IV.

CAUSATION
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE
1.

DEFINITION

BATACLAN V MEDINA
102 PHIL 181 MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957
FACTS
- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after
midnight. While the bus was running very fast on
a highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus
fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four
passengers could not get out, including
Bataclan. It appeared that gasoline began to
leak from the overturned bus. Ten men came to
help. One of them carried a torch and when he
approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning
the four passengers trapped inside.
- The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was
not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus, including himself and
his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan,
though he must have suffered physical injuries,
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages
were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him.
ISSUES
What is the proximate cause of death of the four
passengers?
HELD
The proximate cause of death is the overturning
of the bus.
- see definition of proximate cause under A1
- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, "If through some
event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or
if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to
death, one might still contend that the
proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the
present case and under the circumstances
obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold
that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for
the reason that when the vehicle turned not only
on 'Its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers,
but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was
very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they
had to use a torch, the most handy and
available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect
the rescue requested from them. In other words,
the coming of the men with the torch was to be
expected and was a natural sequence of the

overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of

its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in
part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through its driver and its conductor.
According to the witnesses, the driver and the
conductor were on the road walking back and
forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must
have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked
the area in and around the bus, this aside from
the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and detected
-even from a distance, and yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
-(I guess this case says, if not for the overturning
of the bus then the leak and the fire wouldnt
have happened)
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC
148 SCRA 353
Facts:
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975,
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his
way home from cocktails and dinner meeting
with his boss. He was proceeding down General
Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck
parked askew, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning
reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by
Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the
petitioner company. Dionisio tried to swerve his
car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered
some physical injuries and nervous breakdown.
Dionision filed an action for damages against
Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners
countered the claim by imputing the accident to
respondents own negligence in driving at high
speed without curfew pass and headlights, and
while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.
Issue:
Whether the collision was brought about by the
way the truck was parked, or by respondents
own negligence
HELD:
We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew
pass during the night of the accident and that
the preponderance of evidence shows that he
did not have such a pass during that night.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First
Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court
that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the
wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence
of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's
car with the dump truck was a natural and
foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence.
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the
"immediate and proximate cause" of the injury

remained the truck driver's "lack of due care"

and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are
subject to mitigation by the courts.

stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had

eight windows, each of which was provided with
two fire-escape ladders and the presence of
each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.

QUEZON CITY VS. DACARA,

GR 150304, JUNE 15, 2005

October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out

in a store for surplus materials located about ten
meters away from the institute (across the
street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted Fire!
Fire! and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant instructress of
the Institute were present and they, together
with the registrar, tried to calm down the
students, who numbered about 180 at the time.
The panic, however, could not be subdued and
the students, with the exception of the few who
made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and
pushing their way through the stairs, thereby
causing stampede therein. No part of the GilArmi Building caught fire. But, after the panic
was over, four students, including Lourdes
Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were
found dead and several others injured on
account of the stampede. The deceaseds five
brothers and sisters filed an action for damages
against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute.

FACTS: Feb 28, 1988 (1am) - FUlgencio Dacara

Jr.son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87
Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan while driving said
car rammed in to a pile of earth diggings found
at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City government.
As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained
bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive
damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of
earth.
Indemnification from the City government failed.
Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children
filed a complaint for damages against QC and
Engr. Ramir Tiamzon before RTC. He prayed for
damages.
Defendants claimed that they exercised due care
by providing the area of the diggings all
necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence,
the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the
diggings was precisely because of the latter's
negligence and failure to exercise due care.
RTC - ruled in favor of DACARA
CA - The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that
petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause
of the damage suffered by respondent.
ISSUE: WON the QC is negligent
HELD:
"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for
the defense that there were signs, gasera which
was buried so that its light could not be blown
off by the wind and barricade, none was ever
presented to stress the point that sufficient and
adequate precautionary signs were placed at
Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed
thereat, how then could it be explained that
according to the report even of the policeman
which for clarity is quoted again, none was found
at the scene of the accident
Negligence of QC is the proximate cause
"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil
Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and
supervision over the same. Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory provision
found in the subject-article is tantamount to
negligence per se which renders the City
government liable.
TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ, 51 SCRA 181, L19745 (1973)
FACTS:
The Realistic Institute situated on the second
floor of the Gil-Armi Building in Manila was
owned and operated by Teague. The said second
floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about
400 square meters, and although it had only one

