1. The case involved a dispute over attorney's fees between clients Edmundo and Elnora Cortes and their lawyer Felix Moya arising from a civil case involving the sale of the clients' land. 2. The clients and lawyer had agreed in open court to settle on P100k in attorney's fees, but the clients later contested paying this, claiming financial difficulties. 3. The Supreme Court ruled that the P100k award was not proper, and that attorney's fees should be determined based on quantum meruit, meaning the reasonable value of the lawyer's services.
1. The case involved a dispute over attorney's fees between clients Edmundo and Elnora Cortes and their lawyer Felix Moya arising from a civil case involving the sale of the clients' land. 2. The clients and lawyer had agreed in open court to settle on P100k in attorney's fees, but the clients later contested paying this, claiming financial difficulties. 3. The Supreme Court ruled that the P100k award was not proper, and that attorney's fees should be determined based on quantum meruit, meaning the reasonable value of the lawyer's services.
1. The case involved a dispute over attorney's fees between clients Edmundo and Elnora Cortes and their lawyer Felix Moya arising from a civil case involving the sale of the clients' land. 2. The clients and lawyer had agreed in open court to settle on P100k in attorney's fees, but the clients later contested paying this, claiming financial difficulties. 3. The Supreme Court ruled that the P100k award was not proper, and that attorney's fees should be determined based on quantum meruit, meaning the reasonable value of the lawyer's services.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden & Ruby Lim vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005 B. FACTS Robeto Reyes known as Amay Bisaya saw in a hotel lobby his friend Dr. Violeta Filart who he said to have invite him the party of the hotels outgoing manager. So Reyes carried the fruit basket of Filart to the penthuse where the party is. However, Ruby Lim, the coordinator of the party asked him to leave since it is an exclusive party and he is not one of those invited. Reyes did not leave the party as was instructed but created a scene, thereby he was escorted out. He sued the hotel and Ruby Lim for damages. C. ISSUES Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becomes liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. D. RULING OF THE COURT The Supreme Court ruled that Ruby Lim did not act abusively in asking Roberto Reyes in leaving the party to which he is not invited. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them, had plaintiff simply left the party as requested; there was no need for the police to take him out. Article 19 involves a legal wrong committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. Under the above mentioned articles the act must be intentional. Absent such intention and as the Court observed the conduct of Lim of asking Reyes to leave was in an exemplary manner, there can be no damages to be awarded. Any damage suffered by Reyes must be borne by him alone.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
PHIL. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP. V. GLOBE TELECOM, INC. G.R. No. 147324, May 25, 2004 B. FACTS Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe), had been engaged in the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for the military bases of the US in Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Philcomsat and Globe entered into an Agreement whereby Philcomsat obligated itself to establish, operate and provide an IBS Standard B earth station (earth station) within Cubi Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA. The term of the contract was for 60 months, or 5 years. In turn, Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved. At the time of the execution of the Agreement, both parties knew that the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which was the basis for the occupancy of the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point, was to expire in 1991. Subsequently, Philcomsat installed and established the earth station at Cubi Point and the USDCA made use of the same Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station in view of the withdrawal of US military personnel from Subic Naval Base after the termination of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. Globe invoked as basis for the letter of termination Section 8 (Default) of the Agreement, which provides: Neither party shall be held liable or deemed to be in default for any failure to perform its obligation under this Agreement if such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or fortuitous event. Either party is thus precluded from performing its obligation until such force majeure or fortuitous event shall terminate. For the purpose of this paragraph, force majeure shall mean circumstances beyond the control of the party involved including, but not limited to, any law, order, regulation, direction or request of the Government of the Philippines, strikes or other labor difficulties, insurrection riots, national emergencies, war, acts of public enemies, fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God. Philcomsat sent a reply letter, stating that "we expect [Globe] to know its commitment to pay the stipulated rentals for the remaining terms of the Agreement even after [Globe] shall have discontinue[d] the use of the earth station after November 08, 1992," citing Section 7 of the Agreement. After the US military forces left Subic Naval Base, Philcomsat demanded payment from Globe of its