Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive
Order 227)
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the
psychologist testified at the trial.
Jocelyns testimony reaffirmed her allegations in her complaint. However, the
psychologist who testified failed to personally examine Angelito, which is now the bone
of contention in this case.
The RTC ruled in favor of Jocelyn and held that:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a
person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic)
some admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply
with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective
sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants
(like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks
(The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
However, on appeal, the CA reversed the RTCs ruling and held that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines
set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not
require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be
drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of
the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal
of the CA ruling.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Art. 36 of
the Family Code.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged
to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of
examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we
recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged
relations between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete
personality profile, information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as
the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if not
totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based
entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete
personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or
diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering
from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These
particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is
chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his
marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her
Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a
dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on
this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it
was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was
based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of Angelitos family background and
upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to
what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of
the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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the marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. These allegations,
even if true, could only effectively serve as grounds for legal separation or a criminal
charge for adultery.
FACTS
Resp. Teresita was the teacher in Hawaiian dance of petitioner Ricardos cousin.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Ricardo courted Teresita and the two became a couple 3 months after. When
W/N the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
Ricardos other girlfriend, who was already pregnant at that time, pressured him to
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran.
marry her he decided to elope with Teresita. The two got married and begot 3
children.
More than 20 years after their wedding, Ricardo sought nullification of their HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
marriage on the ground that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply CA did not err in dismissing the case. RTCs decision lacked factual and legal
basis.
with the essential obligations of marriage.
Expert witness presented was psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia Albaran. Teresita did not file
Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that
an answer or opposition to the petition.
the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
Accdg to Ricardo, Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer. During one of his
obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability.
visits to the country, he suspected Teresitas pregnancy because of her slightly bigger
Subsequently, Molina laid down definitive guidelines: (1) burden of proof to show
stomach. Her miscarriage 5 months into the pregnancy confirmed this because the 3
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) root cause of the
instances of sexual contact they had during the visit were characterized by
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
withdrawals. Ricardo also said that Teresita was very extravagant, materialistic,
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
controlling and demanding; she spent for herself the money he sent for their family,
decision; (3) incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
forcing their children to live in a small rented room.
celebration" of the marriage; (4) incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
Accdg to. Dr. Albaran, Teresita was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder
clinically permanent or incurable; (5) illness must be grave enough to bring about
that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6)
obligations: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable treatment and
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally exploitative as on several
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her own ends, lack of empathy as
the same Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) interpretations given by
she was unwilling to recognize her partners feelings and needs, taking into
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
consideration her own feelings and needs only, her haughty and arrogant behavior
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
and attitude and her proneness to blame others for her failures and shortcomings.
courts.
She based these findings on the information she gathered from her psychological
Although the law does not require that the allegedly incapacitated
incurable.
spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist as a
RTC agreed with Ricardo. CA reversed and held that RTCs findings did not satisfy
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity, this does not
the rules and guidelines in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. The RTC failed to
signify that the evidence should be any less than what Art. 36, by its
specifically point out the root illness or defect that caused Teresitas psychological
nature, require. This simply means that the requirements for nullity
incapacity, and likewise failed to how that the incapacity already existed at the time
outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the
of celebration of marriage. Furthermore, Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation
allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential
dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Re allegations on Teresitas
although from sources other than the respondent spouse to show
overspending and infidelity, they do not constitute adequate grounds for declaring
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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emerge only after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals. The
same provides that (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
In this case, Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and
incurability of private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to
show the root cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence
presented during trial
The acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of the psychological
incapacity that the law requires. Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no
specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the
inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state
Further, although Private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good
mother and had some character flaws, these imperfections do not warrant a
conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that
rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties and obligations
Hence petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by
the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC; and
2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the
rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to
initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
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Pursuant to Art 63(2) of the FC, Alfredo as the offending spouse in the LSEP case
forfeits his NET PROFITS earned in the CPG in favor of their common child,
NOT HIS ENTIRE SHARE in the CPG.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and
liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net
profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of article 43(2);
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding article shall produce the following effects:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted
said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited
in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the
guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse; (emphasis supplied)
Net profits: refer to the increase in the market value of the property from the
time of the celebration of the marriage until the time of its dissolution
DENY the Petition. Affirm the CA ruling with modifications: (1) Delete forfeiture
of the land in favor of the daughter Winifred; (2) the Gozons should pay
Interdimentional P18M plus legal interest.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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8. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. and Spouses
Martinez | Villarama, Jr.
