Professional Documents
Culture Documents
]
MANUELA GREY ALBA ET AL., petitioners and
appellants, vs. ANACLETO R. DE LA CRUZ, objector and
appellee.
1. 1.REGISTRATION
OF
LAND; NOTICE
TO
DEFENDANTS BY DUE PUBLICATION.In the
original proceedings for the registration of land under
Act No. 496, the appellee herein was made a party
defendant by publication, but was not personally
served with notice: Held, That the decree of the Court
of Land Registration is conclusive against him as well
as all the world.
1. 2.ID.; NATURE AND EFFECT OF PROCEEDINGS
IN
REM; DUE
PROCESS
OF
LAW.The
proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No.
496, are in rem,and not in personam. A proceeding in
rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted
and carried to judgment without personal service
upon the claimants within the State or notice by
name to those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by
the power of the court over the res. Such a proceeding
would be impossible were this not so, for it would
hardly do to make a distinction between the
constitutional rights of claimants who were known
and those who were not known. to the plaintiff,
50
5
0
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GreyAlbavs.DelaCruz
1. when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges,
175 Mass,, 71; see also People vs. Chase, 165 111.,
527;
Statevs. Guilbert,
56
Ohio
St.,
575;
People vs. Simon, 176 111., 165; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95
U.S.,
714; The
Mary, 9
Cranch,
126;
Mankin vs, Chandler, 2 Brock (U. S. Circuit), 125;
Brown vs. Levee Commission, 50 Miss., 468; 2
Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed., secs. 605, 611.)
1. 3.ID.; PROCEEDINGS
IN
REM
AND
IN
PERSONAM, DISTINGUISHED.If the technical
object of the suit is to establish a claim against some
particular person, with a judgment which generally,
in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some
individual claim or objection, so that only certain
persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action
is in personam, although it may concern the right to
or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other
hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established, and if anyone in
the world has a right to be heard on the strength of
alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent
interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs. Judges,
175 Mass., 71.)
1. 4.ID.; FRAUD; SECTION 38, LAND REGISTRATION
ACT;REOPENING, AND MODIFICATION OF
DECREES.By fraud is meant actual fraud,
grant from the state should prevail over the public document
of purchase of 1864.
The mother of the petitioners died on November 15, 1881;
their father died prior to that time. Manuela, the oldest of the
petitioners, was about six years of age when their mother
died. So these children were minors when the father of the
appellee obtained the state grant.
On the 13th of June, 1882, Jose Grey, uncle and
representative of the. petitioners, who were then minors,
rented the land owned by the petitioners deceased parents to
one. Irineo Jose for a period of three years. On the 23d of
March, 1895, the said Jose Grey, as the representative of the
petitioners, rented the same land for a period of six years to
Baldomero R. de la Cruz, father of the appellee. This rental
contract was duly executed in writing. This land was
cultivated during these six years by Baldomero H. de la Cruz
and his children, one of whom is the appellee. On the 14th of
December, 1905, Jose Grey, for himself and the other
petitioners, rented the same land to Estanislao R. de la Cruz
for a period of two years. Estanislao de la Cruz on entering
into this rental contract with Jose Grey did so for himself and
his brothers, one of whom is the appellee. While the appellee
admits that his father and
54
54
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GreyAlbavs.DelaCruz
brother entered into these rental contracts and did, in fact,
cultivate the petitioners land, nevertheless he insists that
the two small parcels in question were.not included in these
contracts. In the rental contract between the uncle of the
petitioners and the father of the appellee the land is not
58
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GreyAlbavs.DelaCruz
legalfraud. (Id., p. 835, and cases cited in notes Nos. 85,
86, 87, 88, and 89 at bottom of pages 835 and 836.)
By fraud is meant actual frauddishonesty of some sort.
(Judgment of Privy Council in Assets Co. vs. Mere Roihi,
and Assets Co. vs. Panapa Waihopi, decided in March, 1905,
cited by Hogg in his Supplementary Addendum to his work
on Australian Torrens System,supra.) The same meaning
should be given to the word fraud used in section 38 of our
statutes (Act No. 496).
The question as to whether any particular transaction
shows fraud, within the meaning of the word as used in our
statutes, will in each case be a question of fact: We will not
attempt to say what acts would constitute this kind of fraud
in other cases. This must be determined from the facts and
circumstances in each particular case. The only question we
are called upon to determine, and have determined, is
whether or not, under the facts and circumstances in this
case, the petitioners did obtain the decree of February 12,
1908, by means of fraud.
It might be urged that the appellee has been deprived of
his property without due process of law, in violation of section
5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the
Philippine Bill, which provides that no law shall be
enacted in the said Islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The Land Registration Act requires that all occupants be
named in the petition and given notice by registered mail.
This did not do the appellee any good, as he was not notified;
VOL.17,SEPTEMBER16,1910
61
GreyAlbavs.DelaCruz
adopted in various countries of the civilized world, including
some of the States of the American Union, and practical
experience has demonstrated that it has been successful ul as
a public project.
The validity of some of the provisions of the statutes
adopting the Torrens system has been the subject of judicial
decision in the courts of the United States. (Peoplevs. Chase,
165
111.,
527; State vs. Guilbert,
56
Ohio
St.,
575; People vs. Simon, 176 111., 165; Tyler vs. Judges, 175
Mass., 71.)
Act No. 496 of the Philippine Commission, known as the
Land Registration Act, was copied substantially from the
Massachusetts law of 1898.
The Illinois and Massachusetts statutes were upheld by
the supreme. courts of those States.
It is not enough to show a procedure to be
unconstitutional to say that we never heard of it before.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra; Hurtado vs. California, 110
U.S.,
516.)
Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the
necessary requirements of justice, a proceeding in remdealing
with a tangible res may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon claimants within the State or
notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter any
provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the
power of the court over the res. As we have said, such a
proceeding would be impossible, were this not so, for it hardly
would do to make a distinction between the constitutional
rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all.
