduction of desire to attraction.
Thus, the difference from Deleuze here may indeed be more significant than has
previously been recognized.
Tarde had emphasizedthe need for a kind of `self-fashioning' which would
involve creativity and a social individuality. This had a certain influence on Bergson
who used it as a way into researchingwhat was for him a new field: the sociological
field. Being a student of Bergsonianthought, the task for Deleuze is, then, to either
acceptthis Tardian conception of socialization as a premise or createone's own
latter
it.
Deleuze
We
takes
the
that
shall see
path and that what is created
version of
is a much more radical version. It takes its point of departurefrom the end-point of
Bergson's writing, that which dwells upon the theme of the social, but it endsup
far
beyond
Bergson's responseto this question.
going

186

I would put all of this in even stronger terms: if Deleuze could be said to
differ
him
break
Bergson
or
with
significantly, it could only be here, in
with
make a
little
known
break
discussed
implicit
highly
a
very
or
with
aspectof Bergsoniana
Tardian social thought: the conception of desire as attraction, not least inasmuch as
this might be taken as an implied criticism and an alternative explanation for
Durkheim's social example of `marriage'. Herein, in my view, lies the great
(1984),
AntiOedipus
written together with the radical psychologist
of
significance
Felix Guattari, the most socially-oriented of Deleuze's books. If Deleuze was the
bound
Bergson,
to the premisesand the aims of his
of
apprentice
philosophical
diversion
begins
to open onto a new and
and
new
alliance
masteruntil a certain
AntiOedipus
for
Deleuze,
then
was - and I think it is original area of research
Deleuze's first wholly original work.
The one thing that begins to make Deleuze differ significantly from Bergson
is that which takes him onto the sociological ground that Bergson believed had been
his
Sources.
by
Two
On the one hand, this
the
of
writing
obviated or surpassed
might seemlike an obscurepoint. Even with a working knowledge of all of
Deleuze's texts it might still be possible to miss the significance of Deleuze's
is
for
And
this
to
good reason,since little explicit
sociology.
classical
relation
found
in
be
Deleuze's
texts. Indeed, even some
to
can
sociology
classical
reference
do
little
have
his
to
to
themes
with the question of the social. Let us
seem
main
of
take Deleuze's Difference and Repetition (1994) as a casein point. The main theme
do
itself
have
the
to
tradition
than with
to
philosophical
with
more
much
seems
Repetition
be
Difference
believe
I
will
mainly
and
read
as
problems.
sociological
it should - as a highly original essayon the problem of thinking without

187

presuppositions,of the unthought within thought, or the problem, as Deleuze puts it,
19
in
(1994:
begin
129).
"where
to
philosophy"
of
Philosophy and Difference
Difference and Repetition is one of Deleuze's most philosophically-oriented
monograph's. But then, to a sociologically-informed reader, even here one can find
how
show
sociological premises are implicit from the very
subtlereferenceswhich
beginning of properly `Deleuzian philosophy'. To be sure, there is a problem of
scholarship: up to and including Difference and Repetition,-the referencesin
in
small
number. The only reference of lasting
questionare short, vague, and very
in
footnote
is
long
Tarde
Deleuze
to
which
a
claims Tarde's work is a
significance
`microsociology' basedon a similar line of thought to Deleuze's own (1994: 313-4).
But this too might seemmarginal and of little significance. There is also a problem
is
Deleuze's
to perform thought experiments,or
method
explicit
of methodology:
creative appropriations of concepts,using the thought of many thinkers. So why
be
important
few
Tarde
to
than his other,
considered
more
references
should a
diverse references?
Late in his career,Deleuze noted that philosophy has traditionally been
it
that
thrives upon an agonistic relationship with various
such
constructed
disciplinary rivals, beginning with the Platonic struggle with `sophistry' (Deleuze
is
lot
be
kind
It
1-12).
Guattari
1994:
the
to
of
philosophy
a
of Socratic
and
`underdog', always carefully, intentionally, and deliberately facing various and
is
integrity
It
here,
thought.
to
the
though, that we
of
precisely
challenges
repeated
find Deleuze noting a curious fact, that in modem times, "especially sociology,
Guattari
(Deleuze
[philosophy]"
1994:
10).
Is
this a revealing
to
and
replace
wanted

19Seein particular the chapter on "The Image of Thought" (1994: 129-167).

188

it
in
introduction
be
level,
On
to
appears
only
a
comment
passing
an
one
statement?
justify
in
is
But
really
matters.
what
would
to a monographwhich on other
us
is
large
The
is
it
claim,
surely,
quite
and
comment?
only a passing
supposing
is
key
Indeed,
this would
the
that
modem
rival
of
philosophy.
sociology
significant:
haveto be the casefor Deleuze's point of view if we consider that the greaterthe
here
is
is
that
the
the
to
challenge
claim
great - then the
and
challenge philosophy in
be,
Deleuze's way of thinking, the concentratedeffort at a
greater should
strategicalresponse.
Indeed, then, it would not be too far to propose from this that, if Deleuze held
this view more or lessthroughout his career, he would have had to have had as a kind
idea
Difference
during
Repetition
background
the
the
of
and
writing
assumption
of
that modem philosophy is somehow bound up with an effort to wrest from standard
from
`broader
truth'
the
the contemporary
philosophical
sociological conclusions
be
in
Now,
Deleuze
to
sure,
as
made
explicit
project of sociological awareness.
What is Philosophy? (Deleuze and Guattari 1994), any question of `truth' is for him
the
rights of a philosophy to maintain or alter
restoring
of
a
question
of
more
rather
the composition of higher-order conceptsin accordancewith the immediate needsof
fond
became
"so
he
long
is
As
there
thinking.
claiming,
of
as
a time
creative, useful
be
for
that
the
this
operation
undertakes
will always
creating concepts,
and a place
implication
9).
But
is
Guattari
1994:
(Deleuze
the
clear:
and
called philosophy"
there should indeed be a basis for us to treat Deleuze's textual referencesto
sociological works with special care.
I believe we ought to seekin Deleuze's referencesto Tarde signs of
Deleuze's main strategy of thinking rather than just interesting embellishmentsor
tactics. And from this point of view, many interesting possibilities for reading

189

Deleuzedo emerge. In particular, one can isolate two main aspectsto Deleuze's
long footnote to Tarde in Difference and Repetition. Firstly, there is a rather
stunning implied suggestionon the part of Deleuze that the whole outline of
Difference and Repetition was inspired by what he found in Tarde's work,
particularly in a couple of Tarde's essays,"Monadologie et Sociologic" (1895/1999)
and "La Variation Universelle" (1895).
According to Deleuze, these essays present "the free figure of difference"
(1994: 314). If the Laws of Imitation had focussed upon `universal repetition' as the
ground of scientific inquiry that enables the pursuit of sociology and binds it into a
in
his
relationship
philosophy,
short essays Tarde had been better able
working
with
to highlight more effectively the ultimate end of repetition as difference. In
Deleuze's words, it is specifically Tardian philosophy, "one of the last great
philosophies of nature, in the tradition of Leibniz, " in which we can find the
discovery that "repetition... is not the process by which difference is augmented or
diminished, but the process by which it `goes on differing'

and `takes itself as its

in
(1994:
313).
Similarly,
Difference and Repetition Deleuze states explicitly
end"'
that his own interest lies primarily in a "difference that would not extend, or `would
far
have
to
as
as opposition and contradiction; [and] a concept of
extend'
not
repetition in which physical, mechanical, or bare repetitions... would find their raison
d'etre in the more profound structures of a hidden repetition in which a `differential'
is disguised and displaced" (1994: xx). What matters to Deleuze is this idea that he
discovers in Tarde: that "the perpetual divergence and decentring of difference
[corresponds] closely to a displacement and a disguising within repetition" (1994:
xx).

190

To be sure, Deleuze's writing of Difference and Repetition intimately

involves an original, sustainedattempt to situate the theme of difference vis-a-vis the
is
Its
novelty the way Deleuze takes the Leibnizian insight
practice of philosophy.
into repetition as particularity and radicalizes it by placing it into the theoretical
in
anti-Cartesian,
post-Spinozist
materialism
context of a radically
which an ontology
become
difference
(Marks
1998: 75-7; Hardt
possible
purportedly
would
of pure
1993: 79). Perhapseven more important for the future transmission of this book's
importance is the way Bergson's concept of intuition, as an affirmative notion of
difference as processbut also as act, provides a kind of two-layered understandingin
Deleuze's intrepretation of Spinoza as, in a certain fundamental sense,expressionist
(1992), but in another, irreducible sense,pragmatic (1988c). However, what is
is
book,
here
Deleuze's
first
the
thesis
the
that
of
relevant
self-professed
primarily
from
Deleuze's
comes
original
philosophy,
at
an
reading of Tarde, a selfattempt
professedmaster of `pure sociology'.
Sociology and Difference
The secondmain aspectof Deleuze's long footnote to Tarde follows from the
first. This secondpoint takes Deleuze away from philosophy and toward more
straightforwardly sociological matters. Here Deleuze explicitly makes a claim as to
the essenceof Tarde's approachto sociology. This time the contrast with
Durkheimian sociology is explicit. Durkheim had intentionally focussedupon that
is
far
from
being
by
individuals
that
so
controlled
which
sociological subject-matter
fact.
independent,
`external'
it
But
Durkheim concentrates
an
arguably constitutes
individuals,
ie.
between
happens
interactional
theory
upon
an
what
much
upon
not so
individuals,
ie.
`all'
institutions,
constrains
as
upon
what
upon an ontological
of
is
institutions.
For
Durkheim
this
theory of
reason
often seenas having invented a

191

`macrosociology' which is then contrastedwith an interactional `microsociology'

which is built upon skepticism against Durkheimian social ontology. The
Durkheimian point of view is that `microsociology' runs the risk of lapsing back into
individual ontology unless it ultimately locates the sourceof the symbols involved in
interactions in the necessaryphenomenaof long-term social duration rather than in
the contingent circumstancesof social contact. In contrast to thesetwo points of
implicitly
his
footnote,
in
Deleuze,
affirms that Tardian `pure sociology'
view,
constitutesa third sociological possibility which rejects skepticism against social
latter
for
"assuming
but
is
the
critical
of
nevertheless
ontology
what must be
(1994:
314).
explained"
Thus, Durkheimian ontology is tacitly acceptedby Deleuze as a point of
departurefor thinking the social. What is distinctly Tardian about Deleuze's
emphasisis that a notion of the personal self's necessaryinvolvement with social
into
is
back
brought
the sociological picture. Quite commendably in my
ontology
important
distinction
is
Deleuze
an
which
recognizes
not always well
view,
Deleuze
theorists.
social
recognizesthat `microsociology'
even
among
recognized
between
be
and
encounters
relations
a study of
exemplary individuals: "for
neednot
the alternative - impersonal givens or the Ideas of great men - [Tarde] substitutesthe
little ideasof little men, the little inventions and interferencesbetween imitative
in
here
is
(1994:
Now
how
314).
a
crucial
point
which
can
we
see
currents"
important a knowledge of social theory which includes a knowledge of the thought of
Tarde is for the interpretation of Deleuze's thought. For it might seemtempting for
description
interpret
this
of an alternative, perhapsa `radical'
to
statementas a
some
kind of interactionist sociology. The rhetoric of `little ideas of little men' seemsto
interactionist
its
the
of
project
microsociology
with
with
concern to get back
resonate

192

life.
is,
in
fact, absolutely no basis for such an
But
there
to the problems of everyday
interpretation. For Deleuze, Tarde is "not necessarilyconcernedwith what happens
betweenindividuals" (1994: 314). Generally interactionists study that which takes
it
in
individuals'
in
`between
the
appears
communication
as
or
more
generally
place
languageof the symbolic. According to Deleuze, where Tarde's main interest lies is
but
`what
happens
the
symbolic
rather
or
with
with
within a
not with communication
hesitation
`infinitesimal
for
individual,
understood
as
example,
social
single
`infinitesimal
(1994:
invention
314).
social
adaptation"'
as
or
opposition',
Furthermore, Deleuze is right, because,as we have seenin chapter three, the major
formulated
"the
imitation
free
itself
Tardian
tendency
to
as
of
sociology,
of
premise
from reproduction" meansthat imitation can be at a great historical distanceand that
it is therefore not contingent upon intimate, or ultimately physical, social contact
(Tarde 1903: 250).
Tarde reservesa place for the personal self as the key agency of social
from
do
Durkheim's
but
Tarde
to
within
so
ontological affirmation
attempts
change,
by
long
term
meansof reconceiving the archeological
configurations,
social
of
imitative
isolating
`currents'
in
the
that purportedly
of
as
a
method
method sociology
link already establishedsocial configurations to a common model. One great virtue
`mechanical
instead
is
that
that
this
simply
presuming
solidarity', or traditional
of
of
by
`organic
solidarity', or modern
configurations, are repeatedlyovertaken
is
important
it
first
to
Tarde
that
to
come
out
grips with what
points
configurations,
`Mechanical
is
`mechanical
the
theory
solidarity',
as
solidarity'.
goes,
constitutes
basedupon resemblances. In addition to `mechanical solidarity', Durkheim had
have
`custom'
the
that
certain
effects
upon
characterof
could
also
supposed
it
but
less
that
was
somehow
a
significant phenomenon
primitive social groups

193

(1984: 66). Tarde will begin from the premise that the resemblancesof `mechanical
(1903:
253-4).
custom
of
resemblances
solidarity' are all essentially
Custom, for Tarde, is not understood in the ordinary senseof simply any
is
In
Tarde's
is
through
tradition.
transmitted
that
view, custom organized
practice
According
Tarde
familial
to
the
territorialization.
sociological
through
precisely
familial
fact
in
lies
territorializations somehow come
that
the
customary
problematic
imitations'
bring
inspiring
`innovative
by
be
which
about a
to challenged exciting,
family
inclusive
`civilization.
'
flexible,
of
as
model
and
new, more modern,
Purportedly, only this way of conceiving sociology may begin to problematize `what
Durkheim could only assume', ie. that sociological researchmust take its point of
departurefrom the phenomenonthat similar people gather to form groups in an
Tarde,
According
to
manner.
apparently spontaneous

independently of any contact with alien civilisation, a given people

in
inevitably
to
territory
continue
grow
numbers, and
must
within a given
in
life.
inevitably
less
towards
consequence
urban
progress
must no
Now, this progresscausesthe nervous excitabily which develops aptitude
for imitation. [By contrast] primitive rural communities can only imitate
their fathers, and so they acquire the habit of ever turning towards the
in
life
they
because
their
which
the
are open to the
of
period
only
past,
impressions of a model is their infancy, the age that is characterisedby
because,
they
as
children,
are under parental
and
susceptibility,
nervous
rule (1903: 247-8).

194

Clearly, Tarde can only be said to `reproblematize', not `breakwith' Durkheim's

premise. For Tarde agreeswith Durkheim that social resemblanceand social
in
directly
interlinked
that
them
changes
and
are
related to the
quantity are
transformationto modernity.
We saw also in chapter four above that the difference between Durkheim and
Tarde is more subtle than perhapsthesetwo thinkers themselvessupposed. The
difference between them will become a great challenge for Deleuze. In what
difference
from
between
Deleuzian
the
these
most
significant
perspective,
a
consists,
two classical social thinkers? According to Tarde, modern organization, basedas it
is upon the development of urban life, in its earliest form arisesthrough the territorial
direct
family.
Social
in
the
this. But according
quantity
plays
a
role
establishmentof
to Tarde social quantity is related to this transformation only through a `nervous
is
is
he
What
to
a purely affect-basedcollective phenomenon.
referring
excitability'.
Thus, according to Tarde, resemblanceand social quantity are not, as the Durkheim
of the Division of Labour thought, a causeof modernity simply by virtue of bringing
have
idea
duplication.
As
the
seen
above,
we
of role duplication is
about role
formulated as such in order to resonatewith the idea that the source of participation
is
`need
the
therefore
a
of wholeness'. Whatever spatial
of
society
source
and
have
thus
correlated,
as
we
about
are
seenarbitrarily, with
come
configurations
implication
Durkheim's
is
duplications
thus
that
occur.
was
society
whatever role
thus somehow extendedin spaceby meansof a non-extendedsource of constraint.
In Tarde's view this makesDurkheim's sociology unworkable. In Tarde's view,
imitation
is
is
phenomenon
general
of
more
a
much
which
rather what at stake
Tarde
`ideas',
plane,
with
a
non-extended
what
called
on
completely
on a
operates
kind of socio-psychic current of contagion.

