OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS UNDER CRIMES AGAINST

PUBLIC INTEREST

6. Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (RA 9160)

Salient Features of R.A. No. 9160 (The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 20

a. Criminalizes money laundering.

b. Creates a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).
c. Imposes requirements on customer identification, record-keeping and reporting of cove
suspicious transactions.
d. Relaxes strict bank deposit secrecy laws.
e. Provides for freezing/seizure/forfeiture recovery of dirty money/property.
f. Provides for international cooperation.

Amendments under R.A. No. 9194

a. Lowers the threshold amount for single covered transactions (cash or other equivalent
instrument) from P4M to P500,000.00 within one (1) banking day.

b. Expands the reporting requirements to include the reporting of suspicious transactions

amount involved

c. Authorizes AMLC to inquire into or examine any particular deposit or investment, with a
institution or non-bank financial institution and their subsidiaries and affiliates upon order
court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable
deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity. However, no court order is req
involving unlawful activities of kidnapping for ransom, narcotics offenses and hijacking, d
and murder, including those perpetrated by terrorists against non-combatant persons and

d. Authorizes the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to inquire into or examine any deposit or inv
banking institution or non-bank financial institution and their subsidiaries and affiliates wh
examination is made in the course of a periodic or special examination, in accordance wit
examination of the BSP to ensure compliance with R.A. No. 9160, as amended.

e. Transfers the authority to freeze any money/property from the AMLC to the Court of Ap

R.A. No. 10167

a. allows application for bank inquiry ex parte
b. allows verified ex parte for freeze order

A Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas briefer on the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001

1. What is money laundering?
Money laundering is an act or series or combination of acts whereby proceeds of an
unlawful activity, whether in cash, property or other assets, are converted, concealed or
disguised to make them appear to have originated from legitimate sources. One way of
laundering money is through the financial system. Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise
known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 (AMLA), as amended, defined money
laundering as a scheme whereby proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted or
attempted to be transacted, thereby making them appear to have originated from
legitimate sources.
2. What has the Philippine government done to curb money laundering?
The government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160 (The Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001), which took effect on 17 October 2001. Certain provisions of AMLA were
amended by R.A. No. 9194 (An Act Amending R.A. 9160) effective 23 March 2003. It
has also issued the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) implementing
R.A. No. 9160, as amended.
3. What are considered unlawful activities under the AMLA, as amended?
There are 14 unlawful activities or predicate crimes covered by the AMLA. These are, in
the order enumerated in the law:
Kidnapping for ransom
Drug offenses
Graft and corrupt practices
Plunder
Robbery and extortion
Jueteng and masiao
Piracy on the high seas
Qualified theft
Swindling
Smuggling
Electronic Commerce crimes
Hijacking, destructive arson and murder, including those perpetrated against noncombatant persons (terrorist acts)
Securities fraud
Felonies or offenses of a similar nature punishable under penal laws of other countries
4. How is money laundered through the financial system?

Placement involves initial placement or introduction of the illegal funds into the
financial system. Financial institutions are usually used at this point.
Layering involves a series of financial transactions during which the dirty money is
passed through a series of procedures, putting layer upon layer of persons and financial
activities into the laundering process. Ex. wire transfers, use of shell corporations, etc.
Integration the money is once again made available to the criminal with the
occupational and geographic origin obscured or concealed. The laundered funds are
now integrated back into the legitimate economy through the purchase of properties,
businesses and other investments.
5. Why is Money Laundering a problem?
Money laundering allows criminals to preserve and enjoy the proceeds of their crimes,
thus providing them with the incentives and the means to continue their illegal activities.
At the same time, it provides them the opportunity to appear in public like legitimate
entrepreneurs. Organized crime, through money laundering, is known to have the
capacity to destabilize governments and undermine their financial systems. It is thus a
threat to national security.
6. What are the salient features of the law?
It criminalizes money laundering, meaning it makes money laundering a crime, and
provides penalties for its commission, including hefty fines and imprisonment.
It states clearly the determination of the government to prevent the Philippines from
becoming a haven for money laundering, while ensuring to preserve the integrity and
confidentiality of good bank accounts.
It creates an Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) that is tasked to oversee the
implementation of the law and to act as a financial intelligence unit to receive and
analyze covered and suspicious transaction reports.
It establishes the rules and the administration process for the prevention, detection and
prosecution of money laundering activities.
It relaxes the bank deposit secrecy laws authorizing the AMLC and the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas access to deposit and investment accounts in specific circumstances.
It requires covered institutions to report covered and suspicious transactions and to
cooperate with the government in prosecuting offenders. It also requires them to know
their customers and to safely keep all records of their transactions.
It carries provisions to protect innocent parties by providing penalties for causing the
disclosure to the public of confidential information contained in the covered and
suspicious transactions.
It establishes procedures for international cooperation and assistance in the
apprehension and prosecution of money laundering suspects.
7. What is the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)? What are its powers?

The AMLC is the Philippines financial intelligence unit, which is tasked to implement the
AMLA. It is composed of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) as
Chairman & the Commissioner of the Insurance Commission (IC) and the Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as members. The AMLC is authorized
to:
Require and receive covered or suspicious transaction reports from covered institutions.
Issue orders to determine the true identity of the owner of any monetary instrument or
property that is the subject of a covered or suspicious transaction report, and to request
the assistance of a foreign country if the Council believes it is necessary.
Institute civil forfeiture and all other remedial proceedings through the Office of the
Solicitor General.
Cause the filing of complaints with the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman for the
prosecution of money laundering offenses.
Investigate suspicious transactions, covered transactions deemed suspicious, money
laundering activities and other violations of the AMLA.
Secure the order of the Court of Appeals to freeze any monetary instrument or property
alleged to be the proceeds of unlawful activity.
Implement such measures as may be necessary and justified to counteract money
laundering.
Receive and take action on any request from foreign countries for assistance in their
own anti-money laundering operations.
Develop educational programs to make the public aware of the pernicious effects of
money laundering and how they can participate in bringing the offenders to the fold of
the law.
Enlist the assistance of any branch of government for the prevention, detection and
investigation of money laundering offenses and the prosecution of offenders. In this
connection, the AMLC can require intelligence agencies of the government to divulge
any information that will facilitate the work of the Council in going after money
launderers.
Impose administrative sanctions on those who violate the law, and the rules,
regulations, orders and resolutions issued in connection with the enforcement of the
law.
8. What are the covered institutions?
Banks, offshore banking units, quasi-banks, trust entities, non-stock savings and loan
associations, pawnshops, and all other institutions, including their subsidiaries and
affiliates supervised and/or regulated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
Insurance companies, holding companies and all other institutions supervised or
regulated by the Insurance Commission (IC)