(Tyler vs. Judges, supra.) This same doctrine is annunciated
in Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U.S., 714) ; The Mary (9 Cranch,
126); Mankin vs. Chandler (2 Brock., 125); Brown vs. Levee
Commission (50 Miss., 468); 2 Freeman, Judgments, 4th ed.,
secs. 606, 611.
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim
against some particular person, with a judgment which
62
62
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GreyAlbavs.DelaCruz
generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some
individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are
entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in
personam, although it may concern the right to or possession
of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar
indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of
any sort against the right sought to be established, and if
anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of
alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest,
the proceeding is in rem. (Tylervs. Judges, supra.)
In the case of Hamilton vs. Brown (161 U.S., 256) a
judgment of escheat was held conclusive -upon persons
notified by advertisement to all persons interested. In this
jurisdiction, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Act No. 190, a decree allowing or disallowing a will binds
everybody, although the only notice of the proceedings given
is by general notice to all persons interested.
The supreme court of Massachusetts, in the case
of Tylervs. Judges (supra), did not rest its judgment as to the
conclusive effect of the decree upon the ground that the State
had absolute power to determine the persons to whom a
mans property shall go at his death, but upon the
characteristics of a proceeding in rem. So we conclude that
the proceedings had in the case at bar, under all the facts and
circumstances, especially the absolute lack on the part of the
petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of
any right, or in any way injure him, constitute due process of
law.
As to whether or not the appellee can successfully
maintain an action under the provisions of sections 101 and
102 of the Land Registration Act (secs. 2365, 2366,
Compilation) we do not decide.
For these reasons we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
the judgment appealed from should be, and the same is
hereby reversed and judgment entered in favor of the
petitioners in conformity with the decree of the lower court
63
VOL.17,SEPTEMBER16,1910
63
Rodriguezvs.Ravilan
of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is
so ordered.
Arellano,
C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland,
JJ.,concur.
Judgment reversed.
___________________
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
[No. 8936. October 2, 1915.]
59
1
LegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby.
1. was registered, the owner might rest secure, without
the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. The proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is a
judicial proceeding, but it involves more in its
consequences than does an ordinary action.
1. 3.ID; ID.; EFFECT
OF
REGISTRATION
AND
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE.The registration under
the torrens system and the issuance of a certificate of
title do not give the owner any better title than he
had. He does not obtain title by virtue of the
certificate. He secures his certificate by virtue of the
fact that he has a fee simple title. If he obtains a
certificate of title, by mistake, to more land than he
really and in fact owns, the certificate should be
595
VOL.31,OCTOBER2,1915.
595
LegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby.
This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted
in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with
certain other exceptions which need not be discussed at
present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by
an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title
under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription
(section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice
to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the
name of two different persons, has been presented to the
courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the
"torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been
settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the
"Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general
rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting
to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether
the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only
in
part,
comprised
in
the
earlier
certificate.
(Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q. S. C. R., 193;Miller vs. Davy, 7 N. Z.
R.,
155; Lloyd vs. Mayfield,
7
A.
L.
T.
(V.)
48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V. L. R., 152; Register of
Titles vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W. A. R., 118.)" Hogg adds
however that, "if it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary
rules of construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a
mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of
I dissent.
In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am
inclined to .agree with the reasoning and authority on which
it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original
holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against
the original holder of the later certificate, where there has
been no transfer of title by either party to an innocent
purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion, being at
fault in permitting the double registration to take place;
(second) that an innocent purchaser claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the original
holder of the later certificate, and also as against innocent
purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at f ault in connection
with the issuance of the later certificate.
But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor
the reasoning of the majority opinion sustains the proposition
that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against an innocent purchaser from the holder of
the later certificate,
As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority
opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid down by both
Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject
to exception, and of course of no binding force or authority
where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is
inapplicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the
majority opinion rests upon the proposition set forth in the
last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem
to be a just and equitable rule, when two persons
605
VOL.31,OCTOBER2,1915.
605
LegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby.
have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the
one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the
requirements of the law should be protected." The rule, as
applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It
would seem to be a just and equitable rule when two persons
have acquired separate and independent registered titles to
the same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that
the one who first acquired registered title and who has
complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard
should be protected, in the absence of any express statutory
provision to the contrary.
Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a
statement of the general rule to be applied in cases of double
or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act;
for it is true as stated in the majority opinion that in the
adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land
Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable;" and that in the absence
of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of
the courts to adjust the rights of the parties, under such
circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking into
consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the
respective parties to avoid them."
But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and
should not be applied in a case wherein the reasons on which
it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful
reasons demand the application of a contrary rule.
608
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
LegardaandPrietovs.Saleeby.
vail, the new system of land registration, instead of making
transf ers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and
instead of avoiding the necessity for expensive and oftimes
uncertain searches of the land records and registries, in order
to ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase,
will, in many instances, add to the labor, expense and
uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself
as to the validity of the title to lands purchased by him.
As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the
principal object, of the torrens system of land registration
upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled
is to facilitate the transfer of real estate. To that end the
Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and
all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of
looking farther than the certificate of title to such lands
furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot,
therefore, give my consent to a ruling which charges a
purchaser or mortgagee of registered lands with notice of the
contents of every other certificate of title in the land registry,
so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him should he
be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such
knowledge.
Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under
the Land Registration Act desires to avoid the imputation of
negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands
have been made the subject of double or overlapping
registration, what course should he pursue? What measures
should he adopt in order to search out the information with
996
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
[No. 14167. August 14,1919.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
petitioner and appellee. ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO
GAYARES, petitioners and appellants, vs.RUFINA ABURAL
ET AL., objectors and appellees.
1. 1.LAND
REGISTRATION; TORRENS
SYSTEM;
PURPOSE.The prime purpose of the Torrens
System, as established in the Philippine Islands by
the Land Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree
land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and
indisputable.