195

Two points here are relevant to the social thought of Deleuze. Firstly, as we
haveseenabove, despitehis salutary critical point of view, neverthelesswith the
theory of contagious `currents' Tarde fails to provide a non-metaphorical account of
`current'
it
is
Secondly,
from
the
though
of
contagion,
continuity.
social
a Deleuzian
perspectivetantalizingly close to providing a new model of philosophy that would be
is
back
for a senseof
in
desire,
always
referred
unfortunately
grounded social
family.
For
`figure
this
the
the
the
to
reason
of
of difference' that
coherence
model
Tarde elaboratesby meansof the metaphor of `currents' is not as radical, not as
`free', not as Bergsonian, as someoneinterested in radical process such as Deleuze
in
his
first
for
for.
So
two
these
reasons,
collaboratory work with Felix
wish
would
Guattari, AntiOedipus. Deleuze will begin to implicitly but clearly diminish the
had
in
he
Difference
Tarde
that
towards
and Repetition. Deleuze
optimistic attitude
`pure
the
turn
of
sociology' upon metaphor, but he will become
reliance
against
will
idea
by
family
the
the
the
the
recurrence
of
revulsed
of
even
more
model
of
perhaps
in the realm of culture. And as we shall see,perhapssurprisingly, this will bring him
toward a reappraisalof the notion of the horde.
Revolutionary Desire
At first glance such a direction may seemimpossible for a thinker such as
Deleuze. Surely Deleuze is one who sharesan intellectual affinity with those, such
individual
becoming
Freud,
an
social as
working to control the
who conceive
as
forces that constitute his or her ego and thus to better manageany obstaclesto
in
better
in
Is
Deleuze
this
to
all,
who
wants
us
one
not
way,
get
growth.
personal
desires?
his
Is
`real
the
within
our
touch with
not a project of
possibilities' contained
`diagnosis'? From a Deleuzian point of view one could not be less satisfied with
dispersal
is
Deleuze
For
the
the
of
ego
at the sametime the
a
project.
such

196

impersonal
fully
field,
social
not a merely `super' ego. As Deleuze
constitution of a
for
it,
is
"a
Guattari
schizophrenic
out
a
walk
put
a better model than a neurotic
and
lying on the analyst's couch. A breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside
dispersal
is
(1984:
The
2).
the
of
ego
a processwhich testifies to an actual
world"
contribution to `the outside world'. It is, in a word, a synthetic, not simply a
investigative
heuristic,
operation. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, `, what
or
negative,
is a `real' desire, since repressionis also desired? How can we tell them apart? We
demandthe right to a very deliberate analysis. For even in their contrary uses,let us
make no mistake about it, the samesynthesesare at issue", ie. those in psychic
in
(1984:
116).
those
social
repression
repressionand
Deleuze is thus led to the very Tardian and anti-psychologistic tendency in
be
it
is
"social
believed
that
should
repression
not
understood by using as a
which
starting point a familial repressioncoextensivewith civilization - far from it; it is
in
be
inherent
terms
that
to a
of
a
social
must
understood
repression
civilization
Guattari
(Deleuze
form
1984: 118). However, for
and
production"
of social
given
Tarde, it did not seeminconsistent to formulate that form of social production
invention-imitation
disjunction
by
then
to
this
and
still
as
organize
paradoxically
Guattari
family
Deleuze
to
and
want to completely destroy the
model.
reference a
`model',
families
between
the
of
a
and
notion
and on an even deeper
connection
level, as they made clear in A ThousandPlateaus(1988), their follow-up to
AntiOedipus, to challenge `the model' wherever it tends to takes root (1988: 3-25).
Deleuze had realized as early as Difference and Repetition that the risk here is that if
this kind of `model-unity' is rejected one will always be left with dualism unless one
itself.
in
As
Deleuze
it
in
Difference
locate
process
put
a
certain
univocity
and
can
Repetition, "univocity, for its part, has two completely opposing aspectsaccording to

197

in
is
`in
being
manners'
all
a single same sense, but is said thereby of that
said
which
difference
is
displaced
differs,
is
itself
which
said
of
a
always
mobile
which
and
).
being"
(1994:
304.
Italics
mine. This univocity is the `virtual ontology'
within
being
(Boundas 1996). For with
the
time
grounds
and
ungrounds
at
same
which
Bergson and, I would say, contra Adorno, Deleuze believes that the metaphysics of
directly,
reality
not through some system of symbolic
with
process must combine
mediation. Such mediation implies the reduction of process to a mere `realization of
possibilities'.

As Deleuze put it in Difference and Repetition.

the only danger in all of this is that the virtual could be confused with the
is
The
possible opposedto the real; the processundergone by
possible.
the possible is therefore a `realisation'. By contrast, the virtual is not
opposedto the real; it possessesa full reality by itself. The processit
be
is
It
that
would
of
actualisation.
wrong to seeonly a verbal
undergoes
dispute here: it is a question of existenceitself (1994: 211. Italics mine.).

In this way, according to Deleuze, the virtual must not be understood as a

inversion
the
of the economic
whole or as a simple sociologistic
plenitude of
is
because
`scarcity',
the
virtual
a continuous and open
precisely
concept of
left
is
Thus,
to understandthe virtual as a `full
the
only option
process.
full,
itself'
if
Deleuze
`existence
And
together with
s
already
as
particular'.
Guattari goes on to elaboratein AntiOedipus, it does not needa model of
for
diagnosis
it
lacks.
that
a
or
search
something
on
modelled
problem-solving
The textual evidence,however, shows that Deleuze is interested in Tarde as
for
Deleuze's
inspiration
Difference
the
theme
philosophical
main
of
and
an

198

Repetition, and also as a sourcefor the theory of revolutionary desire in

AntiOedipus. The consequenceof this must be, and is, that despite Deleuze's
is
Bergson's
there
philosophy,
of
a significant
extensivecreative appropriation
difference between Bergson's understanding of sociality and that which Deleuze will
in
difference
I
between
Let
think
this
hold.
consists
what
to
propose
me
come
Deleuze and the common tendency of Bergsonian and Tardian social thought:
Deleuze is influenced by their emphasisupon process,especially that of Bergson,
highlights
between
desire
Tarde
the
he
the
relationship
and the
way
and commends
is
For
Deleuze
for
but
Deleuze
too
this
and
negative
not
all
practical
enough.
social,
define
in
it
is
to
the
define
simply
conditions
to
enough
not
which the ego
sociality
A
Bergson
Tarde
thought.
dispersed,
be
greater practicality, even than
and
as
may
that of Bergson, is desired.
I can seetwo main aspectsof this greater intensity of practical disposition in
Deleuzian thought. The first is historically contextual. Deleuze's formative milieu
in the radical 1960sis one in which forces of the constitution of the ego againstits
dispersal,formulated as `conformism', seemto be stronger than ever. In the
`Preface' of Difference and Repetition, one of Deleuze's first attempts at an original
is
life
"modem
by
[we
he
begins
that
that
such
observing
are] confronted
philosophy,
inside
the
repetitions,
stereotypical
most
the
and outside
most mechanical,
with
is
difference
form
The
that
(1994:
this
significant
of
amidst
xviii).
ourselves"
between
identities,
difference
but
traditional
is
pre-established,
thus
not a
modernity
(1994:
In
between
difference
xviii).
sociological terms: what
repetitions
rather a
Deleuze is recognizing is that what is at stakeis not a grand difference among
distinctive individuals with differing philosophies, but a difference made
impersonally and often without even being recognized among already socialized

199

difference,
ie.
`escape'
between
individuals,
small
or
a
variation,
made
single
institutional repetitions. Indeed, this post-war age is an age in which `institutional
institutionally,
lie
Here,
is
high
to
the
seems
social
agenda.
a good part
on
analysis'
for
desires.
Deleuze
the
that
of
the
greater
practicality
response
calling
challenge
of
On the other hand, Michel Foucault, in his introduction to AntiOedipus, hints
deeper
but
`philosophical'
for
or
more
perhaps
reason
at a secondand related,
i

Deleuzian pragmatism. Most projects of institutional analysis, especially in this

impersonal
beyond
the
that
and
quasi-objective,
are
changes
social
period, assume
influence of personal creativity. Although he is inspired by institutional analysis, it
is the peculiarity of Deleuze that he seems,uniquely, to be writing `ethics' (Deleuze
and Guattari 1984: xi-xiv)

It is perhapsmainly for `ethical' reasonsthat Deleuze

.

figure
is
institutional
The
Spinoza
be
analysis.
of
omnipresent
satisfied
with
cannot
in Deleuze's writing and testifies to this Deleuzian desire for a practical and
involves
Institutional
primarily
analysis
a revolutionary resistance
materialist ethics.
kind
is
but
forces
this
of
of
resistance
most
still too potentially
to the
of conformism;
humanist in the sensethat it is still too much involved with political economy as selfFor
himself
Foucault
from
the
these
the
ego.
of
very
reasons
of
view
point
criticism
form
institutional
is
in
involved
heavily
to
that
create
a
of
analysis
attempting
was
further
for
Deleuze
But
`the
than
must
one
go
negative'.
anti-humanist.
explicitly
Deleuze is explicitly concernedin Difference and Repetition to research"a concept
(1994:
difference
xx).
negation"
without
of
In fact, Deleuze's strong interpretation of Foucault's oeuvre is highly
his
his
In
book
Foucault,
Deleuze's
own
project.
of
on
perception
revealing of
Deleuze of course points out the primary distinction in Foucault's early work
between visual knowledge and articulable, linguistic knowledge, and the problem

200

"
that arises:"how could statementsexplain scenes,or scenesillustrate statements?
(1988: 121). According to Deleuze, it is "Foucault's major acheivement" to have
effected a "conversion of phenomenologyinto epistemology" (1988: 109). But
Deleuze goes father and arguesthat the new, discursive-materialist formulation of
the epistemological problematic is, in Foucault's work, particularly in its later
trajectory, governed by the image of a radical exteriority composedof scenesand
statementsfolding into themselvesto createa radical interiority which "condenses
the past...in ways that are not at all continuous but instead confront [the past] with a
future" (1988: 119). As a result, Deleuzethinks there is a certain commonality
betweenhis and Foucault's projects, starting as they do in philosophy, but ending in
for
look
"as
forms
In
Deleuze's
Melville
different
words,
says,
we
quite
of analysis.
be
there
that
no one there and that man's soul will
will
a central chamber, afraid
(who
for
but
immense
looking
terrifying
think
and
void
an
would
of
nothing
reveal
life among the archives?). But at the sametime we try to climb above the strata in
substance'
'non-stratified
that
to
element,
atmospheric
a
order reach an outside, an
forms
how
be
the
two
of knowledge can embraceand
capableof explaining
would
intertwine" (1988: 121. Italics mine.). According to Deleuze, "to be realized in this
different"
(1988:
integrated
becoming
both
122).
and
way means
Becauseof his engagementwith contemporary problems of institutions and of
knowledge, Deleuzian thought opensagain to the problem of social ontology amidst
is
however,
diversity.
This
turn,
closely qualified for Deleuze
conditions of modern
by the Spinozist injunction to critically confront the philosophical hastewhich wants
is
Deleuze
dualism.
It
that
torn betweenthis
to expeditiously overcome
seems
Spinozist doctrine of `caution' (Deleuze 1988c) and Bergson's more optimistic
doctrine of `intuition' (Deleuze 1988a). On the one hand, the need of overcoming

201

dualism without creating a `third term' might be taken to explain certain Deleuzian
formulas. Let us take the assertionthat "social production is purely and simply
desiring-production itself under determinate conditions" (Deleuze and Guattari 1984:
29). The `determinateconditions' might be understood as taking the place of a `third
term' through a direct analysis of their composition which is true simply if it `works'
be
fundamental
difference between
`usefully
'
However,
there
a
would
or
coheres.
this interpretation and Deleuze's more typically Spinozist assertionswhich affirm the
ontological strategy of `univocity-through-parallelism'. A casein point is Deleuze's
famous, rather haunting claim that "there is only desire and the social, and nothing
else" (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 29).
I am not sure that this tension between the Bergsonian and the Spinozist sides
by
is
Deleuze
of
properly explained the caprices of what one might call
`philosophical taste'. I think the difference rather residesin the distinction between
that which is modern and that which is contemporary in the modern. AntiOedipus,
from which these quotations are taken, is in part a document of the time in which one
frustration
diagnostic
the
certain
model and a timely call for a
with
can observea
more positive image of revolutionary movement. But this tendency co-exists with
for
book
link
different
60s and 70s
to
this
tendency,
also
wants
another,very
is
`the
`untimely'
this
and
social',
with
a
again
very
movement
or
revolutionary
`more purely modernist' aspectof the book. AntiOedipus is set againstthe
it
left-wing
But
is
just
'68
the
avant-garde.
not
a responseto
post-May
pessimismof
AntiOedipus
is
of
affairs.
states
also an experiment
a certain set of experiencesand
had
been
developing
in
Deleuze's
that
thought
ontology
on
social
a
certain
view
with
before '68 and essentially since his engagementwith Bergson and Tarde through
Bergson.

202

In AntiOedipus, Deleuze, together with his co-author, Guattari, does not want
between
family
that
the
the
the
to
relation
supposition
psychology of
merely overturn
desireand the constitution of the social can be simply that of a model to a copy.
Theseauthors do not simply want to show that the latter are `complicit'. If that were
true then most of the alternative conceptsthat we find in the book could simply be
explained as deliberately timely products of a contemporary `spirit of
`eccentric
timely
as
rather
an
accidentally
perhaps
product
or
of
experimentation',
`machinic'
But
the
the
of
could not be conceived in this
concept
particularly
minds'.
in
`machinic'
is
There
the
the age of the advent of the
timely
about
nothing
way.
digital revolution. The time in which AntiOedipus is written, the late-60s and early
70s, is precisely the time in which the machine and a machine-centeredmode of
industrial production is being overtaken by the cybernetic model of `post-industrial'
`machinic',
it
back
And
the
though
the
thousandsof
concept
of
yet
goes
production.
figure
deployed
figure
is
of
modernity
and
as
a
as
a
central
of the
years, nevertheless
book.
The figure of the `machinic' appearsin Deleuze's writing whenever there is a
desire.
In addition, the `machinic' involves
the
of
operation
unconscious
question of
is
fully
structure,
and
which
of
connection
a
modern, even
a method of assemblage,
`modernist', productivity-oriented paradigm of object relations. However, in
Deleuzian thinking, the play of assemblagecentral to modernity constitutes a new,
in
is
harmonized
is
desire
What
this
modern
unity
on the one
processualsocial unity.
hand and production involving an open-endednumber of production factors on the
does
Nor
Deleuze
desire
of
attraction.
object
special
needto
some
and
not
other,
`technology'
for
to
to
such
as
concept
account
explanatory
assemblage.
an
appeal
Such notions for Deleuze always carry with them connotationsof anthropocentrism

203

(Deleuzeand Guattari 1984: 4). They again only revert to assumingwhat must be
humans
doctrine
`rational
'
The `machinic'
that
the
as
are
such
animals.
explained,
is, therefore, on one level, introduced in AntiOedipus as an alternative to the
humanistic model of psychic interiority. But the providing of an `alternative' is not
its whole purpose. For Deleuze theory is never just a question of `getting it right', of
adaptingone's premisesto correspondmore accurately with reality. Rather, only if
background
Deleuze's
the
ontological
of
social
entry onto this
we understand
his
deployment
fully
can
understand
we
of a concept such as the
sociological stage
`machinic'.
For this there is a very specific reasonof hidden intellectual genealogy. Let
idea
`machinic'
is
begin
the
the
that
the
of
proposition
related to the classical
with
us
sociological stugglesagainst psychology's tendency to grant an ontological privilege
to the individual. From this perspective,what would be at stake in the concept of the
`machinic', given Deleuze's `rivalrous' relationship with sociology? What is at stake
is that it allows Deleuze and Guattari to formula their intuition of a desirewithout
break
Deleuze
This
to
a
complete
allow
make
will
with the appealsto
attraction.
Bergson's
Two
Sources.
in
This
to
turn will allow
of
mysticism
charismaand
Deleuze to steerontology back towards an `affective materialism'. At the sametime,
through the concept of the `machinic' Deleuze will have found the material he needs
desire
`revolutionary'
formulate
than that of Tarde. The
concept of
to
a more
demand
in
circumstances
such
a
concept
contemporary
ethical
order to
and
practical
break out of the recuperationsof the time by rediscovering the `untimely' element of
`revolutionary'
keep
in
have
Of
term
the
to
scare quotes,as
we
course,
modernity.
Deleuze does, becauseof this untimely way that machinic desire producesthe social.
And this clears up a minor mystery that has gathered around Deleuze's vehement

