Republic of the Philippines vs Crasus Iyoy

Facts:

The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying
for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the
marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went
to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that
Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one she
attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the
certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her newhusbands last
name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.

Issue:

Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad Sagalongos-San Luis
November 12, 2010
514 SCRA 294

During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis (Rodolfo San Luiss dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had
no children with Felicidad but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad, Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their Felicisimos conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, Felicidad filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo claimed that Felicidad has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26
of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
Felicidads bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad may file for letters of administration over Felicisimos estate.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of Felicidad and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal

custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

TONGOL vs. TONGOL

FACTS:
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Orlando Tongol alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because of
Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas
admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims
that their marriage failed because it is Orlandos insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man. Both parties
underwent a psychological exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological
insufficiency.
ISSUE: Does the psychological problem of Mrs. Filipina Tongol enough to compel the court to nullify their
marriage?
HELD: No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must exist during the ceremony of the marriage,
the psychological incapacity must be apparent as to the extent that the other party is incapable the significance of
their marriage and lastly, the malady must be incurable. The definition or manifestation of marriage must within the
scope of article 36of the Family Code. As in the present case, the psychological sufficiency of Mrs Tongol is not
severe that would render her incapable of recognize the sanctity of her marital contract with her husband, second,
Dr. Villegas failed to prove the that the ailment is incurable. As to the facts of the psychological examination report
say: the emotional malady iscused merely by rejection of Mrs. Tongol by her mother when she was young. Further,
the facts of the case did not show thatMrs. Tongol did not care about the welfare of their children.And the financial
issue as being cited in the facts, the courtdeemed that such phenomena is natural in evry marriage andcan be settled
easily. Hence the court dismissed the petitionof the nullity of marriage

EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF

PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC. G.R. No.
100098, December 29, 1995 FACTS: On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee Co., Inc. filed with the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks & Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of Registration No. SR
5054 for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR. LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets, jogging suits,
dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class 25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner Emerald
Garment Manufacturing Corporation. Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark "so closely resembled
its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously registered and used in the Philippines cause confusion, mistake and deception
on the part of the purchasing public as to the origin of the goods. On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a
decision granting private respondent's petition for cancellation and opposition to registration. The Director of

Patents, using the test of dominancy, declared that petitioner's trademark was confusingly similar to private
respondent's mark because "it is the word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that
the goods originated from the same manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the mark.

ISSUE: Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is likely to deceive the public is a question of fact which is
to be resolved by applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the competing trademark contains the main or
essential or dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and deception are likely to result.

HELD: The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive feature of the appellant's trademark and all of the
appellee's "LEE" trademarks. It is the mark which draws the attention of the buyer and leads him to conclude that
the goods originated from the same manufacturer. The alleged difference is too insubstantial to be noticeable. The
likelihood of confusion is further made more probable by the fact that both parties are engaged in the same line of
business. Although the Court decided in favor of the respondent, the appellee has sufficiently established its right to
prior use and registration of the trademark "LEE" in the Philippines and is thus entitled to protection from any
infringement upon the same. The dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla is more acceptable

MIRPURI vs. CA G.R. No. 114508, November 19, 1999

Lolita Escobar applied with the Bureau of Patents for the registration of the trademark Barbizon, alleging that
she had been manufacturing and selling these products since 1970. private respondent Barbizon Corp opposed the
application in IPC No. 686. The Bureau granted the application and a certificate of registration was issued for the
trademark Barbizon. Escobar later assigned all her rights and interest over the trademark to petitioner Mirpuri. In
1979, Escobar failed to file with the Bureau the Affidavit of Use of the trademark. Due to his failure, the Bureau
cancelled the certificate of registration. Escobar reapplied and Mirpuri also applied and this application was also
opposed by private respondent in IPC No. 2049, claiming that it adopted said trademark in 1933 and has been using
it. It obtained a certificate from the US Patent Office in 1934. Then in 1991, DTI cancelled petitioners registration
and declared private respondent the owner and prior user of the business name Barbizon International.

ISSUE
Whether or not the treaty (Paris Convention) affords protection to a foreign corporation against a Philippine
applicant for the registration of a similar trademark.

