Professional Documents
Culture Documents
From the foregoing circumstances, this Court is of the view and so holds
that the instant case is a callous and blatant imposition of lies, falsehoods,
deceptions, and fraudulent manipulations, through the extensive use of
falsified documents by the plaintiff corporation and its former counsel,
Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, defendant Evanswinda C. Morales and even
the Geodetic Engineer who connived with this private group on one hand,
and some officials and employees of the government agencies responsible
for the processing and issuance of spurious or falsified titles, on the other.
Unless these fraudulent operations are put to a complete and drastic halt,
the Courts are at the mercy of these unscrupulous people for their own
personal gain.
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified
document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101
[1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito
See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy
of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty.
Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar
Confidants Office, Supreme Court. Manila.
Further, Benito See and Marly See, President and Treasurer of Sharcons
Builders Phils. Inc., respectively, and Atty. Benjamin S. Formoso, counsel
for Sharcons until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in contempt for
foisting falsehoods and using falsified and spurious documents in the
pursuit of their nefarious activities pursuant to the instant case filed
before this Court. Let the corresponding Warrants of Arrest be issued
against the aforesaid respondents who should serve ten (10) days of
detention at the Dasmarias Municipal Jail, Cavite.
Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc., under TCT
No. T-511462 allegedly issued on November 11, 1994, being spurious, is
hereby cancelled, it having been derived from another spurious title with
TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to Evanswinda C. Morales on December
29, 1989. The Declaration of Real Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby
cancelled for being spurious. Let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the
Registry of Deeds for its implementation with respect to the two (2) titles
for cancellation and to the Assessors Office of the Municipality of
Dasmarias, Cavite, to stave off the proliferation of these spurious
instruments.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, whereas, the private defendants counterclaims, which need
further substantiation, are likewise dismissed. However, the said private
defendants are not precluded from pursuing their rightful course(s) of
action in the interest of justice.
SO ORDERED.
refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect
to the dignity of the court which in some way tends to interfere with or
hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general
efficiency of the same." It has also been described as "a defiance of the
authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere
with or prejudice parties litigants or their witnesses during litigation."4
Simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court.5
The offense of contempt traces its origin to that time in England when all
courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme
court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the
sovereign.6 This concept was adopted by the Americans and brought to
our shores with modifications. In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that
courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that
respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial
institution.7 Such stability is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings, to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the very administration of
justice.8
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 1. Direct contempt punished summarily. A person guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or
to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when
lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by
such court and punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pesos or imprisonment, not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if
it be a lower court.
In Narcida v. Bowen,9 this Court characterized direct contempt as one
done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct the
administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae and
may be punished summarily without hearing.10 In other words, one may
be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the
very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the same Rules states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After
a charge in writing has been filed and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or by counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. (Sharcons) bought
from Evanswinda Morales a piece of land consisting of 33,130 sq.m. in
Paliparan, Dasmarias. A new TCT was issued in the name of Sharcons.
However, when the latters workers tried to fence and take possession of
the lot, they were prevented by the caretaker of spouses Joseph and
Enriqueta Mapua. The caretaker claimed that spouses Mapua are the
owners of the land. Sharcons verified the status of the title and found that
it was indeed registered in the names of spouses Mapua as early as July
13, 1979.
On January 2000, Sharcons filed with RTC Dasmarias a complaint for
quieting of title, impleading as defendants were spouses Mapua,
Evanswinda Morales, and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City. In
their answer, spouses Mapua alleged, among others, that all the
documents relied upon by Sharcons are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, in July 2001, Judge Espaol, petitioner,
issued an Order stating that Benito See and Marly See, president and
treasurer, respectively, of Sharcons, and its counsel, Atty. Benjamin
Formoso, respondents, have used a spurious certificate of title and tax
declaration when it (Sharcons) filed with the RTC its complaint for quieting
of title. Consequently, petitioner declared respondents guilty of direct
contempt of court and ordered their confinement for ten (10) days in the
municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite.
Petitioners Order is partly reproduced as follows:
Using the presumption that whoever is in possession and user of falsified
document is the forger thereof (Gamido v. Court of Appeals, 25 SCRA 101
[1995]), let the appropriate falsification charges be filed against Benito
See and Marly See together with Evanswinda C. Morales. Thus, let a copy
of this Order be forwarded to the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Justice for their appropriate action. As regards Atty.
Benjamin S. Formoso, let a copy of this Order be forwarded to the Bar
Confidants Office, Supreme Court. Manila.
Further, (respondents) until March 13, 2001, are declared and held in
contempt x x x Likewise, the title issued to Sharcons Builders Philippines,
Inc. x x x, being spurious, is hereby cancelled, it having been derived from
another spurious title with TCT No. T-278479 allegedly issued to
Evanswinda C. Morales on December 29, 1989. The Declaration of Real
Property No. 4736 is likewise hereby cancelled for being spurious.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant case is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE x x x. However, the said private defendants are not precluded
from pursuing their rightful course(s) of action in the interest of justice.
