Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906
MATEO CARIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:
The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a
petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of
land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The
Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration and
opposed the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the
military reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in
favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the
law then in force to the Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The case was
therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioner has
brought the case here by bill of exceptions.
The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory
information obtained in 1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this
possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those effects which the
laws give to mere possession.
The petition not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being
agricultural, the case is governed by the decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton et al.
vs.
Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino et al. vs. Valdez et al. 2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488);
and Tiglao vs. The Insular Government 3 (4 Off. Gaz., 747). In these cases it was held
that the mere possession of land such as that in controversy in this case would give the
possessor and title thereto as against the Government; in other words, that the statute
of limitations did not run against the State in reference to its agricultural
lands.lawphil.net
The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did not run
against the Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be

conclusively presumed from immemorial use and occupation. To say that the presumption
of a grant is

presumption of law is, in our opinion, simply to say that it amounts to a statute of limitations;
and for a court to hold that the statute of limitations does not run against the Government as
to its public agricultural lands, and at the same time to hold that if a person has been in
possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively presumed that the Government has
given him a deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each
other.
Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this particular
case. Here the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It is
known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the Province
of Benguet to the Christian religion completely failed, and that during that time they remained
practically in the same condition as they were when the Islands were first occupied by the
Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least 1880, the
provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken
advantage of by these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to
presume something which did not exist. The appellant says in his brief (p.10):
The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is equally
ignorant of the forms of law and procedure necessary to protect his interests.
There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain title from
the Government in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a contract with
Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of which he agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000
pesos when he obtained title thereto from the Government, and this contract he does not say
that he
is the owner, but simply that he is in possession thereof. The court below found that the land
is now worth upwards of P50,000.
would have a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the
United States.
In the case of Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the
following statement at page 562:
Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in
length of time to prove a valid title. In United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the
possession was under the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to
the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by
witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in
the opinion (p. 460), to warrant 'the finding of the court below that the
complainant's title was derived from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and
perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of
New Mexico, within which the land was situated. We do not question the
correctness to the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to evidence of
possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances drawn as
to the existence of a grant.
We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper
case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of
a rightful possession under a legal right. We recognized and enforced such a rule in
the case of United States vs. Chaves decided at this term. in which the question
is involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not a duration
long enough to justify any such inference.

The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a
grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage
of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it
has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.
The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and
the case of The United States vs. Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays vs. The
United States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page 261;
But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed from a
deed which is shown to be void, it will not be presumed that there was an
independent grant (Smith vs. Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or where surrounding
circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant. (Townsend vs. Downer,
32
Vermont, 183).
The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as helping out
the presumption of a grant, but where a void grant is shown, it affords no
presumption that another valid grant was made. Nor does such presumption arise
if the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant. In
this case under consideration we can not find any evidence which justifies us in
believing that a legal grant can have been made, and under those circumstances
we can not consider possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing with the
requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time, was one which the claimant

There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence offered by the
plaintiff himself and upon which the bases the title that he asks the court to confirm,
shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and
which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as
given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of
the lands was taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in this case)
that any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of
his grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not
been long enough to presume a grant. (Crispin vs. United States, 168 U.S., 208;
Hayes vs. United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653; Hays vs. The United States, ante
248.) The possession subsequently existing, we can not notice. Same authorities.
As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not run
against the Government as to its public lands in other words, that if a person desires to
obtain title
to the public lands of the United States situated within the boundaries of the States, he must
do so in the way pointed out by the law. We do not understand that a person in possession of
unsurveyed public lands in the State of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors had
occupied
that the land for fortyh years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner of
the lands by granted the land to his ancestors, a presumption founded not upon any
proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but upon the
mere possession for that length of time.

The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case of
Valenton et al. vs. Marciano it was said:

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that
he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this doctrine of
presumptive grant can not apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for the
Indies. From time to time there were promulgated laws which required the person in
possession of public lands to exhibit their titles or grants thereto. If these titles or grants were
found to be good, they were confirmed, but if they were not, or if the persons had no grants
or titles at all, they were evicted from the land.
For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4, Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is stated:
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretrial courts
designate, at such times as shall to them most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them
and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose their title deeds thereto.
And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue
of just prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us
to be disposed of at our will.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided
that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether
or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either in person or through
their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles
and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will
designate as the period within which documents must be presented a term sufficient
in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for
the purpose
of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they
will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others.
In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows:
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose
possession they are unlawfully enjoining within the time of one year, or, the
adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their
obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the
treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the
ownership of the Stated over the lands, and will, after fixing the whole thereof,
proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which, either because it may
have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone, is not
deemed
4
advisable to preserve as State forest reservations.
In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette of
Manila of the 17th of April, 01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows:

ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment
(composicion) under the royal decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the adjustments
of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the State. Any claim to such
lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of the same, but who
have not done so as the above mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at
any time.
In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public
agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of
thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the
possessor thereof a legal title thereto.
The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the
Public Land Act, for the reason that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The
judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten days
thereafter the case be returned to the court below for execution. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Mapa, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT Manila
THIRD
DIVISI
ON
G.R. No. 171056

March 13, 2009

DINAH C. CASTILLO,
Petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN, AQUILINA A. MISTAS, MARIETTA L.
LINATOC, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
DE
CIS
ION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the
2
Decision, dated 18 October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
3
90533, as well as the Resolution, dated 11 January 2006 of the same court
denying reconsideration of its
afore-mentioned Decision. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision,
affirmed the Joint Resolution4 dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order5 dated 20 June
2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F
and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing petitioner Dinah C. Castillos complaint for
grave misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public
officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas) and Marietta
L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals Lauro S. Leviste II
(Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel),
married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to
satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother
Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot
13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure
an

Order6 dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit
Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural
landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla
K. Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses. She was also able to get from the Office of the
City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification7 stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and
Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration
No. 00554-A itself.8 Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certification9 attesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana,
and Perla, was not covered by a
certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the issuance of a
Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the
public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May
2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713
was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She
immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any
document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even
threatened her that
the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and
influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and petitioner bought
Raquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
On 4 June 2002, petitioner had the following documents, on her acquisition of
Raquels 1/3
pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, recorded in the Primary Entry Book and
Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act
No. 334410: (a) Notice of
Levy;11 (b) Certificate of Sale;12 (c) Affidavit of Publication;13 and (d) Writ of
14
Execution.
Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessor of Lipa City Tax
Declaration No.
00942-A,15 indicating that she owned 5,000 square meters of Lot 13713, while
Urbana and
Perla owned the other 10,000 square meters.
When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-square-meter share
in Lot
13713, she was shocked to find out that, without giving her notice, her Tax
Declaration No.
00942-A was cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and overlapping
with the
105,648 square meter parcel of land known as Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12964216 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A,17 both
in the name of Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No.
129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B to Summit
Realty, to wit:
ENTRY NO. 184894: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY: In favor of
LEONARDO YAGIN: For purposes more particularly stipulated in the
contract ratified before Atty. Ernesto M. Vergara of Lipa City as per
Doc. No. 639; Page No.
29; Book No. LXXVI;
Series of 1976. Date of
instrument 2-6-1976

Date of inscription 6-26-2002 at 11:20 a.m.

ENTRY NO. 185833: SALE IN FAVOR OF SUMMIT POINT
REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORP:
Date of instrument: July 22, 2002
Date of inscription: July 25, 2002 at 2:30 P.M.18
On 25 July 2002, at 2:30 p.m., TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was
cancelled and
TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its place.
The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint Affidavit19
before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging several public
officers and private individuals as follows:
32. I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and July 2002
and onwards in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin], the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations Officer III of
the City Assessors Office of Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office
of the City Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in concert
and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L. Orense, Executive VicePresident and Vice-President, respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation x x x while in the discharge of their administrative
functions did then and there unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross
inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards Summit caused me
injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office
of the City Assessor of Lipa City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco
Catigbac TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT No.
129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally entitled to a new tax
declaration thereby manifestly favoring Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation who now appears to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco
Catigbac, all to my
20
damage and prejudice. (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioners Complaint Affidavit gave rise to simultaneous administrative and
preliminary (criminal) investigations, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and
OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, respectively.
Petitioner pointed out several irregularities in the circumstances surrounding the
alleged sale of Lot 1-B to Summit Realty and in the documents evidencing the
same.
The supposed Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Summit Realty executed on 22
July 2002 by Leonardo Yagin (Yagin), as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, appeared to
be a "one-way street." It did not express the desire of Summit Realty, as vendee,
to purchase Lot 1-B or indicate its consent and conformity to the terms of the
Deed. No representative of Summit Realty signed the left margin of each and
every page of said Deed. It also did not appear from the Deed that a

ENTRY NO. 185834: BIR CLEARANCE: Of the parcel of land

described in this cert. of title is hereby sold and cancelled TCT No.
134609(SN-6672938) Vol. 671- A, having been issued by virtue of the
aforesaid instrument ratified before Perfecto L. Dimayuga, Notary
Public for Makati City as per Doc. No. 148; Page 31, Book No. LXVII,
Series of 2002.
representative of Summit Realty presented himself before the Notary Public who
notarized the said document. The Tax Identification Numbers of Yagin, as vendor,
and Summit Realty, as vendee, were not stated in the Deed.
Petitioner also averred that, being a corporation, Summit Realty could only act
through its Board of Directors. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot
1-B was presented for recording before the Register of Deeds, it was not
accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate attesting to the existence of a Board
Resolution which authorized said purchase by Summit Realty. There was no entry
regarding such a Secretarys Certificate and/or Board Resolution, whether on TCT
No. 129642 or TCT No. T-134609. A Secretarys Certificate eventually

surfaced, but it was executed only on 30 July 2002, five days after TCT No. T134609 in the name of Summit Realty was already issued.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was presented before and recorded by the Register
of Deeds of Lipa City on 25 July 2002 at 2:30 p.m., at exactly the same date and
time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit Realty. Petitioner theorizes that
for this to happen, TCT No. T-134609 was already prepared and ready even
before the presentation for recording of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the
Register of Deeds.
Moreover, Catigbac had long been dead and buried. The agency Catigbac
supposedly executed in favor of Yagin was extinguished by Catigbacs death.
Thus, petitioner argued, Yagin no longer had authority to execute on 22 July
2002 the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 1-B in favor of Summit Realty, making
the said Deed null and void ab initio.
Petitioner asserted that Summit Realty was well-aware of Catigbacs death,
having acknowledged the same in LRC Case No. 00-0376, the Petition for
Issuance of New Owners Duplicate of TCT No. 181 In Lieu of Lost One, filed
by Summit Realty before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City. During
the ex parte presentation of evidence in the latter part of 2000, Orense testified
on behalf of Summit Realty that Catigbacs property used to form part of a
bigger parcel of land, Lot 1 of Plan Psu-12014, measuring 132,975 square
meters, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac; after Catigbacs
death, Lot 1 was
informally subdivided into several parts among his heirs and/or successors-ininterest, some of
whom again transferred their shares to other persons; Summit Realty separately
bought subdivided parts of Lot 181 from their respective owners, with a

consolidated area of 105,648 square meters, and identified as Lot 1-B after survey;
despite the subdivision and transfer of ownership of Lot 1, TCT No. 181 covering
the same was never cancelled; and the owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost
and the fact of such loss was annotated at the back of the original copy of TCT
No. 181 with the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently, in an Order21 dated 3
January 2001, the RTC granted the Petition in LRC Case No. 00-0376 and
directed the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of
Catigbac, under the same terms and condition as in its original form.
Petitioner further cast doubt on the acts undertaken by Summit Realty in
connection with Catigbacs property, purportedly without legal personality and
capacity. The Special Power of Attorney dated 6 February 1976 granted Yagin the
right to sue on behalf of Catigbac, yet it was Summit Realty which instituted LRC
Case No. 00-0376, and Yagin had no participation
at all in said case. Likewise, it was not Yagin, but Orense, who, through a
22
letter dated 27 June
2001, requested the cancellation of TCT No. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance
of a new certificate of title for Lot 1-B. Hence, it was Orenses request which
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, later
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Lastly, petitioner questioned why, despite the cancellation of TCT No. 129642 in
the name of Catigbac and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the
name of Summit Realty, it was the former cancelled title which was used as basis
for canceling petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A. Tax Declaration No.
00949-A was thus still issued in the name of Catigbac, instead of Summit Realty.
Piecing everything together, petitioner recounted in her Complaint
Affidavit the alleged scheme perpetrated against her and the involvement
therein of each of the conspirators:

28. Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation went into action right after
I paid Orense a visit sometime May 2002. Summit resurrected from the grave. (sic)
Francisco Catigbac whom they knew to be long dead to face possible litigation.
This is the height of malice and bad faith on the part of Summit through its Lauro
Leviste II, the Executive Vice President and Benedicto Orense, the Vice President.
I had only in my favor a tax declaration to show my interest and ownership over
the 5, 000 sq.m. of the subject parcel of land. Evidently, Leviste and Orense came
to the desperate conclusion that they needed a TCT which is a far better title than
any tax declaration.

such as the Board Resolution, DAR Clearance, Revenue Tax Receipts for
documentary stamps, real property tax clearance, proof of payment of transfer
tax, tax declaration, articles of incorporation, SEC certification, license to sell
and/or certificate of registration by HLURB, etc. Without the total and lightning
speed cooperation of Atty. [Escutin] to close his eyes to the total absence of said
vital documents, the desperately needed TCT to erase my interest and ownership
would not have come into existence. Atty. [Escutin] had indeed acted in concert
and in conspiracy with Leviste and Orense in producing Annex "H" and Annex
"K".

Both then methodically commenced their evil and illegal scheme by causing on
June 26, 2002 at 11:20 a.m. the inscription with the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City of a purported Special Power of Attorney in favor of Leonardo Yagin
(Annex "I"). Next, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex "J") was made the
following month in order to make it appear that
Yagin unilat erally sold to Summit the subject parcel of land purportedly
belonging to Francisco Catigbac. Since the latter was already dead and realizing
that the agency was already extinguished, Annex "J" was not signed or executed
by Leviste or Orense. This fact however did not deter the two from securing a
BIR clearance on July 25, 2002. Also, on this same day, July 25, 2002, Annex "J"
was presented to Atty. [Escutin] at 2:30 p.m. simultaneously, at exactly the same
time of 2:30 p.m. TCT No. T-134609 in Summits name was issued by Atty.
[Escutin] WITHOUT benefit of the submission of the necessary documentation

29. Thereafter, Leviste and Orense utilized the already cancelled TCT No. 129642
in the name of Francisco Catigbac to be the basis in seeking the cancellation of TD
#00942A in my name (Annex "F"). The Tax Mapping Division of the Office of
City Assessor of Lipa City opined that my 5,000 sq.m. was (sic) part and parcel of
the 105,648 sq.m. covered by TCT No.
129642. A photocopy of the Certification from said division is hereto marked and
attached as Annex "P", hereof. Aquilina Mistas, the Local Assessment Operations
Officer III of the Office of the City Assessor of Lipa City then conveniently
caused the disappearance of my Notice of Levy and other supporting documents
which she had personally received from me on March
13, 2002. For her part of the conspiracy likewise, Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk,
forthwith cancelled by TD#00942-A and in lieu thereof she issued TD #00949-A
in the name of Francisco Catigbac. I dare say so because Mistas and Linatoc were

presented a cancelled TCT as basis for obliterating my 5,000 sq.m. The fact of
cancellation is clearly stated on the posterior side of TCT No. 129642. Both can
read. But the two nevertheless proceeded with dispatch in canceling my TD,
though they had ample time and opportunity to reject the request of Summit who
is not even the registered owner appearing on TCT No. 129642. Francisco
Catigbac could not have been in front of Mistas and Linatoc because he was
already six feet below the ground. Mistas and Linatoc could have demanded
presentation of the document authorizing Summit in requesting for the cancellation
of my TD. Also, they could have demanded from Summit any document
transferring my interest and ownership in favor of a third party. Or, at least, they
could have annotated in Tax Declaration No. 00949-A the fact
that I bought my 5,000 sq.m. from a public auction sale duly conducted by the
court sheriff. Alternatively, Linatoc and Mistas should have advised Summit to
the effect that since they

already appear to be the owners of the subject parcel of land, the new tax
declaration should bear their name instead. Mistas and Linatoc indeed conspired
with Summit in the illegal and unwarranted cancellation of my TD and in
covering up the behind-the-scenes activities of Summit by making it appear that it
was Francisco Catigbac who caused the cancellation. Even Leonardo Yagin, the
alleged attorney-in-fact did not appear before Mistas and Linatoc. Yagin could not
have appeared because he is rumored to be long dead. The aforementioned acts of
the two benefitted (sic) Summit through their manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and/or
gross inexcusable negligence. Perhaps, there is some truth to the rumor that Yagin
is dead because he does not even have a TIN in the questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale. If indeed Yagin is already dead or inexistent[,] the allged payment of the
purchase price of P5,282,400.00 on July 25, 2002 is a mere product of the fertile
imagination of Orense and
Leviste.1avvphi1.zw+ To dispute this assertion[,] the live body of Leonardo
23
Yagin must be presented by Orense and Leviste.
After filing her Affidavit Complaint, petitioner attempted to have the Sheriffs Deed
of Final
Sale/Conveyance of her 5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713
registered with
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City. She also sought the annotation of her Affidavit
of Adverse
Claim on the said 5,000 square meters on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.
Escutin, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, relying on the finding of Examiner
Juanita H. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana), refused to have the Sheriffs Deed of Final
Sale/Conveyance registered, since:
The Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance is a Mode of Transfers (sic)
ownership in favor of the Plaintiff, [Dinah] C. Castillo, (sic) However[,] it happen
(sic) that the presented Tax Declaration [No.] 00942-A is already transfer (sic) in
the name of the said [Dinah] C. Castillo, therefore[,] the registration of Sheriff
(sic) Final Sale is no longer necessary.24
Escutin likewise denied petitioners request to have her Affidavit of Adverse
Claim annotated on TCT No. T-134609 on the following grounds:
1. The claimants (sic) rights or interest is not adverse to the registered
owner. The registered owner is Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T134609 of the Registry of Deeds for Lipa City.
2. The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or
interest of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by
the Regional Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo
City, in Civil Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel
Buenaventura. The registered owner, Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the
judgment debtor or a party in the said case. Simply stated, there is no
privity of contract between them (Consulta No. 1044 and 1119). If ever,
her adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment debtor
who holds no title over the property.25

