You are on page 1of 23

People v. Rayon, G.R. No.

194236, 30 January 2013


The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI
of R.A. No. 7610 (Criminal Case No. 2006-174) and with qualified rape in two
separate informations filed before the RTC. The body of the Information,
however, alleged that the appellant sexually molested AAA; kissed her; mashed
her breasts; fondled her; and forcibly opened her legs.
ISSUE: As between the caption and the body of the information, which
take precedence? Is the conviction proper?
RULING: The conviction is proper, however, the accused is not guilty of
committing a violation of Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, as what was contained
in the caption of the information. The character of the crime is not determined by
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate
facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The averments in the
information against the appellant in Criminal Case No. 2006-174 clearly make out
a charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

Kummer v. People , G.R. No. 174461, 11 September


2013
Leticia J. Kummer was convicted of the crime of homicide by the Regional Trial
Court. Such judgment of conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
appeal. Seeking to reverse her conviction, Kummer filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court in which she claims that she was not arraigned after the
information for which she was convicted was amended after she had entered her
plea. The amendment of the Information involved the change of the date of the
commission of the crime from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988.
She also argues that the decision of the trial court was void in so far as trial court
that heard the testimonies of material witnesses was not the same court that
rendered the decision.
ISSUES/RULING:
Whether the change of date is a formal or substantial amendment?
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time
is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not
prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not
alter the nature of the offense.
NOTE: The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint
or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.
Whether an arraignment is necessary after the introduction of formal
amendments to the Information?

The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or


complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial
amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not
charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or
information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise
and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights
of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the
offense.
An amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules,
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The
purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the
accused was arraigned the first time.
Whether a judgment rendered by a judge who did not conduct the trial
of the same case is valid?
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous
solely because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who
rendered the decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment
that the judge who penned the decision should actually hear the case in its
entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis for his decision. Thus, a judgment of conviction
penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records
available to her.

People v. Arcillas, G.R. No. 181491, 30 July 2012


Henry Arcillas had been convicted of qualified rape by the Regional Trial Court in
Masbate City (RTC) and meted with death penalty, which still imposable at the
time of his conviction. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the finding of guilt, but
found him guilty only of simple rape since the qualifying circumstance of his
common-law relationship with the victim's mother was not properly alleged in
the information.
ISSUE:
Whether the qualifying aggravating circumstance of relationship should
be appreciated despite the failure to specifically allege it in the
information, but subsequently proved during the course of trial?
For the criminal aspect of the case: Arcillas being the common-law husband of
BBB at the time of the commission of the rape, even if established during the
trial, could not be appreciated because the information did not specifically allege
it as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to
be informed of the charge lodged against him.
However, the CA and the RTC should have recognized the entitlement of AAA to
exemplary damages on account of the attendance of her minority and the
common-law relationship between him and her mother. It did not matter that
such qualifying circumstances were not taken into consideration in fixing his
criminal liability, because the term aggravating circumstances as basis for

awarding exemplary damages under the Civil Code was understood in its generic
sense.
NOTE: The rape of a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age by the
common-law spouse of her mother is qualified rape. Yet, the crime is only simple
rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship, where
the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of
relationship between the accused and the female. This is because the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is
inviolable.

People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012


On September 16, 1997, a complaint-affidavit charging Pangilinan with the crime
of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 was filed by private
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Thereafter, Pangilinan filed
a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability
and effectivity of contract and specific performance against the private
complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
On December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the
Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC.
On March 2, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the suspension of
the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the said civil action. The
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of
Justice (DOJ). On 5 January 1999, the Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22. Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, were
filed against Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC).
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC. She alleged that her
criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
ISSUE: Whether the criminal liability has prescribed?
The crime has not yet prescribed. Filing of the complaint with the Fiscals Office
also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. The
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused
interrupts the period of prescription. There is no more distinction between cases
under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption
of the period of prescription.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of

proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before
the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to
suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that
the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of
Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.

People v. Bayabos, et. al. G.R. No. 171222; People v.


