Cases from June 22, 2015 to June 29, 2015

ROMIL T. OLAYBAL, v. OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT MANILA, INC. and

OSG SHIP MANAGEMENT [UK] LTD.
G.R. No. 211872
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenges
the July 31, 2013 Decision and the March 24, 2014 Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 128868, a case involving a claim for disability
benefits filed by petitioner Romil T. Olaybal (Olaybal) against respondent OSG
Shipmanagement (UK), Ltd., through its local manning agent OSG Shipmanagement
Manila, Inc. (OSG).
Labor law; Claim for disability benefits; Assessment by company-designated
physician.--It is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of
assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or
illness, during the term of the latter's employment. Indeed, the seafarer has the right to
seek the opinion of other doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this is
on the presumption that the company-designated physician had already issued a final
certification as to his fitness or disability and he disagreed with it.
Same; Same; Same; When a temporary total disability becomes permanent.--It is not
enough that the seafarer was unable to perform his job and is undergoing medical
treatment for more than 120 days to automatically entitle him to total and permanent
disability compensation. The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period,
declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such a
declaration.
Same; Same; Conflicting findings of the company-designated doctor and the personal
doctor of the employee.--If the findings of his personal doctor were contrary to that of
the company-designated physician, the proper procedure would have been to submit
himself to an examination of a third doctor, agreed upon by him and the OSG, whose
opinion shall be final and binding to both parties.
BERALDE v. LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (GUIHING PLANTATION OPERATIONS)
G.R. Nos. 205685-86
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Consolidated Decision dated June 29, 2012 and
Consolidated Resolution dated November 14, 2012 of the Court of Appeals-Cagayan
de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 035883 and CA-G.R. SP No. 04646.
Remedial law; Petition for certiorari under Rule 65; Exception when there are
conflicting findings of LA and NLRC.--As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising
certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the
respondent court or agency. However, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted in
reviewing the correctness of the factual findings, considering that the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings. Thus, we shall now proceed to
review whether the appellate court's decision was in accord with law and evidentiary
facts.
Labor law; Retrenchment.--Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated
by the employer through no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter,
resorted to by management during periods of business recession; industrial
depression; or seasonal fluctuations, during lulls occasioned by lack of orders,
shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new production program, or the
introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery or automation.
Retrenchment is a valid management prerogative. It is, however, subject to faithful
compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence. In the discharge of these requirements, it is the employer who bears the
onus, being in the nature of affirmative defense.
Therefore, for a valid retrenchment, the following requisites must be complied with:
(a) the retrenchment is necessary to prevent losses and such losses are proven; (b)
written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; and (c) payment of separation pay equivalent to onemonth pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher.
The law acknowledges the right of every business entity to reduce its work force if
such measure is made necessary or compelled by economic factors that would
otherwise endanger its stability or existence. In exercising its right to retrench
employees, the firm may choose to close all, or a part of, its business to avoid further
losses or mitigate expenses.
The rehiring or reemployment of retrenched employees does not necessarily negate
the presence or imminence of losses.
Same; Payment of separation pay upon dismissal.--The payment of separation pay
would be due when a dismissal is on account of an authorized cause as in this case,
and the amount of separation pay depends on the ground for the termination of
employment. When the termination of employment is due to retrenchment to prevent
losses, or to closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay is only an
equivalent of "one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher." In the above instances, a fraction of at least six (6)
months is considered as one (1) whole year.
Same; Entitlement to backwages.-- It is well settled that backwages may be granted
only when there is a finding of illegal dismissal.

CATHERINE HIPONIA-MAYUGA v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST

CO.
G.R. No. 211499
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the October 10, 2013 Decision1 and the February 24, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95249, which affirmed with modification the
September 25, 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 274, Paranaque
City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 98-0299, a case for cancellation of real estate
mortgage.
Remedial law; Appeals; Failure to appeal within the prescribed period.--The failure of
a party to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court
unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from
acquiring the jurisdiction to review and alter the judgment. The judgment becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. Corollary
thereto, an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below.
Same; Same; Issues raised in an appeal.--As a general rule, the CA cannot consider
errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of errors in the appellants brief. As
an exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the assignment of errors, the
same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue or question is
closely related or dependent to an assigned error.
The exceptions under Section 8, Rule 51 can only be applied for the benefit of the
appellant.
Same; Function of the Supreme Court.--As to the non-finding of collusion, let it be
reiterated that the Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to examine and
determine the weight of the evidence supporting the assailed decision.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO LAPORE
G.R. No. 191197
PEREZ, J.:
For review is the conviction of accused-appellant RODRIGO LAPORE (Lapore) of
rape as defined in Article 266-A and penalized under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed against AAA.
Remedial Law; Allegation of qualifying and aggravating circumstances in the
complaint or information.--Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provide that for qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be
appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or information. This is in line with the
constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the
circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the
Information. Hence, although the prosecution has duly established the presence of the

aforesaid circumstances, which, however, were not alleged in the Information, this
Court cannot appreciate the same. Notably, these circumstances are not among those
which qualify a crime from simple rape to qualified rape as defined under Article 266B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Thus even if duly alleged and proven, the
crime would still be simple rape.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALVIN ESUGON Y
AVILA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on July 23, 2010, 1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the conviction of the appellant for the
composite crime of robbery with homicide handed down by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 211, in Mandaluyong City through its judgment rendered on January
27, 2006.2chanrobleslaw
Remedial law; Witnesses and their qualifications.--The qualification of a person to
testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed. Towards
that end, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court makes clear who may and may not be
witnesses in judicial proceedings.
As the rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident,
and can communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a
witness. Age, religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, or social status are
not necessary to qualify a person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any
of the disqualifications as listed the rules. The generosity with which the Rules of
Court allows people to testify is apparent, for religious beliefs, interest in the outcome
of a case, and conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law are not grounds
for disqualification.
Same; Same; Qualification of a child witness.--That the witness is a child cannot be
the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of
child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness (A.M. No. 004-07-SC 15 December 2000), every
child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden
of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will
the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of
a child.
Same; Same; Same; Assessment of the credibility of child witness within the province
of the trial court.--The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the
province of the trial court. All questions bearing on the credibility of witnesses are
best addressed by the trial court by virtue of its unique position to observe the crucial
and often incommunicable evidence of the witnesses' deportment while testifying,
something which is denied to the appellate court because of the nature and function of
its office. The trial judge has the unique advantage of actually examining the real and

testimonial evidence, particularly the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence, the trial
judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies and findings of fact are accorded
great respect on appeal. In the absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal
of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, like when no significant facts and
circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court
is generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more stringently applied
if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court.
Same; Appeal in criminal cases.--It is true that an appeal in a criminal case like this
one opens the record of the trial bare and open. Even so, the finding of facts by the
trial court are still entitled to great respect especially when affirmed on appeal by the
CA. This great respect for such findings rests mainly on the trial court's direct and
personal access to the witnesses while they testify in its presence, giving them the
unique opportunity to observe their manner and decorum during intensive grilling by
the counsel for the accused, and to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and
prevaricating, or sincere and trustworthy.
Criminal law; Robbery with homicide; Elements.--To sustain a conviction for robbery
with homicide, the Prosecution must prove the concurrence of the following elements,
namely: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to
gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed on the occasion or by reason of
the robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main objective of
the malefactor, and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.23chanroblesl
Same; Same; Special complex crime v. complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code.--Robbery with homicide is a composite crime, also known as a special
complex crime. It is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by law as a single
indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from
a compound or complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. A
composite crime is truly distinct and different from a complex or compound crime. In
a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex
or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized,
that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit
the other. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is
specific, but in a complex or compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light felony that
accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the
subject of a separate information, but a light felony that accompanies a composite
crime is absorbed.
Same; Aggravating circumstances.--The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and
nighttime are not appreciated to raise the penalty to be imposed because the
information did not specifically allege them. But they should be appreciated in order
to justify the grant of exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P30,000.00 in accordance with relevant jurisprudence. Under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code, exemplary damages may be granted if at least one aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime. The aggravating circumstance for this purpose