204

opposition to the notion that the `machinic' and other such conceptsare mere
`alternative metaphors'. For truly, in severing desire from attraction Deleuze will
have no further needto indulge in inspirational temporal metaphorsof contemporary
`social space'. The time and spaceof desire will have become much more anarchic
than ever before.
The Horde
The central significance of Deleuze's social thought is that while he finds a
in
for
to
the
the
theorizing
eliminate
unconscious
need
way
social theory to supply
social descriptions of `the actual' - understood here as knowledge basedin the
relation between past social `reality' and prescriptions for actions toward the future
`state' of the social, or `knowledge seekingjudgement, ' in short - in the samestroke
he begins to createa theory that might becomeadequateto the `immanence' or the
`pure operation' of the social consideredontologically which had first appearedto
Durkheim as an inexplicably persistant `externality', a fact upon which Durkheim
had founded sociology. With his focus upon the intensity of pre-consciousaffects
figural,
Deleuze's
the
social thought presentsa novel solution to the
vis-a-vis
arising
impassein Durkheim's social thought between `the actual' and `the metaphysical'.
Deleuzian philosophy is shot through with implications for sociology, and this has
for
though
perhaps
good reason. At the time of
gone completely unrecognized,
Deleuze's main writings perceptionsof reification dominate the concernsof radical
social thinkers. The reception of any thinker who could explicitly claim that the first
is
"to
facts
basic
social
consider
of
sociology
rule
as things", as Durkheim
and most
did, is understandablyat a very low ebb (1982: 60).
Tarde's critique of Durkheimian `reification' had been formulated from the
point of view of attraction. Tarde wondered what attractedtogether the primitive

205

had
been
Durkheim
taking simply as given facts. Durkheim's response
that
groups
to sucha question was to posit a spontaneousgenesis of a horde, which was for him
a more or less accidental group madeup of similar individuals. This was a weak
moment in Durkheim's thinking. Where Durkheim's theory was provocative and
where it made a lasting contribution to social thought was with his theory of
V

modernization according to which, given these primal groups, individuals

neverthelesslose their affiliations to them by losing their similarities and becoming
unconsciously affected by their remaining differences, not through internal strife, but
inter-group
through
primarily
competition and the consequent`division of labour' or
specialization. Durkheim thus attemptsto explain social facts by reference only to
other social facts, and he believes that successin this implies successin establishing
the autonomy of sociology. From this point of view, he had no option but to respond
obtusely to Tarde's criticisms, and to prefer to simply assertthe premise of `the
horde.' The premise of `the horde' is formulated as such precisely becauseit relies
not at all upon individual psychology.
But Deleuzian thought exposesDurkheim's error as one of ambiguity.
Durkheim's `horde' - the formless `germ' from which the mechanical solidarity of
the clan emerges- is neverthelessan extended,spatially-homogenoushorde, a
`solid' one basedupon relatively stable numbers (1984: 126-131). As Durkheim puts
it, "otherwise [these segments]would become so lost in one another as to vanish"
(1984: 128). Taken together in its spatial and social senses,then, this could only
is
horde
that
autochthonousor immediately territorial. To be sure, in
mean a
chaptersone and two abovewe did not need a Deleuzian conceptual framework in
is
Durkheim's
to
that
thought
see
weakenednot so much becauseof his
order
dogmatic methodological pronouncementsbut rather becauseof his hasty premises

206

boundaries.
Durkheim's
is
thought
social
weak becausehe felt it
regardingoriginary
despite
its
distort
his
to
the
tendency
to
to
metaphor
of
solidarity
stick
was necessary
social ontological analysis, especially with respect to so-called `early' societies. But
Deleuze's thought is indispensible when one wants in a more detailed way to account
for why the formless, unboundedgerm of society, a rhizome, neednot be supposedto.
have, asDurkheim supposedit to have, at the sametime no unity and a
"supplementary dimension" or a "comprehensive secretunity" in which it exists as a
ie.
(Deleuze
Guattari
1988: 6). By
clan
a
potential
and
root,
as
radicle or potential
its
from
horde
the
attribute
of
ambiguous
non-unity/secret-unity,
with
positing
Deleuzian thought we can infer that Durkheim attempted to by-passthe question of
the unity of the primal clan and of mechanicalassemblage. Indeed, Durkheim's
tactic here gives the impressionthat Durkheim is devaluing the social criterion of
in
favour
of a more scientific approachto the explanation of the origins of
unity
has
But
Durkheim
to supplementthis obscure explanation straight
then
society.
kind
by
to
the
a
of proto-typical spiritual reality or collective
clan
away granting
is
intellectual
In
there
a
strange
symbiosis here which
conscience. other words,
denial
in
includes
thought
the
a
and an affirmation of unity.
same
somehow
In A Thousand PlateausDeleuze and Guattari claim that "the abortionists of
because
doctores
indeed
they affirm a properly
angelici,
angel makers,
unity are
insight
is
6).
But
(1988:
this
perhaps
mainly available to
angelic and superior unity"
those who have indeed searchedfor such a unity. For, to be sure, with Tarde and
Foucault, and againstDurkheim, Deleuze himself, between Difference and
Repetition and A ThousandPlateauscan be understood as searchingfor nonby
that
are
nevertheless
characterized
social
analysis
of
nonsubjective units
both
Tarde
Durkheim,
Deleuze
Against
and
wanted to reject the strategy
extension.

207

of using a metaphor to convey to whatever non-extended social agency that will be

found a merely symbolic status. With Spinoza, Deleuze is a affective realist and a
is
Spinozist
for
However,
thinking
to
the
purely
unable
account
materialist.
developmentof a paradigm of productivity and the consequentcoming into necessity
of a conceptualconvergencebetween society and modernity. As usual, it is Bergson
that comesto the aid of Deleuze. Deleuze and Guattari would explain this in A
ThousandPlateaus.

In Bergson there is a distinction between numerical or extended

multiplicities

and qualitative or durational multiplicities.

We are doing

approximately the same thing when we distinguish between arborescent

multiplicities

and rhizomatic multiplicities.

micromultiplicities.

Between macro- and

On the one hand, multiplicities

that are extensive,

divisible, and molar; unifiable, totalizable, organizable; conscious or

preconscious - and on the other hand, libidinal, unconscious, molecular,
intensive multiplicities

(1988: 33).

It is on the basis of this distinction betweentypes of multiplicities that Deleuze and

Guattari propose their breakthrough figures of the machinic and the rhizome.
But is Deleuze and Guattari's `rhizome', for example, simply a new `horde', a
disavowed
unity, a new model-in-waiting-for-formation? Unfortunately,
secret
new
I do not have the spaceto fully addressthis question here, but we can note that this is
is
by
deploying
Deleuze
to
Bergson's
concerned
avoid
precisely and explicitly what
distinction betweentypes of multiplicities. The `rhizome', like the `machinic' in
AntiOedipus, is not intended as a model. A model is precisely an idea which may or

208

design
its
be
is
then
and
extension;
contingency
given
not
extrinsic rather than
may
intrinsic. According to Deleuze, unity and universality are only contingents,but the
latter are, however, necessarilyextracted from what is at hand. This does not
decreasetheir contingency, but it conditions it. Or, better yet, as Deleuze and
Guattari put it in A ThousandPlateaus,uniquenessis that which is subtracted from
be
in
to
constituted
events (1988: 6). So, for example,the
whatever multiplicities are
clan is not, as Durkheim seemsto suggest,an accidental, additional, or supplemental
from
horde.
Rather,
the clan's
arose
a
prior
somehow,
somewhere
given which
be
thought
propose
should
only
contingency- one could now
of as a uniqueness
itself
constitutes,not only potentially or to the extent that it is
clan
each
which
in
future
differentiating
functionally
a
which is far away, but rather
capableof
in
future
is
through
a
need
which
always at hand. For one
actually and necessarily
for
`clan'
the sake of a neededcollective
that
the
or
group
exists
only
could say
ie.
for
to
allow
multiple modesof voice to addresstogether a future
enunciation,
form
by
is
is
the
shared
problems
given
which
critical
and
clan
compelled to
which
face with directnessand immediacy.
Thus, the solution to Durkheim's problem, though Deleuze does not refer to
this problem as such, is neverthelesstangible for Deleuze via Bergson.. It lies in the
theory of what we could call -I would provide a definition here to remain within the
illustrate
in
horde,
to
theory
a
point
non-extended
order
social
whose
of
ambit
-a
be
is
to
than
actively critical of certain overgeneralized and
unity no more
by
boundaries
instead
hidden
not
affirming
a
new
or
more
external
apparently
interiority such as a reflected and opinionated self but rather a particular, practical,
What
here
is
outside
continuity.
we
are
speaking
of
not an entity,
problem-centered,

209

then, but rather the theory of an act of exteriorizing creative disorganization implied
and fostered in every actual event of collectivization.
There are more than fanciful reasons for such a reading of Deleuze.
Durkheim posited a `horde' which, given his aims and his evolutionary framework,
he could be satisfied with defining as an amorphous `primitive'

group. Given the

distinction
between types of multiplicities
Bergson's
new
rigorous requirements of
and his conception of creative or open evolution, it is logical for Deleuze to turn
himself to investigate `the horde'. But this time what will be investigated will not be
a horde in the sense of a primitive group. It will rather be a horde in the sense of a
`crowd' or `mass', a horde that can be fully relevant in modernity. What is now of
interest is a horde in immediate relation to an unbridled modern process of
horde
`body',
in
the process of forming, one
as
a
pre-territorial
one
a
production,
body
is
In
"a
organized.
short,
such
without organs is not an empty
not
yet
which
body stripped of organs, but a body upon which that which serves as organs... is
distributed according to crowd phenomena... in the form of molecular multiplicities"
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 30).

So `the horde' will have to be for Deleuze a `body of the crowd' or a `full
body', and be situated in direct relation to production. In this way, the `horde' is also
a zone of sociality, or a `socius'. For one needsto account for that which appearsto
is
how
that
since
organized production
miraculously create organizedproduction,
ie.
According
to Deleuze, however,
to
given.
as
an
accidental
subjects,
new
appears
this solution of `the given', along with its potential for a favourable reception among
`good
common sense' and/or a symmetrically critical reception among
of
subjects
be
in
favour
to
radicals,
ought
revolutionary
rejected
of a conception
unreconstructed
is
Deleuze
process.
rhizomatic
often particularly uncompromising in
of unconscious

210

his stanceagainst what he takes to be vulgar radicalism and what he seesas its
"if
knows
In
Deleuze's
the
words,
unconscious
negation.
central method, namely,
is
in
is
because
it
the unconscious, only
there
nothing
negative
nothing of negation,
indefinite moves toward and away from zero, which does not at all expresslack but
(Deleuze
body
Guattari
full
the
as
support
and
prop"
the
and
positivity of
rather
1988: 31). Negation is often valued among radicals for the way it is able, if applied
is
illusion
that
the
to
social
reality
madeup of atomsthat can
to reifications, expose
be known with certainty, ie. that have no mediating and thus potentially controversial
Guattari,
`horde'
be
Deleuze
For
between
the
them.
and
can
neither
relationships
in
fashion.
Durkheimian
It
be
isolation
in
can
only
postulated
nor
analysed
`founding
`true
by
the
the
mythology',
perception of
examined carefully penetrating
But
the
false
primitive
social
group.
call
also, one of the
we
movement' which
a
interesting aspectsof this theory of the social body is that it brings the social question
back into the context of the question of senseand away from the context of the
questionof certainty.
A `non-extendedhorde', though it is not named as such, is the focus of
Deleuze and Guattari's analysis of the question of social substanceinasmuch as the
latter is analytically prior to that which may become perceived as given, certain,
divine, and autochthonous. The `non-extendedhorde,' if it is not `the One' socius, is
because
`the
is
Many'
Many'
`the
either,
a multiplicity
people
of
or a sheermass
not
One'
its
function
`the
dividing.
by
determined
to
is
and
of
reference
that ultimately
Rather, "it is only the category of multiplicity, used as a substantiveand going
beyond both the One and the many, beyond the predicative relation of the One and
desiring-production
for
desiring-production:
is
pure
that
account
can
the many,
is
irreducible
is
that
to
to
that
any sort of unity"
an
affirmation
say,
multiplicity,

211

(Deleuzeand Guattari 1984: 42). The `horde', then, in Deleuze's thinking, can be
defined as a non-extended,indeterminate, but substantive `social multiplicity'.

It is

the substanceof desiring-production.

AntiOedipus and Postmodernism
Is there any `deeperreason' for this `return to the horde'? I think the reason
is primarily that Deleuze, together with Guattari, cannot be satisfied with Bergson's
final
importance
`open
'
is
becauseDeleuze
This
the
to
of
society.
conclusion as
further
for
like
him
for
the
think
to
of
ethical
conditions
practice,
which
as
would
Guattari involves boundary issuesand therefore also thinking again in terms which
ie.
in
boundaries,
social-ontological terms. Deleuze and Guattari want
problematize
in no way to assumeboundaries,particularly territorial, group boundariesbasedon a
family model. But, tellingly, they will also have nothing to do with or say about
Mark
Seem,
in
`mutual
his introduction to
self-care'.
of
alternative models
AntiOedipus, suggeststhat such a anarchic system of care, basedon `personalenergy
implicit
for
be
in
Deleuzian
model
could
an
collectivity
control',
under personal
thinking (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: xxii). Let us supposethis meansthat this care
is defined as a processthat takes place between single personsor agentswho are
defined by the needsand desiresof their extendedbodies. Such an interpretation of
Deleuze would involve an unfortunate error. Even if one could remain on this
level,
interpretive'
have
difficulty
in
`politically
one
probably
would
great
superficial
(p.
between
171)
distinction
for
I
Deleuzianthe
the
above
mentioned
accounting
Tardian social philosophy of the single social agent and the microsociologies with
`the
focus
between',
`the
the
mutual'
to
or
upon
such as
sameagentswhich
respect
interactionist sociology.

212

But secondly, and more seriously, one would miss the more subtle distinction
betweenthe social philosophies of Deleuze and Tarde. The Tardian conception of
the social is of a quasi-tragic struggle against the family for the purpose of
establishingnon-hierarchically-basedcultural customs. The Deleuzian conception
seemsto refer to the samestruggle, and Deleuze seemsto add only the emphasisthat
this is always a struggle againstthe `family within the self.' But this is simply not
true: the social referent is not exactly the samefor the two thinkers. If Tarde
idea
be
that
the
social
rejected
progress
could
critically
conceived
and
challenged
into
by
to
taking
solidarity
needs
of
reference
without
account
and organized solely
the significance of new group models createdby new attractions, Deleuze, following
Bergson, rather challengesboth sides of this equation. Bergson challengedthe idea
that social configurations must have boundarieswhich are ultimately extendedand
closed, and that social relations are static subject-object relations vis-a-vis these
boundaries. Bergson challengesrepresentationin sociology. Deleuze goes further
than Bergson. Deleuze challengesnot so much the representationalidea that
boundariesinvolve `closure' and `exclusion' as the defeatist idea that it is not
possible to conceive of social groups ontologically and outside of a critique of social
representations.
This attitude of Deleuze's makesit difficult to situate his thought in relation
intellectual
influential
the
movement of his own time, and
to what was perhaps
most
leader,
be
`postmodernism'.
Since
he
to
thought
namely,
a
often
was
of which
`postmodernism' is a confusing term that has been used in many different contexts to
let
field
down
different
the
to
narrow
phenomena,
us
and/or
events
and
refer vastly
be
inhabit
`postmodernism'
to
the core of the
that
which
might
said
take only
form
it
is
has
if
from
that
thinking
a
movement
of
which
evolved
movement -

213

Heideggerianthought where the term might be said to have its greatest senseof
polemical relation to the western philosophical and cultural tradition tout court.
Heideggeriandeconstructionbegins with an attempt to correlate `use' and the `being
there' of the using subject in a way which problematizes human Being as a purported
in
The
totalitarianism
the mid-20th-century then causesan
problem
of
universal.
descriptive
to
this
make
a
of
attempt
phenomenology work to
abandonment
illuminate the conditions of a `fundamental' ontology. Indeed, it is not the project of
`fundamentalontology' so much as the way the latter is linked with a method of
descriptive phenomenologythat becomesstrategically suspectin the post-war period.
This is evident in the fact that deconstructionends by eschewing description
`re-thinking
that
continually
proposing
community' will lead to an
altogether and
avowal of the complexity of a `justice' that will in turn constrain intelligent social
individuals to a tolerant disposition.
The problem is that Deleuze's approachoften seemsto sharemore of an
later
Heidegger. This is true in a
the
the
than
the
of
method
early
rather
affinity with
very specific sense: that Deleuze and the early Heidegger tend to focus most of their
`the
great Kantian error' which consists in assuming that the
attention
upon
critical
is
useful only as an meansof the verification or
of
phenomena
appearance
falsification of knowledge. Knowledge is madeup of claims which imply a
judgement that certain realities and certain accompanying modes of criticism can be
defined for `everyone'. Now, in my view, with the early Heidegger, Deleuze's
interest lies not so much in `representation'per se as in how the question of
knowledge can be transformed into the more productive question of how notions
`use'
Moreover,
Deleuze arguably takes
to
of
may
phenomena
vary.
respect
with
this line of thinking to a more logical conclusion than that of mere `deconstruction'.

