EN BANC

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ,

Complainant,
-

A.C. No. 6697

versus -

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD
S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF
THE
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THEPHILIPPINES

Bar Matter No. 1227

x-------------------------x
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM
THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
GOVERNOR
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTERCOMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE
VERA
DATEDMAY
18,
2005 TO
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE
IBP
RESOLUTION
UNJUSTLY,
ILLEGALLY,
ARBITRARILY,
AND
ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP
FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND
FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE
PROCESS.

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C. J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO JJ.
Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de
Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to
remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letterrequest to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case
concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP
Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP
for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an
investigation,

report and

recommendation

on subject

case, [1] summarized the

antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio
Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:
1)
2)

respondents alleged misrepresentation in

concealing the suspension order rendered against
him by the State Bar of California; and
respondents alleged violation of the so-called
rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No.
491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his

own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act
constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing
Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case
No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced
to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to
evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted
that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the
countrys most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the
so-called rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when
he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the
respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws
pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the
respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the
next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be
enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated
that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues
raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its
Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res
judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar
Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective
allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant
maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral
baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his
disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that
he used his clients money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed
to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the
latters resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that
this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would
not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case
filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request
to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general. [2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the
regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said
meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the
withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question
the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in
the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees. [3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of
the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by
the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a
copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for
oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated
with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. [6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention at
the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where
Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in
connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty.
de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz
a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board
for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront
Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as
member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. [10] Quoted
hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a
member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1.
For making untruthful statements, innuendos
and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held
at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April
2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of

Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et
al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A
Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and
pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2.
For making said untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and
disrepute;
3.
For violating Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others, by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the
IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4.
For instigating and provoking some IBP
chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue
the aforesaidPETITION;
5.
For falsely accusing the IBP National President,
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the
10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from
him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby
creating the wrong impression that the IBP National
President deliberately prevented him from taking the
appropriate
remedies with
respect thereto, thus
compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National
President and the IBP as a whole.[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the
then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to
Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the
Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the

Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de

Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice
and Judgment Without Formal Investigation. [12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified lettercomplaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste,
without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due
process.Pertinent portions of his letter read:
It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and
serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive
Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as
National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the
Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1.

The denial of the right to answer the

charges formally or in writing. The complaint against
me was in writing.

2.

The denial of the right to answer the charges

within a reasonable period of time after receipt of
the complaint.

3.

The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4.

The denial of the right to confront the

accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged
Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question
him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I
could be questioned. My request was denied.

5.

The denial of my right to present witnesses

on my behalf.

6.

The denial of my right to an impartial

judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.

7.

Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes

even more evident because when his motion to expel
me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to
vote), Gov. Rivera asked foranother round of
voting so he can vote to support his own complaint
and motion to expel me.[13] (Emphasis and
underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de
Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to
remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself
from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board
were the following:
(i)

Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign

and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP
Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all
with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of
Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.

(ii)

Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP

Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or
during the Plenary Session at the 10 th National Convention of
Lawyers.

(iii)

Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at

the plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and
went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the
IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to
provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him
in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.

(iv)

Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and

blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of
Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,
nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo
sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors

approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence

or pressure from the Supreme Court.[15]

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session
was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest
of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and
a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from
the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a
special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005,
the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by
Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was
formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.
[18]

On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a

letter addressed to the IBP Board. [19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular
meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente
B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to

Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election. [20] IBP National
President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be
approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty.
de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from

the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. [21] Also on 28
June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]

In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that
there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from
the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal
as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his
removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious
charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio
Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their
language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and
the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with
the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid
cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and
the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right
to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy
of this Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality
of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As
regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election
was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national
officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive
Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1

following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until
their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions
and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the
event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive
Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of
the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both
the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors
shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of
the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and
employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall
hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may
fix.[24]

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and
the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for
the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was
made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express
provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his
replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due
to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its
counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i)

The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power

and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of
Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii)

Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and

as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards
position but because of the various acts that he committed which the

IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP
as a whole;
(iii)

Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking

his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the
Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others;

(iv)

The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera,

observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records
would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of
the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of
Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting;
was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed
to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v)

Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required

number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove
Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was
duly complied with;

(vi)

Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from

Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under
Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been
complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao,
was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced
if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or
viable; and, finally, that

(vii)

Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should
now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President. [25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following

issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA

(sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED
TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO
ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the
fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the
present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment
against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1)
2)

respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing

the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar
in California; and
respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation
rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an

earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues

were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December
2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of
his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in
turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the
position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no
final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge,
as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the
complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not
considered by the investigating officer. xxx
On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator
and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We
find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who
alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case,
the petitioners have not shown how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run
for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is
disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern
Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the

national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP

membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of
Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws
that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of
the chapter where his place of residence or work is located.
He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where
he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not
register his preference that he will become a member of the
Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office.
The only proscription in registering one's preference is that a
lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the
same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In
fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is
allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that
the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to
the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer
wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the
transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary
Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z.
Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty.
Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter,
informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising
them to make the necessary notation in their respective
records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note
that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime
between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27
February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers

were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as

mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall
be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de
Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months
ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco
(Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared
that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasijudicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts]
administrative powers.
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from
service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for
surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale
fromP3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no
longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that
while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings
are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first
case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel
under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case,
he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res
judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty.
Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter
No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it
would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize
respondent judge a second time for an act which he had
already answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs.
Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes
(Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court
held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment,

the present administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated
by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have
been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any
subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity,
has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate
it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again
the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the
same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.Equally
important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule
of law.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by
the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier
administrative case. The complainants contention that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case
was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is
one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is
worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither
the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely
sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In
Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From
Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and
promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case

No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No.
6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are
not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential
conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or
order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity
of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. [29] In the absence of
any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of
Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern
Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to
practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de
Veras alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present
administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of
lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor
forEastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his
Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or
disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We

held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor
as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm
ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper
parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the
complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the
candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on
the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP Bylaws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera
cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of
the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We
held in that case that
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one
must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is
so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and
elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude. [30]

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in
a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be
able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but
must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer
concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his
petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior
judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not
Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the
evidence submitted by complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the
State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of
Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, [31] we were confronted with the question of whether or
not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction,
can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in
the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera
who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California,
U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said
jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension
or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of
suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case
could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino

lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds

for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a

Filipino

lawyer

may

transmute

into

similar

judgment

of

suspension

in

the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of
the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained

that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak

of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant
must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the

hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts
are likewise unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on
the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by
a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [34] The
statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as

a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent
power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. [35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed

by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice.
[36]

That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a

profession, not a business.[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical

code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. [38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1.

An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar
of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis
(father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because
the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds
in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case
which he then deposited to his personal account; [39]

2.

The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty.
de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years; [40] and

3.

Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him
authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider
this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.
By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use
the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own
personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters
memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that
he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account
and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes. [42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. [43] It means such evidence which affords a substantial
basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. [44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this,
thus:
CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature.
Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended
for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to
hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon
of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for
his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should
not underany circumstances be commingled with his own or
be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or
property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and
in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in
gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction
may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients
money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission

constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera

now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to
use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had
restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative
case against him in the State Bar of California. [46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in

the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder
Willis had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few
days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document
containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the
elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an
acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds,
which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such
character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the
latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that

Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his
own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He
caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he
belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence.[48] Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [49] Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension

from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal
account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;
[52]

Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year suspension

each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00,
and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters
permission.In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the
amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here
US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where
the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for
his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay,
Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming
IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of
Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another
IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the
same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the
transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter
election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot
be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly
argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see
anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will
produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for
the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do
not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from
doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the
following issues must be addressed:
I.

Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of

discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13
May 2005.

i.
Whether the IBP Board of Governors
complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii.
Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for
just and valid cause.
II.

Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25

June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its

removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with
the power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP
By-Laws, which states:
Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should
determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or
otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the
Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may
declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be
removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from
Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by
two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever
cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a
successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned
governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of
the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for
cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on
procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of
due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the
right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present
witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he
was not able to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty.
Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser,
prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty.
Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be
mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his
own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary
session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary
or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de
Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the
charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of
the complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein
the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the
opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property
within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over
said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of
governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the
board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in
administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain ones side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of
law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very
nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a
specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement. [57] The phrase
is so elusive of exact apprehension, [58] because it depends on circumstances and varies
with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. [59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial
in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure
and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had
before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be
raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is
required for hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. [61] Nor is an
actual hearing always essential [62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where
the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause
for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that
he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that
Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made
by Atty. Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of
the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he
voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty.
de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de
Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed
for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The
reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to

be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys.
Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven
remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for
expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for
expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP
Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the
removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws
albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority
to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his
disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the
IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the
Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to
remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision
to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is
not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental
objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find
that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not

animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP
since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the
conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression
that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak
for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBPs
prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the

governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when
internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting
and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have
been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless,
once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting
minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected
to the governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall
govern in matters within the authority of the board. [63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the
latters actuations during the 10 th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of
the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the
bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the
Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as
well as improve the administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements
are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision
to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the
Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant
his removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of
Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of
the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the
administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP
By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and
functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern
relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its
day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has
been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. [65] The
Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the
majority.The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on
the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions
and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable
presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the
absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or
in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to
overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article VI, Section 44 [67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether
the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera
from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein,
Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the
IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-

Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no
reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as
IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority
granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 20032005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post
resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely
internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without
violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board
Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there
was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority
to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of
Section 8 of the Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal
of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72] and
Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of
Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the
situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will
assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and
prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47,

which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next
succeeding term.The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the
EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term
(i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano
Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve
the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP,

and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come
from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII,
Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen
by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter
491, wherein we ruled:
ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive VicePresident elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors
of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec.
47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency

upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this
Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as
it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive VicePresident shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The
incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President
from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President
shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions .One who has served
as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the
nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall
begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually
rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency
is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency.
Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the
automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the
Presidency is but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the
election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already
produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the
supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it
impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the
rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the
IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the
spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony
with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition
seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent
matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership
consolidation period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President
on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the
eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further
underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP
Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members
at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position
in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic
succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing
the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors,
the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case,
Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption
of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession
rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the
House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal
of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of

office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would
not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the
IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable
to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar
exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the
IBP

national

presidency

should

be

assumed

by

nominee

from Eastern

Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the
intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of
experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a
national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the
IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the
leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been
no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:
1)

SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the

practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the
personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2)

DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated

18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval
of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts
as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without
grave abuse of discretion;

3)

AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose

Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005,
such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4)

DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his

oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the
automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP ByLaws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
G.R. No. 1203

May 15, 1903

In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law.
Solicitor-General Araneta for Government.
W. A. Kincaid for defendant.
PER CURIAM:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First
Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be
suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he
had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the
law then in force in said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and
after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the
purpose of evading the law.
The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made
answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After
reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs.
H. D. Terrell,1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits
in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that
the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made
an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and
directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of
suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based.
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they
were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge
and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes"
Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of
violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of
an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his
office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or
the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United
States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been
convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while
unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of
opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D.
Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the
7th day of February, 1903.
It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of
law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

[G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO,
HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered
case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al.
The Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable
Court disqualify themselves from hearing and deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set
aside; and
3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending
before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the
members of the Supreme Court from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from participating in any
partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated
by attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail
the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court
in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent
mockery of justice and due process.
Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus
Motion on 19 May 2003, before the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of
counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officioand that, being the now counsel de
parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No.

26565 and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the
foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the
court several portions of the book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice
Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9 June 2003,
petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of
the statements contained in Justice Artemio Panganibans book,
REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to the prejudgment
committed by the Supreme Court justices against President
Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452
and 356 SCRA 108; and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice
Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio, Justice Renato
Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of National
Defense, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify
and bring whatever supporting documents they may have in
relation to their direct and indirect participation in the proclamation
of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as
cited in the book of Justice Panganiban, including the material
events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada
vs. Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner
pertains to what he claims should have been included in the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan; viz:
The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the
TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President
on the ground of permanent disability even without proof of
compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g.,
written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet;
and

c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of

permanent disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which
are obviously undeniable. Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition,
Rollo, pp. 13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as
well as the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to Attorney Paguia, during the
hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against
his client. Thus, he averred, Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly
employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman
kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the
motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition
thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would
result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitude of
the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their
disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e.,
the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito
Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo
2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners
motion for disqualification of 14 July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby
DENIES the Motion for Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross
insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no
grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to the
extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of
the members of this tribunal and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now
before it to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He denounces the

decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula went on
to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the
public officer, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of
the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the act of the justices, if
UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or
trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of the
Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem
absurd to allow the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their
UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness
or unsoundness, of a decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such
reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed.
(In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question
pertaining to the legality of the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the
issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the
presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long
dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within
the judicial forum; indeed, he has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast
and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a
member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have
stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the
administration of justice.
It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the
Supreme Court. In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he has demanded, in a
clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters
pending before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has
strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from
further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.