need not be specifically alleged in the information, and can be either a qualifying or
attendant circumstance. As expounded in People v. Catubig:2
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the Civil Code, the law not
having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense.
The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of
exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction
that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
PROVINCE OF LEYTE, herein represented by MR. RODOLFO BADIABLE,
in his capacity as the ICO-Provincial Treasurer, Province of Leyte, v. ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 203124
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Resolutions dated September
21, 2011 2 and August 3, 20123 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
04575, which dismissed petitioner Province of Leyte's (Province of Leyte) petition for
certiorari before it on the ground of, inter alia, lack of proof of service of such
petition to the adverse party, respondent Energy Development Corporation (EDC).
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari.-- At the
outset, it must be stressed that the instant case was elevated to the CA via a petition
for certiorari which is, by nature, an original and independent action, and therefore,
not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or
order complained of. Being an original action, there is a need for the CA to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before it can resolve the same on
the merits.
Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution
indicating the CAs initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CAs jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before the CA should include

proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise
such party of the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already
been notified of the same and had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose
would have already been served.
Verily, the demands of justice require the CA to resolve the issues before it,
considering that what is at stake here are taxes, albeit locally imposed in this case,
which are the nations lifeblood through which government agencies continue to
operate and with which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its
constituents. Thus, it is far better and more prudent for the Court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a substantive review of the case in order to attain the ends
of justice than to dismiss the same on mere technicalities.
MARLON BEDUYA
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195513
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

v.

ACE

PROMOTION

AND

MARKETING

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 30, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111536 affirming the February 23, 2009
Decision and August 4, 2009 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which granted respondents appeal from the April 24, 2008 Decision of the
Labor Arbiter and ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint for illegal
dismissal. Likewise assailed is the February 3, 2011 CA Resolution which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said CA Decision.
Remedial law; Filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal.--It is thus
clear from the foregoing that the filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement
renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. However, this Court, in
many cases, has relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified. Thus, the rules,
specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, allows the reduction of the appeal bond subject to the conditions that: (1) the
motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. Otherwise, the
filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.
Still, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of
the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule under
certain exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration of
substantial justice, prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and
special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and
the issue involved. Indeed, in meritorious cases, the Court was propelled to relax the
requirements relating to appeal bonds such as when there are valid issues raised in the
appeal and in the absence of any valid claims against the employer.
Same; Same; 10% provisional percentage.--In the recent case of Mcburnie v. Ganzon,
the Court has set a provisional percentage of 10% of the monetary award, exclusive of

damages and attorneys fees, as a reasonable amount of bond that an appellant should
post pending resolution by the NLRC of a motion to reduce bond. It is only after the
posting of this bond that an appellants period to perfect an appeal is suspended.
The required 10% of the monetary award as appeal bond is merely provisional given
that the NLRC still retains the authority to exercise its full discretion to resolve a
motion for the reduction of bond and determine the final amount of bond that should
be posted by an appellant in accordance with the standards of meritorious grounds and
reasonable amount.
Same; NLRC; Jurisdiction.--With respect to the NLRCs failure to initially act upon
respondents motion to reduce bond and petitioners opposition thereto with motion to
dismiss, suffice it to say that the same did not divest the NLRC of its authority to
resolve the appeal on its substantive matters. After all, the NLRC is not bound by
technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules
in deciding labor cases. Further, the NLRC is mandated to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
Labor law; Illegal dismissal.--Petitioners were fixed-term employees whose
respective contracts of employment had already expired. Therefore, there can be no
illegal dismissal to speak of.
RUBY RUTHS. SERRANO MAHILUM v. SPOUSES EDILBERTO ILANO and
LOURDES ILANO
G.R. No. 197923
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the following dispositions of the
Court of Appeals: 1) February 2, 2011 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113782 which
granted herein respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and thus nullified
and set aside the January 5, 20103 and February 24, 20104 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255 in Civil Case No. LP-07-0109; and 2) July
28, 2011 Resolution denying the herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Civil law; Torrens System.--Since a new title was never issued in respondents favor
and, instead, title remained in petitioners name, the former never came within the
coverage and protection of the Torrens system, where the issue of good or bad faith
becomes relevant. Since respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in their
name, the issue of their good or bad faith which is central in an annulment of title case
is of no consequence; petitioners case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of
Absolute Sale, and not one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her
name.
CCC INSURANCE CORPORATION v. KAWASAKI STEEL CORPORATION,
F.F. MANACOP CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., and FLORANTE F. MANACOP,
G.R. No. 156162
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are: (1) the Decision1 dated May
30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54066, which reversed and set
aside the Decision dated May 2, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City,
Branch 66, and held petitioner CCC Insurance Corporation (CCCIC) liable under its
Surety and Performance Bonds to respondent Kawasaki Steel Corporation
(Kawasaki); and (2) the Resolution dated November 14, 2002 of the appellate court
in the same case which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of CCCIC.
Civil law; Contract of suretyship.--Jurisprudence also defines a contract of suretyship
as an agreement where a party called the surety guarantees the performance by
another party called the principal or obligor of an obligation or undertaking in favor of
a third person called the obligee. Specifically, suretyship is a contractual relation
resulting from an agreement whereby one person, the surety, engages to be
answerable for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, known as the principal.
The Court expounds that a suretys liability is joint and several, limited to the
amount of the bond, and determined strictly by the terms of contract of suretyship in
relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee. It bears
stressing, however, that although the contract of suretyship is secondary to the
principal contract, the suretys liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct, primary,
and absolute.
The Court reiterates that a suretys liability is determined strictly by the terms of
contract of suretyship, in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the
obligee.
Same; Relativity of contracts.-- According to the principle of relativity of contracts in
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, a contract takes effect only between the parties, their
assigns, and heirs; except when the contract contains a stipulation in favor of a third
person, which gives said person the right to demand fulfillment of said stipulation.
Same; Interpretation of contracts.--The Court cannot give any additional meaning to
the plain language of the undertakings in the Surety and Performance Bonds. The
extent of a suretys liability is determined by the language of the suretyship contract
or bond itself. Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that [i]f the terms of a contract
are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.
Same; Article 2709 of the Civil Code.--The aforequoted provision clearly speaks of an
extension for the payment of a debt granted by the creditor to a debtor without the
consent of the surety.
Same; Novation.--It is well-settled that novation is never presumed novatio non
praesumitur.
Same; Articles 2066 and 2067 of the Civil Code.--The benefit of subrogation is
granted by the Article 2067 of the Civil Code only to the guarantor (or surety) who
pays.
Remedial Law; Cause of action.--A cause of action is defined as the act or omission
by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of