Petitioner stated that in determining the merits of Sharcons' complaint for
quieting of title, she "stumbled" upon Civil Case No. 623-92 for
cancellation of title and damages filed with the RTC Imus, presided by
then Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. Petitioner then took judicial notice of the
judges Decision declaring that Sharcons' TCT and other supporting
documents are falsified and that respondents are responsible therefor.
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents,
and thus the latter were confined in the municipal jail. That same day,
respondents filed a motion for bail and a motion to lift the order of arrest,
but were denied outright by petitioner.
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
which said court granted. The CA ruled that petitioner judge erred in
taking judicial cognizance of the Decision in the other civil case for
cancellation of title, since it was not offered in evidence in the case for
quieting of title. Furthermore, direct contempt of court is criminal in nature
and the defendants should have been accorded a hearing. Thus, petitioner
judges Order of contempt and the issued Warrants of Arrest were
nullified.
ISSUES:
1) WON petitioner judge erred in taking judicial notice of the Decision in
the civil case for cancellation of title declaring Sharcons TCT and
documents as falsified
2) WON respondents should be held guilty of direct contempt
HELD:
1) YES. In Gener v. De Leon, we held that courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of records of other cases even when such
cases have been tried or pending in the same court. Such does not fall
under Sec. 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on mandatory judicial notice.
2) NO. Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect (not
direct) contempt.
Contempt of court is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the
court. In Narcida v. Bowen, this Court characterized direct contempt as
one done "in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct
the administration of justice." It is a contumacious act done facie curiae
and may be punished summarily without hearing. In other words, one may
be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the
very instance of the commission of the act of contumely.
Indirect or constructive contempt, in turn, is one perpetrated outside of
the sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a
court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any
abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a
CU-UNJIENG
LA'O,
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R.
No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed
although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng
La'O (La O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent
Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her counsel therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG
and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M.
Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with
However, the CA denied the same in its Decision dated June 29, 2004.
Petitioners MR was likewise denied on November 3, 2004. A petition for
review was filed before this Court, but We denied it per Resolution dated
January 10, 2005.
In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002
Order. The supposed inspection on September 30, 2002 was not held per
the trial courts Order dated September 27, 2002.13 The January 22, 2003
inspection also did not push through after petitioners and their codefendants again moved for its deferment.14 When the court eventually
denied their motion on June 16, 2003, respondent set the inspection to
August 1, 2003.15 On said date, however, Atty. Matias V. Defensor, then
Corporate Secretary of the Corporation, was alleged to be out of town and
petitioner Pablo B. Roman, Jr. (Roman) purported to have shown no
willingness to comply with the directive.16 The matter was reported to the
trial court, which merely noted respondents Report and Manifestation.17
On November 3, 2003, respondent moved for the issuance of an order for
immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order, as
reiterated in the Order dated June 16, 2003, but the court denied the
same in its May 24, 2004 Order.18 Respondents motion for issuance of
writ of execution suffered the same fate when the trial court denied it on
February 10, 2005.19
When this Court settled petitioners challenge to the Orders dated August
9, 2002 and December 9, 2002, respondent filed a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion for Clarification and to Resolve Plaintiffs Pending Motion
for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and to Set the Case for Pre-Trial
Conference.20 Acting thereon, Judge Ramon Paul L. Hernando, likewise
now a member of the Court of Appeals, who took over Branch 93 after the
appointment of Judge Bruselas to the CA, issued the July 10, 2006
Order,21 which directed the immediate execution of the September 10,
2002 Order, and set the case for pre-trial.
On February 9, 2007, Judge Hernando issued an Order22 inhibiting himself
from handling the case in view of his "close friendship relation" with
petitioners counsel and ordering the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another sala. The case
was subsequently re-raffled to RTC Branch 90 presided by Judge Reynaldo
B. Daway, who likewise voluntarily recused himself from the case per
Order23 dated July 13, 2007. Finally, on July 30, 2007, the case was reraffled to RTC Branch 226 presided by Judge Leah S. Domingo Regala.24
On November 28, 2006, the parties agreed to defer the pre-trial
conference
until
the
actual
conduct
of
the
inspection
of
records/documents on December 12, 2006.25 Before said date, however,
petitioners and their co-defendants moved to hold the inspection to
January 11, 2007, which the court granted.26
During the January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced by
the Acting Corporate Secretary, Atty. Antonio V. Meriz, and one of the staff,
Malou Santos, was the Stock and Transfer Book of the Corporation. They
alleged that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of
the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings
taken during the stockholders meetings, and that they needed more time
to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in
the bodega of the Corporation.27 This prompted respondent to file a
Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in
accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of Rule 29 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No.
