Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO ATOP @ "ALI," accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, holding that his common-law relationship with
the victim's grandmother aggravated the penalty. We hold, however, that Sec. 11 of RA 7659
prescribes the capital penalty in rape, only "when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim,"
and not by reason of any other kinship. On the other hand, "relationship" as an alternative
aggravating circumstance under Art. 15 of the Revised Penal Code encompasses only "the
spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, and relative
by affinity in the same degrees." Outside these enumeration's and consistent with the doctrine
that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused, no other relationship,
kinship or association between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable
penalty for the crime committed. The fact, then, that the offended party is the granddaughter
or descendant of appellant's live-in partner cannot justify the imposition of death upon the
rapist.
The Case
This is a combined appeal from, and an automatic review of, the Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Ormoc City, finding Appellant Alejandro Atop, alias "Ali,"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape and sentencing him to two (2)
terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts, and to death for the third.
On April 21, 1995, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta filed four separate informations 1
against accused-appellant charging him with rape on three separate occasions on October
9, 1992, sometime in 1993 and on December 26, 1994 as well as with attempted rape on
December 31, 1994. The informations charging rape, except for the date of commission and
the age of the victim, similarly allege the following:
That on or about the 9th day of October, 1992, at Sitio Tambunan, Brgy. Sta. Rosa,
Municipality of Matag-ob, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully [sic], unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended
party REGINA GUAFIN, 11 years old, the accused is the live-in partner of her grandmother
with whom she is living with [sic], against her will and without her consent, with the use of a
knife, mashed her breast, embraced, kissed and inserted his penis over the victim's genital
organ to accomplish his lewd design, to her damage and prejudice.

During his arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Wenceslao Vanilla of the
Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty. 2 Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly. In his
Decision, 3 the trial judge 4 disposed of the cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4627-0 finding the accused Alejandro Atop GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of relationship and nighttime with no
mitigating circumstance to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said
ALEJANDRO ATOP the sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify Regina
Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 4628-0 finding the accused Alejandro Atop GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of RAPE defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of relationship and nighttime with no
mitigating circumstance to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said
ALEJANDRO ATOP the sentence of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify Regina
Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to pay the costs.
3. In Criminal Case No. 4630-0 finding the accused Alejandro Atop NOT GUILTY for
insufficiency of evidence.
4. In Criminal Case No. 4629-0 finding the accused ALEJANDRO ATOP guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of RAPE defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of relationship and
nighttime with no mitigating circumstance to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the
said ALEJANDRO ATOP, also known as "Ali", the sentence of DEATH. Further, the same
Alejandro Atop is directed to indemnify Regina Guafin the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.
By reason of the imposition of two reclusion perpetua and of the death penalties the jail
warden is directed to immediately commit the person of Alejandro Atop to the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila while awaiting the review by the Supreme Court of
this decision. 5
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's evidence is narrated by the trial court 6 as follows:
Private complainant Regina Guafin, told the court that she is a granddaughter of Trinidad
Mejos and that the accused Alejandro Atop is the common law husband of said Trinidad Atop
[sic]. Her mother is a daughter of said Trinidad Atop [sic] and lives in Pangasinan. She is an
illegitimate child and she does not even know her father. Since her early childhood she stayed
with her grandmother Trinidad Atop [sic] and the accused at Barangay Santa Rosa, Matag-ob,
Leyte. Sometime in 1991 when she was already 10 years of age the accused started having
lustful desire on her. The accused then inserted his finger into her vagina. She told her
grandmother about this but her grandmother did not believe her. She was then told by her
grandmother, Trinidad Mejos, that what her grandfather did to her was just a manifestation of
fatherly concern. She continued staying with her grandmother and her common law husband
Alejandro Atop, the herein accused.
On October 9, 1992, she was called by the accused Alejandro Atop to do something for him.
When she approached him the accused rushed towards her, removed her panty and inserted
his male organ into her vagina. She was not able to do anything to resist him because the
accused gagged her mouth and was carrying a knife with him. She was then 12 years old

when the first rape was committed to her and at that time her grandmother was then attending
a delivery since her grandmother was a "hilot". When her grandmother returned home she told
her what the accused did to her but her grandmother, again, refused to believe her. She also
remember [sic] of another incident wherein she was raped again by the accused Alejandro
Atop. It was in the year 1993 but she could not recall the month when it was committed. Only
she and the accused were then at their house at Barangay Santa Rosa, Matag-ob, Leyte as
her grandmother was at San Vicente attending to a delivery. Again, she told her grandmother
about the heinous acts that the accused did to her but her Lola refused to believe her.
On December 26, 1994, the accused again raped her. She could not ask for help because her
mouth was gagged by the accused. Aside from gagging her, the accused carried a knife which
he placed at his side.
On December 31, 1994, while she together with her Aunt Gloria Montealto and her two (2)
nieces Rubilen and Jubilen Atop were about to go to sleep, she noticed that the accused was
looking for her. Upon seeing her the accused rushed towards her and was about to lay on top
of her. She kicked him. After that, the accused caressed and touched his nieces but his nieces
also kicked him. Thereafter, the accused stopped molesting her and his nieces and went to
sleep instead. In the following morning, January 1, 1995, she went to the barrio to go to
school. She then forgot that there were no classes. She was not able to get a ride towards the
school, so she went directly to the house of her grandfather Zacarias Geva. While she was at
the house of her Lolo Geva, the accused arrived and immediately entered the house of her
grandfather. The accused was met by Rubilen Atop who was about to box him but they
immediately went out of the house and the accused followed them. The accused wanted to
bring her back to their house but she refused. So, the accused pulled her. The accused kept
on holding her until they reached the waiting shed were the accused smashed her to the
concrete wall.
She reported the incidents of rape that happened in 1992, 1993 and 1994 only in January
1995. It took her so long to report the said incidents because she was afraid. The accused
threatened to kill her should she tell anybody about that incidents. She was accompanied by
her Aunts Fe Decio and Rosenda Andales in reporting the said incidents to the police. Her
statement was taken by the police at the police headquarters. Thereafter, she filed a complaint
with the Municipal Trial Judge of Matag-ob, Leyte . . . In her sworn statement which was also
marked as Exhibit "1" for the defense, she only stated therein that what was inserted into her
vagina on July 1991 was only the finger of the accused. Out of fear, she deliberately
concealed from the investigator what actually had happened to her because at that time,
because the accused would kill her. Then she filed complaints with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor and requested the fiscal to make a re-investigation in these cases. She told the
Fiscal the truth of what was done to her by the accused because at that time the accused was
already arrested. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Another prosecution witness Fe Decio, an aunt of the private offended party Regina Guafin,
testified that she knows the accused Alejandro Atop, the latter being her stepfather. She
pointed in court the said accused. She testified also that when her niece Regina Guafin went
to her residence at Himarco, Palompon, Leyte on January 2, 1995, she noticed that Regina
Guafin had abrasions on her body and was then crying. She asked her the reason why she
cried and Regina told her that on January 1, 1995 the accused again tried to rape her but did
not succeed because she fought back and was able to resist. The abrasions in her body was

the result of the maltreatments made by the accused who forcibly pulled her back to their
house. Further, Regina told her that the said accused Alejandro Atop had raped her 3 to 4
times. She was told by Regina when the said incidents happened but she forgot the actual
dates that the latter told to her. She accompanied Regina to the police authorities of Matag-ob,
Leyte and reported the said incidents. During the time that Regina was investigated by the
police authorities, the accused had also fled. Thereafter, she submitted Regina for a medical
examination at the Ormoc District Hospital. Then, Regina Guafin filed a complaint at the
MCTC of Matag-ob, Leyte.
On cross examination, she testified that they offer no objection with the relationship of the
accused to her mother. In fact during the time that the accused and her mother were living
together, they were in good terms with the accused. She denied the fact of sending her
mother to Manila for the purpose of separating her from the accused Alejandro Atop because
it was only the decision of her mother to have a vacation in Manila. She testified also that the
age of her mother is more than 50 years old. 7
The third prosecution witness, Dr. Judith V. Lomocso who was a resident gynecologist at the
Ormoc District Hospital, testified that she examined Regina Guafin. Her findings were reduced
in writing, as follows:
External Findings:
1. Incised wound with scab formation (L) middle finger.
2. Tenderness (L) breast.
OB-Gyne Findings:
External genetalia [sic] grossly normal
negative pubic hair
Vaginal canal admits 2 fingers with ease
hymen healed laceration
uterus small
LMP December 4, 1994 8
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied the accusations of Guafin and imputed ill motive upon her aunts, who were
the daughters of his live-in partner. 9 The trial court summed up his testimony this wise:
Accused Alejandro Atop [then 37 years old] testified that he and Trinidad Mejos had been
living together as husband and wife for about 10 years already. When they started living
together, Trinidad Mejos was already a widow with eight (8) children of her previous marriage.
When he started to live with Trinidad Mejos the latter's children became mad at him because
their mother was already old and was still young. He personally knew Regina Guafin, the latter
being their adopted child. Regina Guafin was still 2 years old when he and his wife took care
of her. That Regina Guafin continuously resided at Sta. Rosa, Matag-ob, Leyte. The other
persons who also lived with them aside from Regina Guafin, were the three sons of Trinidad
and his two (2) nieces whom he took from Butuan City and sent them to school. He denied
committing rape against Regina Guafin on October 9, 1992, in the year 1993 and on
December 26, 1994. On December 31, 1994, while he was at his house, Regina went to the
barrio proper to go to school. In the afternoon of the same date, he went to fetch Regina
Guafin because at that time classes were not regular yet. At that time, the companions of
Regina were Jovelyn and Rubilyn. He also denied committing an offense against Regina
Guafin on December 31, 1994. He testified also that he did not evade arrest by going out of
Matag-ob, Leyte because during that time he was working in Hideco as a laborer. The reason

why Regina Guafin filed a case against him because the said private complainant was
coached by her aunt who wanted him and his wife Trinidad to be separated.
On cross examination, he testified also that he was told by his cousin Nicolas Valencia that
her [sic] wife Trinidad was prevented by her children from visiting him in jail upon her arrival
from Manila. 10
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo evaluated the testimony of the offended party in this manner:
. . . this court observed both the complainant and the accused when both were on the witness
stand. The tears that spontaneously flowed from the private complainant's eyes and the sobs
that punctuated complainant's testimony when asked about her experience with the accused
eloquently conveyed the hurt, the pain, and the anguish the private complainant has suffered
and lived with during all the years. When she told the court that she was raped by the accused
she said it all with candor. The mixed expression of sadness and anger shown in the private
complainant's face during her testimony convinced this court that she was telling the truth.
This court then found nothing in the evidence which would indicate in any way that the said
Regina Guafin was motivated in narrating to the court her ordeal other than her quest for
justice. The defense's claim that Regina was coached by her aunts to fabricate her rape story
in order to force their mother Trinidad Mejos to separate from the accused is nothing but a
mere speculation [upon] which this court found no probative value. This court then gives the
testimony of the private offended party full faith and credit. 11
The trial court also ruled that the circumstances of nighttime and relationship aggravated all
the three incidents of rape, but that there was no sufficient evidence proving attempted rape
on December 31, 1994. Considering that the last rape occurred after the effectivity of RA
7659, the death penalty law, the court meted out the capital punishment to accused-appellant.
Issues
In his appeal 12 before us, appellant assigns the following errors: 13
I. The trial court erred in appreciating the circumstances of nighttime and relationship as
aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed on October 9, 1992, in
1993 and on December 26, 1994.
II. The trial court erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We find that the alleged aggravating circumstances were not
duly proved.
First Issue: Nighttime and Relationship
The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance, must have been
deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his
capture or facilitate his escape. 14 The culprit must have purposely taken advantage of the
cover of night as an indispensable factor to attain his criminal purpose. 15
We find merit in Appellant Atop's contention, to which the solicitor general agrees, that the
prosecution failed to prove that nighttime was deliberately sought by appellant to facilitate this
dastardly acts. In fact, the prosecution failed to show that appellant consummated his carnal
designs at night, except only for the December 26, 1994 incident which the victim said
occurred at 11:00 p.m. 16 Much less is there any evidence substantiating the trial court's
conclusion that appellant intentionally sought the darkness to advance his criminal exploits.

Neither can we appreciate relationship as an aggravating circumstance The scope of

relationship as defined by law encompasses (1) the spouse; (2) an ascendant; (3) a
descendant; (4) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister; or (5) a relative by affinity in
the same degree. 17 Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such
as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or
stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by consanguinity or blood
relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth enumeration above. The law cannot
be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no blood
relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying
circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him.
Neither is the following provision of Sec. 11, R.A. 7659 applicable:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the [Revised Penal] Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
Undisputed is the fact that appellant is not the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
He is the common-law husband of the girl's grandmother. Needless to state, neither is
appellant the victim's "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree." Hence, he is not encompassed in any of the relationships
expressly enumerated the aforecited provision.
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in
favor of the accused. 18 Courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law which are not
clearly embraced by it. No act can be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by
statute; so, too, no person who is not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought
within them. 19 Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. 20
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
However, we do not agree with the claim of appellant that the prosecution evidence was not
sufficient to prove his guilt. In the main, appellant relies on the disparity between, on the one
hand, the allegations of Regina in her sworn statement 21 executed before MCTC Judge
Aquilino A. Inopiquez Jr. of Matag-ob, Leyte which merely prove acts of lasciviousness; and,
on the other, her testimony in court showing three counts of rape.
Such disparity, which at first glance may raise some doubts on the truthfulness of
complainant's statements, was cogently and satisfactorily explained by her thus:
Q . . . why did you state in your affidavit that only the finger that [sic] was inserted into your
vagina?
A Because during the time of the investigation, I did not tell what was really true because he
was not yet apprehended, sir.
Q So, you deliberately conceal[ed] from the investigator what actually happened out of fear?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROSECUTOR
Q And when you appeared before the Office of the Prov'l. Fiscal, were you investigated?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q And did you tell the Fiscal the truth of what had this accused done to you?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And what was that statement you have given to the Fiscal?
A I told the Fiscal the truth because the accused was already arrested.
Q And what was the truth?
A The truth that it was his penis that was inserted to my vagina.
Q How many times did the accused inserted [sic] his penis into your vagina?
A Many times ma'am but I can remember only three (3) to four (4) times.
Q And the first time that [sic] was on October 9, 1992?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q When was the second time he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A In the year 1993.
Q And the third time?
A On December 26, 1994. 22
From the testimony of Regina, the crimes evidently committed by appellant on the aforestated
dates were consummated rapes, not merely acts of lasciviousness. Initially, she hesitated to
completely divulge her ravishment by appellant because of his threats to kill her should she
tell anybody of his assaults. 23 With his arrest and detention, she mustered the courage to
finally and completely reveal her embarrassing story.
No simple barrio lass would so candidly admit before the public that a man who had lived as
common-law husband to her grandmother had inserted his penis in her vagina for so many
times in the past. It is unthinkable that complainant, a young lady of fifteen years, would allow
her private parts to be examined and would withstand the rigors of a public trial along with
the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own mortifying defilement if she was
not in fact ravished. A careful examination of her testimony does not reveal any hint of
prevarication. Rather, her straightforward and unequivocal statements, during both her direct
and her cross-examinations, show indelible badges of truth. As the trial judge keenly
observed, "The tears the spontaneously flowed from the private complainant's eyes and the
sobs that punctuated [her] testimony when asked about her experience with the accused
eloquently conveyed the hurt, the pain, and the anguish the private complainant has suffered
and lived with during all the years. When she told the court that she was raped by the
accused, she said it all with candor. The mixed expression of sadness and anger shown in the
private complainant's face during her testimony convinced this court that she was telling the
truth." 24 We find it apt to say once again that when a woman, especially a minor, says that she
has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was committed.
25

Appellant's contention that private complainant was merely induced by her aunts who had
objected to his relationship with their mother, Trinidad Mejos, is a trite defense that is
completely undeserving of credit. It is unnatural and unbelievable for Regina's aunts to
concoct a story of rape of their own very young niece, that would bring shame and scandal not
only to her but to the entire family, especially to their mother. There could have been so many
ways to alienate appellant from their mother, so many crimes to impute to him without
dragging the family's honor into it. The preposterousness of appellant's assertion becomes
more obvious in light of the fact that this case was instituted only after ten (10) years of his
illegitimate union with Regina's grandmother. If Regina's aunts truly wanted them to
discontinue such relationship, the long wait is inexplicable.

Consequently, in the face of private complainant's positive and unequivocal testimony,

appellant's plain denial of the accusations against him cannot prevail. 26 It is well-settled that
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative self-serving
assertion which deserves no weight in law. 27 The recognized rule is that testimonies of rape
victims who are young and immature are each worthy of full credence. 28
Time and again, we have also held that when the question deals with the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case. 29 The
trial judge has the valuable edge of observing the witness' deportment and manner of
testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" 30 all of which are useful aids for
an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity. After a thorough review of all
the evidence on record, the Court finds no reason to reverse the trial court's findings on the
guilt of appellant.
Penalties Imposable
For the rape incidents on October 9, 1992 and sometime in 1993, the court a quo correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the two criminal acts. The third rape
incident, however, occurred after the effectivity of RA 7659, the law which imposed the death
penalty on certain heinous crimes. Under this amendatory law, the penalty for rape committed
with the use of a deadly weapon is reclusion perpetua to death. 31 This provision is applicable
in the instant case, since private complainant was threatened with a knife when appellant
consummated his beastly acts on her. 32
In cases where the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is
neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance in the commission of the felony, the
lesser penalty should be applied. 33 Since there was no modifying circumstance even in the
third rape, the penalty therefor should be reclusion perpetua, not the graver penalty of death
as imposed by the court a quo. As earlier explained, the attendant relationships enumerated
under Sec. 11 of RA 7659 do not apply either.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, 34 we increase the civil indemnity imposed upon
appellant by the trial court to P50,000.00 for each count of rape. The Court notes that, for
appellant's third conviction, the trial court ordered him to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000 "as moral damages." Civil indemnity under Art. 100 35 of the Revised Penal Code is
separate and distinct from moral damages under Arts. 2217 and 2219 of the Civil Code. 36
Conformably, Appellant Atop should indemnify Regina Guafin in the total amount of P150,000
for the three counts of rape separately from payment of moral damages which we find
justified under the circumstances. The moral sufferings of private complainants were obvious
during the court proceedings where, as observed by the trial judge and also noted in the
transcripts, she spontaneously cried and sobbed and showed a mixed expression of sadness,
pain and anger.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION
that Appellant Alejandro Atop shall not suffer the penalty of death but shall SERVE three (3)
terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of the three (3) counts of rape for which he was

found GUILTY by the trial court, and is ordered to PAY Regina Guafin indemnity in the amount
of P150,000 plus moral damages of P50,000.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 10-15; records, pp. 1-5.
2 Records, p. 34.
3 Rollo, pp. 23-33.
4 Judge Francisco H. Escao, Jr.
5 Assailed Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 32-33.
6 In his brief, the solicitor general adopted this narration.
7 Assailed Decision, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 25-28.
8 Records, p. 130.
9 The 14-page appellant's brief, dated May 22, 1997, prepared by the Public Attorney's Office
summarized the evidence for the defense (rollo, pp. 47-48) simply as follows:
"Accused denied the charges against him. He denied committing the rape against Regina
Guafin on October 9, 1992, in the year 1993 and on December 26, 1994. He also denied
committing an offense against Regina on December 31, 1994. He suspect[ed] that Regina
was coached by her aunt in filing this complaint against him for the purpose of separating him
from his wife Trinidad.
Aside from Regina Guafin, the three sons of Trinidad and his two nieces, Jovelyn and Rubilyn,
were also living them."
10 Assailed Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 28.
11 Ibid., p. 7; ibid., p. 29.
12 This case was deemed submitted for decision upon receipt by this Court on October 17,
1997 of the appellee's brief.
13 Appellant's brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 41.
14 People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 118824, July 5, 1996; People vs. Pareja, G.R. No. 88043,
December 9, 1996; People vs. Empacis, 222 SCRA 59, May 14, 1993.
15 People vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. 102062, March 14, 1996; People vs. Broncano, G.R. No.
104870, August 22, 1996.
16 TSN, August 8, 1995, p. 41.
17 Art. 15, 2nd par., Revised Penal Code; People vs. Balondo, 30 Phil. 155, 161, October 31,
1969; People vs. Lamberte, 142 SCRA 685, 692, July 11, 1986.
18 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 208, citing People vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 545,
September 5, 1975, People vs. Yu Jai, 99 Phil. 725, August 15, 1956; People vs. Terrado, 125
SCRA 648, November 25, 1983, and other cases.
19 Ibid., citing U.S. vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, February 10, 1917, and U.S. vs. Madrigal,
27 Phil. 347, March 28, 1914.
20 Ibid.
21 Records, pp. 122-123.
22 TSN, August 15, 1995, pp. 10-12.
23 TSN, August 8, 1995, p. 21.