outstanding obligations under the Agreement. However, Globe refused to heed Philcomsats demand. Philcomsat filed a Complaint against Globe, praying that the latter be ordered to pay liquidated damages under the Agreement, with legal interest, exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. C. ISSUES WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMINATION OF THE RP-US MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT WAS A FORTUITOUS EVENT? D. RULING OF THE COURT YES. There is no merit is Philcomsats argument that Section 8 of the Agreement cannot be given effect because the enumeration of events constituting force majeure therein unduly expands the concept of a fortuitous event under Article 1174 of the Civil Code and is therefore invalid. In support of its position, Philcomsat contends that under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, an event must be unforeseen in order to exempt a party to a contract from complying with its obligations therein. It insists that since the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the nonratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security and the withdrawal of US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point were not unforeseeable, but were possibilities known to it and Globe at the time they entered into the Agreement, such events cannot exempt Globe from performing its obligation of paying rentals for the entire five-year term thereof. From the foregoing, the Court finds that the defendant is exempted from paying the rentals for the facility for the remaining term of the contract. Moreover, it would be unjust to require Globe to continue paying rentals even though Philcomsat cannot be compelled to perform its corresponding obligation under the Agreement.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
ELNORA R. CORTES V. C.A. & F. S. MGT AND DEVT CORP. G.R. No. 121772. January 13, 2003 B. FACTS The controversy stemmed from a civil case for specific performance with damages filed by F.S. Management and Development Corporation (FSMDC) against spouses Edmundo and Elnora Cortes involving the sale of the parcel of land owned by the said spouses. Spouses Cortes retained the professional services of Atty. Felix Moya. However, they did not agree on the amount of compensation for the services to be rendered by Atty. Moya. Before a full-blown trial could be had, defendants spouses Cortes and plaintiff FSMDC decided to enter into a compromise agreement. Defendants spouses received from plaintiff FSMDC, three checks totaling P2.7M. Thereafter, Atty. Moya filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Attorneys Fees, Etc. praying that he be paid a sum equivalent to 35% of the amount received by the defendants spouses which the latter opposed contending that the amount Atty. Moya seeks to recover is utterly excessive and is not commensurate to the nature, extent and quality of the services he had rendered. Later, the Cortes spouses and Atty. Moya settled their differences by agreeing in open court that the former will pay the latter the amount of P100k as his attorneys fees. About six months after the compromise, Atty. Moya filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation praying that his Motion to Fix Attorneys Fees be resolved on the basis of the agreement of the parties in chambers. The Cortes spouses filed their Comment claiming: (1) That they agreed to the settlement of P100,000k attorneys fees expecting that the checks paid by FSMDC will be good but it turned out that they were all dishonored, and no compromise agreement was pushed through; (2) That defendants are willing to pay Atty. Moya as additional compensation for his services only in the amount of P50k subject to the condition that same shall be paid after the case is terminated in their favor and/or the property involved is sold; and (3) That defendants shall compensate Atty. Moya said amount in addition to what they have paid before. The trial court issued an Order directing the spouses to pay Atty. Moya the sum of P100,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. C. ISSUES WETHER OR NOT THE P100K AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES WAS PROPER? D. RULING OF THE COURT NO. The reasonableness of the amount of attorneys fees awarded to private respondent should be properly gauged on the basis of the long-standing rule of quantum meruit, meaning, as much as he deserves. Where a lawyer is employed without agreement as to the amount to be paid for his services, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. In the present case, aside from invoking his professional standing, private respondent claims that he was the one responsible in forging the initial compromise agreement wherein FSMDC agreed to pay P2.7M. The fact remains, however, that such agreement was not consummated because the checks given by FSMDC were all dishonored. It was not the private respondent who was responsible in bringing into fruition the subsequent compromise agreement between petitioners and FSMDC. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that private respondent has rendered services as counsel for the petitioners. He prepared petitioners Answer and Pre- Trial Brief, appeared at the Pre-Trial Conference, CIV LAW REVIEW - OBLICON DIGESTS attended a hearing held on July 13, 1990, cross-examined the witness of FSMDC, and was present in the conference at the Manila Hotel between the parties and their respective counsels. All these services were rendered in the years 1990 and 1991 where the value of a peso is higher. Thus, we find the sum of P100,000.00 awarded to private respondent as his attorneys fees to be disproportionate to the services rendered by him to petitioners.The amount of P50,000.00 as compensation for the services rendered by Atty. Moya is just and reasonable. Besides, the imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to private respondent is unwarranted.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