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the

case. This was however, reversed by the CA. The
CA held that petitioner was negligent and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the
death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of
negligence is based primarily on the fact that
the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been
complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building.
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted
in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi
building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide,
instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each,
although at the time of the fire the owner of the
building had a second stairway under
construction.
ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute
constitutes negligence
HELD:
It is true that the petitioners non-compliance
with the ordinance in question was ahead of and
prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy
of the building. But the violation was a
continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the
occupants of the building. That situation was
undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it
could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to
happen under emergency conditions if there was
only one stairway available.

The general principle is that the violation of a

statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of
another agency if the occurrence of the
accident, in the manner in which it happened,
was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent. To consider
the violation of the ordinance as the proximate
cause of the injury does not portray the situation
in its true perspective; it would be more
accurate to say that the overcrowding at the
stairway was the proximate cause and that it
was precisely what the ordinance intended to
prevent by requiring that there be two stairways
instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the
cases cited by the respondents, the principle of
proximate cause applies to such violation.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs
URBANO V IAC
157 SCRA 1 GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988
FACTS
ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by
the Filomeno Urbano using a bolo. As a result of
which, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm.
On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day
after the incident, Javier was rushed to the
hospital in a very serious condition. When
admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and
was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde
who personally attended to Javier found that the
latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing
wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980,
Javier died in the hospital.
- In an information, Urbano was charged with
the crime of homicide before the then Circuit
Criminal Court of Dagupan City.
- The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged.
The lower courts held that Javier's death was the
natural and logical consequence of Urbano's
unlawful act. He was sentenced accordingly.
- The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal.
- Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of
the victim's death was due to his own negligence
in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and that he went to catch fish
in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980. He states that the proximate
cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to
his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses
found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco
plants with his bare hands exposing the wound
to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE
WON there was an efficient intervening cause
from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
for Javier's death
HELD: YES.

The evidence on record does not clearly show

that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the
wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time
Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to
the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except
because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause
The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
CANLAS VS. CA, GR 112160, FEBRUARY
28, 2000
Facts:
The private respondent own several parcels of
land located in Quezon City for which he is the
registered owner. He secured loans from L and R
corporations and executed deeds of mortgage
over the parcels of land for the security of the
same. Upon the maturity of said loans, the firm
initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the
properties in question after private respondent
failed to pay until maturity. The private
respondent filed a complaint for injunction over
the said foreclosure and for redemption of the
parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the
petition, private respondent and L and R
corporation
entered
into
a
compromise
agreement that renders the former to be insured
another year for the said properties. Included in
the stipulations were the attorneys fees
amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private
respondent however, remained to be in turmoil
when it came to finances and was apparently
unable to pay and secure the attorneys fees,
more so the redemption liability. Relief was
discussed by petitioner and private respondent
executed a document to redeem the parcels of
land and to register the same to his name.
Allegations
were
made
by the
private
respondent claiming the parcels of land to his
name but without prior notice, the properties
were already registered under the petitioners
name. The private respondent calls for a review
and for the court to act on the said adverse
claim by petitioner on said certificates for the
properties consolidated by the redemption price
he paid for said properties. The private
respondent filed a suit for the annulment of