1. 2.ID.; CADASTRAL
SYSTEM;
PURPOSE.The
purpose of the offspring of the Torrens System here
precautions
are
99
7
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
999
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the
issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-called
technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the
latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez, came into
the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
bef ore this court, because the time for the filing of their bill
of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings
did not become final until the f ormal decree was issued by
the Land Registration Office, then it was proper for them to
ask for a reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be
just as proper for this court to order the trial court to permit
the same.
OPINION,
The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been
repeatedly stated, to decree land, titles that shall be final,
irrevocable, and indisputable. Incontestability of title is the
goal. All due precaution must accordingly be taken to guard
against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good
reason, may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless,
even at the cost of possible cruelty which may result in
exceptional cases, it does become necessary in the interest of
1001
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
claimants. This constitutes the decisionthe judgmentthe
decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree
is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title
by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is
made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of
the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again
is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land
Registration Office. This office has been instituted "for the
due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to
the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917, sec.
174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief
surveyor, has as one of his duties "to prepare final decrees in
1003
PHILIPPINEREPORTSANNOTATED
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsvs.Abural.
cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the case would
make unprofitable any discussion of this question.
It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First
lnstance of Occidental Negros of September 21, 1916, has
become final, and that no action was taken within the time
provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of
exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the
appeal is dismissed with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
Arellano,
C.
J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avancea, andMoir, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed.
1005
properties
are
unquestionably
within
its
geographical boundaries.
Land Titles; While certificates of title are indefeasible,
unassailable and binding against the whole world, including
the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They
merely confirm or record title already existing and vested.
In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 452 SCRA
564 (2005), we proclaimed that: We agree with the petitioners
that, generally, a certificate of title shall be conclusive as to
all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears
stressing that while certificates of title are indefeasible,
unassailable and binding against the whole world, including
the govern-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
45
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
4
5
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
ment itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor
can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud;
neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
other.
Same; Mere reliance therefore on the face of the Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) will not suffice as they can only be
conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both
the stated and described locations point to the same area.
Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the
TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta
aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as
they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within
Caintas boundaries. This only means that there may be a
conflict between the location as stated and the location as
technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on
the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be
conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both
the stated and described locations point to the same area.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Abelardo B. Albis, Jr. for petitioner.
TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming
TCT Nos. 92869 and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but
a commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it. 6
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT
Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration
Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs
to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were
located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.7
On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition 8 for the
settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the
RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case,
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 59-70.
4 Id., at pp. 71-72.
5 Now City of Pasig.
6 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
7 Id., at p. 233.
8 CA Rollo, pp. 155-158.
47
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
47
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this
date.
On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, 9docketed
as Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection
of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests, on the
lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869,
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996
for lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive
evidence as to its ownership and location, 13 the RTC, on
August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1)P273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and
penalties as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month until
fully paid;
2)P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
3)The costs of suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor
Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the realty tax payments
improperly collected and received by the former from the
latter in the aggregate amount of P358,403.68.14
After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal,
Pasig, on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTCs August 10, 1998 Decision.
The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in an
Order15 and modified its earlier decision to include the realty
taxes due on the improvements on the subject lots:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs
motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. Accordingly, the
Decision, dated August 10, 1998 is hereby modified in that
the defendant is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of
P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and penalties on
18
the
21
51
cases involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there
is no legal ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of
both cases, the suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig
RTC is baseless.
_______________
25 Id., at p. 17.
52
52 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal
authority over the subject properties, which fall within its
territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been
collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties since
way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property
tax purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that
there is a discrepancy between the locational entries and the
technical descriptions in the TCTs, which further supports
the need to await the settlement of the boundary dispute case
it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed
down into two basic issues:
1)Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding
Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the resolution of
the boundary dispute case between Pasig and Cainta;
and
2)Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real
property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have always
done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias
TCTs.
levying
taxes
on
the
same
_______________
35 Id., at p. 655; p. 577.
36 G.R. No. 180357, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 263.
37 Id., at pp. 271-272.
38 G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745, September 17, 2009, 600
SCRA 33.
39 Id., at p. 63.
57
VOL.652,JUNE15,2011
57
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the
TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta
aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as
they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within
Caintas boundaries.40 This only means that there may be a
conflict between the location as stated and the location as
technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on
the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be
conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both
the stated and described locations point to the same area.
The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case
between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best
determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of
both Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial jurisdictions.
The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the
extent and reach of each local governments authority, a
prerequisite in the proper exercise of their powers, one of
which is the power of taxation. This was the conclusion
reached by this Court inCity of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,41 and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we
cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.
The Prejudicial Question Debate
It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real
property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot
wait for its boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided.
Pasig has consistently argued that the boundary dispute case
is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension
of its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its
argument in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections,42 when
it sought to nullify the COMELECs ruling to hold in
abeyance (until
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 32-33, 191-192.
41 Supra note 32.
42 Id.
58
58 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Sta.LuciaRealty&Development,Inc.vs.CityofPasig
the settlement of the boundary dispute case), the plebiscite
that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We
agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary
dispute case presented a prejudicial question and explained
our statement in this wise:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the
COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the
City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must
first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the
proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial
question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal
action and does not come into play where both cases are civil,
as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule,
this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental,
respondents submitted a Certification13 from the DENRCommunity Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) attesting that, indeed,
_______________
6 Id.
7 Id., at p. 9.
8 Id., at pp. 1-5.
9 Id., at p. 21.
10 Id.
11 Id., at p. 59.
12 Stands for Land Classification Map.
13 Dated 30 January 2002. Rollo, p. 48.
148
148
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Santos
Lot 3 was classified as an Alienable or Disposable Land as
of 15 March 1982.
After fulfillment of the jurisdictional requirements, the
government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
the lone opposition14 to the respondents application on 13
May 2003.
The Claim, Evidence and Opposition
The respondents allege that their predecessors-ininterest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land
making up Lot 3, have been in continuous, uninterrupted,
open, public [and] adverse possession of the said parcels
since time immemorial.15 It is by virtue of such lengthy
possession, tacked with their own, that respondents now
hinge their claim of title over Lot 3.
