Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22579

February 23, 1968

ROLANDO LANDICHO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before the Court is
whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of the first
marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova
answered in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not
been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe
Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise
presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and
void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and
because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a thirdparty complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage
with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the
decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on
November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the
above order, which was likewise denied on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer within ten (10) days,
with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further proceeding with the prosecution of the
bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the
amendment consisting solely in the inclusion of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court
admitted such amended petition in a resolution of April 3, 1964.

Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement of facts as above
detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed upon the complaint of the first
spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are
actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial
questions are automatically raised in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for
bigamy." 1 The answer stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It continued, referring to
Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for this must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ."

This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this Court. In Merced v.
Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must be determined before hand in the
civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a
situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in
the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second
marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage is
determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the conclusion of this Court
then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second marriage which he contracted "must first
be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case
"before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the opinion of Justice
Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The
prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try
the same must be lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question
for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground
that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for
the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of
bigamy. . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February
27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then on March
15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and
intimidation. It was sometime later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil
action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed in the answer of respondent
Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party
complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started could have
been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question.
The above judicial decisions as well as the opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much
less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With
costs.1wph1.t
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141528

October 31, 2006

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,

vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of law: Does a
previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of
San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondents alleged
psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC
denied the petition in a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." 3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals
was likewise dismissed in a resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition 5for
declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent
was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent
filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondents motion to dismiss, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:

A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER
PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS WIFES
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND
DEFINITIVELY BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK
OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED
THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND
FORUM SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of
action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence
required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims
that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no
violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the present suit is
anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the
validity of petitioner and respondents marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover,
respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition
could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the
absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where
the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license
constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single
cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit."11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the
following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice
for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;

however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of
the death of the testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its concept as "bar by
prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains tores
judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action
pendantwhich ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future
case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by
prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it
is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an
orderon the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth
requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity
of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition
which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary
to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition,
a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. 17 In both petitions, petitioner
has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which
the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the
pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondents marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises
now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as
regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been
adjudged in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form
of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of
Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of
the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings
in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by
having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place
in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried
piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by
piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He
is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a
portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the
presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such
piecemeal presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. Once
an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues
therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering
time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over
again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997
of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137590

March 26, 2001

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family. 1 It is this
inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and provides the very bedrock on
which our society finds stability.2 Marriage is immutable and when both spouses give their consent to enter it, their
consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the
"permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of the Family
Code is the justification.3 Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration can free the parties from the
rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their marriage.

A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of procedural and
substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon petitioner, the State is
likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-compliance by the State with its
statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court4 is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals 5 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City6 dismissing petitioner Florence Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence")
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter
"Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. 7
On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for
"declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp. 8 Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.9
On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. 10
After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant."11
On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.12
On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 13
Hence, this appeal.14

The Court's Ruling

We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
Jose Danilo C. Jabson15 filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994, stating that he found no
collusion between the parties,16 he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his appearance at
certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to
encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
orderthe prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed (italics ours).

"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution
of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere proforma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision,17 briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095 (italics ours)." 18
The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not just at the trial
level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the "manifestation" filed with the trial court on
November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,19 while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we
nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely rendered" since the investigating
prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This
stresses the importance of the participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province of the trial
court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows (omitting guideline [8] in the
enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family
Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged
in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.

"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil
Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145370

March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which
dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the
petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They
had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 1970 3
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On
January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40,
against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a
plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the
petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila.4

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882,
together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all
improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the
petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent
vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged
in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." 7 The clerk of court issued summons to the
petitioner at the address stated in the petition. 8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by
substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons
and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6,
1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the
herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons.
Service was made on June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to
Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said
date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no
objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent
testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting
the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of
Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No.
NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent
committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a
resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in
fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According
to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately

secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused
the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano
B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio
M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the
order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and
(2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis
for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that
she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the
affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic,
Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by
petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition
is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial, or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition
in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic
fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no
longer available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This
petition is the only available remedy to her.16

The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondents marriage was
null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether
there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not
admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or
final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of
hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or
relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own.
The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in
the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy. 20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits
thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not
be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits. 21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she
received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended petition did not cure the
fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material
allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause
of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of
the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material
averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,
who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima
facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person
of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of
summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed
against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or
the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case
against him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her. 27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of
the summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be
effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him
and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed. 30 This statement
should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary
because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service
of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc.
No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff
on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable
time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that
Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias,
where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the
complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the
said summons and complaint.

4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been
residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the
conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers lot), my father
came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did
not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for
annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or
copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the
amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. However,
we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that
for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent
herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no
objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent exparte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The
actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9,
Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. 36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the
Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a
true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to
take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint,
the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on
the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating
such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13,
2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CAG.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of
this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.
23

SEC. 3. Period for filing action.If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
24

211 SCRA 879 (1992).

25

Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000).

26

United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001).

27

Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court.

28

Supra.

29

326 SCRA 278 (2000).

30

Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).

31

Ibid.

32

CA Rollo, p. 53.

33

Ibid.

34

Id. at 55-56.

35

Supra.

36

Supra.

37

268 SCRA 198 (1997).

38

Id. at 213.

39

355 SCRA 285 (2001).

40

Supra.

41

The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003.
Sec. 8. Answer.(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or
within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The
answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.
(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.
(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the
public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order
mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court
stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report.
The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from
receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and, if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pretrial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23433

February 10, 1968

GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.

On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for
the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It
was alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles
had contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the
same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the
defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she
was subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of their first child, who
died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with
having compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their
knowledge that he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963
when he was finally able to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is
involved in the case. It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by
force and intimidation employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint
affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion (pp. 22-32, Record on
Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it
can pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for
proof that when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid
marriage. The evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion
for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to
secure the nullification of said marriage. Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January

18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the
dismissal of the action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal to this Court from the
abovementioned orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and
amended record on appeal, dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter approved.
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from the lower court's
orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964; however, there is no indication or certification
or proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the
reglementary period, as required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Thereunder,
the record on appeal must contain, not only the full names of all the parties to the proceeding, as well as the
pleadings, petitions, motions and orders related to the order or judgment subject of the appeal and which are
necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved therein, but also "such data as will show that the
appeal was perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated in the new Rules of Court to enable the appellate
courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether an appeal was timely made or not, was held to be
jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the dismissal of the appeal. 1 There is here no showing that
the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum should have appeared in the record
on appeal.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary
judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly
prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not
countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, respondents.
Magno T. Bueser for petitioner.
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage
celebration, he discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations
with her prior to the marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the
marriage celebration, Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January,
1962 when he discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City
Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.

Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive
pleading, for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for
the presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the
provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for
investigation to determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his
report within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at
the trial of the case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City
Fiscal with copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and
guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to
bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27,
1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply
with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the
date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings
despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not
willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11,
1964, petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to
receive his evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct
that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or
not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to
prevent fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be
observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.

Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the
annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved
(Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised
Rules, with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the present Civil Code does not
authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage
and of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the
State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a
marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant
stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the
defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in
order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40;
Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs.
Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.
WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 175367

June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,

vs.
VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.
DECISION
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23, 1988. They have
two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were
psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In
addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time
of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondents petition are the following allegations, to wit:
x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically incapable of performing
and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the
time of the marriage. Said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband;
his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy
and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in
the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his familys needs. He
exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass
his wife even in the presence of their children.
Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very
quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom
was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to
gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely.
Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential
obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested psychological
aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological make-up of private respondent was
evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their
marital obligations is grave, incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality
Disorder with Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality
disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. 5
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the
petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the
interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order7 denying petitioners motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in an
Order8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioners motion, the RTC ruled that respondents petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the
allegations are meritorious would depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:
A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (268 SCRA 198),
otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of the root cause of the psychological incapacity of
both the petitioner and the respondent contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of
juridical antecedence was alleged in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of
psychological incapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in
paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in paragraph 15 of the
petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both parties. This, in
turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the hearing on the merits of the case. If the
Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidence to sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition
shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that
there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity. 9
On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition for certiorari 10 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondents complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the Family Code and the Molina doctrine revealed
the existence of a sufficient cause of action.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Courts consideration, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA
AND DANILO.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONERS ACTION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO
DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN,
ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12
Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondents complaint been filed after March 15, 2003, this
present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 13 prohibits the
filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of
the arguments raised by petitioner herein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of
cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.15
This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the above
pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the Solicitor General required in
the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance
of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. 16
Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient
to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends
that the petition failed to comply with three of the Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be alleged in the complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital
obligation must be stated in the petition.17
First, contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both
petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity.
Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a
disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent
suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers
from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform their
marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the
petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondents allegations fall under Article 68 of
the Family Code which states that "the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their
marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would
show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have
testified, and that a decision has been reached by the court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from
guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be
too burdensome to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are
sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.18 It would thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in
the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the testimonies of
the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.
Given the allegations in respondents petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It
must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 19 Even assuming arguendo that
this Court were to agree with petitioner that the allegations contained in respondents petition are insufficient and
that the RTC erred in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by
appeal and not an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.20
Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioners petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss, which is
an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to
dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse
decision, appeal the decision in due time.21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of
his petition for certiorari in the CA.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
13

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID
MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES)
Section 7. Motion to Dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed, except on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground
that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150656

April 29, 2003

MARGARITA ROMUALDEZ-LICAROS, petitioner,

vs.
ABELARDO B. LICAROS, respondent.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 9 August 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 58487, as well as the Resolution dated 23 October 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition to annul the following decisions 3 rendered by Branch 143 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati:
(1) The Decision dated 27 December 19904 granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of
the spouses Abelardo B. Licaros and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros;
(2) The Decision dated 8 November 19915 declaring the marriage between the same spouses null and void.
The Facts

The antecedent facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

x x x Abelardo Licaros (Abelardo, for short) and Margarita Romualdez-Licaros (Margarita, hereafter) were
lawfully married on December 15, 1968. Out of this marital union were born Maria Concepcion and
Abelardo, Jr. Ironically, marital differences, squabbles and irreconcilable conflicts transpired between the
spouses, such that sometime in 1979, they agreed to separate from bed and board.
In 1982, Margarita left for the United States and there, to settle down with her two (2) children. In the
United States, on April 26, 1989, Margarita applied for divorce before the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo (Annex "1", Rejoinder, pp. 164-165) where she manifested that she does not
desire counseling at that time (Quotation, p. 166, Rollo). On August 6, 1990, Margarita was granted the
decree of divorce (Annex 2, Answer, p. 108, Rollo) together with a distribution of properties between
her and Abelardo (pp. 167-168, Rollo).
Not long after, on August 17, 1990, Abelardo and Margarita executed an "Agreement of Separation of
Properties" (pp. 60-64, Rollo). This was followed-up by a petition filed on August 21, 1990 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses and for
the approval of the agreement of separation of their properties. This was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 2551. On December 27, 1990, a decision was issued granting the petition and approving the
separation of property agreement.
For his part, on June 24, 1991, Abelardo commenced Civil Case No. 91-1757, for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Margarita, based on psychological incapacity under the New Family Code. As Margarita
was then residing at 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton, California, U.S.A., Abelardo initially moved that summons
be served through the International Express Courier Service. The court a quo denied the motion. Instead, it
ordered that summons be served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time furnishing respondent a copy of the order, as well as the
corresponding summons and a copy of the petition at the given address in the United States through the
Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of Abelardo. Respondent was given sixty (60) days after
publication to file a responsive pleading.
On July 15, 1991, Process Server, Maximo B. Dela Rosa, submitted his Officers Return quoted hereunder:
"OFFICERS RETURN
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on July 3, 1991, I have served a copy of summons and complaint with annexes
together with order dated June 28, 1991 issued by the Court in the above-entitled case upon defendant
Margarita Romualdez-Licaros c/o DFA. (sent by Mail) thru Pat G. Martines receiving Clerk of Department of
Foreign Affairs a person authorized to receive this kind of process who acknowledged the receipt thereof at
ADB Bldg., Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, Metro Manila." (p. 40, Rollo)
As required by law, the case was referred to Trial Prosecutor Bruselas, Jr. to find out any possible collusion between
the parties in the case. Thereafter, with the negative report of collusion, Abelardo was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte. On November 8, 1991, the Decision (Annex "A", Petition) was handed down in Civil Case No.
91-1757 declaring the marriage between Abelardo and Margarita null and void.
Almost nine (9) years later, on April 28, 2000, the petition at bench was commenced when Margarita received a
letter dated November 18, 1991 from a certain Atty. Angelo Q. Valencia informing her that she no longer has the
right to use the family name "Licaros" inasmuch as her marriage to Abelardo had already been judicially dissolved
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on November 8, 1991. Asseverating to have immediately made some
verifications and finding the information given to be true, petitioner commenced the instant petition on the
following grounds:
(A) THERE WAS EXTRINSIC FRAUD IN THE PREPARATION AND FILING BY ABELARDO OF THE PETITION FOR
DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS AND ITS ANNEX, THE AGREEMENT OF
SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES.

