016 DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM v.

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 192123
March 10, 2014
TOPIC: Rule 111 Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted
(sec.1)
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of
the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted
on a three-year old patient born with an imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate
anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure
to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling
him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng
Maynila for a pull-through operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum
(Dr. Solidum) was the anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald
experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. He regained consciousness
only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo
(Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the
attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutors Office filed an
information solely against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997).
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries. On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S): whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
HELD: NO
RATIO: Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate
properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and
using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that
Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic
agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did not preclude the probability
that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not
necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the
hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido
revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist

followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its
corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidums
guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt," according
to United States v. Youthsey:
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a
captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate
position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a
fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both sides, you reach the
conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead
you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a
mathematical demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately
exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly
liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not present
the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only
from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing
how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of
administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of
the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to
adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on
speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have
to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly
holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum.
The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from
the offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could
have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum
for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an
artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment
against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC
and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following
observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its
fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and

the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be
prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not
made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary
liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for
subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with.
Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila
must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The term
industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business,
especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry.
However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in
industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.
Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit,
Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not
such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil
liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen
here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
017 Castillo v. Salvador
G.R. No. 191240, July 30, 2014
TOPIC: Civil aspect of criminal case; damages
PERALTA, J.
FACTS
1. Respondent Philip Salvador and his brother Ramon Salvador were
charged with estafa under Art. 315 par. 2(a) of the RPC. Upon
arraignment, respondent and his brother pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
2. Petitioner Cristina Castillo gave respondent $100,000 to invest into
the remittance business in the name of respondent in HongKong
assuring her huge profits due to the popularity of respondent (si
Philip Salvador as in yung actor HAHA). However, the proposed
business never operated.
3. Petitioners side: she fell in love with respondent and trusted him very
much so she agreed to embark on the remittance business. They went to
HK to register the Philip Salvador Freight and Remittance
International Limited. Upon raising the money, by selling her jewelry,
she gave the amount in cash to respondent. Her mom and brother
witnessed the giving of the money but petitioner did not ask for any
receipt because it will be used as operational expense of a business
for their future, as they planned to get married anyway.
4. Respondents side: He denied that petitioner gave him $100,00 and
that it was actually petitioner who initiated the plan of setting up a
business.
5. RTC: found Philip Salvador guilty beyond reasonable doubt; Ramon
Salvador is acquitted. Respondent appealed his conviction to the CA.

6.

CA: acquitted; prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.
7. Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
decision with respect only to the civil aspect of the case alleging that
the TC was correct in convicting respondent so that even if the CA
decided to acquit him it should have at least retained the award of
damages to the petitioner.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to damages. NO. The acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only. HOWEVER, in this case, petitioner
was not able to prove that she is entitled to damages.
HELD
1. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused:
a. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the
author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been
found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is
the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court.
b. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt
on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is for the same act or omission.
2. A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was
acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to prove that all the
elements of estafa. Petitioner could not even establish clearly and
precisely how respondent committed the alleged fraud. She failed to
convince that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or
insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business.
3. Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only or greater weight of evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
4. The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of US
$100,000.00 is factual. The SC, although no a trier of facts, is called to
re-examine the findings of the TC and CA as they are conflicting.
5. Petitioner was not able to prove that petitioner gave respondent the
money based on the following:

a.

b.

c.

Petitioner failed to prove that she raised the money. She said she
sold her jewelry from Dec 2001 May 2002 thats why she was
able to raise $100,000. However, there was no documentary
evidence showing those transactions within the period.
There was no receipt that the money was given by petitioner to
respondent. There should have been a receipt because
petitioners previous transactions with respondent are evidenced
by some kind of receipt or acknowledgement thereby belies
petitioners claim that she did not give the receipt because she
trusted him.
The testimony of Enrico, petitioners brother, declaring that he
was present when petitioner gave respondent the money did not
help. Enrico testified that there was another case filed by
petitioner against respondent where Enrico submitted an
affidavit. He did not submit an affidavit in this case even though
he allegedly witness the giving of the money. However, when
the other case was dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him
to be a witness in this case. Enrico should have been considered
at the first opportunity if he indeed had personal knowledge of
the alleged giving of money to respondent. Thus, presenting
Enrico as a witness only after the other case was dismissed
would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated

February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
018 LIM VS KOU CO PING
G.R. No. 175256

August 23, 2012

LILY LIM, Petitioner,

vs.
KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil
aspect of a criminal case for estafa?
Factual Antecedents
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing
plant, issued several withdrawal authorities9 for the account of cement dealers and
traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja
(Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities to Co.
On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at
the price of P 64.00 per bag or a total of P 3.2 million.11

Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a
staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back
some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with
Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and
would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to
receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the
plant or for the return of her money had failed.
The criminal case: An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or
Conversion was filed against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. The accusatory portion thereof reads:
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to
prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting
to P 2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.13
On November 19, 2003, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 154, rendered its
Order14 acquitting Co of the estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned, however, set this case for
the reception of his evidence on the matter on December 11, 2003 at 8:30 oclock
[sic] in the morning.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also
relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order.17
Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented
preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her.19
The trial court denied the motion in its Order20 dated February 21, 2005.
IMPORTANT: On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal21 on the
civil aspect of the criminal case. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
85138 and raffled to the Second Division of the CA.
IMPORTANT: On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The
defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal
authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement,
and La Farge Corporation. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
05-112396, asserted two causes of action: breach of contract and abuse of rights
Co filed a motion to dismiss, one in CA one in RTC on the ground of litis
pendentia and forum shopping.
CA granted the motion to dismiss.
Lim filed the instant petition for review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 175256.
RTC: Meanwhile, the Manila RTC denied Cos Motion to Dismiss in an
Order31 dated December 6, 2005. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum

shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It
observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation arising from
contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the appeal of the
criminal case arose from a felony.

In G.R. No. 179160, Lim prays for the denial of Cos petition.49 In G.R. No.
175256, she prays for the reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138,
for a declaration that she is not guilty of forum shopping, and for the
reinstatement of her appeal in Criminal Case No. 116377 to the CA.50

Co filed a petition for certiorari,32 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the
appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in Civil
Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.33

ISSUE: Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of
the criminal case for estafa? NO

CA: denied Cos petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for
further proceedings; agreed with the Manila RTC that the elements of litis
pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do
not share the same cause of action.34

HELD:

Upon cos motion, the two cases were consolidated.

Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only
one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of
Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Cos
violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs
sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of
cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her
case a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance
and damages should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate
the same cause of action twice.39
Co makes light of the distinction between civil liability ex contractu and ex
delicto. According to him, granting that the two civil liabilities are independent of
each other, nevertheless, the two cases arising from them would have to be
decided using the same evidence and going over the same set of facts. Thus, any
judgment rendered in one of these cases will constitute res judicata on the other.40
Lim admits that the two proceedings involve substantially the same set of facts
because they arose from only one transaction.43 She is quick to add, however, that
a single act or omission does not always make a single cause of action.44 It can
possibly give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1)
ex delicto or civil liability arising from crimes, and (2) independent civil liabilities
or those arising from contracts or intentional torts. The only caveat provided in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code is that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission.45 Because the law allows her two independent
causes of action, Lim contends that it is not forum shopping to pursue them.46
She then explains the separate and distinct causes of action involved in the two
cases. Her cause of action in CA-G.R CV No. 85138 is based on the crime of
estafa. Co violated Lims right to be protected against swindling. He represented
to Lim that she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she
bought from him. This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time
that they entered into the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised.
47 On the other hand, Lims cause of action in Civil Case No. 05-112396 is based
on contract. Co violated Lims rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the
subject of the sale.48

A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender51 - (1) civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code,52 and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil
Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be based on an act
or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently
from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in
cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense.54 If the action for the civil liability
ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action,
its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action.55 The
civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist."56
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal
action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the
Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(Emphasis supplied.)
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.57 As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:58