24 Assailed Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 29.

25 People vs. Corea, G.R. No. 114383, March 3, 1997, citing People vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392,
June 27, 1995, and People vs. Biendo, 216 SCRA 626, December 16, 1992; People vs.
Malabago, G.R. No. 108613, April 18, 1997.
26 People vs. Catoltol Sr., 265 SCRA 109, November 28, 1996; People vs. Andres, 253 SCRA
751, February 20, 1996.
27 People vs. Narsico, 262 SCRA 1, September 18, 1996.
28 People vs. Galimba, 253 SCRA 722, February 20, 1996; People vs. Rosare, 264 SCRA
398, November 19, 1996.
29 People vs. Apilo, 263 SCRA 582, October 25, 1996, citing People vs. Gapasan, 243 SCRA
53, March 29, 1995.
30 People vs. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723, October 4, 1996, citing People vs. Delovino, 247 SCRA
637, 647, August 23, 1995.
31 Art. 335, par. 3, Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
32 TSN, August 8, 1995, pp. 15-16.
33 Art. 63, par. 2, no. 2, Revised Penal Code.
34 People vs. San Juan, G.R. No. 105556, April 4, 1997; People vs. Apilo, 263 SCRA 582,
October 28, 1996; People vs. Escoto, 229 SCRA 430, January 21, 1994.
35 "Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable."
36 People vs. Apilo, supra; People vs. Caballes, G.R. No. 102723-24, June 19, 1997.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133527-28 December 13, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP.
ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE
Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, CHARLES DUMANCAS
(Acquitted), POL. OFFICER JOSE PAHAYUPAN (Acquitted), VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.
(Acquitted), accused, JEANETTE (GINETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS, POL. COL.
NICOLAS TORRES, POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO, POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y
FERNANDEZ, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO
R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, accusedappellants.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellants were charged with Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder under two
Informations which pertinently read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562
The undersigned hereby accuses JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES
DUMANCAS, (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M.
TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECT AND/OR INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO
LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR
GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR
PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and ending the late
evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with one

another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of
P353,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouses Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas,
under the direction cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres,
taking advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the Philippine National Police,
Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis
C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian
(police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche,
concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and detain one RUFINO GARGAR, JR. and shortly thereafter at around 11 o'clock in
the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort
money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery
nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while
being handcuffed and blindfolded; that accused Cesar Pecha and Edgar Hilado, with
knowledge that said Gargar was victim of violence, did then and there secretly bury the corpse
in a makeshift shallow grave or the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order to
prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage and
prejudice to the heirs of said victim, to wit:
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages (lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563
The undersigned hereby accused JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES
DUMANCAS (BOTH AS PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION), POLICE COL. NICOLAS M.
TORRES (AS PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION AND BY DIRECTION AND/OR INDISPENSABLE
COOPERATION), POLICE INSPECTOR ADONIS C. ABETO, POLICE OFFICERS MARIO
LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, JOSE PAHAYUPAN, VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., DOMINADOR
GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO B. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN
DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, ALL AS PRINCIPALS BY PARTICIPATION, CESAR
PECHA and EDGAR HILADO, BOTH AS ACCESSORIES, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM WITH MURDER, committed as follows:
That during the period beginning in the late morning of August 6, 1992 and ending the late
evening of the following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Barangay Alijes, Bacolod City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and concurring in a common criminal intent and execution thereof with one
another, save for the accessories, for the purpose of extracting or extorting the sum of
P353,000.00, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, to wit:
Acting upon the inducement of spouse Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Charles Dumancas,
under the direction, cooperation and undue influence, exerted by P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres,
taking advantage of his position as the Station Commander of the Philippine National Police,
Bacolod City Station, with the direct participation and cooperation of Police Inspector Adonis

C. Abeto, other police officers Vicente Canuday, Jr., Jose Pahayupan, Mario Lamis, civilian
(police) agents Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, Jaime
Gargallano, also taking advantage of their respective positions, and Dominador Geroche,
concurring and affirming in the said criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct,
kidnap and detain one DANILO LUMANGYAO and shortly thereafter at around 11 o'clock in
the evening of August 7, 1993 (1992), failing in their aforesaid common purpose to extort
money and in furtherance of said conspiracy, with evident premeditation and treachery
nocturnity and the use of motor vehicle, did then and there shot and kill the said victim, while
being handcuffed and blindfolded, that accused CESAR PECHA and EDGAR HILADO, with
knowledge that said Lumangyao was victim of violence, did then and there secretly bury the
corpse in a makeshift shallow grave for the purpose of concealing the crime of murder in order
to prevent its discovery for a fee of P500.00 each; aforesaid act or acts has caused damage
and prejudice to the heirs of said victim, to wit:
P150,000.00 as indemnity for death;
50,000.00 actual damages;
300,000.00 compensatory damages (lost income);
100,000.00 moral damages;
P50,000.00 exemplary damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 1-3, Record Vol. I-A)
All thirteen accused (excluding Edgar Hilado, who was then still at large) entered pleas of
NOT GUILTY upon arraignment conducted on February 14, 1994 (per Certificates of
Arraignment, Record Vol. I-A, pp. 372-384). After a joint trial (excluding accused Edgar Hilado,
who upon arraignment on April 11, 1994, pleaded NOT GUILTY [Record, Vol. II, p. 866], was
tried separately), judgment was rendered acquitting Charles Dumancas, Police Officers Jose
Pahayupan and Vicente Canuday, Jr., but convicting the rest of the accused for the crime
charged, to wit:
Wherefore, finding the first nine (9) Accused herein
1. JEANNETTE (GINNETTE) YANSON-DUMANCAS
2. POL. COL. NICOLAS TORRES
3. POL. INSP. ADONIS ABETO
4. POL. OFFICER MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ
5. DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY
6. JAIME GARGALLANO
7. ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ
8. EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA
9. TEODY DELGADO and
10. CESAR PECHA
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPALS and CESAR PECHA as
accessory in the two (2) informations filed in these cases, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered
against them, as follows:
1. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15562, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Heirs of Rufino Gargar Jr. in the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as actual damages; P300,000.00 for
compensatory damages (lost income); P100,000.00 in moral damages and P50,000.00 as

exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an
accessory is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4)
months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of
Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost;
2. In CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-15563, each of the Accused charged as principal is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessories of the law,
indemnify jointly and severally, the Heirs of DANILO LUMANGYAO in the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for death; P25,000.00 as actual damages; P100,000.00 as
compensatory damages (lost income); P100,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay the cost. Accused CESAR PECHA who is charged as an
accessory is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay one-tenth of the cost.
Accused CHARLES DUMANCAS, Police Officers JOSE PAHAYUPAN and VICENTE
CANUDAY JR. are hereby Acquitted of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 272-273, Rollo.)
All ten accused filed their respective notices of appeal, and are now before us on review. After
going through the voluminous record of the case, the Court adopts the following summary of
facts by the court a quo, to wit:
February 20, 1992
Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to
Danilo Lumangyao and his cohort.
10:30 A.M. August 5, 1992 present in the house of Rolando Fernandez were:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Rolando Fernandez
c) Jaime Gargallano
d) Edwin Divinagracia
e) Teody Delgado
f) Mario Lamis and
g) Moises Grandeza
On this occasion Mario Lamis brought out the plan to abduct Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino
Gargar, Jr. because they swindled the Dumancas family.
4:30 P.M. August 5, 1992
The group of:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Mario Lamis
c) Rolando Fernandez
d) Jaime Gargallano
e) Edwin Divinagracia
f) Teody Delgado
g) Moises Grandeza
went to the office of Col. Nicolas Torres at PNP Headquarters where they met the colonel who
told them that if you find these two people (referring to Lumangyao and Gargar) to bring and
hide them at Dragon Lodge Motel.

8:30 A.M., August 6, 1992

State witness Moises Grandeza went to the house of Helen Tortocion to invite Danilo
Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar Jr. to "Tinolahan Eatery" at Shopping Center Terminal but
found only Gargar Jr., as Lumangyao went to the house of a certain Bardot at BBB Avenue,
this City.
Moises Grandeza together with Gargar Jr. proceeded to the house of Bardot where they found
Lumangyao and thereafter the three of them went to "Tinolahan Eatery".
9:00-10:00 A.M. August 6, 1992
The three arrived at "Tinulahan Eatery". Waiting for them were:
a) Dominador Geroche
b) Jaime Gargallano
c) Edwin Divinagracia
d) Rolando Fernandez
e) Teody Delgado; and
f) Mario Lamis
Then a) Fernandez b) Geroche and c) Lamis entered "Tinulahan" and handcuffed Lumangyao
and Gargar.
Waiting in the red Toyota Land Cruiser (Plate No. 689) were:
a) Gargallano
b) Divinagracia; and
c) Delgado
10:30 A.M. August 6, 1992
Lumangyao and Gargar were brought to the Office of Jeanette at Ceres Compound on board
red toyota land cruiser by:
a) Moises Grandeza
b) Gargallano
c) Lamis
d) Geroche
e) Divinagracia
f) Delgado, and
g) Fernandez
It was there that a) Divinagracia and, b) Fernandez manhandled Lumangyao and Gargar.
Jeanette then investigated the two victims on the whereabouts of the money that they
swindled from her and the two answered that it was already spent.
It was then that Jeanette ordered Doming (Geroche) to take care of the two (Lumangyao and
Gargar).
3:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
From Ceres Compound and while the group, together with the two victims, were already at
Dragon Lodge Motel, thereafter,
a) Abeto
b) Pahayupan, and
c) Canuday
arrived and investigated the two victims regarding the whereabouts of the gold bar and the
two replied that it was with Helen Tortocion.
4:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
a) Moises Grandeza

b) Fernandez, and
c) Geroche
went to the office of Col. Torres to inform him that Lumangyao and Gargar were already
captured. So Col. Torres ordered them to keep the two victims so that nobody would see
them. After receiving this instructions they went back to Dragon Lodge. Meanwhile, Geroche
again interrogated the victims on where the money was if there was still any let and
Geroche received the same negative reply.
Past 6:00 p.m. August 6, 1992
The group, with the two captives transferred to D'Hacienda Motel.
9:00 P.M. August 6, 1992
At D'Hacienda Motel, Jeanette and Charles Dumancas, together with Rose Ines arrived.
Jeanette and Rose Ines investigated the victims where they kept the money that they
swindled and the two gave the same reply that it was already gone. Jeanette then reiterated
her order to Geroche to take care of the two.
9:30 P.M. August 6, 1992
The group transferred to Moonlight Inn Motel.
3:00 A.M. August 7, 1992
The group transferred again to Casamel Lodge Motel.
10:00 A.M. August 7, 1992
The group returned to D'Hacienda Motel and it was there that the plan was pursued to
liquidate the two victims at 12:00 midnight.
The persons who conceived of this plan were:
a) Geroche, and
b) Fernandez
4:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
1) Canuday
2) Abeto
3) Dudero
4) Lesaca, and
5) Arollado
searched the residence of Helen Tortocion for the gold dust and simulated gold bar per search
warrant 014-92 (Exh. "D") but the search was fruitless.
7:30 P.M. August 7, 1992
The group, including the victims, partook of supper which was charged to Roy Yanson.
Then a) Abeto
b) Canuday, and
c) Pahayupan
entered the room and asked Fernandez what they are going to do with the two victims to
which Fernandez, replied that he will be responsible for the two.
11:00 P.M. August 7, 1992
a) Geroche
b) Lamis
c) Fernandez, and
d) Moises Grandeza
rode on the red Toyota Land Cruiser to conduct Geroche to his house. The victims were left
behind.

From his house Geroche took an armalite rifle and the group then went back to D'Hacienda
Motel.
12:00 P.M. August 7, 1992
a) Fernandez, and
b) Lamis
blindfolded and handcuffed Lumangyao and Gargar (Exh. "A" and "A-1") and have them board
a vehicle, with
a) Gargallano the driver
b) Geroche sitting in front, and with
c) Moises Grandeza also seated inside.
From D'Hacienda Motel, the group rode on the red toyota land cruiser. They proceeded to
Hda. Pedrosa in Brgy. Alijis. When they arrived there the two victims were ordered to alight
and sit by the side of the road. Geroche then asked Moises Grandeza to hold the hands of
Lumangyao and then Gargar behind their backs. After that
a) Gargallano was the first to shoot. He shot Gargar at the back of his head (Exh. K) using a
baby armalite. Then
b) Geroche followed suit by shooting Lumangyao with a .45 cal. Pistol at his right lower jaw
(Exh. L).
Thereafter, the two dead bodies were loaded on board the land cruiser and brought to Hda.
Siason where Pecha and Hilado buried them in the shallow grave they dug.
August 8, 1992
In Sitio Cabalagnan were recovered
a) Three (3) empty shells of armalite rifle and one .45 cal. Empty shell (Exh. "G", "G-2")
In Hda. Siason were recovered
a) the dead bodies of Rufino Gargar, Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao
b) Both of the two victims hands were handcuffed (Exh. "A" and "A-1").
August 9, 1992
The same group again went to see Col. Torres in his office and reported the extermination of
the two and Col. Torres promptly gave the instruction that "you who are here inside, nobody
knows what you have done but you have to hide because the NBI are after you.
August 10, 1992
a) Lamis
b) Geroche
c) Fernandez
d) Divinagracia
e) Gargallano
f) Delgado, and
g) Moises Grandeza
went back to the office of Col. Torres and this time he told the group "to hide because the NBI
are now investigating".
4:00 P.M. August 12, 1992
The same group that liquidated Lumangyao and Gargar again went back to the office of Col.
Torres where they were asked by Col. Torres to escort him to Ceres Compound because he
would like to borrow money from Ricardo Yanson as Col. Torres said that he has huge debts
to pay. Col. Torres was able on this occasion, to meet Ricardo Yanson.
On this same day,

a) Moises Grandeza
b) Lamis, and
c) Geroche
were picked up in a land cruiser by the driver of the Yansons' to go to the house of Fernandez
where Geroche will give the money to the group. Each member of the group, after the check,
which was drawn by Yanson, was encashed were given the amount of P1,700.00 each.
August 13, 1992
Nenita Bello went to the office of Col. Torres to plead for his help in regard to the death of her
relatives Lumangyao and Gargar but was promptly turned down by Colonel Torres with the
curt remark that her case was very difficult because it involves the "military" and some "big
times".
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City also passed, on this day, Resolution No. 328,
series of 1992 urging the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation on
the death of "salvage victims" Danilo Lumangyao and Rufino Gargar, Jr. as soon as possible
(Exh. "I").
September 24, 1992
The bodies of Rufino Gargar Jr. and Danilo Lumangyao were exhumed at Brgy. Buenavista
Cemetery, Balintawak, Escalante, Negros Occidental and autopsies were conducted (Exhs.
"M" and "N") by Dr. Ricardo Jaboneta, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI.
a) Found on the body of Rufino Gargar, Jr. (per examination report, Exh. "M") among others,
were ligature marks, wrist joint, right side (Exh. "M-2"), and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "M-1")
As to Danilo Lumangyao, the exhumation report (Exh. "N" disclose
a) Ligature marks, right wrist (Exh. "N-2") and among others, and
b) Gunshot wound (Exh. "N-1")
After the National Bureau of Investigation, Bacolod Office, conducted its investigation, the
State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice took over and the result were the filing of
these two criminal cases of Kidnapping with Murder against the above-named accused.
(pp. 73-85, Decision; pp. 202-214, Rollo.)
After a thorough review of the factual findings of the trial court vis--vis the evidence on
record, we find ourselves unable to agree with the conclusions arrived at by the trial court
convicting all 10 accused-appellants; rather, we concur in the suggestion of the Solicitor
General, that accused-appellants Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas and Police Inspector Adonis
Abeto should be acquitted. Too, by reason of his supervening death, accused-appellant Police
Col. Nicolas Torres is acquitted. The judgment of conviction of the rest of the accusedappellants is to be affirmed.
A. Jeanette (Ginette) Yanson-Dumancas
On the case of accused-appellant Jeanette Yanson-Dumancas (Jeanette, for short), the
information charged her of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as principal by
induction together with her husband, Charles, who was found by the trial court not guilty of the
crime.
Art. 17, Revised Penal Code, provides:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it.

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
What the Court now has to examine is whether or not sufficient evidence was adduced by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Jeanette indeed performed any of the
following acts: (a) directly forcing the killers to commit the crime, or (b) directly inducing them
to commit the crime.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by using irresistible
force, or (ii) by causing uncontrollable fear. Upon review of the testimony of all the witnesses
of the prosecution, we find nothing to conclude that Jeanette used irresistible force or caused
uncontrollable fear upon the other accused-appellants. From the factual findings of the trial
court, it is patent that the plan to abduct and liquidate the victims was hatched on August 5,
1992 (10:30 A.M.) without Jeanette's involvement or participation whatsoever (p. 202, Rollo).
The record is entirely bereft of any evidence to show that Jeanette directly forced the
participants of the said meeting to come up with such plan, by either using irresistible force or
causing uncontrollable fear. The only basis relied upon by the trial court in arriving at its
conclusion that Jeanette is guilty of the crime as principal by inducement, is the supposed
"commands" or order given by her to accused-appellant Dominador Geroche on two
occasions (one inside the Ceres Compound: p. 205, Rollo, and the other in D'Hacienda Motel:
p. 207, Rollo). By no stretch of the imagination may these so-called "commands", standing
alone, be considered as constituting irresistible force or causing uncontrollable fear.
Likewise, there are 2 ways of directly inducing another to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving
a price, or offering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words of command. The Court finds no
evidence, as did the trial court, to show that Jeanette offered any price, reward, or promise to
the rest of accused-appellants should they abduct and later kill the victims in this case. If at all,
the prosecution witness mentioned the name of Ricardo Yanson as having lent money to
accused-appellant Col. Torres to be used for paying the latter's debts or obligations. But
definitely, no money ever came from Jeanette herself. The trial court's surmise that the money
delivered by Ricardo Yanson to the group was with the knowledge and approval of Jeanette in
completely baseless.
The only matter left for consideration is whether the order supposedly given by Jeanette to
accused-appellant Geroche "to take care of the two" constitutes words of command which
may be considered sufficient basis to convict Jeanette as principal by inducement.
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be
present: (1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the
crime, and (2) such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material
executor (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 [1913]). To constitute inducement, there must exist on
the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very
strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Jeanette to "take care of the two" does not
constitute the command required by law to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by
inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, "a chance word spoken without reflection,
a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a
thought of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some independent reason
predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any
expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce the

result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the
extreme, he (the one who spoke the word or performed the act) would not be guilty of the
crime committed" (p. 219).
Furthermore, the utterance which was supposedly the act of inducement, should precede the
commission of the crime itself (People vs. Castillo, July 26, [1966]). In the case at bar, the
abduction, which is an essential element of the crime charged (kidnapping for ransom with
murder) has already taken place when Jeanette allegedly told accused-appellant Geroche to
"take care of the two." Said utterance could, therefore, not have been the inducement to
commit the crime charged in this case.
Most importantly, it was duly proven by no less than the prosecution witness himself, Moises
Grandeza, that the intention of Jeanette was but to allow the law to its course, when in his
cross-examination, the following transpired:
ATTY. PARREO:
Q. And according to your testimony this morning, Jeanette Dumancas said, what more can we
do that swindling transpired four months ago, definitely that money could nowhere be around.
Would you confirm that you testified that this morning before this Court? Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, this is very important. Please make a vivid recall. When Danilo Lumangyao
made that answer that the money was not around and Jeanette Dumancas said what's the
use, the money is now nowhere to be found as four months have already transpired, did not
Jeanette Dumancas tell Doming: "Doming, bring these two to the PC or police and I will call
Atty. Geocadin so that proper cases could be filed against them?" Kindly make a recall on that.
A. Yes, sir.
(pp. 54-55, tsn Feb. 14, 1994)
Thus, even the veracity of the allegation that Jeanette uttered the words: "take care of the
two" is put to some reasonable doubt by the prosecution witness himself. The remark, if made
at all, cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be basis for the conviction of Jeanette.
People vs. Manambit (271 SCRA 344 [1997]) finds apt application, to wit:
In criminal law, the quantum of evidence for conviction is that which produces moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt, But, if the
evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.
(p. 385)
B. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto
With respect to accused-appellant Abeto, we quote with approval the observations of the
Solicitor General as follows:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto's appeal is meritorious. Be it remembered that Abeto's only
participation was to serve the search warrant on Helen Tortocion's residence and the
subsequent interrogation of the two victims at the Hacienda Motel. He was never part of the
conspiracy to abduct and liquidate the two victims. He is similarly situated as that of Canuday
and Pahayupan.
The trial court, in acquitting Canuday and Pahayupan had this to say:
The evidence against Officer CANUDAY, JR. shows that in the afternoon of August 6, 1992,
together with Officers ABETO and PAHAYUPAN, they went to Dragon Lodge Motel to
investigate LUMANGYAO and GARGAR, JR. as to the whereabouts of the gold (fake) bar
used in swindling JEANE'TTE. The two captives answered that it is with HELEN TORTOCION.