(B) THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals debunked the claim of Margarita that there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by
Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation
of Properties. The Court of Appeals stated:
x x x, the extrinsic fraud alluded to consists of Abelardo coercing Margarita into signing the petition to
dissolve their conjugal partnership of gains together with the agreement of separation of properties, by
threatening to cut-off all financial and material support of their children then still studying in the United
States; that petitioner had no hand directly or indirectly in the preparation of the petition and agreement of
separation of properties; that petitioner never met the counsel for the petitioner, nor the notary public who
notarized the deed; and, petitioner never received any notice of the pendency of the petition nor a copy of
the decision.
Antithetically, a meticulous perusal of the controversial petition (Annex "B-1") and the agreement of
separation of properties (pp. 60-64, Rollo) readily shows that the same were signed by the petitioner on
the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of the petition. The same is true
with the agreement of separation of properties. What is striking to note is that on August 6, 1990,
Margarita appeared before Amado P. Cortez, Consul of the Republic of the Philippines at the San Francisco,
California, United States Consulate Office, to affirm and acknowledge before said official that she executed
the agreement of separation of properties of her own free will and deed, after being informed of the
contents thereof. And yet, there is no showing that Abelardo was with her at the Philippine Consulate Office
in confirming the separation of property agreement. Moreover, on page 2 of the same agreement, it is
specifically stated that such property separation document shall be "subject to approval later on by the
proper court of competent jurisdiction." The clear import of this is that the agreement must have to be
submitted before the proper court for approval, which explains and confirms petitioners signature on the
petition filed in court.
In main, We see no indication nor showing of coercion or fraud from these facts, which could very well be
considered as extrinsic or collateral fraud to justify a petition under Rule 47. From all indications, the
pretended coerced documents were rather freely and voluntarily executed by the parties therein knowing
fully well the imports thereof. This conclusion finds more weight if We consider the fact that the separation
of property was fully implemented and enforced, when apparently both parties correspondingly received
the properties respectively assigned to each of them under the said document. 7
The Court of Appeals also rejected Margaritas claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide
thePetition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for improper service of summons on her. The case involves the
marital status of the parties, which is an action in rem or quasi in rem. The Court of Appeals ruled that in such an
action the purpose of service of summons is not to vest the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but "only" to comply with due process. The Court of Appeals concluded that any irregularity in the
service of summons involves due process which does not destroy the trial courts jurisdiction over the res which is
the parties marital status. Neither does such irregularity invalidate the judgment rendered in the case. Thus, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment, stating that:
At bar, the case involves the personal (marital) status of the plaintiff and the defendant. This status is
theres over which the Philippine court has acquired jurisdiction. This is also the kind of action which the
Supreme Court had ruled that service of summons may be served extraterritorially under Section 15
(formerly Section 17) of Rule 14 and where such service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting
the trial court with jurisdiction over the person of the defendant but only for the purpose of complying with
the requirements of fair play and due process. A fortiori, the court a quo had properly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner-defendant when summons was served by publication and a
copy of the summons, the complaint with annexes, together with the Order of June 28, 1991, was served to
the defendant through the Department of Foreign Affairs by registered mail and duly received by said
office to top it all. Such mode was upon instruction and lawful order of the court and could even be treated
as any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 8

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues
The issues raised by Margarita are restated as follows:
I. Whether Margarita was validly served with summons in the case for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Abelardo;
II. Whether there was extrinsic fraud in the preparation and filing by Abelardo of the Petition for Dissolution
of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Validity of the Service of Summons on Margarita
Margarita insists that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over her person in the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage since she was never validly served with summons. Neither did she appear in court to submit
voluntarily to its jurisdiction.
On the other hand, Abelardo argues that jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant in an action in
rem or quasi in rem is not necessary. The trial and appellate courts made a clear factual finding that there was
proper summons by publication effected through the Department of Foreign Affairs as directed by the trial court.
Thus, the trial court acquired jurisdiction to render the decision declaring the marriage a nullity.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. 9
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15,10 Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. 11
Actions in personam12 and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or quasi in rem are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.13
At the time Abelardo filed the petition for nullity of the marriage in 1991, Margarita was residing in the United
States. She left the Philippines in 1982 together with her two children. The trial court considered Margarita a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. Since the petition affects the personal status of the plaintiff,
the trial court authorized extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The
term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the relations between husband and wife. 14
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with
summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4) when the property of
the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of
the court by registered mail to the defendants last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other
means the judge may consider sufficient.
Applying the foregoing rule, the trial court required extraterritorial service of summons to be effected on Margarita
in the following manner:
x x x, service of Summons by way of publication in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, at the same time, furnishing respondent copy of this Order as well as the
corresponding Summons and copy of the petition at her given address at No. 96 Mulberry Lane, Atherton,
California, U.S.A., thru the Department of Foreign Affairs, all at the expense of petitioner.15 (Emphasis
ours)
The trial courts prescribed mode of extraterritorial service does not fall under the first or second mode specified in
Section 15 of Rule 14, but under the third mode. This refers to "any other means that the judge may consider
sufficient."
The Process Servers Return of 15 July 1991 shows that the summons addressed to Margarita together with the
complaint and its annexes were sent by mail to the Department of Foreign Affairs with acknowledgment of receipt.
The Process Servers certificate of service of summons is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the
certificate.16 Before proceeding to declare the marriage between Margarita and Abelardo null and void, the trial
court stated in its Decision dated 8 November 1991 that "compliance with the jurisdictional requirements
hav(e) (sic) been duly established." We hold that delivery to the Department of Foreign Affairs was sufficient
compliance with the rule. After all, this is exactly what the trial court required and considered as sufficient to effect
service of summons under the third mode of extraterritorial service pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 14.
Second Issue: Validity of the Judgment Dissolving the Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Margarita claims that Abelardo coerced her into signing the Petition for Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains ("Petition") and its annex, the Agreement of Separation of Properties ("Agreement"). Abelardo allegedly
threatened to cut off all financial and material support to their children if Margarita did not sign the documents.
The trial court did not find anything amiss in the Petition and Agreement that Abelardo filed, and thus the trial court
approved the same. The Court of Appeals noted that a meticulous perusal of the Petition and Agreement readily
shows that Margarita signed the same on the proper space after the prayer and on the portion for the verification of
the petition. The Court of Appeals observed further that on 6 August 1990, Margarita appeared before Consul
Amado Cortez in the Philippine Consulate Office in San Francisco, California, to affirm that she executed the
Agreement of her own free will. There was no showing that Abelardo was at that time with her at the Philippine
Consulate Office. Abelardo secured judicial approval of the Agreement as specifically required in the Agreement.
The Court is bound by the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts that the parties freely and voluntarily
executed the documents and that there is no showing of coercion or fraud. As a rule, in an appeal by certiorariunder
Rule 45, the Court does not pass upon questions of fact as the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are
binding on the Court. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court will not examine the evidence introduced by the
parties below to determine if the trial and appellate courts correctly assessed and evaluated the evidence on
record.17
The due and regular execution of an instrument acknowledged before an officer authorized to administer oaths
cannot be overthrown by bare allegations of coercion but only by clear and convincing proof. 18 A person
acknowledging an instrument before an officer authorized to administer oaths acknowledges that he freely and
voluntarily executed the instrument, giving rise to a prima facie presumption of such fact.
In the instant case, Margarita acknowledged the Agreement before Consul Cortez. The certificate of
acknowledgment signed by Consul Cortez states that Margarita personally appeared before him and "acknowledged
before me that SHE executed the same of her own free will and deed."19 Thus, there is a prima

facie presumption that Margarita freely and voluntarily executed the Agreement. Margarita has failed to rebut
thisprima facie presumption with clear and convincing proof of coercion on the part of Abelardo.
A document acknowledged before a notary public is prima facie evidence of the due and regular execution of the
document.20 A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity in its execution, and to contradict
the same, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 21
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58487 dismissing the petition to annul
judgment is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
9

Cano-Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, 2 October 2000, 341 SCRA 670.

10

Formerly Section 17, to wit: "SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of
which is property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent,
or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected
out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other manner the court
may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than
sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer." Now Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
11

12

Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108538, 22 January 1996, 252 SCRA 92.

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be personally
served, substituted service, as provided in Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is essential for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to
the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but
otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication in
accordance with Sections 17 and 18 of the same Rule, see Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803, 25
September 1998, 296 SCRA 538.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should
govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of
psychological incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102).
After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted
the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which
parent they would want to stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the
other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50,
51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper
recording in the registry of marriages. 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the
children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired
by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the
provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply. 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null
and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be
governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to
the procedure for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the
procedure for the liquidation of the absolute community of property. 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling: he argues that:
I
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II

Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay. 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases; 6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all
of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a
party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not
included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code;
in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and

(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of
their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party
who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so
existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of
the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter
case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between
common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
95) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 4014 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes
the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial
decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity
by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicablepro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of
the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No
costs.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
7 Art. 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are Incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full-or half-blood.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth
civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
8 Article 147, Family Code.
9 Article 147, Family Code.
10 Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code.
11 Article 148, Family Code.
12 Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article
44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
propitious of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children. and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial
proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall
be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered In cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value
of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as
advances on their legitime.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in
the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect the third
persons.
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared; listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets.
In case of insufficiency of the said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall be thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such shares provided in this Code. For purposes of computing
the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The Presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition,
in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated the the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of the said children.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset
thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the
acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.