HELD
The Court held in the affirmative. RA 8293 defines trademark as any visible sign capable of distinguishing
goods. The Paris Convention is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of patents,
utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations

of origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair competition. In short, foreign nationals are to be given the
same treatment in each of the member countries as that country makes available to its own citizens. Nationals of the
various member nations are thus assured of a certain minimum of international protection of their industrial
property.

United Airlines vs. Uy

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's
provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some
extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor
beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does
not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate,
much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the
carrier's
employees
is
found
or
established
FACTS:
October 13, 1989 Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound
from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his
luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A United Airlines
employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him to
repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene, Willie did as asked.
Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him overweight charges.
Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline prepaid credit but the same employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending
that there were discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with
his American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his
bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.
October 16, 1989 he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not
refute Willies allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the
maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly
inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was subjected
to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated
October
28,
1991,
demanding
out-of-court
settlement
of
P1,000,000.00.
June 9, 1992 Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two
causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioners
employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and
social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal effects

amounting

to

US$5,310.00.

For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed
out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be
extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second paragraph of
the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be
determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. It is Willies position that
our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should apply. When he sent his letters of
demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him ample time to file his complaint.
The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to the
local forums rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining
the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning filed). Willie filed his
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on the 14th day. The trial court
denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice of appeal. United Airlines this time
contended that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and
should therefore be dismissed. The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest
of justice and ruled in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the 2-year
prescriptive
period
under
Art.
29
of
the
Warsaw
Convention

HELD:
Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw
Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based on tort which can be filed
within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As for the action pertaining to the loss
of the contents of the luggage, while it was well within the bounds of the Warsaw
Convention, the Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the applicability of the
2-year prescriptive period that is when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the
passenger
the
run-around.
Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply them or not
Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored,
depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the
Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by
the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional
type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some
extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor
beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does
not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate,
much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its
passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the
carrier's
employees
is
found
or
established.

Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby
and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco
Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and, (b) the
slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00.
While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or damage to
property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, his first cause of
action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the
violation
of
respondent's
rights
as
passenger
clearly
is
not.
Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of
the respondents rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code
Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file his
complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his
action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the
Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action,
specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on
torts.
Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline employed
delaying
tactics
As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the Warsaw
Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation
incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various
tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our
own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to
let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year
period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a
complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two
(2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be
doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even
employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the
action
itself
was
delayed
because
of
petitioner's
evasion.
Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of
limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it
is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because
petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his
demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when his
claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due to his desire to make an
out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate
of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two
(2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the
instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus,

private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art.
29 of the Warsaw Convention.

Facts: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S
Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he
shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the
request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in
Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

Issue: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

Ruling: The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of
the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local
state.
Petition is dismissed.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS and
DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, March 9, 2000 FACTS: Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and
mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when the American Airlines
security officers prevented him from boarding the plane, detained him for about an
hour and allowed him to board the plane only after all the other passengers have
boarded. Petitioner American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the action for
damages filed by the private respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28
(1) of the Warsaw Convention. However the motion was denied. The Court of
Appeals later affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between the private
respondent and private respondent would be considered as a single operation and
part of the contract of transportation entered into by the private respondent with
Singapore Airlines in Manila?
RULING: No, the contract of carriage between the private responded and Singapore
Airlines although performed by different carriers under a series of airlines tickets,
including that issued by the American Airlines constitutes a single operation.
Members of the TATA are under a general pool partnership agreement wherein, they
act as agent of each other in the issuance of tickets to contracted passengers to
boost ticket sales worldwide which are inaccessible in some parts of the world.
Petitioners acquiescence to take place of the original designated carrier binds it
under the contract of carriage entered into by the private respondent and Singapore
Airlines in Manila. Therefore, findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. Case was
ordered to be remanded for more investigation for action against damages