Securities dealers, brokers, pre-need companies, foreign exchange corporations,

investment houses, trading advisers, as well as other entities supervised or regulated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
9. What are the Customer Identification Requirements KYC (Know Your
Customer Rule)?
Covered institutions shall:
Establish and record the true identity of their clients based on official documents.
In case of individual clients, maintain a system of verifying the true identity of their
clients.
In case of corporate clients, require a system verifying their legal existence and
organizational structure, as well as the authority and identification of all persons
purporting to act in their behalf.
Establish appropriate systems and methods based on internationally compliant
standards and adequate internal controls for verifying and recording the true and full
identify of their customers.
10. What are the Record-Keeping Requirements?
All covered institutions shall:
Maintain and safely store all records of all their transactions for five years from the
transaction dates;
Ensure that said records/files contain the full and true identity of the owners or holders
of the accounts involved in the covered transactions and all other identification
documents;
Undertake the necessary adequate measures to ensure the confidentiality of such files;
Prepare and maintain documentation, in accordance with client identification
requirements, on their customer accounts, relationships and transactions such that any
account, relationship or transaction can be so reconstructed as to enable the AMLC
and/or the courts to establish an audit trail for money laundering;
Maintain and safely store all records of existing and new accounts and of new
transactions for 5 years from October 17, 2001 or from the dates of the accounts or
transactions, whichever is later;
Anent closed accounts, preserve and safely store the records on customer
identification, account files and business correspondence for at least 5 years from the
dates they were closed;
If a money laundering case based on any record kept by the covered institution has
been filed in court, retain said files until it is confirmed that the case has been finally
resolved or terminated by the court; and
Retain records as originals in such forms as are admissible in court

11. What are covered transactions?

Transaction in cash or other equivalent monetary instruments involving a total amount in
excess of P500,000.00 within one business day.
12. What are suspicious transactions?
Transactions, regardless of the amount involved, where the following circumstances
exist:
a. there is no underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose or economic justification;
b.the client is not properly identified;
c. the amount involved is not commensurate with the business or financial capacity of
the client;
d. taking into account all known circumstances, it may be perceived that the clients
transaction is structured in order to avoid being the subject of reporting requirements
under the Act;
e. any circumstance relating to the transaction which is observed to deviate from the
profile of the client and/or the clients past transactions with the covered institution;
f. the transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act
that is about to be, is being or has been committed; or
g. any transaction that is similar or analogous to the foregoing.
13. What are the reporting requirements?
Covered institutions shall report to the AMLC all covered transactions and suspicious
transactions within five working days from occurrence thereof, unless the Supervision
Authority (the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
the Insurance Commission) prescribes a longer period not exceeding ten working days.
Should a transaction be determined to be both a covered transaction and a suspicious
transaction, it shall be reported as suspicious transaction.
14. How is reporting done?
The reports on covered and/or suspicious transactions shall be accomplished in the
prescribed formats and submitted within five business days from occurrence of the
transactions in a secured manner to the AMLC in electronic form, either via diskettes,
leased lines, or through internet facilities. The corresponding hard copy for suspicious
transactions shall be sent to AMLC at the 5th Floor EDPC Building, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Complex, Manila, Philippines. All pawnshops should coordinate with the AMLC
thru tel. nos. 523-4421, 521-5662 or 302-3979 on reporting requirements, procedures
and deadlines.
15. Are there sanctions for failure to report covered or suspicious transactions
and non-compliance with R.A. 9160, as amended?
Sanctions/penalties shall be imposed on pawnshops that will fail to comply with the
provisions of R.A. 9160, as amended.

16. What are the sanctions for failure to report covered or suspicious
transactions?
Any person, required to report covered and suspicious transactions failed to do so will
be subjected to penalty of 6 months to 4 years imprisonment or a fine of not less than
P100,000.00 but not more than P500,000.00, or both.
17. Are there confidentiality restrictions on the reporting of covered transaction
and/or suspicious transaction?
When reporting covered transactions or suspicious transactions to the AMLC, covered
institutions and their officers and employees, are prohibited from communicating,
directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, to any person, entity, the media,
the fact that a covered or suspicious transaction report was made, the contents thereof,
or any other information in relation thereto. Neither may such reporting be published or
aired in any manner or form by the mass media, electronic mail, or other similar
devices. In case of violation thereof, the concerned officer, and employee, of the
covered institution, or media shall be held criminally liable.
18. What are the other offenses punishable under the AMLA, as amended?
a. Failure to keep records is committed by any responsible official or employee of a
covered institution who fails to maintain and safely store all records of transactions for 5
years from the dates the transactions were made or when the accounts were closed.
The penalty is 6 months to 1 year imprisonment or a fine of not less than P100,000.00
but not more than P500,000.00, or both.
b. Malicious reporting is committed by any person who, with malice or in bad faith,
reports or files a completely unwarranted or false information regarding a money
laundering transaction against any person. The penalty is 6 months to 4 years
imprisonment and a fine of not less than P100,000.00 but not more than P500,000.00.
The offender is not entitled to the benefits of the Probation Law.
c. Breach of Confidentiality. For this offense, the penalty is 3 to 8 years imprisonment
and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 but not more than P1 million. In case the
prohibited information is reported by media, the responsible reporter, writer, president,
publisher, manager, and editor-in-chief are held criminally liable.
d. Administrative offenses. The AMLC, after due investigation, can impose fines from
P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 on officers and employees of covered institutions or any
person who violates the provisions of the AMLA, as amended, the Implementing Rules
and Regulations, and orders and resolutions issued pursuant thereto.
Republic of the Phil. Vs. Cabrini Green & Ross, Inc.
Facts: AMLC issued freeze orders against various bank accounts of
respondents. The frozen accounts were previously found prima facie to be
related to the unlawful activities of the respondents. The AMLC filed with the
CA various petitions. It invoked the jurisdiction of the CA in the belief that the
power given to the CA to issue a TRO or writ of injunction against any freeze