(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the
conjugal assets. In the case of insufficiency of the said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties , in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(6) Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or
deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition
in accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of the said children.
13 Art 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce
the following effects:
(1) The children of subsequent marriage concieved prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be decided
by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be,
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children,
the incorrect spouse.
(3) Donations by reasons of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse my revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted as a
beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable;
and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified
in inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
14 Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

15 Art 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-rounded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect or reappearance of the absent spouse.
16 Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated
by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with the
due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance
being judicially determined in such case such fact is disputed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 140484

January 28, 2008

ISABELITA SEVILLA CASTRO, petitioner,

vs.
LAMBERTO RAMOS CASTRO; RTC of Valenzuela, Branch 75 JUDGE JAIME F. BAUTISTA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 seeking the nullification of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 75, on August 19, 1998, and its Orders issued respectively on May 5, 1999, July 1,
1999 and September 20, 1999, in Civil Case No. 180-V-98 entitled "Lamberto R. Castro v. Isabelita S. Castro."
The facts are as follows:2
A petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
was filed by private respondent Lamberto R. Castro against petitioner Isabelita S. Castro on July 1, 1998.
Summons, along with a copy of the petition for annulment, was allegedly received by petitioners nephew on her
behalf at her residence.
For failure of petitioner to file an answer, the RTC ordered the state prosecutor to conduct an investigation and to
submit to the court a report thereon.

The state prosecutor submitted a report stating that no collusion existed between the parties in the filing of the
petition. The petition was set for hearing on August 18, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. For failure of petitioner to appear and to
file any responsive pleading to contest the petition, the trial court allowed private respondent to present his
evidence ex parte in the presence of the state prosecutor.
At the ex-parte hearing, private respondent stated that he married petitioner in 1958. They have four children but
they have been living apart for a number of years prior to the filing of the petition. Private respondent alleged that
their relationship did not last because petitioner was irresponsible, violent, and had failed to show love and
affection towards him and their children, and had an illicit affair with the family driver which prompted him (private
respondent) to file an adultery case against her. He added that petitioner had neurotic and psychotic tendencies,
and was always mad at him for no apparent reason.
To support private respondents petition, Regine Marmee C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist, was presented to testify
on petitioners psychological incapacity based on the psychological tests that she conducted on both parties.
According to her, the tests revealed that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated, hence, unable to perform her
marital obligations.
On August 19, 1998, public respondent Judge Jaime F. Bautista granted the petition. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and the
marriage of petitioner and respondent on January 30, 1958 is hereby declared ANNULLED.
SO ORDERED.3
On September 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside/Declare Judgment Null and Void 4 on the ground that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person for failure to serve summons and a copy of the petition.
She averred that the sheriffs return was invalid because she had no nephew residing with her, and no earnest effort
was shown by the sheriff to serve the summons and a copy of the petition before resorting to substituted service.
Petitioner also claimed that the allegations made by private respondent were false, and that the real reason for
filing the petition for annulment was so that he can marry his concubine.
Private respondent filed an Opposition to Respondents Motion to Set Aside Judgment asserting that summons was
properly served on petitioner. After petitioner had filed her Reply, the trial court issued an Order on March 2, 1999
declaring that:
Before this court is respondents Motion for Reconsideration, whereupon the petitioner, through counsel,
filed [his] Opposition.
Finding the Opposition to be with merit, insofar as the absence of contrary evidence from the respondent,
the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED PARTIALLY, hence, the decision or judgment of this
court is hereby tentatively set aside and the respondent is hereby allowed to present contrary evidence
which is hereby set for March 29, 1999 at 10:00 oclock in the morning.
...
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners counsel filed a motion for postponement which was granted by the trial court. The hearing was reset to
May 5, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
On April 21, 1999, however, petitioners counsel again moved for the postponement of the May 5, 1999 hearing to
June 16, 1999.6
Notwithstanding petitioners motion for postponement, the trial court, on May 5, 1999, issued an Order affirming
the Decision dated August 19, 1998, thus:

When this case was called for hearing today, only Atty. Froilan Zapanta was present in court. Although
absent, respondents counsel, Teresita Marbibi, had earlier filed a "Motion for Postponement."
Upon manifestation of Atty. Zapanta, considering that the respondents counsel, time and again, has been
filing motions to postpone, the respondent is hereby deemed to have waived her right to present
countervailing evidence and the Decision dated August 19, 1998 is hereby ordered MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner received a copy of the Order on May 7, 1999. She filed a motion for reconsideration 8 on May 19, 1999,
asserting that private respondent neither opposed the motion for postponement nor did she receive any order from
the court denying the same. She likewise pointed out that public respondent should have allowed her the chance to
present contrary evidence in court.
After private respondent filed his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. On July 1, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. 9
Petitioner received the Order on July 16, 1999, and on July 19, 1999, she filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial
court10 against which a Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed by private respondent. 11
On September 20, 1999, the trial court issued an Order maintaining its Decision dated August 19, 1998, thus:
Before this Court are several contrasting pleadings propounded by the contending parties through their
respective counsels. It appears, however, that the petitioners "Motion to Dismiss Appeal" vis--vis the
Opposition thereto as well as the related pleadings, is with MERIT. In other words, the arguments or
reasons propounded therein by the movant appear to be INDUBITABLE, hence, the Opposition thereto is
accordingly DENIED, and consequently, the said Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The Decision of this court dated August 19, 1998 is hereby ordered MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.

12

The decision having become final and executory on October 11, 1999, the trial court issued an entry of judgment on
October 29, 1999.13
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that:
One, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her (petitioner);
Two, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction when it issued
the Decision dated August 19, 1998; and
Lastly, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied her appeal, and maintained the assailed
decision.
Petitioner argues as follows:
First, there was no valid service of summons; hence, the trial court had no right or power to render judgment
against her. The sheriffs return stated that summons was served through petitioners nephew without an
explanation why a substituted service was resorted to. Also, petitioner does not have any nephew living at her
residence;

Second, the finding of the trial court that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity is devoid of merit. The
allegations of private respondent merely showed that they could not get along with each other. There had been no
showing of any psychological defect on the part of petitioner or the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability;
Third, the trial court erred in not setting the case for pre-trial and trial which is a mandatory requirement under
Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. It rendered a decision without any evidence presented by petitioner. The
court merely relied on the fabricated report of the public prosecutor as the latter did not actually interview her or
conduct any investigation on the matter; and
Lastly, the notice of appeal filed by petitioner on July 19, 1999 was an appeal from the Order dated July 1, 1999,
which was an interlocutory order. This was, however, dismissed by public respondent. Petitioner, therefore, has no
other recourse but to file the present petition for certiorari.
The petition fails.
This Court finds no reason to set aside the findings of the trial court. The records show that petitioner was
personally informed of the petition for annulment, and as stated by the trial court, petitioner received the summons
and the petition on July 15, 1998. She "acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing her signature on the original copy
of said summons dated July 13, 1998."14 Petitioner neither denied nor refuted this.
Petitioners claim that she was never informed of the proceedings is unbelievable because she even submitted
herself to a series of psychological examination performed by public respondents expert witness, Regine Marmee
C. Cosico, a clinical psychologist.
Petitioner was afforded due process and the trial court acquired jurisdiction over her person. Even assuming that
petitioner did not receive the summons, she was deemed to have submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court when she filed a motion to set aside/declare judgment null and void. 15 After the trial court had granted her
motion and she was given the opportunity to present contrary evidence, she and her counsel failed to appear on
the scheduled hearings for this purpose.
Finally, the trial courts decision had already become final and executory, and judgment was entered on October 29,
1999. For this reason and on account of private respondents death on January 14, 2004, 16 the judgment is binding
on both parties. Section 24 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages17 provides:
Sec. 24. Effect of death of a party; duty of the Family Court or Appellate Court. (b) If the party dies
after the entry of judgment of nullity or annulment, the judgment shall be binding upon the parties and
their successors in interest in the settlement of the estate in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 75, on August 19, 1998, and its Orders issued respectively on May 5, 1999, July 1, 1999 and September 20,
1999, in Civil Case No. 180-V-98, are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43701

March 6, 1937

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.

ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for oppositor-appellant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the
intestate proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escao, denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new
administrator and (2) to set aside the order of May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it
unwarranted to declare that the properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said deceased, but
reserving to the parties the right to discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and which are conjugal;
(4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933. granting to the administrator fees in the sum of P10,000, and that of
June 26, 1933, approving the project of portion and the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another
project of partition and final account.
As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her
entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix
Hortiguela, her widower by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity
of the guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees, as such, be
fixed at P10,000 which was granted by the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented
an inventory of the properties left by said deceased Marciana Escao, a final account of his administration, and a
project of partition of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his
share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter, who
was a minor, was represented in the proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. The project of partition
and final account were approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective
grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was
the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never was a valid marriage between her
mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that
it were valid, Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the
petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by
counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been
committed many errors and inaccuracies which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the
administrator were highly unreasonable and unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings;
(b) that her husband appointed special administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix
Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d) that the partition of the properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be
declared null and void that petitioner be declared the only universal heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in
case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao, Hortiguela be declared not entitled
to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the administrator's account be corrected; the latter be granted a
remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received, the court issued the order of
March 14, 1935, the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Both parties appealed
therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's
alleged marriage to Marciana Escao was celebrated.

It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was
ever heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at
the instance of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month,
the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the
provisions of article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take
effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof in
the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official
Gazette during the month of December, 1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23,
1921, the court issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having
been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were
married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the
order of October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of
the celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2,
of General Orders, No. 68, the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void. This
court does not believe so. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate
of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be
counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from
said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana
Escao, the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog.
Angelita Jones assigns as one of the errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does
not affect the efficacy and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage
must transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate
shall be fined not less than twenty-five and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure to
transmit such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. Interpreting this legal provision,
the Supreme Court, in its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while
the latter was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage
certificate not being one said requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries,
marriages recorded in their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts
to such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when
through the omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the
marriage, it was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."

Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her
daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married
Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She
certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to
section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her
death there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession,
as in the present case (6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her
widower and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933,
approving the partition of the properties of the intestate estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged
therein as one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be
considered that the petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the
proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own
sum of P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his
deceased wife. Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases
wherein Attorney Faelnar has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by the
administrator is a reasonable and moderate compensation. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no
reason to contribute to the payment of Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the fact that said attorney's
professional services were rendered for the benefit of the administration of the estate of the deceased Escao prior
to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect
the sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and considering the importance of the inheritance in
question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration proceedings this court is of the opinion that
the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's
fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to
order the presentation of another project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix
Hortiguela and this court is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction that no
appeal was ever taken therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under
section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the above-cited section refer to
grounds other than those upon which Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.
For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside
the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the
final account and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a
new project of partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of
May 9, 1932, relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the
properties of this intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana Escao reserving to the
parties the right to discuss which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz and Laurel, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165545

March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES,J.:
The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28, 20043 reversing the
Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case
No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 6
More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sorsogon
a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.
By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of the Notice of
Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby declared to [sic] all legal intents
and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.
SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted
marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10
On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960 and a retiree
pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11
Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.
Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted by the SSS on
April 6, 1998.14
Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the
SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three
marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of
whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the
documents submitted by respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious.
In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit dated February
13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who cohabited as husband and wife as
early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the necessary court action to contest the marriage
between Bailon and respondent as they personally know that Alice is "still very much alive." 16
In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P.
Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailons death, 17 he further attesting in a sworn
statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses.
Elisa and seven of her children 19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailons beneficiaries before the
SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the cancellation of
payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the refund of the amount paid to
her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that
she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year
guaranteed pension to Bailons beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the
amount erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation in declaring
the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.
xxxx
x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did not become
final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.
xxxx
3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad faith, and is the
deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.
xxxx
In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his marriage to
Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of reappearance to terminate
the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable
marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)
In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000, 22 advised respondent that as Cecilia and
Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailons funeral expenses, she should return the P12,000 paid to her.
In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999, 23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of her monthly
pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that her marriage with Bailon was
void as it was contracted while the latters marriage with Alice was still subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI
Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the
validity of the order. It thus requested respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of
monthly pension she had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS dated October
12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she reiterated her request for the release
of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon was not declared before any court of justice as
bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon
designated her as his beneficiary.
The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000, 26 maintained the denial of her claim for and the
discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she was not deprived of her right to
file a petition with the SSC.
Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her entitlement to
monthly pension.
In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount of P12,000
representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings "forcibly and coercively
prevented her from spending any amount during Bailons wake." 28
After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondents petition, and the parties filed their respective Position Papers, one
Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch attesting that she is the widow of

Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is
not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have easily located her, she having stayed at her parents residence
in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her
even after their separation.
By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void and, therefore, she
was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the legitimate
spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.
Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00 representing the death
benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999 as well as P12,000.00 representing the
funeral benefit.
The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising from the
demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as Section 13 of the SS
Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this Commission of its compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.
After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable conclusion that
the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.
xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of Sorsogon (10th
Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member represented in bad faith. This
Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in its Memorandum dated August 9,
1999,32revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona, Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente
Bailon x x x.
As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and by exerting
fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the deceased member the right to
marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is void, considering that the first marriage on April
25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled, invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the
parties thereto. x x x as determined through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the
abandoning spouse, not Alice Diaz Bailon.
xxxx
It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law wife of the deceased
member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary, to the latters death benefit. x x x
xxxx
It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary beneficiary of
Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she received from the SSS for the
period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti x x x
Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and burial of Clemente
Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her by the SSS as funeral
benefit.33(Underscoring supplied)

