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*TheauthorthanksTom Lewisand JohnSeamanfor theircommentson an earlierversion of this article.Thanksis also due to Tom Lewisfor invaluablediscussionsconcerning
the Hobbesianaccountof politicalauthority.
1. Thisview has been arguedfor by variouswriterson the problemof politicalobligation over manydecades.See JosephTussman,Obligationand the Body Politic (London:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1960);A. John Simmons,MoralPrinciplesand PoliticalObligation (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1979); John Horton, Political Obligation
Polity
Polity
VHf, Number
VolumeXX
Number 22
XXVIII,
Winter1995
Winter 1995
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C. J. Nock 143
for what it is: "an abstractionthat does not correspondto any past or
presentevent,"4whichis properlyappliedfrom the perspectiveof the de
facto power, rather than that of the individual.While real citizens in
actualstates have not consented,the metaphorof contractstill signifies
what is neededto transformde facto powerinto liberalauthority.
I maintainthat the origins of the liberalstate lie in a purelypolitical
decisionmadeby the rulerto proceedas if liberalsubjectshad consented.
On this view, achievinga reasonablefacsimileof the political relations
impliedby the metaphorof contractrelies upon the state producingliberal subjects-not vice versaas the consenttheoristwould have it. What
is at stake here can most clearly be indicated by utilizing some of
Hobbes'scontentionsin his Leviathan.Accordingly,I shall employthese
contentions-supplementedby othersdrawnfrom JamesM. Buchanan's
Hobbesianliberalism-to develop the foundationsof an alternativeto
consenttheory. On the basis of this alternative,I will contendthat what
the liberalstate needsto concernitself with is not the presence(or otherwise) of consent, but the absence (or otherwise)of dissent. I will then
assess the implicationsof this dissent theory for contemporaryliberaldemocraticstatesand suggestthat, underpresentconditions,it requiresa
shift towardsa more participatoryform of democracy.
I. The Natureof the HypotheticalContract
Anglo-Americanliberalismhas its originsin a particulartype of response
to the horrorsof civil war resultingfrom the religiousvalue-pluralismof
seventeenth-centuryEngland. Value-pluralism,as Hobbes was acutely
aware, means that variousindividuals,groups, and coalitionshold differingvaluesthat are sometimesnot merelydifficult to balance,but are
irreconcilable.Since many human beings are intolerantof those with
whom they disagree,a sovereignthat obviouslypromotesthe claims of
certainindividualsor groupsat the expenseof others producesits own
internalenemies. If it producessufficientnumbersof these enemies,it
sows the seeds for its own demisethroughthe resultingcivil war. Here,
the state of natureis not somethingthat rationalmen contracttheirway
out of. Rather,it is the state into which society is doomedto fall unless
the sovereigntakes pains to rule in accordancewith the metaphorof
contract.5
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C. J. Nock
145
the sovereign power; first, it must ensure that its laws-and their associated punishments-are applied equally to all subjects regardless of socioeconomic status; 1 and second, it must decide all issues of public conflict
through an impartial assessment that assigns equal weight to the liberal
demands of the parties in dispute.1 Subjects must be sufficiently in awe
of the sovereign power that they will not object to this equal treatment of
their adversaries.13Thus, the sovereign's commitment to formal equality
seeks to secure a particular mode of public behaviour from subjects. It
demands a public tolerance of value-pluralism and sovereign neutrality.
No subject has a claim to special treatment based on wealth, rank, or
wisdom. Those subjects who hold their own values in such high esteem
that they will not accept the principle of formal equality are not fit to be
part of the Hobbesian settlement and must be crushed by the sovereign.
Hobbes supposed the all-powerful sovereign's commitment to formal
equality would recommend itself to the prudent subject. Faced by a sovereign that offers no chance of special treatment, formal equality is both
the most that prudent subjects can expect, and the least they should settle
for-as is indicated by the laws of nature.14Hobbes supposed that the
vast majority of subjects could readily be educated to accept formal
equality and he recommended that the sovereign undertake such education.15 There is no immediate sense in which the subjects of Hobbes's
sovereign can be said to have consented. They would likely prefer a ruler
that would promote their interests at the expense of their adversaries.
They are unlikely to be fully satisfied by the decisions of a sovereign
committed to the neutrality of formal equality-such decisions are hardly ever likely to satisfy anyone, let alone everyone. Yet the suggestion is
that the vast majority of subjects are prudent and, confronted by an allpowerful sovereign, will come to accept the terms of the Hobbesian settlement. They can be educated to see the neutral state as offering the best
possible solution to the ever-present dangers inherent in value-pluralism.
Wherever the ruler's gospel of political equality generates the desired
results, its subjects will come to acknowledge their fellow citizens as
formal equals for public purposes.
