CASE No.

11
KOSTER VS. AUTOMARK INDUSTRIES, Inc. 640 F.2d 77, 81 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981)
FACTS:
Koster, a citizen of Netherlands obtained default judgement for breach of contract in
a Dutch Court against Automark, a corporation doing business in Illinois. The case
involves a contract executed in Italy for the production of goods in Switzerland.
There are no other allegations that Automark had any relationship with the
Netherlands beyond letters, telegram and telephone call involved on its business
contact with Koster.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgement is enforceable in the U.S. court.
RULING:
No. The court find out that Automark did not have sufficient contact with the
Netherlands to vest that country's courts with personal jurisdiction over Automark
so as to permit enforcement of the default judgment in United States courts. As
established there are no other allegations that Automark had any relationship with
the Netherlands beyond letters, telegram and telephone call involved on its
business contact with Koster. Such does not amount to minimum contacts to vest
jurisdiction. Therefore, the default judgement cannot be enforced.

CASE NO. 12 ( with 2 issues, just choose one. Thanks!)

QUERUBIN V. QUERUBIN, GR No. L-3693, (July 29, 1950)
FACTS:
In the Superior Court in Los Angeles, California, an interlocutory judgement of
divorce between plaintiff and defendant awarded custody of their child to the
plaintiff. It was established that the divorce was caused by the infidelity of plaintiff
(the wife) who now has her own children with another man. Defendant (the
husband) brought the child here in the Philippines. Hence the plaintiff seeks to
enforce the interlocutory judgement here in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the interlocutory judgement can be enforced here in the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the interlocutory judgement can be enforced on the basis of
reciprocity and international comity.
RULING:
No. The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a court of
another state between the same parties on the same cause of action, on the merits
of the case is conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the merits only.
Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by
the court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the
parties. Because an interlocutory decree does not constitute final decision, it cannot
therefore be enforced in the Philippines.
No. Under the Divorce Act No. 2710, the guilty spouse is not entitled to the custody
of minor children. The current legislation, morality and public order interest advise
that the child should be out of the care of a mother who has violated the oath of
fidelity to her husband. The judgments of foreign courts may not be into force in the
Philippines if they are contrary to the laws, customs and public order. If such
decisions, for the simple theory of reciprocity and international comity are enough
for our courts to decide on the basis of the same base then our courts would be in
poor position of having to dictate decisions contrary to our laws, customs and public
order. We believe that this Court should not enforce a decision given by a foreign
court decree that violates our laws and sound principles of morality that inform our
social structure on family relationships.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3693

July 29, 1950

MARGARET QUERUBIN, recurrente-apelante,

vs.
SILVESTRE QUERUBIN, recurrido-apelado.
Manuel A. Argel en representacion del recurrente y apelante.
Maximino V. Bello en representacion del recurrido y apelado.
PABLO, J.:
Silvestre Querubin es de Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, de padres filipinos.
marcho a los Estados Unidos con el objeto de estudiar pero con el
volver despues a su pais natal. Obtuvo el titulo de "Master of Arts and
la "University of Southern California," institucion domiciliada en
California, en donde el recurrido empezo a vivir desde 1934.

En 1926 se
proposito de
Sciences" en
los Angeles,

En 20 de octubre de 1943, Silvestre Querubin contrajo matrimonio con la

recurrente, Margaret Querubin, en Albuquerque, New Mexico. Como fruto de este
matrimonio nacio Querubina Querubin, quien, al tiempo de la vista de la causa en el
Juzgado de primera instancia de Ilocos Sur, tenia cuatro aos de edad poco mas o
menos.
La recurrente entablo en 1948 una demanda de divorcio contra el recurrido,
fundada en "crueldad mental." En 7 de febrero de 1948 el divorcio fue concedido al
marido en virtud de una contrademanda presentada por el y fundada en la
infidelidad de su esposa. En 5 de abril de 1949, y a peticion del demandado y
contrademandante, (recurrido enesta actuacion de habeas corpus) el Juzgado
superior de Los Angeles dicto una orden interlocutoria disponiendo lo siguiente:
Cherubin is Caoayan Silvestre , Ilocos Sur, Filipino parents. In 1926 he left
the United States for the purpose of study but for the purpose of returning to
her native country. He earned the title of "Master of Arts and Sciences " in
the " University of Southern California, " based in Los Angeles , California ,
where the Respondent began to live from 1934 institution.
On October 20, 1943 , Silvestre Cherub married the appellant, Margaret
Cherubin , in Albuquerque , New Mexico . As a result of this marriage was born
Querubina Cherubin , who , at the time of the hearing of the case in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur , was four years old , more or less.
The applicant instituted in 1948 for divorce against the appeal, based on
"mental cruelty. " On February 7, 1948 the divorce was granted the husband

under a countersuit filed by and based on his wife 's infidelity . On April 5,
1949 , at the request of the defendant and contrademandante ( inthis resorted
acting of habeas corpus) the Superior Court of Los Angeles issued an interim
order directing the following:

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the interlocutory judgment of

divorce hereinbefore entered on February 27, 1948, in Book 1891, page 319, be and
the same is hereby modified in the following particulars in connection with the
custody of the minor child of the parties only:
(1) The care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties, Querubina
Querubin, is hereby awarded to defendant and cross-complainants;
(2) Said child is to be maintained in a neutral home, subject to the right of
reasonable visitation on the part of both parties to this action;
(3) Each party shall have the right to take said child away from said neutral home
but plaintiff and cross-defendant is restrained from taking said child to her place of
residence;
(4) Each party is restrained from molesting the other, or in any way interfering with
the other's right of reasonable visitation of said child;
(5) Each party is restrained from removing the child from the State of California
without first securing the permission of the court; said parties are further restrained
from keeping the child out of the County of Los Angeles for more than one day
without first securing the consent of the court.
El recurrido salio de San Francisco en 7 de noviembre de 1949, arribando a Manila
en 25 del mismo mes. En 27 de susodicho mes llego a Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, donde
vive actualmente, llevandose consigo a la nia Querubina, a quien trajo a Filipinas
porque, en su calidad de padre, queria evitar que llegase a conocimiento de ella la
conducta indecorosa de su propia madre. El recurrido queria que su hija fuera
educada en un ambiente de elevada moralidad.
The recourse left San Francisco on November 7, 1949 , arriving in Manila on 25
March. In 27 above month I get Caoayan , Ilocos Sur, where he now lives ,
taking the Querubina girl , whom he brought to the Philippines because , as a
father , I wanted to prevent it from reaching knowledge of her unseemly
conduct of its own mother. The resorted want his daughter to be educated in an
environment of high morality .

A peticion de la recurrente Margaret, el Juzgado superior de los Angeles, California,

en 30 de noviembre de 1949 modifico su orden de 5 de abril de 1949, disponiendo
lo siguiente:

At the request of the appellant Margaret , the Superior Court of Los Angeles,
California, on November 30, 1949 amended its order of April 5, 1949 ,
providing the following:

Under interlocutory decree of March 7, 1949, the child, a girl now 3 1/2 years old,
was granted to deft husband, but the child was to be kept in a neutral home; both
parties were given reasonable visitation and both were restrained from removing
the child out of the state. Deft has taken the child with him to the Philippine Islands.
At time of trial custody was apparently denied pft because she was then living with
another man. She is now married to this man and they have a well equipped home.
Ptf appears to be a devoted mother. She has one child, the issue of her present
marriage, and is also caring for a child that was abandoned by certain friends of
hers. Ptf's husband is regularly and permanently employed. Witnesses testified in
behalf of the ptf in reference to her motherly qualities and the condition of her
home. She visited the child in question sufficiently when the child was in the neutral
home and brought her toys and other articles. Service of the order to show cause
was made on deft's attorneys of record.
The interlocutory decree is modified so as to provide that custody of the child shall
be awarded to ptf and deft shall have the right of reasonable visitation. Deft shall
pay ptf for the support of the child $30 each month on the 1st day thereof,
commencing Jan. 1950.
En el dia de la vista de esta causa de habeas corpus en Ilocos Sur, el recurrido
declaro que nunca intento cambiar su ciudadania; que cuando vino al pais tenia
unos P2,000 de ahorro; que tres semanas despues de su arribo recibio oferta para
ensear con sueldo P250 mensual en el colegio establecido por el Dr. Sobrepea en
Villasis, Pangasinan; que nunca se le ha privado de patria potestad por sentencia
judicial, ni declarado ausente de Filipinas, ni sujeto a interdiccion civil. Segun el
juzgado a quo, el recurrido es de irreprochable conducta.
On the day of the hearing of this cause of habeas corpus in Ilocos Sur, the
Respondent stated that never try to change his citizenship ; when he came to
the country had about P2,000 savings ; three weeks after his arrival received
offers to teach P250 monthly salary at the school established by Dr. Sobrepea
in Villasis , Pangasinan ; that has never been deprived of parental rights by
court order or declared absent from the Philippines, or subject to civil
interdiction . According to the court a quo , the recourse is irreproachable
conduct .