Respondents Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a petition for
review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).
By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June 4, 2003 Order of
the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due her. Held the CA:
x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the then CFI, now
RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more importantly, whether or not the
respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the
latters decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare
the first marriage subsisting and the second marriage null and void?
xxxx
x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as the finding that
"the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the second marriage contracted by
a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the competent court that can nullify the second
marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. Nowhere does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly
declare the second marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision
of the RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.
Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular courts under the
pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members. Notwithstanding its opinion as to the
soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x
x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the decision of the RTC
to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of fair play and thus its findings are of
doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given ample opportunity to present evidence for and
her behalf.
xxxx
Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil Registry is no
longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore as the marital bond between
Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the latters death. Neither is there a second marriage
to terminate because the second marriage was likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.
However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the respondent SSS has now the
authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare the second marriage null and void.36(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the SSS present petition for review on certiorari 38 anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION. 39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the prior and
subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to determine to whom,
between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant to Section 5 40 of the Social Security
Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due process or ample opportunity to present evidence in
her behalf.
The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no moment to the
present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of the SSCs finding of the
existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by virtue of which Alice has a better right to
the death benefits."41
The petition fails.
That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and contributions, there is
no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less reverse, decisions rendered by courts
of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through
fraud and subsequently disregarded the same, making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and
Alices marriage on the one hand and the invalidity of Bailon and respondents marriage on the other.
In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court. The law does not
give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine
the beneficiaries of the SSS.
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.42
Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of
the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is
deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases
rests on the party assailing the second marriage.44
In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years 45 when Bailon sought the
declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of
remarriage.46
Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:
Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the
second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that the first
marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had

not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant
from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance
of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47(Underscoring
supplied)
Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a
case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.
Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus Article 42
thereof provides:
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by
therecording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to
the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of the Family Code
does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49
If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court
action, such absentees mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will
not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the
former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouses physical reappearance, and by fiction of
law, he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.51
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial
declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:
x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of dissolution of
valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be raised, because, as in annullable
or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except in a direct action for annulment.52(Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2,
of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for
seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the
Code, requiring that the action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the
parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding. 54 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 55 Upon
the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons and respondents marriage prior
to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
40

SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission,
and any case filed with respect thereto shall be heard by the Commission, or any of its members, or by hearing
officers duly authorized by the Commission and decided within the mandatory period of twenty (20) days after the
submission of the evidence. The filing, determination and settlement of disputes shall be governed by the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission.
xxxx
41

Rollo, p. 28.

42

Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
43

Article 41 of the Family Code now provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

44

Armas v. Calisterio, 386 Phil. 402, 409 (2000).

45

CA rollo, p. 8.

46

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, 183 (1937).

47

I A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 282 (1999 ed.). (Citations
omitted)
48

Art. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be
dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Art. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
xxxx
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her
lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
xxxx
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family
Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the
marriage be declared null and void. 1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess
a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead," 2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his
marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet
Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to respondent's
hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in
the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment contract
as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working
overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son.

The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked
permission to leave his ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved
fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton,
Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also
claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica Parker despite his
lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such
information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet Monica's
disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her daughter-in-law
Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7
December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother
replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that
she had tried to dissuade Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but
when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22
December 1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's present
whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order
No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17, 1987) this Court hereby
declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her
reappearance. 4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for
such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis
to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where the following
allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a well-founded
belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition was a
proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family Code. 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that
his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under

the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, 7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4)
years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil
Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead andbelieved to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391
of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee
is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years
if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he had complied
with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that
case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the
whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of his wife,
he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first
wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning
her whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits
that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead
of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I
went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference between
London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places could mean one place
in England, the port where his ship docked and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks,
every time they leave home to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Paraaque, would
announce to friends and relatives, "We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of
places of destination does not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and
Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350)
kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of
somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says he did can be
regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal
background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her.
The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims
were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals
ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of
evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted
before, there are serious doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony
merely tended to show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances,
and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from
January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose.
Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place
of residence. 19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other
authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and
respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a
well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda,

20

the Court stressed that:

. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by
virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of them leave
the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes
that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it impossible to
dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care, still the
requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his
petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an
ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
familyand an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property
relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,

23

the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.

. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State
bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are
governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his absent wife was
already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial court's decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any other person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the
spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of the
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner,
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY * and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents

MARTINEZ, J.:
Which should prevail between the ratio decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary issue in this petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who opposes respondent Isabel's petition for
appointment as administratrix of her grandmother's estate by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were
married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita
Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage
soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay filed a criminal case 1 against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) 2 a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care of their
children who were living with their mother. 3 The suit was docketed as civil case number Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel CojuangcoSuntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between the parties. It
being admitted by the parties and shown by the record that the question of the case and custody
of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties in another
branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in this case.
With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third party
defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is willing to accept the
offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the defendant is awarded said sum of
P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P5.000.00.
SO ORDERED.

(Emphasis supplied).

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans Memorial Hospital.
Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out
of the hospital he continued to be under observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic) existing at the
time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient,
that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic). 5 (Emphasis supplied).
On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina AguinaldoSuntay. The latter is respondent Isabel's paternal grandmother. The decedent died on June 4, 1990 without
leaving a will. 6
Five years later or on October 26, 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) 7 a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late
grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay which case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her
petition, she alleged among others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that
she be appointed as administratrix of the estate. 8
On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse of the decedent, that
he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has been alive and is better situated to
protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that petitioner and her family have been alienated from the
decedent and the Oppositor for more than thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be
issued instead to him. 9
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to dismiss the special
proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the
decedent's estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child
has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay, respondent Isabel's father predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened
succession by representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal
that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no
right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent. 10 On October 16, 1997, the trial court
issued the assailed order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. 11 When his motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court in an order dated January 9, 1998, 12 petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to dismiss as well as his
motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is appropriate in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of
the decision declaring the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents "null and void" must be upheld; and (d) said
decision had long become final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioner's motion to dismiss was alte having been filed after the
opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an ordinary civil action and that petitioner in
his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny respondent Isabel's allegation that she is a legitimate child of
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the decedent's son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a
miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict
between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage, the

court either sustains the validity of the marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing declare a marriage
"voidable" otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article 85 of the Civil
Code before they are annulled is "voidable."
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a)
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. 13 There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. 14
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted thereunder, to wit:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent laws
applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate considering the
peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an ordinary civil action. At the
outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and the petitioner was not called upon to
assert a cause of action against a particular defendant. Furthermore, the State has a vital interest
in the maintenance of the proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if
no heirs qualify, the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.
xxx xxx xxx
The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file and
maintain this special proceedings, that in the case bench, the body of the decision determines the
nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of nullity.
The oppositor's contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex "A" Motion) prevails
over the body thereof is not without any qualification. It holds true only when the dispositive
portion of a final decision is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction.
Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be referred to
for purposes of construing the judgment (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v. Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of
Juan Presto v. Galang). The reason is that the dispositive portion must find support from the
decision's ratio decidendi.
Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex "A" of
oppositor's motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was
annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the
decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.). 15
The trial court correctly ruled that "a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate." The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings. 16 The Rules
do not only apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil Procedure, a motion to
dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said rule provides that the motion to dismiss
may be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint." Clearly, the motion should have
been filed on or before the filing of petitioner's opposition 17 which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil
actions.