A subsequent search of Tortocion's house led by Officer ABETO yielded no fake gold bar.
Meanwhile, in the evening of August 7, 1992, Officers ABETO, CANUDAY, JR., and
PAHAYUPAN showed up at D'Hacienda Motel to inquire from FERNANDEZ what he is going
to do with the two.
Like Officer Pahayupan, his being in the company of Officers Abeto, on the two occasions can
not give rise, to without proof of previous agreement, a conspiracy. Thus, being present at the
scene of the crime is not by itself sufficient to establish conspiracy, as already averted to
previously. So does mere companionship.
(p. 1720-1721, Rollo.)
After due consideration of accused-appellant Abeto's constitutional right to the presumption of
innocence, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official
functions having simply followed the order of his superior officers, much is left to be desired
before the Court can sustain the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant Abeto. The two
presumptions negate the inadequate proof adduced against accused-appellant Abeto, who
must perforce be acquitted, in much the same manner that accused Canuday, Jr. and
Pahayupan, who being similarly situated, were cleared and absolved.
C. Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
As for accused-appellant Col. Torres, who passed away during the pendency of this appeal,
the following rule laid down by this Court in People vs. Bayotas (236 SCRA 239 [1994])
applies:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) xxx xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file a separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on possible privation of right by prescription.
(pp. 255-256)

With the application of the above set of rules to accused-appellant Torres, we hold that his
death extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability solely based thereon. Accordingly,
the appeal of accused-appellant Torres is forthwith dismissed, such dismissal having the force
and effect of an acquittal.
D. Pol. Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano,
Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody Delgado, and Cesar Pecha
Now, in regard to the other accused-appellants, after a careful review of the evidence, we find
the same sufficient to affirm their conviction.
These accused-appellants assail the credence given by the trial court to the eyewitness
account of Moises Grandeza. Even after a thorough perusal of their main appellants' brief (pp.
327-498, Rollo), plus the separate briefs of accused-appellants Geroche (pp. 1453-1627) and
Pecha (pp. 828-1009, Rollo), we find no cogent reason to depart from the well settled rule that
when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the factual findings of the trial court is
generally accorded great weight. In People vs. Taedo (266 SCRA 34 [1997]) the Court had
occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility
of witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor
while they testified in court. The briefs of accused-appellants Lamis, et al. are replete with
generalities and legal principles relating to the issue, but are utterly wanting in relevant
particulars which may be the basis to rule that indeed, the trial court erred in lending full
credence to the testimony of witness Grandeza on the matter. As held in People vs. Ramirez
266 SCRA 335 [1997]), unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on credibility
must be respected.
In an attempt to buttress the contention that witness Grandeza's testimony should not have
been given credence by the court a quo, accused-appellants referred to supposed
inconsistencies between Grandeza's sworn statements before investigators vis--vis his
testimony in court (pp. 349-359, Rollo; and 1465-1468, Rollo). The Court, however, is not
impressed. This will not be the first occasion for us to hold that discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations (People vs. Padao, 267
SCRA 64 [1997]). A contradiction between a witness' affidavit and his testimony in open court
may almost be explained by the fact that, being taken ex parte, an affidavit is often incomplete
and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from the want of
suggestions and inquiries (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]).
Grandeza's perceived failure to mention anything in his 3 affidavits pertaining to the supposed
meetings where the criminal plot was hatched, does not necessarily render his testimony in
court unworthy of credit.
In his brief, accused-appellant Geroche cites Grandeza's failure to identify one of their coaccused, Charles Dumancas, in open court, and the variance on the alleged instructions given
by Jeanette, and the failure by Grandeza to mention the supposed meetings in his previous
affidavits, as grounds to totally disregard Grandeza's entire testimony for being unworthy of
credence (pp. 1461-1469, Rollo). Indirectly, accused-appellant Geroche wants this Court to
apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. In this regard, we held in People vs. Pacis
(130 SCRA 540 [1984]):

The maxim of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus," however, is not a positive rule of law. Neither
is it an inflexible one of universal application. If a part of a witness' testimony is found true, it
cannot be disregarded entirely. The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
disbelieved in part.
(p. 546)
Also in People vs. Li Bun Juan (17 SCRA 934 [1966]) we ruled:
. . . In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of
a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs.
Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:
18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. Trier of facts are not bound to
believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and
reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to
be the truth . . . Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but
may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief.
(p. 945)
The grounds relied upon by accused-appellant Geroche do not, therefore, constitute cogent
reasons to discredit the testimony of eyewitness Grandeza in its entirety.
As regards accused-appellant Geroche's defense of alibi, it is settled that alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification (People vs. Garma, 271 SCRA 517 [1997]). Being easy to fabricate
and difficult to disprove, alibi cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive
identification of the accused-appellant (People vs. Datun, 272 SCRA 380 [1997]). Besides, the
record is bereft of strong and convincing evidence that accused-appellant could not have been
at the scene of the crime because the certification proffered in support thereof stated that he
was in Mt. Calandog only after the commission of the crime. And, as aptly stated by the
Solicitor General in the People's brief, "the trial court expressed puzzlement why this
supposed fact was not mentioned in his July 3, 1993 affidavit . . . The first impulse of an
innocent man when accused of a wrongdoing is to express his innocence at the first
opportune time. The People can only conclude that Geroche's defense of alibi is but an
afterthought" (p. 1723, Rollo).
As to accused-appellant Cesar Pecha's case, the Court finds it difficult to believe that he had
no knowledge that the 2 victims he was burying were victims of violence. The deceased were
surely bloodied from their gunshot wounds and were in fact still handcuffed when exhumed
from their shallow grave. It becomes almost impossible for accused-appellant Pecha not to at
least, entertain doubts as to the absence of foul play in this case. He is thus guilty as an
accessory to the crime committed under Paragraph 2, Article 19, of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of
the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take
part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery;

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided
the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is
guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to habitually guilty of some other crime.
All told, there are only reasons to affirm, and none to reverse, the trial court's conviction of
accused-appellants Pol. Officer Mario Lamis y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche y Mahusay,
Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin Divinagracia, and Teody Delgado as
principals by direct participation of the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder, and that of
Cesar Pecha as accessory thereto.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, when the crime of kidnapping is committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victims, the penalty is death. However, since the
crime was committed before the re-imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua is
imposable upon all the accused-appellant found guilty of the crime as principals. Accusedappellant Pecha's penalty, as accessory is 2 degrees lower, which is prision mayor. Applying
the indeterminate sentence law, the penalty to be imposed is 6 months and 1 day (the
minimum of prision correccional), as minimum, up to 8 years (within the minimum period of
prision mayor), as the maximum.
On the civil liabilities, accused-appellants who are herein convicted of the crime as principals
are held solidarily liable for the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each of the victims, as
indemnity for their death. The amount of P50,000.00, each, by way moral damages and
P25,000.00, each, as exemplary damages are already deemed sufficient. Accused-appellant
Cesar Pecha is held liable for one-tenth of the above amounts. The appealed judgment is
silent as to any justification for the other damages awarded and can therefore not be
sustained on appeal.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellants JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS and ADONIS ABETO
are hereby ACQUITTED and forthwith ordered released from detention unless there may be
reason for their further detention on other criminal cases. The case and appeal of NICOLAS
TORRES is DISMISSED by reason of his death. The convictions of all the other accusedappellants for each case filed are AFFIRMED except for the modification that accusedappellant CESAR PECHA is sentenced for each case to an indeterminate prison term of six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum up to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. Joint and several civil liability for the accused-appellants found guilty as
principals, is reduced to P50,000.00 for each case, as indemnity for the death of each victim,
P50,000.00 for each case, by way moral damages, and P25,000.00 for each case, by way of
exemplary damages. The civil liability of accused-appellant Cesar Pecha is maintained at onetenth of the above amount.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 115351 March 27, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.DANIEL MALUENDA alias
"DONGKOY"; GIL BUENO; RAUL MONDAGA alias "BOBONG"; and RODRIGO
LEGARTO, accused, DANIEL MALUEDA and RODRIGO LEGARTO, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Conspiracy and/or direct participation in a crime may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
However, the comprising circumstances must be duly proven, consistent with each other and
lead with moral certainty to only one conclusion: that the accused is guilty. If the totality of
such circumstances eliminates beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence,
conviction is proper; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted. If said accused, however, took
advantage of the effects of the crime and profited thereby, he can be held criminally liable as
an accessory.
The Case
This is an appeal from the March 18, 1994 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. L-1174, convicting Raul Mondaga, Rodrigo
Legarto and Daniel Maluenda of kidnapping and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

In an Information dated November 20, 1992, Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto, together with
a Certain Gil Bueno, were charged by Prosecutor II Florito G. Cuartero with kidnapping,
committed as follows:2
That on the 19th day of August 1992, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
[B]arangay Diatagon, [M]unicipality of Lianga, [P]rovince of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap Engr. Miguel Resus for the purpose of extorting money from Engr. & Mrs.
Resus, detaining said Engr. Miguel Resus for a period of four (4) days, to the damage and
prejudice of the victim in the amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (In violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code).
Warrants of arrest for the four accused were issued by the trial court, but Bueno eluded the
authorities and remained at large.3 At their arraignment and with the assistance of counsel,
Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga pleaded not guilty. 4
After trial in due course, the lower court found the three accused guilty as charged and
disposed as follows:5
WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing findings, this Court finds all the accuseds
[sic], namely, Raul Mondaga, alias Bobong Gonzaga, 21 years old, single, driver by
occupation, as alleged, and resident of Tagongon, Tagbina, Surigao del Sur; Rodrigo Legarto
alias Rudy, 37 years old, married to Magdalena C. Legarto, gas man of the bankrupt Lianga
Bay Logging Co., Inc. and a resident of New Highway, Purok III, Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del
Sur and Daniel Maluenda, Alias Commander Dongkoy, 22 years old, single, and a farmer and
goldminer, and resident of Purok 1, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, all guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, defined and penalized under
the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the Information,
and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to restitute to the private complainants, Engr. Miguel E. Resus
and Dra. Bernardita R. Resus, jointly and severally, the amount of P200,000.00 corresponding
to the aggregate of the money in cash and medicines extorted as per the demand of the
accuseds [sic] and given by the kidnap victim's wife, including the subject motorcycle which
has been paid for by the victim's ransom money; (Exh. "E") with the down payment as per
agreement advanced by the couple Resus for a total cost price of P46,895.00 (Exh. "F") and
to pay the costs.
Immediately after promulgation of this decision, so as not to render the sentence imposed
ineffectual with respect to accused Rodrigo Legarto, alias Rudy, the bail bond posted for his
provisional release is hereby cancelled and said accused ordered committed to the custody of
the Provincial Warden of Surigao del Sur at Tandag, Surigao del Sur, preparatory to the
service of his sentence.
In the service of this sentence, all the accused are ordered immediately turned over to the
custody of the Director, Bureau of Corrections, at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, pursuant to the
mandate of Supreme Court Circular No. 4-92-A dated April 20, 1992.
Finally, let [an] alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Gil Bueno for distribution to the
different investigative and law-enforcement agencies of the Government for their possible
execution and return, and hereby consigning this case, with respect to said GIL BUENO, to
the ARCHIVES to be reinstated to the active files of criminal cases upon his arrest.

In view of the penalty imposed, Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga interposed this appeal
directly before this Court.6 However, on March 30, 1995, Mondaga withdrew his appeal. 7
Hence, this Court will now pass upon the criminal liability of Legarto and Maluenda only.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee's Brief, the solicitor general presents the following narration of the kidnapping: 8
On August 19, 1992 at around 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus ("Engr. Resus") and
his wife, Dr. Bernardita B. Resus ("Dr. Resus"), arrived at their residence/clinic at Diatagon,
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, from a novena they attended. Waiting for the Resus spouses at the
clinic which adjoins the Resus spouses' residence were three men who identified themselves
as Commander Bobong Gonzaga (who is actually Raul Mondaga), Commander Bongkoy
(who is actually Maluenda) and alias "Alex". Upon the arrival of the Resus spouses, Mondaga
declared that they came upon orders of a certain Father Simon, an alleged NPA Commander,
with his directive to solicit money and medicines needed for the victims of the recent militaryNPA encounter at Melale, Agusan del Sur. The trio demanded from the couple medicines and
money in the amount of P20,000.00, but when the couple told them that they did not have
such an amount, they lowered their demand to P10,000.00, and reduced it still to P5,000.00
when the couple still could not produce the said amount. Finally, the demand was lowered to
any amount the Resus couple could provide. The latter gave the amount of P500.00 plus
assorted medicines worth P800.00. After they were given the money and medicines, the trio
demanded that they be driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, but the couple begged off reasoning that their car [did] have any sufficient
gasoline and that the car was not in good running condition to travel that night. Mondaga then
demanded that very early in the morning, the couple should prepare the vehicle so Engr.
Resus [could] drive them to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. They left the clinic with [a]
threat not to tell anybody about their coming, otherwise they [would] kill all the members of
their family and blow-up the clinic.
The next day or on August 20, 1992 at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, Mondaga arrived at
the residence of the Resus couple. Mondaga hurried up Engr. Resus as he [would] meet his
companions who were ferried by Legarto. Engr. Resus then drove Mondaga to Andanan. As
the two passed along Andanan, they met Legarto, who was on his way back to Diatogon after
his passengers, i.e., Maluenda and Alex, alighted from his motorcycle and [waited] for
Mondaga and Engr. Resus at Andanan. Maluenda and Alex then rode with Mondaga and
Engr. Resus to Barobo. Upon reaching Barobo, Mondaga told Engr. Resus that they [would]
go to San Francisco instead of going to San Roque. They, however, did not reach San
Francisco, and instead they stopped at Alegria. Upon reaching Alegria, Mondaga ordered
Engr. Resus that he had to go with them. Against his will, Engr. Resus went with the three.
They went to the mountain hiking for almost two (2) hours between the boundary of Cardon
and Alegria. Upon reaching a hut, Mondaga told him that he had forgotten something and had
to go back and that Engr. Resus had to stay there. So Engr. Resus, Maluenda, Alex and Gil
Bueno passed the night in the farmhut.
Meanwhile at the house of the Resus couple, Dr. Resus was informed by the midwife that
Mondaga came at around 4:00 p.m. when Dr. Resus was out. Mondaga told the midwife that
he [would] come back. Mondaga arrived at the Resus clinic at around 7:00 in the evening.
Mondaga demanded from Dr. Resus the amount of P300,000.00 for the release of Engr.

Resus. Dr. Resus told Mondaga that she [could] only produce P10,000.00. Mondaga told Dr.
Resus to reserve the amount for he [would] get it the following morning. He also instructed Dr.
Resus to look for the firearm of her husband. Dr. Resus then searched for the gun (Exh. H) of
her husband and after finding it in the cabinet in their room, gave the same to Mondaga. After
[the gun was given to him], Mondaga demanded for the use of Engr. Resus' motorcycle, but
Dr. Resus told him that the motorcycle [was] out of order. So Mondaga instructed Dr. Resus to
get the motorcycle of Legarto, which Dr. Resus did.
On August 21, 1992, at around 4:45 a.m. Mondaga arrived at Dr. Resus' clinic. Shortly
thereafter, Legarto also arrived in his motorcycle. Mondaga demanded that Dr. Resus go with
them but the latter made excuses particularly her health. Dr. Resus asked that her helper
Maria Abne go instead to which Mondaga agreed. At exactly 5:00 a.m., Mondaga, Legarto and
Maria Abne left Dr. Resus' clinic, bringing with them the P10,000.00 Dr. Resus gave and the
Magnum 22 of Engr. Resus. The three arrived at Alegria, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur at
around 7:00 a.m. Legarto then safely kept his motorcycle after which they walked to the forest
for about 2 hours until they reached a carabao crossing where Mondaga left Legarto and
Maria Abne for 30 minutes. Mondaga went to the hut where he left Engr. Resus with a note
from Dr. Resus which state[d], "Daddy, I have committed only P10,000.00". He gave the note
to Engr. Resus but told Engr. Resus that "you can afford P300,000.00". Engr. Resus pleaded
with Mondaga that they [did] not have such amount so Mondaga lowered his demand to
P200,000.00. Engr. Resus then signed the note stating, "Mommy, it is up to you to produce
this amount." With the note, Mondaga and Legarto went back to Alegria, while Abne was left
with Engr. Resus. Legarto who was driving Engr. Resus' car, went to the house of Nora
Gubantes where Dr. Resus was at that time and informed her that Mondaga [was] waiting [for]
her at SSIFA, St. Christine. Dr. Resus went with Legarto at SSIFA, St. Christine where they
met Mondaga, who joined them at the car after which the three proceeded to a deserted
place. Mondaga then handed to Dr. Resus the note written by Engr. Resus where it was
written the P200,000.00 ransom. [sic] Dr. Resus told Mondaga that she [could] only produce
P100,000.00 Mondaga agreed to the P100,000.00 on the additional condition that he [would]
no longer return the motorcycle of Legarto and instead to give to Legarto the amount of
P50,000.00 as payment for the motorcycle. Mondaga also instructed Legarto to deliver the
amount of P100,000.00 and the original license of the motorcycle. Dr. Resus and Legarto then
went back to the clinic leaving Mondaga behind.
At around 1:30 p.m. of August 21, 1992, Dr. Resus, together with Nora Gubantes, went to
Lianga to secure money from the relatives of Dr. Resus. Since Dr. Resus' cousins were out of
town, the two proceeded to San Francisco, Agusan del Sur to see Dr. Presentacion Manatad,
the mayor of San Francisco. Dr. Resus informed Mayor Manatad about the incident and asked
the mayor to give her an amount of P150,000.00 in return for a PNB Check Dr. Resus [would]
issue. Mayor Manatad gave her the amount after Dr. Resus issued PNB Check No. 621330AJ in the amount of P150,000.00 (Exh. B). Dr. Resus gave the money to Nora Gubantes with
the instruction to give the same to Legarto. Upon reaching Diatogon, Nora Gubantes gave the
money to her husband with the instruction to give the money to Legarto. Legarto
acknowledged receiving the money from Mr. Gubantes on August 22, 1992.
On August 22, 1992, Mondaga arrived at the hut where Engr. Resus was and told that [sic] the
latter that he would be released but that he [would] come back to get the balance of the
P300,000.00 in three months. In the afternoon of August 22, 1992, Engr. Resus and Maria
Abne were released. The two were driven by Legarto in Engr. Resus['] car.

Mondaga, Maluenda and Legarto were later arrested by the police.

Version of the Defense
Appellant Legarto, the Resus couple's former part-time driver, denies any criminal involvement
in the kidnapping. He avows that he participated only in the delivery of the ransom money at
the insistence of Dr. Resus herself. In Legarto's Supplemental Brief, his counsel submits the
following counter-statement of facts:9
On August 19, 1992, at 9:45 in the evening, Engr. Miguel E. Resus and wife Dr. Bernardita B.
Resus, arrived at their clinic near their residence at Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur after
attending a novena. (TSN, March 16, 1993, p.3). There were three (3) men who were waiting
for them at the clinic, later identified as Commander Bobong Gonzaga (Raul Mondaga),
Commander Bongkoy (Daniel Maluenda), and a certain "Alex" (ibid. p. 5). Mondaga, upon
arrival of the spouses, solicited money and medicines from them, upon orders of a certain
Father Simon, an NPA Commander (ibid, p. 7). These money and medicines were needed for
the victims of the recent military-NPA encounter at Melale, Agusan del Sur. (ibid.). At first, the
three asked for P20,000.00 (ibid. p. 8) but lowered it to P10,000.00, and still reduced it to
P5,000.00. Finally, the Resus spouses could only give P500.00 together with P800.00 worth of
medicines. (TSN, March 17, 1993 p. 42)
After the money and medicines were handed to them, the three people demanded that they
be driven by Engr. Resus in his Volkswagen car to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur, but
Engr. Resus declined saying that he could not drive them at 12:00 midnight because he [did]
not have enough gasoline and that his service car [was] not in good condition to travel in the
evening. (TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 8). But one person, Mondaga, insisted that the next
morning, a vehicle should be prepared for a trip to San Roque, Barobo, Surigao del Sur. (TSN,
March 17, 1993, p. 43)
At about 4:45 in the morning of August 20, 1992, Mondaga knocked at the door of the clinic.
Engr. Resus was just busy preparing the vehicle, securing gasoline. (ibid, p. 44.) Mondaga
rode in the vehicle of Engr. Resus and met his two companions at Andanan. (ibid.)
Instead of San Roque, the vehicle stopped at Alegria (TSN, March 16, 1993, p. 11). The three
(Mondaga, Maluenda and Alex) asked Engr. Resus to go with them. (ibid.) They went to the
mountains and hiked for almost two (2) hours between the boundary of Gordon and Alegria.
(ibid.) When they reached the area, Mondaga went back to Alegria, leaving behind the three
who passed the night in the area. (ibid, p. 12)
Mondaga arrived at around 4:00 in the afternoon at the clinic of Dr. Resus. (TSN, March 17,
1993, p. 47) Dr. Resus was out, but when Mondaga later came back at 7:00 in the evening
and saw Dr. Resus (ibid, p. 48), he demanded the amount of P300,000.00. But since Dr.
Resus had only P10,000.00, Mondaga told her to reserve it and he [would] get it the next
morning. (ibid., pp. 48-49) After asking for the firearm of Engr. Resus, (ibid, p. 51) Mondaga
demanded to use the motorcycle of Engr. Resus. (ibid.) Dr. Resus said that it was out of order.
(ibid.) Mondaga ordered her to secure a motorcycle. (ibid) Dr. Resus, together with her maid,
Maria Abne, went to the house of their driver, Rudy Legarto. (TSN, November 23, 1993, p. 22)
Dr. Resus requested Rudy Legarto to drive for Maria Abne and Mondaga in his motorcycle to
Alegria and on his return, to drive for his Manong Mike. (ibid) Legarto refused because of his
work. (ibid) But when Dr. Resus insisted and when told that it was very important to conduct
Maria Abne and Mondaga, and because she was his boss, he agreed. (ibid.) He was asked to

file a leave of absence from his job. (ibid.) It is important to note that it was [Dr.] Resus who
got Legarto involved in this drama.
At around 5:00 in the morning of August 21, 1992, Legarto drove for Maria Abne and Mondaga
to Alegria at the behest of Dr. Resus. (ibid, p. 23) At Alegria, the three proceeded of [sic] Dr.
Resus (ibid, p. 23) to a hilly side. (ibid.) Legarto and Maria Abne were left behind and
Mondaga told them that he [would] inform his commander to release Engr. Resus. (ibid.) They
were also warned not to escape because they were guarded. (ibid.)
At about 9:00 in the evening, Engr. Resus, together with Mondaga, arrived. Legarto was told
by Engr. Resus not to worry as he was treated well. (ibid.) Engr. Resus told Mondaga that
Legarto was his driver and Maria Abne was his helper. (ibid.) [O]n the way back, Legarto and
Abne walked five (5) meters ahead while Mondaga and Engr. Resus walked side by side.
Legarto and Abne heard their conversations (ibid, pp. 23-24) and Mondaga was demanding
P300,000.00. Engr. Resus pleaded that he [did not] have that amount. (ibid) Mondaga them
ordered Engr. Resus to make a note to his wife, Dr. Resus stating that P300,000.00 be given.
(ibid) After the note was signed, Mondaga got the keys of the Volkswagen car and the
motorcycle while Legarto was brought along to Alegria. (ibid, p. 25) Engr. Resus and Maria
Abne were left behind. (ibid) When they arrived at Alegria, Mondaga ordered him to drive the
Volkswagen in going back to Diatagon while Mondaga drove the motorcycle of Legarto. (ibid.)
However, at Diatagon, Mondaga stopped Legarto near the School of Fisheries. (ibid.) He was
ordered to fetch Dr. Resus and bring her to Mondaga for final negotiation. (ibid.) There was a
threat not to disseminate the information because if he [did], then Legarto's family [would] be
killed, including himself. (ibid.)
He was able to find Dr. Resus at the house of a certain Nora Gubantes and told her he was
ordered to fetch her. Legarto asked Dr. Resus what [was] this incident about and Legarto was
told immediately to shut up. (ibid, p. 26) Legarto asked her of her decision but was told to shut
up again. (ibid.)
Dr. Resus rode with him in the Volkswagen car towards the area near the Fisheries School at
St. Catherine, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. (ibid.) At some point Mondaga joined them in the car.
Dr. Resus allowed Mondaga to sit at the back while she sat in front seat beside Legarto. They
talked about the money, and Dr. Resus pleaded that she [could] only produce P100,000.00.
(ibid, p. 27) Mondaga agreed, provided the motorcycle of Legarto be included. (ibid.) Legarto,
at this point, intervened and told Dr. Resus not to include in the negotiation his motorcycle
because the installment was not yet fully paid. (ibid). Dr. Resus then told him to "just give his
motorcycle." (ibid) Then, Mondaga told Dr. Resus that Legarto would be the one who [would]
bring the money to Alegria. He agreed again because Dr. Resus was his boss. (ibid.)
On August 22, 1992, at 4:00 in the afternoon, Eslao Gubantes and his son delivered
P136,000.00 to Legarto plus P200.00 for gasoline (ibid, p. 28). The P36,000.00 [was] to be
paid as partial payment for his motorcycle. (ibid)
When he filed his leave of his [sic] absence, he talked to his Superintendent Virgilio
Fernandez and others who told him he should have filed his leave of absence ahead because
nobody was detailed at the depot, (ibid, p. 29) but he told them that, there was an emergency
because Engr. Resus was held hostage and he [would] deliver the money. (ibid.)
On his way to Alegria, he met Dr. Resus together with her nephew riding a police car (ibid). He
was asked by Dra. Resus where the money [was] but he answered, he brought along with him
P100,000.00. (ibid.) Dr. Resus told him to bring also the P36,000.00 and another P14,000.00
which was about to be given by Dr. Resus. (ibid.) However, he advised Dr. Resus that he