action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a correlative
legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from
the defendant.
Civil law; Award of attorneys fees.--Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code allows the
award of attorneys fees [w]hen the defendants act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest[.]
Same; Same; Bad faith.--Bad faith has been defined as a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill will. It must, however, be substantiated by
evidence. Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed, it must be established by clear
and convincing evidence."
GUILLERMO BITOL, WACOY y v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213792
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the Decision
dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac y Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
Remedial Law; Appeal in criminal cases.--At the outset, it must be stressed that in
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or
even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.
Criminal Law; Elements of the crime of death in tumultuous affray.--The elements of
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons;
(b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was
killed in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed
the deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries
or who used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes
place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused
and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and
the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
Same; Elements of the crime of homicide.-- The elements of Homicide are the
following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying

circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the
killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that
of Parricide or Infanticide.
Same; Art. 49 of the Revised Penal Code. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals
when the crime committed is different from that intended.--Jurisprudence instructs
that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from
that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in
personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is wellsettled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime
is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof.
Same; Mitigating circumstance of lack of intention.--In determining the presence of
this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental process and is
an internal state of mind, the accuseds intention must be judged by his conduct and
external overt acts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. JOSE SALVADOR a.k.a. "Felix",
G.R. No. 207815
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is an appeal from the January 9, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34484 which affirmed with modification appellant Jose
Salvador's conviction for the crime of rape as defined under Article 266-A(2)3 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) in Criminal Case No. 4112.
Remedial law; Evidence; Credibility of witnesses.--This Court has reiterated that the
credibility of witnesses is a question best addressed by the trial court because of its
opportunity to observe their demeanor while testifying on the stand: an opportunity
denied to the appellate courts. Absent any substantial reason to justify the reversal of
the trial courts assessment and conclusion, the reviewing court is generally bound by
the formers findings, especially when no significant fact nor circumstance is shown
to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered could affect the
outcome of the case. The rule is strictly applied when the appellate court affirms the
finding of the lower court.
Same; Same; Testimonies in rape.--This Court has acknowledged that it is difficult to
have corroborating testimonies in rape cases since in majority of the cases only the
offended partys testimony is available. The Court has affirmed a conviction of rape as
long as it is supported by a conclusive, logical and probable testimony by the
offended party.
Criminal law; Rape.--This Court has stated that under Article 266-A of the RPC there
are two ways by which the crime of rape may be committed: by sexual intercourse or

by sexual assault. In both cases, only the fact of penetration need be established under
either. It must be stated though that under rape by sexual intercourse, there must be
proof that his penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction.
Same; Same; Penalty thereof.--It is clear from Article 266-B that generally the penalty
for rape through sexual assault is prision mayor. If qualifying circumstances have
attended the crime and the same have been properly alleged in the information the
penalty imposed would be increased to reclusion temporal.
WILFREDO DE VERA v. SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 179457
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision dated May 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated August 22, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79769.
Remedial law; Jurisdiction over the subject matter.--In resolving the issue of whether
the CA erred in annulling the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, the Court is
guided by the well-settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Same; Jurisdiction of RTC in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.-- Clearly then, the
amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTCs appellate jurisdiction; all
cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the
amount involved.
Same; Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.--It bears emphasis that in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court. This restriction of the
review to questions of law has been institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the second sentence of which provides that the petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Indeed, in the exercise of its
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it
does not normally undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the
parties during trial. In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to
probe and resolve factual issues, viz.: (a) When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) When the inference made is manifestly

mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (d)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) When the findings of
facts are conflicting; (f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee; (g) When the CAs findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (j) When the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
Same; Question of law.--There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an
existence of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants
Same; Question of fact.--An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probabilities of the situation.
JULIUS R. TAGALOG v. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES INC., CAPT.
ELEASAR G. DIAZ AND/OR CHIOS MARITIME LTD. ACTING IN BEHALF
OF OCEAN LIBERTY LTD,
G.R. No. 191899
PEREZ,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 dated 26 January 2010 and Resolution dated 12 April
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110168. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for permanent disability benefits filed by petitioner Julius R.
Tagalog.
Labor law; Disability benefits; Entitlement of seafarers thereto.--Entitlement of
seafarers to disability benefits is governed not only by medical findings but also by
contract and by law. By contract, Department Order No. 4, series of 2000, of the
Department of Labor and Employment Philippine Overseas Employment AgencyStandard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) and the parties Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) bind the seafarer and the employer. By law, the Labor Code
provisions on disability apply with equal force to seafarers.
Same; Same; 120-day period.--As the rule now stands, the mere lapse of the 120-day
period itself does not automatically warrant the payment of permanent total disability
benefits.
Same; Same; Assessment of a third doctor.--Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC
provides that if a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the

company-designated doctor, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the

employer and the seafarer, and the third doctors decision shall be final and binding
on both parties.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. GUTIERREZ, represented by
ANTONIA S. GUTIERREZ, (for herself and in her capacity as duly-appointed
Special Administratrix of the Estate of Juan B. Gutierrez), v. HEIRS OF
SPOUSE JOSE and GRACITA CABANGON, represented by BLANCA
CABANGON, JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, Branch 14, 12 th Judicial
Region Cotabato City, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Former 21st
Division, Mindanao Station, Cagayan De Oro City,
G.R. No. 210055
PERAL TA, J.:
This pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court instituted by The Estate of Juan B. Gutierrez (the Estate), represented by
Antonia S. Gutierrez (in her capacity as the duly-appointed Special Administrator of
The Estate of Juan B. Gutierrez) to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated January 21, 2013 and its Resolution dated October 7, 2013 in CAG.R. SP No. 00840.
Remedial law; Jurisdiction over the subject matter.--Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint
of the plaintiff, regardless of whether or not he is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Same; Resolution or disposal by the trial judge over cases submitted for decision or
those past the trial stage.--It is settled that cases that have been submitted for decision
or those past the trial stage, such as when all the parties have finished presenting their
evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion, shall be resolved or disposed by the judge
to which these are raffled or assigned. Also, a judge transferred, detailed or assigned
to another branch shall be considered as Assisting Judge of the branch to which he
was previously assigned. Once trial judges act as presiding judges or otherwise
designated as acting or assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases
substantially heard by them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are
promoted to higher positions, may be decided by them wherever they may be, if so
requested by any of the parties and endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges
through the Office of the Court Administrator. The following procedure may be
followed: (1) The judge who takes over the branch must immediately make an
inventory of the cases submitted for decision left by the previous judge, unless the
latter has, in the meantime, been promoted to a higher court; (2) The succeeding judge
must then inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case and before
whom it was submitted for decision, may be required to decide the case. In such an
event and upon request of any of the parties, the succeeding judge may request the
Court Administrator to formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before

whom it was previously submitted for decision; and (3) After the judge who
previously heard the case is finished with his decision, he should send back the
records and his decision to the branch to which the case properly belongs, by
registered mail or by personal delivery, for recording and promulgation, with notice of
such fact to the Court Administrator. Also, it must be pointed out that the authority to
resolve cases of the newly-appointed judge starts, not upon appointment, but upon
assumption of duty. Likewise, assumption of duty does not automatically mean
resolution of cases because the newly-assumed judge must first conduct the necessary
inventory of all pending cases in the branch.
Same; Effect of lack of notice and hearing in motions for reconsideration.--Since the
Estate's Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial did not contain the mandated
notice of hearing, it becomes pro-forma or a mere scrap of paper. As such, said motion
did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of an appeal.
Time and again, the Court has held that a notice of time and place of hearing is
mandatory for motions for new trial or motion for reconsideration, as in this case. The
requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 is mandatory and the lack
thereof is fatal to a motion for reconsideration.
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., v. JEROME JAPSON,
G.R. No. 191787
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6,
2005 Decision of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010 Resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Remedial law/Political law; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction.--Thus, the CSC,
as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of
controversies relating to the civil service.
It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on
petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19.
Remedial law; Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.--The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal
to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is