Escutin did mention, however, that petitioner may elevate en consulta to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) the denial of her request for registration of the
While her Consulta was pending before the LRA, petitioner filed a
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit26 and a Second Supplemental Complaint
Affidavit27 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, bringing to its
attention the aforementioned developments. In her Second Supplemental
Complaint Affidavit, petitioner prayed that Sta. Ana be included as a corespondent in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, averring that the
latters actuation deprived petitioner of a factual basis for securing a new title in
her favor over her
5,000 square meter pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713, because the public auction
sale of the said
property to her could never become final without the registration of the Sheriffs
Deed.
The persons charged in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F filed
their respective
Counter-Affidavits.
Respondent Escutin clarified in his Counter Affidavit that TCT No. T-134609
reflected the same date and time of entry of the Deed of Absolute Sale between
Yagin (as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact) and Summit Realty, i.e., 25 July 2002 at
28
2:30 p.m., in accordance with Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. He emphasized that his
duty as Register of Deeds to register the Deed of Absolute Sale presented before
him was purely ministerial. If the document was legal and in due form,
and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its face, the Register of Deeds had
no authority to inquire into its intrinsic validity based upon proofs aliunde. It was
not true that he allowed the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale
notwithstanding the absence of the required documents supporting the application
for registration thereof. On the contrary, all the required documents such as the
DAR Clearance, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR), Real Property Tax, Transfer Tax, Secretarys Certificate and
Articles of Incorporation of Summit Realty were submitted. While it was true that
the Secretarys Certificate did not accompany the Deed of Absolute Sale upon the
presentation of the latter for registration, Section 117 of the Property Registration
Decree gives the party seeking registration five days to comply with the rest of the
requirements; and only if the party should still fail to submit the same would it
result in the denial of the registration. The License to Sell and the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board Registration of Summit Realty are only required
when a subdivision project is presented for registration. The use of TINs in certain
documents is a BIR requirement. The BIR itself did not require from Yagin as
vendor his TIN in the Deed of Absolute Sale, and issued the CAR even in the
absence thereof. The Register of Deeds, therefore, was only bound by the CAR. As
to the Certification earlier
issued by the Register of Deeds of Lipa City attesting that Lot 13713 in the name
of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla, was not covered by any certificate of
title, Escutin explained that the Register of Deeds was not technically equipped to
determine whether a cadastral lot
number was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring or
participating in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A for,

Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and annotation of her adverse claim on

TCT No. T-134609. This petitioner did on 3 July 2003.
as Register of Deeds, he was not concerned with the issuance (or cancellation) of
tax declarations.
Respondent Mistas, the Assistant City Assessor for Administration of the Office of
the City Assessor, Lipa City, disputed petitioners allegations that she personally
received from petitioner copies of the Notice of Levy and other supporting
documents, and that she caused the disappearance thereof. Although she admitted
that said documents were shown to her by petitioner, she referred petitioner to the
Receiving Clerk, Lynie Reyes, who accordingly received the same. Mistas
maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the Office and she should
not be held responsible for the missing documents. She opined that petitioners
documents could have been among those misplaced or destroyed when the Office
of the City Assessor was flooded with water leaking from the toilet of the Office
of the City Mayor. As Assistant City Assessor for Administration, Mistas
identified her main function to be the

control and management of all phases of administrative matters and support. She
had no hand in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A, and
the issuance of Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A for such function
pertained to another division over which she did not exercise authority. Thus, it
was also not within her function or authority to demand the presentation of
certain documents to support the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No.
00942-A or to cause the annotation of petitioners interest on Catigbacs Tax
Declaration No. 00949-A.
Respondent Linatoc averred that as Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the
Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, she was in charge of safekeeping and
updating the North District Records. With respect to the transfer of a tax
declaration from one name to another, her duty was limited only to the act of
preparing the new tax declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the
cancelled tax declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to
demand the presentation of any document or question the validity of the transfer.
Neither was
it within her jurisdiction to determine whether petitioners interest should have
been annotated on Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A. Examining the
documents presented in support
of the transfer of the tax declaration to anothers name was a function belonging to
other divisions of the Office of the City Assessors. The flow of work, the same as
in any other ordinary transaction, mandated her to cancel petitioners Tax
Declaration No. 00942-A, and to
prepare and release Catigbacs Tax Declaration No. 00949-A after the transfer had
been
reviewed and approved by other divisions of the Office. It was also not true that
TCT No.
129642 in the name of Catigbac was already cancelled when it was presented
before the Office of the City Assessors; the photocopy of said certificate of title
with the Office bore no mark of cancellation.

particular acts were done or not done by certain public officials was already
beyond the control of Leviste and Orense, and just because they benefited from
these acts did not mean that they had a hand in the commission or omission of
said public officials.
After more exchange of pleadings, OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-030728-F were finally submitted for resolution.
In a Joint Resolution29 dated 28 April 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon gave more credence to respondent Escutins defenses, as
opposed to petitioners charges against him:
Going to the charges against respondent Escutin, he convincingly explained that
he allowed the registration of the allegedly defective Deed of Sale because he, as
Register of Deeds, has no power to look into the intrinsic validity [of] the contract
presented to him for registration, owing to the ministerial character of his
function. Moreover, as sufficiently explained by said respondent, all the
documents required for the registration of the Deed of Sale were submitted by the
applicant.

Leviste and Orense, the private individuals charged with the respondent public
officers, admitted that they were corporate officers of Summit Realty. They
related that Summit Realty bought a parcel of land measuring 105,648 square
meters, later identified as Lot 1-B, previously included in TCT No. 181, then
specifically covered by TCT No. 129642, both in
the name of Catigbac. As a result of such purchase, ownership of Lot 1-B was
transferred from Catigbac to Summit Realty. Summit Realty had every reason to
believe in good faith that said property was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis
of the latters certificate of title over the same. Catigbacs right as registered owner
of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/No. 129642, was superior to petitioners, which
was based on a mere tax declaration. Leviste and Orense rebutted petitioners
assertion that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-infact, and Summit Realty was a "one-way street." The Deed was actually signed on
the left margin by both Yagin and the representative of Summit Realty. The
inadvertent failure of the representative of Summit Realty to sign the last page of
the Deed and of both parties to indicate their TINs therein did not invalidate the
sale, especially since the Deed was signed by witnesses attesting to its due
execution. Questions as regards the scope of Catigbacs Special Power of Attorney
in favor of Yagin and the effectivity of the same after Catigbacs death can only be
raised in an action directly attacking the title of Summit Realty over Lot 1-B, and
not
in an administrative case and/or preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman,
which constituted a collateral attack against said title. Leviste and Orense further
explained that since the owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost and was
judicially ordered replaced only on 3
January 2001, entries/inscriptions were necessarily made thereon after said
date. As to Orenses failure to show petitioner any document proving
ownership of Lot 1-B by Summit Realty when the latter paid him a visit, it was
not due to the lack of such documents, but because of petitioners failure to
establish her right to peruse the same. Orense also denied ever threatening
petitioner during their meeting. Finally, according to Leviste and Orense,
petitioners allegations were based on mere conjectures and unsupported by
evidence. That
We likewise find said respondents explanation satisfactory that Section 56 of
P.D. 1529 mandates that the TCT bear the date of registration of the instrument on
which the said TCTs issuance was based. It is for this reason that TCT 134609
bears the same date and time as the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
which deed served as basis for its issuance.
As to his denial to register [herein petitioners] Affidavit of Adverse Claim and
Sheriffs Certificate of Final Sale, through the issuance by the Registry of Deeds
Examiner Juanita H. Sta. Ana, of the 29 June 2003 Order denying registration
thereof, such matter had been raised by herein [petitioner] in a letter-consulta to
the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) on 03 July 2003. As
the criminal and administrative charges respecting this issue is premised, in part,
on a matter still pending with the LRA, we find it premature to make a finding on
the same.
It is for the same reason that we deny the motion contained in the Second
Supplemental Complaint Affidavit praying for the inclusion, as additional
respondent, of Juanita H. Sta. Ana, who is impleaded solely on the basis of
having signed, by authority of Escutin, the 29
July 2003 Order of denial of [petitioners] application for registration.

Finally, respondent Escutin was able to successfully demonstrate, through

Consulta 2103 dated 25 July 1994, wherein the denial of registration by the
Examiner of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City was upheld by the LRA
Administrator, that the (sic) it was practice in the different Registries that
Examiners are given authority by the Register to sign letters of denial.30
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon declared in the same Joint
Resolution that there was no basis to hold respondents Mistas and Linatoc
administratively or criminally liable:
In this respect, this Office notes that while [herein petitioner] alleges that Aquilina
Mistas caused the disappearance of the Notice of Levy and other supporting
documents received from [petitioner] on 13 March 2003 when she applied for the
issuance of a Tax Declaration in her

favor, she did not present her receiving copy thereof showing that it was Mistas
who received said documents from her. Neither did she show that Mistas is the
employee responsible for record safekeeping.
Next, we find, as convincingly answered, the allegation that respondent Marietta
Linatoc cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued Tax Declaration
00949-Q (sic) on the basis of a cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title upon the
behest of Summit [Realty], which was not the registered owner of the property.
Respondent Linatoc, meeting squarely [petitioners] allegation, admits having
physically cancelled Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and having prepared a new
declaration covering the same property in Catigbacs [name], as mandated by the
flow of work in the City Assessors Office. However, she denies having the
authority or discretion to evaluate the correctness and sufficiency of the
documents supporting the application for the issuance of the Tax Declaration,
arguing that her official function is limited to the physical preparation of a new
tax declaration, the assignment of a new tax declaration number and the
cancellation of the old tax declaration, after the application had passed the other
divisions of the City Assessors Office.
Verily, [petitioner] failed to establish that respondent Mistas and Linatoc, are the
ones officially designated to receive applications for issuance of Tax Declaration,
evaluate the sufficiency of the documents supporting such applications, and on
the basis of the foregoing recommend or order the cancellation of an existing Tax
Declaration and direct the annotation of any fact affecting the property and direct
the issuance of a new tax declaration covering the same property.
In fact, there is even a discrepancy as to the official designation of said
respondents. While [petitioner] impleads Mistas, in her capacity as Local
Assessment Officer, and Linatoc, in her capacity as Records Clerk, Mistas, in her
counter-affidavit, alleges a different designation, i.e., Assistant City Assessor for
Administration, while Linatoc claims to be the Local Assessment Operation
Officer II of the City Assessors Office.
With the scope of work of said respondents not having been neatly defined by
[petitioner], this Office cannot make a definitive determination of their liability for
Grave Misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which charges
both relate to the performance or discharge of Mistas and Linatocs official
duties.31
Neither did the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon find any
probable cause to criminally charge private individuals Leviste and Orense
for the following reasons:
Anent private respondents, with the alleged conspiracy to unlawfully cause the
transfer of the title of [herein petitioners] property to Summit sufficiently
explained by respondent Register of Deeds, such allegation against private
respondents loses a legal leg to stand on.1avvphi.zw+
Inasmuch as [petitioner] was not able to sufficiently outline the official functions
of respondents Mistas and Linatoc to pin down their specific accountabilities, the
imputation that private respondent (sic) conspired with said public respondents

respecting the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 00942-A is likewise stripped of

any factual and legal bases.32
As to whether petitioner was indeed unlawfully deprived of her 5,000 square
meter property, which issue comprised the very premise of OMB-L-A-03-0573-F
and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon ruled
that such matter was not within its jurisdiction and should be raised in a civil
action before the courts of justice.
In the end, the Office of the Ombudsman decreed:
WHEREFORE premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that : (1) the
administrative case against public respondents ANTONIO M. ESCUTIN,
AQUILINA A. MISTAS and MARIETA L. LINATOC be DISMISSED, for lack
of substantial evidence; and (2) the criminal case against the same respondents
including private respondent LAURO S. LEVISTE II and BENEDICTO L.
ORENSE, be DISMISSED, for lack of probable cause.33
In a Joint Order34 dated 20 June 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in its Joint Order, took notice of
the Resolution dated 17 December 2002 of the LRA in Consulta No. 3483, which
involved circumstances similar to those in petitioners case. The LRA
distinguished between two systems of land registration: one is the Torrens system
for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree, and the other is the
system of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113
of the Property Registration Decree). These systems are separate and distinct from
each other. For documents involving registered lands, the same should be recorded
under the Property Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an
instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect. Since it appeared that
in Consulta No. 3483, the registration of the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan, the
Certificate of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation was made under Act No.
3344, it did not produce any legal effect on the disputed property, because the said
property was already titled when the aforementioned documents were executed
and presented for registration, and their registration should have been made under
the Property Registration Decree.
Furthermore, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in the same Joint
Order, took into account petitioners withdrawal of her appeal en consulta before
the LRA of the denial by the Register of Deeds of her request for registration of
the Sheriffs Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance and Affidavit of Adverse Claim,
which prompted the LRA Administrator to declare the consulta moot and
academic. For want of a categorical declaration on the registerability of
petitioners documents from the LRA, the competent authority to rule on the said
matter, there could be no basis for a finding that respondent public officers could
be held administratively or criminally liable for the acts imputed to them.
Petitioner sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court challenging the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution and
20 June

2005 Joint Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.35 The
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90533.1avvphi1
36

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on 18 October 2005, also finding
no reason to administratively or criminally charge respondents. Essentially, the
appellate court adjudged that petitioner can not impute corrupt motives to
respondents acts:

Without evidence showing that respondents received any gift, money or other
pay-off or that they were induced by offers of such, the Court cannot impute any
taint of direct corruption in the questioned acts of respondents. Thus, any
indication of intent to violate the laws or of flagrant disregard of established rule
may be negated by respondents honest belief that their acts were sanctioned
under the provisions of existing law and regulations. Such is the situation in the
case at bar. Respondent Register of Deeds acted in the honest belief that the
agency recognized by the court in LRC Case No. 00-0376 between the registered
owner Francisco Catigbac and Leonardo Yagin subsisted with respect to the
conveyance or sale of Lot 1 to Summit as the vendee, and that the Special Power
of Attorney and Deed of Absolute Sale presented as evidence during said
proceedings are valid and binding. Hence, respondent Escutin was justified in
believing that there is no legal infirmity or defect in registering the documents
and proceeding with the transfer of title of Lot 1 in the name of the new owner
Summit. On the other hand, respondent Linatoc could not be held administratively
liable for effecting the cancellation in the course of ordinary flow of work in the
City Assessors Office after the documents have undergone the necessary
evaluation and verification by her
37
superiors.
The Court of Appeals referred to the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
interfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his investigatory power. If the
Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court
shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. The
appellate court pronounced that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in
dismissing petitioners Complaint Affidavit against respondents.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

merit. The challenged Joint Resolution dated April 28, 2004 and Joint Order dated
June 20,
38
2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F are hereby AFFIRMED.
In its Resolution dated 11 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for failing to present new matter which
the appellate court had not already considered in its earlier Decision.
Petitioner now comes before this Court via the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari, with the following assignment of errors:
I
.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942
OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT (sic);
I
I
.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT RESPONDENTS COULD NOT BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of
UNDULY FAVORING SUMMIT TO THE DAMAGE AND
PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER.39
The Petition at bar is without merit.
As to the first issue, petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration
Decree which provides:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss
or theft of an owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be
sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a
duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any
new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court
may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which
shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost
duplicate certificate, but shall in
all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall
thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only ordered the
issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in lieu of the lost one.
However, respondents did not only issue a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181,
but also cancelled petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place
Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents did not even
annotate petitioners existing right over 5,000 square meters of Lot
1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A.
Petitioner
maintains that a new owners duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring
ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section 109 of the Property

Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title was issued only to replace the old; it
cannot cancel existing titles.
Petitioners position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous arguments
and befuddled reasoning.
Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different from a
certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of
possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of
40
property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation of
41
ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence
of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.42 Under the Torrens system, a
certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true
copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued
subsequent to the original registration.
Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the issuance of the new
owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but from its purchase of the same from
Yagin, the attorney-in-fact of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property.
Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT
No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it could

accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a substantial portion of Lot 1
covered by said certificate, later identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbacs title to Lot 1-B
passed on by sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the
separation of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the issuance of a
certificate of title specifically covering the same. This resulted in the issuance of
TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was
subsequently cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of
Summit Realty.
Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is totally
misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title. It cannot,
in any way, be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration.
The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was not because of
the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1B, which encompassed the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was
already covered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the
name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible
evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.43 All persons must
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration.44 Therefore, upon
presentation of TCT No. 129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize
the ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax declaration for
the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the
name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or
portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of
title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor
would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same
property.
As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioners
title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far superior
and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same property,
conclusive and indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs
certificate of title is binding upon the whole world,
including respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. Time and again,
the Court has ruled that tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be
used to prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not
conclusive evidence of the
same.45 Petitioner acquired her title to the 5,000 square meter property from
Raquel, her judgment debtor who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax
declaration to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly
observed that, "[c]uriously, as to how and
when petitioners alleged predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her
supposed coowners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No.
00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent."46
Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot 1-B to Summit
Realty by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, are beyond the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to consider. It must be remembered
that Summit Realty had already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609,
in its name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence

of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be collaterally attacked in
the administrative and preliminary investigations conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman for Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
For this same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitioners prayer in
the instant
Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty.
Which now brings the Court to the second issue raised by petitioner on the
administrative liability of respondents.
Before the Court proceeds to tackle this issue, it establishes that petitioners
Complaint Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon gave rise to
two charges: (1) OMB- L-A-03-0573-F involved the administrative charge for
Gross Misconduct against respondent public officers; and (2) OMB-L-C-03-0728F concerned the criminal charge for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act47 against respondent public officers and private
individuals Leviste and Orense. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, dismissed both charges. In the Petition at bar,
petitioner
only assails the dismissal of the administrative charge for grave misconduct against
respondent public officers. Since petitioner did not raise as an issue herein the
dismissal by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, of the criminal charge against respondent public officers for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the same
48
became final and executory.
In Domingo v. Quimson,49 the Court adopted the well-written report and
recommendation of its Clerk of Court on the administrative matter then pending
and involving the charge of gross or serious misconduct:
"Under Section 36, par. (b) [1] of PD No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, 'misconduct' is a ground for disciplinary action.
And under MC No. 8, S.
1970, issued by the Civil Service Commission on July 28, 1970, which sets the
'Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases and other
Matters Relative Thereto,' the administrative offense of 'grave misconduct' carries
with it the maximum penalty of dismissal from the service (Sec. IV-C[3], MC
No. 8, S. 1970). But the term 'misconduct' as an administrative offense has a well
defined meaning. It was defined in Amosco vs. Judge Magno, Adm. Mat. No.
439-MJ, Res. September 30, 1976, as referring 'to a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by the public officer.' It is a misconduct 'such as affects the
performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as effects his character
as a private individual.' In the recent case of Oao vs. Pabato, etc., Adm. Mat. No.
782-MJ, Res. July 29, 1977, the Court defined 'serious misconduct' as follows:
Hence, even assuming that the dismissal of the case is erroneous, this would be
merely an error of judgment and not serious misconduct. The term `serious
misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action
more particularly, unlawful behavior of gross negligence by the magistrate. It
implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. For serious
misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts

categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral

attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
complained of were corrupt or inspired by intention to violate the law, or were a
persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. We have previously ruled that
negligence and ignorance on the part of a judge are inexcusable if they imply a
manifest
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. This is not so
in the case at bar." (Italics supplied.)
To reiterate, for grave misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence
showing that the acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or were a

persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. Both the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals found that there was no sufficient
evidence to substantiate petitioners charge of grave misconduct against
respondents. For this Court to reverse the rulings of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals, it must necessarily review the
evidence presented by the parties and decide on a question of fact. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of
50
fact.
Factual issues are not cognizable by this Court in a Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. In order to resolve this issue, the Court would
necessarily have to look into the probative value of the evidence presented in the
proceedings below. It is not the function of
the Court to reexamine or reevaluate the evidence all over again. This Court is not a
trier of
facts, its jurisdiction in these cases being limited to reviewing only errors of law
that may have been committed by the lower courts or administrative bodies
performing quasi-judicial functions. It should be emphasized that findings made
by an administrative body, which has acquired expertise, are accorded not only
respect but even finality by the Court. In administrative proceedings, the quantum
51
of evidence required is only substantial.
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall not
disturb findings of fact. The Court cannot weigh once more the evidence
submitted, not only before the Ombudsman, but also before the Court of
Appeals. Under Section 27 of Republic Act No.
6770, findings of fact by the Ombudsman are conclusive, as long as they are
52
supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
53
a conclusion.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that respondents did not
commit gross misconduct. Evident from the 28 April 2004 Joint Resolution of
the former and the 18 October 2005 Decision of the latter is that they arrived at
such findings only after a meticulous consideration of the evidence submitted by
the parties.
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to
convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in their
dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. Respondents also enjoy in their
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. The
burden of proving otherwise by substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who
failed to discharge the same.
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions
held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How
then could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their
jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner should have at least
been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was
not able to establish that such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or
Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural
basis for her insistence that respondents should have done or not done a particular
act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc
should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of
Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or
recognizes the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally,
absent any reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with
one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than
speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents

were consistently favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted
effort to cause petitioner prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent with the
recognition of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty,
registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11 January 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner
Dinah C. Castillo.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT Manila
E
N
B
A
N
C
G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
petitioner, vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further
seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation.
T
h
e
F
a

c
t
s
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore
and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of
Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to
carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x
x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands
reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"2 under the ManilaCavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing
PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x
x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a
Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:
"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other
works in the MCCRRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid
according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items
of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and
other terms and conditions provided for in

Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such
works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby
agrees to cede and transfer in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title,
interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land
reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which
have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as
of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the
Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately
Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred
Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying
elevations above Mean Low Water Level located outside the Financial
Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a
total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known
as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of One
Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One
(1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.
8

Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the

Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
11
the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports
that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA
Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer
Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for
Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court
dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to
the refiling of the case before the proper court."12
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a
taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner
contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for
brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The
JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and
4
AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On
April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through
6
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all
scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported
the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No.
560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1)
the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which
the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot
alienate these
lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA
itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential
Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study
on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the
reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms
of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,
Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations. Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions
of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion.
13

After several motions for extension of time, PEA and AMARI filed their
Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on
December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a
temporary restraining order; and (c) to set the case for hearing on oral argument.
Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO
dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of

the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada

approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President,
petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the
renegotiated contract be declared null and void."14
T
h
e
I
s
s
u
e
s

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE

PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR
FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE
HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL
FOR NON- EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING
THIS SUIT; V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATION
INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON ON-GOING
NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT
VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF
CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE
RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987
CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR
RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT
VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS
TO THE GOVERNMENT.
The
Court's
Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot
and academic because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the
on-going negotiations for a new agreement." The petition also prays that the
Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing
any new agreement with AMARI."
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI
furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA
containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA
has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations.
Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA is now
moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March

30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA
on May 28, 1999.

15

Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by
simply fast- tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the
Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or
remove it from the ambit of judicial review.

16

The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:

We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court
of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA.
The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds
necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and
AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation
of Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating
lands of the
public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to
transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and
submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes
more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself
does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national
patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent
the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the
Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.17
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of
the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,18 covered agricultural landssold to private corporations
which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private
corporations claimed or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their
imperfect titles19 under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 ("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI
seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for
non- agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and
Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended
JVA constitute the consideration for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can
claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation
of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since June 12,

1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial
20
confirmation of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in
this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of
title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent
proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses. The
Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire
reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project.21
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe
the principle governing the hierarchy of courts.

PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief
directly from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot
entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public.22 The Court can
resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. Also,
the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to
disclose publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed
information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that
mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
23

PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera where the Court
granted the petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially
demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Taada, the Executive Department had an
affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
24
25
Code and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 to publish the presidential
decrees. There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an
initial demand from the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it
has no affirmative statutory duty to
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to
enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA
refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA
also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no
actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks
to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to
compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands
worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation
of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the
nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.
In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's
suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -

disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts
that the
Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from
PEA the needed information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a
government corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,26
the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding.
PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner
or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original
JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a
public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in
breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial
intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely
legal or constitutional question.27 The principal issue in the instant case is the
capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional
ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to
bring this suit
"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of 'transcendental importance to the
public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of
government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of
'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social,
economic and moral well being of the people.'
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court
which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the
subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a
public right and the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner
is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the

action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right
to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the
rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for
the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced 'is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further

declared that
'when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right.'
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public
funds may not have been involved under the questioned contract for the
development, management and operation of the Manila International
Container Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the
economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial
consideration involved.' We concluded that, as a consequence, the
disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to
information and access to official records, documents and papers a
right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to
sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public
right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar
should be allowed."
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable
diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance,
the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final
agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to
information on matters of public concern in this manner:
"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest
reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern. This
State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:

"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State

adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if
expressed without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These
twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x
accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have
the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation
of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry
is essential
to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained
by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30
"An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants
in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit."
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,31 that in cases of on-going negotiations the
right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA
maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the predecisional stage or before the closing of the transaction. To support its
contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does
the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the
contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and
therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract and already a
consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policymaking and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These
twin provisions are essential to the
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the
national interest. Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can
invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at
the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making in
government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real
sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before
they decide.

We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires
PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information
requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract,
PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public
matters relating to the disposition of its property. These include the size, location,
technical description and nature of the property being disposed of, the terms and
conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and
similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the
public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the
contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA
fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at
any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or
proposals. However, once the committee makes
its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of
the government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and
any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite
33
proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court ruled as follows:
"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe
that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on
any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must
The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public
concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in
formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the
public records in the custody of government agencies or officials. The second
category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing,
confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research
data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of
meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to
the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
34
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The
right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise
of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the
public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
35
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to

intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed earlier such as on matters involving national
security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information." (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.1wphi1.nt
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even
illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the
citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposedcontract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow
neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not also
apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other limitations
that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does
not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during
closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of
38
Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked
to exercise
39
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant
case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national

40

security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the
right to
41
information in several legislations.
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the
public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
"lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
42
Crown. The King, as the sovereign ruler and representative of the people,
acquired and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and
waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the timehonored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
43
the public domain." Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article
420 of the
Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the
ownership and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18,
1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations
and individuals. Later, on November 29,
1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the
government to corporations and individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as
the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all
waters within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public
44
domain for public use. The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:
"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority."
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the
party undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary
permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public

dominion as follows: "Art. 339. Property of public dominion is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,

ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that
of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of
general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals."
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public.
In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for
some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use,
but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This
class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed for
some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of
property of public dominion into private property, to wit:
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to
public use or to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the
private property of the State."
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive
department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for
public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate the
45
property to private parties.
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which
regulated the lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of
this law were as follows:
"Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in
existing law, and the title to all Government or public lands made or
reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine

Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to

vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of
Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government
or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or
filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the
necessary streets and alleyways located
thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared
and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall
give notice to the public that such parts of the lands so made or
reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.

xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and
best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the
Governor-General
may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands
reclaimed by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and
disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the
government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No.
1654 mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No.
1654 made government reclaimed lands sui generis in that unlike other public
lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed lands
were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the
sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea
by private parties with government permission remained private lands.

"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or
disposable, (b)
Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act."
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited or classified x x x.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

xxx

On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the
Public Land
46
Act. The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being
neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for
residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural

purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be

disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging,
filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the
foregoing classes. x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fiftysix shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by

the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that

the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be
disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of
the public domain into x x x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the
Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable
lands only to those lands which have been "officially
delimited and classified."
48

Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title shall be
classified" as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other
lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial or other productive non- agricultural purposes. These provisions vested
upon the Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into disposable lands of the public domain. These provisions also
empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the
public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public
domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the
public domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
"shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The
Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must
formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No.
2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907
in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands

remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56
(d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874,
the government could not sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
49
to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea
pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed
from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by
the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian
doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that
"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five
years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis
supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate.
Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural resources, became
inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after
these lands were reclaimed and classified as alienable agricultural lands of the

public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain,
being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public
classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased
and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

50

agricultural lands. However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although

subject to
(a) Alienable or
disposable, (b)

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government

reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition
and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution
did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands
under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
provided as follows:
"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease,
or hold public agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and
twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in
excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in
excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding
two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private
corporation, or association." (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature
continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title
and ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No.
141, also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws
on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the
existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the
51
public domain other than timber and mineral lands.
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public
domain into "alienable or disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior
to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section
7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No.
141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only
lands that
are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as
follows:
"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands
of the public domain into

Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another,53 for the purpose of their administration and
disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for
public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to
be so. x x x."
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public
domain, the President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must
be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands of the public domain, are as follows:
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section
fifty-nine shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary
for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter.
The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease
under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these
lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed only the lease of such lands to private
parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling under
Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the
public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935
Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private
parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public
domain intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive
purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the provisions of this
chapter and not otherwise." Under Section
10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes lease of the land. Any
disposition of

"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither
timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential
purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes
other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging,
filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or
sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation, or association
authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes.
x x x.
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for nonagricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141,54
unless a subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized
succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:
"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use.
So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or
other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the
foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government.
Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of reclaimed land. The Public Land
Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands
reclaimed by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing, however, the
Governor- General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land
reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This requisite must
have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the
foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated
and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was
only by lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis
supplied)

As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act

No. 141 has remained in effect at present."
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in
1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional
edict under the 1935 Constitution. Foreshore lands

became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the

government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which
case they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to
private parties.56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private
parties.
Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the
President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other nonagricultural lands under Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are
the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural purposes that the
government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority
before lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to
government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA
No. 141 declares that
"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is
requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares:
Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants,
donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or
subdivision of the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities
conducive
to the public interest;but the land so granted, donated, or transferred to
a province,
municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be
alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x."
(Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors
the legislative authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141
exempted government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands
that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities
should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of
constitutional or statutory limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for nonagricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could also be used
to evade the statutory

prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by
operation of law a lien on these lands.57
"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are
not needed for public purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural
Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such
authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public
advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of
agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. x x x." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all
58
leases or sales of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section
5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim
portions of the sea with government permission. However, thereclaimed land
could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the
public domain open to disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution
prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of
public dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the
Civil Code of 1950 state that
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State."
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion
is no longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under
Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections
63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:
59

classified as patrimonial property of the State. In the case of government

reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being
disposable, as well as the manner of their disposition, is
governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of
public dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public
use, are intended for public

service or the "development of the national wealth." Thus, government reclaimed

and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public
service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of
public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted
the Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which
cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of "agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However,
the term "public agricultural lands" in the 1935
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now
acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the
public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled
corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA
with the following purposes and powers:
"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following
purposes:

Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement

lands of the public domain.60 If the land of public domain were neither timber nor
mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the
public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public
domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Private corporations,
even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain
unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that

"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation,

ecological, and development requirements of the natural resources, shall
determine by law the size
of land of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired
by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and
the conditions
therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand
hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess
of five hundred hectares or acquire by
purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-four hectares. No
private
corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or
permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in
excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be
increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the
National Economic and Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by
dredging, filling or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide,
dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates
and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or
operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be
necessary for the efficient, economical and beneficial utilization of
the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in
carrying out the purposes for which it is created, have the following
powers and functions:

(a)To prescribe

inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition,

and further declared no longer needed for public service.

its by-laws. x x
x
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area
permitted to private corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise,
any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be
necessary for the attainment of the purposes and objectives herein
specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas
of the public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the
ebb and flow of the
tide.61 Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb
and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the
public domain63 and are

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable
lands of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today,
a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it
still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084
expressly empowers PEA "to hold
lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by
statute." Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands
of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands
of the public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to
sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of
CA No.141, which states
"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government
shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a
manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x
x." (Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain.
Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted
the Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources
are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution state that
"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands
of the public domain may be further classified by law according to
the uses which they may be

devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to

agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor." (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private corporations of
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA
No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring,
except through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood.
During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:
"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to
page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area.'
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but
this was introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits
private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has
not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In
some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the
purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this
provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo,
there were instances where the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to
acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because
the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis
supplied)

period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
64

In Ayog v. Cusi, the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban
in this way: "Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to
encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm' and
to prevent a

recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by

corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the
Constitution could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed
the limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of
alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the
land in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the
break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation,
upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation
instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing
break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the
next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the
public domain.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him.
An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as
stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom
Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option
"granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66
In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only
157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed,
and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of
P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the
Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the
other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will
share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less
30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable
area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c)
of the Amended JVA provides that
"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary
deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI's Land

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a
qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain,
since the vehicle to circumvent the constitutional intent is removed. The
available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an evergrowing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this
constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public domain only to
individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas
clause, consists of three properties, namely:
1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along
Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro
Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"
2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three
islands;" and
3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350
hectares more or less to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed
65
area."

share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in

writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the
proper certificates of title covering AMARI's Land Share in the name
of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of
the titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to
AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles pertaining to AMARI,
until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional
land pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a
maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,

petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.
x

x
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold
such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x
x."(Emphasis supplied)

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its
67
Memorandum, PEA admits that

"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands
are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be
classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging,

filling, or other means;
x
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEAAMARI joint
venture PEA's statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore
and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states
that
"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to
perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as
own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full
and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in
accordance with the Master Development Plan."
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated
April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and
submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:

x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Legal Task
constituted under Presidential Administrative Order
68
No. 365
Force
admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos,
"[R]eclaimed
lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain."69 The
Legal
Task Force
concluded that
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory
authority, the rights of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands
have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may
validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating the
Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from
holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987
Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has
passed on to PEA by statutory grant."