Aris, et. al. G.R. No. 174786, 18 February 2015
The information against Bayabos, et. al., school authorities of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) for violation of the Anti-Hazing Law merely
stated that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim.
However, aside from a reference to word hazing, no allegation of that the
purported acts that were employed were prerequisites for admission or entry into
the organization (one of the elements of the same crime).
Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal
accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material averments
required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
ISSUE: Is the quashal of the information warranted?
Yes. Failure to aver [the] crucial ingredient[s] would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term in this
case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the
acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter
alia, both the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. Thus, the Information must
be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of
accomplice to hazing.

Domingo v. Colina, et. al. G.R. No. 173330, 17 June


2013
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered the acquittal of Domingo in an
indictment involving violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 based on a
demurrer to evidence filed by the same after the prosecution rested its case. The
judge failed to rule on the civil aspect of the case. Without citing evidence,
factual circumstances or any discussion in its Decision, the MTCC simply
concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the
offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. The tenor of the Orders of the MTCC is that the dismissal of the criminal
case against petitioner was based on reasonable doubt.

Colina appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
which ordered Domingo to pay the former the civil liability arising from the
offense.
ISSUE: Whether the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case based on
reasonable doubt amounts to the extinguishment of the civil liability of
the accused?
NO. The trial court did not convict petitioner of the offense charged, since the
prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of
evidence required in criminal cases. Conversely, the lack of evidence to prove
the aforesaid elements of the offense charged does not mean that petitioner has
no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which is proven by another
quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence.

Spouses Gaditano v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No.


188767, 24 June 2013
SMC to filed a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa
against Spouses Gaditano with the Office of the Prosecutor.
Subsequently, the spouses filed an action for specific performance and damages
against AsiaTrust Bank and its general manager Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust
Bank unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts. Petitioners assert
that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and
estafa on the grounds of prejudicial question.
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether
AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings
account.
ISSUE: Whether there exists a prejudicial question?
No. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal
investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. On the other hand, the issue in
the preliminary investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC
for the payment of beer products.
It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based

on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a
prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares AsiaTrust Bank liable for the
unlawful garnishment of petitioners savings account, petitioners cannot be
automatically adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of worthless checks with
knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself the
offense.

Rimando v. Aldaba, G .R. No. 203583, 13 October 2014


Rimando was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) charging Rimando of
the crime of estafa. Allegedly, Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her
business by executing three (3) postdated checks. On the date of maturity of the
checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds. Rimando failed to make good of the
checks.
Meanwhile the spouse filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Rimando was
acquitted in the BP 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a
declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist.
However, the RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly
liable to Sps. Aldaba. The RTC ruled that as an accommodation party to one of
the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel, Rimando should be
held liable to Sps. Aldaba.
Rimando appealed to the CA where she contended that her acquittal and
exoneration from the civil liability in the BP 22 cases should have barred Sps.
Aldaba from claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case.
ISSUE: Whether Rimandos civil liability in the estafa case despite her
acquittal and exoneration from civil liability?
No. It is well-settled that the acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is
only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.
In this case, Rimandos civil liability did not arise from any purported act
constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never
employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel.
Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party
to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel.

Reyes v. Rossi, G.R. No. 159823, 18 February 2014


Reyes and Rossi, in his capacity as Executive Project Director of Advanced
Foundation Construction Systems Corporation executed a deed of conditional
sale involving the purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a dredging
pump. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the downpayment, and
the balance through four post-dated checks. Rossi deposited the checks,
however, the same were returned with the notation Account Closed stamped on
them.
Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and damages in the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City. Meanwhile, Rossi charged Reyes with estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Reyes as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should
suspend the proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action
for rescission of contract that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal
proceedings.
Reyes posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of
whether or not he was criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. He states that if the contract would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under
the conditional deed of sale would be extinguished, and such outcome would
necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal proceedings for the violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
ISSUE: Whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of
sale raised a prejudicial question that required the suspension of the
criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22?
No. The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing
them to be without funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the
civil action for rescission is whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of
Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the rescission of the conditional
sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced Foundation would be
found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of the
contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved
of the criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the
aforementioned elements show, he already committed the violations upon the
dishonor of the checks that he had issued at a time when the conditional sale
was still fully binding upon the parties. His obligation to fund the checks or to
make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should not be tied up to the
future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale
through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of
a worthless check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances,
the criminal proceedings for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could
proceed despite the pendency of the civil action for rescission of the conditional
sale.

Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082;


Abalos v. Delima, G.R. No. 199085; Arroyo v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 199118, 18 September 2012
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new
witnesses indicating the occurrence of massive electoral fraud and manipulation
of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections the Comelec issued
Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007
elections.
Senator Pimentel filed Complaint-Affidavit for Electoral Sabotage against
petitioners before the Joint Committee. Joint Committee issued two subpoenas
against petitioners who, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee.
Respondents therein were ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by
November 14, 2011. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the creation of
the joint committee.
Petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA), in her Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam
to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in his
complaint-affidavit and for production of election documents as basis for the
charge of electoral sabotage, GMA prayed that the Joint Committee issue an
Order directing the Fact-Finding Team and Senator Pimentel to furnish her with
copies of said documents. The Joint Committee, however, denied GMAs motion
which also carried with it the denial to extend the filing of her counter-affidavit.
ISSUE: Who may prosecute election cases?
COMELE and DOJs Concurrent authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses
The text and intent of the constitutional provision granting the Comelec the
authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is to give the Comelec
all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. The Comelec should be
allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created.
Although it belongs to the executive department, as the agency tasked to
investigate crimes, prosecute offenders, and administer the correctional system,
the DOJ is likewise not barred from acting jointly with the Comelec. It must be
emphasized that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses.
Under the Joint Order, resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause
for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with
the Comelec Rules of Procedure. This shows that the Comelec, though it acts
jointly with the DOJ, remains in control of the proceedings. In no way can we say
that the Comelec has thereby abdicated its independence to the executive
department.

During the preliminary investigation, are the complainants required to


furnish all evidence in order to prove probable cause for the filing of a
criminal Information?
Emphasize at this point that during the preliminary investigation, the
complainants are not obliged to prove their cause beyond reasonable doubt. It
would be unfair to expect them to present the entire evidence needed to secure
the conviction of the accused prior to the filing of information. A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
respective evidence but the presentation only of such evidence as may engender
a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Precisely there is a trial to
allow the reception of evidence for the prosecution in support of the charge.

Ocampo v. Hon. Abando,et. al., G.R. No. 176830, 11


February 2014
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Petitioner Ladlad claims that
he was not served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the undated
letters of PC/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.
Furthermore, even though his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance
before the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a
subpoena through his counsels addresses.
On the other hand, Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. He alleges that
Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used
as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis claim that had Judge Abando painstakingly examined the
records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably
dismissed the charge against them.
ISSUE: Whether the failure to serve subpoena to the accused during the
preliminary investigation will invalidate the same?
NO. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could
not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he
was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.
Does the failure of the judge to point out facts and evidence in the
record that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest amount to grave abuse of discretion?
NO. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if on the basis
of his evaluation he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's

resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid


him in determining its existence.
The allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits
of the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no
probable cause for petitioners indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance
of warrants for their arrest. The trial judges appreciation of the evidence and
conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. Again, he sufficiently complies with the requirement of
personal determination if he reviews the information and the documents
attached thereto, and on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime with which he is being charged.

Senator Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et. al.,


G.R. No. 12140-41, 21 January 2014
In the course of the preliminary investigation for the case of Plunder and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Office of the
Ombudsman, Senator Estrada filed his Request to be furnished with copies of
Counter-Affidavits of his other co-respondents in the said cases. The Office of the
Ombudsman, in an Order, denied said motion. Senator Estrada attacks the
validity of said order by imputing to the Ombudsman grave abuse of discretion.
He claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his
co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether a respondent in a criminal case, during the preliminary
investigation, has the right to be furnished counter-affidavits of his coaccused?
No. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman requireis for
the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of thecomplaint
and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time theorder to submit
the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b)refers
to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of
the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are
not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant

People v. Borje, et. al., G.R. No. 170046, 21 January


2014
The Special Prosecution Office of the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman filed an Information against Borje, et. al. for the crime of
Plunder. Thereafter, respondents filed their responsive pleadings essentially
assailing the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause.
The Sandiganbayan issued an Order giving respondents a period within which to
submit their memoranda of authority. In its Omnibus Comment/Opposition of
even date, the Ombudsman alleged that it successfully established probable
cause justifying the issuance by the respondent court of a warrant of arrest. It
maintains Sandiganbayan should have given deference to the finding and
determination of probable cause in their preliminary investigation.

Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of probable


cause for the crime of plunder without prejudice to the filing of appropriate
charges against the accused-respondents. It ruled that as the records reveal, not
all elements of the crime are present for the accused Borje had not amassed illgotten wealth of at least P50 million.
ISSUE: Can the Sandiganbayn question the determination of the
Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause to file an
information?
No. It is well settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the presence or absence of probable cause believing
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman
but upon practicality as well. If it were otherwise, the functions of the Court will
be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would
be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant

Virginia Delos Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.


178947; People v. Desmond, 26 June 2013
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution inding
probable cause against Desmond for estafa. Corresponding criminal informations
were filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Desmond filed before the RTC a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause. The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause
exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not
all present. Consequently, the RTC denied the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
hold departure order against Desmond and ordered the dismissal of the cases
against him.
ISSUE: May a judge dismiss a criminal case after his finding of the lack
of probable cause?
Yes, subject to the following principles: The judges dismissal of a case must be
done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish
probable cause that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of
the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more
likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon,
order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate
course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.

NOTE: Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTCs immediate
dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as the standard of clear lack of
probable cause was not observed. In this case, records show that certain
essential facts namely, (a) whether or not Desmond committed false
representations that induced Dio to invest in Ocean Adventure; and (b) whether
or not Desmond utilized the funds invested by Dio solely for the Miracle Beach
Project for purposes different from what was agreed upon remain controverted.
As such, it cannot be said that the absence of the elements of the crime of estafa
under Article 315(2)(a)57 and 315(1)(b)58 of the RPC had already been
established, thereby rendering the RTCs immediate dismissal of the case highly
improper.

The Law Firm of Chavez, et. al. v. Atty. Fria, G.R. No.
183014, 07 August 2013
In its Complaint-Affidavit charging the Atty. Fria, the Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong with the crime of Open Disobedience under
Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, The Law Firm alleged that it had been
following up on the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the judgment of
the court in a civil case. However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her
ministerial duty of issuing said writ.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria posited that the draft writ
of execution (draft writ) was not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff, who was
then on leave. Nevertheless, she maintained that she need not sign the draft
writ, the presiding judge issued an Order stating that he himself shall sign and
issue the same.
The prosecutor issued a Memorandum recommending that Atty. Fria be indicted
for the crime of Open Disobedience. The corresponding Information was
thereafter filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Atty. Fria filed a Motion for Determination of Probable Cause which The Law Firm
opposed on the ground that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not empower
trial courts to review the prosecutors finding of probable cause and that such
rules only give the trial court judge the duty to determine whether or not a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The MTC ordered the
dismissal of said criminal case for lack of probable cause.
ISSUE: Is the dismissal of the criminal case based on probable cause
proper?
The dismissal was proper. The judges power to immediately dismiss a criminal
case would only be warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear. The
dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the
unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open
Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or
executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Frias position as Branch Clerk of Court,
the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting.

Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, 21 April 2014


Juno Cars, Inc. through its representative, Raul C. Evangelista, filed a complaintaffidavit for qualified theft and estafa against Mendoza.
The Provincial

Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause and recommending the


filing of an information against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
Mendoza moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. He then filed a
petition for review with the Department of Justice. While Mendozas motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong, two informations for qualified theft and estafa were filed before
the Regional Trial Court.
Mendoza filed a motion for determination of probable cause before the trial
court. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the evidence adduced
did not support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and
estafa.
Judge Capco-Umali made an independent assessment of the evidence on record
and concluded that the evidence adduced does not support a finding of
probable cause for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa. Specifically, she
found that Juno Cars failed to prove by competent evidence that the
vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by Alfredo were lawfully possessed or
owned by them, or that these vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to
substantiate the charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint
[did] not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office files or
their valuation purportedly have been removed, concealed or destroyed by the
accused, which she found crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under
Article 315.
ISSUE: Is the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause proper?
Yes. The phrase upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce allows a determination of probable cause by the judge ex
parte. For this reason, Section 6, paragraph (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure mandates the judge to immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record fails to establish probable cause. It is also settled that once
a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case, whether
as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the
sound discretion of the court.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always
proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause,
considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or
she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a judge
finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment
and trial in order that justice may be served.