Not only was petitioner's motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years after respondent Isabel
was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence and petitioner had presented two
witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence on this matter, as
petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in this case. In fact, the alleged
conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or
uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of
respondent Isabel's parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the
enactment of the Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has categorically declared that
the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void" and that the legal effect of such declaration is that the
marriage from its inception is void and the children born out of said marriage are illegitimate. Such argument
cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 18 of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while
Article 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. 19
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction
have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 20irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the annulment of a marriage dissolves
the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects
of the marriage from being totally wiped out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the
second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. 21 (Emphasis
supplied).
Stated otherwise, the annulment of "the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of the society
formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which the marital union
produced during its continuance." 22
Indeed, the terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal connotations and implications, Annul means to
reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away
with 23whereas null and void is something that does not exist from the beginning. A marriage that
is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have legal effect when it is terminated through a court
action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court simply declares a status or condition which already exists from the
very beginning.
There is likewise no merit in petitioner's argument that it is the dispositive portion of the decision which must
control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents was void or voidable. Such argument
springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is
a conflict between the body of the decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as
embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the
parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision or order which may be
somewhat confusing, 24 the same is not without a qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the
dispositive part of a final decision or order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without
need of interpretation or construction-which usually is "the case where the order or decision in question is that of a

court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on which the judgment is
based." 25
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of the decision, effort
must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give effect to the intention, purpose and
judgment of the court. In Republic v. de los Angeles 26 the Court said:
Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail." This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding upon the courts in relation to
its judgments.
. . .The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so as to bring all
of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation and so as
to give effect to every word and part if possible, and to effectuate the intention and purpose of
the Court, consistent with the provisions of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864) [Emphasis
supplied].
Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier shows that the marriage is
voidable:
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as
schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease
worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic)
treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, he remains bereft of adequate
understanding of right and wrong.
There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years
after plaintiff's mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong
indication of schizophernia (sic). 27
Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabel's
parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of
the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary
interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based on said provision the children
of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree
of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of
seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel,
may invoke their successional right of representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however,
without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of Administration may be granted

to her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over the
decedent's estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ruiz Castro,
emphasized to "all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercised
in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the
decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as
well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate
or interpretation. 28
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISIMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
18 Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and
female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 7;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of killing
of the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified
in Article 82. (n)
Art. 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;
(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a).
Arti. 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter
and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the
surviving spouse of the latter;
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a).

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouses of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court. (29a)
Art. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of
her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)
19 Art. 85 of the New Civil Code reads:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having
authority over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen
years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former
husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with
such former husband or wife was then in force;
(3) That either party, was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation,
unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such party, afterwards freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage physically incapable of
entering into the married state, and such incapacity continues, and appears to
be incurable.
20 Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a
complaint for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya,
plaintiff vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were
married on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's
counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the
judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital
secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before
it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from
going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within
the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the
annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as
he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he
denied having committed any fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for
her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that
had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did
not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to
shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely
happened to be the first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of
his whose immediate members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the
close relative);

(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he
loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and
obligations appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with
her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for
him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl
(referent being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff,
carried on a courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and
had several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been
litigated between them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was
postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was
legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed.
Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it
inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the
complaint; it also denied reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause
for its annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or
his wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two
years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband.

No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute

such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of
marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in
Article 85, fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and
voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in
general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the
specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of
pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such
intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the
article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to
annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been
thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her
consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it
agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her)
of the pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has,
likewise, alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his
marital duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that
the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention to perform
duties of consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the
second set of allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on
Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a partyplaintiff is not permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76
Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply.
Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part
not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action
for annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's
wedding was celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared
already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15853

July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita
Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being
alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to
plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was
pregnant by another man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a
child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the
plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose
Goco to represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the
only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared
nor presented any evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later
date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born
within 180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by
the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth
and delivery of the child born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed
to secure earlier and produce before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to
present the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in
denying the motion for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own,
and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when
he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be
denied, that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as
annexes thereof the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom
defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has
begotten two more children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the
father of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from
plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this
fact from plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as
husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26,
1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law;

6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954,
the November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four
months old at the time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on
the prayer for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an
answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court
of Appeals, on August 6, 1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru
the present petition for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in
relation to Art. 86, par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be
reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he
did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the
latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say that
her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It is
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122)
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking,
whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to
conceal the true state of affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and
gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months.
and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse
before they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural
and finds no support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already
been adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
should, therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial
fiscal has been ordered of represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the
contents of the motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the
circumstance, we think that justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without
costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166803

October 11, 2012

CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,

vs.
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH ROSE DE GARCIA
TERINGTERING, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated July H, 2004 and Resolution2 dated January 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
79966, setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 20034 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the Decision 5 dated February 12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto Teringtering (Jacinto), and in behalf of her
minor child, filed a complaint against petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine
Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial assistance, damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas employment contract with Crewlink, Inc. for
and in behalf of its foreign principal Gulf Marine Services, the details of which are as follows:
Duration of Contract

12 months

Position

Oiler

Basic Monthly Salary

US $385.00

Hours of Work

48 hrs/wk

Overtime

US $115.50

Vacation Leave with pay

1 mo. leave after

12 months

Point of Hire

Manila, Philippines

xxxx
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected to a pre-employment medical
examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit to work." Thus, her husband joined his vessel of assignment and
performed his duties as Oiler.
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of Health of the United Arab Emirates
wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and
sealing certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to the Philippines.
After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the payment of death compensation in
the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death
compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose de Gracia Teringtering but was refused
without any valid cause. Hence, a complaint was filed against the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it is enough that he died during the
term of his contract and while still on board. Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic
disorder, or Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his eventual death.
Respondent further asserted that her husbands death was not deliberate and not of his own will, but was a result of
a mental disorder, thus, compensable.
For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around 8:20 p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the
late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped into the sea, but the second engineer was able to recover him. Because of
said incident, one personnel was directed to watch Jacinto.

However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Oilfield and went on standby, Jacinto
jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but despite
efforts to revive him, he was already dead from drowning.
Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being claimed, because Jacinto committed
suicide. Despite the non-entitlement, however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of
P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the amount of US$792.51 representing
donations from the GMS staff and crew. Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and
exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late husband's untimely demise as the same
was due to his own doing.
As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's report on the incident, which we quote:
At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex
boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At 2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat cast
off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto jump and recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the
oiler.
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time informed to GMS personnel about the
accident, And we informed to A/B on duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man informed
that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And that time the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong current. And
the second Engr. jump to the sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered Mr.
Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss of life Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr
Complex to take doctor.
2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check the patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr
Complex Doctor the patient was already dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about the accident.
I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of my knowledge and reserve the right,
modify, ratify and/or enlarge this statement at any time and place, According to the law. 6
In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing, dismissed the case for lack of merit. The
Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of
employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the result of his deliberate or intentional
jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was directly attributable to him.
Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.
Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and sought the
nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated February 20, 2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters Decision dated
February 12, 2002.
On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the NLRC, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and,
accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries, namely respondent Editha
Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and
an additional amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of payment.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as petitioner, raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF
THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE
JUDGMENT OF THE NLRC;

II
WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT
AND SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS, WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN
THE ASSAILED CA DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF
THE DECEASED, BUT POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH THE LATTER ARE NOW
BEING HELD LIABLE ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF OBLIGATION THAT IS
PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS, HAS NO
REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE;
III
WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS
OWN LIFE, AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED, AND NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO
RULED BY THE LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT COMPENSABLE.
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the latter's death resulted from his
willful act. It argued that the rule that the employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died
during the effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from liability if he
can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or
willful act, as in this case.
We find merit in the petition.
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law in the absence of any
showing that the factual findings complained of are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We
are not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies
and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters,
are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a
showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter
disregard of the evidence on record. This case is no different.
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an accident but was deliberately done. Indeed,
Jacinto jumped off twice into the sea and it was on his second attempt that caused his death. The accident report of
Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the circumstances that led to Jacinto's death. The circumstances of
Jacinto's actions before and at the time of his death were likewise entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book and were
attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was
tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first attempt of committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to prevent
Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even shoved him and jumped anew which
eventually caused his death.
Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence presented as well as the findings of
the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired
expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts
when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there is no showing that said findings were arrived at
arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.
Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in this case. For precisely, the issue for
resolution here is the obligation of the employer to its employee should the latter die during the term of his
employment. The relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based on contract of employment and not
one of contract of carriage.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino
Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful
act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the
employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his
heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may be exempt from
liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his
deliberate or willful act.
In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's death was attributable to his deliberate
act of killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her
husband was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical report was given to support
her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start.
Homesickness and/or family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to
mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of
the usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
persons mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be
insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane based on the witness own perception of the
person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. 8 No such evidence was presented to support
respondent's claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the
grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice
be caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true that labor contracts are impressed with public interest
and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9
WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8,
2004, and its January 17, 2005 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW
Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-00, affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179620