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant
case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil
action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based
on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa
criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa
cases against the offender did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of
forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same
act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of
action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil
action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.59
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of
obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the
resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve
different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of
each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted
together with the criminal action.60
On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the
complaint,61 is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she
entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought
37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P 64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full
payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC
corresponding to these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be
honored by FRCC for six months from the dates written thereon. Lim then
maintains that the defendants breached their contractual obligations to her under
the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that Co and his codefendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their
agreement to fix the price at P 64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal
authorities; that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it
issued; and that Co did not comply with his obligation under the sale contract to
deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim. From the foregoing allegations, it is
evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants contractual obligations, given
that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that the defendants
either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach has
caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in
such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs

and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct
(abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from
contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the
civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different
causes of action, which under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and
independent"62 from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in G.R. No. 175256
is GRANTED. The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET
A S I D E . L i l y L i m s a p p e a l i n C A - G . R . C V N o . 8 5 1 3 8 i s
o r d e r e d R E I N S TAT E D a n d t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s
isDIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
Charlie Cos Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007
Decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.
019 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA
G.R. No. 145391
August 26, 2002
TOPIC: Rule 111
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
FACTS:

2 vehicles figured in an accident

o 1st vehicle DRIVEN by Larroya
o 2nd vehicle DRIVEN by Casupanan; OWNED by Capitulo

As a result, 2 cases were filed before the MCTC

o CRIMINAL CASE filed by Larroya (reckless imprudence
resulting to damage to property)
o CIVIL CASE filed by Casupanan and Capitulo (damages)

When civil case was filed, criminal case was in the preliminary
investigation stage

As a result, Larroya filed an MTD, on the ground of forum shopping,

considering the pendency of the criminal case

MCTC GRANTED MTD

RTC DISMISSED petition for certiorari for lack of merit

MR DENIED

Hence, SC petition for review on certiorari

ISSUES : WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
HELD : YES
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in

Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is
REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:

as to NATURE OF DISMISSAL
o RTC was wrong in dismissing the petition for certiorari under
rule 65
o the rules (rule 41, sec1) provide that if MCTC dismissed the
case without prejudice, the proper remedy is certiorari 65, not
ordinary appeal
o in this case, MTC was silent as to whether the dismissal was
with prejudice. Therefore, it shall be presumed to be without
prejudice

as to FORUM SHOPPING
o elements of forum shopping
1. 2 or more cases are pending
2. identity of parties
3. identity of rights of action
4. identity of relief sought
Here,
though the case arose from same act or omission, they
o
have different causes of action
CRIM CASE based on culpa criminal punishable under
RPC
CIVIL CASE based on culpa aquilana under Artcle
2176 and 2177 of NCC

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence

under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.

as to FILING OF A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION

sec. 1, rule 111 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
sec. 1, rule 111 of 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action. "SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to

institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
o

UNDER THE PRESENT RULE, what is "deemed instituted"

with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately
and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in
the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil
Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of
the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent
of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.
o UNDER THE PRESENT RULE, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action
before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended
party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate
civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has
not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with
the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not
apply to separate civil actions arising from the same act or
omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.

as to SUSPENSION OF THE SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION

sec. 2, rule 111 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, AND sec. 2, rule 111 of
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has
been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
o No changes
o A separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could
not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the

criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action
until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This
rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover
liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil
actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the
filing of the criminal action.

as to WHEN CIVIL ACTION MAY PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY

Sec 3, rule 111
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
o

Therefore, Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his

counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed
independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of
the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
CONCLUSION:
o Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation.
o The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles
of the Civil Code.
o The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only
to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal
action.
o The accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same
act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be
litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted
in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for
quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a

right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection
of the law.
#20 PEOPLE v ROMERO and RODRIGUEZ
[G. R. No. 112985. April 21, 1999]
TOPIC: Rule 111
FACTS:

Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator

of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. He came to know the
business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development
Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he interviewed accused
Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the
corporations investment operations in Butuan City and
Agusan del Norte. Romero was the president and general
manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the
operations manager. SAIDECOR started its operation on
August 24, 1989 as a marketing business. Later, it
engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the
public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on
investment within 15-21days. Investors were given
coupons containing the capital and the return on the
capital collectible on the date agreed upon. It stopped
operations in September, 1989. Ruiz went to SAIDECOR
office in Butuan City to make an investment,
accompanied by his friend Jimmy Acebu, and
SAIDECOR collection agent Daphne Parrocho. After
handing over the amount of 150K to Ernesto Rodriguez,
complainant received a postdated Butuan City Rural
Bank check instead of the usual redeemable coupon. The
check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words,
but the amount in figures was for P1,200,000.00, as the
return on the investment. Complainant did not notice the
discrepancy.

When the check was presented to the bank for payment

on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency
of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by

the bank. Both accused could not be located and demand

for payment was made only sometime in November 1989
during the preliminary investigation of this case.Accused
responded that they had no money.

An Information against the two were filed with the RTC

of Butuan City for Estafa. The City Fiscal filed with the
same court another Information, still against the two, for
violation of BP 22.
Both were arraigned. They pleaded NOT GUILTY.
January 10, 1991: The prosecution presented its
evidence, with complainant, Ernesto A. Ruiz, and
Daphne Parrocho, the usher/collector of the corporation
being managed by accused, testifying for the prosecution.
August 12, 1991: The defense presented its only witness,
accused Martin L. Romero.
November 13, 1992: The parties submitted a joint
stipulation of facts, signed only by their respective
counsels. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
TC: Acquitted them in the BP 22 case but convicted them
in the Estafa case. Ordered to jointly and severally return
to Ruiz 150K with 12% per annum and 10K moral
damages.
March 31, 1993: Accused filed their notice of appeal April 5 Trial court gave due course on April 5, 1993.
March 16, 1994: CA ordered the accused to file their
appellants brief. (Oct 30 - accused; Mar 8 - SolGen)
NOVEMBER 12, 1997: During the pendency of the
appeal, accused Ernesto Rodriguez died. As a
consequence of his death before final judgment, his
criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished.
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that
complainant made an investment with SAIDECOR in the
amount of 150K. However, they denied that deceit was
employed in the transaction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish their

guilt beyond reasonable doubt? YES.
HELD:
Under paragraph 2 (d) of Article 315, as amended by R.A. 4885, the
elements of estafa are:
(1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time it was issued;

(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;

(3) damage to the payee thereof.
The prosecution has satisfactorily established all these elements.
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic
term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can
device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an
advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
unfair way by which another is cheated.
Deceit is a specie of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false
representation or contrivance whereby one person overreaches and
misleads another, to his hurt.Deceit excludes the idea of
mistake. There is deceit when one is misled, either by guide or
trickery or by other means, to believe to be true what is really false.
In this case, there was deception when accused fraudulently
represented to complainant that his investment with the corporation
would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days.
Upon receipt of the money, accused-appellant Martin Romero issued
a postdated check. Although accused-appellant contends that
sufficient funds were deposited in the bank when the check was
issued, he presented no officer of the bank to substantiate the
contention. The check was dishonored when presented for payment,
and the check return slip submitted in evidence indicated that it was
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the check was
dishonored without any fraudulent pretense or fraudulent act of the
drawer, the latters failure to cover the amount within three days after
notice creates a rebuttable presumption of fraud.
Admittedly (1) the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds
as evidenced by the check return slip; (2) complainant notified
accused of the dishonor; and (3) accused failed to make good the
check within three days. Presumption of deceit remained since
accused failed to prove otherwise. Complainant sustained damage in
the amount of 150K.