En 10 de febrero de 1950 la recurrente Margaret Querubin, por medio de su

abogado, presento en el Juzgado de primera instancia de Ilocos Sur una solicitud de
habeas corpus reclamando la custodia de su hija Querubina, alegando como
fundamento el decreto interlocutorio del juzgado de California que concedio a ella
dicha custodia. Despues de la vista correspondiente, el Juzgado a quo, en 28 de
febrero de 1950 denego la solicitud. La recurrente acude en apelacion ante este
Tribunal.
On 10 February 1950 the appellant Margaret Cherubin , through his lawyer ,
presented in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur demand for habeas
corpus claiming custody of her daughter Querubina , citing as grounds the
interlocutory decree of the court of California he gave her such custody .

After the corresponding view , the Court a quo , on February 28, 1950 refused
the application . The appellant goes on appeal to this Court .

La recurrente sostiene que bajo el articulo 48 de la Regla 39, el decreto Exhibit A-1
del Juzgado de los Angeles, California, debe cumplirse en Filipinas. Su parte
dispositiva dice textualmente:
The appellant maintains that under Article 48 of Rule 39 , the decree Exhibit
A-1 of the Court of Los Angeles , California, to be met in the Philippines.
The operative part reads:

The interlocutory decree is modified so as to the provide that custody of the child
shall be awarded to ptf and deft shall have the right to reasonable visitation. Deft
shall pay ptf for the support of the child $30 each month on the 1st day thereof,
commencing Jan. 1950.
Un decreto interlocutorio sobre la custodia de un menor no es una decision final. Por
su naturaleza no es firme. Esta sujeto a cambios como cambian las circunstancias.
En el primer decreto se dio al padre la custodia de la menor. A peticion del padre, se
dicto el decreto de 5 de abril prohibiendo a la madre que llavase a la menos a su
casa porque estaba otra vez en relaciones adulterinas con otro hombre. Cuando ya
no estaba el recurrido en Los Angeles, porque ya habian venido a Filipinas, se
enmendo la ultima orden y se dispuso que la custodia estuviese encomendada a la
recurrente, pagando a ella el recurrido $30 al mes para la manutencion de la menor.
La pension no es fija y se aumenta o disminuye como aumentan o disminuyen las
necesidades del pensionista o como exijan las condiciones economicasdel que la da.
An interlocutory decree on the custody of a child is not a final decision. By
its nature it is not firm . It is subject to change as circumstances change.
In the first decree he gave the father custody of the child. At the request of
the parent, the decree of April 5 was dictated forbidding mother llavase the
least because I was home again in adulterous relationship with another man.
When he was no respondent in Los Angeles, because they had already come to the
Philippines, the last order was amended and it was decided that custody were
assigned to the appellant to pay her the contested $ 30 a month for the
maintenance of the child. The board is not fixed and is increased or decreased
as increase or decrease the needs of the pensioner or as required by the
conditions economicasdel gives.

Porque el decreto interlocutorio, Exhibit A-1, no constituye decision final, no cabe

pedir su cumplimiento en Filipinas. En los mismos Estados Unidos no puede pedirse
el cumplimiento de una orden interlocutoria en el juzgado de otro estado.
Because interlocutory decree , Exhibit A-1, does not constitute final decision
, can not be fulfilled in order Philippines. In the United States itself can
not be ordered compliance with an interlocutory order in the court of another
state .

The rule is of common knowledge that the definitive judgment of a court of another
state between the same parties on the same cause of action, on the merits of the
case is conclusive, but it must be a definitive judgment on the merits only. Where
the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of the question by the court

which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties."
(National Park Bank vs. Old Colony Trust Co., 186 N.Y.S., 717.)
As already stated the Minnesota decree, to the extent that it is final and not subject
to modification, is entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the
federal Constitution and must be enforced in this state. If, however, a part of the
Minnesota decree in not final, but is subject to modification by the court which
rendered it, then neither the United States Constitution nor the principle of comity
compels the courts of this state to enforce that part of the decree; for no court other
than the one granting the original decree could undertake to administer relief
without bringing about a conflict of authority. (Levine vs. Levine, 187 Pac., 609.)
A judgment rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction in one state, is
conclusive on the merits in the courts of every other state, when made the basis of
an action and the merits cannot be reinvestigated. Our own Supreme Court so
holds. Cook vs. Thornhill, 13 Tex. 293, 65 Am. Dec. 63. But before such a judgment
rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in the courts of another state, as
conclusive on the merits, it must be a final judgment and not merely an
interlocutory decree. Freeman on Judgment, Sec. 575; Baugh vs. Baugh, 4 Bibb (7
Ky.) 556; Brinkley vs. Brinkley, 50 N.Y. 184, 10 Am. Rep. 460; Griggs, vs. Becker, 87
Wis. 313, 58 N.W. 396. (Walker vs. Garland et al., 235 S.W., 1078.)
En general, un decreto de divorcio encomendando la custodia de un hijo del
matrimonio a uno de los conyuges se respeta por los juzgados de otros estados
(In general , a divorce decree entrusting the custody of a child of the
marriage one of the spouses is respected by the courts of other states

