Saguitan v .

City of Mandaluyong
328 SCRA 137, GR 135087 (2000)
Facts: On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City issued a
resolution authorizing Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos
to institute expropriation proceeding over the
property of Alberto Suguitan located at Boni
Avenue and Sto. Rosario Streets in Mandaluyong
City for the expansion of Mandaluyong Medical
Center. On January 20, 1995, Mayor Abalos wrote
Alberto Suguitan offering to buy his property, but
Suguitan refused to sell. Consequently, the City of
Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. Suguitan
filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied
the said motion and subsequently, it allowed the
expropriation of the subject property. Aggrieved
by the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted
that the City of Mandaluyong may only exercise
its delegated power of eminent domain by means
of an ordinance as required by Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 7160, and not by means of a
mere resolution.
Issue: WON the city of Mandaluyong has validly
exercised its power of expropriation.
Held: NEGATIVE
Ratio: The Court ruled that the basis for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units is Section 19 of RA 7160 which
provides that: "A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to
an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws;
Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the
owner, and such offer was not accepted;
Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated;
Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property. In the
present case, the City of Mandaluyong sought to
exercise the power of eminent domain over

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petitioners' property by means of a resolution, in

contravention of the first requisite. The law in this
case is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19
of the Code requires an ordinance, not a
resolution, for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Therefore, while the Court
remains conscious of the constitutional policy of
promoting local autonomy, it cannot grant judicial
sanction to a local government unit's exercise of
its delegated power of eminent domain in
contravention of the very law giving it such
power.
Estate Or Heirs Of The Late Ex-Justice Jose
B. L. Reyes Vs. City Of Manila
G.R. No. 132431 February 13, 2004
FACTS: The case is a petition for review and
certiorari filed by the heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against
respondent Court of Appeals and City of Manila
et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of the
C.A. for the issuance of protective custody in
favor of respondent on the contested 11 parcels
of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta.
Cruz District, Manila with a total land area of 13,
940 square meters and covered by TCT no. 24359
issued by the Register of Deeds, Manila. The land
in question was initially occupied and leased by
different tenants, among them are respondents
Abiog, Maglonso and members of Sampaguita
Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI).
On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable
judgments against Abiog pursuant to the decision
rendered by the MTC Manila, Branch 3 in Civil
Case No 142851-CV and against Maglonsoin Civil
Case No. 144205-CV on May 4, 1995. While the
case is under adjudication, the respondents City
of Manila intervenes and file a complaint for
imminent domain (expropriation) on April 25,
1995 based on its approved Ordinance No 7818
enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the
City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain
parcels of land with an aggregate area of
9,930square meters, more or less. It argued that
the purpose of expropriation is for a socialize
housing project of the city which would otherwise
benefit its underprivileged and homeless citizens.
However, petitioner turned down the offer on
various reasons among them, the failure of both
to arrive at an amicable offer for the settlement
of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue
the protective order despite the finality of
order rendered by the trial court?

Whether
respondent
City
deprived
petitioners of their property without due
process of law?
Whether the respondent City of Manila
complied with the legal requirements for
expropriation provided under Section 9
and 10 of R.A. 7279?

HELD: RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of

priority in the acquisition of property subject of
any expropriation intended for public purpose.
Section
10thereof,
made
a
significant
pronouncement that the expropriation may be
resorted to only when other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted underscoring supplied.
Before respondent City can exercise its power of
eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned
and must not violate any law. Reiterating the
provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing
that private lands rank last in the order of priority
for purposes of socialized housing. In the same
vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted
to only after the other modes of acquisition have
been
exhausted.
Compliance
with
these
conditions is mandatory because these are the
only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of
private property against violation of due process
when their property is forcibly taken from them
for public use. The state in its paramount interest
of promoting public good and general welfare
cannot simply ignore the rights of its citizens and
such must take precedence over the interest of
private property owners. Individual rights affected
by the exercise of such right are also entitled to
protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
this superior right cannot override the guarantee
of due process extended by the law to owners of
the property to be expropriated. Due to the fatal
infirmity in the Citys exercise of the power of
eminent domain, its complaint for expropriation
was turned down by the court. Petitions granted
and decision of C.A. was reversed and set aside.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Vs. Ca
GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004
FACTS:
Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC)
bought a parcel of land, issued it in the
name of its successor, the Credito Asiatic,
Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently
subdivided it into two parcels
LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75hectare property into a residential and
industrial estate