judgment in the Court of appeals which ruled

over the same.
Issue: whether the petitioner is on solid ground
on the reacquisition over the said properties.
Ruling:
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of
paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any
loan with which to pay the redemption price of
his mortgaged properties and petitioner's
P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the
Compromise Judgment," a development that
should have tempered his demand for his fees.
For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over
and above those of his client, in opposition to his
oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all
good fidelity ... to [his] clients." The Court finds
the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a
moneymaking venture and lawyers are not
merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as
a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law
advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming
of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of
his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for
money."
We are not, however, condoning the private
respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning
Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the
fact that the private respondent has not settled
his liability for payment of the properties. To hold
Atty. Canlas alone liable for damages is to enrich
said respondent at the expense of his lawyer.
The parties must then set off their obligations
against the other.
CONSOLIDATED BANK VS. CA, GR 138569,
SEPTEMBER 11, 2003
FACT:
Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking
corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and
Company, CPAs, is a professional partnership
engaged in the practice of accounting.
In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings
account with Solidbank. On 14 August 1991, L.C.
Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya,
filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990
and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.
Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz,
Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with
Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the
Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to
Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of
the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate
copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6
stamped the deposit slips with the words
DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time
and Calapre had to make another deposit for
L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook

with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank.

When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve
the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that
somebody got the passbook. Calapre went
back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to
Macaraya.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in
duplicate copies with a check of P200,000.
Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and
presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and
check.
The
teller
stamped
the
words
DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK
HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the
deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the
passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that
someone got the passbook but she could not
remember to whom she gave the passbook.
When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got
the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that
someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook.
Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.
The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the
unauthorized withdrawal the day before (14
August 1991) of P300,000 from its
savings account. The withdrawal slip for the
P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized
signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico
L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied
signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel
Tamayo received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of
its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a
Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money
against Solidbank. The trial court absolved
Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA
reversed the ecision of the trial court. CA denied
the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. But
it modified its decision by deleting the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.
RULING:
Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due
to negligence, or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor
is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that x x x savings x x x
deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan. There is a debtorcreditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the
depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the
bank money and the bank agrees to pay the
depositor on demand. The savings deposit
agreement between the bank and the depositor
is the contract that determines the rights and
obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in
view of the fiduciary nature of banking. The bank

is under obligation to treat the accounts of its

depositors with meticulous care, always having
in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the banks
obligation to observe high standards of integrity
and performance is deemed written into every
deposit agreement between a bank and its
depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence
higher than that of a good father of a family.
Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the
degree of diligence required of an obligor is that
prescribed by law or contract, and absent such
stipulation then the diligence of a good father of
a family. Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the
statutory diligence required from banks that
banks must observe high standards of integrity
and performance in servicing their depositors.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bankdepositor relationship does not convert the
contract between the bank and its depositors
from a simple loan to a trust agreement,
whether express or implied. Failure by the bank
to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple
loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply
imposes on the bank a higher standard of
integrity and performance in complying with its
obligations under the contract of simple loan,
beyond those required of non-bank debtors
under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert
a simple loan into a trust agreement because
banks do not accept deposits to enrich
depositors but to earn money for themselves.
Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that
responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is
demandable. For breach of the savings deposit
agreement due to negligence, or culpa
contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank
because the transaction took time and he had
to go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The
passbook was still in the hands of the employees
of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit
when Calapre left Solidbank. When the passbook
is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and
its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook.
Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree
of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. For failing to return the passbook
to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C.
Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively
failed to observe such high degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its
return to the party authorized to receive the
same.

In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a

breach of contract, there is a presumption that
the defendant was at fault or negligent. The
burden is on the defendant to prove that he was
not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the defendant was negligent. In the present
case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank
breached its contractual obligation to return the
passbook only to the authorized representative
of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that
Solidbank was at fault and its teller was
negligent in not returning the passbook to
Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove
that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its
burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial
court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre
left the passbook and who was supposed to
return the passbook to him. Solidbank also failed
to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in
verifying the identity of the person retrieving the
passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that
Teller No. 6 implemented this procedure in the
present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its
employees under the principle of respondeat
superior or command responsibility. The defense
of exercising the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is not a
complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in
culpa aquiliana. The bank must not only exercise
high standards of integrity and performance, it
must also insure that its employees do likewise
because this is the only way to insure that the
bank will comply with its fiduciary duty
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the
facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook
landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank
was in possession of the passbook while it was
processing the deposit. After completion of the
transaction, Solidbank had the contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to
Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C.
Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual
obligation because it gave the passbook to
another person.
Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of
the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not
have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of
the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks
negligence in not returning the passbook to
Calapre.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than

that of the other, or where it is impossible to

determine whose fault or negligence caused the
loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the loss. The antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.

The owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance

to the present case. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory
negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of
damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate
the defendant from his breach of contract

The State is responsible in like manner when it

acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable.

Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa
contractual) may be regulated by the courts,
according to the circumstances. This means
that if the defendant exercised the proper
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence, then the courts may
reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C.
Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in
allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its
authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should
be reduced.
In PBC v. CA where the Court held the depositor
guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated
the damages between the depositor and the
bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling
to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must
shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by
the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the
other 60% of the actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
D. ARTICLE 2180, NCC IN RELATION TO ARTICLES
218, 219, 221, FAMILY CODE AND RA 6809
AMENDING ARTICLE 236, FC.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.

Employers shall be liable for the damages

caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of

arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child are shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside
the premises of the school, entity or institution.
(349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall
be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is
proved that they exercised the proper diligence
required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the
preceding articles shall be governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising
parental authority shall have with the respect to
their unemancipated children on wards the
following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support,
educate and instruct them by right precept and
good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual
guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift,
stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and

inspire in them compliance with the duties of

citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome
educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect
them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting
their interests; (6) To demand from them respect
and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be
required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed
by law upon parents and guardians.
SALEN VS. BALCE, 107 PHIL 748
Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of
Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant
who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living
with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death,
G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide
and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay
the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this
action against defendant before CFI to recover
the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense
that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their
right to recover does not here apply for the
reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of
defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary
liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with
Art. 2180 of the CC.
Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold
otherwise would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his
or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily,
the void that apparently exists in the RPC
(art.101) is subserved by this particular provision
of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent
decisions of the SC which cover equal or
identical cases.
CUADRA VS. MONFORT, 35 SCRA 161
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa
Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six. Their
teacher assigned them, together with three
other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises. Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face
her friend, and the object hit her right eye.
Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next

day, the eye became swollen and it was then

that the girl related the incident to her parents,
who thereupon took her to a doctor for
treatment. She underwent surgical operation
twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4,
1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of
twenty-three days, for all of which the parents
spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical
efforts,
however,
Maria
Teresa
Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the
parents in behalf of their minor daughter against
Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father,
the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as
actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs
of the suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents are liable for
the acts of their minor child when the act or
omission of the child is committed in the
absence of the parents.
RULING:
NO. There is no meticulously calibrated measure
applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all
the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage," it implies a consideration of
the attendant circumstances in every individual
case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could
have been prevented.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred
that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that
he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school, where it was
his duty to send her and where she was, as he
had the right to expect her to be, under the care
and supervision of the teacher.
The act which caused the injury was concerned,
it was an innocent prank not unusual among
children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her
parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little
commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy
that befell her. But if the defendant is at all
obligated to compensate her suffering, the
obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in
court, but only the moral compulsion of good
conscience.
TAMARGO VS. CA, GR 85044, JUNE 3,
1992
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death.
The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed
a complaint for damages against the natural

parents of Adelberto with whom he was living

the time of the tragic incident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a
petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc.
Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after
the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may
be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the
biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical
consequence of duties and responsibilities of
parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.
In the case at bar, during the shooting incident,
parental authority over Adelberto was still
lodged with the natural parents. It follows that
they are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child
under their parental authority in accordance with
the civil code.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may
be given to the decree of adoption so as to
impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruing at the time when they had no actual or
physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactivity may be essential if it permits
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody however in this
case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the
shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was
then with the natural parents of Adelberto.
Petition for review was hereby granted.
SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC &
CASIANO PASCUA, ET AL., 189 SCRA 158
MEDIALDEA/Aug. 30, 1990
NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS:
- This case is for recovery of damages for the 3
jeepney passengers who died as a result of the
collision between the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by
Tomas delos Reyes and the jeepney driven by
Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained
physical injuries.
- It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio,
the jeepneys right rear wheel detached which
caused it to run in an unbalanced position.
-Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result of
which, the jeepney which was then running on
the eastern lane (its right of way) made a U-turn,