214

For eventhough the end of deconstruction might seemethically justifiable such a

is
because
it
dubious
intelligence,
dubious.
It
highly
presupposes
path remains
in
socialization, and variation the technical means of society. I often get the
impressionthat such categoriesare, as a result, more compartmentalizednow than
the statethey were in before Heidegger published Being and Time. This is what
interestsme in the Deleuzian position: the distinction betweenDeleuze and postHeideggerianthinking lies precisely in that Deleuze acceptsthat sociality requires
that we discussnot only community but also how social relations must vary
in
how
has
technical
the
means,
and
a
variations
concept
with
concommittantly
central role only as a pragmatic crystallization of this relation.
To be sure, comparisonsbetween Deleuze and Heidegger are only
beginning
in
Heidegger's
Even
the
project was still one of
comparisons.
`fundamental' ontology - it was still primarly oriented to investigating the
`grounding' of ways of being. Due to Bergson's influence, Deleuze, together with
Guattari, is always primarily interestedin `the intuition of the actual'. Indeed,
Deleuze well observedhis own contemporary circumstancesin which he along with
discrediting
final
the
and
complete
of sociologism and a
everyone else witnessed
20th-century
'
In
including
for
`alternative
to
thinkers,
most
contrast
models.
need
Heidegger, Deleuze rejected intellectual elitism. Deleuze refused to dismiss the
`idle
him
`ideology'
talk', or as screensthat are
or
as
academicconversationsaround
`unfortunately necessary'to control the intensity of the feelings which connect us
did
believe
Deleuze
filters
that
simply
not
society.
such
or
with other membersof
definition
in
included
be
Deleuze
the
of
a
modem
society.
necessarily
should
media
did not becomea `60s thinker. '

215

Nonetheless,Deleuze believed in the development of socially-informed

for
key
Deleuze
But
the
to the advancementin such philosophy is not to
philosophy.
first formulate the conditions in which `mutual self-care' might be possible in the
midst of a horde that one posits as a `masssociety' which swings wildly between
anarchyand total control. Rather, following the Tardian dictum not to take social
but
in
for
also view of the error that Tarde made by hastily
ontology
granted,
family
is
theory
the
the
of
model,
espousing
what therefore important for Deleuze is
to formulate and explore the horde itself, or pre-familial and pre-individual social
reality. In their social thought Deleuze and Guattari are interested in `the actual'
particularly as a construct of anarchic and yet strangely consistent `hordic thinking'.
Since such collectivity-based thinking is the key to the creation of all socially-useful
higher-order concepts,Deleuzian philosophy has to be said to be essentially a social
furthermore
its
takes
and
one
which
point of departure from an implicit
philosophy,
critique of Durkheimian sociology.
Thus, with Deleuze, sociology well and truly meets its rival, philosophy, and
it is a meeting point at which one can no longer be surejust exactly in what their
has
`affiliation'
Is
line
Deleuze's
consisted.
of thinking `post-modern' or
previous
`pre-modern'? Deleuzian thought intimately involves a social ontology
horde'
`non-extended
that
of a
which affectively conditions first
characterizableas
individually-useful
then
concepts, a way of thinking and being
our
sociallyand
our
that animatesthe tribe as much as it swarmsin the flows of capital. As Deleuze and
Guattari would put it, "it cannot be said that the previous formations did not foresee
this Thing that only came from without by rising from within, and that at all costs
had to be prevented from rising" (Deleuze and Guattari 1984: 153). By thus
basic
transforming
sociology's
most
premise, the premise of the primitive
critically

216

`the
in
this
terms of revolutionary
of
an
analysis
actual'
with
group, and combining
`desiring-production', Deleuzian thought exposesboth the absurdity but no lessthe
intuition
Durkheimian
delirious
social ontology.
of
uncanny,
The Actual and the Virtual

Bergson formulated metaphysicsas the desire to intuit reality directly, as "the

(1999:
Since
dispense
24).
this `reality' is thus
to
that
symbols"
with
claims
science
itself,
time
and since the movement of time involves the
the substantialmovement of
future as well as the past and the present,intuition bears more precisely upon what
future
be
included
in
`the
the
the actual even
to
may
since
actual',
we ought call
though the future is not included in anything we can call reality. Rather than oppose
the future and reality, Bergson includes the future in the actual. For the future is the
is
in
from
that
the
the processof
time
only
view
of
point
of
which
movement of
actualizing, and not of that which simply might actualize, since such `possibilities'
in
included
But
by
definition
time.
the
this raisesanother
of
movement
not
are
between
is
the
coherenceor co-existence,and
relationship
question,namely, what
how
How
co-exist,
can these apparently regular patternsof
the actual?
can anything
is
if
future
for
life,
future
is
the
the
the
a
part
of
exist,
actual,
since
example,
of
social
future
is,
in
fact,
itself
the
the
since
and
extension,
non-extended
shape
undetermined
from the point of view of time? The answerthat Deleuze finds in Bergson is, on one
level, quite simply deduced: co-existenceis not the form of the determined or a
`relatively solid' snapshotof the frozen but rather comesto eachco-existing form
from without. It is a zone of indeterminacy. But at the sametime it arisesfrom
`full'
indeterminacy
the
the
rich
or
of the
actual, since
within the movement of
inasmuch
is
involved
dawns
in
only
as
each
upon
each
actual
other's existence
leaves
having
Bergson
the
thus
scene
usefully provided an outline of a
movement.

217

decentredsociology, one without a group and without a self, one which focusses,
for
Deleuze,upon the nature of an `open society of creators' (1988a:
productively,
111).
What Bergson allows for, but does not follow up, is a thinking of variation in
key
formation.
Deleuze
takes
the
step of linking social formations with the
social
desiring-production.
`The
in
AntiOedipus, becomes`the
actual',
variations of
machinic.' After Bergson `the actual' can finally be organized ontologically in terms
of a virtuality which is no longer merely `the whole' but rather includes the future
in
is
Implicit
Deleuzian
thinking
the
actual.
a `non-extendedhorde' which is
within
the virtual principle of social co-existencewhich `organizes' the actual. The `nonbody'
but
horde'
is
`full
a
one precisely `without organs'. That is to say
extended
that it exists prior to the organization efforts of individuals. This intuition of
Durkheim was correct: "there is not one of all the single centers of consciousness
body
the
of the nation, to whom the collective current is not
make
great
up
who
almost wholly exterior, since each contains only a spark of it" (1966: 316). The
problem is that Durkheim, following the model of other sciences,too-hastily
attributed extension to this `body', such as this `national' extension. The theory of
the non-extendedhorde allows one to perceive,without compromising and in fact
through enhancing the point of view of the actual, how organization, along with the
`external social patterns' of organization-over-time, and therefore the appearanceof
`social externality, ' is actually immanent in the horde. Every organization arises
from within the horde in responseto the problems of a desirewhich has not yet any
body which is distinct enoughtto `attract' it or guide it `from beyond its own
horizons', since at this stageit has no `horizons'. What is at stake are the problems
desire
inventing
the
the
time
are
at
same
problems
a
which
of
of
coping machines.

218

Thus, by meansof the Bergsonian analysis of time, the actual is able to

becomes
beyond
But
totality.
the
of
problem
what
progress
of central importance is
the way the theory of the actual and the virtual is able to exhibit, in real time, our
curiously modem and machinic mode of co-existence. This is the mode of coexistencethat Durkheim first called attention to in the Division of Labour in Society,
in which Durkheim showedthat modem social reality lies precisely and positively in
division, structure, and connection. To be sure, a significant part of the aim of
Deleuze and Guattari in AntiOedipus is to show how the figure of the `machinic'
involves a critique of the Freudian concept of the death drive, the psychological
conception according to which "desire can be made to desire its own repression"
(1984: 105). Freudian theory is a useful starting point for Deleuze and Guattari in
AntiOedipus. But their framework of analysis is simultaneously anti-psychologistic
for
them, conversely, the discovery that "social
enables,
anti-sociologistic,
which
and
desiring-production
are one and the same" (Deleuze and Guattari
production and
1984: 116).
It might be objected that Deleuze formulates such a radical social theory that
it is far too divorced from reality to be of any use to working philosophers and
interpretation
Here
the
of Deleuze of Alain Badiou is
recently popular
sociologists.
ironic.
Badiou's revisionist reading of Deleuze is that Deleuze
pertinent, and rather
is actually much more conservativethan most observersthink, since, according to
him, "Deleuze's fundamental problem is most certainly not to liberate the multiple
but to submit thinking to a renewedconcept of the One" (2000: 10). To be sure, as
in
Spinozism
is
Deleuzian
have
thinking, and the
there
of
a
strong
element
seen,
we
in
from
One
Deleuze
Spinoza. Thus, all "those who
the
comes
precisely
concept of
for
is
Deleuze
everything
a
whom
celebrate
event, surprise,and creation
naively

219

[forget] that the multiplicity of `what-occurs' is but a misleading surface, becausefor

is
]
`Being
in
[in
Deleuze's
the
thought,
unique
words,
event
which all
veritable
(2000:
According
10).
is
Badiou,
"it
to
one
another"'
eventscommunicatewith
therefore necessaryto maintain that Deleuze's philosophy is particularly systematic
in that all the impulsions are taken in by it according to a line of power that is
invariable precisely becauseit fully assumesits status of singularity. This is why, in
described
it
be
(2000:
16). Thus,
as
an
abstract
philosophy"
can
also
my view,
...
from Badiou's point of view, for example, one would read Deleuze and Guattari's
What is Philosophy? as a clarification of a philosophy which was all along a
I
indeed
be
think
that.
than
some
such
assertion
never
more
would
philosophy and
in
entailed Badiou's argument.
I agreewith one of the key implications of Badiou's reading, namely that it
is
`early
be
there
to
an
socially-concerned Deleuze' and a
suppose
erroneous
would
`late purely philosophical Deleuze' which can be significantly contrastedwith one
is
because
Badiou
Deleuze was
However,
that
this
claim
would
whereas
another.
in
his
"ethics
(2000:
16), I would rather
thought"
of
an
of
pursuit
single-minded
in
Deleuze's
the
writing as strategical variations stemming from
variations
explain
between
in
Deleuze's
tension
philosophy and sociology. I think Badiou
the
work
ignorance
his
to
apparent
of the sociological side of
makes a seriesof errors related
Deleuze's work. Of most concernis that, becauseBadiou missesDeleuze's implicit
Deleuze's
interest
in
he
that
theory,
supposes
non-extended
engagementwith social
flux is merely indicative of a philosophical taste for `the abstract', or as Badiou
defines the latter, for the "quasi-organic consistencyof conceptual connections"
(2000: 16). This, perhapstogether with his observation of Deleuze's apparently
leads
is
Badiou
Deleuze
kind
lifestyle,
to
that
then
suppose
simply
a
of stoic.
ascetic

220

For `stoics' are concernedprecisely with a philosophy of death, and Badiou thinks an
is
to
attraction such a philosophy exactly what explains the appearancein Deleuze's
thinking of the `categoryof the outside' which is necessarily correlated with a nondeath
is,
"For
"
in
impersonal
Badiou's reckoning "above all
exteriority.
extended
intimately
is
individual
it
to
the
that
most
simultaneously
related
which
else,
affects
impersonality
in
or exteriority to this individual. In
and a relationship of absolute
this sense,it is thought, for thinking consistsprecisely in ascetically attaining that
impersonal
is
by
individual
is
the
transfixed
that
the
exteriority
where
equally
point
his or her authentic being" (2000: 12).
What a strangeirony that Badiou should raise his voice in the period of
denouementof the Deleuzian oeuvre only to make a pronouncementupon Deleuzian
from
exactly that which was the point of view against philosophy of turnphilosophy
here
`thinking'
What
Badiou
is
in fact nothing more
calls
sociology!
of-the-century
`thinking
Durkheimian
the
than
the social.' Moreover, it
model
of
and nothing other
it
basic
forgotten
Durkheim
be
in
that
the
text
to
this
produced
was
who
seems
Suicide
(1966)
had
lengthy
the expresspurpose of
on
monograph
which
a
regard:
by
the
the
the
theory
of
ontological
externality
social
of
arguing that the
supporting
latter's limit-case and final proof residesin the phenomenonof extreme selfhave
held,
Guattari
Can
Deleuze
really
all along, the point of view
and
abnegation.
Deleuze
Guattari
in
Quite
Certainly
death?
to
the
and
contrary,
stated
not.
of
AntiOedipus that "the subject-groupalways invents mortal formations that exorcize
(1984:
And
instinct"
it
death
in
xxii).
even more simply several
the effusion
of a
kind
"eve
death
drive"
in
Plateaus:
later,
A
Thousand
are
not
evoking
any
of
years
(1988: 229).

221

But perhapssuch quotations are not enough to persuadea tenacious reader

such as Badiou. Perhapsonly a more full clarification of Deleuze's relation to
Durkheim would enablea real refutation of Badiou's interpretation of Deleuze. In
fact, I believe this must be so. For we needto know precisely why Deleuze would be
against such an interpetation of his own thought. For this one must begin, as we
have, by examining Deleuze's connection with Bergsonian post-sociology. And the
have
in
as
we
must
answer,
seen,
reside the contrast between two basic elements.
Firstly, we have seenDurkheim's marriage-influenced model of social ontology in
which the externality of the social is proved by reference to obligation, denoting a
`reality principle' by which is explained the rest of social organization including
`love' or desire-as-attraction. Is this that far from Badiou's position? Secondly, we
have seenthe way Deleuze and Guattari, by following out and problematizing the
Tardian critique of resemblance,turn Durkheimian sociology on its head by
analysing first the necessarycollective production of `the actual', as can be
dynamic
horde,
in
they
argue,
only
within
a
conceived,
relation to which attractive
bodies, love, and capital appearonly as contingent, symptomatic, or derivative
is
do
here
All
I
can
point out the significant difference betweenwhat
productions.
Deleuze and Guattari have expresslyproduced by way of social theory. But indeed
for
it
is
impossible
basis
that
me to agreewith Badiou, who, due to his
alone
on
immanent
their
critique of sociology, seemsto supposethat their work
of
neglect
constitutes no more than a prolonged philosophical contemplation of the main
problematic of Durkheim's sociology.
Conclusion
What is Philosophy may appearto turn away from the earlier, more socially
it,
Deleuzeseemsto summarily dismiss sociology by declaring it
In
relevant work.

222

But
par
excellance.
rival
modern
careful attention to the implications
philosophy's
how
the subsequenttrajectory of Deleuze's thought
to
of such a claim and
implications,
least
testifies
these
the
to
to the impossibility of
at
very
corresponds
such a dismissal. As even Badiou correctly points out, a concern with the `outside'
later
in
implied,
However,
does
this
that
work.
even
remains
not changeor diminish
the fact that in the earlier work the constitution of an outside, as analysedin
Deleuze's book on Foucault, is linked more explicitly with revolutionary, antibecoming
social, such as we seewith the figure of the
of
ways
psychologistic
in
machinic AntiOedipus. Figures such as the machinic are in Deleuze's work social
in
diagonal
lines
throughout
societies
ramify
which
particulars
which leave no
become
the object of a projection of essenceor origin.
then
could
which
remainder
The machinic is precisely not an essenceor origin of modernity but is just simply one
impersonal
modesof assemblage. Perhapswhat makesthis
plural,
of modernity's
difficult to seeis that the connectionbetweenthis kind of pluralistic philosophy and
the premisesof classical sociology, by the time of the writing of AntiOedipus, have
been largely forgotten. Even in the works of the late sixties and early seventiesthe
between
the outside and the classical sociological problematic of the
connection
by
is
ignored
the
virtually everyone.
social
externality of
But let us point the blame more specifically at what seemsto be a certain
inattention in the social theoretical and philosophical communities to the influence of
Bergson upon Deleuze. Bergson's inconclusive struggle with Durkheimian
into
Deleuze's
be
to
seen
carry
over
clearly
work. In contrastto
can
sociologism
Bergson's contemplation of a needfor an `open society', Deleuze was able to
As
Deleuze
the
society.
said of Foucault, with whom he felt
open
theorize
notion of
less
is
key
"speak
Open
the
to
the
than of the Outside" (1988:
of
a strong affinity,

223

113). Herein is announced the key, implicit distinction between the post-messianic
fully
Bergson
the
modern perspective aimed at by Deleuze and
and
perspective of
Foucault. Deleuze himself had begun to theorize the outside already in Difference
and Repetition and then together with Guattari, by reappraising Tardian social
it
of the tendency to metaphorize the open space of creative
and
purging
philosophy
imitation, and by examining instead the specific unconscious operations by which
`openness' is the collective production of the actual, or the production of an
impersonal field of forces. In contrast to Tarde's mere suggestiveness, Deleuzian
thought effectively replaces what Durkheim could only pose as a doctrine of the
`externality of the social'. What arises in its place is an analysis, inspired by but
how
intuition
Bergson,
beyond
the
of
specific movements of intelligence,
of
going
forces
technical
productive
operate together along what are only
socialization, and
desire
trajectories
of
and the social. Together, they produce a
apparently opposed
synthesis: an outside which is seized immediately as it appears, seized as a virtual
but no less urgent reality, as an ordinary rather than an exemplary source of
by
and through each actor as an moderating and stimulating intuition of
sustenance,
co-existence with others within the actual.