order issued by the AMLC carried with it the power to extend the effectivity
of a freeze order. The CA disagreed and dismissed the petitions.
Issue: Which court has jurisdiction to extend the effectivity of a freeze order?
Held: The amendment by RA 9194 of RA 9160 erased any doubt on the
jurisdiction of the CA over the extension of freeze orders. As the law now
stands, it is solely the CA which has the authority to issue a freeze order as
well as to extend its effectivity. It also has the exclusive jurisdiction to extend
existing freeze orders previously issued by the AMLC vis--vis accounts and
deposits related to money-laundering activities.
Republic of the Phil. Vs. Glasglow Credit and Collection Services,
Inc.
Facts: On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC for civil
forfeiture of assets against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI.
The case filed pursuant to RA 9160 (AMLA 2001). Acting on the Republics
urgent plea for the issuance of TRO, the executive judge of RTC issued a 72hour of a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an order
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuction. In order, the trial
court directed the issuance of alias summons. However, no mention was
made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication. In an
order, the trial court archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to
serve the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication. In an
order, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the
Republic to serve the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days.
However, it did not resolve the Republics motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Because the Republics motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication remain unresolved, the Republic filed a
manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication. Glasgow filed for motion to dismiss. It alleged
that the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet
been served on it; and that the complaint was premature and stated no
cause of action; and there was failure to prosecute on the part of the
Republic. The RP opposed Glasgows motion to dismiss. It contended that its
suit was an action quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It
asserted that prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition to
the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged ultimate
facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to
prosecute the case. The trial court issued the assailed order. It dismissed the
case on the grounds of improper venue; insufficiency of the complaint in
form and substance; and failure to prosecute. It lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction and directed CSBI to release to Glasgow the funds.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly
dismissed on grounds of (a) improper venue, (b) insufficiency in form and
substance; and (c) failure to prosecute

Held: the case is remanded to the RTC, which shall proceed with the case. (a)
The trial court was a proper venue. Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the
regional trial court. A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any regional
trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a
money laundering offense are located; provided, however, that where all or
any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is located
outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in
Manila or of the judicial region where any portion of the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied) Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in
Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases is any
RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or
proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a
money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought
to be forfeited in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial
Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may
be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the
NCJR,10 it was a proper venue of the Republics complaint for civil forfeiture
of Glasgows account.
(b) The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. Regardless of
the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal prosecution for the unlawful
activity or for money laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be
separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.
(c) Given the circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to
prosecute the complaint for civil forfeiture? While there was admittedly a
delay in the proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to the
Republic. That Glasgows whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only
beyond the Republics control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which left
its principal office address without informing the Securities and Exchange
Commission or any official regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address.
Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already seeking
leave of court to serve summons by publication. In Marahay v. Melicor,18 this
Court ruled: While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non
prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under
the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing
to proceed with reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or
scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe
the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the
case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their
authority to dismiss. (emphasis supplied) We see no pattern or scheme on
the part of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton
failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial court

should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss the Republics
complaint.
7. Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998 (RA No. 8484)
Section 9. Prohibited Acts. The following acts shall constitute access device fraud
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) producing, using, trafficking in one or more counterfeit access devices;
(b) trafficking in one or more unauthorized access devices or access devices
fraudulently applied for;
(c) using, with intent to defraud, an unauthorized access device;
(d) using an access device fraudulently applied for;
(e) possessing one or more counterfeit access devices or access devices fraudulently
applied for;
(f) producing, trafficking in, having control or custody of, or possessing device-making or
altering equipment without being in the business or employment, which lawfully deals
with the manufacture, issuance, or distribution of such equipment;
(g) inducing, enticing, permitting or in any manner allowing another, for consideration or
otherwise to produce, use, traffic in counterfeit access devices, unauthorized access
devices or access devices fraudulently applied for;
(h) multiple imprinting on more than one transaction record, sales slip or similar
document, thereby making it appear that the device holder has entered into a
transaction other than those which said device holder had lawfully contracted for, or
submitting, without being an affiliated merchant, an order to collect from the issuer of
the access device, such extra sales slip through an affiliated merchant who connives
therewith, or, under false pretenses of being an affiliated merchant, present for
collection such sales slips, and similar documents;
(i) disclosing any information imprinted on the access device, such as, but not limited to,
the account number or name or address of the device holder, without the latter's
authority or permission;
(j) obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access device, with intent
to defraud or with intent to gain and fleeing thereafter;
(k) having in one's possession, without authority from the owner of the access device or
the access device company, an access device, or any material, such as slips, carbon
paper, or any other medium, on which the access device is written, printed, embossed,
or otherwise indicated;
(l) writing or causing to be written on sales slips, approval numbers from the issuer of
the access device of the fact of approval, where in fact no such approval was given, or
where, if given, what is written is deliberately different from the approval actually given;