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al vs.CA et al. G.R. No. 102223
August 22, 1996 FACTS: Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC.,
(CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are both domestic corporations..
Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are
corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama,
USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do
business in the Philippines. ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as
Representative Agreement. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its
exclusive representative in the Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in
consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a
License Agreement entered into by the same parties later on, ASPAC was able to
incorporate and use the name ITEC in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade,
Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines). One year into
the second term of the parties Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to
terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual
commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and
another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the
President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information
of ITECs products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product

support, which are similar, if not identical to ITECs own, and offering them to ITECs
former customer. The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC.
Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following grounds: (1) That plaintiff
has no legal capacity to sue as it is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that plaintiff
is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the application against it of the
principle of forum non conveniens. The MTD was denied. Petitioners elevated the
case to the respondent CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65
of the Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: 1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to sue because of nonregistration? 2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on
the principle of forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed. 1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been
engaged in or doing business in the Philippines for some time now. This is the
inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered
into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements, with
these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively engaging in business in the
country. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in
Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a Philippine
citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said corporation. To put it
in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation
after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. And the
doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to
domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a
corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate existence and capacity. In Antam
Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our chagrin over this commonly used
scheme of defaulting local companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign
companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to invoke the lack of capacity
to sue of such foreign companies. Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC
to prevent the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from using
knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary arrangements between the
parties. 2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the
application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non
conveniens defies wellsettled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or
not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before
Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original
complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question
plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry
into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier. Thus, having acquired
jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case,
whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non
convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite

of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction
over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of
the courts disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of
the present forum not being the most convenient as a ground for the suits
dismissal, deserves scant consideration.

ERIKS PTE., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS [February 6, 1997] Effect of Doing Business
in Philippines without a License: Barred From Access to Courts FACTS: 1. Petitioner
Eriks Pte., Ltd. is a nonresident foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture
and sale of elements used in sealing pumps, valves and pipes for industrial
purposes, and PVC pipes and fittings for industrial uses. 2. Private respondent Delfin
Enriquez, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Delrene EB Controls
Center and/or EB Karmine Commercial, ordered and received from petitioner various
elements used in sealing pumps, valves, pipes and control equipment, PVC pipes
and fittings. 3. The transfer of goods were perfected in Singapore for private
respondents account with a 90- day credit term. Subsequently, demands were
made by petitioner upon private respondent to settle his account, but the latter
failed/refused to do so. 4. Petitioner corporation filed with the RTC a complaint for
the recovery of US$41,939.63. Private respondent responded with a Motion to
Dismiss, contending that petitioner corporation had no legal capacity to sue. The
trial court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioner is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license. 5. On appeal, the respondent
court affirmed the RTC as it deemed the series of transactions between petitioner
corporation and private respondent not to be an isolated or casual transaction.
Thus, respondent court found petitioner to be without legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE: Is a foreign corporation which sold its products 16 times over a 5-month
period to the same Filipino buyer without first obtaining a license to do business in
the Philippines, prohibited from maintaining an action to collect payment therefor in
Philippine courts? In other words, is such foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines without the required license and thus barred access to our court
system?

HELD: 1.The Corporation Code provides: Section 133. Doing business without a
license No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a
license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized
under Philippine laws. The aforementioned provision prohibits, not merely absence
of the prescribed license, but it also bars a foreign corporation doing business in

the Philippines without such license access to our courts. A foreign corporation
without such license is not ipso facto incapacitated from bringing an action. A
license is necessary only if it is transacting or doing business in the country. 2.
The test to determine whether a foreign company is doing business in the
Philippines, thus: x x x The true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign
corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for
which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it
over to another. The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works
or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive
prosecution of, the purpose and object of its organization (Mentholaturn Co., Inc. v.
Mangaliman). 3. The accepted rule in jurisprudence is that each case must be
judged in the light of its environmental circumstances. It should be kept in mind that
the purpose of the law is to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines to the jurisdiction of our courts. It is not to prevent the foreign
corporation from performing single or isolated acts, but to bar it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose of business without first taking the steps necessary to
render it amenable to suits in the local courts. 4. Thus, we hold that the series of
transactions in question could not have been isolated or casual transactions. What
is determinative of doing business is not really the number or the quantity of the
transactions, but more importantly, the intention of an entity to continue the body
of its business in the country. The number and quantity are merely evidence of such
intention. The phrase isolated transaction has a definite and fixed meaning, i.e. a
transaction or series of transactions set apart from the common business of a
foreign enterprise in the sense that there is no intention to engage in a progressive
pursuit of the purpose and object of the business organization. Whether a foreign
corporation is doing business does not necessarily depend upon the frequency of
its transactions, but more upon the nature and character of the transactions. 5.
Accordingly, petitioner must be held to be incapacitated to maintain the action a
quo against private respondent. By this judgment, we are not foreclosing
petitioners right to collect payment. Res judicata does not set in a case dismissed
for lack of capacity to sue, because there has been no determination on the merits.
Moreover, this Court has ruled that subsequent acquisition of the license will cure
the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contract. By securing a
license, a foreign entity would be giving assurance that it will abide by the decisions
of our courts, even if adverse to it