224

CONCLUDING CHAPTER

SOCIAL NEED AS OCCUPATIONAL:

TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY ONTOLOGY
OF MODERN SOCIAL TIME AND SPACE

The trajectory Durkheim-Tarde-Bergson-Deleuzetakes us through three major

following
from
the
the
social
ontology,
one
of
upon
other:
provenance
on
positions
the deductive approach(pure sociology), to the discovery of limited universals
(social models), to the project of conceiving fully-ramifying particulars (figures).
There is one transformation that links them all together: the movement from a
doctrine or relatively passivenotion of social externality towards a more active social
image of the outside. In this final chapter I shall attempt to work toward an analysis
based
the
upon the elementsof this movement, of a
principles,
of
main
of some
time
and space.
social
of
modern
ontology
contemporary
This takes me back to my starting point: the notion of occupation in
Durkheim. For like him, I seein the movementof modernity a glimpse of the key to
the movement of social ontogenesis. However, the movement of modernity that I
his
he
`increasing
is
theory
the
the
presents
with
of
as
what
same
perceive not at all
be
It
type
the
the
mechanical
of
solidarity.
organic
over
will
preponderance'of
how
different
is
it
I
to
conception
my
of
show
modernity
now
and
as
see
necessary
-

225

how different it must be after reading Tarde, Bergson, and Deleuze - from that of
Durkheim. For the outcome of this reading might be mistaken for a theory, for
example,of a new modern archetypethat would simply be an improved alternative to
that of Durkheim's conception of organic solidarity. The transformation from the
image
to
a
more
positively
externality
responsible
a
of
perceived
of the
notion
outside might indeed be tempting to presentas an archetype embeddedin our
collective unconsciousperhapsas a result of a political revolution or some other
it
difficult
for
kind
for
to
account
might
seem
otherwise
of
event,
a nonmajor
for
how
this non-empiricality is precisely what is
to
account
empirical repetition, and
issue
here.
at
However, archetypes,though in themselvesnon-empirical, are nevertheless
in
behavioral,
be
to
some
combination
of
manifested
cultural, and
supposed
is
development.
I
What
think
essentialabout modernity is rather the birth
conceptual
is
kind
related to the constitution of the outside. This
which
of movement
of a
direction
in
the
opposite
of any movement that one
movement would move virtually
from
As
lynchpin
the
the
an
archetype.
outside,
as
stemming
conceive
could
of
its
is
become,
the
of
constitution
agency
would
constituted,
as it
modern sociality,
Durkheim
less
rightly separatedthe question of
so.
not
more
manifested,
were,
he
from
But
believed,
do
I
the
ontology.
of
social
question
social
reality
as
empirical
but
indicated
harmony,
in
is
there
nevertheless
that
non-empirical
an
ultimate
not,
law and social constraint, betweenthe factual and the ontological levels of the
he
his
is
This
to
tried
the
express
with
metaphor of
what
social.
question of
`solidarity', and this is what I have devoted most of the first part of this thesis to
attacking.

226

There are a number of points over which I very much agreewith Durkheim.
Durkheim argued that our occupations, as can be seen in an analysis of the division
of labour in society, are creaturesof an ongoing crisis and creation of social
modernity. They do not only resonatewith our present senseof our employment
situations. Rather, they re-enactthe creative/destructive process,the difference,
from
from
society, that modernity createsas an ontological and
apart
selves,
apart
it
is
both.
As
a
result,
not merely our social practices but rather
critical window upon
the occupational dimension of our social practices that is the ontological source of
the theory and genealogyof, as well as the responsibility for, the problems
constitutive of social modernity.
However, I disagreethat one can fruitfully apply a notion of institutional
Rather,
to
this
social
occupations.
of
modern
concept
we can and ought
persistence
instead
By
I
the
the
to
actual.
a
concept
of
actual
meanthe spatioemploy
now
temporal sensory modality of social existencewhich is parallel, co-extensive,and coterminous with the ontological point of view of the occupation. One could say that,
having undertaken the trajectory of social thought that this thesis has taken, the
kind
become
has
the
of sociological correlate of the
a
actual,
occupation, as
Deleuzian conception of the virtual, rather than of the Durkheimian conception of the
includes
The
the
the trajectory of the
virtual,
actual, as an actualization of
whole.
future.
the
the
past, present,and also
occupation through
Below I will illuminate what have been describedtraditionally as mainly
horizontal relations betweena past, presentand future which succeedeach other, as,
instead, structured in each moment of modernity as vertical passagesfrom our
in
into
through
the
our
sense
of
presence
a
real
of
outside,
outside,
a
critical notion
`full' or mature, responsibleimage of the outside, toward theform of occupation

227

in
formal
is
longer
but
is rather the occupation as a
the
sense
of
vocational
no
which
boundary-formation which is, again, constitutive of the notion of the outside. This is
the circuit of the social as a medium of sense,of the condition of cognition in the
layering
incorporates
the conceptualization and the real encounter
which
ontological
with the external.
Deleuze's notion of `full' particularity provides the inspiration for this spatiotemporal fullness of the occupation which reaches,as it were, its vertical peak in the
image of the outside. It is an agencywhich is always already `full' of time and
space,rather than lacking on, or dominated from, one side or the other. Though it is
is
`the
`full'
particularity,
occupation' not a substanceand never could be, precisely
a
becauseoccupationsare processes,not loci, of creative destruction. Perhapsoften
our `feelings of being occupied' are vibrant and alive, and they seemto be
accompaniedby regular as well as new social opportunities. But that is only because
it
`get
link
They
there',
as
were.
out
us
us with an outside that is `larger'
occupations
than ourselves. Occupationsmake us forget ourselves and feel ontological continuity
immediately, with no creative locus, and even without an intermediary `community. '
Precisely becauseof their function of creative dislocation they allow us to feel
bad,
feelings,
be
they
to the social as a whole.
to
our
or
relate
good
continuity,
For me, as we shall see,society exists only in this occupational sense.
Society is wholeness,but wholenessas contingency, as incomplete; occupation is the
in
its
internal
this
of
social
wholeness
accordance
necessity
with
or
need
incompleteness. But what I am referring to here is not an internal teleology which
finality.
For
itself
it
is
the
time
at
to
a
certain
same
with
as
an act
seeks complete
fullness.
is
latter
The
thus cannot mean
already
always
also
occupation
upon a need,
intrinsically
is
it
complete or abstractly whole. But nor doesthis
that
somehow

228

fullness mean that it is `not lacking, ' as if it were a task indifferently waiting for an
itself
for
it.
Rather,
here
is in
to
manifest
occupation
come
will
agencywhich
from
it
distinct
has
kind
full
that
messianic
which
means
as
modem
a
of
principle
being
itself
in
its
is
the
to
a
process
of
creation
of
need
which
at the same
adequacy
time no more than a thinking of the particular problems of that need.
This thinking out of prioritized problems is co-extensive with and dependent
it
if
is
determined,
but
as
were a part of the manifestation, the
not
upon practice
`tricks of the trade', of certain practices. Practice takes place in the present. If
involves
drama,
like
in
the
a partly conscious, partly unconscious
present,
practice
`necessary
illusions',
if
then
a
play
of
and
reality,
of
appearance
we
convergence
itself
isolate
be
isolating
to
would
only
practice
we
an
were social-theoretically
assumptionthat appearanceand reality are separableprior to and/or at the end of
but
Alternatively,
that
practices
posit
are
then our
could
never-ending,
we
practice.
identity
to
them
since
collapse
speak
of
would
an
eternal
of
of
whole conception
be
it
`incorrect',
be
though
would
not
would
nevertheless
and
reality,
appearance
incomprehensible.
That
and
which makes the assumption
nonsensical
paradox,
pure
is
duality
a
necessary
part
of
practices
reality
the
and
appearance
not this
of
of
duality itself as if it were a `real duality', which is absurd, but nor is this agency
definable in terms of an identity that could somehow be conceived apart from the
face
In
is
in
the
these
duality,
of
alternatives,
absurd.
equally
which
problem of
is
an occupationalperspectivewhich enablesus to account
create
practice what we
for what makes necessaryillusion, the whole problem of simulation for example, a
define
being
The
to
sufficient
us.
occupational
necessarypart of practiceswithout
dynamic
in
is
the
simply
of
a
sequenceof
practices
perception
perspective
differences, for example first the difference of the initial role; then the difference of

229

the impression that thesedifferent practices together make something new which is
sensednot as a new somethingbut rather simply as the thrilling feeling of
participation; then the difference of the emerging forms of work, labour, or action
against which, in productivity terms, the initial role is evaluated. These differences
take place in practices but are not manifested as a part of practices. They are that
aspectof practices which - not successivelybut rather simultaneously or vertically
within an event of practice- opens,occupies,and moves on. It is occupational
sequencessuch as thesethat are primary in social practices. Neither the concept of a
practice not the observationof that which appearsas that practice can grasp these
events becausethey cannot revive the forward-facing senseof need which animates
them. I first want to discussthe issue of social need in greater detail. I will then turn
to use the insights that ariseto indicate someof what I think will be main features of
a contemporary ontology of modem occupations.
Two Principles of Modern Existence: Need and Obligation
For Durkheim social necessityis a combination of need and obligation.
Instead of accepting Durkheim's tautological equation we can restyle social
necessityas an ontological distinction operative throughout the Division of Labour.
Let us then examine how we might effect such a reconceptualization of his project.
Durkheim's argumentas a whole in the Division of Labour, basedas it is
is
the
explicitly channelled through his
concepts
of
need
and
of
obligation,
upon
"organism"
is
An
`organism'.
for Durkheim the relation
of
society
as
an
conception
between"living movements" as seenfrom the perspective of the whole or the unity
be
(1984:
11).
There
those
must some place for a conception of the
movements
of
`social whole' in any theory of social necessity. The point of view of the `social
for
is
because,
Durkheim, this is the only perspective
whole' significant primarily

230

from which we have any chanceof telling whether or not a particular movement is
absolutely neededand therefore felt as obligatory. If a need is felt, it is indicative,
for Durkheim, of the possible attainment of this holistic perspective. As in the
division
labour,
for
Durkheim, is a responseto a `needof
the
of
exampleof marriage,
in
wholeness' which results the pursuit of an overall evaluative perspective.
The first steptoward understandingthe ontological distinction operative here
is to seethat Durkheim is implying in his reasoning that the human need of
in
function
has
a
particular
or vital movement. On the
no provenance
wholeness
other hand it is true that, with his novel strategy of argumentation which appealsto
`structuresof need', the primary social motivation, the `needof wholeness,' is
idea
divorced
from
the
of social relations considered asgeneralities,
productively
such as we consider the relation of exchange. The need of wholeness is for
Durkheim real not becauseit is conceptually general but rather becauseit is
continuous and external, and is thus contendedto be primary among that which
As
Leibniz
pointed out, generalizationspresupposean external
concepts.
conditions
both
Tarde's
Durkheim's
and
social philosophies begin, in different
and
continuity,
is
first
formulate
Durkheim
the
to
this
type.
the premise of
ways, with a premise of
becomes
What
fundamental
in
for him,
terms.
theoretical
social
continuity strongly
but
his
is
most
that
also
controversial
original
most
premise,
constitutes
which
and
that the `structure' arising from the need of wholeness,that is, the way each
individual finds the other, is, in substance,"outside each other" (Durkheim 1984:
22). There is a constitutive moment in social theory here where an image of the
And
here
I
is
first
to
social
existence.
should reiterate of
a
convey
used
outside
in
Durkheim
though
I
base
that
to
even
one,
chapter
attempted
argued
as
a
course,
deduction of social fact upon this image, there is, in fact, nothing in itself deductive

231

it,
deductive
in
form,
is
it
Durkheim's
though
of
expression
merely
about and
metaphorical.
Though he falls into the trap of a metaphorical realism Durkheim nonetheless
`right
by
basing
For
to
the
upon
a
mere
generalize'.
sociology
avoids
successfully
falls
is
into
Durkheim
Rather,
linguistic
trap
that
token,
the
not
unavoidable.
same
his shortcoming lies in his neglect of searchingfor a way to attribute existenceto
is
Durkheim's
According
to
view,
existence
only attributable
particular occupations.
to the social insofar as it transcendsthe practice and the self of the individual in an
determinism.
is
For
This
after this transcendencethe
a
not
absolute manner.
individual is in fact left to re-assume,if not an autonomy of action, neverthelessa
it,
"society
As
Durkheim
ultimately,
put
can exist
privilege of agential particularity.
fashions
individuals
it
in
image
`its
if
it
the
of
and
and
penetrates consciousness
only
is
in
(1973:
There
149).
it
this
of
contingency
a
great
amount
process;
resemblance"'
determinism
There
determinism
than
the
tendency
a
of
rather
particular.
of
evokes a
is, precisely, much indetermination in the point of view of the individual according to
Durkheimian thinking. What is of primary importance is that for Durkheim the
intuition
from
feeds
individual
the
the
source
of
the
of the whole.
social
existenceof
Durkheim does not explicitly statethat occupationscannot exist as
for
For
him
little
that
they
he
leaves
but
the
they
can.
supposition
room
particulars,
One
differentials
that
could
say
an occupation,
a
structure.
of
as
are only considered
like a gender difference, is for Durkheim the whole as a senseof lack seenfrom
is
by
individual
inasmuch
the real as that
this
confronted
particular
the
as
part,
within
lack
But
her
his
beyond
this
is
durably
generalization.
sense
of
conceptual
or
which
is for Durkheim not simply a matter of messianicwaiting, mourning, or desire,
individual
for
indicative
is
just
it
the
because
of worldly enablementas
as much

232

constraint. In other words, in Durkheim's view, the social promises to the individual
not a redemption or return or the overcoming of a privation but rather an overarching
grandeur of its own possibilities of freeing them to be more of what they already are
becoming, not through a senseof destiny but through a sensethat special roles,
though changing and dynamic, still must, through a kind of metaphysical
taxonomical evolution, eachbring about a significant difference vis-a-vis the social
whole. This is that sensewhich is for Durkheim linked with the durable externality
of each social fact in relation to the other as confirmed and indicated by the history
of rules, regulations, and law.
But this is precisely where one will begin to have a problem with Durkheim's
way of thinking, becausefor him what the modernity of the modern occupation
is
is
kind
that
society
a
a
special
of reality the necessityof which cannot
reveals
its
in
merely
actuality. Rather, "eve must determine the degreeto which the
consist
labour]
[the
division
producescontributesgenerally to the integration of
of
solidarity
society. Only then shall we learn to what extent it is necessary,whether it is an
essentialfactor in social cohesion" (Durkheim 1984: 24. Italics mine.). The study of
the division of labour and the intrinsic plurality of occupations standsor falls on
beginning
it
from
Durkheim has posited, that
that
the
or
confirms
which
not
whether
"social solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenonwhich by itself is not amenableto
(1984:
24). Indeed, the study
to
measurement"
observation
and
especially
not
exact
is
"solidarity
that
confirms
solidarity
something too indefinite to
of modern organic
be easily understood. It remainsan intangible virtuality too elusive to observe. To
take on a form that we can grasp, social outcomesmust provide an external
interpretation of it" (Durkheim 1984: 27). And yet solidarity is not merely possible,
it
fact
despite
that
the
cannot be materially manifested. For
or a mere possibility,

233

"where social solidarity exists, in spite of its non-material nature, it does not remain
in a stateof pure potentiality, but shows its presencethrough perceptible effects"
(1984: 24). Thus, the necessityof society for Durkheim cannot be merely particular,
merely general, or even merely possible. Its reality does not consist in such
attributes. Nor is it a necessityof constraint, of actual boundaries such as laws, since
these are for him only indicators of something else. Rather, the necessity of society
is for Durkheim simply the necessityof coherenceamidst diversity, the necessityof
`the whole'. The social occupation itself is only a contingent division of this One
whole entity.
I would opposethis proposition. I would say rather that with respectto
ontology society as a senseof the necessityof coherenceand wholeness is a mere
contingency, since those attributes refer to the representationalproblem of the
dualism of appearanceand reality with its reduction of time to the dialogue between
the past and the present. This problem, I would submit, is subordinateto the more
fundamental sensein which occupationsare the creation and addressingof needsand
in which they are in this the very necessityof an ongoing sociality. In a sense,then,
one could with somejustification claim that Durkheim did not attribute enough
durability to society, in the sensethat he did not attribute to society a durability that
could extend to the temporal modality of needas oriented toward a future that is
intimately included in unfolding time. The insight of Durkheim that social quantity
does not dependupon empirical manifestation is probably correct, but we have seen
that he is frustrated, and falls into obvious errors, when he then wants to link social
quantity with progress.
With Durkheim we are limited to peering at the future through the opaque
lensesof a comparative method. With such a method we restrict ourselvesto the

234

elementsof the past and the present. If that means supposing that beyond such a
20
ideal
`science'
flourish,
it also must mean that the
restriction such an
as
may not
peculiar temporality of needis fated to remain obscure, addressed,if at all, in only an
inadequate,circular fashion. Durkheim feels it is sufficient to make statements
such
as that "men draw closer to one another becauseof the strong effects of social
solidarity" as that social solidarity "is strong becausemen have come closer
together" (1984: 25). There is, ultimately, only a linguistic figure at work here which
employs the metaphor of strength and solidity to stand for the coherenceof a society
which is more than an aggregateof individuals. Durkheim's whole social philosophy
boils down to this thin thread of coherencewhich claims to be the basis of every
society but which cannot even be proven to be necessaryin relation to any existing
be
because
his
To
sure,
society.
realism is precisely only metaphorical, the
begins
to becomedetachedby Durkheim, albeit in
as
a
social
occupation
occupation
a confusing way, from the false problem of manifestation. With the advent of his
social philosophy we can start to envisagethe occupation in a new, more essential,
and more invigourating light: in terms of the image of the outside, which is nonfeature
But
the
characteristic
of Durkheimian methodology is always the
empirical.
for
he
to
the metaphysicsof society through actualities which
account
attempts
way
limbo
between
in
kind
the past and the present.
suspended
of
comparative
a
are
Within the tenetsof Durkheimian sociological method, societies must be
posited only as metaphysicalprinciples of totality that - somehow, somewhereimmediately bound and organize `the horde.' In Durkheimian sociology there can be
horde
subordinateto a metaphysicsof the whole, never a real
metaphorical
only a
horde or virtual coexistenceof the random elementsof the actual. This is brought
20Durkheim often presentedhimself as a champion of the scientific point of view. Seefor
example
Durkhcim 1996: 121-128.