) "at the time and under the circumstances of its rendition but that such a decree
has no controlling effects in another state as to facts or conditions arising
subsequently to the date of the decree; and the courts of the latter state may, in
proper proceedings, award the custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent
to the decree which justify the change in the interest of the child." (20 A.L.R., 815.)
En el caso presente las circunstancias han cambiado. Querubina ya no esta en los
Angeles sino en Caoayan, Ilocos Sur. Esta bajo el cuidado de su padre. Hay una
distancia enorme desde Los Angeles y el presente domicilio de la menor y el costo
del pasaje hasta aquella ciudad seria muy elevado, y aun es posible que este fuera
del alcance de la recurrente. No hay pruebas de que ella esta en condiciones de
pagar los gastos de viaje de la menor y del que la acompae. Ella no es un paquete
de cigarrillos que se puede enviar por correo a Los Angeles.
In the present case, the circumstances have changed. Querubina no longer in LA
but Caoayan , Ilocos Sur. He is under the care of his father . There is a huge
distance from Los Angeles and present address of the child and the cost of
travel to that city would be very high , and this may even beyond the scope of
the appellant. There is no evidence that she is able to pay the travel
expenses of the child and of the submission. She is not a pack of cigarettes
that can be mailed to Los Angeles.

No consta que las circunstancias que se daban en noviembre de 1949 en Los

Angeles, prevalecian en el mismo estado hasta el momento en que se vio la causa
en el Juzgado de primera instancia de Ilocos Sur. Tampoco hay pruebas de que la

recurrente dispone de suficientes fondos para costear el viaje de la nia Querubina

desde Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, hasta Los Angeles, California, y para responder de su
alimentacion, cuidado y educacion, y constando en autos que el padre, mas que
nadie, esta interesado en el cuidado y educacion de su hija, y que tiene ahorros de
mas de P2,000 depositados en un banco, creemos que el Juzgado a quo no erro al
denegar la solicitud.
Not aware of the circumstances that occurred in November 1949 in Los Angeles,
in the same condition prevailed until the time the case was heard in the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. Nor is there evidence that the applicant has
sufficient funds to finance the trip Querubina girl from Caoayan , Ilocos
Sur , to Los Angeles , California, and to answer for their food, care and
education, consisting ground that the father, more than anyone , are
interested in the care and education of her daughter, and has more than P2,000
savings deposited in a bank , we believe that the court a quo was right to
reject the application.

El Juzgado no podia, sin prueba satisfactoria, disponer sin remordimiento de

conciencia la entrega de la nia al abogado de la recurrente: es su obligacion velar
por la seguridad y bienestar de ella. No se trata solo de resolver el derecho
preferente del padre y de la madre en la custodia. La vital y trascendental cuestion
del porvenir de la nia es superior a toda consideracion. El Estado vela por sus
ciudadanos. El articulo 171 del Codigo Civil dispone que "Los Tribunales podran
privar a los padres de la patria potestad, o suspender el ejercicio de esta, si trataren
a sus hijos con dureza excesiva, o si les dieren ordenes, consejos o ejemplos
corrutores." En Cortes contra Castillo y otra (41 Jur. Fil., 495), este Tribunal declaro
que no erro el Juzgado de primera instancia al nombrar a la abuela, como tutora de
dos menores, en vez de su madre que fue condenada por adulterio.
The Court could not, without sufficient evidence , have no remorse of
conscience delivery of the child to the lawyer of the applicant : is their
obligation to ensure the safety and welfare of her. This is not only to solve
the preferential right of the father and the mother in custody. The vital and
crucial issue of the future of the child is above every consideration . The
State ensures its citizens. Article 171 of the Civil Code provides that " the
courts may deprive parents of parental authority , or suspend the exercise of
this , if trataren their children too harshly , or if they dieren orders ,
advice or corrutores examples. " Cortes against Castillo and other ( 41 Phil.
Rep . , 495) , this Court held that not missed the District Court to appoint
grandmother, as guardian of two children , instead of his mother who was
convicted of adultery .