based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore,
the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and dispose of the case.
Same; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.--The CA is further justified in refusing to take
cognizance of the petition for review, as [t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
Political law; Conduct of public officers prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.-- The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service may be imposed upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or
conduct taints the image and integrity of the office; and the act need not be related to
or connected with the public officers official functions. Under our civil service laws,
there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated
as such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report
back to work without prior notice; failure to safekeep public records and property;
making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judges act of
brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; a
court interpreters participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainants property which resulted in a quarrel in the latters family; selling fake
Unified Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office
hours; a CA employees forging of receipts to avoid her private contractual
obligations; a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) employees act of
repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network problems within his office
and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in
a vulnerable state of security; a public prosecutors act of signing a motion to dismiss
that was not prepared by him, but by a judge; and a teachers act of directly selling a
book to her students in violation of the Code of Ethics for Professional Teachers.
Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that
requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office
must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is
expected.
ADELFA DIO TOLENTINO, VIRGINIA DIO, RENATO DIO, and HEIRS OF
ROBERTO DIO, represented by ROGER DIO v. SPOUSES MARIA JERERA
AND
EBON LATAGAN
G.R. No. 179874
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated July 6, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated

August 22, 2007 in CA G.R. CV No. 83337.

Remedial law; Non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective
verification and certification against forum shopping.--In Oldarico S. Traveno v.
Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, the Court restated the
jurisprudential pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on,
or submission of defective verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement
on or submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum
shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent
submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or
compelling reasons.
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as
when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rules.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
Same; Partial default.--Suffice it to state that the effect of such partial default is dealt
with under Section 3 (c), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: (c) When a pleading asserting
a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of
whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon
the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
Same; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Contrary findings of trial and appellate courts.-Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court clearly states that the petition filed shall raise
only questions of law. In the exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of
facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial, One of these
exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial

court. After all, findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when
such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts'
conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts.
Same; Evidence; Civil law; Forgery in sale.-- Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be
presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party
alleging the same. A forged deed of sale is null and void and conveys no title, for it is
a well-settled principle that no one can give what one does not have; nemo dat quod
non habet.
One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no
more right than what the seller can transfer legally.
Civil law; Transfer to an innocent purchaser for value; Reliance on Torrens title-However, it has also been consistently ruled that that a forged or fraudulent document
may become the root of a valid title, if the property has already been transferred from
the name of the owner to that of the forger, and then to that of an innocent purchaser
for value. This doctrine emphasizes that a person who deals with registered property
in good faith will acquire good title from a forger and be absolutely protected by a
Torrens title. This is because a prospective buyer of a property registered under the
Torrens system need not go beyond the title, especially when she has no notice of any
badge of fraud or defect that would place her on guard.
The Court held that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies
upon one who asserts that status and this onus probandi cannot be discharged my
mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith. A purchaser in good faith is
one who buys property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
in such property and pays its fair price before she has notice of the adverse claims and
interest of another person in the same property. The honesty of intention which
constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put a person on inquiry.
It is a well-settled rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely
on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way
oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
Where there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the
ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required
to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defects or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
However, this rule shall not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make such inquiry or
when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent person to inquire into the status of the
title of the property in litigation.
Remedial law; Evidence; Civil cases; Burden of proof.--Petitioners would do well to
remember that in civil cases, the specific rule as to the burden of proof is that the
plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint which are
denied by the answer; and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
allegations in his answer, which sets up new matter as a defense. This rule does not

involve a shifting of the burden of proof, but merely means that each party must
establish his own case. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Alleged simulation of contract.--The burden of proving the
alleged simulation of a contract falls on those who impugn its regularity and validity.
A failure to discharge this duty will result in the upholding of the contract. The
primary consideration in determining whether a contract is simulated is the intention
of the parties as manifested by the express terms of the agreement itself, as well as the
contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties. The most striking index of
simulation is not the filial relationship between the purported seller and buyer, but the
complete absence of any attempt in any manner on the part of the latter to assert rights
of dominion over the disputed property.
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima
facie evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration and the party alleging lack
of consideration has the burden of proving such allegation.
Same; Same; Civil law; Evidence of ownership.--It is a settled rule that albeit tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his actual or at least constructive possession.
Same; Laches.--Therefore, petitioners' complaint is likewise barred by laches, which
has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it.
Same; Cause of action for quieting title as enforcing implied trust.--Finally, the Court
notes that petitioners' cause of action for quieting of title, recovery and damages over
the subject property acquired by respondents through a forged deed can be considered
as that of enforcing an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code: Art. 1456.
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
Same; Same; Prescirption.--With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has
ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land
based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.

CESAR NAGUIT v. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 188839
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 13, 2009 and
July 15, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 107311. The Resolution of February 13, 2009
denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari, while
the Resolution dated July 15, 2009 denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Remedial law; Relaxation of procedural rules.-- Suffice it to say that workload and
resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the
relaxation of the procedural rules. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.
Same; Duty of litigants.--In addition, it is also the duty of petitioner to monitor the
status of his case and not simply rely on his former lawyer, whom he already knew to
be unable to attend to his duties as counsel. It is settled that litigants represented by
counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the
outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for
at stake is their interest in the case.
Same; Effect of failure to file petition on time.--Failure to file petition on time does
not involve mere technicality but is jurisdictional. Petitioner's failure to timely file his
petition renders the questioned NLRC Decision final and executory, thus, depriving
the CA of its jurisdiction over the said petition.
Furthermore, no one has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari.
These are statutory privileges which may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by law. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be
discarded with by the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.
Same; Petition for review on certiorari.-- However, it is settled that in a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court, only questions of law may be raised. Questions of
fact may not be inquired into. While there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.
Labor law; Dismissal of an employee.--The settled rule is that fighting within
company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the
act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the
termination of employment.

Also, the Court agrees with respondent's contention that if petitioner's long years of
service would be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it
will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice
and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables. In
addition, where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
the employees, the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction
between a first offender and a habitual delinquent.
ANALOUB.NAVAJA v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting
Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, DKT PHILS., INC.,
represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE,
G.R. No. 182926
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated May 7, 2008
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the
Order dated September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay,
Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.
Remedial law; Venue v. jurisdiction.--Venue in criminal cases is an essential element
of jurisdiction.
The venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the
Information states that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients
occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information and not by the result of proof.
Same; Venue in falsification of private documents.--In cases of falsification of private
documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified, to the
prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not
the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was intended.
Criminal law; Damage in falsification of private documents.--Such damage need not
be present, as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that
mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.
Remedial law; Conclusiveness of findings of the appellate court.--It also bears
emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent
any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Same; Venue in criminal proceedings.--To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper
venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction. Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done
in a criminal case because it is an element of jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to

answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was
committed.
Same; Same; Power of court to change venue.--Be that as it may, Section 5 (4),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a
change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently,
where there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of
original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been
mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Same; Petition for certiorari; Interlocutory orders.-- An order denying a motion to
quash is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari.
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would
not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed
with dispatch in the consideration thereof.
SIO TIAT KING, v. VICENTE G. LIM
G .R. No. 185407
REYES,J.:
Remedial law; Action for recovery of possession; Matters of ownership.--One who
claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate
judicial action for its physical recovery. The judicial process could mean no less than
an ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the
contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
Matters regarding its ownership should be ventilated in a separate proceeding, as this
case is limited to the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession following
redemption.
MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO v.
FORTUNATO CAJUCOM,
GR. No.171095
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the trial court's Order denying
petitioners' motion to quash a writ of execution.
Remedial law; Writ of execution.--Stated differently, once a judgment becomes final,
the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. Its issuance