235

in
those
at
points
precisely
which `organic solidarity' is traced in
out most clearly
For
these are the points in which Durkheim's
than
penal
sanctions.
rather
restitutive
way of thinking shifts abrubtly from what seemsto be the neutral, empirical
framework provided by law to the concernsof social theory. At these points,
according to Durkheim, the type of society that correspondswith the restitutive type
law
be
cannot
comparedwith that which correspondswith the penal type of law
of
by treating them asjuxtaposed in space. There is a certain non-empiricality about
is
here.
from
being
However,
this all-important point of view,
that
addressed
society
repeatedso often in Durkheim, societieshave suddenly and unaccountably become
have
become
`positively'
They
than
merely non-empirical.
metaphysical
more
by
degree
the
only
of their effects that are accessibleto individual
compared
entities,
human
the
the
and
nature
of
needthey correspondto. In Durkheim's
consciousness
farthest
law
from
"restitutory
the
springs
zones of consciousnessand extends
words,
itself,
it
becomes
beyond
it
The
its
distance" (1984:
the
them.
takes
more
more
well
16).
What is at work here is a kind of traditional deductive way of thinking
in
its
because,
limit
Society
to
see
as
seem
exists
we
casein `organic
ontologically.
be
inclusive
it
`farther'
than
conceived
can
or
more
nothing
on the part of
solidarity',
I

individuals, not merely becauseit displays effects which seemto be patterned as

by
is
defined
just
by
design.
Society
of
coherence,
a
principle
not
sort
of
a
some
for
become
first
design.
"The
to
an
entity
condition
coherent is for the
of
principle
But
discordantly.
harmony
form
it
does
that
to
such
an
external
clash
not
not
parts
bring about cohesion. On the contrary, it presumesit" (Durkheim 1984: 75). The
in
just
that
we
conceive
effect
entails
of
coherence
societies
not
requirement
as actual
but as `the real', as immediately metaphysicalorganizations of the actual. The mere

236

designor systemof a modem society is only an aspect of "negative solidarity",

is
is
"only
in
the
that
of
another
solidarity
emanation
positive
which
nature: it is the
in
feelings
`real'
the
sphere
social
of
of
rights which come from a
repercussion
different source" (1984: 77). Here what is properly metaphysical and real can only
be `solidarity', as Durkheim claims. But he does not seemto notice that the latter
term, to the contrary, symbolizes a physicality and a characteristic of manifestability
that Durkheim has already clearly shown cannot be attributed to the social.
Moreover, for Durkheim the articulation of solidarity in modernity is one of
business,
life,
in
in commerce, in court, and in administration
in
family
cooperation,
in
in
by
that
these
tasks
the
or
projects
are
undertaken
spheres
special
various
have
become
just as futureThis
that
to
to
show
social
actuality
ought
goes
groups.
it
became
in
Durkheim's
thought
as
past- and present-oriented. Projects
oriented
require cooperation among an exclusive clique of actors who understandthe special
They
"overflow
to
take
that
the
therefore
aims
project
up.
or
challenge
problem
beyond" the common consciousness(1984: 82). The formal outside constituted as
be
have
in
be
fact,
filled
to
to
to overflowing with
said,
would
solidarity
negative
by
Durkheim,
by
`negatively'
The
as
conceived
outside,
which I meanas
projects.
is
the
through
of
of
solidarity,
concepts
externality
and
at the sametime an
mediated
infinite multiplicity of cooperativeprojects, a `multiplicity of ends', so to speak. '
What could be intuitively understoodas a zone of indeterminacy is rather, for some
is
What
boundary
this
alleged
solid.
as
of solidarity
mysterious reason,understood
is
but
not a unity?
unity
a
which
21A concept of the `multiplicity of ends', or polytelisme, was invented by an avowed Durkheimian,
CClestinBougld, and promoted by him in an article in 1914 (Vogt 1983: 243). It seemsto me that
Durkheim's
in
be
`futural'
understanding
more
could
very
useful
side and perhaps
concept
a
such
In
his
it
has
in
teleology.
addition,
vis-a-vis
while
position
not seemednecessaryto
clarifying
even
formal
here
ontological considerationsare of primary concern, I
this
more
connection
where
explore

237

It is indubitable that the occupation, for Durkheim, as the perspective of the

division of labour in society, always has the character of a social venture which
comestogether with social feelings, feelings of participation in a project. As
Durkheim put it in his prefaceto the secondedition of the Division of Labour,

it is otiose to waste time in working out in too precise detail what [our
laws] should be. In the present stateof scientific knowledge we cannot
foreseewhat it should be, except in ever approximate and uncertain
terms. How much more important it is to set to work immediately on
constituting the moral forces which alone can give that law substanceand
shape!(1984: lvii).

Furthermore, one can seethat for Durkheim occupational agency holds the potential
for social innovations and personalinitiatives of varying degreesof originality (1984:
81-5). According to Durkheim, "the more extensivethis free area is, the stronger the
cohesion that arisesfrom this solidarity" (1984: 85). But if it seemsthat Durkheim is
on the verge of re-thinking social variation in an exciting way, we must remember
that for Durkheim, there is no post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning intended in the
latter proposition. For Durkheim it is always primarily his concern to hold that "the
individuality of the whole" is what is mostly at stakein his thought since few in the
latter
him,
have
the
to
and how it "grows at the sametime
understood
past, according
as that of the parts" (1984: 85). In the Durkheimian view it is actually the mode of
least
`precedes'
that
ontologically grounds the free acts, and not
cohesion
or
at
social
in
as
moral and political philosophieswhich promote an image of statesof
vice versa
think it would be well worth doing so to comparethe Durkheimian ontology of social modernity with
concepts of society in political philosophy.

238

is
It
`consequences'
the occupational
arise
out
of
actions.
which
affairs as
holds
for Durkheim the key to
the
occupation as a process, which
corporation, not
the capacity we need in order to attain a social stability (1984: xxxi-lvii).
In Durkheim's way of thinking the social, this premise of the precessionof
the social, far from leading him to posit any kind of parallelism as might seem
logical, rather runs the risk of being taken by carelessreadersas a positing of an
latter
indeed
be
The
the
would
absurd and would
social.
empirical precessionof
if
dismissing
Durkheim
be
for
Durkheim's
project
could
shown to
constitute grounds
hold such a belief. But Durkheim does not, in fact, hold such a belief. Rather,
Durkheim holds the much more complicated and rather difficult to grasp supposition
that the relationship between need,as the sourceof coherence,and obligation, as the
general formula of the articulation of this source and as such the structuring
is
implicit
ontological-level equation. Or to
an
condition of social manifestations,
here
background
`source'
it
two
the
concepts
are
main
and
another
way,
put
`structure', and in Durkheim's view there is a perfect symmetry between the two as if
it
two
two
as
modesof expression,
were, of what is really
they were
equal aspects,
only one social existence.
Of course, Durkheim's social philosophy runs counter to common sense. For
distinction
between
justification
the
why
need and
one might ask perhapswith some
`stress'
`tension'.
kind
Surely
be
of
or
as
a
simply
most
obligation cannot construed
is
do
do
believe
to
to
and
what
one
that
obliged
tacitly
needs
are very
one
what
of us
leads
However,
to
this
that
practical
conflicts.
to
often opposed one anotherand
interesting,
is
and what our common senseunderstandingcannot grasp
what
deny,
is
it
ignore
that
but
or
sometimesoccurs that need
can only affirm,
rationally
the
to
and
yet
at
sametime supportive of one
one
another
opposed
are
obligation
and

239

another,when individuals can no longer practically distinguish between need

motivating obligation and obligation satisfying need. This is when, in the
Durkheimian view, individuals must simply affirm `solidarity, ' as takes place, he
in
for
example, a vow of marriage. These `events of coherence', as we might
claims,
for
Durkheim are ontologically primary in relation to the more
them,
call
individualistic negotiationswith contradiction. Durkheim's argument implies that
between
blurring
distinction
the
of
such a
needand obligation in `factual reality' is
evidenceof the genesisof properly social forms of existence.
The problem is that such a formulation contains a fundamental ambiguity.
How could this possibly engender- as in chapter two we have seenDurkheim imply
boundary?
In
intangible,
tend
to
moments
of
crisis,
social
we
all
see
need
as
an
-a
virtual reality and obligation as an all-too-tangible, actual reality and on the basis of
this division we convince ourselvesof a great, impassable- indeed sublime - gulf
between them. The necessityof getting along with others seemsalways twofold in
accordancewith a social-ontological acceptanceof a distinction between virtual need
divide
is
But
the
obligation.
not exclusive and boundary-constitutive.
and actual
And contrary to what Durkheim asserted,we do not needmerely the observation of
factual reality to give us essentialinformation in this regard, as we might gather it
by
fact.
We
the
assigning the virtual reality of
change
cope
with
modem
can
after
future.
to
the
the
to
the
to
the
obligation
actual
reality
of
and
past
present
and
need
But even this tells us little of what we needto know about the distinction
becauseto the extent that it is focussedin this way upon the attainment of presence,
is
If
the need of
of
a
need
wholeness.
as
understood
still,
erroneously,
need
is
be
there
somesort of event of coherence. Would not the
must
actual,
wholeness
Tarde
as
argued,rather constitute a continuity that can and must
of
coherence,
event

240

be composedand decomposedvis-a-vis particular repetitions which, if we supposed

them to be unified a priori, would simply not exist, and which must therefore lead us
to the premise that the real is a function of the particular, not the whole? On the
other hand, such a conception contra Durkheim of the primacy of particularity could
not allow us to escapethe problem of the reduction of social existence to the problem
of the real. The problem of the real, in its temporal aspect,is always only the
problem of the relation between the past and the present.
We could satisfy ourselvesby simply stating a truism such as that obligation
is only secondaryto the shapingof social time as an unfolding of the immediate
present,and need contrastswith obligation becauseneed is more relevant to the
in
immediacy
the
the
senseof
of the particular. It seemsto us that many
present
social philosophies tend to link needwith the real in such a way. If the latter tend to
disagreewith the precessionof the social as a principle of totality, they nevertheless
agree with the precessionof needand the way this distinguishes a sociology of the
social particular from, say, an economic theory of individual behavior basedupon an
inverted or naively externalist conception of needconstruedas `scarcity'. But such
a
be
social
philosophy
could
saying more than that obligation
not
really
particularist
has a kind of `mental' priority in social matters,that it is only a priority in conscious
reflection, not for that adventurewhich motivates us and of which the best is still to
is
little
Here
I
too
that
there
still
upon which to make a
would
suggest
come.
between
distinction
a particularist social philosophy and a rugged economic
practical
individualism. I am not saying that the two are the sameor that they refer to the
same problems, events, and phenomena. I am rather saying that nothing positive is
in fact said about needitself in either conception and in fact we tend to revert with
them to an orientation towards the future which is no more than a kind of blind

241

waiting which we have seendominatesin the messianic perspective. Perhapsit is no

accidentthat at the sametime the theories of the particular, such as we can find in
Tarde and Bergson, eachexhibit a peculiar urge to celebratethe power of the
model.
Let us, then, turn the tables on Durkheim, but without unduly privileging the
realist perspectiveof the particular. We begin by recognizing obligation and its
imperative to wait for the good which will satisfy needsas the true negative figure.
Obligation is a figure of monolithic modernity, a gentle monster that will do the best
it can for us `until the systemimproves', but one which at the sametime
assertsits
privilege to define itself as a leviathan, an `increasing preponderance',or movementforce which tends to eclipse everything. Obligation operatesprecisely as a
meansto
eclipse need, to divide everything into the attainable and the unattainable, and to
strive for that which seemsnecessaryand possible over againstthat which seems
impossible.
Need, on the other hand, is a figure of multiple
and
unnecessary
modernities. Need is a temporal concept without a before and after and thus without
succession,and thus without teleology, without a sourceor an aim in wholeness(in
contrast here to obligation). There is no spatial outcome of need. There is only a
sequenceof synthesescharacterizableas occupationswhich delimit the everis
defined
Occupation
thus
practical
contours
of
need.
changing
as that aspectof
social activity which constitutesand shapesneedinto a reality. Only in retrospect
does this seem like a choice betweenone's following of an internal desire versus

22
everyone'sconformityto externalpressure.

22There is also in Durkheim strong evidenceto suggestthat the distinction I draw in this
paragraph
between need and obligation is closely related to the history of gender relations (see Gane 1992: 85132). I would suggestthat one might fruitfully think; for example, of obligation as a principle of
patriarchy and need as a principle of feminism; and one might even correlate theseprinciples each
image
image
the
an
of outside-as-social-inclusion,ie. a `working
contrasting
of
outside,
such
as
a
with
outside' among men contrastedwith patriarchy and an image of outside-as-social-exclusionor a
`domestic outside' among women contrastedwith feminism, such that each image of the outside refers
to an outside of one of the principles in question. Of course, such a correlation might constitute the

242

We have thus reachedan understandingthat is required in order for us to turn

now to examining fresh ways of socially perceiving, socially understanding, and
socially existing, namely, that there are no needsthat precede occupations.
Everything social begins with occupation, as occupation. Since occupation
constitutes need, and obligation requires the sublimation of need, obligation, far from
being a meanstowards facing up to a work-load which calls to be completed, as it is
often presentedin vocational terms, can rather be understood as a meansto
marginalize the occupation, to contain and minimize the extension of the
occupational and the creation of new needs,new problems, and new
accomplishmentsinto all areasof life.
Social Need as Occupational: Three Analyses
We are now in a position to re-evaluateand re-construct the elementsof that
intellectual trajectory which takes us from Durkheim to Deleuze. My first premise is
that everything social exists on the basisof a logic of being that unfolds in and
through occupations. This logic of being is not a logic of a thing that moves but is a
logic of movement itself, or a senseof movement. As Bergson teachesus, a thing
that moves is most naturally or common-sensicallydefined in relation to successand
from
distinct
is
But
labour
categories
such
as
precisely
work,
occupation
succession.
in
defined
because
it
is
For
to
success
and
this
succession.
relation
action,
tot
and
be
intuition
defined
in
had
have
to
that
occuption
traditionally
ought
an
reason,we
in
`intrinsic
ie.
from
to
terms,
the
relation
perspective,
messianic
value',
vocational
displacement',
`end
in
itself.
but
'
`accomplishment
tiny
or
as
an
worthy
of a
as an
The vocational conception both presupposesand emphasizesa subject of value, a
kind of halo over the vocation, exhibiting something about the vocational subject that
beginningof suchan analysis,but it would haveto be submittedto extensivecritical andhistorical
for
here.
I
do
have
not
space
which
reflection

243

is more important than the vocation itself. But in modernity, what we are compelled
to consider about our practicesis not so much this completion, recognition, and
hallowing of the educationof the subjectbut rather more pressingly its problems of
inadequacyand redundancywithin `progress', within movement, ie., its
contextualized needs. If work, labour, and action are now, in modernity, applied to
movement, occupation ceasesto believe in itself as a vocation and becomesprecisely
no more or less than that portion of work, labour, and action which is adequateto
movement at any given time and beyond which lies the slipping of movement into
its
Occupation
chaos.
mere
sheds pretenceof experienceand becomesa perspective
intrinsic to movement consideredin- and for-itself.
My aim is to seehow this occupation can be investigated, still as distinct from
categoriessuch as work, labour, and action - as that which is non-empirical is
distinct from that which is empirical - but now from a perspectiveproper to
is,
Modernity
modernity.
as the truism goes, pure movement, pure change. But what
distinguishes it from mere chaos? I believe an occupational perspective upon
inand for-itself can provide us with a meansto a new rigour in
modernity
both
For
the changeand the generic
modernity.
occupation
contains
understanding
logic, both the movement and the sense,of modernity, in plural occupational events.
By `occupational events' I meanthe occupation consideredontologically apart from
I
`ontologically'
By
mean not as a unity of subject
or
a subject object of occupation.
but
is
designating
those
terms
than
rather
a
way
object
which greater
of
and
a
distinction between movementsand the sensesof those movements. Movements,
taken as simple movements,cannot be fully graspedwithout a notion of `trajectory',
framework
I
from
trajectory
Durkheim to
of
as
speak
a
of
succession,
when
a
or
Deleuze, who are finite manifestations,as it were, of a certain intellectual movement.

