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Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, the German army general at the
beginning of the nineteenth century is widely renowned for his political
philosophy on war. In his book, On War, he defines war as a duel on larger
scale constituted of opposing forces, an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will (Clausewitz, 1976, p.75). His work, is specifically orientated
towards strategies of war and is rich with examples related to the close
analysis of the battles of his time and those before. Given the apparent
prevailing forms of armed conflicts in Clausewitzs times, it can be assumed
the text and Clausewitz philosophy were highly relevant to his period.
Clausewitz died before getting a chance to fully revise his book as he wished,
explaining possible weaknesses due to the evolution of his views. Accounting
for these weaknesses, this essay will assess his relevance in todays security
environment: essentially, anything related to the alleviation of threats. Indeed,
extrapolating from his work would not guarantee an accurate reflection his
thoughts.
Furthermore, statistics from the Center for Systemic Peace show that from
1997 to 2012, levels of societal warfare have always exceeded those of
interstate warfare, with a global decline in the total of armed conflicts (Center
for Systemic Peace, 2013a). Figure 5 reveals that overall, the same pattern
can be noticed regarding the nature of newly onsets wars (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2013b). Therefore, focusing on interstate rather than
intrastate wars is equivalent to focusing on, numerically at least, a less
common type of warfare. It might be argued that the decline of interstate wars
does not mean that insecurity between states disappeared. Indeed, countries
still prepare for such a potential threat. Recently, NATO set as a future focus
the protection of European countries from ballistic missiles attacks from
countries such as Iran. In practice this has resulted in the translocation of a
US ballistic missile defence destroyer to Rota, Spain (BBC World Service,
2014), showing that Clausewitzs ideas are still relevant to some extent.
Nevertheless, set in the wider context this only represents the minor fraction
of the contemporary war environment and an even smaller one in the global
security environment. Thus, this essay will mainly focus on Clausewitzs
relevance in intrastate wars.
It could be rightfully argued that economic interests are also at the origins
of war and so they are not protections for peaceful relations based on mutual
gains. The 2001 Iraq war, though officially aimed at removing Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMDs), has been analysed as a war motivated by
economic profits instead (Hassan and Ralph, 2011). Nevertheless, this does
not discredit the fact that war is not the continuation of a policy but rather the
pursuit of non-political goals. Presently, ethnic and religious features are at
the origin of intrastate wars. It sets the basis for M. V. Crevelds argument that
Clausewitz is out-dated because war is the product of different elements
(Williams, 2008). War is now mostly the degeneration of cultural tensions, as
the current situation in the Central African Republic between Muslims and
Christians exemplifies. Furthermore, the Arab Spring shows another pattern:
intrastate wars find origins in the popular will to break up with their current
politics. The aim in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria was to achieve a regime
change. Confrontations which are the result of clashes between civilian
demands and governmental positions. War is not exclusively a tool in the
hands of politicians nor the extension of politics. Hence, even though it is
widely accepted by all scholars, regardless their belief in Clausewitzs
contemporary relevance war cannot be considered a continuation of politics
anymore due to the nature of the origins of todays intrastate conflicts.
Delbrck argues that Clausewitz sets two objectives of war that need to be
clearly separated. The first is to achieve a position in allowing peace
negotiations; the second is to implement a new order by eradicating the
enemy (Strachan, 2007). Looking at these two aims while considering the
emergence of nuclear weapons and more widely WMDs, results in a biased
conclusion. Considering Bernard Brodies position that nuclear weapons are
coherent only as a deterrence tool implies that WMDs could limit escalations
of violence. Indeed, as Clausewitz advocates, decision makers have to be
rational individuals therefore a nuclear attack leading to Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) is unlikely. A situation where peace talks could be carried
out would be created, as conflicts could not rationally further escalate. Hence,
Clausewitz can be considered relevant when arguing regarding decision
makers rationality (Brodie, 1976). Yet, it is not his objective of achieving a
situation allowing peace negotiations that is relevant to todays security
environment but WMDs that contribute to his objective. Consequently the
primary relevance goes to WMDs and military developments, not Clausewitzs
idea which is a consequence of the previous. Ultimately, the progresses in
military equipment have developed to such point that eradicating the enemy
became a fairly easy goal to achieve (from a logistic perspective). It is the
extent of social, political, economic and potentially environmental damages
that renders said goal too costly from all perspectives and so decreasingly
relevant.
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trinity cannot accommodate new actors and their attributes. To conclude, the
security environment has changed too much for Clausewitz to be as relevant
as he once was thought to be. The development of his field of expertise, the
overall settling of territorial and political aspects of interstate wars, the
evolution of the origins and goals of war have rendered his strategies and two
main concepts ill adapted to dominant contemporary intrastate wars.
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Bibliography:
Center for Systemic Peace. 2013a. Figure 3: Global Trends in Armed Conflict,
1946-2012. [Online]. [Accessed 28 February 2014]. Available from:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm
Center for Systemic Peace. 2013b. Figure 5Global Trends in Armed Conflict
Onsets, 1946-2011*. [Online]. [Accessed 28 February 2014]. Available from:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/conflict.htm
Daase, C. 2007. Clausewitz and Small Wars. In: Hew Strachan, H. and
Herberg-Rothe, A. ed. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. New York:
Oxford University Press, pp. 183-195.
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Echevarria II, A. J. 2007b. Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror. In:
Hew Strachan, H. and Herberg-Rothe, A. ed. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First
Century. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 197-218.
Kaldor, M. 1998. New and Old Wars. Cambridge: Stanford University Press.
Marcus, J. 2013. Gruesome Syria video pinpoints West's dilemma. BBC News.
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Strachan, H. 2007. Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War. In: Hew Strachan, H.
and Herberg-Rothe, A. ed. Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century. New York:
Oxford University Press, pp. 15-44.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNODA. 2013. Treaty on the
non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). [Online]. [Accessed 26 February
2014]. Available from:
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml
Van Creveld, M. 1991. The Transformation of War. New York: The Free Press.
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