invading and eventually stopping on the western

lane of the road in such a manner that the
jeepney's front faced the south (from where it
came) and its rear faced the north (towards
where it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked
the greater portion of the western lane, which is
the right of way of vehicles coming from the
north, among which was Bus No. 753 of Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a
sudden U-turn and encroached on the western
lane of the highway, or after stopping for a
couple of minutes, the bus bumped from behind
the right rear portion of the jeepney which
resulted in the said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident,
there were no vehicles following the jeepney,
neither were there oncoming vehicles except the
bus. The weather condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide.
- Manalo was eventually convicted and was
imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
***As regards the damages.
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon,
(jeepney driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits
driver)delos Reyes were all impleaded as
defendants.
- Plaintiffs anchored their suits against spouses
Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their
contractual liability.
- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs
based their suits on their culpability for a quasidelict.
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.
(the insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded
as additional defendant in the civil case filed by
the Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases
were for medical expenses, burial expenses, loss
of wages, for exemplary damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and
Carreon filed a cross-claim for the repair of the
jeepney and for its non-use during the period of
repairs.
TC: found the couple and Manalo to be
NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of
the contract of carriage with their passengers;
ordered them to pay the damages. Filriters was
jointly and severally liable as it was the
jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the
jeepney party for actual damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it
found delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to
pay jointly and severally with Rabbit the
plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1) the doctrine of
last clear chance, (2) the presumption that
drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle
guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the
substantial factor test to conclude that delos
Reyes was negligent.
ISSUE:

WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER

ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH
SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGERS OF THE JEEPNEY
HELD:
YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS
ARE LIABLE.
REASONING:
TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF
FACTS CONCERNING MANALOS NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his
passenger Caridad Pascua that the Mangune
jeepney was "running fast" that his passengers
cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but did
not heed the warning
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac)
Police who found that the tracks of the jeepney
ran on the Eastern shoulder (outside the
concrete paved road) until it returned to the
concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the
Eastern lane and the (imaginary) center line and
encroaching fully into the western lane where
the collision took place as evidenced by the
point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal
Cacalda also of the San Manuel Police that the
path of the jeepney they found on the road \was
shown by skid marks which he described as
"scratches on the road caused by the iron of the
jeep, after its wheel was removed;"
(4) His conviction for the crime of Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
with Damage to Property thru Reckless
Imprudence by the CFI of Tarlac, as a result of
the collision, and his commitment to prison and
service of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa
loquitar attesting to the circumstance that the
collision occured on the right of way of the Phil.
Rabbit Bus.
SC:
-The principle about "the last clear" chance
would call for application in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles.
It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
(Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al.)
-On the presumption that drivers who bump the
rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of
the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence: would have been correct were it not
for the undisputed fact that the U-turn made by
the jeepney was abrupt. Delos Reyes could not
have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by
Manalo.
***With regard to the substantial factor
test:
- The IAC held that
. . . It is the rule under the substantial
factor test that if the actor's conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which

it occurred does not prevent him from

being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at
a fast speed when the accident occurred and did
not even make the slightest effort to avoid the
accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney, not only because he
was driving fast and did not even attempt to
avoid the mishap but also because it was the
bus which was the physical force which brought
about the injury and death to the passengers of
the jeepney.
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by
the IAC. But the SC was not convinced. It cannot
be said that the bus was travelling at a fast
speed when the accident occurred because the
speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming
such calculation to be correct, is yet within the
speed limit allowed in highways.
- Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having
avoided the collision because as was shown, the
jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters,
measured from the time its right rear wheel was
detached up to the point of collision.
- Delos Reyes admitted that he was running
more or less 50 kph at the time of the accident.
Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the
distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We
adopt the speed of 80 kilometers per hour, delos
Reyes would have covered that distance in only
2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react
to the situation.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is
to ask too much from him. Aside from the time
element involved, there were no options
available to him.
- Also, It was shown by the pictures that driver
delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the right
attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney.
That it was not successful in fully clearing the
Mangune jeepney as its (Rabbit's) left front hit
said jeepney must have been due to limitations
of space and time.
- That delos Reyes of the Rabbit bus could also
have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid
bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then
on the western lane: Under such a situation, he
would run the greater risk of running smack in
the Mangune jeepney either head on or
broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly
making a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of Manalo and spouses
Mangune and Carreon. They all failed to
exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger
dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, and
this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code 2 or
that the death or injury of the passenger was
due to a fortuitous event 3 (Lasam v. Smith, Jr.,
45 Phil. 657).
- To escape liability, defendants Mangune and
Carreon offered to show thru their witness