(m) making any alteration, without the access device holder's authority, of any amount
or other information written on the sales slip;
(n) effecting transaction, with one or more access devices issued to another person or
persons, to receive payment or any other thing of value;
(o) without the authorization of the issuer of the access device, soliciting a person for
the purpose of:
1) offering an access device; or
2) selling information regarding or an application to obtain an access device; or
(p) without the authorization of the credit card system member or its agent, causing or
arranging for another person to present to the member or its agent, for payment, one or
more evidence or records of transactions made by credit card.
Section 14. Presumption and prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. The mere
possession, control or custody of:
(a) an access device, without permission of the owner or without any lawful authority;
(b) a counterfeit access device;
(c) access device fraudulently applied for;
(d) any device-making or altering equipment by any person whose business or
employment does not lawfully deal with the manufacture, issuance, or distribution of
access device;
(e) an access device or medium on which an access device is written, not in the
ordinary course of the possessor's trade or business; or
(f) a genuine access device, not in the name of the possessor, or not in the ordinary
course of the possessor's trade or business, shall be prima facie evidence that such
device or equipment is intended to be used to defraud.
A cardholder who abandons or surreptitiously leaves the place of employment, business
or residence stated in his application or credit card, without informing the credit card
company of the place where he could actually be found, if at the time of such
abandonment or surreptitious leaving, the outstanding and unpaid balance is past due
for at least ninety (90) days and is more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), shall
be prima facie presumed to have used his credit card with intent to defraud.
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR CREDIT CARD DEBTS (Source: Police, Facts and Law
Facebook, July 2013)
The question that is frequently asked, as far as credit cards are concerned, is whether
one may be imprisoned for failure to pay credit card debts. This has often been posed
by no less than the credit card holders, who, for some reasons, failed to pay their credit
card debts.

In order to obtain the desired answer, there is an imperative need to examine the
applicable law on credit cards; and, for similar purpose, it is equally important to take a
closer look at the pertinent provisions in our Constitution, particularly those found under
the Bill of Rights.
Here in the Philippines, the law governing credit cards is Republic Act No. 8484 (RA
8484), otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998. Approved by
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines on February 11, 1998, RA 8484 is an act crafted
to, among others, regulate the issuance and use of access devices and prohibit
fraudulent acts committed in relation to such devices.
An Access Device is defined under RA 8484 as any card, plate, code, account
number, electronic serial number, personal identification number, or other
telecommunications service, equipment, or instrumental identifier, or other means of
account access that can be used to obtain money, good, services, or any other thing of
value or to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper
instrument).
While a Credit Card, which is included within the meaning of an access device, is
defined under RA 8484 as any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device existing
for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services or any thing of
value on credit.
Upon careful reading of RA 8484 in its entirety, it becomes apparent that mere failure to
pay credit card debts is not among the Prohibited Acts, constituting Access Device
Fraud, which are declared to be unlawful and, thus, punishable with a fine and
imprisonment.
What is punishable under RA 8484 is the act of obtaining money or anything of value
through the use of an access device, with intent to defraud or with intent to gain and
fleeing thereafter.
Notably, as far as the element of Intent to Defraud is concerned, RA 8484 provides for
a prima facie presumption to the effect that a cardholder who abandons or
surreptitiously leaves the place of employment, business or residence stated in his
application or credit card, without informing the credit card company of the place where
he could actually be found, if at the time of such abandonment or surreptitious leaving,
the outstanding and unpaid balance is past due for at least ninety (90) days and is more
than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), shall be prima facie presumed to have used his
credit card with intent to defraud.

Nevertheless, what is clear from RA 8484 is that mere failure to pay credit card debts,
in the absence of fraud, will never give rise to any criminal liability on the part of any
credit card holder.
Even assuming, just for the sake of discussion, that mere failure to pay credit card
debts is among the prohibited acts constituting access device fraud, which, as
discussed, are declared to be unlawful and, thus, punishable with a fine and
imprisonment, still, it will be struck down as void and, as such, of no effect for being
unconstitutional, it being in direct contravention of the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debts.
Under Section 20 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, it is explicitly
provided that no person shall be imprisoned for debts, and, this, no doubt, includes,
within its scope, credit card debts.
Soledad vs. People, February 23, 2011
Information; when sufficient. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners claim that the
Information against him was invalid. He argued that though he was charged with
possession of an access device fraudulently applied for, the act of possession, which
is the gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in determining the
sufficiency of a complaint or information which states that a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed. In Information filed before the RTC against petitioner,
it was clearly stated that the accused is petitioner Mark Soledad y Cristobal a.k.a.
Henry Yu/Arthur. It was also specified in the preamble of the Information that he was
being charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e) for possessing a counterfeit
access device or access device fraudulently applied for. In the accusatory portion
thereof, the acts constituting the offense were clearly narrated in that [petitioner],
together with other persons[,] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private
complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access device defined under R.A. [No.]
8484, from Metrobank Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu
and his personal documents fraudulently obtained from him, and which credit card in the
name of Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a
fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real
Henry Yu. Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was private complainant
Henry Yu and the crime was committed on or about the 13 th day of August 2004 in the

City of Las Pias. Undoubtedly, the Information contained all the necessary details of
the offense committed, sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Mark Soledad y Cristobal v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
184274, February 23, 2011.
8. Anti-Camcording Act of 2010 (RA10088)
I highly doubt any of my readers sneak in cameras to document movies, but
if youre a fan of the flea market DVD bonanza, youll know what I mean. Its
no secret that movie piracy is rampant in this country, and there is definitely
a blind eye cast upon this. It appears that the fines are slapped on those
caught recording inside movie theaters.
Today, its now a law. RA 10088, the Anti-Camcording Act of 2010, was
passed by the Senate on January 18, 2010 and the House of Representatives on
January 27, 2010, and approved by the President on May 13, 2010. The Act declares
unlawful the following acts committed when a copyright exists in a cinematographic film
or other audiovisual work or its soundtrack, without the authorization of the copyright
owner or exclusive licensee: (a) use or attempt to use an audiovisual recording device to
transmit or make a copy of any performance in an exhibition facility; (b) to possess an
audiovisual recording device in an exhibition facility, with the intent of using or
attempting to use the same to transmit or make a copy of the performance; and (c) aid,
abet or connive in the commission of these prohibited acts. These shall be punished by
a fine from P50 thousand to P750 thousand, and imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day
to 6 years and 1 day. If the purpose of the acts is the sale, rental or other commercial
distribution of a copy, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum. If the offender is
an alien, he shall be deported immediately after payment of the fine and imprisonment,
and shall thereafter be refused entry into the country.