El articulo 154 del Codigo Civil dispone que "El padre, y en su defecto la madre,
tienen potestad sobre sus hijos legitimos no emancipados." Con todo, si se hace
indebido ejercicio de esta facultad, los tribunales, como ya hemos dicho, pueden
privarie de ella y encomendar el cuidadano del menor a otras instituciones, como
dispone el articulo 6 de la Regla 100, que es reproduccion del articulo 771 de la Ley
No. 190. En el asunto de Lozano contra Martinez y De Vega (36 Jur. Fil., 1040), en
que el primero, en un recurso de habeas corpus, reclamaba contra su esposa la
custodia de su hijo menor de 10 aos, este Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro que el
juzgado a quo no abuso de la discrecion conferida a el por el articulo 771 del Codigo
de procedimiento civil al denegar la solicitud. Esta interpretacion del articulo en

cuanto al debido ejercicio de la discrecion de un Juzgado de primera instancia ha

sido reafirmada en el asunto de Pelayo contra Lavin (40 Jur. Fil., 529).
Article 154 of the Civil Code provides that "The father and the mother failing
have legitimate authority over their minor children . " However, if improper
exercise of this power is made, the courts , as we have said , it can privarie
cuidadano and entrust the child to other institutions , as required by Article
6 of Rule 100, which is reproduction of Article 771 Law No. 190. in the case
of Lozano against Martinez and De Vega ( 36 Phil. Rep . , 1040 ) , in which
the first , on a writ of habeas corpus against his wife demanded custody of
her youngest son 10, the Court, on appeal , that the court declare a quo no
abuse of discretion conferred to him by article 771 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to deny the request . This interpretation of the article concerning
the due exercise of the discretion of a court of first instance has been
upheld in the case of Pelayo against Lavin (40 Phil. Rep . , 529).

En la solicitud presentada, no hay siquiera alegacion de que el juzgado a quo haya

abusado de su discrecion. Este Tribunal no debe revocar su actuacion.
In the request , there is not even claim that the court a quo has abused its
discretion. This Court should not revoke his performance .

En la vista de la causa en el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Ilocos Sur, el recurrido

declaro que habia traido su hija a Filipinas porque queria evitar que ella tuviera
conocimiento de la conducta impropia y de la infidelidad cometida por la madre,
impidiendo que la viese convivir con el hombre que habia ofendido a su padre. El
recurrido dijo que queria que su hija se criase en un ambiente de elevada moral, y
que no se sancionara indirectamente la infidelidad de la esposa. Bajo la Ley de
Divorcio No. 2710, el conyuge culpable no tiene derecho a la custodia de los hijos
menores. La legislacion vigente, las buenas costumbres y los interesesdel orden
publico aconsejan que la nia debe estar fuera del cuidado de una madre que ha
violado el juramento de fidelidad a su marido. Creemos que este Tribunal no debe
hacer cumplir un decreto dictado por un tribunal extranjero, que contraviene
nuestras leyes y los sanos principios de moralidad que informan nuestra estructura
social sobre relaciones familiares.
In the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the
Respondent stated that he had brought his daughter to the Philippines because
I wanted to prevent her knowing about the misconduct and infidelity committed
by the mother, preventing the saw live with the man who had offended his
father. The appeal said that her daughter wanted to be bred in an environment
of high morals, and not indirectly punish unfaithful wife. Under the Divorce
Act No. 2710, the guilty spouse is not entitled to the custody of minor
children. The current legislation, morality and public order interesesdel
advise that the child should be out of the care of a mother who has violated
the oath of fidelity to her husband. We believe that this Court should not
enforce a decision given by a foreign court decree that violates our laws and
sound principles of morality that inform our social structure on family
relationships.