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of
resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and
submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural
lands" of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not
convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi71
public use.
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to
72
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified."
The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of
CA No. 141. In Laurel vs. Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to sell
the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine
Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy.
Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen years earlier,
the Court still ruled that, under Article 42274of the Civil Code, a property of public
dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court
ruled that
"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for
actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use
(Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A
property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership
'until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it
from being such'(Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]."
(Emphasis
supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special
land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay. On January
19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the
name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality
of Paranaque issued
TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD
No. 1529
authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To
this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying

Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other
natural
the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No.
1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration
that the Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom
Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to
disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had
already reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial
erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila
Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands,
the

reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural

lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the
public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to
qualified private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are
"waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and are
inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission
from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would
76
remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land
ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."77

AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a
private corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20,
1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the
75
public domain which the State may not alienate." Article 5 of the Spanish Law of
Waters reads as follows:

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws
subsequently enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141
requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between
CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the
Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.

"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works

constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or private
persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the
party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the
terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could
reclaim from the sea only with "proper permission" from the State. Private parties
could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms of the
grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea
without permission from the State because the sea is property of public dominion.
It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the reclaimed
land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because
reclamation of areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National
Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National
Government, and no longer by grant or permission as provided in Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the
National Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of
the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private
party receives compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to
the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of portions of the reclaimed
land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment
in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land
open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional
592.15 hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There
is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These
submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be

Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws
authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A
declared that
"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall
be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by
it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x."
no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed
from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x
owned by the State," forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are
the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition.
Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is
tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of lands
of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA
include the following: "[T]o own or operate railroads, tramways and other kinds
of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such systems
of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such storm drains as may be necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all
of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to
impose or collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore

and submerged lands held by the PEA would actually be needed for public use or
service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be
primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section also
states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x

x x." Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA
became the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim
foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized
PEA as the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure
their maximum utilization in promoting
79
public welfare and interests." Since large portions of these reclaimed lands
would obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration
segregating reclaimed lands
no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public
service.1wphi1.nt
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall
belong to or be owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify
inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would
automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not
classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or
EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for
brevity) the following powers and functions:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The
Department shall: (1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of
exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges,
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of
licenses, permits, concessions, lease agreements and such other
privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all
aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee,
supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any
regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in furtherance of the
conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain and serve as the sole
agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and

80

titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies." (Emphasis

supplied)

"exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the

public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA
needs authorization from DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects
in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of
the public domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA
81
82
should be classified as alienable under Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then
recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the
Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private
contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On
the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged
areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer
by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make
the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
83
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III of CA No. 141
84
and other applicable laws.
PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with
CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits
that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government
"shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
x."85 (Emphasis by PEA)

As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises
"supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also
exercises
In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative
Code of
1987, which states that
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following: x x x."

Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property
belonging to the
Government. The Court declared that "It is not for the President to convey real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
allowing
PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides
that
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila
Bay pursuant to the contract for the reclamation and construction of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or
reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred,
conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the
Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No. 1084;
Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the
aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and
assume the obligations of the Republic of the Philippines (Department
of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid

contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction

and Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public
Estates Authority shall issue in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an
issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid
and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the
Public Estates Authority shall execute such contracts or agreements,
including appropriate agreements with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to
implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural
Resources in favor of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice
to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such
portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as
provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such
patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the
corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides
that -

that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands
shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084."

"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the

PEA which shall be responsible for its administration, development,
utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to
the sale of
PEA's patrimonial lands.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA
to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO
No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose
of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 1084," the
charter of PEA.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to
private individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any
statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to
individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain to private corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative authority benefits only
individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x
87
x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." (Emphasis
supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its
lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties itspatrimonial properties in
accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The
constitutional ban on private

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would
not apply to private corporations but only to individuals because of the
constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands

Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable

lands open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public
service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
requiring public auction, in the absence of a law exempting PEA from holding a
public auction.88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent
is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by
Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA
No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public
89
domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, which
authorizes PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer"
of its assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement of public
auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment,
whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with
public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property
through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for
any cause, or is no longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer
accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if
found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their
presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the
highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award
or similar body in the presence of the auditor concerned or other
authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising by
printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three
consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the
value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by
notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the
locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that the public
auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as
may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved
by the Commission."
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which
case the Commission on Audit must approve the selling price.90 The Commission
on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through
91
Circular No. 89-296 dated January 27,
1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be disposed of
only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in
case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's
reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private
corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December
10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim
another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom
Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the
92
winning bidder. No one, however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the
Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the Freedom Islands
through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the
93
failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991.
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area
94
to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving
95
only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the
area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on
December 10,

1991, more than three years before the signing of the original JVA on April
25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during
the intervening period.
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is
absolute
and clear: "Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT
Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell
reclaimed lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of
RA No. 6957 states
"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction,
operation and maintenance of any infrastructure projects undertaken
through the build-operate- and-transfer arrangement or any of its
variations pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a
share in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments,
such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect
to the ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a
government BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain in view of the constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and
AMARI, authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the
contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land,
to wit:
"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and
Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private
Sector. x x x x x x
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the
repayment plan may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a
proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land
ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the
Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of
the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the
96
reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares of non-agricultural lands, may be
conveyed to him in ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such
conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the
reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public
domain to private lands." This

theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the "issuance of the special
patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the
land of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private
property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with the issuance of Special
Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles,
the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private
lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following
rulings of the Court:
97

1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato, where the Court held

"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title
was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and
became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
control nor jurisdiction."
98

2. Lee Hong Hok v. David, where the Court declared "After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered
thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496
subject to all the safeguards provided
therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where
the Court
ruled "While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead
patents, he may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titlesissued to private parties. These four cases
uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the
Torrens System. The fifth case cited involves the registration under the Torrens
System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National Government to
Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health.
The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the
site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical Center,
which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of
Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example of
a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its
character as a
property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the
name of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well
as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any
private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or
certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's
certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a
private corporation.

domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the
patent is registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes private property over which
the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held
"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971,
and free patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private
respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and,
therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."
101

5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,

where the Court stated

"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay

legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau
of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly
sufficient for initial registration
under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee
simple' title
or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus,
Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or
patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in
the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United
States or to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration
Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the
registrant private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred
by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not
give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the
registration.102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
103
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer
of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141
as expressly stated in Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to
wit:
"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the
Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the
Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety

four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical description of which are

hereto attached and made an integral part hereof." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not
covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when
authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are
transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes,
under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered
land even if not annotated on the certificate of
title.104 Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under
Section 60 of
CA No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered
unless
Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot
authorize the

sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain

because of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60
of CA No.
141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into
private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be
transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to
dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial
lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can
declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private
corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands
which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus,
EO No.
525 declares that
"EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 525
Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily
Responsible for all Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or
being
proposed to be undertaken in various parts of the country which need to
be evaluated
for consistency with national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the
Government's declared policy to provide for a coordinated, economical
and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of
areas shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the
National Government which shall ensure a coordinated and
integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates
Authority as a government corporation to undertake reclamation of
lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting public
welfare and interests; and

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with

continuing authority to reorganize the national government including
the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct the
following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all
reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.
All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or
through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity;
Provided, that, reclamation projects of any national government agency
or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation
with the PEA upon approval of the President.
x x x ."
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as
the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the
public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private
lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands,
does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only
when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private
lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose
of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still
public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the
public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands
of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of
the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land
patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such
lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the
Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and
still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in
only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse
equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos,
now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of
the public domain since PEA can "acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands."
This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring

hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that
in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This will result in corporations
amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating the very
evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this
country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024
105
hectares of public lands.
The 1973 Constitution prohibited private
corporations from acquiring any kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution
has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.

The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under
Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to
existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be
registered under the Torrens System or Act No.
496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122
of Act No.
496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively,
provide as follows: Act No. 496
"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging
to the x x x Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated,
granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations,
the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and
shall become registered lands."
PD No. 1529
"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land
is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any
person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation
of this Decree." (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103
of PD No.
1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a
province, municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government," as provided
country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of
an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town
plaza or public school site may likewise be titled in the name of the
106
municipality. All these properties become properties of the public domain, and
if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land.
There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-registration of
land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of
eminent domain become unquestionably part of the public domain.
Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to
issue in the name of the National Government new certificates of title covering
such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered
land, or interest therein, is expropriated or taken by eminent domain,
the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other
agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for
registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment
which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular

in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System

pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly
subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be
alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title,
except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled
but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by
Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the
public domain from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified
private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public
domain may be registered under the Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12,
Book I of the Code states
"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the
deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate
agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a
public wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating
port operations in the
property or interest expropriated, the number of the certificate of title,
and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right or interest
taken shall be made on
each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee
simple is taken, a
new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government,
province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality
exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident
to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of
title shall be for the account of the authority taking the land or interest
therein." (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be
registered pursuant to existing laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of
the Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of
Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA
for the earlier reclamation and construction works performed by the CDCP under
its 1973 contract with the Republic."

Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the
Amended JVA
requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title
conveying
107
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI."
This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that private corporations "shall not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to
AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than
by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed
lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No. 141,108 the
Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not
available for sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed
lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural
resources, are to be distributed equitably among our ever-growing population. To
insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have barred
private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek
to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public domain
to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands
reclaimed from foreshore and

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom

Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas.
Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
110
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership
111
of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of

alienable land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987

112

Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or
purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men,"
are "inexistent and void

from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule
on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and
VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT Manila
SECOND
DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59731 January 11, 1990

ALFREDO CHING,
petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO,
respondents.
Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for
petitioners. Edgardo Salandanan for private
respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the
concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in effect affirmed
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court
(penned by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII
Pasay City) granting ex-parte the cancellation of title registered in the name of
Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No. 6888-P entitled Pedro
Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.
The facts as culled from the records disclose that:
In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and
Dominga Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and Original Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given
by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land
situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of Paranaque,
Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA,
Rollo).
In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to
Francisco, Regina, Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633 was issued on August 10, 1960
accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and
82, Ibid.).

By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad

Street, Pasay City, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on
September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No.
78633 was deemed cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).
On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States
of America. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III, Pasay City a petition for administration
of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1956-P. Notice
of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper
of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7,
1965. No oppositors appeared at the hearing on December 16, 1965,
consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo Ching was
appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and
letters of administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land
covered by T.C.T. No. 91137 was among those included in the inventory
submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).
Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on
December
27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (now
RTC), Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for
reconveyance of the abovesaid property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in
his favor based on possession (p.
33, Ibid.). Ching Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City
which
appears on the face of T.C.T. No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City,
as alleged in
private respondent's complaint). (Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An
amended complaint was filed by private respondent against Ching Leng and/or
Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of the fact

that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by
summons and other processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by
publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by the trial court in its
order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the complaint were published in
the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the
sixty (60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive
pleading and on motion of counsel for
the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed
the presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on
June 15, 1979, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the
complaint to be duly substantiated by the evidence, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true
and absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No.
91137; ordering the defendant to reconvey the said property in
favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching Leng
and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of
T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be cancelled failing in
which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered
to issue, in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title over
the
said property in the name of the plaintiff Pedro Asedillo of
legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro
Manila, upon payment of the
fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes
due the
Government.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)

Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979
pursuant to Section
7 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The
title over the
property in the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued in favor of Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently
sold the property to Villa Esperanza Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp.
125-126, Ibid.).
On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated
decision. He filed a verified petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null
and void for lack of jurisdiction which was granted by the court on May 29, 1980
(penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp. 54-59, Rollo).
On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was
reconsidered and set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted
reinstated in the order dated September 2, 1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)

On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
latter order but the same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 7779, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but
the same was dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied on February 10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)
Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro
Manila during the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA
Rollo).
Hence, the instant petition.
Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in
compliance with the resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed
a reply to comment on June 18,

1982 (p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution
of June 28,
1982 (p. 191, Ibid.)
Petitioner raised the following:

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR

RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND
CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND
IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN AND/OR HIS ESTATE
BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND
DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

ASSIGNMENTS
I
I
I

OF ERROR I
WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG
AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE VALIDLY SERVED
WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY
PUBLICATION.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR

RECONVEYANCE AND CANCELLATION OF TITLE
CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.
I
V

I
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
PARTIES.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
GUILTY OF LACHES IN INSTITUTING THE ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19
YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF
REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.
Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in
personam and the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased
Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of service of summons by publication in
accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa et al., 86 Phil. 448
[1950].
On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title
is quasi in rem, for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly
a judgment in in rem, it fixes and settles the title to the property in controversy and
to that extent partakes of the nature of the judgment in rem, hence, service of
summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who on the face of the
complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine
enunciated in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].
The petition is impressed with merit.

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an

action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land registration
proceeding or the probate of
a will; it is an action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding
only upon the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity
recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds
a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing (Ang
Lam v.
Rosillosa, supra).
Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in
personam, the judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was
commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death. As ruled by this Court in
Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision of
the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical personality,
that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through death (Arts. 37 and
42 Civil Code).
The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of
Ching Leng's estate as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue
or be sued through an executor or administrator in his representative capacity (21
Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims, deceased Ching Leng is a
resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate and T.
C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court,
Branch III commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in
the same year. Such misleading and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of
candor on the part of private respondent and his counsel, which is censurable.
The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the
original land registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration
court in accordance with Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496,
as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection with, or as a mere incident in
Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114
SCRA 748 [1982]).
Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since
Ching Leng was already in the other world when the summons was published he
could not have been notified at all and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of title could not have
been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since
petitioner Perkins was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and
sought to be excluded from whatever interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks
with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action being a quasi in rem
summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.

to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are
directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are
directed against the thing or property or status of
a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole world. An
action to
The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been
granted and the amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and
filed only in 1978
dismissed outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by
the evidence adduced in his behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of
his title since 1960, from the time the decree of registration was issued.
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's nameafter one year from the date of the
decreeis not to set aside
the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for damages if
the property has passed unto

the hands of an innocent purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R.
No. 66742; Teoville Development Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June
16, 1988).
Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from
the date of registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action
on the ground of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508,
June 27,
1988).
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever
any question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the
"mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land (National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).
Republic of the
Philippines
SUPREME
COURT Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385

December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO
A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA,
DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU
MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA,
DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU
SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI
NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land

referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that
Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is
incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing prior to
the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz,
G.R. No. 39272, May 4, 1988).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2)
the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated June 15, 1979 and the Order dated
September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared NULL and VOID for
lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado,
JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON
FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESO
LUTI
ON
SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P.
HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L.
GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO,
SATUR S.
BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY
ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANGCAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM
MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M.

MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father

CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father
MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother
LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND,
PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTERPEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.

PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No.
8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA),
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.1 In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998
their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the
IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment.
The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the
ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene.
They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for
the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the
responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous
People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources,
Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-inIntervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and
mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the
arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA

and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition
of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous
peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which
are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition
of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private
lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of
3
private landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the
settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the
4
ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and
recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole
authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP
that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation,
the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and
practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to
property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous
peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents
power of control over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65
and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson
and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from
implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist
from implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public
funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying

out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the

exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
7
natural resources."

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which
the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join,
sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno
also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice
Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a
justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5,
6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He
reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the
law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join
in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, GonzagaReyes, Ynares- Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
5

Rollo, pp. 25-27.

Id. at 27-28.

Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13,

1999, pp. 5-6. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE
OPINION PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich
Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life."
Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the
most
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree,
ritual, custom,
ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history.
It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy
and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who
wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token,
pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

Rollo, p. 114.

Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide
with
settled constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other
natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This
Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist
of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to
their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice
to our indigenous people.

Id. at 23-25.

This Opinion discusses the following:

Footnotes

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the

Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.

A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources

within the ancestral domains does not deprive the State of
ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision
in their development and exploitation.

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing

Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a)
of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and
is ultra vires.

A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in

Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under
Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Consitution.

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in

Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of
indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the
public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how
acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include
the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International

Indigenous
Mo
ve
me
nt.
DIS
CU
SSI
ON
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE
PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the I ndies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of
3
dominium. This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the
feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regaliais a Western
legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the
Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima
Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with
respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands,
territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in
order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons
in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to
the natives what may be necessary for tillage and

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial
courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable
period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall
exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their
title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and
receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest
4
shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land:
long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful
occupation of the subject land in
1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land
from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the
plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to
the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas
and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including
the State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest.

Consequently, all lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the
Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge of distributing the lands
by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and
civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either
6
by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the Crown.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of
"those special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the
10
public lands in the colonies." The question posed by the Court was: "Did these
special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these
lands; and if so, to what extent was it
recognized?"

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage
Law of
1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax
lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
"Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws
of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders
and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It
required
the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall
revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to
the government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial
government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first
Public Land Act.
B. Valento n v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
9
Murciano.

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the
disposition of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the
absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies
would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed
that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the
Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, theOrdenanza
11
of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.

of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should
exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.14

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes
de las Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the
date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal
lands, whether or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit
to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are
occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term
designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and
15
evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others."