would bring only P100,000.00 because that was what they [had] agreed upon. (ibid) If
Mondaga objects [sic] he [would] just come back. (ibid.) This was confirmed by Dr. Resus'
nephew (ibid.)
Legarto proceeded to Alegria and subsequently delivered the money to Mondaga, which
resulted [in] the release of Engr. Resus, together with Maria Abne. (ibid, p. 30) Engr. Resus
and Maria Abne were brought back to Lianga, where they met Dr. Resus. Mayor Layno of
Lianga commented that if not for your driver and Maria Abne, Engr. Resus [would] not be
rescued. (ibid.) Engr. Resus and Dr. Resus remained at Lianga, while he and Maria Abne
proceeded to Diatagon. (ibid.)
On September 18, 1992, Legarto and Maria Abne were brought to the municipal building to
act as witnesses for Engr. and Dr. Resus. (ibid, p. 31) However, after executing his affidavit
before the Municipal Judge, he was arrested just when he went out from the office (ibid, p.
31). He was brought to Patin-ay, Agusan del Sur, where he was detained. (ibid, p. 32) While
there, he wrote a letter to Engr. and Dr. Resus for help. (ibid.) The letter expressed his
sentiment and dismay that in spite of his help, he was included in the case. (ibid, p. 33) He
denied having driven Mondaga alias Bobong Gonzaga at any other time.
Similarly, Maluenda denies knowledge of Mondaga's plan to commit the said crime. He
accompanied the latter to Mahilom only to mine for gold and not to plan, much less commit,
any crime. He alleges that he guarded the victim at the hut only because Mondaga threatened
to kill him and his family. Through counsel, Maluenda presents his own version of the facts, as
follows:10
Daniel Maluenda testified that on August 20, 1992 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he
was in his house at Barobo when Raul Mondaga came over. Mondaga told him that he [had] a
tunnel in Mahilom and offered Maluenda a fifty-fifty proposition to gold mine the tunnel.
Maluenda, who [was] a farmer and at the same time a gold miner, agreed to the proposition.
On August 21, 1992 at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Maluenda together with Mondaga
proceeded to Sitio Mahilom. Upon reaching Garden, Tambis, Surigao del Sur, Mondaga tried
to give Maluenda a pistol and grenade but Maluenda questioned Mondaga's purpose for
bringing the same since they were just looking for gold inside the tunnel. Mondaga in turn told
Maluenda to just follow what he [ordered] so that nothing will happen to him, and that
Mondaga [would] not hesitate to kill a person, so Maluenda merely followed Mondaga as he
was afraid.
Arriving at Mahilom, Mondaga and Maluenda proceeded to a hut where the latter saw Engr.
Resus and some other persons. Mondaga ordered Maluenda to stay in the hut and feed these
persons. Maluenda in turn retorted that their agreement was to mine for gold, but Mondaga
told him "to just follow my order so that nothing will happen to you, or else I will blast your
head and kill your family." Inside the hut, Maluenda and Engr. Resus talked and planned to
escape.
The next day at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Maluenda, together with Engr. Resus, left but
when they reached Alegria, they met Mondaga. Mondaga approached Engr. Resus, held his
hand and said, do not be afraid because you can go home. Mondaga also told Maluenda not
to report the matter to the authorities otherwise, they [would] all be killed.
Maluenda denied that he was at the clinic of Dra. Resus on August 19, 1992. Furthermore, he
denied having received any money from Mondaga. (TSN, November 24, 1993, pp. 50-59)
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court convicted Legarto, Maluenda and Mondaga, holding that they successfully
perpetrated a clear case of kidnapping. It gave complete credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses whom it deemed unquestionably reliable, sincere and candid. The
lower court held that Mondaga was the mastermind of the kidnapping. While Appellant Legarto
portrayed himself as a good Samaritan to the Resus couple, the trial court stated that he was
a wolf in sheep's clothing and described his testimony as evasive, false and shallow.
The court a quo: "[A]s to how accused Raul Mondaga came out to know that the Resus couple
could pay ransom, the finger of suspicion points to Legarto as source." 11 Legarto failed to
satisfactorily explain why he did not testify against Mondaga in the criminal case for
carnapping involving his motorcycle. His actuations from the outset until the time he delivered
the ransom money betrayed his active participation as a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation in the crime. Of the P136,000 handed to him for delivery to the kidnappers,
Legarto kept P36,000 for himself. Legarto confidently refused to accept P14,000 more from
Dr. Resus, saying that what he had was already sufficient. He further failed to report the
incident to the police when he had the opportunity to do so.
The trial court also noted the following pieces of evidence which proved Legarto's participation
in the crime.
1. Witness Sanchez testified that she saw Mondaga frequenting Legarto's house in Diatagon,
and she even saw him and Mondaga riding on his motorcycle.
2. On August 20, 1992, Engineer Resus saw him convey Maluenda and "Alex" to Andanan,
where Maluenda and "Alex" boarded Engineer Resus' car.
3. He drove the victim's car back to Diatagon from Alegria.
4. He delivered Mondaga's ransom note to Dr. Resus.
5. He also delivered the ransom money to the kidnappers.
6. He used P36,000 of the ransom money to pay the balance of the purchase price of his
motorcycle.
All these allegedly show Legarto's participation as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation
in the crime.
Through the same witnesses for the prosecution, Maluenda, who introduced himself as
Commander Dongkoy, was positively identified as one of the men who went to Dr. Resus'
clinic on August 19, 1992. The kidnap victim also identified him as the guard at the hideout in
Alegria. Hence, the trial court convicted him as a co-principal.
Assignment of Errors
Legarto assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: 12
I The lower court erred in finding that, "as to how accused Raul Mondaga came to know
that the Resus couple could pay ransom, the finger of suspicion points to Legarto, as source".
II The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Norma Sanchez.
III The lower court erred in finding that, "with respect to accused Rodrigo Legarto, there
were several instances noted by the court which lead [sic] it to conclude that this particular
accused was part of the criminal scheme to commits [sic] said kidnapping."
IV The lower court erred in holding, "that he has all the opportunity to report such criminal
scheme to the police or military authorities, if he wanted to and his failure to do so plainly
indicated his part in the criminal plan; and his actuations from the outset in a criminal plan was
put to an [sic] effect, up to his rule [sic] in hand carrying the ransom money which he turned
over to Mondaga at the mountain hideout which he know [sic] invetably, shows his active
participation as a co-principal by [indispensable] cooperation.

V The lower court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of Rodrigo Legarto.
VI The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant as co-principal of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under the last par. of Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code as charged in the information and [in sentencing him] to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
VII The lower court erred in ordering the confiscation of appellant's motorcycle.
In the Supplemental Brief, Legarto's other counsel adds the following issues: 13
I. The participation of Legarto was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
II. Legarto was convicted on mere suspicion of one prosecution witnesses.
III. Legarto [had] no motive in kidnapping Engr. Resus.
IV. Lower court erred in holding that Legarto [was] a co-principal by indispensable
cooperation.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the confiscation of the motorcycle of Legarto.
For his part, Maluenda submits the following as his lone assignment of error: 14
The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged despite the fact that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
For clarity and order, the Court will separately discuss the participation of the appellants and
the probative value of the evidence presented against each of them.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partially meritorious as regards Legarto who, in the light of the evidence
presented, should be held liable only as an accessory. In contrast, Maluenda's conviction
deserves affirmation, as his culpability in the kidnapping was clearly proven.
Legarto's Culpability
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
The solicitor general argues for the affirmation of Legarto's conviction on the ground that the
trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is generally accorded
great respect on appeal. However, the Court believes that the resolution of this appeal
transcends the issue of the credibility of the witnesses. There is need to evaluate the
sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented to sustain Legarto's conviction.
The trial court found Legarto guilty as a principal by indispensable cooperation on the basis of
several pieces of circumstantial evidence, which the solicitor general depicts as clearly
demonstrating his participation. On the other hand, Legarto asserts that the same set of
evidence is frail and inconclusive.
Legarto's contention merits consideration. A principal by indispensable cooperation is defined
by Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code thus:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
xxx
xxx
xxx
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
Legarto cannot be convicted under this definition because the prosecution failed to allege,
much less prove, any overt act on his part showing direct participation in the kidnapping itself,
his participation in the incident being limited to acts committed after the abduction was already
consummated. He was not with the kidnappers (1) when they forcibly solicited money and
medicine from the Resus couple, (2) when they brought the kidnap victim to Alegria, and (3)
when Mondaga demanded ransom for the victim's release. Together with the Resus

housemaid, he accompanied Mondaga to the hideout in Alegria only upon Dr. Resus' request.
In short, the prosecution failed to piece together a clear story as to show Legarto figured in the
kidnapping caper.
Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict an accused as a principal by
indispensable cooperation in accordance with Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. 15 It may
also show conspiracy. Thus, this Court meticulously examined the pleadings, the records and
the assailed Decision in order to evaluate the sufficiency of Legarto's conviction. The pieces of
circumstantial evidence used by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court are
enumerated and evaluated seriatin.
Acquaintance Is InconclusiveProof of Participation
That Mondaga frequented the house of Legarto in Diatagon proves that he knew the latter.
Witness Sanchez testified that she even saw them riding Legarto's motorcycle during the town
fiesta on June 24, 1992. However, this event occurred about two months before the
kidnapping on August 19 to 22, 1992. Considering that the prosecution did not present any
evidence to show that the plan to kidnap Engineer Resus was hatched as early as June 24,
1992, the fact that Legarto and Mondaga were together during the town fiesta should not be
considered as proof of Legarto's direct participation in the crime. Likewise, that Legarto was
acquainted with Mondaga does not prove that the former had a hand in the kidnapping.
Conveying Maluenda and BuenoDoes Not ConclusivelyProve Participation
The solicitor general harps on the fact that, on August 20, 1992, Legarto was seen
transporting Maluenda and "Alex" to Andanan on his motorcycle. He claims that this is strong
proof of Legarto's complicity, as it shows that Legarto had knowledge of the plan to kidnap
Engineer Resus. The trial court, for its part, said that this fact "points to the clear perception
that . . . he was part of the dubious criminal plan." The "fact" relied upon by the solicitor
general and the trial court, however, is a mere speculation. This is clear from Engineer Resus'
testimony, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced below: 16
Q On the following day, August 20, 1992, where were you?
A I was at my residence, sir.
Q While you were in your residence, what transpired, if there was any?
A I got ready of [sic] my car, at the same time Raul Mondaga came in, sir.
Q What time did Raul Mondaga enter your residence?
A At about 5:00 o'clock early in the morning, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Where was the accused Maluenda at that time?
A At that time Maluenda was not around, sir.
Q Now, while you were preparing your car, what happened next?
A I parked my car infront [sic] of the clinic, sir.
Q Then what happened next after parking your car infront [sic] of your clinic?
A Raul Mondaga hurried me up to go with his companion who was ferried by Rudy Legarto,
sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q When you arrived at Andanan, what happened?
A As we passed along Andanan, I met Rudy Legarto on the way going back to Diatagon, with
his two (2) passengers already alighted from his motorcycle and waiting for us at Andanan
and then took a ride with us on our way to Barobo, sir. (Emphasis supplied.)

Engineer Resus merely said that he saw Legarto heading back to Diatagon. He did not
witness Maluenda and "Alex" on board Legarto's motorcycle or alighting therefrom; he only
saw the two at Andanan waiting for Mondaga and him. In fact, Engineer Resus did not actually
see Legarto transport Mondaga's companions. Hence, the statement that Legarto did so is a
conclusion unsupported by Resus' testimony, a mere speculation of the event that might have
preceded what Engineer Resus saw. Its true nature as a conjecture is evident from the
averment of the trial court that ". . . they were conveyed there by Rodrigo Legarto with the use
of his motorcycle, as he was even encountered on the road on his return back to Diatagon
that morning by Engr. Resus."
From the foregoing, it is clear that Legarto's alleged direct participation in the kidnapping is
without factual basis; it is nothing more than an inference drawn from a presumption. And
because circumstantial evidence not adequately established cannot become the basis of
conviction, such inference cannot be given evidentiary weight to support Legarto's conviction
as a principal by indispensable cooperation.17
No Specific Demand for Legarto's Motorcycle
The solicitor general avers that Mondaga's instruction to Dr. Resus to requisition Legarto's
motorcycle proves Legarto's complicity in the felonious scheme. The averment is inaccurate
because Mondaga, in accordance with Dr. Resus' testimony, had originally requisitioned the
victim's motorcycle, but the latter told him that it was out of order. 18 So, Mondaga asked for
Legarto's motorcycle instead.
That Mondaga chose Legarto's motorcycle when he could have demanded any other twowheel vehicle can be explained by the fact that, several times prior to the kidnapping, he had
taken a ride on the said motorcycle. Note that Legarto used the motorcycle as a vehicle for
hire in the area.
Delivering the Ransom Moneyand Keeping Part of ItDo Not Prove Conspiracy
The solicitor general avers that the completes trust of Mondaga in Legarto, whom the former
designated as collector of the ransom money, proves the latter's participation. The trial court,
on the same point, said:19
. . . His subsequent direct involvement in the negotiations with Dra. Resus when he was made
to drive the Volkswagen car to Diatagon, contact Dra. Resus in the final negotiations, and
delivery of the ransom money agreed upon [sic] to Raul Mondaga, admitting having withheld
at his house a part of the ransom money amounting to P36,000.00(?) and paying off the
balance of the motorcycle with it, as evidenced by the receipt of payment, demonstrates very
strongly and beyond doubt to [sic] his participation in that criminal act, as now charged. . . .
The averments, however, are sufficiently rebutted by Legarto's allegation that, out of loyalty to
his former boss, the participated in the release of the
kidnap victim, not in his detention. The testimony of Engineer Resus that Legarto was at
Alegria in order to fetch the former is cited by the defense as follows: 20
Q Do you confirm . . . the statements in these affidavits which you subscribed and sworn [sic]
to before Judge Ricardo L. Mosquerra III on September 18, 1992 and September 23, 1992?
A Yes, Sir.
Q In your affidavit on September 16, 1992 subscribed before Judge Mosquerra, you never
mentioned Rudy Legarto as one of the kidnappers, am I correct?
A Yes, Sir.

Q In fact, you will agree [with] me that the presence of Maria Abne and Rudy Legarto was for
them to fetch you. Am I correct?
A Yes, Sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Regarding the P36,000 which he kept, Legarto alleges that this was payment for his
motorcycle which was taken by Mondaga. He claims that he had initially refused to give his
motorcycle to Mondaga, but was prevailed upon by Dr. Resus who told him that she would
replace it.21 Confirming this, Dr. Resus testified that she told Mrs. Gubantes that the money
was payment for Legarto's motorcycle, 22 not his share in the ransom. Thus, such payment
could not rationally constitute evidence of direct participation or of conspiracy in the
kidnapping.
Non-appearance at the Hearingsof the Carnapping Case
The solicitor general and the trial court posit the direct participation was established by the
failure of Legarto to testify against Mondaga in the criminal case for the carnapping of
Legarto's motorcycle. The excuses of Legarto for his inability to attend the hearings that he
did not have transportation and that he had stomach ache were branded by the solicitor
general as "flimsy and incredible." After all, Legarto was able to appear sans such problems
when the trial court ordered the release of the motorcycle.
The contention is untenable. Legarto's lack of merits in pursuing the criminal case against
Mondaga may be less than laudable, but it does not necessarily show direct participation in
the kidnapping. Dismissal of cases due to failure to prosecute is a common legal experience.
Legarto's excuses for failing to prosecute may be dubious, but they cannot become the basis
for his conviction as a principal by indispensable cooperation in this case.
"Finger of Accusation"Was Baseless
In the assailed Decision, the trial court states, "As to how accused Raul Mondaga came to
know that the Resus couple could pay [the] ransom, the finger of suspicion points to Legarto
as [the] source"23 However, an examination of the transcripts of stenographic notes reveals no
testimony that Legarto provided the kidnappers with information regarding the spouse's
finances. This was pure speculation or suspicion-nothing more, nothing less.
Elements Required to ConvictBy Circumstantial Evidence
A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.24 For such a conviction to withstand judicial scrutiny, the
prosecution must further show that all the circumstances are inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is innocent or with any other rational hypothesis except that of his guilt. 25
In this case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence being imputed to Legarto does
not foreclose the possibility that he took no part in the criminal enterprise and does not,
therefore, overcome his constitutional right to be presumed innocent. 26
The presumption of innocence is founded upon substantive law and basic principles of justice.
It serves to balance the scales of justice in what would otherwise be an uneven contest
between a single individual accused of a crime and the prosecution which has all the
resources of the government at its command. Thus, this presumption cannot be overcome by
mere suspicion or conjecture that the defendant probably committed the crime or that he had
the opportunity to do so. The prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the accused must be set free in accordance with the rule that
conflicts in and insufficiency of evidence must be resolved in favor of the theory of innocence
rather than the theory of guilt.27
Same Circumstances Do NotConclusively Show Conspiracy
Although the trial court did not pass upon conspiracy as a source of Legarto's culpability, we
deem it proper to do so, since it was alleged in the Information. In theory, conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.28 Once established, the act of one becomes the act of all. Further,
conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself, although
direct proof is not essential.29 Prior agreement or assent to the crime is usually inferred from
the acts of the accused showing concerted action, common design and objective, actual
cooperation, concurrence of sentiments, or community of interest. 30 In most cases, like the
one at bar, proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances
only.31 But such proof must always be established by evidence that satisfies the requirement
of proof beyond reasonable doubt.32
In Legarto's case, conspiracy was not at all established by the prosecution. The familiarity
between Legarto and Mondaga is insufficient proof, as conspiracy transcends
companionship.33 Moreover, Mondaga's act of meeting Legarto on the road to Andanan does
not show conspiracy, because a merely casual or unintended meeting, like passive presence,
is not proof of conspiracy.34 Similarly insufficient as circumstantial evidence to prove
conspiracy were Mondaga's demand for the use of Legarto's motorcycle, Legarto's collecting
the ransom money and delivering part of it, and Legarto's collecting the ransom money and
delivering part of it, and Legarto's failure to testify against Mondaga due to either refusal or
neglect. We stress that conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and
conjectures.35 Without an allegation of any overt act showing community with the kidnappers,
inferences do not adequately establish participation in a criminal conspiracy. 36
Legarto's Criminal Liability
Despite its belief that Legarto was not a co-principal or a co-conspirator, this Court cannot
completely free him from criminal liability. Established by the prosecution are the following: (1)
he reported the "loss" of the motorcycle to the police authorities despite the fact that it had
been given to Mondaga as part of the ransom; (2) he had received P36,000 for it; (3) he paid
the balance of the purchase price of the motorcycle with the said money; and (4) he claimed,
regained and retained its possession.
Legarto may not have had a direct hand in the kidnapping, but he received part of the ransom
and used it to pay off his arrears in his motorcycle loan. Thus, having knowledge of the
kidnapping for ransom and without having directly participated therein, he took part in the
crime subsequent to its commission by profiting from its effects.37 He may not be the devil with
the face of an angel that the trial court described, but he is definitely not a saint. He is
criminally liable as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, accessories are defined as those who (1) have
knowledge of the commission of the crime, (2) did not take part in its commission as principal
or accomplice, but (3) took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes
enumerated in this article, 38 one of which is by profiting or by assisting the offender to profit
from the effects of the crime. 39 These elements are all present and proven in Legarto's case.

As an accessory to the consummated crime of kidnapping, the penalty imposable upon

Legarto is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law under Article 267 of the said Code. 40
Since no modifying circumstance is appreciated for or against him, the imposable penalty
should be in the medium period of the indeterminate sentence applicable under RA 4103, as
amended. 41
Affirmation of Maluenda's Conviction
Acquittal is sought by Maluenda on the ground that only Mondaga executed the acts
constituting kidnapping with ransom; i.e., demanding and receiving money, medicine and
ransom from the Resus couple and detaining Engineer Resus. He avers that his presence at
the hideout in Alegria was involuntary because Mondaga had threatened his life and the lives
of the members of his family.
Such contention is patently bereft of merit, Maluenda's conviction deserves affirmation based
on the precept that actions speak louder than words. Established by the prosecution beyond
cavil was his direct participation in the criminal conspiracy to kidnap Engineer Resus, who
testified that Maluenda was one of the men who had, on the night of August 19, 1992, extorted
money and medicine from him and his wife who corroborated this story. 42 Engineers Resus
testified:43
Q: So what time did you arrive at your residence?
A About 9:45 in the evening, more or less, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. ALVIZO:
Q: When you arrived [at] your residence, what happened, if any?
WITNESS:
A: When I arrived at our house, the midwife on duty told us that we [had] visitors, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Who were your visitors?
A: Alias Bobong Gonzaga but his true name, after interrogation by the police which I
happened to know later, is Raul Mondaga, sir. And the other one is Dongkoy but after
interrogation by the police, they told me that the true name is Daniel Maluenda; then alias
"Alex" whose identity is still unknown because he is not yet arrested. These were the three (3)
people in my residence at that time, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: What happened, after introducing themselves to you?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A: This Raul Mondaga drew his revolver and also his grenade ready to be blown-up and
introduced himself to us that NPA Commander Father Simon [had] instructed them to solicit
funds for the victims in the recent Melali, Agusan del Sur, military-NPA encounter, sir.
The kidnap victim also testified that he conducted Maluenda and his companions to Alegria in
his car the following day:44
Q: When you arrived [at] Andanan, what happened?
WITNESS:
A: As we passed along Andana, I met Rudy Legarto on the way going back to Diatagon [sic],
with his two (2) passengers already alighted from his motorcycle and waiting for us at
Andanan and then took a ride with us on our way to Barobo, sir.
Q: Who were your passengers then when you reached Barobo?