Educating subjects to the value of formal equality is a key element in
the peace process. Yet the sovereign also has other mechanisms available
for augmenting this process. The Hobbesian sovereign can seek to mini-
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Hobbes,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
Leviathan,
p. 360.
p. 212.
p. 314.
ch. XIV-XV.
pp. 377-84.
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C. J. Nock
147
Indeed, on the face of it, there seems to be little cogency in his claims
concerning the basis of parental authority. Children lack reason and, as
Hobbes recognized, are in no position to consent to anything in the way
consent theorists demand. They are, rather, under the despotic power of
their parents who-at least in the state of nature-even possess the
authority to decide whether they live or die.23Under these circumstances,
it seems nonsense to say that they consent to the authority of their
parents. Yet Hobbes was insistent that this was how the relationship
between children and their parents must be understood. If children have
not consented, and are in no position to consent, what could Hobbes
mean by this?
As with the relationship between Leviathan and subject, it is vital to
think of the parental relationship as one which proceeds as if the children
had consented-which, of course, they have not.24 In raising children
parents may produce either friends or enemies.25 If they produce the
latter it is likely that, in the long run, the enemies they have produced will
destroy them one way or another. Prudent parents will seek to avoid this.
They will undertake child-rearing such that they will be in a position to
satisfactorily explain what they have done when their children reach the
age of reason. They must be able to convincingly demonstrate that the
way they raised their children was the best under the available circumstances. That is, they are to proceed in a way that elicits the love and
respect of the child when it reaches the age of reason. Under such circumstances, the relationship between parent and child takes the form of a
hypothetical contract. The parent is required to do what will elicit the
appropriate response when the child achieves the status of a prudent
adult. The same construct works for the relationship between the sovereign and its subjects. The sovereign will punish those subjects who fail
to abide by the dictates of liberal equality and sovereign neutrality, but is
willing to explain the necessity of this public reason to those who wish to
learn.
Parental authority is a substitutional authority which has pedagogical
aims.26The immature child will damage itself unless guided by the more
mature and prudent will of the parent. Parental authority substitutes the
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C. J. Nock
149
29. For a full account of Hobbes's commitmentto such policies and schemes see
Seaman,"Hobbeson Public Charity& the Preventionof Idleness."
30. Seaman,"Hobbes," pp. 120-23.
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31. This assessment draws directly from Buchanan's The Limits of Liberty, ch. 5.
32. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 299.
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C. J. Nock
151
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34. Thomas J. Lewis, "Contract Theory and the Right to be Punished," American
Behavioral Scientist, 28 (November/December 1984): 269-75.
35. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 338, 388.
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C. J. Nock 153
used by illiberalsubjectstemptedto employ the moral force of democratic decisions as a basis for suppressingdissidentsor imposing particularvalues upon them. Such activitiescould, in the long run, lead to
an undoing of the Hobbesian settlement. Nevertheless, a long-term
publiccommitmentto formalequalitywill inclinesubjectsto believethat
they have a rightto the influenceover publicdeliberationsthat the franchise seems to offer. As subjectslearn the rules of the liberal political
game, the sovereignwill find it prudentto extendthe franchisewherever
this seems necessaryfor ongoing peace preservation.In the long run a
full adult franchisemay result.36
The long-termdevelopmentinto liberal-democracy
continuesthe process of openingup the sovereignto greaterpublic scrutiny.Its decisions
can now be questioned by subjects through the rights-basedpublic
reason that is administeredby the courts. Many of its officers may
become subject to election or impeachment. In short, government
becomes more responsive to the demands of its subjects. Liberaldemocracyis one facsimile-albeit an imperfect one-of the consent
theorist'sreificationof the contractmetaphor.Subjectsmay exercisesignificant influence over the rulers, but that influence must remain far
from complete. The liberalsovereigncannot escape the need to adjudicatethe disputesthat value-pluralism
generates.Rather,it mustretainits
coercivepowersto enforce its decisionsagainstthose unwillingto abide
by them. It must continueto employits coercivepowersto protectits liberal dissidentsfrom unwarrantedinterferenceby the majority.This suggests that liberal-democracycan never match the contract metaphor
completely.
III. AssessingLiberal-Democracy
In Hobbes's day the methods availablefor assessingthe grievancesof
subjects were less extensive than in our own. In part, the sovereign
neededto rely on advisors,petitions,and representationsfrom subjects.
Whereverserious discontentwas thought to be brewing,the sovereign
might designate an advisor to report on the situation. The liberaldemocraticsovereignof our own day has far more sophisticatedtools at
its disposalfor monitoringthe grievancesof subjects.Elections,opinion
polls, instantcommunications,moreeasily arrangedpublichearingsand
the like suggest that the liberal-democraticsovereignshould be more
adept at gaugingpotentialdissentand providingprudentresponsesto it.
