I.

"Most thought-provoking"
The phrase suggests that there is a specific and yet universal issue that is mos
t thought-provoking. This suggestion amounts to the contention, in a contemporar
y argot, that there is an objective value-structure built into thinking. That wh
ich is most thought-provoking is not a matter of subjective evaluation. That whi
ch is most thought-provoking is not something for us to determine but rather for
us to discover. To think, Heidegger claims, is to respond to what most demands
our thinking, and that which most demands our thinking is a universal matter. He
idegger's contention is thus analogous to Augustine's contention about happiness
in The Confessions. Augustine's key thesis is that happiness is a matter of pro
perly ranking desires, and that there is an objective ranking of desires. One ca
nnot be happy in the fullest sense if one's desire-set does not mirror the objec
tive valuation of desires. Augustine thus concludes that happiness is a matter o
f ranking the desires for truth and God--both being eternal, secure, and nonexcl
usive--at the top of the hierarchy. In like manner Heidegger is advancing the th
esis that one cannot think in the fullest sense if one does not think about that
which most calls for thinking. Thinking involves the ranking of items in terms
of their thought-worthiness, and for Heidegger that means locating the Being of
the thinker (and thus Being itself--see Lecture VII, p. 79) at the top of the hi
erarchy.
Was Heisst Denken?, as I noted above, could be translated as either What Is Call
ed Thinking? or as What Calls For Thinking?. This puzzling choice of title can n
ow be resolved, for the foregoing shows not only that Heidegger intends the ambi
guity but also the reason why. Heidegger's point is that one cannot properly add
ress the question What Is Called Thinking? without answering the question What C
alls For thinking? This distinction between the two questions and the priority g
iven to the latter over the former I take to be Heidegger's most valuable contri
bution to discussions of thinking or rationality. One is not thinking if one doe
s not rank objects of thought in terms of thought-worthiness. This point flies i
n the face of many contemporary accounts of rationality, for they suggest that o
ne can be thinking well as long as one is following the right method. What one t
hinks about plays no normative role on such "ratio-inspired" accounts (see below
for the contrast to legein-inspired models); indeed, critical thinking has come
to mean critical qua method-following thinking instead of critical qua essentia
l thinking. Heidegger's point is that such means-end accounts involve and indeed
propagate a distortion; a life spent rationally researching the history of admi
nistrative memos is not a thoughtful life. (7) In rationally pursuing anything a
nd everything we are not thinking.
Being calls for thinking, and it is the peculiar task of the philosopher to arti
culate this most intimate and yet universal issue. The idea that this (or anythi
ng) should be most thought-provoking does not sit well with many contemporary ph
ilosophers, but it is precisely the failure of philosophers to take to heart the
importance of thought-worthiness that leads Heidegger to take a dim view of muc
h of philosophy. On the other hand, though, he does claim that philosophers are
"the thinkers par excellence". (8) What justifies this self-adulation? The reaso
n is that the issue of thinking is one that falls squarely within the province o
f philosophy. (9) The philosopher differs from the chess player, biologist, and
politician in that the philosopher's calling is to think about thinking as such.
Moreover, to think philosophically about thinking, for Heidegger, is to come to
a confrontation with a mode of existing--"being-thoughtful"--and thereby with B
eing.
The idea of thought-worthiness serves to unify large chunks of text. Heidegger o
bserves that this idea rings alien to modern ears, and thus goes on to discuss t
he modern age--this thought-provoking time in which we are still not thinking--v
ia a philosopher who has his finger on the pulse of the present age--Nietzsche.
The idea of thought-worthiness also leads Heidegger to discuss a past time in wh

ich the ranking of issues in terms of thought-worthiness was manifest in the exp
erience of thinking. This age was philosophy in the age of the Greeks, and it is
a reason why Heidegger devotes the last lectures in Part Two to a reflection on
Parmenidean Fragment 6.