150
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Santos
sions of Act 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, it is hereby
decreed and adjudged to be confirmed and registered in the
name
of
herein
applicants MICHAEL
C.
SANTOS,
have
been
in
open,
lands
by
prescription
under
the
_______________
35 Separate Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 960; 347 SCRA 128, 199 (2000).
36 Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related
Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), 2006, p. 2.
predecessors
in
interest
have
been
in
open,
occupation of agricultural
154
154
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Santos
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 specify identical
requirements for the judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles, to wit:39
1.That the subject land forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain;
2.That the applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and,
3.That such possession and occupation must be since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
that
the
respondents
failed
to
43
was
the
property, even
if
classified
as
such
alienable
and
disposable
lands
are
Proclamation
in
cases
where
the
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
12
YuChangvs.Republic
and disposable only on October 30, 1986. Prior to that
period, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of
imperfect title. Petitioners possession of the subject forest
land prior to the date when it was classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. To reiterate, it is
well settled that possession of forest land, prior to its
classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective
since such possession may not be considered as possession in
the concept of owner. The adverse possession which can be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title
cases cannot commence until after forest land has been
declared and alienable.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Land Registration; The mode of acquisition recognized by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and made registrable
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree is
through confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is the law that
recognizes the substantive right of a possessor and occupant
of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
while Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
recognizes this right by authorizing its registration, thus
bringing the land within the coverage of the Torrens System.
The mode of acquisition recognized by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act and made registrable under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree is throughconfirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title. Both provisions allow
only
toprivate
lands
acquired
through
YuChangvs.Republic
sion1 dated August 26, 2005 and the Resolution 2 dated
February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67430. The CA reversed and set aside the April 28,
2000 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines
Sur, Branch 31, in LRC No. P-115, LRA Rec. No. N-68012,
which granted petitioners application for registration of title
over two parcels of land, denominated as Lots 2199 and 2200
of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre.
The antecedent facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On March 22, 1949, petitioners father, L. Yu Chang 4and
the Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, through its then
Mayor, Justo Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange
Real Property5 wherein the former assigned and transferred
to the Municipality of Pili his 400-square-meter residential
lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, in exchange for
a 400-square-meter piece of land located in San Juan, Pili.
Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the
property thus obtained and erected a residential house and a
gasoline station thereon. He also declared the property in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 01794 6 and 017957 and paid
the real property taxes thereon as evidenced by twenty-eight
(28) official receipts from February 21, 1951 up to March 10,
1976. When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 49-60. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal
M. De Leon, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court),
concurring.
9 Lot 2199 was described as follows: A parcel of land (Lot2199 of Plan SWO-05-000888 Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre),
situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Pili, Province of
Camarines Sur, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the SW., along
line 1-2 by Lot 2184 on the NW., along line 2-3 by Lot 2198,
all of Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre, on the NE., along line 3-4 by
National Road (20.00m. wide) and on the SE., along line 4-1
by Lot 2200, SWO-05-000888. Containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY[-]THREE (133) square meters. x x x
(Records, p. 2.)
10 Lot 2200 was described as follows: A parcel of land
(Lot-2200 of Plan SWO-05-000888, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre),
situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of Pili, Province of
Camarines Sur, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along
line 1-2 by Lot 2199, SWO-05-000888, on the NE., along line
2-3 by Lot 2394, beyond by National Road (20.00 m. wide) on
the SE., along line 3-4 by Lot 1, Cad. 291, Pili Cadastre, (Lot
2, PSU-48590 Port. Accepted), and on the SW., along line 4-1
by Lot 2184, Cad-291 Pili Cadastre. Containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED SIXTY[-]FOUR (264) square meters. x x x
(Id.)
11 Exh O, Additional Exhibits for the Petitioners.
12 Records, pp. 1-7. Exh. A, entitled Re: Petition for Land
Registration of Lot 2199 and Lot 2200 of Plan SWO-05000888, CAD.
116
116
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
YuChangvs.Republic
over the aforementioned lots under the Property Registration
Decree. In their petition, they declared that they are the coowners of the subject lots; that they and their predecessors-
and disposable under Project No. 9-E, L.C. Map No. 3393 and
released and certified as such only on October 30, 1986. A
Compliance31 dated January 19, 1999 submitted by OICCENR Officer Joaquin Ed A. Guerrero to the trial court also
stated that Lots. 2199 and 2200 of Cad. 291 wereverified to
be within Alienable and Disposable area under Project No. 9E, L.C. Map No. 3393, as certified on October 30, 1986 by the
then Bureau of Forestry. Evidently, therefore, the subject lots
were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30,
1986. Prior to that period, the same could not be the subject
of confirmation of imperfect title. Petitioners possession of
the subject forest land prior to the date when it was classified
as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of
possession.32 To reiterate, it is well settled that possession of
forest land, prior to its classification as alienable and
disposable land, is ineffective since such possession may not
be considered as possession in the concept of owner. 33 The
adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title
in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence
until after forest land has been declared and alienable. 34
Much as this Court wants to conform to the States policy
of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable
public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the
ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the laws
stringent
_______________
31 Exh. R, records, p. 121.
32 Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority,
G.R. No. 174536, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 207, 227
Office
of
the
Solicitor
General),
the Court
of
as
required
under
Section
48(b)
of
that the
petitioners
failed
to
(3)By lease;
(4)By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title;
(5)By judicial legalization;
(6)By administrative legalization (free patent).
7 G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47.
8 Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 2 at
p. 234.
