Argumentative Essay

The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in fact the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).

Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide

the best explanation for international relations?

9 April 2015

The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in fact
the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they
have to accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).

Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide

the best explanation for international relations?
Introduction
In 1975, in the United States Department of State (US DoS) was prepared the
document named The Lessons of Viet-Nam which later has been declassified. In
one of the paragraphs of this document is stated,
[s]ince our ability to understand the politics of countries such as Viet-Nam is
limited, it follows that our attempts to manipulate political forces may well fail.
We should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what is best for a
country and proceed, as in the overthrow of Diem, to precipitate a situation
with unknown and possibly disastrous consequences. Nor should we take the
opposite tackallying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose
diminishing mandate we may not be able to perceive (US DoS, 1975).
Since then some time has passed. Have the lessons identified been learned? The
question reflects the actual debate of International Relations (IR) between principal
rivals: realism and liberalism. Different realisms theories are associated with ancient
Greek philosopher Thucydides, author of the Peloponnesian War, and this essay is
going to use primarily his pristine explanation. Therefore, realism acknowledges the
dominant role of power politics in international relations, but as well that unhindered
power is acting to defeat its own purpose (Lebow, 2013: p. 59). Realisms main
suppositions are that the international system is anarchic, composed of selfinterested states pursuing national interests, and the only important actors are
powerful states which shape international relations. On the other hand, different
liberalisms theories of international relations are relatively new, with roots in the
Enlightenment, and its main assumptions are that democratic governments within
states, economic interdependence, and international law and institutions will make
the world more peaceful (Russet, 2013: p. 95). This essay argues that despite the
existence of international institutions and organisations, international law, and
growing economic interdependence, international relations remain a place of power
politics defined by realism. Moreover, it argues that promoting democracy by force
harms both realisms and liberalisms assumptions in their pursuit for more peaceful

world. The essay is divided into three main parts. Part one seeks to examine
international relations actors, namely states and international institutions; it shows
that important actors are the most powerful states, and international institutions and
organisations, and international law does not much restrain them. Part two focuses
on the economic interdependence in international relations and includes, inter alia,
how states exercise power politics in pursuit of national interests, and the economy
as a non-military means (Walt, 2012) used by powerful states to achieve their
national interest. Finally, the last third part subsequently focuses on the defence of
liberal democracy, and how the dangerous amalgam (Snyder, 2009) of
misinterpretation of liberal and realist theories damages both theories in their pursuit
for more peaceful world.

Actors of international relations and international law

The state is going to survive globalization. Decolonisation, the reunification of
Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, different separatist
movements, even the latest events in the Middle East with claims for an Islamic state
are examples of the desire to create own country or secure political space - i.e.,
territory (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013: p. 72) despite growing interdependence.
Humans are social animals and from ancient times people have lived in groups and
have attributed themselves to them. People continue to live in states, and it is rare for
a human being not belong to any state. The problem is that states inevitably will
compete between them and have conflicts. First of all, states are not in equal
position. They have different geography, existence of resources, climate conditions
and so on. All those conditions influence development and welfare of the countries.
First liberals, as John Locke, did not refuse importance of the state in preserving a
favourable environment inside of the state from external threats, and liberals agree
that states protect citizens from undue interference from other people (Sorensen,
2011, p. 149). Not to forget that states (including neighbouring states) consist of
people, it means that very existence of states shows us not tendency of people to
cooperation but rather their tendency to separate. The European Union (EU) is an
example used by liberalisms supporters, but it is not an exception. Every country
sought to join the EU seeking the relative gains, and the only driver was national
interest. EU members preserved the necessary degree of sovereignty. Despite the
EU membership, there is growing nationalism, and separatist movements in Scotland
and Catalonia have not disappeared. When confronted with setbacks, some major