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CAI embarked on the development of the

housing project into three phases and
secured a locational clearance for the
project from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC
CAI decided to continue with the
development of its Hakone Housing Project
but the project was stymied by a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for
Temporary
Restraining
Order
and
Preliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs alleged that they had
reached
an
agreements
with
the
respondent that they would remain in
peaceful possession of their farm holdings
but notwithstanding such, the defendant
ordered the bulldozing of the property
In answer to the complaint, CAI denied
that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess and
cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals
Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs
entered into a compromise agreement
which eventually led to all of the other
plaintiffs entering into an agreement with
CAI
CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for
Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No.
6657,
otherwise
known
as
the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) was filed before the DAR by
seventeen (17) individuals who alleged
that they are farmers who have occupied
a parcel of public agricultural land
adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River
According to the petitioners, the said
illegal bulldozing activities would convert
the land from agricultural to nonagricultural land, thereby depriving the
members of the PBFAI of their tenancy
rights over the property. For this reason,
the petitioners prayed that a temporary
restraining order be issued ex-parte to
stop the bulldozing of the property, and
that a preliminary injunction or a status
quo order be later issued to enjoin the
same.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the property subject of the suit is
covered by Rep. Act No. 6657, the Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL);
(2) Whether the DARAB had original and
appellate jurisdiction over the complaint of the
petitioner PBFAI against the private respondent;
(3) Whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI
have a cause of action against the private

respondent for possession and cultivation of the

property in suit;
(4) Whether the dismissal by the RTC of the
complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to
the complaint of the petitioners-members of the
PBFAI; and
(5) Whether the appellate court committed a
reversible error in dismissing the petition for
review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no
merit.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June
15, 1988. But long before the law took
effect, the property subject of the suit had
already been reclassified and converted
from agricultural to non-agricultural or
residential land.
With our finding that the property subject
of the suit was classified as residential
land since 1976, the DARAB had no
original and appellate jurisdiction over the
property subject of the action of the
petitioner PBFAI and its members.
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI
were not the tenants of the private
respondent CAI, the petitioners and its
members had no cause of action against
the private respondent for possession of
the landholding to maintain possession
thereof and for damages.
When the complaint was filed, twenty-five
(25) of the thirty -seven(37) members of
the petitioners had already executed
separate deeds of quitclaim in favor of the
private respondent CAI over the portions
of the landholding they respectively
claimed, after receiving from the private
respondent CAI varied sums of money. In
executing the said deeds, the members of
the petitioner PBFAI thereby waived their
respective claims over the property.
Hence, they have no right whatsoever to
still remain in possession of the same.
Petition denied.

Dacanay v. Asistio 208 SCRA 404

Facts: Way back in January 5, 1979, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) enacted

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MMC Ordinance 79-02, which allowed certain city

and municipal public streets and roads to be sites
for many vendors applied for licenses to conduct
such activities in said streets.
On Dec. 20, 1987, the RTC of Caloocan City ruled
that the streets were of public dominion and
ordered the demolition of said stalls. But Mayor
Martinez, who had advocated the demolition of
the said stalls, has been replaced by Mayor
Asistio. Mayor Asistio did not carry out the order
of the RTC, for humanitarian reasons. Francisco
Dacanay, a concerned citizen and a resident
along Heroes del 96 street, filed a petition for
mandamus to compel the Mayor, thru the City
Engineer, to remove the said stalls. Will the
petition prosper?
Held: Yes, for the plain and simple reason that
public roads cannot be the object of leases and
thus cannot be bargain away thru contracts.
Public roads should serve the purpose for which
they were built: for public use as arteries of travel
for vehicles and pedestrians.
ISSUE: May public streets be leased or licensed
to market stallholders by virtue of a city
ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila
Commission?
HELD: NO
1. A public street is property for public use hence
outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of
lease or other contract
2. The vested right of the public to use city
streets for the purpose they were intended to
serve such as for traveling
3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot
change the nature of the public street because it
is going to be contrary to the general law
HELD: There is no doubt that the disputed
areas from which the private respondents
market stalls are sought to be evicted are public
streets. A public street is property for public
use hence outside the commerce of man.
Being outside the commerce of man, it may
not be the subject of lease or other contract.
The right of the public to use the city streets may
not be bargained away through contract. The
interests of the few should not prevail over the
good of the greater number in the community.