9 Id., at p. 235.
129
VOL.644,FEBRUARY23,2011
129
YuChangvs.Republic
significance of this date though was never explained by the
law. In order not to prejudice the vested rights of those who
complied with the original 30-year period of possession (but
whose possession began only after the June 12, 1945 cut-off
date set by P.D. No. 1073), the Court declared that the P.D.s
requirements as inapplicable to them:
Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-ininterest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under abona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24,
1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. 10
Whether the cut-off date is June 12, 1945 or January 24,
1947 (applying the 30-year prescriptive period used prior to
the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073), the petitioners application
for registration of land pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act [in relation with Section 14(1) that the Property
Registration Decree] should be denied. The facts stated that
the petitioners (through their predecessors-in-interest)
possessed the subject property only after March 22,
1949 exchange agreement with the Municipality of Pili. The
petitioners obvious failure to meet the laws alternative
deadline renders any discussion of Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act unnecessary.
b.Registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, however, are not the only
open avenues to register over the land. [E]ven if possession
of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
_______________
10 Id., at p. 236, citing Abejaron v. Nabasa.
130
130
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
YuChangvs.Republic
June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
(2)Those
who
of private lands
have
by
acquired
ownership
prescription under
the
131
VOL.644,FEBRUARY23,2011
131
YuChangvs.Republic
the law requires 30 years of uninterrupted, adverse
possession of the property.15
Whether ordinary or extraordinary, prescription will
_______________
SCRA 611 (2004), this Court explained that the intent behind
the use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to
emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or
fictional possession. The law speaks ofpossession and
occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.
Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
(citations omitted)405
VOL.666,FEBRUARY20,2012
4
05
Republicvs.EastSilverlaneRealtyDevelopmentCorporation
Same; Same; Same; Possession; Acquisitive Prescription;
Possession for purposes of prescription must be in the concept
of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.On the
other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature
of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And
under Article 1118 thereof, possession for purposes of
prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted. In Heirs of Marcelina ArzadonCrisologo v. Raon, 532 SCRA 391 (2007), this Court
expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes
SO ORDERED.3
In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the
petitioners August 29, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration.4
The Factual Antecedents
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part,
or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
applications.
(b)Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c)Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was
issued on January 25, 1977, deleted subsection (a) and
amended subsection (b) as follows:
SECTION4.The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section
48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
the
property,
even
if
classified
as
pursuant
to
Article
420(2),
and
thus
such
alienable
and
disposable
lands
are
Proclamation
in
cases
where
the
15
VOL.666,FEBRUARY20,2012
419
Republicvs.EastSilverlaneRealtyDevelopmentCorporation
Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the
testimony of the respondents lone witness that the
respondents predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject property as of June 12, 1945 lacks
probative value for being hearsay.
It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and
occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable public land must be open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious in character. InRepublic
of the Philippines v. Alconaba,23 this Court explained that the
intent behind the use of possession in conjunction with
occupation is to emphasize the need for actual and not just
constructive or fictional possession.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party
would
naturally
exercise
over
his
own
24
property. (citations omitted)
o0o
_______________
** Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo
D. Brion per Special Order No. 1195 dated February 15,
2012.
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
4
4
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
real estate not registered under the Torrens system should
affect only the parties thereto unless the deed or instrument
was registered in accordance with the same section.
Same; Same; Constructive Notice; The only exception to
the rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or
instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of a
third party with a better right.The only exception to the
rule on constructive notice by registration of the deed or
instrument affecting unregistered realty exists in favor of a
third party with a better right. This exception is provided in
Section 194, as amended by Act No. 3344, to the effect that
the registration shall be understood to be without prejudice
to a third party with a better right; and in paragraph (b) of
Section 113 of P.D. No. 1529, to the effect that any recording
made under this section shall be without prejudice to a third
party with a better right. As to who is a third party with
better right under these provisions is suitably explained
in Hanopol v. Pilapil, 7 SCRA 452 (1963), a case where the
sale of unregistered land was registered under Act No. 3344
but the land was sold twice, as follows: It thus appears that
the better right referred to in Act No. 3344 is much more
than the mere prior deed of sale in favor of the first vendee.
In
the
Lichauco
case
just
mentioned, it
was
the
BERSAMIN,J.:
The ownership of a sizable parcel of land is the subject of
this dispute between the buyer of its recognized owner and
the buyer of the successors-in-interest of the recognized
owner. The land has since been registered under the Torrens
system in the name of the latter buyer who had meanwhile
obtained a free patent on the premise that the land belonged
to the public domain.
The Case
Aznar Brothers Realty Company (Aznar Brothers) is on
appeal to review and undo the adverse decision promulgated
on October 10, 2002,[1] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the judgment rendered on March 8, 1996 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, in Cebu
City[2] insofar as the RTC: (a) dismissed for lack of merit
Aznar Brothers complaint for the declaration of the nullity of
the extrajudicial declaration of heirs with extrajudicial
settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale, and (b)
declared Lot No. 18563 as legally owned by defendants
Spouses Jose and Magdalena Ybaez (Spouses Ybaez), but
modified the decision of the RTC by deleting the awards of
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs of suit.
Antecedents
On March 21, 1964, Casimiro Ybaez (Casimiro), with the
marital consent of Maria Daclan, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Aznar Brothers conveying for P2,500.00 the
17,575-square-meter unregistered agricultural land planted
_______________
Cebu City. By the same document, they sold the entire lot for
P1,000.00 to their co-heir, Adriano D. Ybaez (Adriano).[7]
On June 21, 1978, Adriano sold Lot No. 18563 to Jose R.
Ybaez for P60,000.00. Lot No. 18563 is described in their
deed of sale as containing an area of 16,050 square meters,
and was bounded on the North by the lot of Eusebia Bacalso;
on the East by a lot of Aznar Brothers; on the South by a lot
of Angel Abellana; and on the West by a lot of Teofila C.
Leona.[8]
On January 15, 1979, Jose R. Ybaez filed Free Patent
Application No. (VII-I) 18980 in respect of the land he had
bought from Adriano.[9] In due course, on July 20, 1979,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2150 was issued to
Jose R. Ybaez. The 16,050-square-meter land is particularly
described in OCT No. 2150 as
situated in the Barrio of Bulacao-Pardo, City of Cebu
x x x. Bounded on the NorthEast, along lines 1-2-3 by
Lot No. 1811, on the SouthEast, along lines 3-4 by Lot
No. 5316; on the SouthWest, along lines 4-5-6-7-8-9-1011 by Lot No. 18565; on the NorthWest, along line 11-12
by Lot No. 18566; along line 12-1 by Lot No. 18114, all
of Cebu City.[10]
_______________
[7] Id., at pp. 36-37.