contributors for the EU economy (as, for example, the United Kingdom (UK))
questioned their membership. Apart from this, the last elections to the European
Parliament also displayed the rise of Eurosceptic parties. The commitment to
preserve the state system in the ongoing globalization strengthens realisms
assumptions.
However, liberalism argues that there are other actors of IRinternational institutions
and organisations, and international lawwhich can shake state sovereignty. In
practice, international institutions and organisations, and international law do not
much restrain powerful states. Starting with international non-governmental
institutions and organisations (INGOs), primarily of democratic states, (role of
intergovernmental institutions (IGIs) will be discussed later) they do not have as a
scope to substitute states. As for example, hybrid and a class of its own (Rona,
2004) the International Committee of the Red Cross has a limited mandate and tied
as it is to states and the state system of international relations (Forsythe, 2005). Also
in this case, it is interesting the assessment of international relations of another
important INGO, Amnesty International. Their 2003 report emphasises a slightly
different trend than those expected by liberalism. They notice that against a backdrop
of increasing globalisation, there is growing concern of powerful states to defend
national interests by using their military, political and economic means. Also, it is
underlined that INGOs may be easily targeted as propagandists of interests of an
opponent state (Amnesty International, 2003). Regarding international law, it
theoretically has potential to stabilize forces of international relations, and it can end
impunity and promote justice. But in practice powerful states have maintained their
sovereignty in that domain, protecting their citizens and engaging in support of
international law when it is consistent with advance of their interests and values. For
instance, the US is not a party to the International Criminal Courts (ICC) Statute and
is supporting only ad hoc international tribunals and hybrid courts (US DoS, no date).
Other major powers such as China, Russia and India are also reluctant towards the
ICC. International law faces political challenges mainly by constraints imposed by the
major powers, caused by rivalry between them. Moreover, the application of
international law has potential negative impact on the peace process between
opponents (Royal African Society, 2008).
The most important actors in international relations are great powers. As a result of
the anarchic competition there are alternately emerging powerful states, largely

responsible for shaping the most important international events (Jackson and
Sorensen, 2013: p. 94). The most significant part of their power is military might, but
the use of military means is not only a single way how states exercise power. The
example of the work of power politics is the UN Security Council (UNSC), which has
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (UN,
1945), and particularly its five permanent members (P5). Liberals argue that the UN
is an example of IGIs as potential peace promoter. However, the UNSC has not once
failed to stop outbreak of violence in international relations when particular P5
members interests were at stake. Secondly, the UNSC membership has not
preserved P5 to express their power in third countries (including sustainment of proxy
conflicts) as it was in Afghanistan in 1979, Grenada, Panama, Iraq in 2003 and
Ukraine. Thirdly, since the end of the Second World War, the real pacifier has been
nuclear capability, thus present great powers are concerned about proliferation of
nuclear capabilities. Fourthly, there is struggle to maintain power by P5, opposed to
reforms of the UNSC, which is not exactly representing real division of power among
states (UN, 2013). Besides, despite reducing military spending in the West, there are
also different trends, especially in rising powers such as China and India (Jeppesen,
2014; IISS, 2015). Lastly, the potential inability of the UNSC to prevent the outbreak
of violence is embodied in the UN Charter, which has preserved the right of countries
to self-defence and was used by the UK, the P5 member, during the Argentinian
invasion of the Falklands. The role of intergovernmental institutions in promotion of
peace is exaggerated; in reality, the world remains a place of power politics, and
intergovernmental institutions do not much restrain great powers.

National interest and non-military means to exercise power

Concerning economic interdependence, the answer of the realism is that this is not
something new; thus, it cannot be seen as an argument in favour of liberalism, which
tends to overestimate the positive side of economic globalisation. History often
repeats itself and remains the best prophet of the future. International trade has been
a necessary attribute of states to enhance the wealth and welfare of countries for
centuries. In the second half of nineteenth century the developed world knew of the
high growth of trade, which did not prevent the outbreak of the Great War. Again,
after this, despite optimistic discourses of liberals the world was going to the next