8799 (Interim Rules).
On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued a Resolution, the concluding
portion of which ordered:
In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to
comply with the order dated September 10, 2002, this Court reiterates the
said order:
"s
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find
that defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the order of
September 10, 2002 despite the order of this Court.
Both plaintiff and counsel, as well as defendants and counsel, are
therefore ordered to meet on November 13, 2007 at the corporate offices
of defendant firm between 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. so that faithful
compliance with the order of September 10, 2002 may be done,
otherwise, this Court shall allow the plaintiff to present evidence to prove
their prayer in their Manifestation with Omnibus Motion filed on January
31, 2007 and issue a resolution based on the same accordingly.
SO ORDERED.28
Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari
(With Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction).29 In resolving the petition, the CA ruled that there
is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. According to the appellate
court, the September 3, 2007 Resolution was issued pursuant to Section
3,30 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, with the suppletory application of Section
1,31 Rule 27 of the Rules. It noted that, except for the sanctions contained
therein, the assailed Resolution merely reiterated the September 10, 2002
Order of Judge Bruselas, which petitioners did not dispute in accordance
with Section 2,32 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules or via petition for certiorari.
The CA further held that petitioners were not denied due process as they
were able to move for a reconsideration of the September 10, 2002 Order,
but not opted to file the same with respect to the September 3, 2007
Resolution.
Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for
contempt of court and the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined
that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange Commission33 cited by
petitioners is inapplicable, since the September 3, 2007 Resolution merely
warned petitioners that they would be cited for contempt and be fined if
they fail to comply with the courts directive. Moreover, it said that the
penalty contained in the September 3, 2007 Resolution is in accord with
Section 4,34 Rule 3 of the Interim Rules, in relation to Section 3,35 Rule 29
of the Rules.
Petitioners moved to reconsider the CA Decision, but it was denied.36
Before Us, petitioners contend that the "threatened imminent action" by
the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard to the guideline
laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardido37 is not proper
and calls for the exercise of Our power of supervision over the lower
courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay,38 among others, they
claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the
policy that there should be wilfullness or that the contumacious act be
done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.
We deny.
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a
court39 or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice40 may be
punished for indirect contempt. In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as
non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure
to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply.
Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing
agent of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or
other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be
done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of
options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not
exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others." Thus, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,41 We said:
To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise
untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the
party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the
disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the
party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in
obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired
into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege
that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of
the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and
decision. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, where there is a verified petition to cite someone in contempt of
court, courts have the duty to ensure that all the requirements for filing
initiatory pleadings have been complied with. It behooves them too to
docket the petition, and to hear and decide it separately from the main
case, unless the presiding judge orders the consolidation of the contempt
proceedings and the main action.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court,
the above rules, as clarified in Regalado, do not necessarily apply. First,
since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be
no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform
the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or her right to due
process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order
requiring the respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in
contempt of court.
In Calimlim, the Judge issued an Order requiring the petitioners to explain
their failure to bring the accused before the RTC for his scheduled
arraignment. We held in that case that such Order was not yet sufficient to
initiate the contempt proceedings because it did not yet amount to a
show-cause order directing the petitioners to explain why they should not
be cited in contempt. The formal charge has to be specific enough to
inform the person, against whom contempt proceedings are being
conducted, that he or she must explain to the court; otherwise, he or she
will be cited in contempt. The Order must express this in clear and
unambiguous language.
xxxx
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty
of the court (1) to docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately
from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the discretion to
order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to
be docketed, heard and decided separately from the main case precisely
because it is the show-cause order that initiated the proceedings.
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a
verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is the duty of the court to
ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due
process of the party being cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating
indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the
contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must
conduct a hearing, and the court must consider the respondents answer.
Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.
xxxx
In contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the right to
defend himself or herself and have a day in court a basic requirement of
due process. This is especially so in indirect pcontempt proceedings, as
the court cannot decide them summarily pursuant to the Rules of Court.
As We have stated in Calimlim, in indirect contempt proceedings, the
respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him or her, and there must be a hearing, and the court must
investigate the charge and consider the respondents answer.45
In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been
initiated.1wphi1 To the Courts mind, the September 3, 2007 Resolution
could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect
contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned
therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the
consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue order to
produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to
comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate
the indirect contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory
requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Even if We are to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment
or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt," this would still not
work to petitioners advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
lays down the proper remedy from a judgment in indirect contempt
proceedings. It states:
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.The judgment
or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to
the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or
final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person
adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he
will abide by and perform the judgment or final order.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear
enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal
under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for
its suspension pendente lite.46 Obviously, these were not done in this
case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the
September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.