August 26, 2008

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a
true intertwining of personalities.1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254.
The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989
at the Manila Cathedral.3 Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2)
Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994. 4 Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. 5
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on
the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, docketed as
LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as
medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married. 6
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture
of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a
harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on
their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple. 7 Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast
to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida. 8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when
she noticed Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.9She also found several pornographic homosexual
materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.
The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. 12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia
testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a onetime interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). 13 She concluded
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.14Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however,
maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida
came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began when
he refused to heed the memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to
desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. 16 Leonida's family owns Christ the
King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence. 17 In other words, he and
her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he
only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the love
and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his
mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship
because of her very jealous and possessive nature. 19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He wanted to
avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his
masculinity.20

To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at
Manuel's house during his weekly trips to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a
husband and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony. 21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He
denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date, 22 he and Manuel went straight home from a trip to
Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver. 23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by presenting his own expert witness.
However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its effects under the
law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with forfeiture of defendant's
share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with
visitorial right afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its finality in the Book of
Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to cause the registration of
the said Entry of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. It
ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations in the
complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is
more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero sexual
marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special
contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed
into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to
Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no
matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to live a normal
heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall
prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family. 25

Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no
jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in
toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in
Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition for
annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower Court.
But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary
appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an
ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise thereof.
"Excess" assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule
refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS. 29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.

Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.30 This is to prevent the party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most
rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are
available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,33 this
Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore,
they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that while the
Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations . Also, in some cases the Supreme
Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. 35 It
has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this Court to consider his petition
before the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for annulling
his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service
Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is
deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is
ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is
filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court. 38(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of
appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from
judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative Circular.
The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only a
minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals
should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the parties
concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules
would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified
in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this
Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the
strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and
treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity
or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a
statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of
the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His
counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of
appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition
for annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of
Manuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice
so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of
petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's
grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher
court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in
court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice
and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not
be made to suffer for the lawyer's mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of
lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the demands
of justice require it. With more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution of
marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
one's action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to
prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case from
the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. 53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought
back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v.
Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels and/or
beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in
the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity. 55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally
predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered
Manuel incapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the
ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is fire.
Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can bededuced from the totality of
the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own close
friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December
2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but
defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials.
Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more
important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be effected by these
people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him.
Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of
initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker,
reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff and
their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small details
in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what
clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant
taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends
(sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly seen

by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly
discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex identity becomes
stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case;
but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify
and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the expense
and humiliation of their children and family as a whole. 57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities
and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground
to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of homosexuality.59Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid
such fact to his wife.60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in
giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An
allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an
exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its
concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations 62 of the Committees on the Civil Code
and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for legal
separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment,"
while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the
ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage.
Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the
end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a valid
ground to annul a marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of
fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual
identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which would make
the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of
a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things, they would
cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health. 67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly
different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a
ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years, which
produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she
failed to discharge this onus.

The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found inVillanueva v.
Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the
instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of selfdefense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
xxx
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue
influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioner's
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basicautonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. 71 Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing
such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership.
In a valid marriage, both spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In the
same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is
upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted.
They remain the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the petition in
the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
14

Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality Disorder of lack of empathy or unresponsiveness to
the needs and feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements or expectations of automatic compliance,
manipulative and deceit stance, grandiose sense of self-importance, the strong need to seek approval and
recognition and to prove his self-worth with Anti-social Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and
lack of genuine remorse. Rigidly pervasive and egosyntonic in nature and hence no effective psychiatric therapeutic
modality could satisfactorily remedy his unremitting psychology, defendant's psychological incapacity has its
antecedence as early as before his marriage. x x x
32

Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.

61

Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time
of the marriage.
70

Philippine Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 12 provides:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

71

Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 1.

72

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955

October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition
for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution 3 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that
he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited
him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born
prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the award of attorneys fees and costs,
but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on the following
assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING
THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS
NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY
LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent;
and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced consent
which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17,
1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to
have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilias
allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment
thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for
bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the
criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even the
very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy
case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that with a decree of
annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in
this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone
calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to
deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he
was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at

that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed
made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And
neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter
was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee
x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where
"the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to undermining
the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a
year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellees fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the
cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988,
matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve
the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact
date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put
August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellees evidence continues in his
argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December 1987,
then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellees impression
that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus
on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellants admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in
January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot
complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the
seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted
by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man
under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied
authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was
threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission,
where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation
can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those letters
against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to
the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to
annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it
arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of
parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify
his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that
attorneys may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant
case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is nothing
in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award,
the Court of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the appellant
as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental
anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed,
respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his
claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they
were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This is
clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question
of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can be
awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his
marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages
is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 174451

October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,

vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision 1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City,

Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for
the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G.
Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to
Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo,
Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone
or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a
half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go
home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his
parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that
respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner
concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient
cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was
served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion 5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.
As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order 6 directing the public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that
she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never
participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and
measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown
trial be conducted to determine whether petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist
Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated
petitioners testimony.
Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any
underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede
her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the
sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality
disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply
[with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.
The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically
classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and
incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in
fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a
variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized
as superior without commensurate achievements)
2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love
3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with,
other special or high status people (institutions)
4. requires excessive admiration
5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic
compliance with his or her expectations
6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others
8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing
psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his
mothers second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his
growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had been
unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they
were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the
love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a
cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to
develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long
before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and
becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable. 7
Tayag concluded in the end that:
As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and
have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of
love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and

commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned
findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent. 8
On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa),
who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioners evidence and
manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.
On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners Complaint for annulment of her marriage to
respondent, holding in substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not
living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a
Decision12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondents psychological
incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondents
personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at
least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the
marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At
most, respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family
Code.1avvphi1
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution 14 dated 28 August 2008.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS. 15
At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of
marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.
Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate. 16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse. 17 Nonconsummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or
structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such

mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage
act.18
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and
respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being
no physical incapacity on respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to
respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters psychological incapacity to comply
with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsels mistake or gross
ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction
that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. 20 Although
this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross,
palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients substantive rights, 21petitioner failed to convince
us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article
36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented
by petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than amental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 23
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of
the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in
the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle

ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the
totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies, merely established that respondent left
petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year
and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in
Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies
though do not give us much insight into respondents psychological state.
Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioners cause. It must be noted that
Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayags
invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner.
Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondents psychological
condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the
latters experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag
did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon
petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological
disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and

discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a
"refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioners marital life and, as
a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other,
with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.
To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness;
neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to
allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws.
Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have
validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological
illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could
not have validly entered into a marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity.29
As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion 30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in
Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital
state.31
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with
petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave
psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage
that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide
the specific answers to every individual problem. 34
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos
City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.