(IMPORTANT PART - - - ABOUT DEATH PENDING APPEAL)

The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto
Rodriguez, died pending appeal.
People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily,
the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. (ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE!)
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining
accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero. The TC considered the
swindling involved in this case as having been committed by a
syndicate and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment based on
the provisions of PD 1689, which increased the penalty for certain
forms of swindling or estafa. However, the prosecution failed to
clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate, as defined
under the law. The penalty of life imprisonment cannot be imposed;
instead, it should be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the appealed judgment. The
Court hereby sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in
the amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with
interest thereon at six (6%) per centum per annum from September
14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as
exemplary damages, and the costs.
021 FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE & ELENA LIBROJO
[G.R. 148072; July 10, 2007 ]
TOPIC: prejudicial question
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario
FACTS:
Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against Magestrado with the Office
of the Prosecutor of Quezon City. Asst. City Prosecutor Fernandez filed an
information for perjury and the case was raffled off to MeTC QC.

Magestrado filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial

question. He alleged that Civ case 1, a case for recovery of a sum of money
pending before the RTC QC and Civ Case 2, for cancellation of mortgage,
delivery of title and damages pending before RTC QC must be resolved first
before the criminal case may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are
similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
[quick facts on the 2 civ cases]
Civ case 1 deals with the cancellation of mortgage and delivery of title and
damages. Petitioner alleges that he bought the land and that Librojo was the real
estate broker. When he discovered that the deed of sale was already signed by
another person, he demanded the delivery of the title to the lot and Special power
of attorney. He hired a lawyer to file the appropriate legal actions but was instead
charged for perjury for filing a false affidavit of loss.
Civ case 2 complaint for sum of money. Librojo alleges that Magestrado
obtained a loan from her and executed a real estate mortgage as security.
Magestrado failed to pay and executed an affidavit of loss of title in order to
secure another copy of the title.
MeTC issued an Order denying the motion stating that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil cases is not determinative of the guilt of the accused. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Aggrieved, Magestrado filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 but the RTC dismissed the petition stating
that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases. The civil cases are
principally for determination whether or not a loan was obtained by Magestrado
and whether or not he executed the deed of real estate mortgage involving the
property, whereas the criminal case is for perjury which imputes upon Magestrado
the wrongful execution of an affidavit of loss to support his petition for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copy. The issue on perjury can be resolved
independently of the civil cases.
Magestrado filed another petition for certiorari under Rule 65 this time with the
Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition being that the proper remedy
should have been appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S): WON the RTC erred in denying the petition on certiorari of petitioner
to suspend the criminal action due to a prejudicial question.
HELD: NO, the civil cases and the criminal cases can proceed independently of
each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish
the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The
purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will
have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently
executed a false affidavit of loss.
RATIO:
The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the

cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be

determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that
it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as
to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of
the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction
to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the
criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking
up the criminal case, therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
However, the court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of
sound discretion, and upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the
action in abeyance to abide by the outcome of another case pending in another
court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the
rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the
questions raised in the first action are settled, the second action should be stayed.
The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its time
and effort, those of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be stayed, it
must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious
litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and courts. It bears
stressing that whether or not the trial court would suspend the proceedings in the
criminal case before it is submitted to its sound discretion.
As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be
suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with the issues raised

in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil cases would
also determine the judgment in the criminal case.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No.
Q-98-34308 pending before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349,
pending before RTC-Branch 84, are principally for the determination of whether a
loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner
executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No.
N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC-Branch 43,
involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing
an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. N-173163.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed
independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it
will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for
perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate
mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as
to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of
the civil case, the following requisites must be present:
(1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and
(3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
022 Pimentel v. Pimentel
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
TOPIC: RULE 111 Prejudicial Question
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
NATURE: a petition for review assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS:
1. 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private
respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel (petitioner), before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
2. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the
(RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
3. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal
case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

4.

RTC QUEZON CITY - the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent
and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
marriage with respondent is in question.
5. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the
Court of Appeals.
6. CA dismissed petition. Ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission
of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action
for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court
of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the
crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
ISSUE(S): Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure: Section 7.
Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
2. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the
filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City
on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the
Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.
3. Respondents petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for
annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that
would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a
prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
A prejudicial question is defined as: x x x one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person who
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.
The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the
crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the
offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this
case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is
whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted,
will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be
held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.

9.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no
issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws
are concerned.