worldwide war, and great powers were using their economy to build war machines.
The globalisation of economy is believed by liberals as a challenge to the existence
of the state system. They sincerely hope that people will forget longstanding conflicts
and be concerned about profit through honest commerce, as the US president
Thomas Jefferson stated, peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations,
entangling alliances with none (1801). The trouble with this view is the issue of
insurance of fair trade. There is misunderstanding of differences between the
intrastate environment and the realm beyond state's borders, in the world where
there is no sovereign higher authority, and relations are governed by principles of
power. One of the realisms assumptions is that self-interested states pursue national
interest, and commercial interest (sometimes subnational) can become part of
national interest in pursuit of balance of power (Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Economic
rivalry in the global economy is high, and free market brings not only benefits.
Economy has tied states together, making them interdependent, but the increased
interdependence gave more levers of power for leaders of international relations.
Moreover, growing number of population in the world related with the scarcity of
resources and food shortages hardly will make economy a pacifier of international
relations.
States pursue national interest, and economy remains a place of power politics. Let
us take a look on an example how commercial (or economic) interest is becoming a
national interest of a state. Since the end of nineteenth century, the US has had
permanently growing interest and involvement in the East Asia (mainly China) and
named at that time Open Door policy. The initial meaning of this policy was simply
commercial. However, after other powers, especially Japan, threatened the US
commercial interest militarily, the principle was interpreted not for commercial, but for
political reasons (US DoS, no date; Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Since then,
international relations have modernized, and talk about economic interest of a state
is unpopular. However, power politics did not leave economic relations. Alan
Greenspan, ex-Chairman of the US Federal Reserve stated, I am saddened that it is
politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war [2003] is
largely about oil (2009). For sure the US remains the worlds strongest military
power, but the US economic status is going to be challenged by rising mainland
China. China continues to grow and already started to secure resources for its
economy in the South China Sea (EIA, 2013; Chilcoat, 2014; The Economist, 2015).

Smaller countries also do not remain behind. France is concerned about its businessrelated issues in West Africa (Baig, 2013; The Economist, 2014), and there is
continued confrontation among the UK and Argentina concerning the Falkland
Islands, where were found considerable reserves of crude oil (Stanley, 2014). The
reciprocal influences of economy and geopolitics remain central concern for
governments of states, which are continuously adjusting their security strategies. For
instance, Norway observing melting ice already developed a strategy to take
advantage of the opportunities in the High North (Norwegian Government, 2006).
Similar with Greenspans opinion has former UK Governments Chief Scientific
Advisor Sir David King, who added, [u]nless we get to grips with this problem
globally, we potentially are going to lead ourselves into a situation where large,
powerful nations will secure the resources for their own people at the expense of
others (Randerson, 2009).
Next, the economic interdependence made from the economy a powerful tool in the
hands of great powers. However, the non-military exercise of power remains backed
by the military might of the countries. The example of the Russian Federation can be
the most illustrative. Recent political developments in post-Soviet countries are
strongly related to economy, or more precise, to Russian politico-economic pressure
(Birnbaum, 2014). One of the useful tools of Russian policy is natural gas price. An
analysis of gas prices for the abroad consumers revealed an interesting anomaly.
The prices for gas for faraway countries can be significantly lower than for more
proximate countries to Russia, or countries situated at the same distance of
transportation have significantly different prices (Kates and Luo, 2014). The similar
tool of Russias economic power is Rospotrebnadzor (the service responsible for
supervision of Russian consumers rights), which allows Russia to ban some
particular imported items using different alleged pretexts (Cenusa et al, 2014).
However, similar economic tools were used by the West against Russia as an answer
to its actions in Ukraine. The result of the imposed sanction is Russias ongoing
economic downturn (The Economist, 2014). However, liberals are right that actual
economic interdependence is high because sanctions against Russia affected its
small neighbours (Recknagel, 2014). Likewise, China, which is well-known for its
opposition to the use of sanctions, does not shun using unilateral sanctions to
advance its interests over Taiwan or Tibet (Reilly, 2012). Those examples show that
economy also can be targeted or used as tool of economic warfare. Chinese

militaries envision economic means of warfare as part of new generation of wider

unrestricted warfare (Liang and Xiangsui, 2002). Going back to the role of
international organisations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) cannot do much to
prevent sanctions imposed by states for security reasons (WTO, no date). As it is
seen, economy, envisioned by liberalism to pacify international relations, plays the
role of a new powerful tool in the hands of great powers searching for their national
interests.

