RULES 10-14

E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER VS. HON. HERMINIO J. BENITO

G.R. NO. 136426
AUGUST 6, 1999
SUMMONS; JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop parcels of land belonging to the latter
into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units.
Private respondent filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages
against petitioner before the RTC allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its
contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were
no substantial developments.
Summons, with the complaint, were served upon the petitioner, through its
Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro (CdO) City but the Sheriffs Return of Service stated that the summons
was duly served upon petitioner thru SALBULBERO at their new office Villa Gonzalo,
Nazareth, Cagayan De Oro City. Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to
Dismiss alleging that the summons was served upon Sabulbero, who is not one of those
persons upon whom service of summons may be made.
Private respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default alleging that
petitioner has failed to file an Answer. Private respondent filed an Opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss as well as the Motion to Declare
in Default, stating that since the summons and copy of the complaint were in fact
received by the corporation through its branch manager, there was substantial
compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it validly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be
served is restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule on statutory construction
expressiouniosestexclusioalterius.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at
its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its
principal office at Davao City was proper.
HELD:
No.

Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no
longer authorized. The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point. The
designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14. The rule now states general manager instead of only manager;
corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The
phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The particular revision was explained by retired SC Justice FlorenzRegalado,
thus: x xx the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to
be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.
The terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes
illogical interpretations, especially the word agent of the corporation. The Filoil case,
involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the
validity of service of summons but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized
upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this revised
section with limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil
case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of
the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from
an independent practitioner.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, to bring home to the
corporation notice of the filing of the action.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served on a
domestic corporation. Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a
firms branch office has been held as improper as summons should have been served at
the firms principal office.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. Before, the rule was that
a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special
appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised
other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the exercise of the
jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
This doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in

the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. The
emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement
of the rules on summons. Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not
belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be
deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. HON. REINATO G. QUILALA
G.R. NO. 168723
JULY 9, 2008
SUMMONS; JURISDICTION
FACTS:
Private respondent All Season Farm Corporation sought the recovery of a sum of
money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh
Division) and several of its officers. According to Dole, an alias summons was served
upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific
General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.
Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons. The RTC denied said
motion. The Motion for Reconsideration suffered the same fate. Thereafter, Dole filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that the alias summons was
not properly served. The appellate court, however, ruled otherwise.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the corporate defendant, now the petitioner
herein.
HELD:
No, but Dole is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court because it
sought affirmative relief from the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is
restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio
unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that on April 23, 2003, Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant,
received the alias summons. Contrary to private respondents claim that it was received

upon instruction of the president of the corporation as indicated in the Officers Return,
such fact does not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which Marifa Dela
Cruz signed. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court
processes in behalf of the president. Considering that the service of summons was
made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the
designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by
this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order
of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the
service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file
responsive pleading. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the
summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief
in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of the RTC. It is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this
Court.

RULES 15-19
ALBERTO G. PINLAC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91486
JANUARY 19, 2001
SUMMONS; INTERVENTION; CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT
FACTS:
The instant case springs from a contentious and protracted dispute over a
sizeable piece of real property situated in what is now known as Old Balara, Sitio
Veterans, Barrio Payatas and Silangan, all of Quezon City. Petitioners herein are World
War II veterans, their dependents and successors-in-interest. Together, they filed a
class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the RTC. In particular, petitioners claimed
that the real property, which has an aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest
lands belonging to the government; that they and their predecessors-in-interest have
occupied said property continuously, adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30)
years; and that they have accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective
names with the appropriate government agency.

One of those so impleaded as a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles

Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The individual lot owners of the said subdivision,
however, were not specifically named. Since personal service of summons could not be
effected on Vil-Ma and some of the other named respondents, petitioners moved for
leave of court to serve summons by publication which was granted. Accordingly, the
summons was published in the "Metropolitan Newsweek", a periodical edited and
published in the City of Caloocan and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings,
while the others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in default.
Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents. The trial court rendered a partial judgment in favor of the
petitioners.
Exactly one (1) year and fifty-seven (57) days after the above-quoted judgement
by default was rendered, a Petition for Annulment of Judgement with Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus4 was brought before the Court of Appeals by the titled
owners of the subdivided lots within Vil-Ma. They assailed the default judgement which
nullified all their titles, arguing that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over them and
their respective titled properties. They also alleged that they only came to know of the
adverse judgement when petitioners sought the execution of the judgement by
attempting to dispossess some of the titled owners of the lots and making formal
demands for them to vacate their respective properties. Also, they claimed that the
Partial Decision against the defaulted respondents was null and void on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
The trial court granted the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, granted the petition
for annulment of judgment.
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered
declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this
Honorable Court had already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square
meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No.
333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT
No. 333 are null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no
notice of the hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other
interested parties.