En el asunto de Manuela Barretto Gonzales contra Augusto Gonzales (58 Jur. Fil.,
72), se pidio por la demandante que el divorcio obtenido por el demandado en
Reno, Nevada, en 28 de noviembre de 1927, fuera confirmado y ratificado por el

Juzgado de primera instancia de Manila. Este juzgado dicto sentencia a tenor de la

peticion. Teniendo en cuenta el articulo 9 del Codigo civil que dispone que "Las
leyes relativas a los derechos y deberes de familia, o al estado, condicion y
capacidad legal de las personas, obligan a los espanoles (filipinos) aunque residan
en pais extranjero" y el articulo 11 del mismo codigo que dice en parte qye ". . . las
leyes prohibitivas concernientes a las personas, sus actos o sus bienes, y las que
tienen por objeto el orden publico y las buenas costumbres, no quedaran sin efecto
por leyes o sentencias dictadas, ni por disposiciones o convenciones acordades en
pais extranjero," este Tribunal, en apelacion, declaro: "Los litigantes, mediante
convenio mutuo, no pueden obligar a los tribunales a que aprueben sus propios
actos, ni que permitan que las relaciones personales de los ciudadanos de estas
Islas queden afectadas por decretos de paises extranjeros en una forma que
nuestro Gobierno cree que es contraria al orden publico y a la recta moral," y revoco
la decision del juzgado inferior.
In Case of Manuela Barretto against Augusto Gonzales Gonzales (58 Phil. Rep.,
72), it was asked by the applicant that divorce obtained by the defendant in
Reno, Nevada, on November 28, 1927, was confirmed and ratified by the Court of
First Instance of Manila. This court issued a ruling on the basis of the
petition. Considering Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that "The
laws concerning the rights and duties of family or the state, condition and
legal capacity of persons, forcing the Spaniards (Filipino) even if they
reside in a foreign country" and Article 11 of the Code which reads in part
qye "... the people concerning prohibitive laws, their actions or their
property, and aimed public order and decency and not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments, or by provisions or acordades convention in a foreign
country, "the Court, on appeal, declared:" Litigants, by mutual agreement, can
not force the courts to adopt its own acts or to allow personal relationships
citizens of these islands being affected by decrees of foreign countries in a
way that our Government believes that it is contrary to public order and good
morals, "and reversed the decision of the lower court.

Las sentencias de tribunales extranjeros no pueden properse en vigor en Filipinas si

son contrarias a la leyes, costumbres y orden publico. Si dichas decisiones, por la
simple teoria de reciprocidad, cortesia judicial y urbanidad internacional son base
suficiente para que nuestros tribunales decidan a tenor de las mismas, entonces
nuestros juzgados estarian en la pobre tesitura de tener que dictar sentencias
contrarias a nuestras leyes, costumbres y orden publico. Esto es absurdo.
The judgments of foreign courts may not properse into force in the Philippines
if they are contrary to the laws, customs and public order. If such
decisions , for the simple theory of reciprocity and international comity
civility are enough for our courts to decide on the basis of the same base
then our courts would be in poor position of having to dictate decisions
contrary to our laws , customs and public order. This is absurd .

En Ingenohl contra Olsen & Co. (47 Jur. Fil., 199), se discutio el alcanse de la
cortesia internacional. El articulo 311 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que es hoy
el articulo 48, Regla 39, fue la base de la accion presentada por Ingenohl. Pidio en
su demanda que el Juzgado de primera instancia de Manila dictase sentencia de
acuerdo con la dictada por el Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong. Despues de la vista
correspondiente, el juzgado dicto sentencia a favor del demandante con intereses
legales y costas. En apelacion, se alego que el juzgado inferior erro al no declarar

que la decision y sentencia del Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong se dicto y registro