is, in fact, the trial courts ministerial duty, the only limitation being that the writ must
conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, more
particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion of the decision. Even the
holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory
judgment can be considered abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Same; Same; Final and executor judgment.--And equally settled is the rule that when
a judgment is final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
longer be modified in any respect, except to correct clerical errors or to make nunc
pro tunc entries, or when it is a void judgment. Outside of these exceptions, the court
which rendered judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution. A
decision that has attained finality becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim
that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final
and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose. Thus, an order of execution which varies the tenor
of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
Hence, to this Court, the final judgment has become the law of the case which is now
immovable. The rudiments of fair play, justice, and due process require that parties
cannot raise for the first time on appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a writ of
execution issues which they could have raised but never did during the trial and even
on appeal from the decision of the trial court.
The simple matter is that petitioners herein may not do indirectly, by assailing the writ
of execution, what they cannot do directly, which is attacking the final, immutable and
unalterable judgment of the RTC. They may not raise in their opposition to the writ of
execution issues that they should have raised in the case during the trial proper or
against the judgment via an appeal. They may not object to the execution by raising
new issues of fact or law, except under the following circumstances:
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
NORMILITO R. CAGATIN v. MAGSAYSAY
MARITIME c.s.c.s. INTERNATIONAL NV,
GR. No. 175795
PERALTA, J.:

CORPORATION

and

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals'
Decision dated July 21, 2006 and Resolution dated December 5, 2006 which affirmed
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).

Remedial law; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.--Basic is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact
are for the labor tribunals to resolve. It is elementary that the scope of this Court's
judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law
and does not extend to questions of fact.
Same; Same; Exception.--There are recognized exceptions to the above rule, however,
such as when the findings of the Labor Arbiter conflict with those of the NLRC and
the CA, as in the case at bar. Given such a situation, this Court is compelled to
examine the evidence on record to determine whether petitioner is indeed entitled to
disability benefits.
Labor law; Evidence in a claim for disability benefits.--In labor cases, as in all cases
which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic rule is that the
burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. In
particular, in a case of claims for disability benefits, the onus probandi falls on the
seafarer as claimant to establish his claim with the right quantum of evidence; it
cannot rest on speculations, presumptions or conjectures. Such party has the burden of
proving the said assertion with the quantum of evidence required by law which, in a
case such as this of a claim for disability benefits arising from one's employment as a
seafarer, is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is not one that establishes
certainty beyond reasonable doubt, but only such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. It is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence.
It is consistently held that good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the
contrary on his opponent has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith,
with malice, or with ill motive. Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Although
strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability
benefits, the seafarer must still prove his claim with substantial evidence, otherwise,
injustice will be done to his employer.
Same; Same; Assessment of physician.--Under the above provision, it is the findings
and evaluations of the company-designated physician which should form the basis of
the seafarer's disability claim. It is this physician who is entrusted with the task of
assessing a seafarers disability and there is a procedure to be followed to contest his
findings. But the assessment of the company-designated physician is not final,
binding or conclusive on anyone, including the seafarer, the labor tribunals, or the
courts, since the seafarer may seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice
regarding his ailment or injury. If the physician chosen by the seafarer disagrees with
the assessment of the company-designated physician, the company and the seafarer
may agree jointly to refer the latter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and
binding on them.
Same; Same; Same; When total disability changes from temporary to permanent.-And in jurisprudence interpreting the aforequoted provision of the POEA-SEC, a
temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the companydesignated physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration

of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either

fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. The 240-day period is meant
to harmonize the provision of the POEA-SEC above with the provisions of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code, specifically Rule X,
Section 2, on disability benefits. Where before it was held that permanent disability is
the inability of a seafarer to perform his work for more than 120 days, regardless of
whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body, now the rule is that if the
injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days, the companydesignated physician has, including the initial 120 days, up to a maximum of 240 days
to declare either fitness to work or permanent disability, beyond which and with or
without any declaration, the disability is considered total and permanent.
Remedial law; Issues raised on appeal.--Thus, this Court, likewise, will not discuss
the same in respect of the well-settled rule, which also applies in labor cases, that
issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; such points of
law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by the reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.
Labor law; Construction of the provisions of POEA-SEC.--As a final note, the Court
is wary of the principle that provisions of the POEA-SEC must be applied with
liberality in favor of the seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can
be fully carried into effect.
However, on several occasions when disability claims anchored on such contract were
based on flimsy grounds and unfounded allegations, the Court never hesitated to deny
the same. Claims for compensation based on surmises cannot be allowed; liberal
construction is not a license to disregard the evidence on record or to misapply the
laws. This Court abides by the principle that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing
jurisprudence.
CLODUALDA D. DAACO v. V ALERIANA ROSALDO YU
G.R. No. 183398
PERAL TA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Section 2( c ), Rule 41, in
relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Order
dated October 4, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, of Tacloban City
in Civil Case No. 2006-12-16 dismissing the case for annulment of title, recovery of
property under Transfer Certificate (TCT) No. T-28120 and damages due to the
absence or failure of petitioner to appear at the pre-trial conference.
Remedial law; Pre-trial.--It has been held that pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It
is more than a simple marking of evidence. It is not a mere technicality in court
proceedings for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and
expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. Hence, it should not be ignored
or neglected, as petitioner had.

Same; Same; Non-appearance at pre-trial.--Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the

pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may be
declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to
render judgment on the basis thereof.
In certain instances, however, the non-appearance of a party may be excused if a valid
cause is shown. What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels
at the pre-trial is subject to the sound discretion of a judge. Unless and until a clear
and manifest abuse of discretion is committed by the judge, his appreciation of a
partys reasons for his nonappearance will not be disturbed.
Same; Same; Notice of pre-tral.--Section 3,14 Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that notice of pre-trial conference be served on counsel. The
counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party he
represents. However, when a party has no counsel, as in this case, the notice of pretrial is required to be served personally on him.
Same; Issues on appeal.--It is settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage.
Same; Application of the rules.--Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to at least
promptly explain its failure to comply with the rules. Indeed, technical rules of
procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect
the prompt, proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the
clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of these rules cannot justly be rationalized
by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, v.
MINING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 193945
REYES, J.:

MARICALUM

For review is the Decision dated April 26, 2010 and Resolution dated September 30,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110178, which reversed and set
aside the Order dated December 19, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. 84-25858.
Remedial law; Immutability of judgments.--Indeed, the well-settled principle of
immutability of final judgments demands that once a judgment has become final, the
winning party should not, through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is the existence of a
supervening event. A supervening event is a fact which transpires or a new
circumstance which develops after a judgment has become final and executory. This

includes matters which the existence at that time. To be sufficient to stay or stop the
execution, a supervening event must create a substantial change in the rights or
relations of the parties which would render execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution in the
interest of justice.
Same; Reversal of judgment; Restitution.--The Rules of Court provides for restitution
according to equity, in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. When the
executed decision is reversed, the premature execution is considered to have lost its
legal bases.
The situation necessarily requires equitable restitution to the party prejudiced thereby.
The phrase on appeal or otherwise in Section 5 of Rule 39 specifically permits the
application of restitution or reparation in cases where a judgment is reversed or
annulled, not only on appeal but also through some other appropriate action filed for
that purpose.
Nevertheless, the Court stressed in the early case of Po Pauco v. Tan Junco that in a
restitution case, a party who received by means of a judgment cannot be treated as a
wrong-doer for causing execution to issue.
The judgment protects him while it remains in force. It may seem a hardship to the
claimant in such a judgment that under it, his property may be sold for greatly less
than its value, and his right of restitution be limited to what came into the hands of the
defendant. But such hardship, when it occurs, will generally, if not always, be the
result of his own acts. If, by failing to appeal, or to obtain a supersedeas on an appeal,
he permits the judgment to remain in force and enforceable, he can hardly complain
that the other party proceeds to enforce it.
Civil law; Legal rate of interest.--As clarified in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, pursuant to
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799 (Series of
2013), the legal rate of interest is currently at six percent (6%) regardless of the source
of obligation. Such new rate should be applied prospectively, and the twelve percent
(12%) legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the new rate of
six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest.
Same; Same; Application.--The rates of interest prescribed by the MB is also
applicable to restitution cases where money is transferred from one person to another
and the obligation to return the same or a portion thereof is subsequently adjudged in.
RICKY DINAMLING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 199522
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated November
25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 32912, which affirmed with
modification the conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to
Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence

Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 .

Remedial law; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.--As a general rule, under Rule 45, no
questions of fact but only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
brought before this Court. Time and again, the Court has consistently declared that
questions of facts are beyond the pale of a petition for review. Factual findings of the
trial court, particularly when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally binding
on this Court.
But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact may not be
entertained by this Court in a petition for review, to wit:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record,
Criminal law; RA No. 9262; Psychological violence.--Psychological violence is an
element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while
mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the
offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i)
or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.
Remedial law; Evidence; Denial and alibi.--Denial and alibi, as defenses of an
accused in a criminal case, have been consistently held as inherently weak and which,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim. In general, a plea of denial and alibi is not given much
weight relative to the affirmative testimony of the offended party. The only exception
to this rule is where there is no effective identification, or where the identification of
the accused has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant inconsistencies.
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if the accused was able to prove
that not only was he at some other place when the crime was committed, but also that
he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime, or in its

immediate vicinity, during its commission.

Criminal law; RA No. 9262; When physical violence becomes necessary to prove the
essential element of the crime.--In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the
victim nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator are necessary to prove
the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only
exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical violence done by the accused is
alleged to have caused the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such acts of
physical violence must be proven. In this instance, the physical violence was a means
of causing mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual
bodily injury, the physical violence translates to psychological violence since its main
effect was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being.
Same; Same; Aggravating circumstances.--For this crime, pregnancy or the presence
of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which increase the imposable
penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence for the
penalty to be properly imposed.
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. CPR PROMOTIONS
AND
MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and
LEONIZA F. REYNOSO,
G.R. No. 200567
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the September 28, 2011 Decision and February 13, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424. Said rulings dismissed
petitioner Metropolitan Banking and Trust Company's (MBTC's) claim for deficiency
payment upon foreclosing respondents' mortgaged properties and ordered the bank,
instead, to return to respondent mortgagors the excess amount of PhP 722,602.22.
Remedial law; Counterclaim; When compulsory.--Accordingly, a counterclaim is
compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to
its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive,
We have, in several cases, utilized the following tests:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as
the defendants counterclaim?

(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the
conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the
compelling test of compulsoriness.
It is elementary that a defending partys compulsory counterclaim should be
interposed at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively
bar such claim.
Same; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.--Basic is the rule that a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should only cover questions of law.
Moreover, findings of fact of the CA are generally final and conclusive and this Court
will not review them on appeal. This rule, however, admits of several exceptions, such
as when the findings of fact are conflicting, manifestly mistaken, unsupported by
evidence or the result of a misapprehension of acts, or when the findings are contrary
to that of the trial court, as in this case.
Same; Deficiency in the proceeds of sale from extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.-We have already ruled in several cases that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the
right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. xxx Verily, there can only be a deficit
when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure
proceedings; and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and
penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure.
In demanding payment of a deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage,
proving that there is indeed one and what its exact amount is, is naturally a
precondition thereto. The same goes with a claim for reimbursement of foreclosure
expenses, as here. In this regard, it is elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests
on the party asserting such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v, ERNIE INCIONG y ORENSE,
G.R. No. 213383
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Ernie Inciong y Orense
(accused-appellant) from the Decision2 dated December 5, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05549 affirming his conviction for the crime
of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
Criminal law; Elements of self-defense.--In order for self-defense to be appreciated,
accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. An accused who invokes
self- defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important of
which is unlawful aggression. Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense,

unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully

pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. No self-defense can exist without unlawful
aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.
Same; treachery.-- Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
AND
DEPORTATION and its COMMISSIONERS and LUIS T. RAMOS,
G.R. No. 191810
PERAL TA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeking to nullify the October 28, 2009 Decision and March 22, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88840, which affirmed as final and executory
the April 17, 2002 Decision3 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) in BSI-D.C. No.
ADD-01-117.
Remedial law; Rule on second motion for reconsideration.--As a general rule, a
second motion for reconsideration cannot be entertained. Section 2 of Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court is unequivocal. The Court resolutely holds that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive
reasons and after an express leave has been first obtained may such motion be
entertained. The restrictive policy against a second motion for reconsideration is
emphasized in A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC, as amended (Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court). Section 3, Rule 15 of which states: SEC. 3. Second motion for
reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration,
and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by
the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is
reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not
only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second
motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration. In the
Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
Same; Power of the Court to suspend its rules and regulations.-- The Court has the
power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it. In the exercise of sound discretion, We may
determine issues which are of transcendental importance.
Same; Finality of judgment.--Based on the principle of immutability of judgment, a
decision must become final and executory at some point in time; all litigations must
necessarily come to an end. Subject to certain recognized exceptions such as (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no

prejudice to any party; (3) vod judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, which
are not present in this case, the principle of immutability leaves the judgment
undisturbed as nothing further can be done except to execute it
Same; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.--In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in
matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a
better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.
Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules generally bars any
question pertaining to the factual issues. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact
are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial courts
judgment or the appellate courts misapprehension of the adduced facts.
Same; Forum shopping.--Forum shopping is defined as: [w]hen a party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or
already resolved adversely by some other court.
Forum shopping consists of the following elements: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
OFFICE OF TlIE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, v. MS. FLORED L. NICOLAS,
former Court Interpreter and Officer-in- Charge; MS. ERLINDA U.
CABRERA, former Clerk of Court II; and MR. EDWIN SANTOS, Clerk of
Court II, all of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, GUIGUINTO, BULACAN,
A.M. No. P-10-2840
(Formerly A.M. No. 10-7-87-MTC)
Political law; Public office is a public trust; Legal Ethics.--Section 1, Article XI of the
Constitution declares that a public office is a public trust, and all public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives. The demand for moral uprightness is more pronounced for the
members and personnel of the judiciary who are involved in the dispensation of
justice. As frontliners in the administration of justice, they should live up to the
strictest standards of honesty and integrity in the public service.
Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and

sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and

administrative orders, processes and concerns. They perform a delicate function as
designated custodians of the courts funds, revenues, records, properties and premises.
As such, they generally are also the treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant
manager thereof. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of
such funds and property.
An OIC bears the same responsibilities and is expected to serve with the same
commitment and efficiency as a duly-appointed Clerk of Court.
Failure of a public officer, to remit funds upon demand by an authorized officer
constitutes prima facie evidence that the public officer has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson of
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, v. HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47
and JA HOON KU,
G.R. No. 210759
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the
Orders dated 28 January 2014, 29 January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014, as well as
the Resolution dated 14 March 2014, all issued by respondent Presiding Judge
Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 in
SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.
Remedial law; Writ of amparo.--On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the
Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the
martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal
killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are
attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with
the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes enforced
disappearance, the elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851 are the following:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the