People v. Villareal, 2013363, 18 March 2013


PO3 De Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he
saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing
in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de eon, a member of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU), alighted from his
motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he
had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest without warrant was lawful?


NO. The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had
personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by the
appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had reasonable ground to believe
that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.
However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same
offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless arrest. Personal
knowledge of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed
is required. To interpret personal knowledge as referring to a persons
reputation or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and
unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a persons previous criminal
infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

People v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 153304-05,


07, 2012
Two criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging the Imelda R.
Marcos and Jose Conrado Benitez (Respondents) and Rafael Zagala.
The prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
Subsequently, respondents filed demurrers to evidence. The prosecution filed a
Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the demurrers to evidence. The
Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the
respondents.
The People filed a petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan particularly imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the
presentation of additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant
traceable to the special prosecutors conduct. The special prosecutors conduct
allegedly also violated the States due process rights.
ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan in granting the demurer to evidence?
NO. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Sandiganbayan is under no
obligation to require the parties to present additional evidence when a demurrer
to evidence is filed. In a criminal proceeding, the burden lies with the prosecution
to prove that the accused committed the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt, as the constitutional presumption of innocence ordinarily stands in favor
of the accused. Whether the Sandiganbayan will intervene in the course of the
prosecution of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretion, provided that its actions do not result in the impairment of the
substantial rights of the accused, or of the right of the State and of the offended
party to due process of law.
The court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may require or allow the
prosecution to present additional evidence (at its own initiative or upon a
motion) after a demurrer to evidence is filed. This exercise, however, must be for

good reasons and in the paramount interest of justice.[73] As mentioned, the


court may require the presentation of further evidence if its action on the
demurrer to evidence would patently result in the denial of due process; it may
also allow the presentation of additional evidence if it is newly discovered, if it
was omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or if it is intended to correct the
evidence previously offered.
NOTE: In this case, we cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Sandiganbayan when it exercised restraint and did not require the presentation
of additional evidence, given the clear weakness of the case at that point. We
note that under the obtaining circumstances, the petitioner failed to show what
and how additional available evidence could have helped and the paramount
interest of justice sought to be achieved. It does not appear that pieces of
evidence had been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or that these
pieces of evidence are intended to correct evidence previously offered. More
importantly, it does not appear that these contemplated additional pieces of
evidence (which the special prosecutor allegedly should have presented) were
ever present and available.

Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411;


Nacionales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191871, 15 July
2013
On November 9, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas (Office of
the Ombudsman) received a letter-complaint from Peoples Graftwatch,
requesting for assistance to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and
agricultural equipment for the Province which allegedly happened around a
month before Coscolluela stepped down from his post as Governor of the
Province of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the letter-complaint, the Case Building Team of the Office of the
Ombudsman conducted its investigation, resulting in the issuance of a Final
Evaluation Report dated April 16, 2002 which upgraded the complaint into a
criminal case against petitioners.
On March 27, 2003, the assigned Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) prepared a
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Anti-Graft
law and recommended the filing of the corresponding information. On even date,
the Information was prepared and signed by the GIO and submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas(DOV) for recommendation. The DOV recommended
the approval of the Information on June 5, 2003. However, the final approval of
Acting Ombudsman (AO), came only on May 21, 2009, and on June 19, 2009, the
Information was filed before the SB.
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that his
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated as the criminal
charges against him were resolved only after almost 8 years since the complaint
was instituted.
In reply, the respondents filed their Opposition to Motion to Quash dated August
7, 2009, explaining that although the Information was originally dated March 27,

2003, it still had to go through careful review and revision before its final
approval. It also pointed out that petitioners never raised any objections
regarding the purported delay in the proceedings during the interim.
The SB denied petitioners Motion to Quash for lack of merit
ISSUE: Is the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases
available during preliminary investigation?
YES. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings
but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as
well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party
to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice. The preliminary investigation proceedings took a
protracted amount of time to complete. In this regard, the proceedings were
terminated almost eight years after the filing of the complaint.
NOTE: There is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation
until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officers recommendation to
either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in
the case at bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners
were not terminated upon [the DIOs] preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time [the AO] finally approved
the same for filing with the SB.