A: Paul Mondaga, Maluenda and alias Alex, sir.

Maluenda also guarded the victim at the farm hut in Alegna. 45
Q: (PROS. CALVIZO)
Where did you go?
A: (ENGR. RESUS)
We went to the mountain and hiked for almost two (2) hours between the boundary of Garden
and Alegria, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: While you were there, what happened next, if any?
A: Raul Mondaga told me that he [had] forgotten something, he [had] to go back and I [had] to
stay there because the camp of the NPA still further away and that we [had] to pass the night
in that NPA hut, sir.
Q: Who were your companions in that place?
A: Daniel Maluenda and Alex plus another reinforcement, Gil Bueno, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: In the following morning, August 21, 1992, what happened next?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A: When Raul Mondaga arrived with a note from my wife and that was the time when they
started to grind me, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. ALVIZO:
Q: After the accused Raul Mondaga took the note from you, what happened next?
xxx
xxx
xxx
WITNESS:
A: I waited at the farmhut where I was guarded by the three (3) persons, sir.
Q: Who were guarding you at that time?
A: Daniel Maluenda, Alex and Gil Bueno were guarding me at that time, sir.
Engineer Resus' testimony that Maluenda guarded the kidnappers' hideout was corroborated
by Abne, the housemaid, as follows:46
Q: Where were you bound for with your companions, Rudy Legarto and Bobong Gonzaga?
A: To the forest where Engr. Resus was kept or held, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Did you see Engr. Resus?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: And what happened, after that?
A: Bobong Gonzaga and Rudy Legarto went back to Alegria, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: What about you, where were you?
A: I and Engr. Resus were left in theforest [sic] with the guards, Alias Dongkoy and Alex, sir.
Q: And where did you spend your night on August 21, 1992?
A: In the forest, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: And who was one of the guards?
A: Alias Dongkoy, Alias Alex and Alias Gil, sir.

Although only Mondaga verbally extorted money and demanded ransom from the Resus
couple, it is evident that the kidnapping was committed with Maluenda's participation. Beyond
reasonable doubt, Maluenda's actions exhibited a community of interest and a concurrence of
sentiment with Mondaga. Consequently inevitable as they relate to Maluenda are the following
holdings of the trial court:47
. . . Simply stated, the witnesses for the prosecution, in contrast to that [of] the defense, are, in
the Court's, assessment, unquestionably reliable, sincere and candor [sic] in their testimonies
which [were] very logical and credible.
xxx
xxx
xxx
and, as between the affirmative testimony of the prosecution witnesses and that of the
negative versions of the defense, the former [was] more stronger [sic]. The accuseds [sic]
resorted to unfounded denials.
xxx
xxx
xxx
To summarize, the Court finds that a clear case of kidnapping for ransom [had] been
successfully committed by all the accuseds [sic] charged in the information, who are all private
individuals; that the victim of that heinous crime [was] Engr. Miguel E. Resus; that ransom
money was actually paid in consideration of his release on the third day that he was forcibly
deprived of his liberty; . . . .
Accused Raul Mondaga, alias Bobong Gonzaga, and Accused Daniel Maluenda alias
Commander Dongkoy have both been positively identified as among the active
perpetrators. . . .
Insofar as Maluenda is concerned, we find applicable the well-entrenched rule that the factual
findings of the trial court are binding on the appellate
court.48 In this light, our earlier holding negating the trial court's assessment of the
circumstantial evidence pertains only to Appellant Legarto, not to Appellant Maluenda.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially granted. The assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED as
regards Maluenda, but MODIFIED as regards Legarto. Legarto is hereby found GUILTY as an
ACCESSORY only and is ORDERED to serve the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is further ordered to RETURN to Engineer and Dr.
Miguel E. Resus the amount of thirty-six thousand pesos (P36,000) corresponding to the
amount he used to pay his loan arrears. The amount which the trial court ordered to be
restituted by Mondaga and Maluenda is accordingly reduced by said amount.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Bernardo V. Saludares; rollo, pp. 14-37.
2 Rollo, p. 6.
3 Records, p. 74.
4 Records, pp. 116-117.
5 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
6 Rollo, pp. 38-39.

7 Rollo, pp. 123-124. This case was deemed submitted for decision on October 29, 1996 upon
the submission of the Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived.
8 Rollo, pp. 136-147. References to the TSNs were omitted.
9 Supplemental Brief for Appellant Legarto prepared by the Misa Law Office, as represented
by Attys. Claudine O. Montenegro and Joaquin L. Misa, pp. 3-10; rollo, pp. 166-173. Atty.
Romeo C. Buenaflor filed the main Appellant's Brief for Legarto.
10 Rollo, pp. 226g-226h. Appellant Maluenda's Brief was signed by Attys. Exaltacion L.
Carlos, Arceli Adan-Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena and Jerry F. Ibay of the Public Attorney's
Office.
11 Rollo, p. 21.
12 Rollo, pp. 53-54.
13 Rollo, p. 175.
14 Rollo, p. 226-b.
15 "Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt." People vs. Ragon, G.R. No. 100593, November 18, 1997, pp. 8-9; People
vs. Verano, 264 SCRA 546, 554, November 21, 1996; and People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167,
178, November 14, 1996.
16 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 9-11.
17 People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720, 736, September 16, 1996, per Bellosillo, J.
18 TSN, March 17, 1993, p. 51.
19 Rollo, p. 31.
20 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 24-25.
21 TSN, March 17, 1993, pp. 56-57; and TSN, November 23, 1993, p. 27.
22 Ibid., pp. 62 & 87.
23 Rollo, p. 21.
24 People vs. Ragon, G.R. No. 100593, November 18, 1997, p. 8-9; People vs. Verano, 264
SCRA 546, 554, November 21, 1996; and People vs. Malimit, 2643 SCRA 167, 178,
November 14, 1996.
25 People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 44, March 29, 1995, p. 44; and People vs. Abitona,
240 SCRA 335, 340, January 20, 1995.
26 People vs. Verano, supra, p. 554; People vs. Dulatre, Jr., 248 SCRA 107, 120-121,
September 7, 1995.
27 People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 727-728, December 6, 1995.
28 People vs. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39, 45, March 1, 1995; People vs. Cayanan, 245 SCRA 66,
77 June 16, 1995.
29 People vs. Salodaga, 247 SCRA 98, 106, August 7, 1995; People vs. Dulatre, Jr., supra, p.
119.
30 People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620, 627, March 23, 1995; People vs. Torres, 247 SCRA
212, 217-218, August 11, 1995; People vs. Asoy, 251 SCRA 682, 689, December 29, 1995;
People vs. Tami, 244 SCRA 1, 22, May 2, 1995; People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, 145, May
15, 1995; People vs. De Leon, 245 SCRA 538, 546-547, July 3, 1995.
31 People vs. Miranday, supra.

32 People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 93, April 29, 1994; People vs. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA
215, 230-231, November 18, 1994; Fonacier vs. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 655, 695,
December 5, 1994.
33 People vs. Padrones, 189 SCRA 496, 506-507, September 13, 1990 per Sarmiento, J.
34 People vs. Vda. de Quijano, 220 SCRA 66, 71, March 17, 1993; People vs. Buntan, Sr. 221
SCRA 421, 430, April 12, 1993; People vs. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349, 361, November 4, 1992.
35 People vs. Halili, 245 SCRA 340, 352, June 27, 1995; Sabiniano vs. Court of Appeals, 249
SCRA 24, 29, October 6, 1995; People vs. Argawanon, 231 SCRA 614, 618, March 30, 1994.
36 People vs. Orehuela, supra, p. 94.
37 Art. 18, Revised Penal Code.
38 People vs. Lojo, 122 SCRA 753, 757-758, June 24, 1983.
39 Art. 19(1); People vs. Cordova, 224 SCRA 319, 338, July 5, 1993; People vs. Verzola, 80
SCRA 600, 608, December 21, 1977; and People vs. Amajul, 1 SCRA 682, 689-690, February
28, 1961.
40 Art. 53, Revised Penal Code.
41 Art. 64(1), Revised Penal Code.
42 TSN, March 17, 1993, pp. 40-47.
43 TSN, March 16, 1993, pp. 4-7.
44 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
45 Ibid., pp. 11-15.
46 TSN, June 2, 1993, pp. 3-8.
47 Rollo, pp. 31-34.
48 People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191, 201, January 18, 1995; People vs. Dolar, et al., 231
SCRA 414, 422-423, March 24, 1994; People vs. De Guzman, 216 SCRA 754, 759-760,
December 21, 1992.

BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Vicente Y. Bayani for petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 80130 August 19, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:p
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated September 16, 1987 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch VII of Palo, Leyte, dated January 11, 1984, convicting him as an accomplice in
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 172 thereof. 1
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of
hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with Banco Filipino,
Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was befriended by Glicerio Balo,
Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban Branch. On several occasions,
petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to nightclubs or have drinking sprees. 2
They became close friends. Balo even became the godfather of Abejuela's daughter. 3
Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in the latter's welding business, claiming
that he was expecting a large sum of money out of the insurance policy of his late father.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela's welding shop to borrow the latter's passbook.
Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his passbook. Balo
showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father's insurance policy.
He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela's account with Banco Filipino. Abejuela then
suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained that he was prohibited
from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was employed with that bank as a
savings bookkeeper. Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead with another bank but
Balo insisted that he wanted the checks deposited with Banco Filipino so that he could
facilitate their immediate encashment as well as avail himself of some privileges. Balo assured
Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to use his passbook and even
reassured Abejuela that he would accompany him to the bank to make the deposit.
Accepting Balo's explanations and assurances Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo. On
August 8,1978, Balo returned Abejuela's passbook where a deposit in the amount of
P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing
wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of his checks. On the same, day
Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the former's behalf, money from his account
with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela reluctantly agreed. He went to
Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 which he gave to Balo at a restaurant
called Felisa's Cafe.
Balo's practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela's passbook continued for
quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela with Banco
Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of P175,607.96.
In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days from
August 9, 1978. But feeling apprehensive over Balo's constant use of his passbook, Abejuela
decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his father and

taking the other P10,000.00 from his business profits. 4 Abejuela also closed his account with
Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of his deposit.
Thereafter, the bank's accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy between
the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest bookkeeper
could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He also notice that
Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four (4) large deposits on
various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling P176,145.25, but the deposits
slips thereof could not be located.
After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest
bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the savings
bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account ledger. They
concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the fictitious deposits after
banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by the bank
accountant.
The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the accusations,
but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuela was also implicated
because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing his fraudulent
scheme. On December 5,1978, an information was filed against Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. 5
Separately arraigned, both pleaded "not guilt to the crime charged 6 Trial followed.
On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an order of
preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin
Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled or
misappropriated. On September 4,1979, the Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return of
service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which goods
were placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the refrigerator and
television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a good pace on
account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at P62,295.00. 7
In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reportedly killed by members of the New
People's Army in the mountains of Mati Balangkayan Eastern Samar, on suspicion that he was
a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a rattan gatherer and former
NPA member whose testimony before the court a quo was never impeached. Consequently,
on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice to a civil action for recovery of
damages arising from the offense which may be instituted by Banco Filipino and without
prejudice also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal action in the event the accused
would turn out to be alive. 8 On September 7, 1981, Banco Filipino filed a motion praying for
the forfeiture in its favor of the goods seized from the accused which were in the custody of
the National Bureau of investigation. On November 5, 1981, the trial court, thru District Judge
Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, granted the motion and ordered the National Bureau of Investigation
to deliver the seized goods to Banco Filipino. In addition, the bank was authorized to withdraw
the savings deposit of Glicerio Balo, Jr. for eventual reversion to said bank. 9
Thereafter, trial continued with respect to petitioner Abejuela. On January 11, 1984, the lower
court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial

document under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 172 thereof
and as the amount involved is more than P22,000 he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of not less than fifteen (15) years, three months and 11 days to not more than sixteen
(16) years, eight months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify Banco Filipino,
Tacloban Branch, in the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Thousand One Hundred Forty Five
Pesos and Twenty Five Centavos (P 176,145.25), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay one half of the costs.
On May 29, 1979, the court issued a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties of
defendants Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela. This Attachment is hereby made
permanent. 10
Abejuela appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 1987, the Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 11 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied in a resolution dated October 7, 1987. Hence the instant appeal.
Petitioner Abejuela contends that the Appellate Court erred in not acquitting him for the
following reasons:
(1) Accused-petitioner has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused, Glicerio
Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, be cannot be convicted as principal, neither as
accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime, hence, he cannot be convicted
even as an accessory.
(2) The lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith, and after he
was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is necessary because as employee of
Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said hank
(3) The presumption of innocence and the 'equipoise rule' apply in favor of accused-petitioner.
12

Respondents, in their comment, maintain that petitioner Abejuela had knowledge of the
fraudulent acts of Glicerio Balo, Jr. They asseverate that petitioner is an intelligent individual
who can take care of his concerns, considering that he is a businessman who finished third
(3rd) year college (commerce). 13
Respondent also point out that Abejuela should not only have been convicted as an
accomplice but as a principal by indispensable cooperation, because without the withdrawal
slips which he executed allegedly in spite of his many doubts and apprehensions, Glicerio
Balo, Jr. could not have succeeded in his scheme.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he had no knowledge at all of the fraudulent
machinations of Balo, and that his act of lending his passbook was done in good faith.
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into consideration the
evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela was completely
unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo's own admissions, it was he who
deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and parties and cajoled
him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody would have
questioned Balo's source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the insurance
proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be his
father's insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo indeed had
money. Balo's request to borrow Abejuela's passbook in order to facilitate the encashment of
the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were close friends and
"compadres", Abejuela's acquiescence to Balo's overtures is understandable.

Furthermore, the court takes judicial notice of the practice of banks in allowing anybody to
deposit in an account even without the owner's passbook, as long as the account number is
known. Thus, even without Abejuela's passbook, the false deposits could still have been
posted by Balo in the savings account ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is the record of
the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is the record of the
depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and up-to-date. This is
the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded transactions like
interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank charges.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one who had
posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela's ledger. He was also the one who wisely manipulated
petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his Balo disposal,
Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the amount he had earlier placed in the
latter's account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually believed that the money
was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that he was interested in it. Thus,
the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Abejuela had
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could be attributed to Abejuela
was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal in this case, (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in
order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there must be
cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the
cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally,
which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the offense intended
to be committed.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the criminal
intention of the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice.
Thus:
It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished the
means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said criminal
design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is an accomplice
therein. 14
There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually
participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered as a
principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying outside of the
house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, appellant effectively
supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. 15
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary
before a judgment of conviction can be rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the Court's
mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not
on mere assumptions. 16
In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner
Abejuela has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which reason he must be
acquitted. The question that must be resolved now is the effect of Abejuela's acquittal on his
civil liability.

The Rules provide: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who
may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered."
17

We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had knowledge of
the plan of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false deposits and withdrawing
these later. Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will not extinguish his civil liability.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the same is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases, or where the court has
expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature. 18
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 19 we declared:
.1s1
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of s own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same
be punishable by law.
It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of
P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and systematically
withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela, was unaware of
the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their
eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the
withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care. Therefore, he must be held
civilly accountable.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979 against
petitioner's properties and those of his co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their civil
obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made permanent by the
said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I quite agree with the holding of the Chief Justice's ponencia that Benjamin Abejuela must be
held civilly accountable and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court against Abejuela's properties and those of his coaccused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy
their civil obligation in the amount of P 176,145.25.
At the same time, I submit, with respect, that Abejuela should not be completely exonerated of
criminal liability. The facts in this case appear so similar as to be practically on all fours with

the facts in Samson v. Court of Appeals (103 Phil. 277 [19581). In Samson, the Court held the
accused guilty of "estafa through falsification of commercial documents by reckless
negligence." Two (2) out of ten (10) members of the Court dissented: Reyes, J.B.L., J. and
Concepcion, J. As far as I can determine, however, Samson has not been overruled,
expressly or impliedly. Upon the other hand, the doctrine in Samson was explicitly followed in
People v. Rodis, et al. (105 Phil. 1294 [1959]), where the Court held that the accused could be
held liable for the crime of "malversation of public funds through falsification of a public
document by reckless negligence." Much the same doctrine has been applied in both earlier
and subsequent cases: U.S. v. Malesa et al. (14 Phil. 468 [1909]) (Falsification of documents
through reckless negligence); People v. Blancas (56 Phil. 801 [19311) (Unpublished)
(Falsification of public document through reckless negligence); People v. Leopando (C.A.) 36
O.G. 2937 (1938) (Falsification of public document through reckless negligence); Sarep v.
Sandiganbayan (177 SCRA 440 [1989]) (Falsification of public document through reckless
imprudence).
Finally, it might be noted that the ponencia explicitly found Abejuela to have acted with
reckless negligence:
... although Abejuela was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he
nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting
his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence
and care. Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable. (Emphasis supplied)
Footnotes
1 Criminal Case No. 3272.
2 TSN, p. 7, July 26, 1983.
3 TSN, p. 17, July 26, 1983; p. 5, August 17, 1983.
4 TSN, pp. 3-4, 6 and 24, July 26, 1983.
5 Original Record, pp. 1-10.
6 Ibid, pp. 94 and 106.
7 Original Record, pp. 287-288.
8 Original Record, pp. 235-236.
9 Original Record, pp. 296-302.
10 Original Record, pp. 480-481.
11 Rollo, pp. 118-125.
12 Rollo, p. 178.
13 Rollo, p. 134.
14 People vs. Lingad, 51 O.G. p. 6191; Emphasis supplied.
15 People vs. Balili, No. L-14044, August 5,1966,17 SCRA 892, 898; Emphasis supplied.
16 Gaerlan vs, Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 57876, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 20.
17 Rule 111, Sec. 2 (c)
18 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-39999, May 31, 1984, 129 SCRA 558, citing PNB vs.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286 and De Guzman vs. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558.
19 G.R. Nos. 78911-25. December 11, 1987, 156 SCRA 325, 330.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and
ANTONIO ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple
frustrated homicide and assault upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14, 1966, in
Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial, the other five named only as
"John Does" in the information having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood
trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of first
Instance of Rizal, imposed the death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble,
Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The decision of the trial court is now before Us for
review for having imposed the death penalty.
Both the de ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio,
a retired Justice of this Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed decision, and as
quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material facts accurately reflect the evidence
presented, except only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors, with respect to which
appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).
As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:
Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily armed with pistols,
carbines and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to
Navotas, Rizal. "Their mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company. Once in Navotas and taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men
disembarked from the banca and proceeded to the beach in the direction of the branch bank.
Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the people around in panic. As confusion
reigned, the people ran in different directions scampering for safety. As time went on, the
shots grew in intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their banca,
still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the
waiting motor banca and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and
some injured. Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala
of the Philippine Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teofilo Evangelista of the
Navotas Police Department. Dominador Estrella, a market collector, was also killed. 'Those
who were injured were Pat. Armando Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina
Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.
The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North hay Boulevard,
Navotas, Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an unusual banking hours. It opens at
midnight and closes at 8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten employees, more or less,
including a security guard. It has two cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under

the care of Melvin Domingo and the other one under the care of Alejandro San Juan. At
around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant cashier of the bank, was near the
cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank asking that their money be changed.
Domingo refused, saying that they had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men armed
with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They ordered the
employees to lie down, face downward and then demanded the key to the vault. When Reyes
answered that they do not have the key, the armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired
upon it until its doors were opened. They entered the vault and found that they could not get
anything as the compartments inside the said vault were locked. Not being able to get
anything from the vault, the armed men went to the two teller cages and took whatever they
could lay their hands on. Not long afterwards, the men left, carrying with them the sum of
P10,439.95.
Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat. Nicolas Antonio was
in the outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl.
Evangelists. were on duty watching the fish landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30
a.m., he heard a burst which he believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man
pointing a Thompson upwards while he was in front of the banca Afterwards, Antonio said, he
heard another burst coming from the same direction. Antonio and his companions then went
to the middle of the road and again they heard shots, and this time they were successive,
coming from their left. Antonio could not see who was firing the shots. Suddenly, he said, he
saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella
sitting down folding his stomach. They were both felled by the shots coming from the left side
of the bank. Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm.
Sgt. Aguilos, however, collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to
the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo to go too. He said that from the outpost he heard some
more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh. After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his
wounded companions placed in a vehicle, together with Evangelista and Aguilos who were
already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the PC, lying prostrate in the
ground already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).
It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing that
followed in its wake were actually committed, the three appellants had no participation. It is
not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the acquittal of one of the
appellants, Simeon Doble. With this recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of
this appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.
In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following
observation:
As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in his house to
discuss the plan to rob the Prudential Bank This circumstance, standing alone, does not
conclude his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act
tending to the perpetration of the robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced
other persons to commit, or that he cooperated in its consummation by some act without
which it would not have been committed. It could be that Simeon was present at the meeting
held in his house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme but, aside from this, he
did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by the others. At most, his act
amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence,
or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to

constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose (15 CJS 1062).
We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that Simeon was a
principal both by agreement and encouragement, despite his non-participation in the
commission of the crime. Nor was it clearly proved that Simeon received a part of the looted
money as to make him an accessory. Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he
gave P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly
be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is significant that in his statement he claimed
he had not yet received his share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief; p. 146, Rollo).
A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to
be with convincing rationality it is only that portion in which is cited Simeon's statement made
before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not
yet received his share" that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor General's
recommendation, for it gives the impression that Simeon had given material or moral support
or encouragement to the malefactors (referring to those still at large as the principal culprits)
as to entitle him to a share in the loot. However, a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement
would erase that impression, and reveals the true import of that statement as intended only to
show that Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not
receive any share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions Of his statement. on
custodial investigation:
3. T Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?
S Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal
at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.
4. T Kailan ka hinuli?
S Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero nito pong buwan
na ito.
5. T Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang bangko dito sa
Navotas?
S Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong nangholdap
dito sa Navotas.
6. T Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?
S Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at ang mga kilala ko
lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe Rondina Cresencio Doble at narinig
kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan pero makikilala
ko Pag aking nakitang muli.
7. T Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?
S Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi (June 13,
1966).
8. T Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?
S Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,
9. T Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?
S Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being shown five (5) other
pictures).
10. T Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?
S Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal.
11. T Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay nakikinig lamang.
12. T Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa ang iba mong
mga narinig?
S Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose Rondina na
"MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY HANDA
TAYO."
13. T Ano pa ang sumunod?
S Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.
14. T Ano pa ang nangyari?
S Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.
15. T Pagkatapos?
S Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.
16. T Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?
S Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay nagmamadali na silang
umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon ay
nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil iyong
aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa amin.
17. T Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay mayroong nais
na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?
S Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.
18. T Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?
S Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang lahat at ako ay
sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na lamang ang
maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi ako makatakbo at
qqqmahuh lamang.
19. T Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?
S Opo, may limang (5) taon na.
20. T Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?
S Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.
21. T Ano pa ang masasabi mo?
S Wala na po.
The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the meeting
place of the malefactors for their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the
Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury
which would make him only a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the
malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because
it was near the landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting
for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his house where the conspirators met, and for
merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury, and will just wait for
them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal
purpose, for he could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being
suspected that he was against their vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by
no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active part in the talks among the
malefactors in his house.
Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the
commission of the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in any way