Defending liberal democracy in realisms world

Liberal democracy should be protected, and it should be protected by realisms
means. No matter how paradoxical it may sound it is true. Thucydides, the father of
realism, in his writing about the Peloponnesian War by the Pericles funeral oration
praises democracy, despite the fact that he was less enthusiastic about it. After
centuries, Winston Churchill once said that democracy is the worst form of
Government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time
(Langworth, 2008). Since the time of ancient Greeks, democracy has undergone long
trip, and it will be very sad if a setback occurs again. However, the realm beyond
state's borders is different. The attempt to strangle the young Ukrainian democracy is
the most egregious breach of security in international relations. The RussianUkrainian armed conflict (unfortunately, denied) should be a wake-up call for those
who do not observe reality in international relations. However, previous Russian
actions in other former Soviet republics have not awakened liberals (UK Parliament
Website, 2014). The world remains a dangerous place, and rogue autocratic states
(sometimes with pseudo democratic governments) present a danger for liberal
democracy. Si vis pacem, para bellum. In this way, liberal democracy should be seen
as a child of realism that should be protected. The Ukrainian case has resurrected
such terms claimed by realism as anarchy, state, national interest, power politics,
balance of power and so on. At the same time, things envisioned by liberalism to
pacify, such as international law and international institutions, played little role, and
economy was used by power politics as non-military tool to curb Putins desires. At
one fell swoop NATO relevance was confirmed, together with its reliance on
American hegemony. Theories are good in checking on each other. Realism is first of
all a theory of survival. If protected by realisms means liberal democracy becomes
the unique form government, liberalism will have opportunity to check realism theory

in practice, answering the question if democracies will fight democracies in

completely Kantian world.
However, if liberal democracy is the best known form of political organisation of the
state, it does not mean that democracy should be promoted by force. This is a
dangerous amalgam of misinterpretation of liberal and realist theories. Realism is
reserved about the imposing of will on other nations, whatever they arereligious,
socio-economic and so on. Realists see it as a dangerous endeavour which
threatens peace and security in international relations. First of all, it can cause an
honour-based resistance to invaders (Lebow, 2007: p. 396) of indigenous inhabitants
as it was, for instance, during colonisation (and decolonisation). And it is still harder
to convince people that the real enemy is their own government, when they are being
bombed by foreign aircraft. Secondly, such interventions cause a balancing of
antagonistic states against the invader and open or covert intervention on behalf of
targets (Wang and Ray, 1994: p. 139). The results can be prolonged conflicts, as it
was, for instance, in Afghanistan starting with the late 1970s, where the interest of
the US, the Soviet Union and others collided (US DoS, 2013; Wilson Centre, no
date). As a consequence, promotion of democracy by force can become a Sisyphean
task. By the words of Richard Ned Lebow, [realism] stresses [] the need to base
influence, whenever possible, on shared interests and persuasion (2013: p. 59). The
concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is considered as the achievement of liberal
policies, but it will be hardly applied on great powers. Moreover, the study on the
R2P, conducted by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), concluded that the military intervention should be proportional
and the last resort for protection of population. It should be authorised by the UNSC,
with no intention to defeat a state. The intervention should be clearly supported by
regional opinion and the victims concerned, with the consequences of action not
likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction and maximum possible
coordination with humanitarian organizations (ICISS, 2001).
Finally, promoting democracy by force undermines liberalisms agenda by harming
democracy itself. Democracy cannot be hurried up. It took time for countries to
become liberal democracies. Historical events made liberal democracy to win in the
US (however, there is room for improvement). The leading states are also a role
model for other states, and the US is a leader. However, unrestrained by the
membership of the UNSC and without the resolution of the latter, the US invasion of