G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010|(Property Relations between H & W )
FACTS
Spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained loans from Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. (the Bank) in the aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00, secured with a REM over
a condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle Verde 5, where the spouses are
residing. Mr. Martinez signed the REM both as principal debtor and as President of
the registered owner and third-party mortgagor, OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM
was annotated on the Condominium Certificate of Title
The Spouses defaulted in the payment of their outstanding loan obligation
In a letter, they offered to settle their indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank
of a commercial lot of corresponding value and also requested for recomputation
at a lower interest rate and condonation of penalties
While the Banks officers held a meeting with Mr. Martinez, he failed to submit the
required documents such as certificates of title and tax declarations so that the bank
can evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago
Consequently, the Bank initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage
The Spouses filed a civil action for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO),
Injunction and Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale in the RTC of Pasig
City, which the RTC granted by issuing a TRO for 20 days
o It was alleged in their Complaint that the subject property is being used
and occupied as a family home
The RTC granted the application for a writ of preliminary injunction. MR denied
On appeal, the CA affirmed the issuance of the Writ of PI
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the Spouses have shown a clear legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and
public auction of the third-party mortgagors property while the case for
annulment of REM on said property is being tried
o It is alleged by the Bank that while the condominium unit is supposedly a
family home, it is admittedly owned by the corporation and not by the
conjugal partnership or absolute community of the Spouses and that even
assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a family corporation, the Spouses
stance contravenes the established rule that properties registered in the
name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct
from its members or stockholders
o The Spouses on the other hand claims that the said unit being a Family
Home is exempt from foreclosure as provided under Art. 153 of the
Family Code and that if the injunctive relief would not be granted, they will
suffer an irreparable injury, as well as their children
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
The Spouses failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.
In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the
mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized
and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation
The Court notes that the claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code,
thereby raising issue on the mortgaged condominium unit being a family home and
not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual agreement
of the REM. Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged condominium unit constitutes
respondents family home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article
155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a family home for
debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution. The
Spouses thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection of the injunctive
writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously erred in sustaining the trial courts orders
granting the Spouses application for preliminary injunction
Anent the grave and irreparable injury which respondents alleged they will suffer if
no preliminary injunction is issued, this Court has previously declared that all is not
lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditorsmortgagees, viz:
o In any case, petitioners will not be deprived outrightly of their property.
Pursuant to Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000, mortgagors
who have judicially or extrajudicially sold their real property for the full or
partial payment of their obligation have the right to redeem the property
within one year after the sale. They can redeem their real estate by paying
the amount due, with interest rate specified, under the mortgage deed; as
well as all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank
o Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, petitioners have the right to receive
any surplus in the selling price. This right was recognized in Sulit v. CA, in
which the Court held that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the
proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to
recover such surplus
W HEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 29, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED. No
costs.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
Page 11 of 15
A land that originally belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership.
3 In this case, we held that when the conjugal house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to
the husband, the land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to reimbursement of
the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
2
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In the present case, there is clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot
from her father, and this has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code provide that properties acquired
by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential
lot, therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas doctrine.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil
Code, provides as follows:
When the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the
improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
Although it is true that Eliseo partly paid for the improvements on the lot (i.e. the
two-story residential house) through monthly salary deductions, petitioner advanced
P136,000 to Erlinda to cancel the GSIS loan. Therefore, considering the
P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that
the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount
paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda
at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the
transaction was not necessary.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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Whether the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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Whether only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring
the action to annul that sale
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale.
When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely,
the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil
Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things,
to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00 that they paid him, with
legal interest until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.
ADRANEDA, BOLONG, CAPATI, DIO, LINA, LIPANA, MATIBAG, MORAL, OCAMPO, SIAN, VIRTUDEZ.
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On appeal to the CA, the latter reversed RTC and declared RESPONDENT to be
PETITIONERs illegitimate daughter.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SHOWED
ESTABLISHED THAT PETITIONER IS THE FATHER OF THE
RESPONDENT?
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HER OTHER
PRAYERS?
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about
Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as
competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in cases involving
paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of
the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace
of the putative fathers legitimate family.
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