36. Lewis, "ContractTheoryand the Rightto be Punished,"pp. 263-65.
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37. John Stuart Mill, "On Liberty," in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty,
and Considerations on Representative Government, ed. H. B. Acton (London: J. H. Dent,
1976), pp. 65-77.
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C. J. Nock 155
adversaries.Such an arrangementis not conduciveto the promotionof
the tolerationand compromiseneededto maintainthe Hobbesiansettlement. Rather, it is more likely to promote the underlyingfriction and
tension that threatenscivil peace.
These dangersare furthercompoundedby the fact that the liberaldemocraticsovereignis now widelyregardedas havingthe rightto alter
the currentdistributionof propertyat will. Whereverthis is widelysupposed to be the case, the democraticelementof the sovereignbody has a
tool availableto promoteits own short-termexpediencyat the expenseof
the protectivefunctionsof the liberalelement.If the currentdistribution
is alteredwithout regardfor the principleof mutualbenefit, those outside the rulingcoalition will see their capacitiesdiminishedwithoutcorrespondingcompensatoryrewards.Whereverpeople's rights are sacrificed in this way, the potentialarises for that festeringresentmentthat
can spawnan undoingof the Hobbesiansettlement.It is truethatthe distributionshould be continuallyopen to renegotiation,and that the sovereign-who defines and enforces these rights-may alter them in a
mannerthought prudentto preservethe peace. Yet this does not imply
that such redistributioncan be arbitraryto the extent that the liberaldemocraticsovereignand its subjectsnow often seem to suppose. The
Hobbesiansovereignrecognizesthat an unequaldistributionshould be
tolerablewhereverthe principleof mutual benefit is satisfied.38In this
regard-as has been stressed-the sovereignmust take steps to ensure
that this principleis satisfied, and that its benefits are explainedto its
subjects. All proposed changes to the existing distributionmust be
defendedin a similarmanner.
Unless the principle of mutual benefit is satisfied, redistribution
becomesa case of robbingPeterto pay Paul, and Peterand his alliesare
likely to feel aggrieved enough to want to undo changes that have
reduced their possessions. This perspective suggests that we should
expect the functions of the liberal state to be more easily performed
during periods of economic expansion. Increasingmaterialwealth-at
least whereits benefitsare enjoyedby a sufficientcross-sectionof society
-is likely to minimizeopposition to the existing distribution.At the
sametime, moreresourceswill be availablefor the sovereignto meetthe
liberal demands of the few dissatisfied with the currentdistribution.
When economicexpansionfalters,the sovereign'stask of preservingthe
peace becomes correspondinglymore difficult and its balancingact of
ongoing compromisebecomes more precarious.As Buchananhas sug-
38. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 298-300; Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty, p. 11.
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C.J. Nock
157
IV. Conclusion
The liberal state was not instituted by liberal individuals coming together
with a view to securing their own ends. Rather, as the Hobbesian perspective suggests, individuals partial in their own interests cannot be
relied upon to act in the manner demanded by the consent theorist's
reification of the contract metaphor. From time to time subjects need to
be coerced to abide by those public codes that make a liberal political
process possible. Thus, of necessity, liberalism fails to fulfill the condition of strict voluntarism most consent theorists erroneously extract
from the metaphor of contract. The origins of the liberal state actually lie
with a political authority induced to treat and educate its subjects in particular ways by the threat of its own demise. Insofar as subjects come to
respect the prudence of the Hobbesian settlement, the necessity of state
coercive activity recedes-although it could never fully disappear in a
society of real people who are sometimes unreasoning, irrational, invasive, partial, and intolerant. Insofar as the necessity of state coercion
does diminish, the political authority moves further along the continuum
toward the status of liberal authority which the metaphor of contract
ideally demands.
On this view, the type of consent required by consent theory is of no
real concern to the liberal state. The relevance of consent is strictly limited to the extent to which it may be inferred when liberal subjects see so
little need to dissent from what is that they do not press their claims in a
disruptive manner. This being so, the liberal perspective is not wedded to
the strict voluntarism insisted upon by the consent theory of political
obligation. Rescuing the liberal perspective from consent theory restores
its relevance as a framework for distinguishing between illiberal and liberal political authority. Liberal authority is authority that promotes a
practical rights-based framework for as wide a degree of self-governance
as is compatible with preservation of peace. It teaches formal equality
for public purposes. It accepts the task of persuasively defending the current distribution of property in terms of mutual benefit and the task of
altering it should that defense become untenable. In attending to these
basic functions, the liberal sovereign-no matter what form it takes,
democratic or otherwise-aims at preserving peace through persuasion
rather than coercion. Insofar as it is successful in this task, it promotes
the closest approach to the liberal contract that practical circumstances
allow.
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