The Republic likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable
under the circumstances.
ISSUES:
a. Whether the CA was correct in granting the petition for annulment of
judgment?
b. Whether publication of the summons made in the Metropolitan Newsweek was
defective, hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents.
c. Whether or not the intervention of the Republic of the Philippines is proper in
this case.
HELD:
a. Yes.
The case before the Court of Appeals was one for annulment of judgement,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In resolving the same, the Court of Appeals need
not retry the facts. An action for annulment of judgement is grounded only on two
justifications: (I) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. All
that herein private respondents had to prove was that the trial court had no jurisdiction;
that they were prevented from having a trial or presenting their case to the trial court by
some act or conduct of petitioners; or that they had been denied due process of law.
Thus, the Court of Appeals need only to resolve the issues of lack of jurisdiction,
existence of extrinsic fraud, and denial of due process of law.
The action for annulment of judgement cannot and was not a substitute for the
lost remedy of appeal. The very purpose of the action for annulment of judgement was
to have the final and executory judgement set aside so that there will be a renewal of
litigation. Whether or not the assailed Partial Decision based solely on facts and
evidence presented by the petitioners is meritorious is irrelevant and immaterial. Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err, nor did it violate the petitioners' right to due process of
law, when it refused to consider all the factual issues raised by petitioners.
b. No.
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the
approval of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the "Metropolitan
Newsweek" is not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City .The Rules strictly
require that publication must be "in a newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may order." The court orders relied upon by
petitioners did not specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be
published. In the absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does
not satisfy the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a

quo coupled with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by
publication ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in
order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly
comply with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal
defect in the service of summons. It cannot be over emphasized that the statutory
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by
publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service other
than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the
rules, the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents
are concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of title was filed on November 2,
1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles
Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced
by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January 26,1976.
Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical personality.
c. Yes.
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the
powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of
the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention
was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention was granted even after the decision
became final and executory, thus
. . . The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the
Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same. But needless to say, this discretion should be exercised judiciously and only after
consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as
well as government properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The
Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an
indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of
the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.

RULES 23-32

SPOUSES VICENTE AND LETICIA AFULUGENCIA VS. METROPOLITAN BANK

AND TRUST COMPANY AND EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA
G.R. NO. 185145
FEBRUARY 5, 2014
WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
FACTS:
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws,
while Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for
nullification of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other
documents, with damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. and
Emmanuel L. Ortega before the RTC of Malolos City.
After the filing of the parties pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial,
petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to
require Metrobanks officers to appear and testify as the petitioners initial witnesses
during the hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the
documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners 200-square meter land in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. The Motion contained a notice of hearing.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing,
the Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set
a date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that
pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobanks officers who are
considered adverse parties may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for
the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that
petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to be
produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
The trial court denied petitioners Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum
Ad Testificandum for its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of
hearing as specified in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court and
that the defendant bank and its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned
to testify unless written interrogatories are first served upon them, as provided in
Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The CA held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Orders; petitioners Motion is a litigated motion, especially as it
seeks to require the adverse party, Metrobanks officers, to appear and testify in court
as petitioners witnesses. It held that a proper notice of hearing, addressed to the parties
and specifying the date and time of the hearing, was required, consistent with Sections

4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules.

The CA held further that the trial court did not err in
denying petitioners Motion to secure a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum,
ratiocinating that Rule 25 is quite clear in providing that the consequence of a partys
failure to serve written interrogatories upon the opposing party is that the latter may not
be compelled by the former to testify in court or to render a deposition pending appeal.
By failing to serve written interrogatories upon Metrobank, petitioners foreclosed their
right to present the banks officers as their witnesses.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to respondent
banks officers before they can be subpoenaed.
HELD:
a. Yes.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness
stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This
is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides
Sec.6.Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a
deposition pending appeal. One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent
fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate
the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit
facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand
as its witness. Instead, the process could be treated as a fishing expedition or an
attempt at delaying the proceedings; it produces no significant result that a prior
written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse partys
testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the
calling party damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or
information useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode
of discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve
to weaken its own case as a result of the calling partys being bound by the adverse
partys testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling
partys cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the
court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.
In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobanks officers to the witness
stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobanks
possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper. Petitioners
may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their evidence-in-chief
at that, to present Metrobanks officers who are considered adverse parties as well,
based on the principle that corporations act only through their officers and duly
authorized agents as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access
to Metrobanks documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own. This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent. The
burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if petitioners cannot
prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may not
be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.