The Act provides for presumptions on the subsistence of copyright and/or ownership of
copyright. It shall not be a defense that the transmission or the making of a copy is for
private or domestic purposes, or in connection with a fair use deal.
All exhibition facilities, cinemas or theatres are required to conspicuously post notices
or signages warning against the bringing in of audiovisual recording devices into the
screening/exhibition area. The management/operator who fails to post these required
notices shall be fined P50 thousand.
Members of the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation are
given the power to enter and search an exhibition facility, without a warrant and without
payment of admission fee or other charge, when he has reasonable grounds to believe

that a violation of this Act has been or is being committed. These authorized persons
may also, under the same circumstances, (i) search any person who has any
audiovisual recording device by which an offense has been, or is being, committed; (ii)
seize, remove, or detain any audiovisual recording device or other object which appear
to contain, or likely to contain, evidence of an offense; (iii) use reasonable force to
remove any person or object obstructing them in the exercise of any of their powers
under the Act; (iv) detain any person, within a reasonable time not exceeding 18 hours,
found in the exhibition facility and is reasonably believed to be connected to the subject
of the search, when detention is necessary to adequately perform the search; and (v)
require the operator or other responsible person of the exhibition facility to give
information or render assistance that may be necessary to enable the authorized
persons to carry out their functions under this Act.
Regardless of the conviction of the accused, the courts may order any copy of a
cinematographic film or other audiovisual work, which the court believes to be an
unauthorized copy, and any audiovisual recording device or other equipment that was in
the possession of the accused, be destroyed or delivered to the owner or exclusive
licensee of the copyright.
Section 3. Acts Constituting Unauthorized Possession, Use and/or Control of
Audiovisual Recording Devices. - It shall be unlawful for any person, at a time when
copyright subsists in a cinematographic film or other audiovisual work or its soundtrack
and without the authorization of the copyright owner or exclusive licensee thereof, to:
(a)use or attempt to use an audiovisual recording device to transmit or make a copy of
any performance in an exhibition facility of such cinematographic film or other
audiovisual work or its soundtrack, or any part thereof;
(b)have in his/her possession, an audiovisual recording device in an exhibition facility,
with the intent of using or attempts to use the audiovisual recording device to transmit or
make a copy of any performance in the exhibition facility of such cinematographic film or
other audiovisual work or its soundtrack, or any part thereof; or
(c)aid, abet or connive in the commission of the acts prohibited under this section.
Section 8. Powers of Authorized Persons to Enter an Exhibition Facility and Search the
Same. - An authorized person, without a warrant and without payment of any admission
fee or other charge, may enter and search any exhibition facility if the authorized person
has reasonable ground to believe that any violation of this Act has been or is being
committed and, due to the delay necessary to obtain a warrant could result in the loss or
destruction of evidence, or for any other reason it would not be reasonably practicable
to obtain a warrant.
Section 9. Other Powers of Authorized Persons. - An authorized person who has
reasonable ground to believe that a violation under this Act has been or is being
committed may:

(a)search any person if the person subject of the search has in his/her actual
possession, any audiovisual recording device, in respect of which an offense under this
Act has been or is being committed;
(b)seize, remove or detain any audiovisual recording device or other object which
appears to contain, or likely to contain evidence of an offense committed under this Act;
(c)use reasonable force to remove any person or object obstructing the authorized
person in the exercise of any power conferred upon him/her by this Act;
(d)detain any person, within a reasonable time not exceeding eighteen (18) hours,
found in any place which the authorized person is empowered to enter and search if,
after inquiry made, said authorized person has reasonable ground to believe that the
person subject of the search is connected with the subject matter of the search and it is
considered necessary to detain the person subject of the search to be able to
adequately perform the search; and
(e)require the operator of an exhibition facility or any other person who appears to be at
the time responsible for the control or management of the exhibition facility to give
information or render assistance that may be necessary to enable the authorized person
to carry out the functions under this Act.

9. Illegal Recruitment (RA No. 8042 as amended by RA NO. 10022)

Acts of illegal recruitment: RA No. 10022, Section 5. Section 6 of Republic Act No.
8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority:
"(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
or to make a worker pay or acknowledge any amount greater than that actually received
by him as a loan or advance;
"(b) To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;
"(c) To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor
Code, or for the purpose of documenting hired workers with the POEA, which include

the act of reprocessing workers through a job order that pertains to nonexistent work,
work different from the actual overseas work, or work with a different employer whether
registered or not with the POEA;
"(d) To include or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment
in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
"(e) To influence or attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency or who has formed, joined or
supported, or has contacted or is supported by any union or workers' organization;
"(f) To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health
or morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
"(h) To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies,
remittance of foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such
other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment;
"(i) To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved
and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual
signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the
same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
"(j) For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or
member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged
directly or indirectly in the management of travel agency;
"(k) To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations, or for any other reasons, other than those
authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
"(l) Failure to actually deploy a contracted worker without valid reason as determined by
the Department of Labor and Employment;
"(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the
deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment
when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage; and
"(n) To allow a non-Filipino citizen to head or manage a licensed recruitment/manning
agency.
"Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
"In addition to the acts enumerated above, it shall also be unlawful for any person or
entity to commit the following prohibited acts:

"(1) Grant a loan to an overseas Filipino worker with interest exceeding eight percent
(8%) per annum, which will be used for payment of legal and allowable placement fees
and make the migrant worker issue, either personally or through a guarantor or
accommodation party, postdated checks in relation to the said loan;
"(2) Impose a compulsory and exclusive arrangement whereby an overseas Filipino
worker is required to avail of a loan only from specifically designated institutions, entities
or persons;
"(3) Refuse to condone or renegotiate a loan incurred by an overseas Filipino worker
after the latter's employment contract has been prematurely terminated through no fault
of his or her own;
"(4) Impose a compulsory and exclusive arrangement whereby an overseas Filipino
worker is required to undergo health examinations only from specifically designated
medical clinics, institutions, entities or persons, except in the case of a seafarer whose
medical examination cost is shouldered by the principal/shipowner;
"(5) Impose a compulsory and exclusive arrangement whereby an overseas Filipino
worker is required to undergo training, seminar, instruction or schooling of any kind only
from specifically designated institutions, entities or persons, except fpr recommendatory
trainings mandated by principals/shipowners where the latter shoulder the cost of such
trainings;
"(6) For a suspended recruitment/manning agency to engage in any kind of recruitment
activity including the processing of pending workers' applications; and
"(7) For a recruitment/manning agency or a foreign principal/employer to pass on the
overseas Filipino worker or deduct from his or her salary the payment of the cost of
insurance fees, premium or other insurance related charges, as provided under the
compulsory worker's insurance coverage.
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices
and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having ownership, control,
management or direction of their business who are responsible for the commission of
the offense and the responsible employees/agents thereof shall be liable.
"In the filing of cases for illegal recruitment or any of the prohibited acts under this
section, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the POEA Administrator or their duly
authorized representatives, or any aggrieved person may initiate the corresponding
criminal action with the appropriate office. For this purpose, the affidavits and
testimonies of operatives or personnel from the Department of Labor and Employment,
POEA and other law enforcement agencies who witnessed the acts constituting the
offense shall be sufficient to prosecute the accused.
"In the prosecution of offenses punishable under this section, the public prosecutors of
the Department of Justice shall collaborate with the anti-illegal recruitment branch of the
POEA and, in certain cases, allow the POEA lawyers to take the lead in the prosecution.
The POEA lawyers who act as prosecutors in such cases shall be entitled to receive
additional allowances as may be determined by the POEA Administrator.

"The filing of an offense punishable under this Act shall be without prejudice to the filing
of cases punishable under other existing laws, rules or regulations."1avvphi1
Sto. Tomas vs. Salac (November 13, 2012)
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No.
152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos. 182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers
abroad, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and
TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters. Salac et al invoked Sections
29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that
recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of
the said law; that 5 years thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042
was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as early as 2000, the
aforementioned government agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and
circulars regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of
this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the
POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned
the validity of the following provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term illegal recruitment. PASEI claims that the
definition by the law is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the
penalties for simple violations against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or
obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either
file the criminal case where he or she resides or at the place where the crime was
committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being contrary to the Rules of
Court which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the
crime or any of its essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found
to be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this
automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being
violative of due process.

RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said
provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the
RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and
non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they
commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who
engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any
of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the
said penalties. Besides, it is not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind
the law.
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110,
itself, provides that the rule on venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to
existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when Congress provided an
alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make
them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they
were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her
parents received insurance benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration). But when they found out based on an autopsy conducted in the
Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment
and placement agency which handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since
Becmen was negligent in investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of
RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme Court also ruled that pursuant to
Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are themselves jointly and
solidarily liable with Becmen.
Eufrocina Gumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to
intervene. They aver that Section 10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.

HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not
automatic. However, the SC reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are
solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no evidence on record which shows
that they ere personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in
Jasmins case.

People vs. Hadja Jarma Lalli

FACTS: Lolita Sagadsad Plando, herein complainant, was a victim of illegal
recruitment and human trafficking. She was allegedly recruited by a certain
Ronnie Masion Aringoy to work in Malaysia as a restaurant entertainer. She
was told that she only needed a passport to get to Malaysia. She then took
her sisters passport which was altered by Ronnie Masion Aringoy . In a
matter of days, she was bound to Malaysia. One Hadja Jarma Lalli and one
Nestor Relagampos accompanied her to her workplace in Malaysia, together
with three other recruits. It was Nestor Relampagos who introduced them to
their Boss. However, when she arrived there, the restaurant turned out to
be a prostitution den where she was forced to work as a prostitute. After a
month, she escaped from the said prostitution den with the help of her sister
residing in Malaysia. Thereafter, she returned to the Philippines and filed a
complaint against Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relagampos and Ronnie Masion
Aringoy. The accused were found guilty by both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE: Did the accused commit illegal recruitment?
RULING: YES. A person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement
activities without the requisite authority from DOLE, whether for profit or not,
is deemed to be engaged in illegal recruitment. The commission of illegal
recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic
sabotage. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in
this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority
required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of recruitment
and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to
Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons,
conspiring and confederating with one another.
People vs. Melissa Chua G.R. No. 184058, March 10, 2010
Facts: Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large
Scale). Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Her co-accused Josie
remained at large. The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded only
with respect to appellant. Of the five complainants, only three testified,
namely, Marilyn D. Macaranas (Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry
James King (King). Appellant denied the charges. Claiming having worked as

a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden

Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng, she maintained that Golden Gate was a
licensed recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother, was an
agent. Appellant was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila. She was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted only
for three. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction.
Issue: Is appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale?
Ruling: Yes. For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution
has to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook a
recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under
Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more
persons individually or as a group.
In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a
cashier from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit
workers for deployment abroad. Per the certification from the POEA, Golden
Gates license only expired on February 23, 2002 and it was delisted from the
roster of licensed agencies on April 2, 2002.
Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the
complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation
that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad. In the
absence of any evidence that the complainants were motivated by improper
motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not be
interfered with by the Court
Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did
not make her any less an employee to be held liable for illegal recruitment as
principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown
that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was unaware of the illegal nature of the
recruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability either.
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale penalized under Republic Act No. 8042, or
"The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," is a special law, a
violation of which is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Intent is thus
immaterial. And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa,
convicted of such offense. [I]llegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is malum in se. In the first, the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second,
such an intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2,
of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who
defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to

possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,

business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud.
10. Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA No. 10175)
Source: http://www.ilonggotechblog.com/2012/10/what-is-republic-act-no-ra10175-or.html#sthash.UOiNoogC.dpuf
Republic Act No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is a
Philippine Republic Act signed by President Aquino on 12 September 2012. It
aims to address legal issues concerning online interactions. Among the
cybercrime offenses included in the bill are cybersquatting, cybersex, child
pornography, identity theft, illegal access to data and libel, but the new Act
received mixed reactions upon its enactment especially on the grounds of
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and data security. Several
petitions are currently submitted to the Supreme Court of the Philippines
questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 is the first law in the Philippines
which specifically criminalizes computer crime, which prior to the passage of
the law had no strong legal precedent in Philippine jurisprudence. The Act,
divided into 31 sections split across eight chapters, criminalizes several
types of offenses, including illegal access (hacking), data interference, device
misuse, cybersquatting, computer-related offenses such as computer fraud,
content-related offenses such as cybersex and spam, and other offenses. The
law also reaffirms existing laws against child pornography, an offense under
Republic Act No. 9779 (the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009), and libel, an
offense under Section 377 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, also
criminalizing them when committed using a computer system. Finally, the
Act provides for a "catch-all" clause, wherein all offenses currently
punishable under the Revised Penal Code are likewise punishable under the
Act when committed using a computer, with corresponding stricter penalties
than if the crimes were punishable under the Revised Penal Code alone.
Section 4 - Cyber Crime Offenses
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer
data and systems
Illegal Access - The access to the whole or any part of a computer system
without right.
Illegal Interception - The interception made by technical means without right
of any non-public transmission of computer data to, from, or within a
computer system including electromagnetic emissions from a computer
system carrying such computer data.
Data Interference - The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion
or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data
message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

System Interference - The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or

interference with the functioning of a computer or computer network by
inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or
suppressing computer data or computer program, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right or authority, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
Misuse of Devices - The use, production, sale, procurement, importation,
distribution, or otherwise making available, without right, of:
A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for
the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act; or
A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or
any part of a computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that
it be used for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act.
Cyber-squatting - The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others from
registering the same, if such a domain name is:
Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered
with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name
registration:
Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and
Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
(b) Computer-related offenses
Computer-related Forgery- The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer
data without right resulting in inauthentic data with the intent that it be
considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic,
regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible; or the
act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computerrelated forgery as defined herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a
fraudulent or dishonest design.
Computer-related Fraud - The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of
computer data or program or interference in the functioning of a computer
system, causing damage thereby with fraudulent intent: Provided, That if no
damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree
lower.
Computer-related Identity Theft - The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,
transfer, possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information
belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided,
That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one
(1) degree lower.

(c) Content-related offenses

Cybersex - The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Child Pornography - The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable
by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009,
committed through a computer system. The penalty to be imposed shall be
(1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.
Unsolicited Commercial Communications - The transmission of commercial
electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or
customers; or
The following conditions are present:
The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial
electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
recipients to read the message.
Libel - The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or
any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Section 5 - Other offenses under R.A. 10175
Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime - Any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in
this Act shall be held liable.
Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime - Any person who willfully
attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in R.A. 10175 shall be
held liable.
Penalties:
For sections 4a and 4b, imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least
P200,000 or both.

For section 4a5, imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than
P500,000 or both.
If section 4a are committed in critical infrastructure, penalty of reclusion
temporal or a fine of at least P500,000 or both.
For section 4c1, imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least P200,000
but not exceeding P1,000,000 or both.
For section 4c2, penalties as enumerated in RA 9775 or Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009. 1 degree higher if committed in computer system.
For section 4c3, punishment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least P50,000
but not exceeding P250,000 or both
For section 5, punishment of 1 degree lower of the prescribed penalty for the
offense or a fine of at least P100,000 but not exceeding P500,000 or both.
Corporate liability is equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in
section 7 up to maximum of P10,000,000.
Enforcement and Implementation
Law enforcement authorities, such as the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall be responsible for the
implementation of the provisions of this Act.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) shall be responsible for assisting in
investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to
computer systems or data, in collection of electronic evidence of criminal
offense and in ensuring the provisions of the law are complied with.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL.,
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as spam is
entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is
constitutional. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since

Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect,
Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes similar means
for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime
law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it
certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted.
The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes aiding or abetting libel on
the cyberspace is a nullity. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression,
especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as
libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section
5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P.
Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19
of RA 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2)
prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the aforementioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of
the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information
Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National
Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the
petitioners constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression,
due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as
the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation
of legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure;
o Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the
liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws
are in violation of the petitioners right against Double Jeopardy;

o Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and

the PNP with due cause to engage in real time collection of
traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge,
violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to
the privacy of communications;
o Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the
Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any
content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the
law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority,
infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the
Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to due process and
freedom of expression; and
o Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to
Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4
years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years,
infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also
restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima
facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order
directed at service providers to block access to the said material
without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175
infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also
restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus
the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed
from access, work together as a chilling effect upon protected
speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and
that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SCs judicial power
under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to
Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based
libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions
penalized separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the
imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period. Such
changes will result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of
speech;
o with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto
IIIs earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers
and internet users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of
online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive
Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA
10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from

posting social commentaries online, thus creating a chilling

effect upon the freedom of expression;
o gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block
access to content whether authored by private citizens or the
organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a
mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article
constitutes online libel;
o respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will
fare under strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double
Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o Persons who commit crimes using information and
communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being
imprisoned more than double the imprisonment laid down in the
RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
o the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the
Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and
special laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be
punished twice for the same offense in violation of the
Constitution;
o Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes by,
through or with the use of ICTs in violation of the equal
protection clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy
and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
o No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of
data; the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and
the National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not
bounded by any reasonable standard except due cause which
presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
o While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human
Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of
Appeals before surveillance operations are conducted, the
privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial
participation in the Cybercrime Act;
o Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion
into the right to privacy;
o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can
lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
o No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion
into the privacy of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretarys Take Down Authority under Section 19
of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation
of Legislative Authority
o The DOJ Secretarys overwhelming powers to order the
restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere
prima facie finding without any need for a judicial determination

is in clear violation of petitioners Constitutionally protected right

to due process;
o The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ
Secretary will be judge, jury and executioner of all cybercrimerelated complaints;
o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are
cybercrimes under Section 6, it follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may
be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block
access to websites and content upon a mere prima
facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to
Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail
Trade Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked
from offering voice services without securing a license from
the National Telecommunications Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the
IP Code.
o The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court
in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to
determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Acts declaration of policy does
it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the
blocking of content. No limits upon the takedown power of
the respondent DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ
Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming
the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7,
12 and 19 of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12
and 19 of RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections
4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional
most provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law,
including online libel subject to one condition.
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the
state the power to take down online content without a court warrant.