be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have been
desired by the latter to be one of them.
Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main
contention is that their extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was principally
made to rest, are inadmissible for having been allegedly obtained by force and intimidation,
and in violation of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination. In
support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon.
Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone he
could not name boxed him on the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left side with the
butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he was made to lie on a narrow table
and peppery liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it was then
that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he could not read because of his blurred
eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to admit
culpable participation in the heist. The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the claim of
violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to render said statements
inadmissible in evidence.
Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements (Exhibits
E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by how the details as
given by both appellants in their respective statements fit into each other, at least as to the
part played by each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to procure the latter's
banca up to their get-away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his
statement that although he wanted to escape from the scene after his passengers have
disembarked for their evil mission, he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed
at him to prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio by the rest of the gang. The
latter denied this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he
did not know how to use or manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M,
p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he stated that he accepted the gun.
The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is generally
taken as an indication of lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving his statement on
custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679).
The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to which
appellant's were subjected to, that neither one of the appellants presented medical certificate
to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's Brief) which disproves the claim
(People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to the
fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one
of the accused, made no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his
testimony in court, he admitted that no violence was applied to him when he gave his
statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough that the
appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was
allowed to give his statement freely without the employment of force or intimidation upon him.
The evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E) of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin asking
the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the names of the
members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both appellants. That the
Identity of five of those charged in this case has remained only as "John Does" indicate the

non-employment of any coercive means with which to force them into revealing the names of
their companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture and violence.
It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed their
extra-judicial statements when they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited, persuasive
enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements plus the positive denial of Sgt.
Lacson, the only one named among the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced by
the investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18,
t.s.n., October 27, 1967) the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully
discredited.
It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to escape could
have instilled fear in the minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of will in giving
their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is a far-fetched argument to prove
involuntariness in the giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after their
interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of
Exhibits), Romaquin pointed to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place
long after appellants have given their main statements, all in mid June, 1966. If counsel de
oficio had only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of both appellants which
were given not later than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary
statement of Romaquin which is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this
argument.
Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd.
694, harps on the inadmissibility of appellants' custodial statements, for their having been
unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right thereto during the interrogation. 'There might
be merit in this contention were the right to counsel during custodial interrogation one of
constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the right was given
only to an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs.
Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People vs. Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time
of their custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite of assistance of counsel was not
yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new 1973
Constitution.
The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be appreciated to
impair the admissibility of their extra-judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an admission
or confession that determines its admissibility, for no principle of law or constitutional precept
should stand on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only requisite justly
demanded being that ample safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the
element of voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed,
the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession, admission or statement becomes
unquestionable. 1
The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the testimony they
gave in court, would convince Us that their liability is less than that of a co-principal by
conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the holding of the trial court. The most
damaging admission made in the extra-judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was asked
by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if he could
procure a banca for his use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told
him that the banca would be used for robbery. Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe
Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio accompanied Joe

Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1,
Romaquin, p. 15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his
banca, to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of
Cresencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca is at once apparent, for while
according to the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the latter, it was to
bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated
thereby is the full freedom with which both appellants were allowed to give their respective
statements while in custodial interrogation.
Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a coconspirator. Neither would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band of
malefactors that would commit the robbery more than just asking his help to look for a banca.
Joe Intsik had enough men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the
commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual
confidence of each other, which is not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were
asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery.
Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at large, to be
asked to join actively in the conspiracy. The amount received by Romaquin who alone was
given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00, indicate that the latter did not consider
appellant as their confederate in the same character as those constituting the band of robbers.
The sum given to Romaquin could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the
cooperation he extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one.
Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin who
gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he were a full-fledged ally or
confederate.
The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious
misdeeds, Romaquin might speed away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as shown
by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further proof that Romaquin was not
considered a co-conspirator, who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For his
part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who
might escape, he returned the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the
malefactors was left near the beach to prevent appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime
with banca. In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he refused to
accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he received it.
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime
charged. At the most their liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in the
criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and Romaquin provided it
when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of
the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was
the banca that brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from
the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not
in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could
have been committed, specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in
committing the crime.
The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26, Record
of Exhibits) addressed to Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the names of their

companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for money which the latter gave in the sum of
P41.00, as if to show that he had helped in some material way to deserve a share in the loot.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which
the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently to show that
he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts were in fear of bodily harm and
therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent his escape, could
have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the course of the
commission of the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that
he never voluntarily made the trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio
saying that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding
away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he
not joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the
malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of
cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve their criminal purpose.
An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18,
Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of unlawful purpose between the principal
and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco 11 Phil. 526),
to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way
(People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of
a car used for abduction which makes the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs.
Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-15009.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon
Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob.
What appellants may be said to have joined is the criminal design to rob, which makes them
accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing.
Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of
one seeking relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised
Penal Code). 2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering
the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged. The evidence,
however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy with the real malefactors
who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons, including peace officers.
The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring
the wrath of the victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose
participation has not been shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The
desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting out a
penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, but only as accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. 3 As discussed
earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so recommended by the Solicitor
General who finds no sufficient evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as
accomplices for the crime of robbery in band is prision mayor minimum which has a range of 6
years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to

Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by
nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no mitigating circumstance, both
appellants should each be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four
(4) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the sum of 1112,000.00 not
P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects. The immediate release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted is ordered,
unless he should be continued in confinement for some other legal cause. Proportionate costs
against Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient attitude, I can agree
that they were not principals but merely accomplices as stated in the main opinion. However, I
cannot persuade myself that their complicity must be limited to the robbery only and should
not include the killing. For it must be remembered that the principal malefactors were each
fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns, This
fact was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors has so many guns that one
was given to Cresencio with which to cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows
that the principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an accomplice so that they could
accomplish their criminal objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal design
to kill but only to rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I
cannot believe that under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal
design to kill and that they gave their cooperation albeit not indispensable only to the
robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as accomplices in the
crime of robbery with homicide.
Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos.
Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.
Footnotes
1 People vs. Molleda 86 SCRA 667; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53; People vs, Narciso, 23
SCRA 844.
2 People vs. Hamiana 89 Phil. 225.
3 People vs. Palencia, 71 SCRA 679; People vs. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246; People vs.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 34386

February 7, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias
"CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero,
charged with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the
crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the
court a quo the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty
as principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as
accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio,
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the minor
child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to mitigate the
penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE
IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to
6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan
Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1
Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4
Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional penalty of
2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by the
minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed
Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of

P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00;
and the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay threefourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4)
cost de oficio. 1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once
thereat, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme cruelty,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike
Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter,
the same accused while already on the road, conspiring together and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack
and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused
his death. 2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision,
the trial court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de
Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of
Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of
his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero,
81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he
died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado
and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and
Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately
thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo
Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on
November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
(sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came
from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo.
Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or
reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun
with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession
of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico
Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so
she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay
in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico.
Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun.
While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out.

Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three
accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her.
She told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At
about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three
accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused,
Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be patient and
forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they
struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio
Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo
Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of
Maria Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house of
Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and
Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at
their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their
house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going
up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she
heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your children."
Then she saw the three accused coming down from the house, going towards the road where
they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he fell. When Antonio
Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left. 3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the
crossing of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was
with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio
Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7
hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home.
(p. 8, Ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed,
however, Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun
why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a
downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the
process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed
his bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman
and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as
his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico
tried to escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run
(sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal,
together with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in
the kitchen downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing
June 8, 1971-Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might
meet something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the

door. Then he ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer
anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins,
Juanito and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial
Sagun, who was also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house
calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial
Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial
Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the
back of his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19,
tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri
tree, thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from the
south or the east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him
coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and
thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man was
Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked Marcelo
Doctolero where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your
foolishness" and hit him on the shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico
Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took
a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on
his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the
latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times. (pp. 1926, ibid). 4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A
doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then taken. 5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below
established that
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead.
There is fracture of the underlying skull.
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the
underlying skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right
eyebrow. There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the
lower border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level of
the middle finger.
(8) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm,
left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx
xxx
xxx

One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3
cms. long and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the
sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal
bone at the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the right
frontal portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony
portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right.
There was fracture of some of the underlying bones. 6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: "Stab
wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm,
right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There
was also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child
was admitted to the hospital on November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely healed
fifteen (15) days later. 7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on
May 17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal 8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day. 9
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accusedappellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per
death certificate attached thereto as Annex "A". 10 Hence, this review is only with respect to
the liability of appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice
in the commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated
in the commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at
the place where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not
corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While
the testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from
a polluted source and must be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel
suspicion.11
This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations
of the prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves
more credence. 12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants.
The only imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants

occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as
shown by the following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic)
your relationship with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail to
see you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house. 13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of
Marcial Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed
Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While
Maria Sagun may have a grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that
previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should
also implicate Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime." 14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit. 15
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the
prosecution was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved,
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain
inconsistencies that allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses incredible.
These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As
correctly explained by the People, the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere
inconsequential variations on the part of each observer in relating his own observation of the
same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of witnesses in regard to the details of an
incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all persons
who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural that said
eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details. 17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which
refer to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 18 And where
the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the
crime and the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions
become insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the
investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is
accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed
that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the
contrary. Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an
improper motive other than that of accomplishing his mission. 20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of
San Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the
Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the
scene of the crime and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused
Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun. 21

In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the
weight to be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as
accomplices in the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree
with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling
challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women
thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn.
Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up
the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally
killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child
Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and
locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1),
it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming
that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of their brother's
victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother
Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is
obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on
inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their
brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore,
reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their
brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend
assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in
the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and
reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two
defenseless women and a child. 22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house
while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the
criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. 23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or
impulse, thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be
rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended
by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. 24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus 25 that where the
accomplices therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they were
responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide
was unknown to the accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants
Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with
regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal
participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the
milder form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices, 26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on
Jonathan Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability

of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of
twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado
Doctolero as an accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only
his criminal liability but not his civil liability. 27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the
same should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and
the judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with
respect to him.

21

Original Record, 228-229.

Brief for the Appellee. 42-44: Rollo, 135.
23
People vs. Balili, et al., 17 SCRA 892 (1966).
24
People vs. Largo, et al., 99 Phil. 1061 (1956).
25
2 Phil. 514 (1903).
26
People vs. Torejar, 43 SCRA 158 (1972); People vs. Irenea, 164 SCRA 481 (1988).
27
People vs. Garachico, et al., 113 SCRA 131 (1982); People vs. Pamintuan, et al., 126 SCRA
5 (1983); People vs. Salig, et al., 133 SCRA 59 (1984).
22

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10)
years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each
for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on
Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are
ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the
respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to
pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 128966
Footnotes
1
Original Record, 239-240.
2
Ibid., 50.
3
Ibid., 215-218.
4
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 3-6; Rollo; 110.
5
Original Record, 79-80.
6
Original Record. 218-220.
7
TSN. January 12, 1971, 5-7.
8
Rollo, 149.
9
Ibid., 150.
10
Ibid., 171.
11
People vs. Aquino. 57 SCRA 43 (1974).
12
People vs. Macabenta, 170 SCRA 203 (1989).
13
TSN, February 18, 1971, 58.
14
Original Record, 228.
15
People vs. Samson, 176 SCRA 710 (1989).
16
People vs. Perez, 175 SCRA 203 (1989).
17
Brief for the Appellee, 39; Rollo, 135.
18
People vs. Lamosa, 173 SCRA 518 (1989).
19
People vs. Baysa, et al., 172 SCRA 706 (1989).
20
People vs. Mahumanding, 174 SCRA 237 (1989).

August 18, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM, KENNETH FLORENDO
and ELMER CASTRO, accused,
EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction
between the two?
Statement of the Case
These are the main questions passed upon by the Court in resolving the present appeal,
which assails the March 12, 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 57) in Criminal Case No. Q-92-31323, finding Appellant Edwin De Vera and Accused
Roderick Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero charged
with murder Appellant Edwin De Vera, together with Roderick Garcia and two other persons

who were subsequently identified during the trial as Kenneth Florendo and Elmer Castro. The
crime was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and
use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal.
with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo
inside, hitting him between his eyes and striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the
mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Frederick Capulong y Dizon.2
On July 9, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor Enrico P. Bringas filed a Motion to Amend the
Information to include the use of a .32 caliber firearm in the killing of Frederick Capulong. The
trial court granted the Motion, and the Amended Information now reads as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring [and] confederating [with] and helping . . . two (2) other persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and
use of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
FREDERICK CAPULONG y DIZON, by then and there shooting him with the use of a .22 cal.
with trade mark "Paspar Armas" bearing SN-29069 with five (5) pieces of caliber 22 ammo
inside and a .32 cal. firearm of still undetermined make, hitting him between his eyes and
striking him with the use of a baseball bat in the mouth, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Frederick Capulong y Dizon. 3
On their arraignment, Appellant Edwin De Vera4 and Roderick Garcia5 pleaded not guilty. The
other two accused were at large. Trial in due course proceeded only against De Vera and
Garcia. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused EDWIN DE VERA y GARCIA
and RODERICK GARCIA y GALAMGAM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and they are hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, including
all its accessory penalties; to indemnify the heirs of Frederick Capulong y Dizon, as follows:
a) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;
b) P211,670.00, as compensatory damages;
c) P600,000.00, as indemnification for loss of earning capacity;
d) P500,000.00, as moral damages;
e) Interest at the legal rate on a) and b), hereof from the filing of the information until full
payment; and,
f) Costs of suit.16
Only Edwin De Vera filed a Notice of Appeal.7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,8 the Office of the Solicitor General presented the following narration of facts: 9
As earlier stated, the prosecution presented an eyewitness in the person of Bernardino
Cacao, a resident of Denver Loop Street, Filinvest II, Quezon City before he moved to No. 58

Elisa Street, Caloocan City. He was residing at Filinvest II, together with his wife and children,
at the time of the incident on June 28, 1992 in the house owned by David Lim. He was then
employed at a Kodak branch in Caloocan City, while his wife served as secretary of the
homeowners association.1wphi1.nt
About 1:30 in the afternoon of June 8, 1992, while bringing out the garbage, the witness saw a
car passing by, driven by victim Frederick Capulong together with four (4) other passengers.
He knew the victim by name who was a resident of the subdivision. He recognized and
identified two of the passengers as Kenneth Florendo and Roderick Garcia, both familiar in
the subdivision.
Cacao did not at first notice anything unusual inside the car while it passed by him, but then
he heard unintelligible voices coming from the car as it was cruising around Denver Loop
Street, a circular road whose entrance and exit were through the same point (ibid, p. 12). His
curiosity taking [the] better part of him, Cacao walked to the opposite side of the road from
where he saw the car already parked. Moments later, he saw the victim dragged out of the car
by Florendo and brought to a grassy place. Florendo was holding a gun (ibid, p. 13). Upon
reaching the grassy spot, Florendo aimed and fired the gun at the victim, hitting him between
the eyes, After the shooting, Florendo and his companions fled in different directions.
When he submitted a sworn statement to the investigating prosecutor, Cacao attached a
sketch of the crime scene prepared by police officers, indicating therein his relative position at
the time of the incident. While testifying in court, Cacao identified Garcia and pointed to
appellant as among the companions of Florendo.
Ten minutes later, or about 2:40 in the afternoon, the desk officer of the Investigation Division,
Station 5, Central Police District, Quezon City received a report about the shooting incident
from a security guard of the subdivision. The officer immediately dispatched a team to
Filinvest II, composed of PO2 Armando Garcia, PO3 Armando Junio, and PO3 Jovencio
Villacorte, to investigate and gather evidence (TSN, p. 5, September 13, 1993). A security
guard guided the team to the corner of Denver and Doa Justina Streets, site of the shooting,
where they discovered blood stains and damaged grass (ibid, p. 6). The guard informed them
that the victim was rushed to the East Avenue Medical Center by other security guards. The
policemen then found a color red sports car with plate no. NBZ 869, with engine still running
and its doors opened. They recovered inside the car several class cards and a license
belonging to one Ric Capulong, who was later identified as Frederick Capulong.
The policemen went around the subdivision to look for possible suspects. They came upon a
person wearing muddled maong pants and white t-shirt "standing and walking around" near
the clubhouse of the subdivision. When asked his name, the person identified himself as
Edwin de Vera, herein appellant. Explaining the mud stains on his pants, appellant declared
that he was a victim of a hold-up. Suspicious [of] his conduct, the policemen brought appellant
to Station 5 and turned him over to the desk officer for investigation.
Another prosecution witness, SPO3 Mario Guspid, a police investigator since 1989, was
assigned to investigate the shooting of Frederick Capulong. He was assisted by SPO4 Pablito
Selvido, SPO2 Armando Rivera, SPO3 Jovencio Villacorte, SPO3 Rolando Gacute, SPO3
Danilo Castro and other police officers.
Upon receiving his assignment, SPO3 Guspid immediately went to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he saw the victim lying inside the intensive care unit receiving medical
treatment. The victim was unconscious. After conferring with the victim's parents and relatives,
SPO3 Guspid returned to Station 5. On his arrival, the desk officer referred appellant to him

for questioning. He was told that appellant was picked up near the crime scene acting
suspiciously. When appellant was asked about his participation in the shooting, he was
reluctant at first to talk, but later relented after SPO3 Guspid told him that his conscience
would bother him less if he would tell the truth.
Without any hesitation, appellant admitted being [with the] group which perpetrated the crime,
and implicated Roderick Garcia. He was then persuaded to accompany a group of policemen
to the residence of Garcia, which turned out to be at Doa Justina Street, Filinvest II
Subdivision. Finding Garcia at home, SPO3 Guspid informed him that he was implicated by
appellant [in] the crime. He was then invited to the station to shed light [on] the incident.
Garcia consented.
At Station 5, SPO3 Guspid interviewed appellant and Garcia. In the course of the interview,
Garcia revealed the place where he hid a .22 caliber gun, black t-shirt and black cap.
According to Garcia, Florendo asked them to wear black t-shirts. With the revelation, SPO3
Guspid, SPO2 Rivera, SPO3 Gacute and SPO3 Castro, together with the suspects, went back
to the subdivision and proceeded to a grassy portion near the boundary of Filinvest II and San
Mateo, Rizal. The place was near a creek and about 50 meters away from the residence of
Garcia (TSN, pp. 9-14, September 30, 1993). Truly, the policemen recovered a .22 caliber
revolver, black t-shirt and black cap (TSN, pp. 12-13, August 24, 1993).While there, SPO3
Guspid and SPO2 Rivera prepared a sketch of the crime scene to reflect the explanations and
answers given by appellant and Garcia in response to their questions. As identifying marks,
SPO3 Gacute placed his initials "OG" (acronym for his first name and family name) between
the handle and cylinder of the gun, and on the neck of the t-shirt, as well as in the inner lining
of the black cap.
From the crime site, the policemen and the suspects returned to Station 5 where SPO3
Guspid asked them if they were willing to give their written statements, to which they
assented. Consequently, they were brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon
City Chapter, at Malakas Street, Diliman, Quezon City. They were then introduced to Atty.
Confesor Sansano, the [c]hairman of the Free Legal Aid of the IBP. Also, present at that time
were appellant's relatives, including his mother and sisters, and other lawyers of the IBP.
SPO3 Guspid inquired from them if they would agree to be assisted by Atty. Sansano, "a
competent lawyer." They replied in the affirmative. Thereafter, the two conferred with Atty.
Sansano.
Atty. Sansano, a rebuttal witness of the prosecution, testified that upon arrival of the suspects
[i]n his office, he requested the policemen, as a matter of policy, to step outside the building in
order to assure that no pressure would be exerted on the suspects even by their mere
presence (TSN, p. 6, November 6, 1996). After they left, Atty. Sansano interviewed the
suspects for about twenty minutes, informing them of their rights under the constitution and
inquiring from them if they indeed wanted to give voluntary statements. To the query, the
suspects answered positively. They also affirmed their earlier declaration that they were willing
to be assisted by the IBP (ibid, pp. 8-9). He further advised them of their right during the
investigation to answer or not to answer the questions which they thought would incriminate
them, but they retorted that they fully understood their right.
Satisfied that they were not coerced or threatened to give their statements, Atty. Sansano
requested the suspects to show their upper bodies to enable him to determine any telltale
signs of torture or bodily harm. Finding no such signs, he then summoned the policemen to reenter the building. The investigators readied two typewriters and each suspect was assigned

to an investigator. He served as the lawyer of the suspects, cautioning them against

answering questions that they did not understand, and to seek . . . a clarification, if needed.
According to Atty. Sansano, the interrogation took place in his office, a single separate room
from where his five staff members were visible. He sat between the two tables used by the
investigators for typing the questions and answers, involving himself from beginning to end of
the investigation until the signing of the statements. He never left the office to attend to
anything else, consistent with [the] standing policy of the IBP to properly safeguard the rights
of suspects during investigation.
He recalled that the investigators first typed the headings of the statements, then informed the
suspects before starting the investigation about their rights under the constitution, specifically,
the right of the suspects to have a lawyer of their own choice; if not, the police would provide
them with one who would assist them; that they could answer or refuse to answer the
questions. The investigators also asked him if he was willing to serve as counsel of the
suspects. They also asked the suspects if they were willing to accept him as their counsel.
They agreed expressly by saying: "Oho."
SPO3 Guspid investigated Garcia while SPO4 Selvido investigated appellant. They conducted
the question and answer investigation in Pilipino. The statement of appellant was marked as
Exhibit O and that of Garcia was marked as Exhibit N. The statements were signed by the
suspects and Atty. Sansano.
For his part, SPO4 Selvido declared that SPO3 Guspid requested his help in taking the
statements of the suspects (TSN, p. 4, June 29, 1993). He took the statement of appellant in
the presence of Atty. Sansano. Before proceeding, he reminded appellant of the constitutional
warnings, consisting of four (4) questions under the heading "Paunawa," to which the latter
gave positive answers. The statement was signed by appellant and Atty. Sansano. After taking
down the statement, he turned over appellant to SPO3 Guspid.
Following the investigation, the policemen brought the suspects to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory for paraffin testing. The result: "both hands of Edwin de Vera y Garcia
@ Boy/Bong gave positive results [in] the test for gunpowder nitrates while both hands of
Roderick Garcia y Galamgam @ Deo gave negative result [in] the test for gunpowder
nitrates."
After coming from the crime laboratory, SPO3 Guspid contacted the mother of the victim to get
her own statement. Next, he obtained a death certificate and prepared a referral to the
Quezon City Prosecution Office which was signed by Senior Inspector Ernesto Collado, Chief
of the Station Investigation Division. During the inquest, the prosecutor asked the suspects
some clarificatory questions.
Surveillance and follow-up operations were conducted against Florendo and his other
companion, Elmer Castro. However, the two were never arrested and brought to trial.
Version of the Defense
Appellant claims that he had no part in the killing, and that it was Kenneth Florendo who had
shot the victim. He avers that he merely accompanied to Filinvest the other accused and
Florendo, who was his friend, upon the latter's request. A few hours after the shooting incident,
appellant was picked up by the police, who subsequently tortured and coerced him into
signing his Statement regarding the incident. The trial court summarized appellant's evidence
in this wise:10