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those
lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name,
or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there
might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the
idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because
some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the
mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to
produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their
title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be
protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law
that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners
of the land possessed by them without any action on
the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or
in his name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For
those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment
proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his
16
deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law
in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of
17
these lands by prescription, without any action by the State." Valenton had no
rights other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other
hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state
ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the
Spanish Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public
lands to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by
18
the American Government in Act No. 926."
C. The Public La nd Acts a nd the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions
of the the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the
public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling,
and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it
ordered the Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the
publication of the Crown's instructions:

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands
"wrongfully occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands.
Valenton construed these
regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive
interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under
the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier
ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted
that he must make that
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain
native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and
sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's title
to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the
22
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land
Act. This new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive
in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and
Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act
2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth
Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same
as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the
24
Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system
under Act

496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine

Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under
the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir
Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South
Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official
certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such liens

26

and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. The

certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel
of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates
land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the
fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was
28
the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country.
There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of
natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of
the state's power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to the
Constitutional
Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural
resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian
doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and
Utilization of
Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV
on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or

utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period

exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other

than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article

XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

- the right to stay in the territories;

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

x x x."
Simply stated, all la nds of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is
this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by
the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote
the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is
simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants
these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members
of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years
from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the
ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if
33
the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration.
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the
34
35
right to self- governance and empowerment, social justice and human rights,
the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and
community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and
36
technologies.
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office
of the President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to
ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan,
Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao;
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and
ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such
territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from
the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group
of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory.
These groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their
territories under claim of ownership since time

37

Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. The NCIP took over the
functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino
which were merged under
38
a revitalized structure.
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and
practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which
is granted quasi-judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the
Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited
to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall
be punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to
12 years and/or fined
from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. I ndigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous
Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in
the 1987
Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and
other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became
historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions but who may have been displaced from their traditional
territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of
Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu
group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc,
Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and
Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva
Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan,
Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora,

Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid,
Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of
Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; AetaAbiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of
Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of
Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz;
the Magahat of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi,
Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon
and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the
Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the
Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte,
Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of
Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the
Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and
Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are
tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan,
Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental;
Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South
Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo,
Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and
South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,
Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as
early as
25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled
44
largely by the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays. The strains from these groups
eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became the dominant
influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese
and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth
millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and sociocultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial
45
society.
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering
became supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and
the cultivation of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine

communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a

basically common way of life where nature was a
primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and

responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the
largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was
essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and
form. They had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parentstock and used them not only as media of daily communication but also as
vehicles for the expression of their literary
moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not
see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion
and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after
death. Their rituals were based on
beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of
other deities, in
the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun,
the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of
Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that was
close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man
and the object of nature.51

regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of land was

non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what
regulated the development of
lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise free to all. Coastal
communities
depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing concept
similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains
and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic
privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and sea, were
subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to
provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61

The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning
from the Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to
these shores.52 The barangay
was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred
families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It
was the chieftain's duty to
rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain
had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down
orally from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of
the barangay. They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the
elder persons in the community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain
55
and his elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. The oldest
known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about
1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal
Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various
subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and
punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes
arose, these were decided peacefully
through a court composed by the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as
"jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different barangays were resolved by
arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays acted as
57
arbiters.
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private
property in
land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The
social order
was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership
58
of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. This
ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual
sharing of resources so that no individual,

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in

Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction
over territorial

areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga.

Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and
62
Subanon. The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward
63
Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was
still held in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the
Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of
cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the acquisition, transfer,
64
cession or sale of land.
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive
economies where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to
the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to
exchange and profit.65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well
as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found
the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river
banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos
67
was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion. As early as 1551,
the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the
68
natives. The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to
civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to
accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the
"protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."69
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored
by the
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the
Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the
76
lowest classes.
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros
were driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the
hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The
upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish
interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus,
the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able
to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
78
separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. Their own
political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally
mutual feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the
one hand and the non- Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and
rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace through a colonial
79
system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church
and convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required
to construct their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to
do the same.70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the
reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. Thereduccion, to the Spaniards, was a
"civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish
Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture and
civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization
as well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now
declared to be crown lands
or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that
land grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction
of the concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results
73
of Spanish colonial theory and law. The concept that the Spanish king was
the owner of everything
of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and
religious, classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs,
and divided them into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized
Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, were the
Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were
75
the infieles or the indigenous communities.
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of
April 7, 1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North America n India ns to maintain their tribal organization and
government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to
conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized
80
customs."
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in
the path of civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter
measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
81
conscience."
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and
the non- Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to
religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
82
relationship apart from settled communities."

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903,

they passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes
(BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to
conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in
Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most practicable
means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The
BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in Philippine cultural
83
minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian
Filipinos. The raging issue then was the conservation of the national
patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in
a more rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political
advancement of the non- Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to
render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating
the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for
a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream and
for this purpose created theCommission on National Integration (CNI).84 The
CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American
regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial
policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward
relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like
the Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with
fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the
lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces
in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the
Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers'
names. With government initiative and participation, this titling displaced
several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples were also
displaced by projects undertaken by the national government in the name of
national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of
national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State
policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the
"cultural minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and
they were referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time,
their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition and their "customs,
traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered
by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies.President
Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential
Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to
integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community,
and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their
original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting
the integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to
preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the
Ancestral Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land
occupancy certificates to members of the national cultural communities who

91

were given up to 1984 to register their claims. In 1979, the Commission on

the Settlement of Land Problems was created under
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some
100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the
Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos
of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized
by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the
NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was
93
possessed by the Agusan natives. Timber concessions, water projects,
plantations, mining,
and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to
the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their land but also to the reduction
and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration
to one of preservation.Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution,
President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all
under the Office of the President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right
of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than
the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to
their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to
their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their
right to live in a culture distinctly their own.
2. Their
Co ncept of
Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal,
mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon
the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They
follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the
rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous
peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by
making it difficult
for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The
"infieles
societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented,
from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The
political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented
arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by
the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure
which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98

E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of
land problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no
traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and
that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and
the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary
owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not
only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the
land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere
stewards.100 Customary law

has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be

ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by
marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be
related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under
customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized
mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in
team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming
found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial
grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a
common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and
obligations to the land are shared in common.

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF

LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of
the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous
peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed
and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of
1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House
Bill No. 9125.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also

sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are
governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because
while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does
not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil
103
Code. Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land
is strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet
sudden financial needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of
crops.104Moreover, and to be alienated should first be offered to a clan-member
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a
non-member of the ili.105

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as
Finance. It adopted almost
en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a
result of six regional consultations and one national consultation with
indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth
Congress, Senator Flavier, in his
sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the
Philippines, to wit:

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social
system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien
to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands.
Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if
not inexistent.106

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long
suffered from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the
majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk
their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands.
Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the massive
exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among

the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has been
an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of
people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first
introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of
13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government passed laws to legitimize
the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
109
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and
cared for the land long before any central government was established. Their
ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains,
the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its
totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives
through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture
is the living and irrefutable proof to this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their

rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct
110
peoples."
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier
proposed a bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2)
the principle of parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the
Regalian Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,"
our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception
to the doctrine." This exception
was first laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Governmentwhere:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous
member of the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal
concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it
was affirmed in subsequent cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141,
P.D. 705, P.D.

410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or
restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and the existence of
ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however,
Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation
has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in
its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the
Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government
organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the
ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and
possess their ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of
parens patriae inherent in the

supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition.
This principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or
handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or
transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21)
Senators voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee
on Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented
and defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar
implications that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to
assure and ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural
traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic
was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker,
to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall
bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12
million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine
114
society as we fashion for the year 2000."
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation
as mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their
land was enunciated
in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested
rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT
CONTRAVENE THE
CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Do mains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of
Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Co nstitute Part of the Land of the Public Do main.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples
Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas

generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable
and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home
ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of
the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until
the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations.
Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to
for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited
to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
117
lots.
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the
procedures embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series

possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or

individually since time immemorial, continuously to
of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
118
Alcala. DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task
forces and
ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and
Certificates of
Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a
power conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP).119 The guiding principle in identification and delineation is selfdelineation.120 This means that the ICCs/IPs

have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all
the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set
forth in Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and
certification of ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law
and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall
issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the
122
community concerned. The allocation of la nds within the ancestral domain
to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and
traditions.123 With respect to ancestral la nds outside the ancestral domain, the
NCIP issues a
124
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before
the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Do mains and Ancestral Lands : How
Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be
acquired in two modes: (1) bynative title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(a) Cario v. Insular
Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of
130
Cario v. Insular Government. Cario firmly established a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration
court 146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed
that this land had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time
immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding
of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cario inherited the
land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under
131
the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. In
1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
132
Law. The
North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and
built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a Torrens title to his
property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S.
military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a
military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cario, off the land.134

(2) The Co ncept o f

Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which,
as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thusindisputably
126
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands
are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by virtue
127
of native title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when
solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs
128
over the territories identified and delineated.
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native
title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been
public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore,
indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute
ownership to the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S.
Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration
135
court and dismissed Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme Court
affirmed the C.F.I. by applying
the Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one
hand, the
Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cario
failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which
required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the
other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that
the land never formed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S.
Supreme Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory
that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment
accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also,
that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations,
the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not
follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts
that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a

question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist
upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it
137
shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The
choice was with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided
under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's
concept of "due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the
natives."138 It was based on the

strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No
law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the
equal protection of the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in
the United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North
American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy
land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the
Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as
consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration
of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private
gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at
Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to
suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what
was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It
provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws.' In the light of the declaration that
we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was
ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had
become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants
never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native
custom and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,regarded as their own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been
public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the
Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back
as testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land
held by this title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees
upheld in the
1904 decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof
that the
Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed
in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of
any royal

grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist
beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:
with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as
owning some lands,
irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert
all the native
inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For
instance, Book
4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a
contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it commands
viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants,
directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is
true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and
the origin of all titles in the King or his
predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their
books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held
sway over unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not
framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that failure to register what to
them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration
requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of
Valenton. It was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant
might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent
ambiguity of the decrees and
concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely
because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient,
even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a
Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes
explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present
a problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed
it proper on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty
and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be
observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law
and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he
lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten
law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the
144
148 hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover
such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not
own the land. To begin

Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer
to the title it upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the SolicitorGeneral, in his argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was
brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It
seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not have
granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his
title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of

Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights
and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The
argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which
the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the
entire length of the Cariodecision. It is observed that the widespread use of the
term "native title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting
Professor at the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale
University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the
Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and
Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty
tribal
communities throughout the country and studied the origin and development
147
of Philippine land laws. He discussed Carioextensively and used the term
"native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native
title" as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to
"aboriginal title" of the American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to
Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American regime, government policy
towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native Americans.149 This
150
was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are
not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all
that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any
previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they
have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the
general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of
the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative
and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon,
the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system.
Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the Manguianes
in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the
153
United States."
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the
Philippines. An Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by
proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It
may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it
155
cannot be established by custom and prescription.
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It
156
also covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy." The
aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in
question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the

provincial governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them
in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who
refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one
who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas
corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court
denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld
government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only
successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs,
improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they
151
roamed. Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the
policy adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed
by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called nonChristian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed
by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable
lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been
treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the
Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.152
constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
157
nation. It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other
governmental action, although in numerous instances treaties have been
negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession and
delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights
to land they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas
by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme
Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson &
Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made
by the chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to
recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only
conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government
of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief
Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old world believed that they
had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing
civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found
it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to
establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be consummated by
possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the nation making the
discovery

the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives
were to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being
exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were,
in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent,
impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to
their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their
own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as
occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and
claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power
to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. These grants have
been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive
right to acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discovererwhether to England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any
other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did
not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or
conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the
"rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied
by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from the Indians or
conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title
unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could
not convey a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other
parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their
right of possession has never been questioned. The claim of government
extends to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession,
162
and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present
163
day, proves the universal recognition of this principle.
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their
native lands without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government
164
to many U.S. citizens.
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the
State of Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the
Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and
any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who
were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with
the treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some
foreign potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection
from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally
termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great
Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the
declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection
of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the relation with the
United States
which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one
more powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and
166
submitting as subjects to the laws of a master."
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with
distinct territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the
lands within their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to
regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations,
respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which
treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially
that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within
those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the
United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial,with the single
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from
intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the
coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very
term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from
167
others." x x x.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by
our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of
168
the United States."

as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the

relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the
discoverer as against all other European governments. Designated as the naked
169
fee, this title was to be consummated by possession and was subject to the
Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just
claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of
the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the
Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so
doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian
title because

it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations
of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the
170
ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee
title to the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became
vested in the sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the
original 13 States and the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian
tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government continued the
policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title,
which it accorded the protection of complete ownership.171 But this aboriginal
Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the
land,
and means mere possession not specifically recognized as ownership by
Congress.172 It is clear
that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal possession is not a property
173
right. It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal government who, as
sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at
174
will. Thus, aboriginal title is not
the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous
use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails that land owned by Indian title
must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold
to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such title as Indians have
to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the
right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is
ordinarily used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined
in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs.
Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the
only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long
line of cases citing Cario did not touch on native title and the private
character of ancestral domains and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding
cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land
Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land
sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When the conditions
specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor
of the land is deemed to have
189
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. The land ceases to
be part of the
190
191
public domain, ipso jure, and is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.
192

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands

that the rule

that the court declared

that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or
grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any
land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that

178

under general laws. Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall
179
into the public domain. On the other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the
180
public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of Indians. Once
set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the
Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right
181
on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral
land claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First,
aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal
point of
view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title,
however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on
American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S.
recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians
over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as
successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of
aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the
185
Federal Government. Although there are criticisms against the refusal to
186
recognize the native Americans' ownership of these lands, the power
of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty
188
over the ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA, however, is still
in its infancy and any similarities between its application in the Philippines
vis--vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the
peculiar facts of each case.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural
in character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree
farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or
more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20)
years from the approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually- owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands
only, not domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally,
owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of
197

the same in the concept of owner since time

or for a period of not less than
immemorial
30
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.193
Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and

Cariowas cited to support the applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under

the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long,
continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It
is this long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of
194
thirty years both for ordinary citizens and members of the national cultural
195
minorities that converts the land from public into private and entitles the
registrant to a torrens certificate of title.
(3) The Option o f Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates
that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their
individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into
public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is thatancestral land is private. It, however, has to be
first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To
wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural
communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same
ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act
496.

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for
the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and
202
extent of ancestral domain." It
is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over
their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.

years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be
registered
under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land
Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned ancestral
lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for
agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be
classified as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of
18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance
with the requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A.
141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its
provisions apply to those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x
"which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become
private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by
this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or
199
appropriated, have ceased to be so." Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral
domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to
avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his
ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per
200
cent (18%) or over, from private to public agricultural land for proper
disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act has nonetheless a limited period. This option must be
exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the date of
approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of
Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution
classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b)
forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national
parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral
domains but it
does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as
public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law
a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which
is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of
the ICCs/IPs.201
B. The rig ht o f ownership a nd possession by the ICCs/IPs of their a ncestral
domains is a limited form o f owners hip a nd does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes
the concept of ownership under thecivil law. This ownership is based on adverse
possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land
Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles
and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto,
has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to
disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has
not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this
chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land
not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of
this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he
is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under
203
the provision of the Public Land Law.
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves

or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b)
204
hereof."
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally
public agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free
patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private.
Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed
judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as
entitled to all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the
Philippines defines ownership
in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards
introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under
Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the
right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy
and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it
produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its
use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing
owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by
any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The I ndigenous Concept o f Ow nership and Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a
torrens title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT
formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.
Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve
as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource
rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public
domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned
in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular

person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These
communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights
under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand
concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive
not only of customary law of the community but of the very community
itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real
property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist
only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty
213
years in any single instance. Every stockholder has the right to disassociate
214
himself from the corporation. Moreover, the corporation itself may be
215
dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the
land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future,
to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within
the ICCs/IPs themselves. The
domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the
ICCs/IPs as
a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership.
The lands are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the
following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in
accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of
redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to
a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights
or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the
IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a
concept that has long existed under
customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the
218
Civil Code as a source of law. Some articles of the Civil Code expressly
provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is
2 19
applicable. In other words, in the absence of
any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can
220
define rights and liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA
and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs.Its recognition does not depend on the
absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized,
and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land
221
titling and land registration.

partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that
"no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as
his share is
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a
paper title. The CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is
clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected.
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is

"belongingness" to the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having
sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the
land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity
of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through
perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land;
222
from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.
C. Sectio ns 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalia n
Doctrine
Ens hrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitutio n.
1. The Rig hts of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Do mains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such
rights include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to

Section 56 hereof, the right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources
within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant
to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory
and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated
without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any
means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a
result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the
displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life
support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the
entry of migrant settlers and organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the
ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the management of
their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes,
except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and
service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in
accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is
located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the
Courts of Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to

transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same
ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of
land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a nonmember of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of
the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or
price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same
within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of
transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral
domains which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains.
The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop
lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c)
the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry
of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts

of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in
accordance with customary laws.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural

resources is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the
ancestral domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land
or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This
is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the
ancestrallands, but not to domains.