[8] Id., at p. 20.
[9] Id., at pp. 43 & 44.
[10] Id., at p. 21.
9
VOL.722,APRIL21,2014
9
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
in its favor of Lot No. 18563 despite the sale being registered
under Act No. 3344, as amended; and for awarding moral
damages,
_______________
[22] Id., at pp. 184-191.
[23] Supra note 2.
13
VOL.722,APRIL21,2014
13
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses to
the Spouses Ybaez.
As earlier mentioned, the CA promulgated its adverse
decision on October 10, 2002,[24] decreeing thusly:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
of
the
lot in
litis is
no
correctly
Lot
No.
concluded
18563;
that
and
Aznar
that
the
Brothers
Spouses
Mortgage
Law.No
instrument
or
made
under
this
section
shall
be
_______________
[36] G.R. No. 185477, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 807,
817, citing Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 125585, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 412, 416.
24
24 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
land shall not be valid against any person unless registered,
except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third
persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof. As held by
the Court of Appeals, petitioners are the heirs of Ignacio, the
grantor of the subject property. Thus, they are bound by the
provisions of the deed of donation inter vivos.
The effect on third parties of the constructive notice by
virtue of the registration of the deed or instrument was aptly
illustrated in Bautista v. Fule,[37] where the Court
pronounced that the subsequent buyer of unregistered land
sold at an execution sale, which the purchaser at the public
auction registered under Act No. 3344 seven days after that
sale, was deemed to have constructive notice of the sale,
and, therefore, could not be entitled to the rights of a
purchaser in good faith. The Court emphasized that as to
lands not registered under either the Spanish Mortgage
Law or the Land Registration Act, the registration under Act
No. 3344 should produce its effects against third persons if
the law was to have utility at all.[38]
It is worth mentioning that Act No. 3344 (approved on
December 8, 1926) was the governing law at the time of the
execution of the deed of absolute sale of March 21, 1964
between Casimiro and Aznar Brothers, and the deed of
absolute sale of February 17, 1967 between Tanuco and
land
with
26
26 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
parties thereto unless the deed or instrument was registered
in accordance with the same section.[41]
The only exception to the rule on constructive notice by
registration of the deed or instrument affecting unregistered
_______________[41] The Property Registration Decree states:
Section113.Recording of instruments relating to
unregistered lands.No deed, conveyance, mortgage,
lease, or other voluntary instrument affecting land not
registered under the Torrens system shall be valid,
_______________
one copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or city
assessor as required by existing law.
(d)Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens,
adverse claim and other instruments in the nature of
involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered lands, if
made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be
admissible to record under this section.
(e)For the services to be rendered by the Register of
Deeds under this section, he shall collect the same amount of
fees prescribed for similar services for the registration of
deeds or instruments concerning registered lands. (Italics in
the original; emphasis supplied)
[42] No. L-19248, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 452.
[43] Id., at p. 456.
28
28 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
The Court also observes in Sales v. Court of Appeals,[44] a
case involving parties to a deed of donation who had agreed
to register the instrument under Act No. 3344 but failed to do
so, that the better right of a third party relates to other
by
laches
did
not
bar
No.
18563,
not
being
land
of
the
open,
continuous,
exclusive,
and
notorious
_______________
[53] Records, p. 290 (Exhibit 2).
[54] Rule 130, Rules of Court, states:
Section31.Admission by privies.Where one derives
title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to
the property, is evidence against the former.
[55] Exhibit F.
[56] Magistrado v. Esplana, G.R. No. 54191, May 8, 1990,
185 SCRA 104, 109.
[57] G.R. No. 151440, June 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 193, 199.
34
34 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
AznarBrothersRealtyCompanyvs.Ybaez
the
BROTHERS
VOL.724,JUNE2,2014
Camposvs.Ortega,Sr.
245
19,
1988,
similar,
or
almost
purchase, [she] learned that the property, Lot 18, Block [7],
Phase III of Hulo estate was already sold to herein
defendants in violation of her right. The court is convinced
that plaintiff has acquired a vested right over the subject
property. Such right is protected by law and a violation of
said right will give rise to a valid cause of action.[10]
Upon appeal by respondents, the CA reversed the trial
courts decision. In ruling that petitioner has no vested right
over the subject parcel of land and the residential structure
standing thereon, the appellate court pronounced:
To our mind, [respondents] correctly underscore the fact
that, even from the testimonial evidence proffered by
[petitioner], there is no gainsaying [of] their lease of the first
floor of the residential structure owned by Dominga Boloy.
Although the commencement of their contract with the latter
had, admittedly, not been exactly established, the record
ineluctably shows that both [respondents] had attended the
meetings conducted by the NHA
_______________
[10] Id., at pp. 33-34. (Emphasis in the original)
250
250
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Camposvs.Ortega,Sr.
Arbitration Committee for the purpose of awarding the lots
covered by the ZIP. Even more significantly, [respondent]
[Ortega, Sr.] was also included in the NHAs [1977] survey of
the Hulo Estate and was, in fact, issued a separate
identifying house tag alongside [petitioners] husband.
In contrast, [petitioners] lease of the second floor since
1966 clearly qualified her as a beneficiary under the ZIP
Guideline Circular No. 1 which employs the term to refer to
254
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Camposvs.Ortega,Sr.
in favor of petitioner. Her possession and occupancy of the
said property could not be characterized as fixed and
absolute. Assuch, petitioner cannot claim that she was
deprived of her vested right when the NHA ordered her
relocation to another area.[14]
Neither does petitioner have a cognizable right
respecting the lot in question. Notably, she readily admitted
not exercising their option to buy Boloys property despite the
knowledge that one of the requirements before an
entitlement to an award of the government-owned lot is that
they must own the subject house.[15]
Petitioner argues that what prompted her refusal to
purchase was not a matter of whimsical preference, not really
insisting on any preferential right, but on imminent
apprehension that the house that was being sold by Boloy is
situated at Lot 17 while they were occupying Lot 18; that the
particular lot number is different from what she is applying;
and that said lot is actually occupied by another person who
too may have already qualified as a ZIP beneficiary, resulting
in conflict of award. She contends that she could not be
compelled to suddenly become particularly interested in a lot
that is completely different from the one where the house
structure she occupies is situated and that the structure
owner in Lot 17 may not be willing to sell the same.