como resultado de un error manifiesto de hecho y de derecho. Este Tribunal declaro
que "Es principio bien sentado que, a falta de un tratado o ley, y en virtud de la
cortesia y del derecho internacional, una sentencia dictada por un tribunal de
jurisdiccion competente de un pais extranjero, en el que las partes han comparecido
y discutido un asunto en el fondo, sera reconocido y puesta en vigor en cualquier
otro pais extranjero." Pero teniendo en cuenta el articulo 311 del Codigo de
Procedimiento Civil que dispone que "la sentencia puede ser rechazada mediante
prueba de falta de competencia, o de haber sido dictada sin la previa notificacion a
la parte, o que hubo connivencia, fraude o error manifiesto de derecho o de hecho,"
concluyo: "En virtud de esa Ley cuando una persona trata de hacer cumplir una
sentencia extranjera, el demandado tiene derecho a ejercitar cualquier defensa de
esas, y si se llegara a demostrar que existe propiamente alguna de ellas, destruira
los efectos de la sentencia." Revoco la decision del juzgado inferior y declaro y fallo
que "la sentencia dictada por el Tribunal de Hongkong, contra la demandada,
constituyo un error manifesto de hecho y de derecho, y, por tal razon, no debe
exigirse su cumplimiento en las Islas Filipinas."
In Ingenohl against Olsen & Co. (47 Phil. Rep., 199), the alcanse of comity
was discussed. Article 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure is now Article 48,
Rule 39, was the basis for action by Ingenohl. Requested in its application
that the Court of First Instance of Manila to issue a ruling in accordance
with the decision given by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. After the
corresponding view, the court ruled in favor of the complainant with legal
interest and costs. On appeal, he argued that the lower court erred in not
declaring the decision and judgment of the Supreme Court was dictated Hongkong
and registration as a result of manifest error of fact and law. The Court
stated that "It is the beginning it clear that in the absence of a treaty or
law, and under the courtesy and international law, a judgment delivered by a
court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country, in which the parties
have appeared and discussed a subject in the background, it will be recognized
and enforced in any other foreign country. " But considering Article 311 of
the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "the sentence can be rejected by
lack of competition test, or that it is delivered without prior notification
to the party, or that there was collusion, fraud or manifest error in law or
in fact, "he concluded:" Under this Act when a person tries to enforce a
foreign judgment, the defendant is entitled to exercise any defense of these,
and if they were to show that there really any of them, destroy the effects of
the judgment. " Reversed the decision of the lower court and declare failure
and that "the judgment of the Court of Hong Kong against the defendant,
constitute manifest error of fact and law, and for that reason, should not be
enforced in the Philippines . "

Si se concede la solicitud, la menor estaria bajo el cuidadode su madre que fued

declarada judicialmente culpable de infidelidad conyugal; viviria bajo un techo
juntamente con el hombre que deshonro a su madre y ofendio a su padre; jugaria y
creceria con el fruto del amor adulterino de su madre; llegaria a la pubertad con la
idea de que una mujer que fue infiel a su marido tiene derecho a custodiar a su hija.
En semejante medio ambiente no puede criarse a una nia de una manera
adecuada: si llegara a saber durante su adolescencia que su padre ha sido
traicionado por su madre con el hombre con quien vive, esa nia viviria bajo una
impresion de inferioridad moral de incalculables consecuencias, y por ello nunca
seria feliz; y si, bajo la influencia de su madre, llegara a creer que la infidelidad de

una esposa es solo un incidente tan pasajero como cambiar de tocado, la nia iria
por el camino de la perdicion. Y la educacion moral que puede darle su padrasto
dificilmente puede ser mejor.
If the request is granted, the child would be under her mother cuidadode fued
judicially declared guilty of marital infidelity; would live together under
one roof with the man who dishonored his mother and his father offended; would
play and would grow with the fruit of the adulterous love of his mother; reach
puberty with the idea that a woman was unfaithful to her husband is entitled
to custody of her daughter. Amid such an environment can not be bred to a
child in a proper way: should you know during his teens that his father has
been betrayed by his mother with the man lives, that child would live under an
impression of moral inferiority of incalculable consequences and therefore he
would never be happy; and if, under the influence of his mother, came to
believe that a wife's infidelity is just as fleeting as changing incident
touched, she would go down the road to perdition. And the moral education that
can give your stepfather can hardly be better.

Si se deniega la solicitud, la nia viviria con su padre con el beneficio de un cuidado

paternal exclusivo, y no con la dividida atencion de una madre que tiene que
atender a su esposo, a sus dos hijas y a una tercera nia, la protegida. Para el
bienestar de la menor Querubina, que es lo que mas importa en el caso presente,
su custodia por el padre debe considerarse preferente.
If the request is refused, the girl would live with his father with the
benefit of an exclusive parental care , and not with the divided attention of
a mother who has to care for her husband, her two daughters and a third child,
protected. For the welfare of the child Querubina , which is what matters most
in this case , the custody of the father is to be preferred .

En los mismos Estados Unidos, el punto cardinal que tienen en cuenta los juzgados,
no es la reclamacion de las partes o la fuerza del decreto interlocutorio, sino el
bienestar del menor.
In the United States itself , the cardinal point which takes into account the
courts , not the claim of the parties or the force of interlocutory decree ,
but the child's welfare .