CONCEPCION R. AINZA, substituted by her legal heirs, DR. NATIVIDAD A. TULIAO, CORAZON A. JALECO and LILIA A. OLAYON vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005 B. FACTS Spouses Eugenia and Antonio Padua owned a 216.40 sq. m. lot with an unfinished residential house Thereafter, Concepcion Ainza bought one-half of an undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latters husband, Antonio, for P100,000.00. No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but cash payment was received by the respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through physical delivery to Natividad Tuliao. However, respondents caused the subdivision of the property into three portions and registered it in their names in violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of the title. Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that Concepcion offered to buy 1/3 of the property who gave her small amounts over several years which totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a receipt. C. ISSUES Whether there was a valid contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. D. RULING OF THE COURT There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration. The contract of sale was consummated when both parties fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid Eugenia the price of P100,000.00, as evidenced by the receipt. The verbal contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion did not violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. When a verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, as in this case, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement. However, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of her husband is voidable. It is undisputed that the subject property was conjugal and sold by Eugenia in April 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Thus, the contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion being an oral contract, the action to annul the same must be commenced within six years from the time the right of action accrued. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
HEIRS OF SOFIA QUIRONG, Represented by ROMEO P.QUIRONG, Petitioners, Present:Carpio, J.,Chairperson,-versus- Leonardo-De Castro,Brion,Peralta,* and Abad, JJ. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Respondent. G.R. No. 173441 December 3, 2009 B. FACTS When the late Emilio Dalope died, he left a 589-square meter untitled lot in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, to his wife, Felisa Dalope (Felisa) and their nine children, one of whom was Rosa Dalope-Funcion. To enable Rosa and her husband Antonio Funcion (the Funcions) get a loan from respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Felisa sold the whole lot to the Funcions. With the deed of sale in their favor and the tax declaration transferred in their names, the Funcions mortgaged the lot with the DBP. On February 12, 1979, after the Funcions failed to pay their loan, the DBP foreclosed the mortgage on the lot and consolidated ownership in its name on June 17, 1981.But, because the heirs failed to file a formal offer of evidence, the trial court did not rule on the merits of their claim to the lot and, alternatively, to relief from the DBP. On December 16, 1992 the RTC rendered a decision, declaring the DBPs sale to Sofia Quirong valid only with respect to the shares of Felisa and Rosa Funcion in the property. It declared Felisas sale to the Funcions, the latters mortgage to the DBP, and the latters sale to Sofia Quirong void insofar as they prejudiced the shares of the eight other children of Emilio and Felisa who were each entitled to a tenth share in the subject lot. But the DBP failed to appeal supposedly because of excusable negligence and the withdrawal of its previous counsel of record. On June 14, 2004, after hearing the case, the RTC rendered a decision rescinding the sale between Sofia Quirong and the DBP and ordering the latter to return to the Quirong heirs the P78,000.00 Sofia Quirong paid the bank. On appeal by the DBP, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the heirs action on the ground of prescription. The CA concluded that, reckoned from the finality of the December 16, 1992 decision in Civil Case D-7159, the complaint filed on June 10, 1998 was already barred by the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1389 of the Civil Code. The Quirong heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but the appellate court denied it, thus, this petition. C. ISSUES In the negative, whether or not the heirs of Quirong were entitled to the rescission of the DBPs sale of the subject lot to the late Sofia Quirong as a consequence of her heirs having been evicted from it. D. RULING OF THE COURT With the conclusion that the Court has reached respecting the first issue presented in this case, it would serve no useful purpose for it to further consider the issue of whether or not the heirs of Quirong would have been entitled to the rescission of the DBPs sale of the subject lot to Sofia Quirong as a consequence of her heirs having been evicted from it. As the Court has ruled above, their action was barred by prescription. The CA acted correctly in reversing the RTC decision and dismissing their action. Parenthetically, the Quirong heirs were allowed by the RTC to intervene in the original action for annulment of sale in Civil Case D-7159 that the Dalopes filed against the DBP and the Funcions. Not only did the heirs intervene in defense of the sale, they likewise filed a cross claim against the DBP. And they were apparently heard on their defense and cross claim but the RTC did not adjudicate their claim for the reason that they failed to make a formal offer of their documentary exhibits. Yet, they did not appeal from this omission or from the judgment of the RTC, annulling the DBPs sale of the subject lot to Sofia Quirong. This point is of course entirely academic but it shows that the Quirong heirs have themselves to blame for the loss of whatever right they may have in the case. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the November 30, 2005 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 83897.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners, Present: Puno, C.J.,Carpio,Corona,Carpio Morales,Velasco, Jr.,Nachura,- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,Brion,Peralta,Bersamin,Del Castillo,Abad,Villarama, Jr.,Perez, andMendoza, JJ.CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R.JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBALand PILAR MALCAMPO, Promulgated: Respondents. G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010 B. FACTS Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 or P160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment. Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. C. ISSUES 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged; 2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed D. RULING OF THE COURT The Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007as follows: 1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void; 2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel; 3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate; 4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
OLIVERIO LAPERAL& FILIPINAS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB INC. vs. SOLID HOMES,INC. G.R. No. 130913. June 21, 2005 B. FACTS Filipinas Golf Sales and Development Corporation, predecessor-in-interest of Filipinas Golf and Country Club, Inc., represented by its then President, Oliverio Laperal, entered into a Development and Management Agreement with respondent Solid Homes, Inc., a registered subdivision developer, involving several parcels of land owned by Laperal and FGSDC. Under the terms and conditions of the aforementioned Agreement and the Supplement, respondent undertook to convert at its own expense the land subject of the agreement into a first-class residential subdivision, in consideration of which respondent will get 45% of the lot titles of the saleable area in the entire project. The aforementioned Agreement was cancelled by the parties, and, in lieu thereof, two contracts identically denominated Revised Development and Management Agreement were entered into by respondent with the two successors-in-interest of FGSDC. Unlike the original agreement, both Revised Agreements omitted the obligation of petitioners Laperal and FGCCI to make available to respondent Solid Homes, Inc. the owners duplicate copies of the titles covering the subject parcels of land. It appears, however, that even as the Revised Agreements already provided for the non-surrender of the owners duplicate copies of the titles, respondent persisted in its request for the delivery thereof .Then, petitioners served on respondent notices of rescission of the Revised Agreements with a demand to vacate the subject properties and yield possession thereof to them. C. ISSUES Whether the termination of the Revised Agreement and Addendum, because of the contractual breach committed by respondent solid homes, carried with it the effect provided under Article 1385 of the New Civil Code. D. RULING OF THE COURT Mutual restitution is required in cases involving rescission under Article 1191. Since Article 1385 of the Civil Code expressly and clearly states that rescission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with their fruits, and the price with its interest, the Court finds no justification to sustain petitioners position that said Article 1385 does not apply to rescission under Article 1191.As a consequence of the resolution by petitioners, rights to the lot should be restored to private respondent or the same should be replaced by another acceptable lot. Applying the clear language of the law and the consistent jurisprudence on the matter, therefore, the Court rules that rescission under Article 1191 in the present case, carries with it the corresponding obligation of restitution.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION GR No. 147465, January 30, 2002 B. FACTS A build-Operate-Transfer Contract for the waste-to energy project was signed between JANCOM and the Philippine Government. The BOT Contract was submitted to President Ramos for approval but was then too close to the end of his term that his term expired without him signing the contract. He, however, endorsed the same to incoming President Estrada. With the change in administration came changes in policy and economic environment, thus the BOT contract was not pursued and implemented. JANCOM appealed to the President for reconsideration and despite the pendency of the appeal, MMDA caused the publication of an invitation to pre-qualify and submit proposals for solid waste management. C. ISSUES Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM. D. RULING