But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia
appears to persist on end.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby
orders Attorney Alan Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW
CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should not be sanctioned for
conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause
order. In a three-page pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance,
repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly
quoted to give some semblance of validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its
members, provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to
avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in
other partisan political activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities;
the law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons
for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a
candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or
oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The
assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different
from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of
the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by
anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the
task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of
our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by
it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer
should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and,
indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and
devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members
of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and
pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule
13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar
from making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public
opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring
the Courts well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to
say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due
process of law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and
void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it
appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and
his fellow justices had already committed to the other party - GMA - with a
judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the

proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the

unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to
become mindful of his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and
an officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts of the land through the Office of the
Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

[A.C. No. 4497. September 26, 2001]

MR. and MRS. VENUSTIANO G. SABURNIDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FLORANTE
E. MADROO,[1] respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is the administrative complaint [2] for disbarment of respondent,
Atty. Florante E. Madroo, filed by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia
Saburnido. Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police
stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school
teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, BalingasagLagonglong, Misamis Oriental.

Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three separate

administrative cases against respondent.
In A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,[3] complainant Venustiano Saburnido filed charges of
grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary against
respondent. Respondent was therein found guilty of pointing a high-powered firearm at
complainant, who was unarmed at the time, during a heated altercation. Respondent
was accordingly dismissed from the service with prejudice to reemployment in
government but without forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Respondent was again administratively charged in the consolidated cases
of Sealana-Abbu v. Judge Madrono, A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC and Sps. Saburnido v.
Judge Madrono, A.M. No. MTJ-90-486.[4] In the first case, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Florencia Sealana-Abbu charged that respondent granted and reduced bail
in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution. In the second case, the
spouses Saburnido charged that respondent, in whose court certain confiscated
smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the goods but did not
issue the corresponding memorandum receipts. Some of the goods were lost while
others were substituted with damaged goods. Respondent was found guilty of both
charges and his retirement benefits were forfeited.
In the present case, the spouses Saburnido allege that respondent has been
harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them, namely:
1. Adm. Case No. 90-0755,[5] for serious irregularity, filed by respondent against
Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent claimed that Venustiano lent his service firearm to
an acquaintance who thereafter extorted money from public jeepney drivers while
posing as a member of the then Constabulary Highway Patrol Group.
2. Adm. Case No. 90-0758,[6] for falsification, filed by respondent against Venustiano
Saburnido and two others. Respondent averred that Venustiano, with the help of his corespondents in the case, inserted an entry in the police blotter regarding the loss of
Venustianos firearm.
3. Crim. Case No. 93-67, [7] for evasion through negligence under Article 224 of the
Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent against Venustiano Saburnido. Respondent
alleged that Venustiano Saburnido, without permission from his superior, took into
custody a prisoner by final judgment who thereafter escaped.
4. Adm. Case No. 95-33,[8] filed by respondent against Rosalia Saburnido for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Respondent alleged that Rosalia Saburnido

served as chairperson of the Board of Election Inspectors during the 1995 elections
despite being related to a candidate for barangay councilor.
At the time the present complaint was filed, the three actions filed against
Venustiano Saburnido had been dismissed while the case against Rosalia Saburnido
was still pending.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation,
since they had earlier filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his
dismissal from the judiciary. Complainants assert that due to the complaints filed against
them, they suffered much moral, mental, physical, and financial damage. They claim
that their children had to stop going to school since the family funds were used up in
attending to their cases.
For his part, respondent contends that the grounds mentioned in the administrative
cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not constitute moral
turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor.He then argues that none of the
complaints he filed against complainants was manufactured. He adds that he was so
unlucky that Saburnido was not convicted.[9] He claims that the complaint for serious
irregularity against Venustiano Saburnido was dismissed only because the latter was
able to antedate an entry in the police blotter stating that his service firearm was
lost. He also points out that Venustiano was suspended when a prisoner escaped
during his watch. As for his complaint against Rosalia Saburnido, respondent contends
that by mentioning this case in the present complaint, Rosalia wants to deprive him of
his right to call the attention of the proper authorities to a violation of the Election Code.
In their reply, complainants reiterate their charge that the cases against them were
meant only to harass them. In addition, Rosalia Saburnido stressed that she served in
the BEI in 1995 only because the supposed chairperson was indisposed. She stated
that she told the other BEI members and the pollwatchers that she was related to one
candidate and that she would desist from serving if anyone objected. Since nobody
objected, she proceeded to dispense her duties as BEI chairperson. She added that her
relative lost in that election while respondents son won.
In a resolution dated May 22, 1996, [10] we referred this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that
respondent and his counsel failed to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the
case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus, respondent was considered to

have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither did
respondent submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants
submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross
misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction. The IBP recommends
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity,
that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. [11] Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, in Rule 7.03, the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein complainants
reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act evinces
vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual,
as complainants were instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see
in respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is
trying to exact revenge.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal
profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be suspended, following
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. -A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. xxx