A consideration of all the facts and circumstances leads to the conclusion that
comity does not require the courts of this state, regardless of the well-being of the
child, to lend their aid to the enforcement of the Iowa decree by returning Winifred
to the custody of her grandmother. A child is not a chattel to which title and the
right of possession may be secured by the decree of any court. If the decree had
been rendered by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, it would not have
conclusively established the right to the custody of the child. In a contest between
rival claimants, this court would have been free, notwithstanding the decree, to
award the custody solely with an eye to the child's welfare. (State ex rel. Aldridge
vs. Aldridge, 204 N.W. 324.)
On habeas corpus by the mother to obtain possession from the father of two
children aged four and six years, whose custody she alleged had been awarded her
in divorce proceedings in another state, it appeared that the mother was without

property, and had no means of support save her personal earnings of $15 per
month, was in poor health, and lived with her mother, in immoral surroundings, and
that the father was an industrious and sober man, earnings $100 per month. Held,
that the welfare of the children was the only thing to be considered, and a judgment
awarding their custody to the mother should be reversed. (Kentzler vs. Kentzler, 28
Pac., 370.)
La recurrente, como ultimo recurso, invoca la comity of nations. La reciprocidad, la
cortesia entre naciones no es absoluta. Rige cuando hay tratado y hay igualdad de
legislacion. Se adopta la doctrina de reciprocidad cuando el tribunal extranjero tiene
jurisdiccion para conocer de la causa, las partes han comparecido y discutido el
asunto en el fondo. Algunas veces se concede como privilegio pero no como estricto
derecho. La cortesia pedida no ha sido reconocida por este Tribunal cuando declaro
que los derechos y deberes de familia, estado, condicion y capacidad legal de las
personas se rigen por las leyes de Filipinas y no por las de America (Gonzales contra
Gonzales, supra) y no dio validez a la decision del Tribunal Supremo de Hongkong
porque era erronea en sus conclusiones de hecho y de derecho (Ingenohl contra
Olsen y Co., supra).
The appellant , as a last resort , invokes the comity of nations .
Reciprocity, comity is not absolute. Applies when there is no treaty and
equality legislation. The doctrine of reciprocity is adopted when the foreign
court has jurisdiction to hear the case , the parties have appeared and
discussed the matter in the background. Sometimes it is granted as a privilege
but as a right strict. The courtesy requested has not been recognized by this
Court when he declared that the rights and duties of family , state, condition
and legal capacity of persons are governed by the laws of the Philippines and
not those of America ( Gonzales against Gonzales , supra ) and He did not give
validity to the decision of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong because it was
wrong in its findings of fact and law ( Ingenohl against Olsen & Co. , supra )
.

La reciprocidad entre los estados de la Union Americana no es absoluta. No es regla

inquebrantable. Los varios casos citados mas arriba lo demuestran. He ahi otro
caso:
Reciprocity between the states of the American Union is not absolute. It is no
steadfast rule . The various cases cited above demonstrate . There I have
another case:

On the question of comity, this court said in the habeas corpus case of In re
Stockman, 71 Mich. 180, 38 N.W. 876:
"Comity cannot be considered in a case like this, when the future welfare of the
child is the vital question in the case. The good of the child is superior to all other
considerations. It is the polar star to guide to the conclusion in all cases of infants,
whether the question is raised upon a writ of habeas corpus or in a court of
chancery." (Ex parte Leu, 215 N.W., 384.)
Ya hemos visto que la orden interlocutoria cediendo la custodia de la menor a la
recurrente esta en pugna con las disposiciones expresas de la legislacion vigente en
Filipinas. En el primer decreto y en el enmendatorio se encomendo la custodia de la

menor al padre y se prohibio, en la orden enmendada, a la madre llevar a la menor

a su casa porque estaba otra vez en relaciones ilegales con otro hombre. Pero el
ultimo decreto enmendatorio, contrario al sentido de justicia, a la ley, y a las
buenas costumbres, encomendo la custodia de la menor a la que fue esposa infiel
porque ya estaba casada con quien cometio adulterio. Y bajo la doctrina de la
comity of nations, la recurrente contiende que debe cumplirse en Filipinas ese
decreto. Opinamos que por las varias razones arriba expuestas, la pretension es
insostenible.
We have seen the interlocutory order giving custody of the child to the
applicant is in conflict with the express provisions of the legislation in the
Philippines. In the first decree and the enmendatorio custody of the child to
the father he was charged and was banned , as amended order, the mother take
the child to his house because it was illegal again with another man . But the
last enmendatorio decree contrary to the sense of justice, law and morals ,
entrusted the custody of the child to which he was unfaithful wife because she
was already married to who committed adultery. And under the doctrine of
comity of nations , the applicant contends that must be met in the Philippines
that decree . We believe that for various reasons set out above, the claim is
untenable.

Se confirma la sentencia apelada. La recurrente pagara las costas.

It confirms the original ruling . The appellant pay the costs.