People v. Gambao, et. al, G.R. No. 172707, 01 October


2013
Karim, one of the accused, was charged with kidnapping for ransom to which he
initially pleaded not guilty. However, after the victim and her son testified, he
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of not guilty to guilty. His coaccused followed.
Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,
the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did. Such
plea, however, was entered by the accused on the assumption that his plea of
guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty. Both the judge and his counsel failed
to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty; neither
were they warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is
single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The accused were convicted.
ISSUE: Whether the accuseds conviction based on an improvident plea
of guilt should be reversed?
Reversal of the judgment of conviction is not warranted. As a general rule,
convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are
remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If
the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the
accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it
is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the
commission of the offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the

conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the


crime by the accused.

People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, 17 July 1013


Odtuhan was indicted for the crime of bigamy. He moved to quash the
information on the ground that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and
that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished considering that his
first marriage had been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the charges of
bigamy.
The RTC denied the said motion to quash. The RTC held that the facts alleged in
the information that there was a valid marriage between respondent and
Modina and without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted
a second marriage with Alagon constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial court
further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that
criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the
first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
ISSUE: In criminal proceedings for bigamy, would the defense a prior
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage in a motion to quash
warrant the quashal of such information?
No. Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to
Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a marriage
license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged
in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he
contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because
matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper,
therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full
blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to shut
off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information
on the basis of the document presented by respondent. With the presentation of
the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed the prima
facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical
admission thereof.
In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that
the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for
determining prescription.
NOTE: The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not
to be considered. To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in
the information which is evident on its fact. Thus, if the defect can be cured by
amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court
may order that another complaint or information be filed except when the

information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double


jeopardy.

Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258; People v. Court of


Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. 154954, 01 February 2012
Twenty-six members of the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila) were convicted
by the Regional Trial Court for homicide for the death, due to hazing, of Leonardo
Lenny Villa. On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), however, 19 were acquitted,
four were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and two were found guilty of
homicide. During the pendency of the appeal, Villarreal died.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon questions the decision of the CA by setting forth that he was
denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right
to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993
hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was
scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence
on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being
allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
ISSUES:
Was Dizons right to due process violated?
YES. The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent
denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Whether such invalid waiver of right warrant the reversal of the finding
of guilt?
NO. Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver
of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a
finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the
case to the trial court
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs decision, arguing that the case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points
out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal
case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court
had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. A dismissal of the

case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to


acquittal.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal based on the violation of right to speedy trial
warranted?
YES. The final amended Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29
November 1993, they were all arraigned. Unfortunately, the initial trial of the
case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after
arraignment. The unexplained interval or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan since
the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the
disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy
disposition of cases. As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the
dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
NOTE: The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be
a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed
violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial,
or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried
and for no cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to
speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of
both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion
of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to
a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on
double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the
order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof. Rather, grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant
and petitioner were denied due process of law. Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the
finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part CA?
YES. The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion. The
CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished

under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable
felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise
of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal
Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a
person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We
emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable
for physical injuries when actual death occurs.

People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185729-32, 25 June


2013
Homero Mercado, together with other respondents, was indicted before the
Sandiganbayan for the violation of the Anti-Graft Law and two counts of
falsification under the Revised Pena Code.
Prior to the filing of the Information, Mercado applied with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) for immunity as state witness under its witness protection program.
The DOJ favorably acted on the application and granted immunity to Mercado.
Still, since the investigation of the case fell within the authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman, the latter charged him and the other respondents before the
Sandiganbayan
Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the
Ombudsman, citing the DOJs grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably on the
motion, on September 4, 2003 the Ombudsman executed an Immunity
Agreement with Mercado. Accordingly, on the same date, the Ombudsman filed a
motion to discharge Mercado from the information involving him.
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the Ombudsmans motion. In
denying the Ombudsmans motion to drop Mercado from the information, the
Sandiganbayan largely dwelt on the question of whether or not the prosecution
complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Respondents De Vera and Diala, Mercados co-accused who opposed the grant of
immunity to him, contend that the immunity that the Ombudsman gave Mercado
does not bind the court, which in the meantime already acquired jurisdiction over
the case against him. That immunity merely relieves Mercado from any further
proceedings, including preliminary investigation, which the state might still
attempt to initiate against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in refusing to recognize the immunity from criminal prosecution that
the Ombudsman granted respondent Mercado and, as a result, in
declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness?
Yes. Having already acquired jurisdiction over Mercados case, it remained within
the Sandiganbayans power to determine whether or not he may be discharged
as a state witness in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. But, the filing of the criminal action against an accused in

court does not prevent the Ombudsman from exercising the power that the
Congress has granted him under Section 17 of R.A. 6770.
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed,
Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary
of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must
necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a
successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The latter do not
as a rule have a vision of the true strength of the prosecutions evidence until
after the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the
judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he
can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119.