Iraq in 2003 drastically damaged the USs soft power (CSIS, 2007). Additionally, the
dichotomy between speech and deed of the US officials, on the one hand, stressing
on democracy promotion, and, on the other hand, having good relationship with
authoritarian regimes also played its role. Moreover, the issue of the breaching of
human rights and civil liberties in occupied countries, at homeland and elsewhere
was raised up in the context of the world-wide counter-terrorism (UN, 2006). The
importance of soft power or, in other words, winning of hearts and minds of the
people in other countries should not be underestimated. The 2003 watershed year
damaged position of liberal democracy in the entire world, working to the advantage
of the political adversaries of the US in other countries, associating liberal democracy
with Americas self-interest. Some countries previously quite benevolent towards the
US gradually shifted towards potential opponents (Samuels, 2007). It is remarkable
that Francis Fukuyama clarified his position towards promoting democracy after
received criticism on his earlier writing. He already argues that coercive regime
change was never the key to democratic transition (Fukuyama, 2007). The US is not
the first great power and most likely not the last one which by its actions
demonstrated realisms claim that great powers to be their own worst enemies
(Lebow, 2013, p. 60). The Iraqi campaign backfired against the US, and, as it was
pointed out by many, the proverb if you break it, you own it is the best description of
the situation. However, realism is not a theory of despair, and it is necessary to learn
lessons taught by it.

Conclusion
International relations are complex, and no single theory is perfect in explaining
them. Nevertheless, the Athenians, represented by Thucydides, are right, and realism
still provides the best explanation for international relations. Realism describes how
the world actually is in comparison with its counterpart liberalism, which describes
how the world is ought to be. And the world remains a place of power politics.
International relations are still bound to the state system, and powerful states are
strengthening their positions. Intergovernmental institutions are dominated by
powerful states, and international non-governmental institutions and organisations do
not much restrain them. International law, designed to bring justice, is still having
discriminating applicability between winners and losers in international relations.
Despite the growing economic interdependence, powerful states are driven by

national interest and enabling their economy to become a non-military means to

exercise a states foreign policy.
However, power politics has also the negative side, and great powers remain their
own enemies. A great deal of the misunderstanding and misperception of realities
further exacerbates international relations, and liberal democracy itself is caught in a
trap of the realities of international relations. Power politics has multiple facets. It is,
of cause, hard military and economic powers, which are backing one another. But it is
also underestimated soft poweror ability to lead and influence, which,
accompanying its fellow hard part, can do much more than all of them alone. The
promotion of democracy by force with the coercive replacement of a government in
order to insure peaceful relations represents a dangerous enterprise which harms
peace and security, and undermines the basics of democratic rights and freedoms.
Practitioners of foreign policies should understand that whenever possible hard
power politics should come after and accompanied by negotiations, searching
common ground and consensus with all interested actors, and with a discourse
supplemented by correlated conduct. As the leader, the US is responsible for the
defence of liberal democracy outside but also inside of the country, and not letting
democracy regress. But it does not mean to impose it. Liberal democracy should
itself become attractive for others and not to be associated with bombing and torture.
America should learn the lessons identified in Vietnam and confirmed in Iraq. And
eventually democratic peace will be achieved through the realistic means of realism.
Finally, it is necessary not to forget that theoretical debates have real-world
consequences.

Bibliography
Baig, Rachel. 2013. The interests behind Frances intervention in Mali. Deutsche
Welle. [Online] 16 January 2013. [Cited: 15 February 2015.] http://www.
dw.de/the-interests-behind-frances-intervention-in-mali/a-16523792.
Birnbaum, Michael. 2014. Russia pressures Moldova and Ukraine ahead of signing
of EU Association Agreement. The Washington Post. [Online] 26 June 2014.
[Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/
russia-pressures-moldova-as-date-for-signing-of-eu-deal/2014/06/25/0d9ed50f
-42d3-47db-90f6-3073c03746b1_story.html.
Centre of strategic and international studies (CSIS). CSIS commission on smart
power. Centre of strategic and international studies (CSIS). [Online] 2007.
[Cited: 22 March 2015.] http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csis
smartpowerreport.pdf.
Cenusa, Denis et al. 2014. Russias Punitive Trade Policy Measures towards
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Centre for European Policy Studies. [Online]
25 September 2014. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.ceps.eu/
book/russia%E2%80%99s-punitive-trade-policy-measures-towards-ukrainemoldova-and-georgia.
Chilcoat, Colin. 2014. China Strengthening Claim To South China Sea Oil And Gas.
oilprice.com. [Online] 25 November 2014. [Cited: 15 February 2015.]
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/China-Strengthening-Claim-ToSouth-China-Sea-Oil-And-Gas.html.
Forsythe, David P. 2005. The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the
Red Cross. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Greenspan, Alan. 2007. The age of turbulence. Panzertruppen. [Online] no date.

[Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.panzertruppen.org/ebooks/ 27.pdf.
International

Commission

on Intervention

and State

Sovereignty.

The

Responsibility to Protect. International Coalition for the Responsibility to

Protect.

[Online]

2001.

[Cited:

March

2015.]

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS% 20Report.pdf.
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Military Balance 2015 Further
Assessments. IISS. [Online] 11 February 2015. [Cited: 15 February 2015.]
http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press
%20releases/archive/2015-4fe9/february-0592/military-balance-2015-furtherassessments-4723.
Jackson, Robert and Sorensen, Georg. 2013. Introduction to International
Relations: Theories and Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Jefferson, Thomas. 1801. First Inaugural Address. Princeton University. [Online] no
date. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected
-documents/first-inaugural-address-0.
Jeppesen, Helle. 2014. Military spending on the rise, except in the West. Deutsche
Welle. [Online] 13 April 2014. [Cited: 15 February 2015.] http://www.dw.de/
military-spending-on-the-rise-except-in-the-west/a-17561992.
Juhasz, Antonia. 2013. Why the war in Iraq was fought for Big Oil. CNN. [Online] 15
April 2013. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/
19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/.
Kagan, Robert. 2012. The World America Made. Alfred A. Knopf, 2012
Kates, Glenn and Luo, Li. 2014. Russian Gas: How Much Is That? Radio Free
Europe / Radio Liberty. [Online] 1 July 2014. [Cited: 14 February 2015.]
http://www.rferl.org/content/russian-gas-how-much-gazprom/25442003.html.
Langworth, Richard 2008. Churchill by Himself: The Definitive Collection of
Quotations. PublicAffairs, 2008.

Lebow, Richard N. 2013. Classical Realism. [book auth.] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and
Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Lebow, Richard N. 2007. Coercion, Cooperation, and Ethics in International
Relations. New York: Routledge, 2007.
Liang, Qiao and Xiangsui, Wang. 2002. Unrestricted Warfare: Chinas Master Plan
to Destroy America. Panama City: Pan American Publishing Company, 2012.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1950. The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The
National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions. The American Political Science
Review. December, 1950. Vol. 44, 4.
Norwegian Government. The Norwegian Governments High North Strategy.
Norwegian

Government.

[Online]

2006.

[Cited:

15

February

2015.]

https://www. regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/strategien.pdf.
Randerson, James. 2009. David King: Iraq was the first resource war of the
century. The Guardian. [Online] 12 February 2009. [Cited: 14 February 2015.]
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/feb/12/king-iraq-resources-war.
Russet, Bruce. 2013. Liberalism. [book auth.] Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve
Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Recknagel, Charles. 2014. Money Troubles: Russias Weak Rouble Pulls Down
Neighbours Currencies. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. [Online] 12
December 2014. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.rferl.org/content/russiaruble-effects-neighboring-countries/26738229.html.
Reilly, James. 2012 Chinas Unilateral Sanctions. Centre of strategic and
international studies (CSIS) [Online] 2012. [Cited: 14 February 2015.]
http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12FallReilly.pdf.
Rona, Gabor. 2004. The ICRCs status: in a class of its own. International
Committee of the Red Cross. [Online] 17 February 2004. [Cited: 31 March
2015.] https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm.