OF THE COURT There is a valid and binding contract between JANCOM and the Republic of the Philippines. Under Articles 1305 of the Civil Code, A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Art. 1315 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is perfected by mere consent. Consent, on the other hand, is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract (Art. 1319, Civil Code). In the case at bar, the signing and execution of the contract by the parties clearly show that, as between the parties, there was a concurrence of offer and acceptance with respect to the material details of the contract, thereby giving rise to the perfection of the absence of Presidents signature is untenable. Significantly, the contract itself provides that the signature of the President is necessary only for its effectivity, not its perfection. There being a perfected contract, MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the consent of the other. From the moment of perfection, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. (Art. 1315) It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to change hid mind or disavow and go back upon his own acts, or to proceed contrary thereto, to the prejudice of the other party.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
ANAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. GR. No. 128609. January 29, 2004 B. FACTS The property was previously owned by Douglas Anamas parents, who mortgaged it to Philippine Savings Bank and later was foreclosed. Douglas and the PSBank entered into an agreement denominated as a Contract to Buy whereby the bank agreed to sell to Douglas the said land with all the improvements thereon. The Contract to Buy provides that Anama shall purchase the property of a certain amount and shall pay to the PSBank; it also provides that (1) Anama shall apply with the bank for a loan, the proceeds of which answer for the balance of the purchase price; (2) should the petitioner fail to comply with any of the terms of contract, all amounts paid are forfeited in favor of PSBank, the latter having the option either to demand full payment of total price or to rescind the contract. Anama was able to pay the first and second installments; however, he failed to pay the third installment when it became due. There were several transactions between them to settle the amount due. But later, the bank executed an Affidavit of Cancellation rescinding the contract, and forfeited the payments made by Anama which were applied as rentals of the use of the property. Anama was then advised to vacate the property despite his opposition to the rescission of the Contract to Buy. The bank sold the property to spouses Co, in whose favor TCT was issued. Anama then filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of TCT, and Specific Performance with Damages. C. ISSUES Whether the rescission of the Contract to Buy was valid. D. RULING OF THE COURT Since Anama failed to pay the third installment, PSBank was entitled to rescind the Contract to Buy. The contract provides the Bank two options in the event that petitioner fails to pay any of the installments. This was either (1) to rescind the contract outright and forfeit all amounts paid by the petitioner, or (2) to demand the satisfaction of the contract and insist on the full payment of the total price. After petitioner repeatedly failed to pay the third installment, the Bank chose to exercise the first option. The Contract to Buy is actually a contract to sell whereby the vendor reserves ownership of the property and is not to pass until full payment. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a breach but simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. Since ownership of the subject property was not pass to petitioner until fill payment of the purchase price, his failure to pay on the date stipulated, or in the extension granted, prevented the obligation for the Bank to pass title of the property to Anama. The bank could validly sell the property to the spouses Co, the right of the bank to sell the property being unequivocal.
A. TITLE AND DATE OF THE CASE
YHT Realty Corp, et al vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005 B. FACTS MAURICE McLaughlin is an Australian national who comes to the Philippines for business. During his trips he stays in Tropicana, a hotel recommended to him by Brunhilda Tan. McLaughlin deposited cash and jewelry to the safety deposit box of the Hotel. The safety deposit box cannot be opened unless the key of the guest and that of the management are present. Lainez and Payam are employees of Tropicana who is charged with the custody of the keys. Thereafter, McLaughlin found out that some of the money and jewelry he deposited were missing. Lainez and Payam admitted that they assisted Tan to open his deposit box. Tan admitted that she stole McLaughlins keys. Tan executed a promissory note to cover the amount of the stolen money and jewelry. McLaughlin wanted to make the management liable. C. ISSUES Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003 of the Civil Code which voids such waivers. D. RULING OF THE COURT The issue of whether the Undertaking For The Use of Safety Deposit Box executed by McLoughlin is tainted with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and the appellate court found the same to be null and void. We find no reason to reverse their common conclusion. Article 2003 is controlling, thus: Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001[37] is suppressed or diminished shall be void. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their signature.