Senador v. People, G.R. No. 201620, 06 March 2013


In an Information Senador was charged before the Regional Trial Court with the
crime of Estafa. The Information cites Cynthia Jaime as the victim and
complainant. However, during trial, the private complainant turned out to be
Rita Jaime. Hence, Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that
her constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her
has been violated by the wrong designation of the complainant in the
Information.
ISSUE: Whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of
the offended party violates the accuseds constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus,
entitling her to an acquittal?
NO. Variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence
offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal,
more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere
formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal
act charged in the information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the
offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court
mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal.
In offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense
was sufficiently described and identified.
NOTE: As correctly held by the appellate court, Senadors reliance on Uba is
misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime
against honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the defamatory
words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the
person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was
charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as
indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party.
If the subject matter of the offense is specific or one described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is not material and would not result in the
violation of the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal
of the accused.
If the subject matter of the offense is generic or one which is not described with
such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is material and would result in the violation of
the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.

Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014


The Regional Trial Court convicted Aliga for the crime of Theft thru Falsification of
Commercial Document, committed. The conviction was reversed on appeal of
Aliga to the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioner who is the private offended part file
a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA but was later denied. By way of
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
challenged the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Does the petitioner have legal standing to file the appeal?
NO. Petitioner lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision
because it is only the Office of Solicitor General which can bring actions on behalf
of the State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA.
NOTE: Unlike in Montaez v. Cipriano, where we adopted a liberal view, the OSG,
in its Comment on this case, neither prayed that the petition be granted nor
expressly ratified and adopted as its own the petition for the People of the
Philippines. Instead, it merely begged to excuse itself from filing a Comment due
to conflict of interest and for not having been impleaded in the case.
Was Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) the proper remedy?
NO. Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.The People may assail a judgment
of acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the
petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the
findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy would be violated.
NOTE: Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the
appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are:
(1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding
of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under
exceptional circumstances.

People v. Paras, G.R. No. 192912, 22 October 2014


The accused was convicted of rape by the Regional Trial Court. The accused
appealed his conviction. Pending appeal the accused died in 2014. Without being

informed of the accuseds death, the Court of Appeals issued the Decision in
2014.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the death of the accused to the criminal
aspect and civil aspect of the case?
Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. The
death of the accused-appellant herein, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as
well as his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime
committed. Accordingly, the Court's Decision dated June 4, 2014 had been
rendered ineffectual and the same must therefore be set aside.

Sombilon, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 175528, 30 September


2009
In 1998 Sombilon committed acts constituting acts of lasciviousness against
AAA, a minor. In the Information filed in 1999 charging the accused with the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, the prosecution failed to allege aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position, nor any other aggravating
circumstances. Convicting the accused, the RTC imposed the indeterminate
sentence of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 5 years 4 months and 21 days of
prision correccional, as maximum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position, thus thereby increasing the sentence of the
accused to prision correccional in the maximum period of 6 years.
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000. Said
rules required that aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be
expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise,
they cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are
subsequently proved during trial
ISSUE:
May the new rules of criminal procedure be applied retroactively?
YES. The Court gave the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactive application
since it benefited the accused and disregarded the generic aggravating
circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information.
In so far as the civil aspect of the case, specifically in the award of
exemplary damages, should the new rules be given retroactive
application?
NO. As regards the award of exemplary damages, the Court declined retroactive
application of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The retroactive application
of procedural rules, nevertheless, cannot adversely affect the rights of the
private offended party that have become vested prior to the effectivity of said
rules. The offense having been committed, however, prior to the effectivity of the
new rules, the civil liability already incurred by appellant remains unaffected
thereby.

You might also like