Edwin de Vera admitted that, as of June 8, 1992, he and Kenneth Florendo were already
close friends for about a year, sometimes sleeping in the latter's house at No. 106 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. His own residence at the time was at No. 7 Bignay Street, Project 2,
Quezon City. That was also the address of Elmer Castro, his and Kenneth's friend.
Edwin had slept in Kenneth's house on Kamias Road from June 6 to June 8, 1992 and went
home at 7:00 am of June 8th Later at around 10:30 am, Kenneth passed by Edwin's house to
invite him back to [the former's] house that morning and to bring Elmer along. Kenneth
mentioned that he, his girlfriend, and Deo, who were then with him, would be going
somewhere first. Deo, or Roderick Garcia, was another friend of Kenneth's.
Edwin and Elmer later went to and arrived at Kenneth's house at 11:00 am. Kenneth, his
girlfriend, and Deo were already taking lunch, and invited the two to lunch. After lunch,
Kenneth asked Edwin to go with him to Filinvest without telling why. It was Deo who
mentioned to Edwin that Kenneth was going to see a friend. Edwin was not aware if Kenneth
had also asked the others to go with him to Filinvest, but the four of them Kenneth, Edwin,
Elmer, and Deo later proceeded to Filinvest [i]n Kenneth's car. Edwin sat at the back seat.
The time was past 12:00 noon.
Kenneth drove his car. Upon reaching Filinvest, Kenneth stopped at a house and the four of
them alighted in front of the house. Edwin did not know whose house it was. Kenneth and
Elmer told Edwin and Deo to wait near the car because they were going to see a friend. At
that point in time, Edwin knew the person[,] whom Kenneth and Elmer went to see[,] by name,
never having met him personally before then. From his conversation with Deo, Edwin found
out that the house was where Deo stayed.
Then, Edwin heard the voices of Kenneth and his friend and they appeared to be arguing (". . .
. parang nagtatalo sila") The voices came from some twenty-two (22) meters away. Not before
long, Edwin also heard a gunshot which came from where Kenneth and Elmer had gone to.
He was shocked because he was not used to hearing gunfire. Frightened, he panicked and
ran away from the place. His singular thought while running was to get out of Filinvest. Deo
also ran away.
Edwin denied that either he or Deo carried any firearm on that occasion.
Edwin was arrested by the police at past 2:00 p.m. when he was already outside of Filinvest
subdivision in front of Batasan. He was brought to Station 5 where four (4) persons in civilian
attire tortured him by forcing him to lie down on a bench, tying his feet together and binding
his hands from his back with handcuffs, and then covering his face with a piece of dirty cloth
into which water was poured little by little into his face and mouth, while one of them sat on his
thighs. This maltreatment lasted for about 20 or 25 minutes, because they wanted him to
admit "something" and to name "my companions" but he refused to admit or to name anyone.
They next took him outside to a mango tree where they repeated his ordeal for 30 minutes. At
one point during the torture, a policeman untied his feet and hands and poked a gun to his
temple, telling him to run as it was his chance to escape, but he did not escape because he
could see that they were merely frightening him.
None of the policemen told him that he could . . . get a lawyer[;] instead, one of them, whose
name he [did] not know, told him that "I should listen only to them and not to anyone else." He
claimed that he saw one [of] his tormentors in court, and he identified him as police officer
Rivera. Guspid did not participate in his torture, because he merely took down his statement.
His tormentors were not drunk or under the influence of drugs, but Guspid seemed to be
under the influence of drugs when he took his statement because of his troubled appearance.

Edwin was not advised to inform or call any of his relatives. Before his torture, his request to
contact his relatives or lawyer was turned down. His intimidation continued (". . . . puro
pananakot and ginawa nila sa akin"). After his torture at the mango tree, he was returned
inside and thrown into a cell, where he remained until the following day (June 9th). During the
night, an inmate named Cesar boxed him once in the upper body upon instruction of a
policeman. He was not given any dinner.
At around noontime of the next day (June 9th), Edwin was taken out of the cell and brought to
the IBP office by police officers Guspid and Selvido. Also with them were Deo Garcia and two
other police officers. At the IBP office, the officers talked with one of the lawyers there, whom
Edwin came to know to be Atty. Sansano only after the lawyer was introduced ("present") to
him and Deo. That was the first he met and saw Atty. Sansano.
Atty. Sansano informed both Edwin and Deo that they had the choice whether to talk or not.
Edwin could not make any comment because "wala po ako sa sarili ko". Then, Atty. Sansano
warned Edwin substantially that: "Alam n'yo ba na ang salaysay na ito ay maaring hindi ninyo
sumpaan," referring to the statement taken from Edwin by officers Guspid at around past 8
p.m. until 9 p.m. on the day before (June 8, 1992) at the police station. He was not assisted by
counsel, and had no relatives present. Guspid appeared to be "like drunk or tipsy," when he
took down Edwin's statement that night."
At the IBP office, Edwin's and Deo's statement were taken separately by Guspid and Selvido,
respectively. At the time, Edwin and Deo were about six (6) meters from each other, but he
could hear what was being asked of Deo. Guspid asked the questions and typed both the
questions and his answers, which were given in Tagalog. All the while, Atty. Sansano was
inside his office, which was about seven (7) meters away from where he and Guspid were
situated. The office of Atty. Sansano was separated by a divider, so that he could not see what
Atty. Sansano was doing at the time. After the questioning, he signed a paper which he was
not able to read. He did not see Atty. Sansano sign the paper.
xxx
xxx
xxx
On July 14, 1992, Edwin executed a so-called salaysay ng pagbabawi ng sinumpaang
salaysay, which he swore to before Prosecutor Tobia of Quezon City, for the purpose of
recanting his statements given at the precinct in the evening of June 8, 1992 and at the IBP
office on June 9, 1992 on the ground that they were given under coercion, intimidation, and in
violation of his constitutional rights.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Based on the testimony of Eyewitness Bernardino Cacao, the trial court ruled that it was
indeed Kenneth Florendo who had actually shot the victim, Roderick Capulong. It convicted
appellant as a principal, however, because "the scientific and forensic findings on the criminal
incident directly and substantially confirmed the existence of conspiracy among the four
[accused], namely, Kenneth Florendo, Elmer Castro, Edwin de Vera, and Roderick Garcia. 11
The Issues
Appellant submits for the consideration of this Court the following alleged errors:
I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PROSECUTION EYE-WITNESS
BERNARDO CACAO HAD TESTIFIED TO NO CRIMINAL ACT OF APPELLANT;
II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY TO KILL THE VICTIM AND THAT APPELLANT WAS A CO-CONSPIRATOR;

III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT "O", ALLEGED STATEMENT OF
APPELLANT; AND IN NOT DECLARING THE SAME AS AN INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
CONSIDERING THE BARBARIC MANNER UNDER WHICH IT WAS
EXTRACTED/OBTAINED FROM THE APPELLANT WHICH VIOLATED THE LATTER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND DECLARING THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT PROVED THE APPELLANT'S GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE APPELLANT.12
In the main, the Court will resolve three questions: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, (2) the admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial statement, and (3) the nature of his
liability.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only as an accomplice, not as
a principal.
First and Third Issues:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence and Appellant's Liability
Because the first and the third questions mentioned above are interrelated, they shall be
discussed jointly.
Eyewitness Account
In ruling that there was conspiracy between Florendo, Castro, Garcia and Appellant De Vera,
the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of Eyewitness Cacao. Specifically, it based its
conclusions on the following facts: appellant was seen with the other accused inside the
victim's car; the victim was clearly struck with a blunt object while inside the car, and it was
unlikely for Florendo to have done it all by himself; moreover, it was impossible for De Vera
and Garcia to have been unaware of Florendo's dark design on Roderick.
We disagree. It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt.13 In the present case, the bare testimony of Cacao fails to do so.
Cacao testified that he saw Appellant De Vera in the car, where an altercation later occurred.
Thereafter, he saw Florendo drag out of the vehicle an apparently disabled Capulong and
shoot the victim in the head moments later.
Cacao's testimony contains nothing that could inculpate appellant. Aside from the fact that he
was inside the car, no other act was imputed to him. Mere presence does not amount to
conspiracy.14 Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions, and
not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit murder. Such
suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court has repeatedly
stated, criminal conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.
Clearly, Cacao's testimony does not establish appellant's culpability.
Appellant's Extrajudicial
Statement
Aside from the testimony of Cacao, the prosecution also presented Appellant De Vera's
extrajudicial statement, which established three points.
First, appellant knew of Kenneth Florendo's malevolent intention.
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag
kang maging kasapakat nito?

S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.15
Second, appellant's companions were armed that day, a fact which revealed the unmistakable
plan of the group.
T: Ikaw ba ay mayroong dalang armas noong hapon na iyo[n]?
S: Wala po akong dalang armas. Pero itong si Kenneth ay mayroong dalang dalawang baril[,]
sina Deo at Elmer ay wala. Pero noong naroroon na kami sa lugar ay ibinigay ni Kenneth ang
isang baril niya kay Deo at itong si Elmer ay mayroong nang dalang baseball bat.
Third, he cooperated with the other accused in the commission of the crime by placing himself
at a certain distance from Kenneth and the victim in order to act as a lookout. This is clear
from the following portion of his statement:
S: Kabarkada ko po si Kenneth at dalawang araw po akong nakitulog sa kanila at noong araw
ng June 08, 1992 ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth Gumabao na huwag raw akong uuwi, dahil
[mayroon] daw po kaming lakad. Pagkaraan ng ilang oras ay dumating naman itong si
Roderick Garcia @ Deo at may sinabi sa kanya itong si Kenneth at sinabi naman ito sa akin ni
Deo na kaysa raw maunahan siya ni Frederick Sumulong [sic] ay uunahan na raw po niya ito.
Umalis po itong si Kenneth na kasama ang kanyang nobya at itong si Deo, para ihatid ang
kanyang [sic] sa hospital at bago sila umalis ay sinabihan ako ni Kenneth na sunduin ko raw
itong si Elmer Castro at magbhihai [magbihis] na rin daw ako at pagdating nila ay . . . lalakad
na raw po kami. Mga ilang oras pa ay sinundo ko na itong si Elmer Castro at pagdating namin
sa bahay nila Kenneth ay naroroon na itong si Kenneth at Deo. Matapos magpalit ng damit
itong si Kenneth ay sumakay na kami sa kanilang kotse at nagtuloy sa kanilang katabing
bahay at doon ay kumain kami. Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na kami at nagtuloy sa F[i]lInvest. P[a]gdating namin sa isang lugar doon sa medyo malayo-layo sa bahay nila Deo ay
bumaba na itong si Deo at Elmer at sila ay nagpunta doon sa lugar ng pinagbarilan para kunin
ang bayad sa utang ni Fred[er]ick Capulong sa tiyuhin ni Deo P[a]gkaraan ng ilang minuto ay
sumunod po kami ni Kenn[e]th sa lugar at ako ay naiwan nang medyo malayo-layo sa lugar
upang tingnan kung mayroong darating na tao. Samantalang si Kenneth ay lumapit kina Deo
at Frederick at kasunod noon ay nagkaroon ng sagutan itong si Kenneth at Frederick at nakita
kong inaawat ni Deo itong si Kenneth. Hindi nakapagpigil itong si Kenneth at nasipa niya s[i]
Frederick at kasunod noon ay binunot niya ang kanyang baril na kalibre .38 at pinaputukan
niya ng isang beses itong si Frederick na noong tamaan ay natumba sa lupa. Lumapit si
Elmer kina Kenneth habang binabatak ni Kenneth itong si Frederick at kasunod po noon ay
lumapit sa akin si Deo at sinabihan ako na tumakbo na kami. Tumakbo na po kami, pero ako
po ay nahuli ng mga security guard ng Subdivision at itong si Deo ay nahuli naman sa
kanilang bahay. Itong sina Kenneth at Elmer ay hindi pa nahuhuli. 16
Appellant an Accomplice,
Not a Conspirator
In other words, appellant's presence was not innocuous. Knowing that Florendo intended to
kill the victim and that the three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a
lookout to watch for passersby. He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis
in order to aid and abet the commission of the crime. These facts, however, did not make him
a conspirator; at most, he was only an accomplice.
The Revised penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when "two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." 17 To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three requisites: "(1) that two or more

persons came to an agreement, (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime,
and (3) that the execution of the felony [was] decided upon." 18 Except in the case of the
mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.19 The Court has held that in most instances, direct proof of a
previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of
the accused pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. 20
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not
being included in Article 17,21 cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts."22 The Court has held that an accomplice is "one who knows the criminal
design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which,
even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same." 23 To hold a person liable
as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the "community" of criminal design; that
is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the
latter in his purpose;" and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime.24
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be underscored, in view of its effect on
appellant's penalty. Once conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual. The
act of one of them is deemed the act of all.25 In the case of an accomplice, the liability is one
degree lower than that of a principal.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the
criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves
have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur
in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent
to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of
the offense.
Thus, in People v. Castro,26 the Court convicted Rufino Cinco, together with two others, as a
principal, although he had acted merely as a lookout. The Court held that "their concerted
action in going armed and together to their victim's house, and there, while one stayed as a
lookout, the other two entered and shot the mayor and his wife, leaving again together
afterwards, admits no other rational explanation but conspiracy." It may be noted further that
Cinco executed a Sworn Statement that the three of them, together with some others, had
planned to kill the victim on the promise of a P5,000 reward.
In People v. Tawat et al.,27 the lookout, Nestor Rojo, was convicted as a principal for
conspiring with two others. The Court ruled that the conspiracy was shown by their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime. The Court also noted that, upon their
arrest, they disclosed that they had intended to rob the victim's store and that they did so in
accordance with their plan. In that case, it was clear that all three of them, including the
lookout, were the authors of the crime.
In People v. Loreno,28 the Supreme Court convicted all the accused as principals because
they had acted in band. In acting as a lookout, Jimmy Marantal was armed at the time like the
other conspirators, and he gave his companions effective means and encouragement to
commit the crime of robbery and rape.

Upon the other hand in People v. Corbes,29 the Court noted that Manuel Vergel knew of the
criminal design to commit a robbery, and that he cooperated with the robbers by driving the
vehicle to and from the crime scene. In convicting him as an accomplice and not as a
conspirator, the Court observed that he was merely approached by one of the robbers who
was tasked to look for a getaway vehicle. He was not with the robbers when they resolved to
commit a robbery. When his services were requested the decision to commit the crime had
already been made.
In People v. Tatlonghari,30 the Court was asked to resolve the responsibility of some
appellants who "knowingly aid[ed] the actual killers by casting stones at the victim, and
distracting his attention." The Court ruled that they were accomplices and not co-conspirators,
"[i]n the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them."
In People v. Suarez et al.,31 Wilfredo Lara merely introduced the gang of Reyes to Suarez who
intended to perpetrate the crime with the help of the said group. In ruling that he was merely
an accomplice, the Court noted that there was no evidence showing that he "took part in the
planning or execution of the crime, or any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the
crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his part."
In People v. Balili,32 the Court convicted appellant as an accomplice, holding that "in going
with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while
the others went inside the store to rob and kill, [he] effectively supplied the criminals with
material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accompliance." The Court noted that there
was no evidence that he "had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he actually participated
in the commission of the crime."
In People v. Doble,33 the Court held that Cresencio Doble did not become a conspirator when
he looked for a banca that was eventually used by the robbers. Ruled the Court: "Neither
would it appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Crescencio into his band of malefactors that
would commit the robbery more than Just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had
enough men, all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the commission of which
needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which
[was] not shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for
a banca just a few hours before the actual robbery."
In the present case, Appellant De Vera knew that Kenneth Florendo had intended to kill
Capulong at the time, and he cooperated with the latter. But he himself did not participate in
the decision to kill Capulong; that decision was made by Florendo and the others. He joined
them that afternoon after the decision to kill had already been agreed upon; he was there
because "nagkahiyaan na." This is clear from his statement, which we quote again for the
sake of clarity:
T: Ito bang balak ni Kenneth para patayin itong si Frederick ay alam mo ba ito at pumayag
kang maging kasapakat nito?
S: Sinabi po niya ito sa akin. Hindi po ako pumayag. Pero noong araw na iyon ay
nagkahiyaan na lamang at napilitan akong sumama.34
Significantly, the plan to kill could have been accomplished without him. It should be noted
further that he alone was unarmed that afternoon. Florendo and Garcia had guns, and Castro
had a baseball bat.
In any event, the prosecution evidence has not established that appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victim. His participation, as culled from his own Statement, was made.

after the decision to kill was already a fait accompli. Thus, in several cases, the Court has
held:
[L]ack of complete evidence of conspiracy, that creates the doubt whether they had acted as
principals or accomplices in the perpetration of the offense, impels this Court to resolve in their
favor the question, by holding . . . that they were guilty of the "milder form of responsibility,"
i.e., guilty as mere accomplices.35
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statement
Extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution, provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
If the confession meets these requirements, "it is subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if
it was given freely without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of mankind." 36
Appellant claims that his extrajudicial statement was inadmissible, because it was not made in
the presence of counsel. Although Atty. Confesor Sansano of the Quezon City IBP Legal Aid
Committee purportedly assisted him and his co-accused in the execution of their extrajudicial
Statements, appellant asserts that the lawyer was in his office, not with them, at the time.
Appellant adds that he was tortured.
Appellant's claims must be rejected. Atty. Sansano testified that he did not leave them at any
time.
Q: You were involved in the interrogation from the very start?
A: Yes, from the beginning to the end of the interview until the boys signed their statements.
Q: Did you recall having at any time left your office to attend to some official matters?
A: I never left the office to attend to anything.
Q: Is that the usual manner by which you assist persons referred to you by the police insofar
as custodial investigation is concerned?
A: It is our policy that when we assist [in] that capacity, we [want] to see to it that the rights of
the accused or suspects are properly [protected] during the course of the entire interrogation. 37
In fact, Atty. Sansano even checked to see if there were torture marks on Appellant De Vera,
and Garcia and interviewed the two to make sure that they understood what they were doing.
Q: What was your purpose in asking the police officers to leave the room?
A: My purpose in asking the police officers to step out of the building was to assure myself that
no pressure could be exerted on the two boys by the presence of the police officers during my
personal interview. Before we allow any police officers to take the statements of people
brought before us[,] we see to it [that] we interview the persons personally out of hearing and
sight of any police officer.
Q: After the police officers left the room, completely left the room[,] you were able to interview
the two accused namely Mr. de Vera and Mr. Garcia?

A: Yes, I spent about 15 to 20 minutes interviewing the boys.

