G.R. No.

129093

August 30, 2001

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA,

and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the RTC, enjoining
petitioners from implementing or enforcing KAPASIYAHAN BILANG 508, TAON 1995,
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of laguna..
On 29 December 1995, Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to
install Terminal OM for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz for
mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. However, this was denied by the said mayor in
its letter. The ground for the said denial was ordinace passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled KAPASIYAHAN BILANG 508, TAON 1995.
Respondent filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his
decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution
or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the
Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and
all forms of gambling.
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a
curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had
already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.
ISSUE:
1. whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and;
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are
needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit.
HELD:
As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which
may be contrary to that of the national government. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually
enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to
legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power
coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,ordinances should not contravene
an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.

Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.

Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred
upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may
abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right,
the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations
in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation
on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to
phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder
Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot
avail of Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as
justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an
expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring
water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c)
and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country.

G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976

PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
On 02 September 1976, President Ferdinand Marcis issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) 991,
calling for a national referendum to be held on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies
(barangays) to resolve, among others, the issues on martial law and to amend certain
provisions in the Constitution, thru the authority of the President.
Twenty (20) days after, Marcos issued P.D. 1031, amending P.D. 991, which declared the
provisions of P.D. 229, which provides for the manner of voting in barangays applicable to the
national referendum to be held. Herein public respondent, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the said referendum.
On 27 September 1976, herein petitioners, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding the said referendum,
invoking that the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions do not grant the incumber President to exercise
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. Hence, the referendum has
no legal basis.
The Solicitor General, replying for the COMELEC, stated that petitioners has no capacity to sue;
that the issue is political in nature and beyond the powers of the Court, and that at such
situation (transition period), only the incumbent President can exercise constituent power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case filed by petitioners is a political one and beyond the judicial
review powers of the Court?

RULING: The Court held No.

The Court disagreed with the Solicitor General and maintains that the amending process both as
to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question and can be reviewed by the Court.
The Court stated that like in the present case, in view of the preceding statement, it can exercise
judicial review in cases where the power if the President to initiate which normally exercise by
the legislature is seriously in doubt.
That the issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is
justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to
perform such act is in question.
Thus, the present case is not of a political one and can be taken cognizance by the Court.
Find out what is a political question and a justiciable question?
As defined in the case given, a political question is neatly associated with the wisdom and not on
the legality of a particular act. It is a question of policy in matters concerning the government of
a State as a body politic. Moreover, It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
government (Separate Opinion/Concurring of Castro, C.J., citing Tanada v. Cuenco)

On the other hand, a justiciable question is said to be a question where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act.
In the present case, the basic issue is the constitutional validity of the presidential acts of
proposing amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendum-plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern itself with the
wisdom of the exercise of the authority claimed, instead, the inquiry vel non is focused soley on
the existence of the said power of the President a question purely of legality determinable thru
interpretation and construction of the Constitution by the Court.
Who declares that a question is a political or justiciable?
As mentioned in the present case, it is the Supreme Court who exercises the power of judicial
review, to whom the people vested such power, has the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norm of amendments have been observed or not.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that declares whether a question is political or justiciable.
Who are the parties involved in resolving these cases?
The Supreme Court has the final say is determining whether a case should be
considered as Political or Justiciable in nature. If Justiciable, the Court can take
cognizance, if Political , it is considered beyond jurisdiction.