Natalio Navarro, an alleged mechanic, that he

periodically checks and maintains the jeepney of
said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day
before the collision, which included the
tightening of the bolts. This notwithstanding the
right rear wheel of the vehicle was detached
while in transit. As to the cause thereof no
evidence was offered. Said defendant did not
even attempt to explain, much less establish, it
to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages
against the carrier for his failure to safely carry
his passenger to his destination, an accident
caused either by defects in the automobile or
through the negligence of its driver, is not a
caso fortuito which would avoid the carriers
liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus
Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v.
Smith, Jr., 45 Phil. 657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et
al., 104 Phil. 75).
***On the sole liability of the Jeepney
Owners (excluding Manalo)
-the contract of carriage is between the carrier
and the passenger, and in the event of
contractual liability, the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if
such breach be due to the negligence of his
driver (Viluan v. CA, et al., April 29, 1966, 16
SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally
liable with the carrier, that would make the
carrier's liability personal, contradictory to the
explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC.
DISPOSITION: TCS DECISION WAS REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY
THE COUPLE AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY
ASSURANCE CORP. INC WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED
TOO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED
THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE FROM 3K (AS
PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.

collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as

if something had bumped against the vehicle,
but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian,
Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane
in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit
him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his
advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the
incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had
only one functioning headlight.

Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC, GR 75112,

August 17, 1992

Mercy Drug Corp. vs. Sps. Huang, GR 172122,

June 22, 2007
Makati Shangri La Hotel & Resort vs. Harper,
GR 189998, August 29, 2012
Cadiente vs. Macas, GR 161946, November 14,
2008
Amadora vs. CA, L-47745, April 15, 1988
Aguilar vs. Commercial Savings Bank, 412 Phil
834
E. Article 2183, NCC
Afialda vs. Hisole, L-2075, November 29, 1949
F. Article 2185, NCC
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. Vs. Delos Santos,
GR 152032, March 16, 2011
Phil. Hawk Corp. vs. Lee, GR 166869, February
16, 2010
G. Article 2187, NCC
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. vs. CA, GR 110295,
October 18, 1993
H. Article 2189, NCC
Jimenez vs. City of Manila
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, GR 61516, March
21, 1989
I. Articles 2190, 2191, 2192, in relation to Article
1723, NCC
De Roy vs. CA, GR 80718, January 29, 1988
Hospicio de San Jose vs. Findlay Miller Timber,
50 Phil 227

FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a parttime Janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer.
He was, in relation to the school, an employee
even if he was assigned to clean the school
premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of
each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha
requested the driver, Allan Masa (driver &
security guard at the school), and was allowed,
to take over the vehicle while the latter was on
his way home one late afternoon. It is significant
to note that the place where Allan lives is also
the house of his father, the school president,
Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house
where Funtecha was allowed free board while he
was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha
only after driving down a road, negotiating a
sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road
was clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast
moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them
so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a

ISSUE: W/N FCI is has an obligation to pay

damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle.
HELD:
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer.
He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may
be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the
time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting with the
scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its
having exercised the required diligence of a
good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby
GRANTED. The decision of the respondent
appellate court affirming the trial court decision
is REINSTATED||| (Filamer Christian Institute v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75112,
[August 17, 1992])