The argument is untenable. Petitioner is certainly
confused. There should be no doubt that the object of the sale
is a determinate thing, a semi-apartment house owned by
Boloy and not the specific lot on which it was built. Thus, it is
therein from 1966 until 1997 when they were ejected by the
sheriff of Pasig RTC;[29] (2) TCT No. 13342 was issued on
De_______________
[26] Yared v. Tiongco, supra note 25 at pp. 552-554.
[27] ART. 1155.The prescription of actions in
interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there
is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when
there is any written acknowledgement of the debt by the
debtor.
[28] See Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Napiza, 536 Phil. 1102; 506
SCRA 396 (2006); Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v.
Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004, 439 SCRA
1; Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106646, June 30,
1993, 224 SCRA 175; Philippine National Railways
v.National Labor Relations Commission, 258 Phil. 552; 177
SCRA 740 (1989); and The Overseas Bank of Manila v.
Geraldez, 183 Phil. 493; 94 SCRA 937 (1979).
[29] TSN, July 23, 2001, pp. 7, 33-34, 36-37.
261
VOL.724,JUNE2,2014
261
Camposvs.Ortega,Sr.
cember 9, 1997; and (3) the instant case for specific
performance with damages was filed on August 17, 1999.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
Petition
of
the
Philippines
COURT
June 4, 2014
Report, the RTC rendered the assailed July 20, 2010 Decision,
granting the petition for reconstitution and ordering the Registrar
of Deeds of the QCRD to reconstitute the original copy of TCT
No. 301617. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby
directed to reconstitute in the files of his office the original copy
of Transfer Certificate Title No. 301617 in exactly the same
terms and conditions on the basis of Owners Duplicate
Certificate of said Transfer Certificate of Title No. 301617 and
other available supporting documents submitted to your office
and once accomplished, the said Register of Deeds is further
ordered to issue new owners duplicate copy of the said
Certificate of Title after payment of the prescribed fees.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 16, 2010, the RTC issued the Certificate of
Finality,5 there being no motion for reconsideration or appeal
filed by any of the interested parties.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 2010, the RTC received the LRA
Report,6 stating that TCT No. 301617was registered in the name
of a certain Emma B. Florendo (Florendo)and that it was
previously the subject of an application for administrative
reconstitution. It was also discovered that the original copy of
the title on file in the Registry of Deeds was among those saved
titles from the fire that gutted the office of QCRD on June 11,
1988. In addition, when the technical description of the subject
property was plotted, it was identical with Lot 939,Piedad Estate
covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532), in the name of Magnolia
W. Antonino (Antonino).
On December 3, 2010, Spouses Paulino filed with the QCRD an
application for registration of the judicial reconstitution of TCT
No. 301617 based on the RTC decision. The Registrar of
Deeds, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala (Atty. Quilala),and other officials of
the QCRD refused to reconstitute the original copy of the TCT.
Hence, Spouses Paulino filed a petition for indirect contempt.
SO ORDERED.9
SO ORDERED.11
Taking into account that the case was still in its completion stage
and it appearing that the immediate execution and satisfaction
of the assailed Decisions, dated July 20, 2010 and December 2,
2011, would probably result in manifest injustice and irreparable
injury against petitioner Republic of the Philippines (now
respondent LRA), the CA found merit in its prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It explained that it
was in the best interest of all the parties to maintain the status
quo until it had resolved the merits of the issues raised in the
petition, adding that to deny the prayer would render ineffective
any judgment that may be rendered in the case.10
Propriety
of
Petition
of
RTC
Title No. 301617, was plotted on the Municipal Index Map No.
5708, it appears that the aforesaid lot is identical to Lot 939,
Piedad Estate covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the
name of Magnolia W. Antonino, which title is already totally
cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof TCT Nos. 296725 to
296728inclusive all in the name of Magnolia Antonino, covering
Lots 939-A to 939-D of subdivision plan Psd-00-065898.
xxx
2.3. TCT No. 301617 was previously the subject of a petition for
judicial reconstitution under LRC Case No. Q-3796 (90) in
Regional Trail Court, Branch 77, wherein this Authority rendered
a Report dated August 20, 1991. The said petition was
dismissed on September 23, 1997 by then Presiding Judge
Normandie B. Pizarro, on the grounds that the submitted basis
for reconstitution are fabricated and that an earlier title was
issued covering the same property.
2.4 The real TCT No. 301617 covers Lot 17, Blk. 83 of the
subdivision plan Psd-57970, containing an area of 182.80
square meters, in the name of Emma B. Florendo. The same
was applied for administrative reconstitution but it was found
that the original copy of title on file in the Registry of Deeds, is
among the saved titles from the fire that gutted the registry on
June 11, 1988, reproduction of which is hereto attached.
The Court, thus, finds no reversible error in the findings of the
CA.1wphi1 It is clear from the records that the subject TCT No.
301617 is in the name of a different owner, Florendo, and the
technical description appearing therein pertains to a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. RT-55869 (42532) in the name of one
Antonino.
It must be remembered that the reconstitution of a certificate of
title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a
lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title
reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or
destruction
occurred.29 Reconstitution
apparently
presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title which
was lost or destroyed. If there was no loss or destruction like in
the case at bench, there is actually nothing to reconstitute. The
same rule applies if in fact there is an earlier valid certificate of
title in the name and in the possession of another person and
said title is existing. Accordingly, the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the same, and its judgment rendered thereafter
is null and void, which may be attacked anytime.
With respect to the contention of Spouses Paulino that the LRA
Report is inadmissible because it was not presented and
identified in open court and admitted in evidence, suffice it is to
say that they are estopped from questioning it. The admissibility
of the LRA report was not challenged during the proceedings of
the petition for annulment in the CA. Its admissibility was only
questioned in these petitions. They are deemed to have waived
their right to question its genuineness and authenticity.