244

Trajectory, as such, has to be defined concretely, retrospectively, and historically.

But the sensesof movementsare appreciationsof the element of the broadening, and
over-running of borders,that all movementsshare.
This feeling of occupation, this social-occupational affect, is indeed common
to the politico-militant and work-practical spheresof human activities, and is, I
would submit, the key connection betweenthe latter which is irreducible to either.
Now it will perhapsbe thought that it is no accident that the intellectual trajectory I
have presentedculminates in the very peculiar context of the 1960s,where this
connection becomesa matter of intense,popular, and global debate. This is certainly
true. However, at the sametime, in this context, the contemporary thinker whose
have
I
discussedhere, Gilles Deleuze, was a thinker very much aheadof this
works
decadeand of stereotypically `60s thought'. It might be charged,then, however, that
I have presentedideasthat are not very well `in sync' with the intellectual trajectory I
have described.
I would, in fact, discouragetoo much faithfulness to Deleuze. But I would
implore
by
be
the
time,
to
us,
at
same
not
cowed those, such as Alain Badiou,
also
who would attempt to impose their own memory of the 60s as a criteria against
be
in
is
found
lacking
Deleuze's
to
political and
effort measuredand
which
May
'68
in
Paris in the
Let
the
example
of
organizational will-power.
us re-consider
light of our discussionsabove. In my view, May '68 in Paris was neither a purely
rhizomatic multiplication of desire acts, nor an organizational effort by
face
in
the
of too much external pressure. Let us
revolutionaries which aborted
demonstrators,
There
the
the
neither collective
evidence.
was, among
consider
enunciation or affirmation pure and simple, nor an agendaeither explicit or hidden.
Nevertheless,during this period in Paris, what was peculiar was that revolutionaries

245

and workers somehow combined their efforts to create an unintended and unforeseen
kind of demonstration. This demonstration was neither rhizomatic nor organizational
but was, in fact, occupational, and very intuitively

so. Student militants and factory

labourers were able to join forces only very intermittently

and temporarily: but these

distinct
their
types of occupations could be set
very
moments were precisely when
aside for the sake of a general militant occupation of politically strategical spaces deterritorialized
occupations were

and reinscribed within an occupational movement

(see Vienet 1992). Occupation here sheds its vocational aspect and takes on a very
different, non-linguistic, in fact hardly communicable but nevertheless virtually
literal, meaning of occupying time and space. But precisely it does not become so
literal that this could be understood apart from the sense of overcoming the earlier,
now seemingly more mystifying vocational sense of the term. Thus, we could say
that it is the focal point in the occupational movement that raises what had up until
1968 been only random, isolated demonstrations into a sense of an event which as
such supplies an image and a memory even today.

This example, this particular event, is precisely not isolated. It has still,
arguably, a vital continuity. Indeed, the overall radical movements of the `60s, taken
together, provide a good exampleof a sequenceof eventswhich could only become
become
they
a sharedsenseof a movement outside, when they
could
potent when
kinds
literal
In
become
tactics.
of events, social functions,
such
occupationsas
could
less
increasingly
the
manifested, and more
are
social as concrete machines,
or
less
A
thus
abstract.
social ontology of social
and
abstract,not more constraining
be
inadequate
in
is,
to
proven
and prone to
such events,
structuresor systems
distortion. And this `making strange' of systemswas, in fact, a common raison
d'etre of these movements. Even if the eventsof the '60s consideredas acts of

246

systemicrevolution were not successful- or perhapsprecisely becauseof this lack of

demonstrators
the
regime
were able to overcome borders
creating
a
new
an aim of
intensify
for
time,
to
a certain
sociality. They created a new
and a certain extent,
demonstration.
They
affirmed that the social is essentially
paradigm of social-critical
occupationalbut demonstratedthat this senseof the occupational, which contains its
borders,
has
its
broadening
logic
own pure senseof
and overcoming of
own
of
is
I
become
This,
the social paradigm that we,
submit
would
generalized,
sociality.
live
for
better
for
in
today,
still
or
cultures
with
worse. It is not
especially western
surprising, then, that our contemporary modem senseof sociality has precisely been
difficult to describe,explain, or quantify in terms such as work, labour, or action.
If the paradigm of the 60s is not caricatured as a mere sentiment of freedom
intimately
is
rather
as
a
paradigm
of
and
understood
or of revolution
relating
problems and practicesthough occupational action, then perhapsit is still a vital
inclusive
distinction
between
for
If
now
make
an
must
us. so, we
paradigm
movement and our occupational sensationof movement. This distinction I hope will
enableus to specify different modalities of this occupational sense.
Notion-sense
Where is the starting point of modern sociality, if not in `revolution'? The
first modality of the social senseof occupation is notion-sense. Notion-sense shapes
its point of view on the model of empirical observationsof human practices around
is
its
design
but
that
perception
an
analytical
of
of
social
mode
of
operation
and
us,
For
beginning
is
is
ie.
it
outlook.
this
the
ontological
example,
an
of
what
coherence,
is at stake in the Durkheimian and Tardian clash over `solidity versus fluidity'. The
formations
his
Durkheim
through
to
that
social
metaphor of
attributed
solidity
`solidarity' already presumesin advancethat the socially-derived conceptssuch as

247

that of totality will display a certain cognitive or analytical stability. The fluidity that
Tarde attributed to social formations through his metaphor of `imitative currents'
in
in
`ideas',
terms of micrological social
that
understood
presumes advance
innovations
fashions
in
in flux amidst
terms
such
as
new
social
of social
multiplicity,
each other, are that which are able to undermine perceived, stable resemblances
(which
he
in
family
the
the
se
of
sociality
per
sees
continuity
undermining
as
without
model of civilization).
At first glance, we seemto have here only opposed accounts of the social
is
However,
distance,
multiplicity.
what
cognitive
at stakein
of
origin of critical
inferiority
inclusion
is
of
and exclusion,
these accounts rather our senseof
and
incompleteness,
These
and
so
on.
sensessensea
superiority, of completenessand
force, internal or external, a current or a solidity, that is somehow preventing a
full
is
for
but
time
the
the
this
material
at
same
which
productive resolution
is,
indeed,
level,
`revolution'
Like
the
occupation
on
one
productive resolution.
inclusive
However,
this
notion-sense,
resolution.
of the
always an addressingof
is
the
not
only aspect of the senseof
concepts,
other
such
and
revolution
of
concept
it
is
that
but
the
to
extent
constitutes the
the occupational
rather only occupational
beginning of a perception of an outside.
For the outside in notion-senseis only a beginning becauseit still perceives
fullness as otherness. The occupational notion-sensehere, in this perception of
is
for
by
`directive'
in
that
example,
critical
the
moment
a
of
perception
otherness,
in
between
terms
of
movement
analysis
an
a)
of
there
option
arises
an
which
determination, ie. in terms of a blocked subject and a blocking object, orb) in terms
in
ie.,
beginning
`pure
terms
Bergson
the
of
perception'
of the
called
of what
formation of images. Senseis not here related automatically to an object but is rather

248

a kind of interval, or critical hesitation, which mulls over the kinds of critical
oppositionsmentioned above. As Bergson puts it, "the diverse perceptions of the
by
different
object,
given
my
senses,will not, then, when put together,
same
image
the
complete
of the object; they will remain separatedfrom each
reconstruct
by
intervals
other
which measure,so to speak,the gaps in my needs" (1988: 49).
The analysisof pure perceptioncan be articulated in terms of the notion-senseof
is
by
first initiated a formulation of need. It is on the level
there
occupations which
of notion-sense,of cognitive-critical-sense,that a new needfirst emerges,when one
is initiated, for example, into an office or a task which one feels necessarilyrequires
support.
Need is not just anotherabstractconcept. Rather, our occupationsare that by
imagining
the
we
create
possibility
of
which
an outside and need is generated as our
way of articulating this possibility which, precisely, we immediately senseis shared
by others. This capacity is thus not simply a neutral or stablecognitive function
-a
for
for
`taking
giving
or
orders',
example. Rather, it is meant to guide us in
capacity
our negotiation and overcoming of the oppositions we perceive. Its essenceis that it
is the beginning of a capacity for modern sociality, for `smooth functioning, ' as it
is
irreducible
for
has
Wholeness,
that
to wholenessitself, a
a
need
example,
were.
from
but
does
wholeness,a needwhich does not
come
not
need which aims at
be
incompleteness
from
would
a straight contradiction.
either, which
exactly come
The need of wholenessrather comes from occupation itself; it is the occupation, not
focus
be
the
to
that
therefore
of social ontological analysis.
primary
ought
wholeness,
Occupations are, in the initial phaseof notion-sense,that by which we
challenge ourselvesvis-a-vis the changesgoing on around us with our `notion of the
it
is
in
being
For
the
occupied
courseof
necessaryto maintain a notion of
outside'.

249

the outside since the notion suppliesthe possibility of choosing to move outside
is
which the condition of changing or modifying occupations. The notion of the
is
is
the condition of possibility of
the
really
outside
outside which not yet
occupation as flexibility, as variation, as what Durkheim called `the division of
labour in society'. But too often the perspectiveof `managementstudies' influences
here.
is
because
leave
This
to
the
the `notion' of the
unfortunate,
simply
question
us
outside is not sufficient material to composea concept of the necessity of the outside
it
is
ideology
feeling
For
true
that
the
also
as a
of social occupation.
of `constant
change' attempts to oblige us to restrict ourselvesto a notion of the outside and to
ignore our immediate senseand image of it. It is an ideology with an interest in
leaving us with a perpetual feeling of unsatisfaction which it would have us take as a
social norm.
Social occupationstherefore intimately involve a social struggle. For the
is
derived
from
by
itself,
in
the
always
a
situatedness
notion
of
outside,
mere
an
`mechanical'
For
in
the
example,
spatio-temporal
relation.
already-constituted
Durkheim is a notion-senseof the outside. It involves a certain acceptanceof a
distinction betweenwhat is inferior and what is superior which is always in the last
instance, as the theory goes, determinablespatially in terms of what Durkheim called
`segments'. These 'segments'- one could think of them, for example, as tasks -are
isolated, bounded sectionsof sociality. Thus, according to Durkheim the mechanical
becomesrelated primarily not to the outside but rather to an inside, a conscience
inside,
feature.
This
isolated
its
be
to
or
notionprimary
collective, which seems
in
involved
be
the objectification and
to
primarily
thus
the
seems
outside,
senseof
dissolution of the real senseof the outside. Movement here is perceived abstractly as
destructive,
`against
'
the
comfort
of
colleagues,
as
as
as one might put it.
successive,

250

But what I am attempting to say,in occupational terms, is that movement is

destructiveonly from a certain, initial point of view. This point of view is what I call
the notion which is involved in the initiation of the senseof movement, or notionsense.
For the notion is certainly not something to be devaluedand marginalized in
the theory of social occupations. We ought not to stressonly its conservative
possibility, its possibility of choosing the path of subject-object analysis. We can
also stressits role as a potential source of contradiction and opposition. Durkheim
seemedto sensethis as we can seein his claims that `mechanicalsolidarity'
somehow must always co-exist with `organic solidarity' even at the height of
modernity. At times Durkheim seemedto stressthe nefarious, conservative
possibility of `mechanicalsolidarity' as an exclusionary force. At the sametime he
was forced, within the terms of his own conception, to admit that he needsto suppose
that the mechanical is a necessaryorigin of what seemsto be a collective
consciousness.The metaphorof solidarity-solidity led him into this contradiction.
First he confusedthe mechanicalwith a processof externalization and solidification.
Then this idea of exclusion had to dependfor Durkheim upon positing an entity
which could exert a motivating influence upon mechanicalrelations and causethis
process,which he called the consciencecollective. Due to this positing of the
existenceof a consciencecollective, this construction of an abstractinteriority,
Durkheim's implied criticisms of mechanicalrelations had to therefore be silenced
by Durkheim himself. He deprived himself of a basis of criticism, leaving the
diagnosis of social ills to the vagariesof polemical emphasison the one hand and the
rigid normal/pathological distinction on the other.

251

There should be no needto posit somemystical conscience collective once

in
issue
the
of social externality the terms of an outside. A notion of the
we rethink
is
involved
in
form
an
objectifiable
a
gaze
upon
social
outside
and a perception of
distance from this object. This is what tends to happenin Durkheim's `mechanical'
relations, but Durkheim could provide no explanation for objectification other than
i

his description of a primal, `mechanical' tendency. But how could one have a notion
if
has
this
never come within a senseof the outside or, to put it in
externality
one
of
if
thing,
to
the
same
one has never been outside? What
another way which amounts
is missing in Durkheim's account is the immediate senseof the outside itself, and as
for
`mechanical',
`organic'
be
that
the
to
take
the
cannot
or
matter,
result
we
more
a
than hypothetical conceptslinked by the metaphor of solidarity-solidity. What is
always presupposedby the notion of the outside, and by its potential inside, is a
senseof the outside.
In contrast with mere notion, absolutenotion, or notion arbitrarily abstracted
from sense,a notion-senseof the outside already is the outside, is already a modality
it
begins
become
it
is
level
For
to
that
the
the
of
sense
on
clear,
outside.
of
if
had
that
things
as
we
some
are either certain or uncertain,
notionally, not
traditional cosmological relationship with `things' which precedesthe initiation of a
become
it
begins
in
to
Rather,
clear that the outside is
modernity
modern sensibility.
become
in
it
begins
because
to
apparentthat we
modernity
composedof movement,
infinite,
dynamic
finite
between
draw
static
and
and
elements
useful oppositions
can
in nature. Thenotion of the outside is always included in this emerging senseof
for
movement,- this emerging senseof self-empowerment, example at work -be
ill-conceived,
it,
for
therefore
in
would
the
and
of
phase
emerging
especially
have
We
to
seem
arrived at a choice of whether to
example, as a negation of sense.

252

determination
the
of
a
servant
or of movement. But since
see
notion as
determination implies movementmuch more than movement implies determination,
is
however
is
Therefore,
movement.
notion,
critical, is always a
what primary
modality included among the sensesof movement, and it is thus nothing less and
nothing more than an initial contribution to the image of the outside, even if it stands
in both notional and image worlds in the sensethat it holds the potential to imagine
an inside as well.
Despite the fact that notion-sensedoes not necessarilylead outside, which is
to say to a richer senseof the outside, the notion of the outside also does not
necessarilylead to objectification and interiorization. Rather, like that which
in
the
viewer of art a gallery, the notion of the outside involves the facing
confronts
of a choice between a hesitating, gazing objectification which de-occupiesboth the
viewer and the object, and a movement to the outside of the work where the various
occupationsthat constitute the work, such as those of the artist, the gallery, and the
immediate
become
On
level
the
and
sensible.
notional
real,
we can only
viewer,
before
that
the
of
criss-cross
us as possibilities. At this
variety practices
perceive
begin
have
to
that
to
sense
sense
and
an
outside
moment
also
we
we
very
our own
into
We
those
then
stable objects-objectives,but
vectors
may
resolve
occupations.
the price of that choice is in any caseto lose our senseof occupation. Since our
high.
is
the
stakes
are
senseof occupation our senseof social reality,
Image-sense
In one way the outside is a simple, immediate, sensualconstitution.
Perceptually, it is multiplicity. However, it is not just a senseof empty spacein
is
it
directly
because
isolated
contingent upon practice and
movementsoccur,
which
by
initiation
the observational-critical attitude
the
that,
through
provided
movement

253

of notion-sense,crossessocial boundaries. That is why the senseof the outside is

always connectedwith a nascentimage of the outside. Indeed, there is much to say
distinct
the
topic of the image-senseof occupation. For an image of the outside
on
does have a certain content inasmuchas it accompaniesthe senseof the outside as an
indeterminate feeling of occupation. Theaffect of occupying is thefeeling of the
image
links
immediate
The
the
thus
senseof the outside with the practiceoutside.
movementsthat generatethat sense. If the notion-sensecritically raises the event of
the occupation into the senseof becoming a moving outside, it is the image-senseof
the outsidethat makespossiblethe discernmentof the event of crossedboundaries
involved in an immediate senseof the outside. The immediate senseof the outside
be
in
social
sense,
and
not
a
specifically
would
probably
not
exist
at
all any
would
be
for
if
the
and
notion-sense
would
nothing, there was not generated
sustainedway,
this image. The image of the outside is always a positive effect of the occupational
for
further
kind.
has
In
the
of
events
same
and
positive
consequences
contrast,
event
it is only the notion-senseof the outside that facesa choice of whether or not to
become `deeply' involved with the outside, of whether or not to move `further'
In
image
it
has
because
the
the
outside.
of
other words,
sensed
not yet
outside,
but
to
the
neverthelessstill real,
claim reality of a vanishing,
notion-sensechallenges
senseof the outside.
As an undergoing and an overcoming of this painful initiation, social
is
Image-sense
is
large
that
image-sense.
to
which makes us
a
extent,
ontology,
describe the social to ourselvesas an ideal structure of action that is irreducible to
kind
is
It
In
of
exhileration.
a
contrastto the
states
affairs.
of
actual experiencesand
does
image-sense
just
indicate
`public
the
not
spheres',
of
a special
representation
domain or realm but rather stemsfrom the occupational affect of a social individual