7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and

government control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of
Republic Act 10175 a little over a year afteroral arguments were heard
on Jan 15, 2013.
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the
law's provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario
for SC cybercime ruling')
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled
online libel to be constitutional but with an exception that is, in cases
where it covers persons other than the original author. Recipients of,
and netizens who react to a potentially defamatory post, will not be
covered by online libel.

Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial
communications
Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer
data
The SC decided that Section 19 granting power to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially
observed evidence was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said
automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before
the SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because
it permits a form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial
determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause
to collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real
time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial
electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited" unless
certain conditions such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient are
met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows
the rest of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain
provisions are held invalid.
Nuances in other provisions
Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but
they will not apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these

provisions is online libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author

is concerned.
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a
cybercrime and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared
unconstitutional only in the following cases: child pornography, unsolicited
commercial communications (or spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply
to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald
Aguto explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement
and the prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."
Aiding a
nd abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added,
might unduly cover certain players in the online industry.
Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other
laws, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel
and child pornography.
The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being
punished more than once for the same offense a guarantee outlined in the
Constitution in deciding on Section 7.
Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child
pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once,
under the coverage of a single law.
10.
RA No. 10586 ANTI DRUNK OR DRUGGED DRIVING LAW
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10586)
DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS IS NOW A
CRIME.
Republic Act No. 10586 was recently signed into law. This law makes it
unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances. (So, somebody
who is drunk or drugged and rides his bicycle through the streets is not
liable under this law. This seems to be true even if he be the cause of a
vehicular accident!)
It appears that the law does not require any specific level of alcohol
intoxication one has to be under in order that he can be held liable for
driving while in the influence of liquor.
Under this law, law enforcement officers are authorized to conduct field
sobriety test (Field sobriety tests refer to standardized tests to initially
assess and determine intoxication, such as the horizontal gaze nystagmus,
the walk-and-turn, the one-leg stand, and other similar tests as determined
jointly by the DOH, the NAPOLCOM and the DOTC) when he has probable
cause to believe that the driver is under the influence of alcohol, dangerous
drugs and/or other similar substances by apparent indications and
manifestations, including overspeeding, weaving, lane straddling, sudden
stops, swerving, poor coordination or the evident smell of alcohol in a

persons breath or signs of use of dangerous drugs and other similar

substances. If the driver fails in the sobriety tests, it shall be the duty of the
law enforcement officer to implement the mandatory determination of the
drivers blood alcohol concentration level through the use of a breath
analyzer or similar measuring instrument. If the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that a person is driving under the influence of
dangerous drugs and/or other similar substances, it shall be the duty of the
law enforcement officer to bring the driver to the nearest police station to be
subjected to a drug screening test and, if necessary, a drug confirmatory test
as mandated under Republic Act No. 9165.
Refusal to subject oneself to undergo the mandatory field sobriety test and
drug test is likewise punishable by confiscation and automatic revocation of
his or her drivers license, in addition to other penalties.
Another remarkable provision of the law is the direct and principal liability of
the owner or operator of the vehicle together with offending driver. However,
this solidary liability of the vehicle owner or operator is limited only on the
penalty of fine and damages. The penalty of imprisonment can be imposed
only against the offending driver. The only defense the vehicle owner or
operator can set up his exercise of extraordinary diligence in the selection
and supervision of his or her drivers in general and the offending driver in
particular. The law merely provides that this solidary liability
shall principally (not exclusively) apply to the owners and/or operators of
public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles such as delivery vans, cargo
trucks, container trucks, school and company buses, hotel transports, cars or
vans for rent, taxi cabs, and the like. Thus, textually, the law does not
exclude from this solidary liability, the owners of private vehicles.
The penalties for violation of the law are as follows:
SEC. 12. Penalties. A driver found to have been driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, dangerous drugs and/or other similar
substances, as provided for under Section 5 of this Act, shall be penalized as
follows:
(a) If the violation of Section 5 did not result in physical injuries or homicide,
the penalty of three (3) months imprisonment, and a fine ranging from
Twenty thousand pesos (Php20,000.00) to Eighty thousand pesos
(Php80,000.00) shall be imposed;
(b) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in physical injuries, the penalty
provided in Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code or the penalty provided in
the next preceding subparagraph, whichever is higher, and a fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) to Two hundred
thousand pesos (Php200,000.00) shall be imposed;
(c) If the violation of Section 5 resulted in homicide, the penalty provided in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and a fine ranging from Three hundred

thousand pesos (Php300,000.00) to

(Php500,000.00) shall be imposed; and

Five

hundred

thousand

pesos

(d) The nonprofessional drivers license of any person found to have violated
Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and suspended for a period of
twelve (12) months for the first conviction and perpetually revoked for the
second conviction. The professional drivers license of any person found to
have violated Section 5 of this Act shall also be confiscated and perpetually
revoked for the first conviction. The perpetual revocation of a drivers license
shall disqualify the person from being granted any kind of drivers license
thereafter.
The prosecution for any violation of this Act shall be without prejudice to
criminal prosecution for violation of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No.
9165 and other special laws and existing local ordinances, whenever
applicable.
Let us all drive sanely and responsibly! (Even if you drive a bicycle or
something else.)
- See more at: http://philjurislaw.blogspot.com/2013/06/anti-drunk-or-drugged-drivinglaw.html#sthash.6gEsM8zQ.dpuf