Royal African Society. Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa. The
London School of Economics and Political Science. [Online] March 2008.
[Cited:

22

March

2015.]

http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/

research/crisisStates/download/others/ICC%20in%20Africa.pdf.
Rubin,

James

P.

2003.

September/October

Stumbling
2003.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/

Into

War.

[Cited:

Foreign
14

Affairs.

[Online]

February

2015.]

articles/59183/james-p-rubin/stumbling-into-

war.
Samuels, David. 2007. A Conversation With Colin Powell. The Atlantic. [Online] 18
April 2007. [Cited: 8 March 2015.] http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2007/04/a-conversation-with-colin-powell/305873/.
Snyder, Jack. 2004. One World, Rival Theories. Foreign Policy. 1 November 2004.
Stanley J.B. 2014. Oil and gas in the Falklands Treasure islands? The Economist.
[Online]

28

February

2014.

[Cited:

15

February

2015.]

http://www.economist.com/blogs /americasview/ 2014/02/oil-and-gas-uk.

The Economist. Collateral damage. The Economist. [Online] 3 April 2003. [Cited: 14
February 2015.] http://www.economist.com/node/1683253.
The Economist. France in Africa. We cant help coming back. The Economist.
[Online] 15 July 2014. [Cited: 15 February 2015.] http://www.economist.com/
blogs/baobab/2014/07/france-africa.
The Economist. Oil on troubled waters. The Economist. [Online] 22 January 2015.
[Cited: 15 February 2015.] http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21640403two-case-studies-disputed-sea-oil-troubled-waters.
The Economist. On the edge of recession. The Economist. [Online] 2 October 2014.
[Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21621877wests-sanctions-are-hitting-contracting-economy-edge-recession.
UK Parliament Website. Daily Hansard Debate, 4 Mar 2014: Column 775. UK
Parliament Website. [Online] 4 Mar 2014. [Cited: 31 March 2015.]
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm140304/debt
ext/140304-0002.htm.

United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. United Nations. [Online] 26 June
1945.

[Cited:

March

2015.]

https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/

uncharter.pdf.
United Nations. Protecting Human Rights while countering terrorism. United
Nations.

[Online]

no

date.

[Cited:

March

2015.]

http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ terrorism-hr.shtml.
US Department of State. International Criminal Court. US Department of State.
[Online] no date. [Cited: 24 February 2015.] http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/icc/.
US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United
States, 19691976. Volume X, Vietnam, January 1973July 1975, Document
279. US Department of State, Office of the Historian. [Online] no date. [Cited:
22 March 2015.] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/
d279.
US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Milestones: 18991913.
Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 19001922. US
Department of State, Office of the Historian. [Online] no date. [Cited: 24
February

2015.]

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-

relations.
US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Milestones: 19771980. The
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the US Response, 19781980. US
Department of State, Office of the Historian. [Online] 31 October 2013. [Cited:
22

March

2015.]

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-

invasion-afghanistan.
US Energy Information Administration. South China Sea. US Energy Information
Administration. [Online] 2013. [Cited: 15 February 2015.] http://www.eia.gov/
countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs.
Walt, Stephen M. 2012. Getting Iran to say uncle might not be smart. Foreign
Policy.

[Online]

http://foreignpolicy.
smart/.

26

October

2012.

[Cited:

24

February

2015.]

com/2012/10/26/getting-iran-to-say-uncle-might-not-be-

Wang, Kevin and Ray, James L. 1994. Beginners and Winners: The Fate of
Initiators of Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers Since 1495. International
Studies Quarterly. March, 1994, Vol. 38, 1.
Wilson Centre. Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan. Wilson
Centre. [Online] no date. [Cited: 22 March 2015.] http://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/113260.
Wolf, Martin. 2001. Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization? Foreign Affairs.
[Online] February 2001. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/56665/martin-wolf/will-the-nation-state-survive-globalization.
World Trade Organization. Security exceptions. World Trade Organization. [Online]
no date. [Cited: 14 February 2015.] http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_
e/gatt_ai_e/art21 _e.pdf.