Hutchison Ports Philippines, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Metropolitan

Authority
G.R. No. 131367 (August 31, 2000)

In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL)won a public bidding made by the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a
modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board of

Directors already declared HPPL as the winner but later on, the Office of the President
reversed the decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding however,
HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a petition for
injunction to enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case against SBMA.
HELD: No. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the winning
bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the
SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of the President. Hence, the Board of SBMA
is under the control and supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore, the
declaration made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL.
Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation registered under the
laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not register here in the Philippines.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated transaction. The conduct of
bidding is not an isolated transaction. It is doing business here in the Philippines. The
Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, doing or engaging in or transacting
business in the Philippines is a case to case basis. It has often been held that a single act
or transaction may be considered as doing business when a corporation performs acts for
which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. The
amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for even a singular act cannot be
merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporations intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes doing business because it shows the
foreign corporations intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the concession
contract is but an exercise of the corporations reason for creation or existence. Therefore,
HPPL has done business here without license. It cannot now sue in the Philippines without
license because its participation in the bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign corporation desiring
to do business within the Philippines to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
state and to enable the government to exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of
their activities in this country.

SBMA v. Universal International Group of Taiwan

September 14, 2000
Panganiban, J.

Facts

UIG and SBMA entered into a Lease and Development Agreement (LDA)
wherein SBMA leased to UIG the Binictan Golf Course and appurenant
facilities thereto to be transforemed into a world-class 18-hole golf
course/resort.
The LDA contained pre-termination clauses which authorizes SBMA, after due
notice to UIG, to terminate the lease and immediately take possession of the
property if UIG commits a material breach of any of the contracts conditions.
SBMA wrote UIG, calling its attention to its failure to deliver its various
contactual obligations.
UIG imputed the delay to the default of its main contractor, FF Cruz, but
committed itself to comply with its undertakibngs.
The following month, SBMA declared UIG in default.
Six months later, UIG still failed to satisfy its obligations so SBMA served a
letter of pre-termination to UIG. Shortly thereafter, the golf course was
formally closed and SBMA took possession of the subject premises.
UIG filed a complaint against SBMA for Injuction and Damages with prayer for
TRO and preliminary injuction.
TC granted UIGs prayer and ordered SBMA to restore possession of the golf
course to UIG. In a subsequent order, TC denied SBMAs motion to dismiss.
CA upheld UIGs capacity to sue, holding that SBMA is estopped from
questioning its standing. It also held that UIGDC 1 and SBGCCI2 were real
parties in interest because they made substantial investments in the venture
and had been in possession in property when SBMA took over.

Issues/Held
1. WON UIG has capacity to sue.
YES. As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations
cannot file suits in the Philippines. A corporation has legal status only
within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a
corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the
Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the
country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the SEC
and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot
institute a suit in the Philippines. However, after contracting with a foreign
corporation, a domestic firm is estopped from denying the formers
capacity to sue.
1 UIG International Development Corporation
2 Subic Bay Gold and Country Club, Inc.

2. WON UIGDC and SBGCCI are real parties in interest.

YES. According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party in
interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In
this case, the CA made a factual finding that UIGDC and SBGCCI were in
possession of the property when SBMA took over. Moreover, it also found that
they had already made substantial investments in the project. The CA is correct
in holding that UIGDC and SBGCCI stand to be benefitted or injured by the
present suit and should be deemed real parties in interest.

3. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the suit.

YES. According to petitioners, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because
ejectment suits are cognizable by municipal courts. However, the complaint
reveals that it sought to enjoin petitioners from rescinding the contract and
taking over the property. While possession was a necessary consequence of the
suit, it was merely incidental. The main issue is not ejectment, but whether
SBMA could rescind the LDA. Because it was a dispute that was incapable
of pecuniary estimation, it was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.