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension

from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline respondent.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
[12]
While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. [13] In this case, we find
suspension to be a sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is
not primarily intended as a punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.[14]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroo is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Respondents suspension is effective upon his receipt of notice of this
decision. Let notice of this decision be spread in respondents record as an attorney in
this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment [1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims. [4] To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a
loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for
gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule
138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into

complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR
provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES

SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY

ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice,
a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which
provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)
[17]

as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence [19] (consisting of the sworn statements of

the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove
that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later

admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless

seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos
connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing

fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity
to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause. [24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the

prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere
reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a)

lawyers name;

(b)

name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c)

address;

(d)

telephone number and

(e)

special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change

counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of
the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one yeareffective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI,respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would
indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent
had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with
the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste,
the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned
detachment accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of
Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a
fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone,
gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities
and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding,
fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private
respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the
house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife
and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan.
In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his
salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as
well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of
full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of
employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the
NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as
the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of
the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether

the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with
the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12,
1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive
Labor Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the
action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the
Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed
by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the
only heir against his own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were
noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had
with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son
relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work,
they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want
of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner

for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in
the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up
his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and
accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and
evidence submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985,
and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually
decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,
ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private
respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The
strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid
bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an
employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the

trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the
corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by
reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is
prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his
services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is
well-settled that abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to
effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October
1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work
because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the
medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc.,
Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills
sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 4950).

During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod
City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat
and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a
manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day
inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness
and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence
from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any
event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice
and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee
are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the
employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the
Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of
the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC(184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. .
. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to
work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his
residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained

family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail
health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J")
informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for
illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are
indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment.
Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of
health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and
even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The
disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the
point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of which were
amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for
petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal
to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I
assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could
do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be
subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is
essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and,
while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved
to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during
the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from
illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by
private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the
control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer
of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic
rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residenceper se be a valid ground to terminate an
employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
the payroll, reported him as an employee of thehacienda for social security purposes,
and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end
of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that
petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have
abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee.
According to private respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner
from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were
made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped
giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had
been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on
the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the
agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm
legally converts the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from
May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and
legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since
April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to
resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With

these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are
designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he
was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly
be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment
from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and
machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip
Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for
crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private
respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request
or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however,
considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and
monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to
just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be
trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms,
specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed
petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner
to concern himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would

then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority
an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to
perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of
Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a
sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited plantermember of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to
(sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in
my name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign
for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll
for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the
same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED
CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for
an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such
deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private
respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on
the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative
Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties
must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's
entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as
farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips
or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative
of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of
concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that
can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are
also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination
by the employee of his employment 38does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private

respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice
and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in
this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was
petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set
out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this
wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of
abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known
address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period
from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. Any decision taken by the employer
shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity
or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of
the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. The employer shall submit a monthly
report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at
all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the

names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates
of commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held
by them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin
requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that
no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification
issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department
of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted
thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as
the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance.
While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure,
the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not work to
invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for
dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be
imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the

notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC,

G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex
"C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the
rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must
be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case,
however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment
because he has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed
employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the
penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process
requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in
imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the
employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required
under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules, and not the
failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of actual reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the
practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there
are strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages
and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly
when managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and
just share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to
wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his
backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to
the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But
in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this
Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences
should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The
Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers
cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC
should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen.
It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers with the same
ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been
terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in
case of antipathy or antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC,
188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated
as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and
peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary
damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They
are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad
faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel,
however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even
if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of
illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed
employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring
employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and
the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in
good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For
this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be
modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because
petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does
not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private
respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered
to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of
dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a
fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with

recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for
damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just
as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we
reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it
whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon
less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should
be a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was
expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do
not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement
between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not
but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally
hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within
his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious
records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family
leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and
enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that
we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sanssentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to
this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to
the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the
parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that

with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this
decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their
differences on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975

VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for
more than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit
against Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain
machineries (civil case 27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed,
and on June 30, 1961 this Court, in Ago vs. Castaeda, L-14066, affirmed the
judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for
the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of execution but his motion was denied,
and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in Quezon City. The sheriff then
advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago moved to stop the auction

sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January 31,1966 this
Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice
attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and
the sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the
petitioners Castaeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the
sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castaeda and Henson.
Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to
the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his
co-plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q7986) to annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon
which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal
obligation, and that Lourdes Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house
and lots which were levied upon and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for
the satisfaction of the judgment. They alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was
not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of execution
was issued only against husband Pastor, and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her
husband's venture in the logging business which failed and resulted in the replevin suit
and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon
City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents'
certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ
of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be
done, the Quezon City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter
court lifted the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds
of Quezon City cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in
favor of the petitioners. But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted
as the Quezon City court again issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted
but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967 the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the
restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was
being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for
a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession.
This Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June

3, 1966; reconsideration was denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on
August 2, 1966 a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court (L27140).1wph1.t We dismissed the petition in a minute resolution on February 8,
1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The
said court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After
hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ
of possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q7986 on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to
costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castaeda and Henson filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a coequal court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which
issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court,
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had
previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is
the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al., 1 where the wife was a party in one case and
the husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was
upheld, the petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin
judgment against her husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable.
The case invoked is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were
admittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the
present case, the Agos deny that their conjugal partnership benefited from the
husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property

is adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously
wrong, for, besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his
business that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction
sale made by the sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is
not that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely
determined, but that the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution,
a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former,
unless in the interval between the judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of
possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. The ruling
in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present case, for, here, there has been no
change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the
writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was issued, and even up
to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife
is normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4)
her husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction
in 1963; (6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to
restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed
of final sale on April 17, 1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly
admitted that the conjugal properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his
family house and lot" in his efforts to prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2,
1964 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon
the issue that the wife's share in the properties cannot be levied upon on the ground
that she was not a party to the logging business and not a party to the replevin suit. The
spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the various proceedings
hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.

(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the onehalf share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is
not in esse, but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither
legal nor equitable estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and
settlement there appears to be assets of the community. 3 The decision sets at naught
the well-settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and
which may never arise. 4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its
enforcement. The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house 5 which is
conjugal property. By the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from
the house, but the decision under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now,
which part of the house would be vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes
continue to stay in? The absurdity does not stop here; the decision would actually
separate husband and wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their
conjugal properties during coverture and before the dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment,
to the extended prejudice of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of the
judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme
Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have
tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator
for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his
client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do

not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent

futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case.
If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable. 7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other
than to seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case
below which might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we
have motu proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the
present case). We find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the
merits has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castaedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the
plaintiffs Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new partiesdefendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit
an amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new partydefendant (no action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint;
and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension
to the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint
and amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder
stated. The Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal
properties of the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was
personal only to Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which

resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
The issue here, which is whether or not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal
property is leviable, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as barred by
laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary
injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before quoted. This ruling applies
as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the
Castaedas and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took
possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their
damage in the sum of P256,000 up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to
state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or
illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties
was irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castaeda
spouses to pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the
properties at the auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of
the certificates of title a mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718
where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of
P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and because of said acts, the Agos suffered
P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment
of the purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment
creditor, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if
it does not exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castaedas
but did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to
the Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of
the judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is
moreover barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause

of action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are
baseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castaedas aver that the action was
unfounded and as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services
of counsel for not less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary
injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the
Castaedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 17,
1964, the value of such deprived use being 20% annually of their actual value; and that
the filing of the unfounded action besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of
which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in
conspiracy and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs,
caused the registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage,
the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question;
that the purchasers acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged
the two other parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the
defendants' lawyer and his wife also mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal
Commercial Bank; and that the bank also acted in bad faith.
The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by
the defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental
complaint, which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage
and prejudice to the plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two
parcels of land they had previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in
bad faith, while Venancio Castaeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other
parcels to Juan Quijano (60%) and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith
and with knowledge that the properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint
Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the
cause of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original
complaint, for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership
and possession of the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered
into by the Castaedas and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The
reverse is also true: if the sheriff's levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the
conjugal properties could not be levied upon, then the transactions would perhaps
prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that the issue in the first cause of
action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must therefore follow that the
first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental
complaint is also barred.
For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil
case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent
action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago,
which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be
made a part of the personal file of Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.