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated.The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the
Ancestral Domains Does Not Deprive the State of O wnership Over the Natural
Resources and Control and Supervision in their Develop ment and Exploitation.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of
the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
223
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution."
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned
by the State. The Constitution provides
that in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may
undertake the same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified
corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-s cale utilization of natural

resources by
Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, develop ment and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by
224
itself, or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,
225
226
joint venture, or production- sharing agreements. These agreements may be
for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through
Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens. For the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils, the State, through the President, may enter into
technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's SmallScale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227
228
and small-scale mining. "Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities
which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and
229
do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment."
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The
right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includesownership, but this
"ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of
water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of wat er
not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting
grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timb er in the sacred
places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains.
Indeed, the right of ownership under Section
7 (a) does not cover "waters,minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests ortimber, wildlife, flora
and fa una and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
Section 7(a)
complies with the Regalian doctrine.

(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the I mplementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of
Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA

230

in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands,

waters, and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time
within the ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to,
the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume,
right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests over
land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to
lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an
unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over
"lands, waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of
those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership over land does not
necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
231
on or under the land. The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and
natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over
the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law
that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be discussed
later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was
not specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually
assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless,
to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare
that the inclusion of "natural
resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987
Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization o f Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) o f the IPRA
Is Allowed
Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitutio n.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section
7 (b) merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and cons erve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiat e the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and int elligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
and the right to effective measures b y the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied;

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and
uphold
the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and
the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation
for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State
and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for
future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and
utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the
purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers
only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not
extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the
profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains
are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not
harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from largescale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers,
gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural
235
resources for their daily sustenance and survival." Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates
the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily
reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization o f Natural Resources In Sectio n 57 of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories
and
rights in theharvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period
of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25)
years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process, has agreed to
allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and
take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural
resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The
terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not
merely for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology
other
than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources and
thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for
another 25 years. This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered
into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the
natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
priority rights implies that there is a superior entit y that owns these resources and this entity
has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said
doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read
in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article
237
XII of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of
these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the
natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of
the ICCs/IPs as owners of the la nd on which the natural resources are found by entering
into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The
State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the
ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State
decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission on
Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be
protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25
years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains,
the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself,
directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may
recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such

development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of
the
ICCs/IPs,
whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such nonmember to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on
which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the
ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which
option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to
solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains.
The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour alwaysunder State supervision or control.
This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in
their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs
who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally
utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the
following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies
shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession,
license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral
domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the
Ancestral
Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the
NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs
concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government agency or governmentowned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That
the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project
that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural
resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government
agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does
not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a
field- based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written
consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives
the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or
government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the
NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The
provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to
determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives
the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and

natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that
are
that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements
over

development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of
the within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
found
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTI VE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching
back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from
two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the
possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination
238
was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights. The rise of the civil rights
movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines
in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights
and freedoms.
239

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, and during the
1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine
Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It
was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the bestorganized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This
came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for
indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together
241
with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation. Indigenous rights came

natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that
area result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of
as
242
today's priorities for the international agenda.
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example,
first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin
America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its
projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the Asian
Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares
as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and
245
development. The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the
246
international category of IPs, and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor
Organization
(ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
248
Peoples in Independent Countries" and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many
249
other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination. ILO Convention No.
169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed
on June

26, 1957. Developments in international law made it appropriate to adopt new

international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to removing the assimilationist
orientation of
the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of these peoples to exercise control
over their own institutions, ways of life and economic development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin
251
or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of
a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of
the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the
252
understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was
made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but
through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy
a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the
Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the
253
Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is
this Court's
duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and
affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting

Malabanans application for land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case,
in addition
to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age,
Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration
shall forthwith issue.
3
SO ORDERED.
1982.2

BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who
both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of
the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not
established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in
Barangay
Tibig, Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of
71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration
covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming
that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and
that he
and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him
to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang
Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952
is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.
3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March
15,

CAs decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession
of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession.
Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15,
1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit
(Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural
land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its
declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the
Property Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that
the declaration of the land subject of the application for registration as alienable and
disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter dictum
considering that
the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab initio for
lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their
argument that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of
an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was

essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed
to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and
on the part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the
land as alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
7
property of the State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, Menguito v.
8
9
Republic and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., they argue that the reclassification of the
land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that
Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right
to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period
prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost
16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.
The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with
reference to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through
judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only
when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the
different classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration
laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
10

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or

11
of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some

12

public service or for the development of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State
that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public
13
use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is
other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the
14
country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all
15
lands of the public domain belong to the State. This means that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless
the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17
Classifications of public lands
according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of
the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,
resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law
might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the classification under
the
1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
22
Department.
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of
the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial
lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A
25
positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive
26
Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively
removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must
be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive

Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the

State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the development
of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;

excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth
in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under
the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following requirements in order for his
28
application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been
in possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership;

(2) By sale;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945,
or earlier; and

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain"
or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands
otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial
or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not
include, it

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the

public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the
application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the requirement that the
classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification
or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced
no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or
glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and
insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which
should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period
of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the
fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain
and literal meaning of the law as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified
as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or
incomplete

title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This
means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land
registration, not the ownership or title over it.

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may
not be alienated or disposed;

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-ininterest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by
virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as
the
lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
30
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. It is for
this reason that the property subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the entire duration of
the requisite period of possession.

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under
Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the
agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be classified as
alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36
and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an
imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part
of the public domain and has become private property.37

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only
to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of
the applicants possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
32
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly
recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act
No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication
of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby
converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision
concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but
35
the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. As
such, prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land
or lands of the public domain, namely:

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no

longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may
be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period
is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession - possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it
as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
the respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN,
represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN
PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D.
BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.
G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE
PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO
SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN
PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144
SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and
4
Director of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] terminated the controversy as to
ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as
the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point,
litigation must end, Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits
have been undergone, and the modes of review set by law have been
exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties,
continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein
embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not
their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public
policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest
and the
5
court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality. [Cited cases
omitted]
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render
judgment herein writing finisto these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of
the basis of the estate's claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in
these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim
and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government
1
itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," on the
basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894.
The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon
City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general
lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area
between
2
Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south.
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land
swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in
3
the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, in connection therewith.
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muoz, 23
SCRA 1183 [1968];Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc.
(WIDORA)

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint 6 for recovery of
possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon
7
8
City in its decision dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint
against the defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa
dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with
damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by
Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey
Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen
Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay,
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment & Development Corporation),
Capitol
Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that
the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
titles

to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982,
951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all
9
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 and Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos.
255544 and 264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that
the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of
certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith and
misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled
by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation to letter
recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the Office of
the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971,
April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence,
validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers
the subject estate had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April
25,
1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a
10
case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio
Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung
11
and Victoria Chung Tiu.
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco,
Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu
for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel
Chung and
12
Victoria Chung Tiu.
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela
Cruz. On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on
the
following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of
the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish
title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands
which have already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System by private
persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
14

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, and so, the petitioner estate
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was
dismissed 15 for being unmeritorious and the lower court's decision was affirmed with costs
against the petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof
was presented in the proceeding below;

(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered
under the Torrens system hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership;

(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor

expressly excluded from the Titulo titled lands of private
individuals;
(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled,
hence, the lower court did not err in not declaring the same as null and
void. 16
Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16,
1
1992, filed the present petition 7 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
G.R. NO. 106496
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a
petition 18 for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
19
Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order dated November 17, 1978 declaring
inter alia, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and
effect.

The dispositive portion

20

of the said Order reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no
legal force and effect and that therefore no rights could be derived
therefrom.
3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other
transactions involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 are declared invalidated, void and of no force and effect.
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the
estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from
representing or exercising any acts of possession or ownership or from
disposing in any manner portions of all the lands covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the same.
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in
Court within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real
and personal properties of the estate which had come into their
possession or knowledge under oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to

continue with the presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.
The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting
and inventory of the presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as
well as the consideration of all other incidents are hereby set on
December 22,
1978 at 8:30 a.m.
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito
who sought to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for
the petitioners was received by the lower court without any opposition. 21
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing
22
Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate.
On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San
Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of
the letters of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the
properties of the estate to the following entities:
(a) The Commanding General
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
A. Mabini St., Manila
(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City

(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which
properties of the estate are located; and
(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp
24
Aguinaldo, Quezon City.
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion
brought about by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having
been legally authorized to act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue
thereof.
On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed
by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976,
Spanish titles like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective
as proof of ownership in court proceedings, except where the holder
thereof applies for land registration under Act 496, which is not true in
the proceedings at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE
PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or
his supposed heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might
have had to the so-called Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or
prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered
for purposes of inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with
law, and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as they embraced
lands within the TITULO, are deemed ineffective and cannot be legally
considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land
subject matter of the petition considering that, except such portions
thereof had been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication or
disposition in accordance with law, the same belong in State ownership. 25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to
Suspend
26
Proceedings.
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration was dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno
Puno:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues

raised, the Court hereby DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August
30,
1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of
merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated February 15, 1977,
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino
Z. Benito are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all
copies of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10) days from
2
notice hereof. 7
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
28
Republic.
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao,
rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April
29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
covering a total area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000
hectares, situated in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon
City and Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa
Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro,
Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and
lawful heirs of the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the said deceased, consisting
of the above-mentioned tract of private land covered and described by
said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of the Registry of
Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have already
been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private
persons, or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities
or agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government as reservations for
public use and purposes; (c) all lands belonging to the public domain; and,
(d) all portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed and/or
previously excluded by
the Administrator and duly approved by a final order of the Court,
except those which may hereafter be set aside, after due consideration on
a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said Court order
which approved the said sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is
hereby revoked to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in
the administration of the Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of
administration to the co-heir Administrator, Engracio San Pedro,
whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said coadministrator

Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of

his co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to
amass, collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the
deceased Don Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and
credits lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal
action to recover the same in the proper Courts of Justice, government
offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or charges due
from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the estate, and
thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful
heirs as herein recognized and declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to
a few persons and in line with the projected urban land reform program of
the government, corollary to the agricultural land reform program of the
New Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by the
government to be used in its human settlements and low cost housing
projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.

29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for
the Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12,
1978, after the Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez
31
denied the said petition.
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge
32
Fernandez issued the aforestated Order dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set
aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad
No.
4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of
Appeals and alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the
Republic's motion for reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a
prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs. 34
In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its

discussion solely on the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de
Priopriedad No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed
to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the
following bases; (a) non-production of the original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of
the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title
under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree No. 892
(Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of Spanish
Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by
invoking certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been
allegedly recognized. The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion
35
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the herein petition,

36

docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18,

1992. After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this
Court
resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15,
3
1994. 7
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions
for intervention which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447,
RTC, Branch 104 was denied due process of law due to gross negligence
of lawyer, which respondent court grossly failed to take cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and
in affirming the lower court's null and void judgment. 38
In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which
resolved a question of title or ownership over which the lower court as
an intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated
39
objections of the petitioners.
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of
Judge Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and
Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court
reviewing, revising, amending or setting aside the order and decision of
Judges of
40
equal rank.

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the

order of Judge Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of

Judge Puno and the decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which

were already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that
Judge Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge
Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners
were denied the cold neutrality of an impartial tribunal. 42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
evidence presented before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and
merely adopted the order of Judge Fernandez who never received a
single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906 Guide title over
Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated
therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November
1991 en banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.
43

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the
petitioners' Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of
the question of ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case.
Thus, before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first
determine whether or not the lower court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for
letters of administration, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in
settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then
CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court" 44 to resolve the question
of title or ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San
45
Pedro y Esteban.
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae,
argues that petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic
questioned the existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court
became duty- bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136
which purportedly covers the said estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate
proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the
46
State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of the deceased.
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and
what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to
the issue of the validity of wills. We held in the case of Manigat v. Castillo, 47 that "the
main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons
either summarily or through the process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily
includes theexamination of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on
whether
or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for purposes of distribution of the
net assets of the estate of the deceased to the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 48 we stated, thus:

. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate

of the deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the
consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons . . .
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether
certain properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of
the estate subject of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In
49
this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia that:
. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a
deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has
supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power,
it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the
administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In
compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine
what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in
or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the court's attention to the fact
that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory,
it is likewise the court's duty to hear the observations, with power to
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the
properties referred to therein belong prima facieto the intestate, but no
such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership
50
of the said properties. [Emphasis Supplied]
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any
reversible error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge
Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null
and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed
Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez
did not personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing
judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI,
Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao,
respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority
51
and/or jurisdiction.
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is
fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as
the record and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into
consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs
has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact that the judge who penned the decision did
not hear a certain case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and
52
conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his perusal." In the case at
bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez

bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering

and setting aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez'
disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of
November
17, 1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No.
106496 committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
primarily on the ground that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect.
Juxtaposed with this is the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R.
Nos. 103727 and
106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to
prove ownership by the Late Mariano San Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16,
1976, the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all
holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered
53
under the Land Registration Act within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the
54
said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in
55
a re-classification of their lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as
56
indubitable evidence of land ownership.
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not
yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of
their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the
Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage,
to wit:
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances
of large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary
buyers appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in
conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders,
bona fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and

the holders of, or person claiming rights under the said Spanish titles
or

grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in

property ownership and threatening the peace and order renditions in
the areas affected;
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that
recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law
is practically nil and that this system has become obsolete;
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under
the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of
registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;
5

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al., 7 we took cognizance
of this Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and
admission of Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been
discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad
4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on
August 13, 1976. 58 Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and
the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. 59 Proof of compliance with P.D.
892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge
Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the
existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge
Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in
the special proceedings case. He made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to
wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of
recognizing the nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored
the fact that during the pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise
alecks had inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of the socalled estate with considerations running into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to
charitable and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations
as smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood
wink further other gullible and unsuspecting victims. 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then
heir- judicial administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of
possession

and/or reconveyance with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge
Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the
fact that, by then, the said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order
of November 17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R No.
103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496,
otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the
private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the
Torrens system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply
with the provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in
question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been
proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the
petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP")
to produce it as requested by the Republic from the then administrators of the subject intestate
estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an
alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners referred to a
document known as
"hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the
said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence. Likewise, in the
action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the petitioners-heirs did
not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the
Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is
stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be
no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry,
other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:
Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed When the
original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its
contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses.

Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody.

If the writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory
proof of its existence, he fails to produce the writing, the contents thereof
may be proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to produce it is not
necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where it has been
wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its
nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the
absence of a clear showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or
cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be
disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
piece of evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the
existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of
the Titulo could not be produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which
should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Ching Po v.Court of
62
Appeals, we pointed out that:
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary
evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the
document. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence; execution;
loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in the discretion
of the court. 63
In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge
Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo
Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned
Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly
certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila; and
(3) the hipotecaRegistered in the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.
Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978
decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the
genuineness of the two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado
appearing on the last page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of
the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the Titulo, the handling
Solicitor testified:
xxx xxx xxx

COURT:
Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the
question of counsel is already answered by witness.
The parties have not yet established the due existence
of the titulo.
ATTY. BRINGAS:
We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be
candid about the question. The witness is a witness for
the government, so with the testimony of this witness
for the government to the effect that there is actually
in existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the
question candidly to the government counsel whether
he is prepared to state that there is really in existence
such titulo propiedad 4136.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
We are now stating before this court that there was
such a document examined by the NBI insofar as the
signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Manuel Lopez
Delgado are concerned and they are found to be
authentic. 64
The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to
our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated
September 2, 1977 (Exhibit "O-RP") concluded that the document
contained material alterations as follows:
a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word
"Pinagcamaligan" was written after "Pulo;"
b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"

ATTY. BRINGAS:

c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in
"tres mil;"

With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call

the distinguished counsel for the government whether
he admits that there is actually a titulo propiedad 4136.

d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after

"setentay tres;"

e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;"

and f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."
The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the
titulo. According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of
black ashes around the rings of the portions which are indications of
burnings". The burnings were made on the very portions where there
were previous erasures, alterations and intercalations. Understandably,
the burnings were done to erase traces of the criminal act. 65
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1. 66 Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title
in the name of Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and
intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the area and change the
location of the land described in the original title . . .
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the
lower court's analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:
To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never
presented in Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena
duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two administrators,
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well as to other interested
parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. But
no one produced the titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to
one another.
Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could
not be produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary
evidence.
It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the
hands of a certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and
that his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts
on the part of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document
of vital importance despite the Court order to produce it in order to
determine its authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are
unknown or that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only
logical conclusion would be that the original would be adverse if
6
produced. 7

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their
admissibility as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value. 68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et
al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch I, et al. 69 is enlightening. In said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan IndoAgro Development Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000
hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its
ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly
opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity, 70 Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, speaking for
the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two
undisputed facts. First. The Title embraces land "located in the
Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The
title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed
only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries
desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that
private ownership of land must be proved not only through the
genuineness of
title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17
Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v.
Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51
Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in
a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land must be
concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos
ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the
Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for
classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be
measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In
Piadeco's "Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil
Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad
as
74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of May 13,
1964 in the same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares
(Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity
of Piadeco's land, Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers from
vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original
owner appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by
prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880,
(Rollo of L24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By

this decree, applications for adjustment showing the location,

boundaries and area of land applied for were to be filed with

the Direccion General de Administration Civil, which then

ordered theclassification and survey of the land with the assistance
of the interested party or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit.,
p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing
applications for adjustment at one year from the date of publication of
the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for
another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano
sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then,
seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of November 25,
1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000 hectares
of arids lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of
irrigable lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v.
Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of
January 26,
1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500
hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the
risk of repetition, it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulo is held
out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of
February 13, 1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894
(Ibid., p. 26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second
petition for adjustment within six months from publication, for those who
had not yet secured their titles at the time of the publication of the law
(Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for the adjustment
of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and
confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were
directed to deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established
by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records
and documents which they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v.
Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that
title was either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days
after the publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco
exactly acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner
appearing thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From
Piadeco's explanation not its evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188)
we cull the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the
land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to
one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have been
registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died,
his daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to
herself. At about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of
registration was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
June 27, 1932. Later, Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a
shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the land to Piadeco's treasurer
and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain

amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada assigned the

land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo,
appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land.
Castillo also executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the
same land, and then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was
paid partially by Piadeco, pending the registration of the land under Act
496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the
consideration to Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the
land under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of
Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and other factors herein pointed out, cast
great clouds of doubt that hang most conspicuously over Piadeco's title.
71

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we
categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had
become bereft of any probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892
as contained in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and
WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final
judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court
relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from
adjudicating otherwise. In the Muoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the
WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the
estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case
en banc of Calalang
v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 72 the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment, viz:
. . . conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was
in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in
privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or
any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same
parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment
between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity
of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be
laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their
privies as evidence of ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the

inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely

of lands covered by the Titulo.