State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge
or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
The Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of
what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is.
Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be
construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated
in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases,
courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.45
Same; Same; Evidence required.--The Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish
their claims by substantial evidence.
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject
Same; Forum shopping.-- While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the
Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her
pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in
two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly
procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing of such
remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the
said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the
courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the
administration of justice.
Same; Construction of the resolutions of the Court.--It is well to note that a resolution
of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the Courts lawful
order and directive.
Legal ethics; judicial conduct.--In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a
cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from
judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT GAIL M. BACBAC-DEL ISEN, v. ROMAR Q.
MOLINA,
A.M. No. P-15-3322
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3569-P]
This administrative matter originated from the verified Complaint dated 3November

2010 filed by Atty. Gail M. Bacbac-Del Isen (complainant), Clerk of Court V at the
Regional Trial Court, Baguio City, Branch 3 (the RTC). Complainant charged Mr.
Romar Q. Molina (respondent), Clerk III at the same RTC, with violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Remedial law; Evidence; Denial.--It is settled that denial is an inherently weak
defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability;
otherwise, the denial is purely self-serving and with no evidentiary value. Like the
defense of alibi, a denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations.
Legal ethics; Conduct of court employees.--Being a court employee, respondent was
expected to conduct himself in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and
morality. The special nature of duties and responsibilities of court personnel has been
recognized through the adoption of a separate code of conduct especially for them.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel requires judicial employees to avoid
conflicts of interest in performing official duties. It specifically mandates that they
should not receive tips or other remunerations for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings in the judiciary.
Time and again, the Court has stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials
involved in the administration of justice - from judges to the most junior clerks - is
circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict
propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public's respect
for and trust in the judiciary. As emphasized in Villahermosa, Sr. v. Sarcia, "the acts
of court personnel reflect on the Judiciary."
UNITED OVERSEAS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS-HLURB, J.O.S. MANAGING BUILDERS, INC., and
EDUPLAN PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 182133
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
February 27, 2006 and March 5, 2008, respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 86401.
Civil law; PD No. 957; Mortgage; Nullification.--While a mortgage may be nullified
if it was in violation of Section 18 of P.D. No. 957, such nullification applies only to
the interest of the complaining buyer. It cannot extend to the entire mortgage. A buyer
of a particular unit or lot has no standing to ask for the nullification of the entire
mortgage.
More importantly, it should be understood that the prior approval requirement is
intended to protect buyers of condominium units from fraudulent manipulations
perpetrated by unscrupulous condominium sellers and operators, such as their failure
to deliver titles to the buyer or titles free from lien and encumbrances. This is pursuant
to the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of
unscrupulous developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects
sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB.

Thus, failure to secure the HLURB'S prior written approval as required by P.D. No.
957 will not annul the entire mortgage between the condominium developer and the
creditor bank, otherwise the protection intended for condominium buyers will
inadvertently be extended to the condominium developer even though, by failing to
secure the government's prior approval, it is the party at fault.
To rule otherwise would certainly affect the stability of large-scale mortgages, which
is prevalent in the real estate industry. To be sure, mortgagee banks would be
indubitably placed at risk if condominium developers are empowered to unilaterally
invalidate mortgage contracts based on their mere failure to secure prior written
approval of the mortgage by the HLURB, which could be easily caused by
inadvertence or by deliberate intent.
MA. SUSANA A. AWATIN, and on behalf of the heirs/beneficiaries of deceased
ALBERTO AWATIN v. AVANTGARDE SHIPPING CORPORATION and MRS.
DORA G PASCUAL, OFFSHORE MARITIME MANAGEMENT INT'L., INC.
(SWITZERLAND), SEABULK TREASURE ISLAND
G.R. No. 179226
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court of petitioners Ma. Susana A. Awatin, and on behalf of the
heirs/beneficiaries of deceased Alberto Awatin that seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated March 21, 2007 and August 3,
2007, respectively.
Remedial law; Factual findings of administrative bodies.--It is well settled in
jurisprudence that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, which
are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions,
are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when
supported by substantial evidence. Consistent therewith is the doctrine that this Court
is not a trier of facts, and this is strictly adhered to in labor cases.
We may take cognizance of and resolve factual issues, only when the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC are inconsistent with those
of the CA.
Labor law; Death of seaman; When compensable.--The death of a seaman to be
compensable should occur during the term of his employment contract and must be
the result of a work-related illness or injury.
While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in
construing the Standard Employment Contract, we cannot allow claims for
compensation based on surmises. When the evidence presented negates
compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause injustice to the
employer. The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer - there may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of management but never
should the scale be so tilted as to result in an injustice to the employer.

SPOUSES CRISPIN AQUINO and TERESA V. AQUINO, herein represented by

their Attorney-in- Fact, AMADOR D. LEDESMA, v. SPOUSES EUSEBIO
AGUILAR and JOSEFINA V. AGUILAR,
G.R. No. 182754
SERENO, CJ:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
Petitioner spouses Crispin and Teresa Aquino (petitioners) assail the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision dated 25 April 20082 in CA-GR SP No. 92778. The CA
modified the Decisions of both the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The CA ruled that although respondent spouses Eusebio and
Josefina Aguilar (respondents) cannot be considered builders in good faith, they
should still be reimbursed for the improvements they have introduced on petitioners'
property.
Civil law; Property; Application of Articles 1678 and 546 of the Civil Code.--By its
express provision, Article 1678 of the Civil Code applies only to lessees who build
useful improvements on the leased property. It does not apply to those who possess
property by mere tolerance of the owners, without a contractual right.
A careful reading of the statement made by this Court in Calubayan would show that
it did not, as it could not, modify the express provision in Article 1678, but only noted
an "analogous" situation. According to the Court, the analogy between a tenant whose
term of lease has expired and a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance lies in their implied obligation to vacate the premises upon demand of the
owner. The Court stated:
It is clear from the above that Calubayan is not sufficient basis to confer the
status and rights of a lessee on those who occupy property by mere tolerance
of the owner.
In those cases, the Court found that the owners knew and approved of the construction
of improvements on the property. Hence, we ruled therein that the structures were
built in good faith, even though the builders knew that they were constructing the
improvement on land owned by another.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, through its PROVINCIAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF DAVAO CITY, and THE MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF CALINAN, DAV AO CITY v.
WOODLAND AGRO-DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G. R. No. 188174
SERENO, CJ:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 seeks the nullification of the Decision dated 2
February 2009 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch 14 (RTC)
and its Order dated 8 May 2009 in Special Civil Case No. 30855-2005. The RTC
nullified the Notice of Coverage (NOC) dated 11 December 2003 and Notice of
Acquisition (NOA) dated 5 October 2004 issued by petitioner Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) over a portion of a parcel of land owned by respondent Woodland