Further, records show that the CA gave credence to the LRA
Report, which was submitted in compliance to its resolution,
dated July 26, 2012. The LRA Report is a certified photocopy
from the records duly signed by the Branch Clerk of Court.
Accordingly, the LRA report is deemed to form part of the
records which may be used in resolving the present controversy.
It need not be emphasized that the RTC hastily acted on the
petition for reconstitution because it did not wait for the LRA
Report. If there was no haste, the LRA Report would have
shown that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because
there was already an existing title.
In addition, Spouses Paulino also raised the irregularity in the
issuance of TCT No. RT-558969 (42532), arguing that a
reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on a title
that was irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. They
argued that it was an error on the part of the CA to deny their
right to have their title reconstituted based on the fake title of
Antonino. They assert that the rule, that a title issued under the
JOSE
Associate Justice
CATRAL
MENDOZA
for
reconstitution.
The
order
of
(e) the
names
and
addresses of
the
311, 369; 102 SCRA 370, 438 (1981). See also Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 109645 &
112564, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 482 and Subido
v. Republic of the Philippines, 522 Phil. 155, 165; 488 SCRA
178, 187 (2006).
[19] 121 Phil. 1122, 1128; 14 SCRA 358, 363-364 (1965).
36
36 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Republicvs.Millado
and the legal provisions laying down the germane
jurisdictional requirements.[20] Thus, we have held that
notwithstanding compliance with the notice publication, the
requirement of actual notice to the occupants and the owners
of the adjoining property under Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. 26
is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a
petition for reconstitution of title and essential in order to
allow said court to take the case on its merits. The
nonobservance of the requirement invalidates the whole
reconstitution proceedings in the trial court.[21]
For noncompliance with the actual notice requirement to
all other persons who may have interest in the property, in
this case the registered owners and/or their heirs, in
accordance with Section 13 in relation to Section 12 of R.A.
26, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over L.R.A.
Case No. RTC-237-I. The proceedings therein were therefore
a nullity and the January 14, 2009 Decision was void.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
for
review
The trial court also ruled that because the application for
free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was attended by fraud
and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered
as a trustee of an implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed
the case to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision on
_______________
[9] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
408
408
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
CalalangParulanvs.CalalangGarcia
December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises,
the
defendants
of
the
Philippines
COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183448
SPOUSES
DOMINADOR
PERALTA
PERALTA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON,
MANSUETO ABALON, Respondents.
AND
OFELIA
represented
by
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183464
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by
MANSUETO
ABALON, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL,
SPOUSES DOMINDOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA,
and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his
children ALEX, IMMANUEL, JULIUS and SYLVIA, all
surnamed RELLAMA.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to
Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and Ofelia M. Peralta
(Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued
in their names. Lot 1679-B, on the other hand, was first sold to
Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his
ownership thereto to Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil
Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT No. 42482 was issued in
the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT No. 42821 in their favor
on December 27, 1995.
Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in
favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further
that they acquired the subject property by succession, they
being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without issue,
plaintiff-appellees Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the
case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals,
the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank of the
Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party
defendant.
It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended
Complaint, under five separate causes of action, that Rellama
was able to cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in
lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name
from which the defendants-appellants derived their own titles,
upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed of
absolute sale and the order granting the issuance of a second
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in
Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he had filed on
the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by OCT No. (O) 16 was sold
to him and that the owners duplicate copy of the said title got
lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They averred
that the owners duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always
been with Abalon and that upon her death, it was delivered to
them. Likewise, they alleged that Abalon had always been in
possession of the subject property through her tenant Pedro
Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta
Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On the other hand,
they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was
claiming. They further alleged that after the ownership over the
subject property was transferred to them upon the death of
Abalon, they took possession thereof and retained Godofredo
as their own tenant. However, they averred that in 1995 the
defendants-appellants were able to wrest possession of the
subject property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the
defendants-appellants are not buyers in good faith as they were
aware that the subject land was in the possession of the
plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the purchase. They
thus claim that the titles issued to the defendants-appellants are
null and void.
was a mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted
that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in the hands of the
plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic] the perforated serial number B
221377, which it held is a convincing proof of its authenticity and
genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous Cadastral Case
No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic] fraudulently concocted ...
for the issuance of a fabricated (second) owners duplicate
certificate of Oct No. (O) 16" since the owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. (O) 16 has not been lost at all. It said that any
subsequent registration procured by the presentation of such
forged instrument is null and void. The dispositive portion of the
court a quos decision reads: WHEREFORE, [p]remises
[c]onsidered, judgment is rendered as follows, to wit:
As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate
answers to the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are
buyers in good faith and for value.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by
his heirs.
After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of
presenting their own evidence, the defendants-appellants and
the Heirs of Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a
demurrer to evidence.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT No.
(O) 16 in the name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles
issued to the defendants-appellants. The fact that only a xerox
copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama and Abalon
was presented before the Register of Deeds for registration and
the absence of such xerox copy on the official files of the said
Office made the court a quo conclude that the said document
SO ORDERED.11
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30
May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals to be
buyers in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the
land title issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta, for
their part, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said
CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them as
buyers in bad faith which accordingly nullified the title issued to
them.
On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial
Reconsideration of the movants for lack of merit.12
On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the 30 May 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542. 13 On the
same day, the heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by
Mansueto Abalon, filed a similar Petition questioning the portion
of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the validity of the title
issued to the Andals, who were adjudged by the appellate court
as buyers in good faith.14 THE ISSUES
The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No.
183448, lists the following issues:
a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed
because the purported Deed of Sale executed by Abalon
and Rellama was not introduced in evidence and thus,
forgery was not proven.
b) The heirs of Abalon are notforced heirs of Bernardina
Abalon; hence, they do not have the legal personality to
file the action to annul the subject Deed of Sale.
c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had
inherited the subject property.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
LOURDES
Chief Justice, Chairperson
P.
A.
SERENO