Hence, there can be no "net estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from
the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents
Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982
73
(Exh. "2" De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" Dela Cruz). Under the
Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and
74
incontrovertible one year from its final decree. More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982,
269707, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of
validity. 75 As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate covered by the subject
Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and bad faith which they failed to prove on
the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper witnesses from the Bureau of
Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614 from which private
respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the
76
negligence of counsel binds the client. The records show that the petitioners-heirs were
not
at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity
considering that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In
7
the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 7 we held:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his
responsibilities to his client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a
judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds the
client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA 13 [1980]
Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the
petitioner has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an
unsupported claim that the petitioner bad been prejudiced by the
negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.

Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that
rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir,
legal holder and owner of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for
adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two
cases before us for
review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10, 1993, 78 denied Catalino's motion for
leave to reopen and/or new trial. And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not
included in the inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators, Engracio
San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20,
1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and,
therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of
the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed
to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of
in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate
the same, if they or any of them are in possession thereof.

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitionersheirs were denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the
writ of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are
not without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of
Spanish Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree.
Thereafter, however, any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used
as evidence of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may
be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act
3344.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., took no

In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more
vigilant in handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of
the subject estate. It is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest
the

part. Vitug, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8936

October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.
D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of
Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said
lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court
of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition
the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be
registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system.
Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March,
1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate
provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the
defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that
the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in
the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of
Land Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said
wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition
for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the
registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.

Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners
of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of
the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding
upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that
the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was
situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting
that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in
fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied
to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he
had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than
six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply
including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their
lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the
proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the
same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that
system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may
arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the
court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of
course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens
system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all
the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in
rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49
Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary
action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete
and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an
interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The
government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who
are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the
same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would
destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system,
does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect
title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of
registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status
of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title
and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few
exceptions,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except
in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles
would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
acollateral proceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the
period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the
registration of titles under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in
said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the
Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name
of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular
parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of
the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is
forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the
rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and
with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered
can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title
under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The
title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead
ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has
been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens"
system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In
others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian
Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates
of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land
comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155;
Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles,
vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly
ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on
the "Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of
Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general
question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date
prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of
a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled
to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder of,
or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly
cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a
registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two
certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one
continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after

entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired
an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one
year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in
a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral
proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of
registration? We do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his
registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the
ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two
persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of
real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it,
who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees
or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon
priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil
Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto,
yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive
influence
in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting
the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of
the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered
under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the
appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the
application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a
proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the
parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his
right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became
irrevocably bound by
the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up
their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a
court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens
titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet
title. If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of
the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then
nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in
vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present
case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had
secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right
of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and
sometimes the
damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the
parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al
of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case,
the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the

real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants.
He

was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of
the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and
the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the
decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be
permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment
duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land
upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name
of
the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the
validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee
should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original
parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates?
Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his
original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land
has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his
vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as
against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the
rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act
No.
496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the
vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are
cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who
had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be
unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of
said
sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He
subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that
phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of
a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by
virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including
the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase
"innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would
be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the
two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be
protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with
which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first
original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in
the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land
so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The
purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely
necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171
U.S.,

620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its
contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson,
15
Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill.,
500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509;
Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the
record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the
record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the
provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to
endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance
of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts.
1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity.
(Art
.1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not
been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were
interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance
of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien?
Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien

by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said
land, bona
fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the
rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory
upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance
of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct
of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is
mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense
of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner
of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land
had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion
that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe
that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first
original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the
vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in
nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another
earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea
of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land
included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his
successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We
believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to
cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens
system. When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original
certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule,
could Teus even regarded as the holder

in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not.
Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system.
Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said
strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of
the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any
right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the
rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be
answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the
purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the
purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to
resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest
the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first
original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against
one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge
of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason
of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and
by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase,
rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of
negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from
double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither
do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry
upon
the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that
the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then
it will be sufficient, in dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is
registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights
in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all
the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is
hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and
decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in
the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as
in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 155012

April 14, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M.
LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented
by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the State
promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to
deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court must, therefore,
exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may not be
1
raided by unscrupulous land speculators.
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set
aside the decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323,
which affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna,4 of
1
September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 ordering the registration in favor of the
respondents of parcels of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna, designated as
Lot
2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna,
5
an application for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area
of
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their
application, they stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs of
Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original
owners of Lot
2111 of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession
of the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and
father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the
property among themselves and subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111A,
2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been in actual
possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and
peaceful manner.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their
predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the property or have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since
1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts,
presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide right to registration of the land under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141,
6
otherwise known as The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073;
(c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.7
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita M.
Alconaba testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and
his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of Cad-455,
which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in possession of the said land since
1949 and had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and
his siblings immediately took possession of said property in the concept of an owner, paid
taxes, and continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and subdivided it into five lots.8
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the possession of
their parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she and her siblings
immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The land is being
cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no improvements have been
introduced by their family on the lot. On cross examination, she admitted that plans to sell the
property were at hand.9
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have
sufficiently established their family's actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of
the subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the possession of their
predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such possession was in an adverse and public
manner. Likewise, it found that the land in question is alienable and disposable and is not
within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the title of the respondents over the
said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the registration
of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment of fees; and ordered the
issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes final and executory.
10

Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) giving weight
to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in
question in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents'
tax declaration is sufficient proof that they and their parents have been in possession of the
property for at least thirty years, despite the fact that the said tax declaration was only for the
year 1994 and the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were all of recent dates,
i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the OSG states that even granting for
the sake of argument that the respondents have been in possession of the property since 1940,

their adverse possession should be reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the
property was declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive
upon us,11 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the findings of
fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious
12
abuse of discretion. This exception is present in this case.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942,13 reads as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 107314 by substituting the phrase "for at
least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945"; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
15

The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D. No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title
to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12
June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classified as
alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject property was classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981, and hence, possession by
respondents' predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be considered. In support of
this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in the survey plan marked as Exhibit
"Q," which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 23-A L.C.
Map No. 004 certified on September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or
military reservation.
As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on September 28, 1981" could not
have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981. That
date obviously refers to the time thatProject No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Project No. 23-A
L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December 1925 by the
then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable as early as of that
date. There is nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is the date of the
approval of such project or the date of the classification of the subject property as disposable
and alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks registration of title to a piece of
land
16
must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence. The respondents have failed to
discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or
since 12 June 1945.1awphil.net
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty-seven years of possession
by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and
17
18
Mauricio. The two were aged 62 and 60, respectively, when they testified in 1997. Thus,

they must have been born in 1935 and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted
for

a period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the same must have commenced
sometime in 1940, or at the time that Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3
years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to the age of
reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify thereon nearly six
decades
later. In short their testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse possession of
the subject parcel of land by their parents.
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessors19
in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita ) or since 1949 (as testified to by
Mauricio20 and declared in respondents' application for registration) are hardly "the well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of ownership
must be presented to substantiate their claim. They cannot just offer general statements which
21
are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Even granting that the
possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.22 Actual possession of a land consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.23
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated, had
control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural
24
purposes. Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no evidence as to how
big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that
the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation purposes or paid its
taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
25
they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests one's
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an adverse
claim against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to contribute
needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of
26
acquisition of ownership.
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land upon the
death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and 19
February
1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes thereon. If that were
27
so, why had they not themselves introduced any improvement on the land? We even find
unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the land. They did not
present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant could have cultivated such a
vast tract of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.

The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation purposes by the
respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990,
1991,

1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust the assertion of the
respondents that they immediately took possession of the property in the concept of an owner
after the death of their parents. While belated declaration of a property for taxation purposes
does not necessarily negate the fact of possession,28 tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least,
29
constructive possession.
Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on the subject property.
Carmencita even admitted that plans of selling the property were at hand. Thus, it would
be rational to conclude that this move for registration is just but a camouflage by smart
land speculators who saw in the land applied for expected profits from its existence.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the land
subject of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court.
They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable and alienable

agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and their
predecessors-ininterest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals of 26
August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323 and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao,
Laguna, of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby
orderedDISMISSED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL
CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.

MARTIN, J.:t.hqw
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No.
39577-R, raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has
registerable title over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in
1956 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,
applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property
applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted
sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per
hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of
Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de
Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled
bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio
de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro
and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per
hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of
2
Award, the dispositive portion of which reads: +.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in
connection with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with

law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded

to

the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00

for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales
Application No. 3231,covering the tract herein awarded, which is
more particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,+.wph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:+.wph!1
NMaria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SEProvincial Road and Mary Gohn; SW
Public Land;
WMunicipal Road;

Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed
his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On
July
29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated
as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400
hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes,
the said application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the
sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course."
The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of
12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing
Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes,
under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was
amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the
same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the payment was
made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the
issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land
having an area of

20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent
to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao,
Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares.
5

On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared
the disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for
resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9,
President Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No.
1176- B-2 for medical center site purposes under the administration of the Director of
7
Hospital.
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance
of Davao. The Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of
proclamation No. 350 reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio
de Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired
a vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director
of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the
2-hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2,
1966, directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd5134, shown on Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and
containing an area of 128,081 square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center,
Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment
of the trial court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.

Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the
present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied
by the Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances.
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land
grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of
the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such
land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner
Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of
grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines arealienated, granted, or
conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation
9
of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." It would be
completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has
registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the
reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the reservation, when the
proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized
competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the
public domain for a specific public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised
Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and
for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the private domain of the
Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. the land
reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until
otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141)
authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its
branches, or of the inhabitants thereof,
... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it,
including reservations for ... other improvements for the public benefit.

On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: +.wph!1

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it
denies the claim of appellant Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby
affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,
registration Lot
1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area
of 12.8081 square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said
appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to relinquish to the
appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical
center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable
appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration,
maintaining ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a
8
Special Division of Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975.

2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus,
had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales
Award issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos
covered the 33 hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any
reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to draw such conclusion. On the
contrary,
the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with
an area of22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo;
on
the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on
11
the west by a municipal road. This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400
hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with
by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de
Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land
12
having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." In
like

manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the

sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao,
Island of Mindanao, Philippines,containing an area of 20 hectares 64, ares 00 centares."
Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent,
invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares,
it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only
20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder,
submitted a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which
amount represents 10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the
purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For
33 hectares, the total purchase price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10%
deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public
bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited
P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares
and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on
November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares,
the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936,
excluding "the military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the
said site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934
ws only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an
amendment excluding the military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then
would have been left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have
been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong
assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not
the Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of
Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in the Order of
Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for
the conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific
description delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award
specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on
the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a
provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the
west by a municipal road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general description,
or that which is
more certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered that the series of
executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the
intent of the Government to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most
18
strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the
19
intention of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor. In general, the quantity of
the
land granted must be ascertained from the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of
the

land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent
and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's
alleged occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the
12-hectare
camp site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the
acquisition of the land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the
Sales
Award was issued to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was
only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33
hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np contractual
or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw suchlands
for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting
by the government of title threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved
a parcel of public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of
protection and are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa
proclamation reserving certain lands and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this
terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands by a person who was settled thereon
in
24
order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been
previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any
there be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private
rights over the property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown
by clear and convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by
him or
his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or
patents, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent
Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the
disputed
12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that
the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his
father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the
27
public domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie except as provided in
Section
48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru
Secretary Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936
subject to the condition that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army would
no longer
need it. As found by the trial court in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet
in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered
into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081
hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in 1939. Nonetheless,
respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of
such
donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules

provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty may be established by

secondary evidence, it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the original
instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the

document and its subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the
introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. And the
due of the execution of the

document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed
it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present
and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
28
previously confessed the execution thereof. None of these modes of proof was ever
followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus,
merely made a broad statement that he executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense
Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not yet in existence. The
notary public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the
instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the
notary Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the document as witnesses to
testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of the
29
deed. This is especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code
requires the accomplishment thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The testimony
of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a
copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting
Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to his
office to register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of
former Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation
signed by Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the
Rules, as to which very strict compliance is imposed because of the importance of the
30
document involved. First none of these persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of
them saw the document after its execution and delivery ind recognized the signatures of the
parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution;
second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" ambigous as to be synonymous with a "deed
of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus and Col.
Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's
narration of the existence and loss of the document equally deserves no credence. As found
by the trial court, he testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him
in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio
de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed
was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was
"still needed for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation
cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence
of such donation much less official admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void,
because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly
donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military purposes. Respondent
Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself
but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree.
It
31
is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or right. But the term
"right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus
disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent impoverishment
of the donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of
that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081
hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of
disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award.
Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore
farfetehed.

In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot
was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of donation. In
Sales
Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession of the land
34
so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." In other words, the right
granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary
right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be
considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this
has the singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable"
by the Director of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely
provisional because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before
any patent is issued. It is only after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of
the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued and the land applied for considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a circumstance that demeans
the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales applicant to pursue
the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2,
1974, and its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations,
are hereby reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao
Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the petitioner for leave to
construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious diseas
pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs
against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Concepcion, Jr., JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by
the Court of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its
case to this Court, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it
held, contrary to the evidence on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous,
notorious and exclusive possession of the land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.

G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary
Technical School), petitioner,
vs.
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and dismissing herein
petitioner's complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for
saltwork purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of
Forestry, however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of
Misamis Oriental passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as
a school site. This reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970.
Seventeen years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 180 reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High
School, now renamed the Opol National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol
National School). Needing the area occupied by Doldol for its intended projects, the school
made several demands for him to vacate said portion, but he refused to move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint
for accion possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled
in the school's favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he
occupied, he having possessed the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of
the filing of the complaint in 1991.

In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the
Philippines may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for
thirty years. Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled
that the former had acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School's
claim over the questioned area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991)
declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed
possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law
creates the legal fiction whereby the land upon completion of the
requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over
the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land.
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of.The application for confirmation
is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would he evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to
be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right
to possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of
the Public Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor
General erred in assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still
good law. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation
of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
2
1942, whichprovided for a simple thirty year prescriptive period of occupation by an
applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already
been
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
Section 48(b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires
that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in
accordance with the District Forester's Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the
subject area is within Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing
in

Bureau of Forest Land Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.

The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been
occupying the portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently
phrased, requires that possession of lands of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945
or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having
complied with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to
the land in question as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot,
therefore, assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had
reserved the lot for Opol National School. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption
confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition
by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by
the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the

imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to

entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 3
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
27,
1997, and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case.
The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the
admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the
Government had no evidence to adduce. 3

SECOND DIVISION
4

G.R. No. 134209

January 24, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina
Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69.
Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired
the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessorsin- interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to
the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor
is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to
the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in
question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the muniments of title and tax payment
receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide
acquisition of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .;
and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the
whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with
the hearing of this registration case.

In a decision dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein
respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question
and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land
situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of
3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322
containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal
age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga
together with
all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in
accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended,
and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various
easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or
presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be
issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration
be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner
Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29,
1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is not
in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not
established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of
the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land
Act (C.A.) 141."
In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the
length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration
and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have
been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the
Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on
6
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. Given this postulate, the principal issue to be
addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have
the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying lands of
the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do
not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth
9
of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
10

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to
11
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or
mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government
and not the
14
court. Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable
15
rests with the applicant.
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable
and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain
cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a
reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property .
(Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for
respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands vs.
Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the completion
of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and
become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning
cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable
nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And
there lies the difference.

Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.18 Aside
from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical
descriptions
of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification
of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
19
domain.
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a
notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has
made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands,
as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need an express
21
and positive act from the government.
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-ininterest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however
22
long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29,
1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land Registration
Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133240

November 15, 2000

RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, respondent.