Agro- Development. Inc. (Woodland). The court also denied DAR's Motion for
Reconsideration.
CARL.--Sixteen months after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress enacted
the CARL. The policy of the law is to pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program that shall give highest consideration to the welfare of landless farmers and
farmworkers to promote social justice; move the nation toward sound rural
development and industrialization; and establish owner cultivatorship of economicsize farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture. To this end, a more equitable
distribution and ownership of land shall be undertaken with due regard for the rights
of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation to
provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their dignity and
improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural lands.
In Secretary of Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, Inc., we recognized the CARL as
a bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to
redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate
them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek the laws benefit, it is the means
towards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life.
ANASTACIO TINGALAN, substituted by his heirs, namely: ROMEO L.
TINGALAN, ELPEDIO L. TINGALAN, JOHNNY L. TINGALAN and
LAURETA T. DELA CERNA, v. SPOUSES RONALDO and WINONA
MELLIZA,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
G.R. No. 195247
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01874-MIN dated June 23, 2010 and
January 12, 2011, respectively, which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, in Civil Case No. 3120-01 dated
December 8, 2008. The trial court ordered the cancellation of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-8757 of petitioner Anastacio Tingalan (Anastacio), its
corresponding tax declaration and the transfer of title of the tax declaration under the
name of respondent-spouses Ronaldo and Winona Melliza.
Civil law; Land Titles and Deeds; Sale of land under free patent or homestead.--The
law is clear under Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, that unless made
in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or institutions, lands acquired
under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to any form of
encumbrance for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent
or grant.
This provision of law is clear and explicit and a contract which purports to alienate,
transfer, convey or encumber any homestead within the prohibitory period is void
from its execution. The Court has held in a number of cases that such provision of law
is mandatory with the purpose of promoting a specific public policy to preserve and
keep in the family of the patentee that portion of the public land which the State has

gratuitously given to them.

A void contract produces no legal effect whatsoever in accordance with the principle
quod nullum est nullum producit effectum. It could not transfer title to the subject
property and there could be no basis for the issuance of a title. It is not susceptible of
ratification and the action for the declaration of its absolute nullity is imprescriptible.
JULIE S. SUMBILLA, v. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION,
GR. No.197582
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of
procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in the Decision dated January 14,
2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in Criminal
Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of
petitioner's failure to timely file an appeal.
Remedial law; Immutability of judgments.--Under the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon
finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The
Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case
from their operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would
hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to
the latter, as specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of
substantial justice is at stake and where special and compelling reasons called for such
actions.
The Court has the duty and inherent power to correct the erroneous penalties meted on
the accused in final and executory judgments, and make it conform to the penalty
prescribed by law.
Criminal law; Imprisonment in violations of BP22.--In like manner, the issue of
whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes
imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the
negative in Lozano v. Martinez. Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case
read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt? x x x The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the
law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his

debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order. x x x x
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power
and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for
debt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO DE CASTRO and RANDOLF1 P
ABANIL
G.R. No. 205316
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the May 23, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 04343 affirming appellants' conviction for the crime of murder.
Criminal law; Murder; Elements.--To be convicted of murder, the following must be
established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was
with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor
infanticide.
Same; Same; Qualifying circumstance.--To take advantage of superior strength is to
purposely use excessive force, out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.
Same; Justifying circumstance.--Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for
the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.
SANDRA M. CAM v. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Acting
Ombudsman, MOTHALIB C. ONOS, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Prosecution and Monitoring Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, ROSANO
A. OLIVA and LOURDES S. PADRE SAN JUAN, in their capacities as Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officers, IGNACIO "IGGY" ARROYO, JUAN
MIGUEL "MIKEY" ARROYO and RESTITUTO MOSQUEDA,
G. R. No. 184130
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
the Resolution dated 9 October 2006 and Order dated 13 February 2008 issued by
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-05- 0380-H dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence and denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
Remedial law; Probable cause.--For the purpose of filing a criminal information,
probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed, and that respondent is probably

guilty thereof. The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the
discretion of the prosecuting officers after they have conducted a preliminary
investigation upon complaint of an offended party.
In order to engender the well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, the
elements of the crime charged should be present. This rule is based on the principle
that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be at the
most no criminal offense.
Same; Same; Preliminary investigation.--A preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case; sufficient proof of the guilt of the
criminal respondent must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may
not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. While probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to
prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play. The need for a careful examination of the
evidence is also intended to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses
in prosecuting and trying cases arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
Same; Power of the Ombudsman.--The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine
whether a criminal case, given its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. The complaint may be dismissed should the Ombudsman find it insufficient in
form or substance, or the Ombudsman may proceed with the investigation if the
complaint appears to be in due form and substance. Hence, the filing or non-filing of
the information is primarily lodged within the full discretion of the Ombudsman.
Remedial law; Petition for certiorari; Grave abuse of discretion.--This Court deems it
necessary to remind its officers that to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on
the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility;
and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Courts do not interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in determining
probable cause, unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave
abuse of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Ombudsmans findings.--Nevertheless, the Ombudsman's
discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute. It remains
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in a
manner that would warrant the Courts reversal of the Ombudsmans findings.
The rule of non-interference is rooted in the recognition that the Ombudsmans
exercise of investigatory and prosecutory powers is mandated by the Constitution.
The rule is also adopted for practicality. Otherwise, courts would be swamped if they
have to review the exercise of discretion of public prosecutors each time they decide
to file an information or dismiss a complaint.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO MIRANDA y FELICIANO

G.R. No. 209338
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the May 16, 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04547, which affirmed the May 13, 2010
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, finding
accused-appellant Bienvenido Miranda y Feliciano (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 53 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165.
Criminal law; Special penal laws; RA No. 9165; Illegal sale of dangerous drugs.-Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of dangerous drugs if the
following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
thereto.32
Same; Same; Same; Buy-bust operation.--It bears stressing that the sale of the illegal
drugs in this case was brought about by a buy-bust operation a form of entrapment
that is resorted to for trapping and capturing criminals. It is legal and has been proved
to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. Time and again, this Court has ruled
that a buy-bust operation is employed to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto.
Same; Same; Same; Illegal possession.--Parenthetically, in illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, such as shabu, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of
police officers.--It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.
Same; Same; Same; Chain of custody.--The chain of custody requirement is essential
to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the
monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to
the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.
We have laid down the following links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; Second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer; Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and Fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Same; Same; Same; Non-compliance with Sec. 21 of the IRR.--Non-compliance with

Section 21 of the IRR does not make the items seized inadmissible. Substantial
compliance thereof is sufficient. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Remedial law; Evidence; Denial.--Denial is inherently a weak defense and cannot
prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution. Negative and self-serving
denial deserves no weight in law when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence. Such defense of denial, like frame-up, is a common and standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Same; Findings of the trial court.--Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial
courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conduct the buy-bust operation and appellate courts, upon established
precedents and of necessity, rely on the assessment of the credibility of witnesses by
the trial courts which have the unique opportunity, unavailable to the appellate courts,
to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct
and cross-examination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,v. JOSE BRONIOLA@ "ASOT",
G.R. No. 211027
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision dated September 24, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA)Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00805-MIN affirming with modification
the Judgment dated September 30, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kidapawan City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 207-2000. The RTC found
appellant Jose Broniola alias "Asot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with
Homicide under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 83533, Article 266-A, in relation to Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, AAA, the sum of
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Criminal law; Rape with homicide.--The felony of rape with homicide is a special
complex crime that is, two or more crimes that the law treats as a single indivisible
and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. In rape with
homicide, the following elements must concur: (1) the appellant had carnal
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of
force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.
Remedial law; Evidence in criminal cases.--Direct evidence is not a condition sine
qua non to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence
of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to
discharge its burden.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from

which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law
does not mean such a degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and
produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.