254

image-sense
Now,
feels
it
is
this
of
course,
carries implications of
outside.
which
both inclusion and exclusion. Durkheim attempted to account for this apparently
internally contradictory nature of the division of labour by formulating a holistic
he
`solidarity'
would attempt to both explain and transcend
with which
category of
the contingent divisions of inclusion and exclusion. This perhapsworks to a certain
if
difference
inherent in
the
the
structure
and
one
considers
only
perception
of
extent
he
he
But
then neededto specify a type of solidarity
solidarity.
called
organic
what
by which organic solidarity could be measuredin a comparative fashion, namely, the
initiated
Tarde
that critique of Durkheim which
type
of solidarity.
mechanical
impossibility
being
lack
image
in
there
total
the
of
a
of
precisely
exposes
certain
types of societieswhich are supposedlyconstituted as a melangeof concatenated
resemblancesamidst the membersof a community. For Tarde there could not be just
this mechanicalassemblageby itself but rather there had to be for him first a familial
desire amidst the assemblage,a kind of `welcoming' as it were, and then an
impersonal model of civilization arising out of this and finally the possibility of a
civilizational archeology.
We have seenthat Bergson's critique of sociologism is linked with the way
Bergson brings this Tardian model back into the scopeand influence of a personal
is,
him,
This
Bcrgsonian
to
according
capable, in rare
sensation.
personalsensation
become
to
a spiritual event of a new sensewhich
moments, of extending outwards
be
done
involving
how
others
things
and
can
ourselves
of
completely
makes us see
differently. The image-senseof an occupation is thus not simply a `welcoming to' or
Image-sense
`opportunity
routine.
already
established
rather
an
within'
an
it
it
itself
being
As
the
the
as
were.
such
points to openings
of
model
constitutes
become
have
tended
to
closed systems. For Bergson the
otherwise
within what

255

in
in
this
together
the
way a continuum of differentiating
personal and
social exist
modes of sense. Bergson teachesus that image is always within senseand as such
does not transcendsenserepresentationally or constitute initially a negation of
sense. What Deleuze then does is clarify for us how the continuum of sensedoes not
have to be conceivedas unified on the level of a model, and that, in fact, the
`continuum' is only a presuppositionthat sensemust sensein an infinite multiplicity
directions,
basis.
ongoing
of
ways, and media on an
Form-sense
This is why social ontology, as the study of the plurality of modernities, is
his
form-sense.
inaugurated
Durkheim
this
with
seminal distinction
also
perspective
between the mechanicaland organic types of solidarity. What is at issue in these
types of solidarity is not just a social formation, for instancea particular institution,
but rather the form of these formations. The types of solidarity are not models; they
are not configurations of the social that are manifestedfor others to observe and
affirm, ignore, or deny. Nor are they general conceptsof various kinds of political
arrangementof human affairs. Rather they are the sense,the felt affect, of a specific
kind of needful relation to wholeness,non-empirical or non-manifested,but
neverthelessa real, felt needwhich occurs as a kind of structuring of configurations.
They are the form or immediate shapeand dispensationof need. They are general
described
types of the senseof social needconceptualizedand
as types of solidarity.
While they are prototypical casesof form-sensethey are at the sametime, for
Durkheim, structural types, since they determinethe mode of the perception of
difference for the configurations under theseforms. What is important here and now
is to point out that this is not the only way in which form-sensemay operate.
Deleuze has shown us a way in which form-sensebecomeslinked with the

256

continuous multiplicity of practices: through the medium of figures. For example,

the whole raison d'etre of Deleuze's A Thousand Plateausis to experiment with
figures. He presents,for instance,the figure of the nomad (Deleuze and Guattari
1988: 351-424). The nomad, on the one hand, involves a logic of senseon many
levels, both of humour and of seriousness. On the other hand, the nomad is a figure
which presentsan intimation of a temporary autonomy of form. There is a figure of
the rat which swarms and the figure of the swarm itself through which we intuit not a
model of the social or observean actual social formation but through which we sense
kind
kind
the
effusion
of
a
of `hordic' social desire (Deleuze and
a
of social need and
Guattari 1988: 233).
I often think of thepirate as a figure central to early modernity. For the pirate
form-sense
the
of an outsider who seeksan expansion of wealth and
us
with
presents
displays an advancedtechnological innovativeness,but he or she cultivates his or her
initiative not for the sakeof capital accumulation but rather for the sake of sustaining
is
lived
life
The
as
pirate a symbol a symbol of good or of evil; as a
outside.
a
framework
is
he
to
a
preconceived
of values. The
or she evaluatedaccording
symbol
immediately
is
it
however,
has
form-sense,
effective,
since
more
much
more
pirate as
to do with fright than with calculated disapproval. The fear a pirate brings with him
discomforting
is
but
is
the
her
fear
senseof the
rather
of a man or woman
or
not a
form of pure modernity, the fear of the co-existenceof the creative and the
destructive in one life. Form-senseis not simply form, nor formation, nor any other
kind of product. Rather, it is a mode of our occupational senseof the social, one of
is
just
how
It
the
to
social
exists.
through
not
the modes
which we can understand
ironically
be
it
be
fact
that
that
the
can
an
occupation,
piracy
can
curious
out
point
it
is
like
rather to point out that piracy is occupation, in
any other occupation;
much

257

all its senses,that all the fears and expectations,needsand promises of early modern
being are convergent,concentrated,exploded, and dispersedthrough the intensity
and the contiguity of thesesenses: the militant-(de)territorial, work-active, and
outside-exploratorysensesof occupation.

The notion of the outside in Deleuzian philosophy could not have emergedif
it were not for Bergson's notion of `open society', and the latter could not have been
developedif it were not for the challenge posed by Durkheim's doctrine of the
is
There
kind
the
social.
a
of
externality
of overarching reasonfor this intellectual
genealogy. For the outside is the key to an immanent account of what has appeared
in the past to be the twin, inseparablecriteria of modernity: the autonomy of
intelligent desireson the one hand, and the overall societal discipline required for
their coordination and technical achievement on the other. A socially-immanent
is
of
account modernity now necessaryfor two reasons. First, it is necessaryin order
to avoid elevating modern intelligence to a transcendentalplane at the `end of
history' upon which there can only flourish a struggle between `intellectual
property'
and the `conscientiousgood will' of a global elite. Secondly, it is necessaryto avoid
issue
the
time
the
same
of production to a struggle between the
reducing
at
determinations of an oppressive,quasi-objective political economy, and mere
`anticapitalist' destruction. The notion of the outside fills a practical and popular
function that all classical social conceptshave filled. Certainly it could not have
been formulated in its presentstate if philosophy had not taken a `secondsocial turn'
in the thought of Deleuze.
Durkheim's approachto the problem of defining the externality of the social
linked
its
inextricably
have
as
with
context: the theory of
seen,conceived
was, as we

258

by
`monolithic'
the contours of the `division of labour.' What
shaped
modernity
a
division
labour
instead
theory
a
of
of
of
a
now
need
which shapesthe grand
we
is
edifice of a single modernity rather to theorize occupational difference as a basis
for multiple modernities.
One of the obstaclesconfronting the theorization of a plurality of modernities
has beena certain inherited way of seeingthe relation betweentime and space. In
has
been
formulated in mainly
this
theories
modernity
relation
of
more universalistic
two ways: sometimesas a confrontation between a pre-establishedmental continuity
blocked and fragmented by technocratically-ordered spatial patterns of social
is
institutions
but
to
time
rather
attributed
social
sometimes
as testified
production;
by their longevity and their history as over against a spaceof vital mental freedom
from institutional control. The difficulty with both points of view lies in the way
they imply that is is necessaryto compare time and space. Such comparisonsalways
imply a kind of dialectical conflict betweentwo things: actualities situated in the
from
the past. While the paradoxical element of the
coming
presentand actualities
is
fact
be
there
that
the
always an element of
may
real
conflicts of modernity
inescapablity co-existing with an element of unattainability - the answersformulated
in terms of time and spacehave never beenmore than heuristically-useful and have
illusory.
been
ultimately
always
This problem of social time and spaceshould, to begin with, be set into the
between
the social part and the social whole.
the
the
of
relation
problem
context of
For what occurs in the peculiar relation of social part to social whole in modernity is
labour
the
of
and
under the virtual heading of
actualities work
the reorganization of
involve
image-sense,
form-sense
a
notion-sense,
and
occupations
which
social
of
being outside. This existenceoutside is intimately related to the problem of social

259

time and space. The modern social occupation is not just a role-specialization which
labour
for
the sake of economic
traditional
and
organizations of work
supplants
it
includes
is
labour
but
`special'
the
that
to
extent
within
work
and
rather
efficiency
'
`fullness,
its
is
'
intrinsic
its
`effort,
a
spatio-temporality
own
which
own
an outside,
it
is
intrinsic
it
is
Since
to
these
than
an ontological
activities.
extrinsic
rather
instrumental
The
than,
of
rationality.
outside
a
say, problem
problem, rather
becomesmore than a notion associatedwith the essentially static locations of sets of
`inferiors' and `superiors'. It becomessomething real and necessaryto modern
increasing
inter-connection
in
the
and
multiplication
ever
of social
people engaged
tasks. Modern social actors sensean outside to the extent that they sensethe
instances
in
deal
instances
`progress'
by
those
this
particular
and
with
of
necessity
image
In
depending
this sense,as a social fact,
of
an
an
outside.
upon
creating and
is,
in
fact,
It
includes
larger'
is
`much
but
than
that
a
phenomenon
work.
occupation
also exceedsthe actual tasks and sets of rules, procedures,and conventions of work
by
but
by
is
defined
labour.
It
the
those
rather
notion-sense,
actualities
not
and
image-sense,and form-senseof the outside that it generates,a negotiation at the
intersection of many social vectors in the processof emerging, combining, and
disappearing.

260

BIBLIOGRAPHY
This bibliography includes all the primary and secondary material referred to in the
text, as well as additional material that I consulted in the course of the writing. Author
lists
but
not
exhaustive
of those authors' works.
are
are
provided,
sub-sections

Works by Durkheim
(1961) The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious
Sociology. London: Allen & Unwin.
(1966) Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Translated by John A. Spaulding and George
Simpson. Edited with an introduction by George Simpson. New York: Free
Press.
(1969) Primitive Classification. 2nd ed. London: Cohen and West.
(1973) On Morality and Society: SelectedWritings. Edited with an introduction by
Robert N. Bellah. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
(1974) Sociology and Philosophy. New York: Free Press.
(1982) The Rules of Sociological Method: And Selected Texts on Sociology and Its
Method. Edited with an introduction by Steven Lukes. Translatedby W.D.
Halls. London: Macmillan.
(1983) Pragmatismand Sociology. Translated by J.C. Whitehouse. Edited and
introduced by John B. Allcock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1984) The Division of Labour in Society. Translated by W. D. Halls. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
(1996) Durkheim on Politics and the State. Translated by W. D. Halls. Edited with
Giddens.
Cambridge:
by
introduction
Anthony
Polity Press.
an
Works by Tarde
(1895) Essaiset m6langessociologigues.Paris: Editions Maloine.
(1899) Social Laws: An Outline of Sociology. Translated by Howard C. Warren.
New York: Macmillan.
(1903) The Laws of Imitation. Translatedfrom the secondFrench edition by Elsie
Clews Parsonswith an introduction by Franklin H. Giddings. New York:
Henry Holt and Company.
(1969) On Communication and Social Influence. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.

261

(1999) Monadologie et sociologie. Prdsentationd'Eric Alliez. Postfacede Maurizio

Lazzarato. Oeuvresde Gabriel Tarde 1. Paris: Synthdlabo.

Works by Bergson
(1919) Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.
Translated by F.L. Pogson. New York: Macmillan.
(1977) The Two Sourcesof Morality and Religion. Translatedby R. Ashley Audra
and Cloudsley Brereton with the assistanceof W. Horsfall Carter. Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
(1983) Creative Evolution. Authorized translation by Arthur Mitchell. Lanham,
MD.: University Pressof America.
(1991) Matter and Memory. Translatedby Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott
Palmer. New York: Zone Books.
(1999) An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translatedby T.E. Hulme. Indianapolis:
Hackett.

Works by Deleuze
(1979) "A Quoi Reconnait-on Le Structuralisme. " La Philosophie Au XX Siecle.
ed. Francois Chtelet. Vol. 4. Verviers: Marabout. 306-12.

(1983) Nietzsche and Philosophy. Translatedby Hugh Tomlinson. London:

Athlone.
(1984) Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
(1985) Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Translatedby Hugh Tomlinson and
Barbara Habberjam. London: Athlone Press.
(1988a) Bergsonism. Translatedby Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Zone.
(1988b) Foucault. Translatedand edited by SeanHand. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
(1988c) Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Translated by R. Hurley. San Francisco:
City Light Books.
(1989) The Logic of Sense. Translatedby Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. Edited
by Constantin V. Boundas.London: Athlone.
(1989) Cinema 2: The Time-Image. Translatedby Hugh Tomlinson and R. Galeta.
London: Athlone Press.

262

(1991) Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature.

Translated with an Introduction by Constantin V. Boundas.New York:
Columbia University Press.
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(1994) Difference and Repetition. London: Athlone Press.
(1995) Negotiations, 1972-1990.New York: Columbia University Press.

Works by Deleuze and Guattari

(1984) Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia. Mark Seem& Helen R. Lane
Translated by Robert Hurley. London: Athlone, 1984.
(1988) A Thousand Plateaus:Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translation and
foreword by Brian Massumi. London: Athlone, 1988.
(1994) What Is Philosophy?. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill.
London: Verso, 1994.

Other works in Philosophy and Social Theory

Adorno, Theodor W. & Horkheimer Max (1979) Dialectic of Enlightenment.
Translated by John Cumming. London: Verso.
Adorno, Theodor W. (1973) Negative Dialectics. Translatedby E. B. Ashton.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Agamben, Giorgio (1993) The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt.
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Eric
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Alliez,
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Ansell-Pearson,Keith (1997a) Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer.
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Arendt, Hannah (1988) The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

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(1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New ed. New York: Harcourt Brace
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Auge, Marc (1995) Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of
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Badiou, Alain (2000) Deleuze: The Clamour of Being. Translated by Louise
Burchill. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

Baudrillard, Jean(1988) The Ecstasy of CommunicationTranslatedby Bernard &

Caroline Schutze. Edited by Sylvere Lotringer. Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents
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Philip
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Paul
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Bauman, Zygmunt (1991) Modernity and Ambivalence.
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Liquid Modernity.

Cambridge: Polity.

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Beistegui, Miguel de. (1998) Heidegger & the Political: Dystopias. London:
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Bell, Daniel (1973) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic
Books.
Benjamin, Walter (1973) Illuminations. Edited and with an introduction by Hannah
Arendt. Translatedby Harry Zohn. London: Fontana.
Besnard, Philippe (ed. ) (1983) The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the
Founding of French Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Besnard, Philippe (1983) "The Annee sociologique team," in Besnard (ed. ), The

Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French

Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11-39.
Blanchot, Maurice (1988) The Unavowable Community. Translated by Pierre Joris.
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Boundas, Constantin V. (1996) "Deleuze-Bergson:An Ontology of the Virtual, " in
Paul Patton (ed.), Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Boundas,Constantin V. & Olkowski, Dorothea (eds.) (1993) Gilles Deleuze and the
Theater of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Translatedby Richard
Nice. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Debord, Guy (1977) Society of the Spectacle. Rev. ed. Detroit: Black & Red.
Derrida, Jacques(1995) The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

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(1982) Margins of Philosophy. Translatedby Alan Bass.Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Ouestion. Translated by Geoffrey
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Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt. the Work of Mourning. and the
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Writing and Difference. Translatedby Alan Bass.Chicago:University

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Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1987) The Vocation of Man. Translated, with an
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Foucault, Michel (1989) The Archaeologyof Knowledge. London: Routledge.

The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.London:
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"Nietzsche,Genealogy,History, " in Language.Counter-Memory,
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Practice. Ithaka: Cornell University Press,139-64.
Power/Knowledge:SelectedInterviews and Other writings. 1972-1977.
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The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Translatedfrom the French
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Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translatedby Alan

----(1991a)
Sheridan.London: Penguin.
Remarkson Marx: ConversationsWith Duccio Trombadori. Translated
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