Q: What was the nature of your initial interview with these two accused?
A: I asked the boys Roderick and Edwin if it [was] true that they [were] going to give their own
statements to the police?
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said yes, sir.
Q: What was your reaction to that?
A: Routinely[,] I informed them about their rights under the constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: Having obtained their answers, what next transpired?
A: After telling them the statements they may give to the police could be used against them for
a [sic] in any court of the Phil., I was satisfied that nobody coerced them, that they were never
threatened by anybody much less by the police officers to give these statements. Casually I
asked the two boys to raise their upper clothes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q: What was your purpose in requiring these persons to show you or remove their upper
clothing?
A: I wanted to assure myself that there were no telltale signs of torture or bodily harm
committed on the[m] prior to their [being brought] to the office. In spite of their [personal]
assurances . . . , verbal assurance that they were never hurt. 38
The right to counsel is enshrined in the Constitution in order to address, among others, the
use of duress and undue influence in the execution of extrajudicial confessions. 39 In the
present case, the Court is satisfied that Atty. Sansano sufficiently fulfilled the objective of this
constitutional mandate. Moreover, appellant's allegations of torture must be disregarded for
being unsubstantiated. To hold otherwise is to statements at the mere facilitate the retraction
of solemnly made statements of the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.
When an extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes
evidence of a high order, because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.40 The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force,
duress or promise of reward.41 Appellant failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution
evidence to the contrary.
Sec. 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an
accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti." In the present case, the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two
elements of corpus delicti: (a) a certain result has been proven for example, a man has
died; and (b) some person is criminally responsible.42 It is indubitable that a crime has been
committed, and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that appellant had
conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. He himself does not deny that he was
at the crime scene. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution eyewitness in the company of the
gunman. Furthermore, Atty. Sansano and the police officers testified to the voluntariness of his
confession. It must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should
be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession."43
Criminal and Civil Liability

In ruling that the crime committed was murder, the trial court found that the killing was
attended by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. One of these
was enough to qualify the crime as murder; the two others constituted generic aggravating
circumstances. The lower court explained that the evidence established evident premeditation,
for Florendo's group acted with deliberate forethought and tenacious persistence in the
accomplishment of the criminal design. Treachery was also proven, because the attack was
planned and performed in such a way as to guarantee the execution of the criminal design
without risk to the group. There was also abuse of superior strength, because the attackers
took advantage of their superiority in numbers and weapons.
We disagree with the court a quo in appreciating two generic aggravating circumstances,
because treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength. 44 Hence, there is only one generic
aggravating circumstance, not two. Notwithstanding the presence of a generic aggravating
circumstance, we cannot impose the death penalty, because the crime was committed before
the effectivity of the Death Penalty Law.
In the present case, the penalty of appellant as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of
a principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. He is
also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
We sustain the trial court's grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The award of P211,670 as
compensatory damages was duly supported by evidence. Based on the evidence presented,
moral damages is also warranted, but only in the amount of P50,000, not P500,000 as fixed
by the trial court. Furthermore, we affirm the payment of interest. 45 However, the grant of
P600,000 for loss of earning capacity lacks factual basis. Such indemnification partakes of the
nature of actual damages, which must be duly proven. 46 In this case, the trial court merely
presumed the amount of Capulong's earnings. Since the prosecution did not present evidence
of the current income of the deceased, the indemnity for lost earnings must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby partially GRANTED. Appellant De Vera is CONVICTED
as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We AFFIRM the awards of: (a) P50,000
indemnity ex delicto, (b) P211,670 as compensatory damages and (c) interest of six percent
per annum on these two amounts. The award of moral damages is however REDUCED to
P50,000 and the award for the loss of earning capacity is DELETED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.Vitug, J., please see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
I share the ponencia of my colleagues in its affirmance of the conviction of appellants except,
with all due respect, insofar as it has concluded that appellant De Vera is guilty merely as an
accomplice.
There is conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy, of course, by itself is legally inconsequential unless the criminal plot is, in fact,

carried out. Once the offense is perpetrated, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective,
not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the
commission of the felony. An accomplice, under Article 18 of the same Code, is one who, not
being a principal who (a) takes a direct part in the execution of the act, (b) directly forces or
induces others to commit it or (c) cooperates in the commission of the offense by another act
without which the offense would not have been accomplished (per Article 17 of the Code),
collaborates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
In the case at bar, De Vera, "knowing that Florendo intended to kill the victim and that the
three co-accused were carrying weapons, he had acted as a lookout to watch for passersby.
He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis in order to aid and abet the
commission of the crime" (ponencia).
I cannot bring myself to accept any material variance between the terms "to decide," on the
one hand, and "to concur" or "to assent," on the other hand, in defining, i.e., whether as a
conspirator or as an accomplice, the specific criminal liability of the criminal offender. Where
there is concurrence or assent by one to a plan, even when previously hatched by another or
others, to commit a felony which concurrence or assent is made prior to the actual
perpetration of the offense, and he then actually participates in its commission, regardless of
the extent of such participation, his liability should be deemed, in my view, that of a
conspirator rather than that of an accomplice. I would equate the liability of an accomplice to
one who, knowing of the criminal design, but neither concurring nor assenting to it, cooperates
in the execution of the crime short of taking a direct part in, and short of taking an
indispensable act for the commission of the offense. In the last two instances (taking a direct
part in, or taking an indispensable act for, the commission of the felony), his participation
would be that of a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.
When appellant De Vera, aware of the plan to kill the victim, agreed to be the lookout during
the commission of the crime which, in fact, so took place as planned, he rendered himself
liable no less than that incurred by his co-accused.
Footnotes
1

Penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.

Information, p. 1; rollo, p. 12.
3
Amended Information, p. 1; records, p. 31.
4
Assisted by Atty. Raymundo de Cadiao.
5
Assisted by Atty. Domingo Floresta.
6
Assailed Decision, p. 35; rollo, p. 84.
7
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 27, 1998, upon the receipt by
this Court of the Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was
submitted within the reglementary period.
8
Signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Carlos N. Ortega and Associate Sol.
Thomas M. Laragan.
9
Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-12; rollo, pp. 195-204.
10
RTC Decision, pp. 10-13; rollo, pp. 59-62.
11
Assailed Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 157.
12
Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 98-99. This was signed by Atty. Vicente D. Millora.
2

13

People v. Magallano, 266 SCRA 305, 314, January 16, 1997; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA
129, March 6, 1998; People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, January 14, 1998; People v. Sumalpong,
284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52, September 26, 1994;
People vs. Orehuela, 232 SCRA 82, 93, April 29, 1994; People v. Villagonzalo, 238 SCRA
215, 230-231, November 18, 1994; Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 238 SCRA 655, 695,
December 5, 1994.
14
People v. Campos, 202 SCRA 387, October 3, 1991; People v. Saavedra, 149 SCRA 610;
May 18, 1987; People v. Madera, 57 SCRA 349, May 31, 1974.
15
Sworn Statement of Edwin De Vera, p. 2; records, p.10.
16
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
17
Art. 8. See also People v. Abarri, 242 SCRA 39, 45, March 1, 1995; People v. Cayanan. 245
SCRA 66, 77, June 16, 1995.
18
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 12th ed., p. 133.
19
People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
20
People v. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 306, July 28, 1998; People v. Andres, GR No. 122735,
September 25, 1998; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v.
Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213, January 24, 1996; People v. Salison Jr., 253 SCRA 758, February
20, 1996; People v. Obzunar, 265 SCRA 547, December 16, 1996.
21
Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
22
Art. 18, Revised Penal Code.
23
People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465, 472, March 26, 1997, per Bellosillo, J.; citing People v.
Lingad, 98 Phil. 5, 12, November 29, 1955; People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71, May 14, 1993;
People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289, October 30, 1972.
24
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, 12th ed, p. 515. See also Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
1997 ed., p. 557; Padilla, Criminal Law, 1987 ed., p. 700; People v. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289;
People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil 38, November 17, 1922.
25
People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369, February 15, 1995.
26
11 SCRA 699, August 31, 1964, per curiam.
27
126 SCRA 362, December 21, 1983. See also People v. Evangelista, 86 Phil. 112, April 12,
1950.
28
130 SCRA 311 July 9, 1984, per Concepcion, J.
29
Supra.
30
27 SCRA 726, March 28, 1967, per J. B. L. Reyes, J.
31
267 SCRA 119, January 28, 1997, per Regalado, J.
32
17 SCRA 892, August 5, 1966, per Makalintal, J.
33
114 SCRA 131, May 31, 1982, per De Castro, J.
34
Sworn Statement of Edwin de Vera, p. 2; records, p. 10.
35
People v. Riveral, 10 SCRA 462, March 31, 1964, per Bengzon, CJ; People v. Torejas, 43
SCRA 158, January 31, 1972; People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514, 519, August 31, 1971;
People v. Ablog, 6 SCRA 437, October 31, 1962; People v. Ubina, 97 Phil 515, August 31,
1995; People v. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726; March 28, 1969.

36

People v. Santos, 283 SCRA 443, December 22, 1997, per Panganiban J., See also People
v. Muleta, GR No. 130189, June 21, 1999.
37
TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 15.
38
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 7-11.
39
People v. Lucero, 244 SCRA 425, 434, May 29, 1995; People v. Rous, 242 SCRA 732,
March 27, 1995.
40
People v. Montiero, 246 SCRA 786, July 31, 1995; People v. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364,
September 5, 1991.
41
People v. Dasig, 221 SCRA 549, April 28, 1993.
42
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624, January 26, 1995, per Davide, J. (Now CJ).
43
Ibid.
44
People v. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1, April 1, 1996; People v. Torrefiel, 265 SCRA 369, April 18,
1996.
45
Art. 2211 of the Civil Code provides: "In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the
damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court."
46
Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433, March 13, 1997.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173858

July 17, 2007

ERNESTO GARCES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 dated January 31, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 rendered by Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, finding petitioner Ernesto Garces guilty as an
accessory to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. Also assailed is the Resolution 3 dated
July 27, 2006 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In an Information dated December 10, 1992, Rosendo Pacursa, Senando Garces, Antonio
Pira, Jr., Aurelio Pira, and petitioner Ernesto Garces, were charged with Forcible Abduction
with Rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1992, in the evening, at x x x, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with criminal and carnal intent, with lewd
design and by means of force, accused Rosendo Pacursa, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, after covering her mouth, forcibly abduct, pull and take away one
AAA while walking to the church to the tobacco flue-curing barn and while inside the barn lie
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge of the offended party; that
accused Ernesto Garces later on covered the mouth of AAA and take her out of the barn; that
accused Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira stand guard outside the barn
while Rosendo Pacursa is raping AAA; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of: (1) uninhabited place, and (2)
nighttime.4 (Emphasis supplied)
All the accused, except Senando Garces who is still at large, pleaded not guilty.
The prosecutions version of the incident is as follows:
On August 2, 1992, between 8:00 and 9:00 oclock in the evening, AAA was on her way to the
chapel when the five accused suddenly appeared and approached her. Rosendo Pacursa
covered her mouth with his hands and told her not to shout or she will be killed. He then
brought her inside a nearby tobacco barn while his four companions stood guard outside. 5
Inside the barn, Pacursa started kissing AAA. Private complainant fought back but to no avail.
Thereafter, Pacursa succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After a while, they heard
people shouting and calling the name of AAA. At this point, petitioner Ernesto Garces entered
the barn, covered AAAs mouth, then dragged her outside. He also threatened to kill her if she
reports the incident.6
Upon reaching the house of Florentino Garces, petitioner released AAA. Shortly afterwards,
AAAs relatives found her crying, wearing only one slipper and her hair was disheveled. They
brought her home but when asked what happened, AAA could not answer because she was in
a state of shock. After a while, she was able to recount the incident. 7
Rosendo Pacursa denied that he raped the victim, while his co-accused presented alibis as
their defense.
Pacursa testified that he and AAA were sweethearts for almost a year prior to the incident. On
the night of August 2, 1992, he was on his way to the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. to watch a
televised basketball game when he saw AAA. The latter allegedly wanted to have a talk with
him so he led her to the tobacco barn about 15 meters away, so that no one might see them.
They were alone by the door of the barn talking, embracing and kissing. They only parted
ways when he saw the relatives of AAA. He denied having sexual intercourse with her. After
the incident, he received a letter8 from AAA asking him to elope.9

On the other hand, petitioner, Antonio Pira, Jr., and Aurelio Pira, testified that they were
watching a televised basketball game at the house of Antonio Pira, Jr. at the time the alleged
rape transpired. They denied seeing Pacursa that night. 10
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision finding Pacursa guilty of Forcible
Abduction with Rape while petitioner Garces was found guilty as an accessory to the crime.
Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 11
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused ROSENDO PACURSA and ERNESTO
GARCES are hereby found guilty of the crime of Forcible Abduction With Rape punishable
under the Revised Penal Code committed upon the person of AAA. The other accused
ANTONIO PIRA, JR. and AURELIO PIRA are hereby ACQUITTED as accessory for the crime
of Forcible Abduction With Rape.
ROSENDO PACURSA, the principal accused in this case is hereby sentenced to one degree
lower than that prescribed by law for the offense, for being 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime pursuant to Art. 68 of the Revised Penal Code. Taking into
consideration the aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and nighttime, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 11 years of prision mayor as minimum to 18
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Ernesto Garces, being an accessory to the commission of the crime is hereby penalized two
degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the offense. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of
prision mayor as maximum.
Both accused are jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
and by way of actual and moral damages plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.12
Both Pacursa and petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals. However,
Pacursa subsequently withdrew his appeal.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision convicting accused ROSENDO
PACURSA as principal and accused-appellant ERNESTO GARCES as accessory of the crime
of forcible abduction with rape is AFFIRMED.
However, accused-appellant Ernesto Garces sentence is MODIFIED in that he is to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS of prision correccional,
as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but same was denied. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari.
Petitioner claims that no rape was committed and that there is no evidence to show that he
covered the mouth of the complainant when he brought her out of the barn.
The petition lacks merit.
It has been established that Pacursa forcibly took AAA against her will and by use of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. The trial court found complainants testimony to be
credible, consistent and unwavering even during cross-examination.
Regarding the letter she wrote to Pacursa asking him to elope with her, she explained that she
felt uncertain at that time and was trying to avoid the possible trouble or scandal the incident

might bring upon her,14 which we find plausible. In pursuing the case, she had to transfer to
another school because of the threats of her assailants and their persistence in settling the
case. Furthermore, no improper motive was shown why she would accuse and testify against
Pacursa who was her boyfriend, and the other accused, who are her relatives. 15
Prosecution witness Grace Liberto likewise corroborated the testimony of complainant when
she testified that she saw the latter crying, wearing only one slipper, and her hair disheveled, 16
immediately after the incident. The medico-legal findings of Dr. Herminio Venus also showed
that there was a laceration in complainants private parts possibly caused by sexual contact. 17
Pacursa, however, could not be convicted of the crime of forcible abduction with rape because
the crime committed was only simple rape. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape
if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. 18 Based on the evidence presented,
the accused intended to rape the victim when he took her to the tobacco barn. Hence, forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape.19
We also note that the trial court failed to make any definitive finding as to the existence of
aggravating circumstances. However, we find that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and uninhabited place did not attend the commission of the crime.
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused from being
recognized or to ensure his unmolested escape.20 The mere fact that the rape was committed
at nighttime does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance. 21 In the instant case,
other than the fact that the crime was committed at night, there is no other evidence that the
peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused.
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot likewise be appreciated in the
absence of evidence that the accused actually sought an isolated place to better execute their
purpose.22 The records do not show that solitude was purposely sought or taken advantage of
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
Although Pacursa has withdrawn his appeal, the Courts ruling that the crime committed is
simple rape and not forcible abduction with rape, shall apply to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122
of the Rules of Court specifically provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
As regards petitioners complicity, his defense of alibi cannot prevail over complainants
positive identification of her assailants. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and
constitute self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. 23
For alibi to prosper, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. 24 Petitioner alleged he was watching
television at Aurelio Piras house, which is about 20 meters away from the barn at the time of
the incident. However, it will only take one minute for him to reach the barn from the house. 25
Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
Contrary to petitioners contention, there is proof that petitioner covered AAAs mouth when he
dragged her out of the barn. Complainant executed a sworn statement recounting her
harrowing experience which she identified during her direct examination and offered as
Exhibits A, A-1, and A-226 for the prosecution and admitted by the trial court. 27 In her sworn
statement, AAA narrated thus:

Q - Will you relate carefully the manner by which Rosendo Pacursa raped you?
A - x x x Then someone came inside the barn, shut-off my mouth, then brought me out and
away southward and when we reach the house of Florentino Garces he released me and as I
walked down the path my uncle Bartolome Florendo was able to light me with his flashlight
xxxx
Q - Who was that person who later came inside the barn who brought you out shutting-off your
mouth then took you away southward?
A - Ernesto Garces also from our place, sir.
Q - Why, has Rosendo Pacursa other companions?
A - He has, sir. They are Ernesto Garces, Senando Garces, Antonio Pira, Jr. and Aurelio Pira.
Q - What did these companions of Rosendo Pacursa do?
A - They stayed outside the barn but it was Ernesto Garces who brought me out, sir. 28
Complainants failure to testify during her direct examination that her mouth was covered by
petitioner when she was pulled out of the barn does not preclude resort to her sworn
statement to provide the missing details, since said sworn statement forms part of her
testimony. As held in People v. Servano:29
Evidence in criminal cases is not limited to the declarations made in open court; it includes all
documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the witnesses, and other supporting evidence. It
comprehends something more than just the mere testimony of a witness. Thus, when a sworn
statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution
evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the testimony on the
witness stand. A sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and
trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to reiterate, during trial, the
contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn
statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This
is not to say, however, that the sworn statement should be given more probative value than
the actual testimony. Rather, the sworn statement and the open court declarations must be
evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and thorough determination of the
merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness oral testimony during the trial
should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn
statement. In like manner, the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the
exclusion of the oral testimony. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the
totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony
during trial. x x x30
Petitioner also faults the court a quo in finding that he threatened AAA while leading her out of
the barn. He argues that complainant failed to positively identify the person who issued the
threats because she vaguely referred to said person merely as "they".
The contention lacks merit.
The use of the word "they" in referring to the person who threatened complainant is of no
moment. When the threats were issued, both Pacursa and petitioner were inside the barn;
thus, it is logical to conclude that the threats came from both of them.
Petitioner likewise cannot take refuge in the acquittal of Antonio and Aurelio Pira. Both were
acquitted because there was no evidence to show their participation in the crime. Complainant
only testified that she heard their voices which the trial court considered insufficient. However,
in the case of petitioner, complainant positively identified him as one of the companions of

Pacursa who remained outside the barn and who eventually entered upon noting the
presence of AAAs relatives nearby. He thereafter covered complainants mouth and led her
out of the barn. All these circumstances demonstrate petitioners complicity.
We do not agree, however, that petitioner should be convicted as an accessory to the crime.
It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment,
whether it is made the subject of an assignment of error or not. Such an appeal confers upon
the appellate court full jurisdiction and renders it competent to examine the records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 31
In finding petitioner guilty as an accessory, the Court of Appeals found that his participation
was after or subsequent to the rape and that his acts were employed as a means of
concealing the commission of the crime and assisting Rosendo to escape.
We find otherwise. The facts show that petitioner participated in the commission of the crime
even before complainant was raped. He was present when Pacursa abducted complainant
and when he brought her to the barn. He positioned himself outside the barn together with the
other accused as a lookout. When he heard the shouts of people looking for complainant, he
entered the barn and took complainant away from Pacursa.
Having known of the criminal design and thereafter acting as a lookout, petitioner is liable as
an accomplice,32 there being insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy, 33 and not merely as an
accessory. As defined in the Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those who, not being
included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.34 The two elements necessary to hold petitioner liable as an accomplice are present: (1)
community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2) performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. 35
The crime committed in the case at bar is simple rape, the penalty for which under the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua. Since Pacursa was a minor when the crime was
committed, the penalty must be reduced by one degree, to reclusion temporal.36 Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the maximum of the penalty shall be within the medium range of reclusion temporal, or
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years.37
With respect to petitioner, the penalty imposed upon accomplices in a consummated crime is
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the felony. 38 Since simple rape is
punishable with reclusion perpetua, the penalty of reclusion temporal should also be imposed
on petitioner in its medium period in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty should range
from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 39 If there are two or more
persons civilly liable for a felony, as in this case, the court shall determine the amount for
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
40
which each must respond to be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, the amount of damages to be awarded must be apportioned according to the

respective responsibilities of the accused to be paid by them solidarily within their respective
class and subsidiarily for the others.41
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the complainant in rape cases is entitled to an award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. Civil
indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape which is distinct from moral
damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof because it is assumed that
a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. 42
In determining the civil liability of petitioner, a clarification of the trial courts decision is
necessary. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision held Pacursa and petitioner
"jointly and solidarily liable to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of actual
and moral damages plus the cost of suit." For our purposes, we shall treat the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as the civil indemnity ex delicto for which, as an
accomplice, petitioner should be solidarily liable with Pacursa only for one-half of the said
amount, or P25,000.00, and is subsidiarily liable for the other P25,000.00 in case the principal
is found insolvent.43
In addition, complainant must be awarded another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However,
this additional award should not apply to Pacursa who has withdrawn his appeal as the same
is not favorable to him.44 Hence, the additional monetary award can only be imposed upon
petitioner who pursued the present appeal.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Rosendo
Pacursa guilty as principal by direct participation, and petitioner Ernesto Garces as an
accessory, to the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape, is MODIFIED. Accused Rosendo
Pacursa is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, and being a minor
at the time the crime was committed, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Petitioner Ernesto Garces is found guilty as an accomplice to the
crime of rape, and is also sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
Rosendo Pacursa and Petitioner Ernesto Garces are ORDERED to pay complainant
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. Being an accomplice, petitioner is held solidarily
liable with the principal only for half of the amount or P25,000.00 and their subsidiary liability
shall be enforced in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is
likewise ordered to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C ERTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 64-75. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam and concurred in by
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Japar B. Dimaampao.
2
Id. at 28-37. Penned by Judge Charito B. Gonzales.
3
Id. at 93-94.
4
Records, p. 1.
5
Rollo, p. 147.
6
Id. at 147-148.
7
Exhibit "C," records, pp. 14-15.
8
Exhibit "2," records, p. 126; TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31, Translated to read as follows: "Let us
elope, please answer this to tell me of your decision. the one who wrote Bing".
9
TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.
10
Id. at 2-15.
11
Rollo, pp. 28-37.
12
Id. at 36-37.
13
Id. at 75.
14
TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 30, 32.
15
See People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 97921, September 8, 1993, 226 SCRA 156, 174.
16
Exhibit "C," records, pp. 14-15; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 13-15.
17
Exhibt "B," not found in the records; TSN, July 28, 1993, pp. 3-10.
18
People v. Almanzor, 433 Phil. 667, 700 (2002).
19
See People v. Lining, 433 Phil. 797 (2002), where accused were convicted for simple rape.
In this case, complainant was dragged towards the ricefield and was forcibly carried to an
unoccupied house where she was subsequently raped.
20
People v. Fortich, 346 Phil. 596, 617 (1997).
21
People v. Lining, supra at 812.
22
People v. Fortich, supra at 618.
23
People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 280, 297.
24
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 141599, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 102, 116.
25
TSN, October 20, 1993, pp. 27-38.

26

TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 5-6.

Records, p. 92.
28
Id. at 10-11.
29
People v. Servano, 454 Phil. 256 (2003).
30
Id. at 277-278.
31
People v. Las Pias, Jr., 427 Phil. 633, 641 (2002).
32
Cf. People v. Corbes, 337 Phil. 190, 197 (1997).
33
See People v. Tulin, 416 Phil. 365 (2001). As a rule, if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal since any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of
lesser responsibility.
34
Revised Penal Code, Art. 18.
35
People v. De Vera, 371 Phil. 563, 584 (1999).
36
People v. Clores, Jr., G.R. No. 130488, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 210, 222.
37
Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 829 (2002).
38
Revised Penal Code, Art. 52.
39
Id., Art. 100.
40
Id., Art. 109.
41
People v. Garcia, 424 Phil. 158, 194 (2002).
42
People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.
43
People v. Flores, 389 Phil. 532, 552 (2000).
44
RULES OF COURT, Rule 122, Sections 11-12. See People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. 34386,
February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 632.
45
People v. Arondain, 418 Phil. 354 (2001).
27