Before counsel for petitioner could receive an official copy of the aforesaid order of
8
dismissal, he filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration. On February 20, 1998,
in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.9 On March 30, 1998, the lower court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.10
Petitioner, thus, is before this Court arguing that
The court a quo acted contrary to the rules and jurisprudence on the matter for the
following reasons:
1. It has no power to immediately dismiss an initiatory pleading for improper venue;

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review is filed on a pure question of law arising from the Decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Metro Manila, Branch 257, in
LRC Case No. 97-0170.
Petitioner corporation was formerly known as Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. On July 15, 1996, it
amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. The
Amended Articles of Incorporation was approved by the Securities and Exchange
1
Commission on February 20, 1997.
As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer
certificates of title over real properties owned by the said corporation, all of which were
under the old name, Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated. For this purpose, petitioner instituted, on
November
20, 1997, a petition for amendment of titles with the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
City, docketed as LRC Case No. 97-0170.2
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently
because the titles sought to be amended, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 99446,
99447,
3
99448, 102486, 102487, 102488 and 102489, all state that they were issued by the Registry
of
Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition
that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City.
Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of
4
Deeds of Paraaque City. Hence, on February 16, 1998, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion
5
6
to Admit Amended Petition. In the attached Amended Petition, petitioner impleaded
instead
as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located
in
Paraaque City.

2. Assuming the Order of 30 January 1998 was proper, it was nevertheless still a
matter of right on petitioners part to amend its petition in order to correct the
wrong entries therein; and
In the meantime, however, on January 30, 1998, the court a quo had dismissed the
petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the
respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in
Pasay City.7

3. The unassailable reality is that the subject parcels of land are located in
Paraaque City, so venue was properly laid despite that erroneous allegation in the
original petition.11
12

The Solicitor General filed on November 4, 1998 his Comment. He contends that the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original
petition
that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque
court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to
admit amended petition.
13

On February 15, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply. It discussed the distinction between
jurisdiction and venue, and maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition,
but that venue appeared to be improperly laid based on the erroneous allegation therein on the
location of the properties.

The issue involved herein is simple. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint
on the ground of improper venue? This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,14 where this Court held that it may not.
While the ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the petition below was clearly that
of improper venue,15the Solicitor General confuses venue with jurisdiction. A distinction
between the two must be drawn. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is
16
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand,
the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and
an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at
the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural,
not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the
17
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.
In Dacoycoy v. IAC, this Court ruled:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial court on the
ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish
between jurisdiction and venue.

Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. --- Judicial proceedings for

the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on
the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It is said that the laying of venue is procedural rather than
substantive. It relates to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Provisions relating to venue establish a relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant and
not between the court and the subject matter. Venue relates to trial not to jurisdiction,
touches more of the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case.

Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interest
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through its
clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.

xxx

xxx

x x x.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate
course of action at this stage of the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as
well as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived expressly or impliedly.
Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided
by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to
be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge
the wrong venue, which is deemed waived.
Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue
cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes,
the venue, though technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose
convenience the rules on venue had been devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
dismissing the case.
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first
allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course. Although we are
for the speedy and expeditious resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary
importance. The ends of justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the
rules of procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to be
18
heard on his cause.
Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may
only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
litis pendentia, res judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred when
it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or a
responsive pleading from respondent, raising the objection or affirmative defense of improper
venue, before dismissing the petition. However, this was overtaken by petitioners motion for
leave to amend its petition.
Petitioner correctly invoked the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in seeking the
amendment of its certificates of title. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
matters involving the registration of lands and lands registered under the Torrens system is
conferred by Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, The Property Registration Decree,
viz:

More specifically, jurisdiction over petitions for amendments of certificates of title, such
as the one brought below, is provided for by Section 108 of P.D. 1529, thus:
Amendment and alteration of certificates. --- No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be
made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum
thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except upon order of the
proper Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). A registered owner or other
person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds
with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, ma y apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or
that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or
error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate
certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the
registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected, or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same
within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground and the court
may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the
entry or cancellation of a new certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper: xxx. (Emphasis
ours.)
In the case at bar, the lands are located in Paraaque City, as stated on the faces of the
titles. Petitioner, thus, also correctly filed the petition in the place where the lands are
situated, pursuant to the following rule:
Venue of real actions. --- Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.19
Petitioner, however, named as respondent the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, under the
mistaken impression that it was still the custodian of the titles to lands in Paraaque. Later,
petitioner learned that a Register of Deeds for Paraaque City had taken over the record and
custody of titles therein. Petitioner, thus, promptly moved for leave of court to amend its
petition. This, to our mind, was justified. In preparing its amended petition, petitioner
likewise corrected its allegation on the location of the lands involved.

Before the amended petition was filed, the trial court had already dismissed the petition based
on improper venue. It relied on the allegation in the petition that the lands are located in
Pasay City. However, the titles of the land, copies of which were attached to the petition,
plainly show that the lands involved are situated in Paraaque City. The trial court should
have considered these annexes, as these form an integral part of the pleading.
At the very least, the trial court should have allowed petitioner to amend its petition, for
this was still a matter of right on its part.1vvph!1
Amendments as a matter of right. --- A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time
20
within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every
case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of
cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.21 The trial court,
therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it
would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard
22
to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of
suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is
greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the
complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed
23
by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 30, 1998,
February 20, 1998, and March 30, 1998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. LRC Case No.
970170 is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155051

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence
was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal
Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to
discuss the
situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the
Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

May 29, 2007

RURAL BANK OF ANDA, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN- DAGUPAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore the concrete fence. On 20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that
the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was
willing to discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions,
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
On 4 January 2000, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

The Case
1

This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 15 October 2001 and the Resolution
dated
23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66478.
The Facts
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley,
Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3.
Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas
Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot
1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building
of Mary Help of Christians Seminary (seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being
claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley.
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot
736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse
3
manure was already bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence
enclosing
Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through
Lot 736 at any time of the day.4
On 22 December 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan, passed and
5
6
approved Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Resolution No. 104 converted Lot 736 from an
institutional lot to a commercial lot. Resolution No. 105 authorized the municipal mayor to
enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of
Lot
736 with an area of 252 square meters.7

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

the plaintiff [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan]:
1. Making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent;
2. Ordering the defendants to cause to be restored the concrete wall with
iron railings, to cause to be removed the sawali fence, both at the expense of
the defendants, jointly and severally, and
3. Condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally, to the plaintiff
the amount of P25,000.00 as litigation expenses, attorneys fees in the
amount
of P50,000.00 and the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision with the modification that the awards
of litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs should be deleted. The Court of Appeals
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the Municipality of Binmaley and the
Rural Bank of Anda.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that Lot 736 is not covered by any Torrens title either in the name of
respondent or in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley. The trial court held that Lot 736
is public in nature. Since Lot 736 is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce
of man. Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when
it adopted Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a
commercial lot and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25
years with the Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736 .

The Ruling of the Co urt of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Lot 736 is property of public dominion
and is used by the public as a pathway. Respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley are
mere claimants with no sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of Lot 736. The Court of
Appeals held that property of public dominion is intended for the common welfare and
cannot be the object of appropriation either by the state or by private persons. Since Lot 736
is for public use, it is a property of public dominion and it is not susceptible of private
ownership. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void for being enacted beyond the powers
of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley. The contract of lease between the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda is therefore void.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that since neither the respondent nor the Municipality of
Binmaley owns Lot 736, there is no basis for the monetary awards granted by the trial court.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley are valid.
The Ruling of the Co urt

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736.
Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other
mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As
held
16
in Hong Hok v. David:
There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government." It
is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: "The applicant, having failed to establish his right or
title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there
being no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public
domain."
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain.17 Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the state."

The petition has no merit.

Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not have title over
Lot
736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land Management
Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented
to their office.9

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without

18
prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus,
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the
Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

Respondent claims Lot 736 based on its alleged open, continuous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of Lot 736. However, the records reveal otherwise. Even the
witnesses for respondent testified that Lot 736 was used by the people as pathway, parking
10
space, and playground.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 October

2001 and the Resolution dated 23 August 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, the Municipality of Binmaley alleged that it is the sole claimant of Lot
736 based on the Property Identification Map, Tax Mapping Control Roll of the Municipality
of Binmaley, and the Lot Data Computation in the name of the Municipality of Binmaley.
However, these documents merely show that the Municipality of Binmaley is a mere
claimant of Lot 736. In fact, the chief of Survey Division of the Department of Environment
and
11
Natural Resources, San Fernando City, La Union testified that the cadastral survey of Lot
736, which was surveyed for the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989, had not been
approved.12 The cadastral survey was based on the Lot Data Computation13 of Lot 736
which was likewise contracted by the Municipality of Binmaley in 1989.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the
church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736.14 Lot 736 was also used for
parking and playground.15 In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title

No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale:

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 133698

April 4, 2001

ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners,

vs.
HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG and JUAN HERNANDEZ, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For purposes of real property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the
taxpayer and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the resultant
proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property
through an unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are not the
registered owners. Moral lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon
as possible and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
1
assailing the November 20, 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
41586. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4,
1993) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No.
1456- R is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs/appellants."
Also assailed is the April 27, 1998 CA Resolution2 which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The questioned CA ruling affirmed the Decision3 of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R. The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action for
the annulment of the auction sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651 and located in Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio
City.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of this case in this wise:

"On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged,
inter alia, that:

--On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x

in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner
Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at
public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate
taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias
Imperial never authorized a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or
mail matter for and on his behalf;
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent]
Tayag for P4,400.00 without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to
[petitioners], and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;
--A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent]
Hermenegildo Tayag. The assessed value alone of the said property is
P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and
both [respondents] knew these;
--The bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the
conscience, thus, the sale for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of
P4,039.79, including penalties is null and void ab initio;
--[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they
bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public,
continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent]
Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum
of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but
said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status
quo. They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary
damages of
not less than P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of
P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than
P5,000.00 to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the

allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following
affirmative defenses, among others:
--(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by
virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on
September
16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced
by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith
in a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to
participate.
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the
[petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill
of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become]
final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8,
1987;
--The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree
No. 464 hence, the same is lawful and valid:
--[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the
[petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with
the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of
at least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00;
and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he
denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or
illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the
delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant
herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the
provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be
imputed against him. He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x
thus, the case cannot prosper;
--Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs
[because of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons
including defendant herein."

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the
condominium from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was
purportedly evidenced by a Deed of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never
been registered with the Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez
sold the property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes
thereon. The property was sold to Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which
represented the unpaid taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They
cited irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint, Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16,
1987 judgment of Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier
Branch 6
Decision had consolidated ownership of the condominium unit in favor of Respondent
Tayag. The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of Branch 5 of the same
court
which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651
in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of Deeds to issue a new Certificate of
Title in the name of Respondent Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision in LRC
Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the questioned auction sale. Hence,
to rule again on the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal
court, contrary to the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment."
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled on the validity of the auction sale of the
subject condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that sale, because the city
treasurer complied with the requirements of notice, publication and posting. It added that
"[i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then they have only
themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale between them and the former
owner x x x."
Rejecting petitioners contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled that
such inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale. It likewise held that petitioners had not
established bad faith on the part of respondents in conducting the auction sale. Finally, it
agreed with the latters contention that the former were "remiss in causing the registration of
the sale in their favor of the subject property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation
to pay taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they should only have themselves to blame. Laws exist
to be followed, failing in which the price must be paid."
Hence, this recourse.

The Issues
Petitioners assigned the following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court:

"I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the
petitioners were deprived of their right to due process in this case due to the gross
and inexcusable negligence of their former counsel who failed to inform them of
the decision in this case and protect their interest.
"II. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction
sale of the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when
there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D.
464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be
published.
"III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack
of personal notice of the sale for public auction of the subject property to its
owner which nullifies the said proceeding.

We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their Motion for Reconsideration was accepted
and considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact which petitioners
themselves admitted in their Memorandum: "As a matter of fact, in the very resolution of the
Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998 (Annex C to Petition) denying the motion for
reconsideration, wherein the matter of inexcusable negligence of counsel in not informing
petitioners immediately of the decision of the court a quo, were among the grounds thereof,
it was held that the issues raised therein had already been considered in the Decision of
November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals obviously considered that the Motion for
Reconsideration was validly filed by petitioners so that the Court of Appeals favorably
considered the plea of petitioners to be afforded due process by acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could have just denied said Motion for late filing or simply
7
noted the same without action."
8

Moreover, petitioners themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum that this matter is
no longer in issue: "At any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the appellate court and obviously it was favorably considered as the said Court
denied the merit of said Motion by stating that the issues raised have already been treated in
the Decision, instead of outrightly denying the same for late filing. Hence, this is no longer
9
in issue in this proceeding."

"IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of
the trial court in the petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the
private respondent in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a bar to this proceeding.

First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of
subject property on equitable considerations."

Petitioners contend that the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate action to annul
the auction sale. Citing Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank,10 they aver that this RTC
Branch had no jurisdiction to rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its Decision in the LRC
case
cannot bar the present proceedings.

We deem it appropriate to simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision in
LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the
subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a) non-publication of the
notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax, (b) lack of personal notice of the sale
or public auction of the subject property and (c) equitable considerations. As a preliminary
matter, we shall also consider petitioners submission that they were deprived of due
process because of their counsels failure to inform them immediately of the receipt of the
CA Decision.

Petitioners reliance on Tiongco is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are
different from those of the present controversy. In that case, the trial court was acting
on
a Petition for the Surrender of Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, the trial
court was faced with a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. It had jurisdiction to rule on
all matters necessary for the determination of the issue of ownership, including the validity
of
the auction sale.

Preliminary Matter:

Indeed, this Court in several cases has previously declared that a petition for the surrender
of the owners duplicate certificate involves contentious questions which should be threshed
out in an ordinary case, because the land registration court has no jurisdiction to try
them.1wphi1.nt

"V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Negligence of Petitioners Former Counsel

Petitioners aver that their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on
February
5, 1998, more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3, 1997. According
to petitioners, their former counsels negligence effectively deprived them of their right to
due process.

11

Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to
promote the expeditious termination of cases. In more recent cases,12 therefore, the Court
declared that this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested
in the regional trial court and the latters limited jurisdiction when acting merely as a land
registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide even
controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving substantial issues.13

Thus, petitioners err in contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from
ruling on the validity of the auction sale. That court now has the authority to act not only
on applications for original registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original
registration of title. Coupled with this authority is the power to hear and determine all
14
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Especially where the issue of
ownership is ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land registration court
15
commits no error in assuming jurisdiction.
It is equally important to consider that a land registration courts decision ordering the
confirmation and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the
whole world.16 Thus, the trial courts ruling consolidating the ownership and the title of the
property in the name of herein respondent is valid and binding not only on petitioners, but
also on everyone else who may have any claim thereon.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites
regarding notice and publication were not satisfied. We are not convinced.
It has been held that matters of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions that
17
cannot be determined by this Court. Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as in this case, generally precludes the determination of factual issues. This Court
will not, as a rule, inquire into the evidence relied upon by the lower courts to support their
findings.18 In this case, the CA had already ruled on the question of compliance with the
requirements of notice and publication in this wise:
"In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of notice,
publication and posting have been complied with by the public defendant prior to
the auction sale wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo, there
was nothing irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the validity of the
same must be
upheld in accordance with the aforementioned cases."19
The CA ruling notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order
to assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere disposition
of procedural technicalities.
The Non-Publication of Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency
Petitioners assert that the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with
the requirement of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases
involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in personam.
Thus, notice by publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule
satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam.20 As such, mere publication of the
notice of delinquency would not suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in
personam. It

was, therefore, still incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice of tax
delinquency directly to the taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent
address of the registered owner in Manila. In that notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City
directed him to settle the charges immediately and to protect his interest in the property.
Under the circumstances, we hold that the notice sent by registered mail adequately protected
the rights of the taxpayer, who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the
taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and
other proceedings relative to the tax sale. Not being registered owners of the property,
petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such notice. In fact, they were not entitled
to it.
Lack of Personal Notice of the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property
Petitioners also contend that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the
public auction. They cite Section 73 of PD 464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced
hereunder:
"x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith b e sent either by registered mail or b y
messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent
taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or propert y tax records of the
municipalit y or cit y where the propert y is located, or at his residence, if known to
said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x." (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in
their Memorandum)
According to petitioners, the notice of public auction should have been sent to the address
appearing in the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No.
5, Baden #4105, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known address or
residence of the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They
contend that notice may be sent to the residence of the taxpayer, only when the tax roll does
not show any address of the property.
The above-cited provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayers address
to which the notice may be sent is the treasurers discretionary prerogative. In this case, the
city treasurer deemed it best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the
taxpayer. The former validly exercised this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was
known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and favorable to the registered owner that the
notice of delinquency be sent to his permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the
subject condominium unit merely as a vacation house and not as a residence.
This Court in Pecson v. Court of Appeals21 made a clear and categorical ruling on the
matter, when it declared as follows:
"Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be
sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or
property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located
or

(ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain." (emphasis

supplied)
To reiterate, for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of
the property is considered the taxpayer. Although petitioners have been in possession of
the subject premises by virtue of anunregistered deed of sale, such transaction has no
binding effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.
The importance of registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property
Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:
"Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the
same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey
or effect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall
operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to
the Registry of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or the city where the land lies."
Thus, insofar as third persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can
22
validly transfer or convey a persons interest in a property. In the absence of registration,
the registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the taxpayer to
whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be
taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment of the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.
The Annulment of the Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations
As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application,
if the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by
which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent
purchasers of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers,
the one who has registered the sale in ones favor has a preferred right over the other whose
title has not been registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject
23
property.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon
themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the
real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981,
they did not take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.

24

Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps the vigilant, but not those
who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs
25
against the slothful and the contemners of their own rights.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.