1. PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner, vs. HON.

COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO

LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES,
ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
[G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001, BUENA, J.:]
FACTS:
1. Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land in Manila
2. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana's estate

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

a. They adjudicated and divided among themselves the real property

b. Under the agreement: Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14
share of the said property.
The heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of
Rights"
a. they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name
a. The land was further subdivided into two separate lots
i. Graciano sold the 1st lot to a third person but retained ownership over the 2 nd lot
Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher
a. He sold the 2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name.
Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs
A civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC of Manila by the 6 children
a. REASONS
i. Alleging that Natcher through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery,
acquired the 2nd lot by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her
favour
ii. Alleging that their legitimes have been impaired
b. ANSWER OF NATCHER: she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter.
c. RTCs RULING:
i. deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity.
1. no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property
between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering into a contract of sale
2. not a valid donation
3. can be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased
CAs Ruling:
a. probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
b. trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person.

ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment
of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
HELD: NO. CA decision AFFIRMED.
1. Civil action vs- Special Proceeding

Civil Action

a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in

Special Proceedings

as an application or proceeding to establish the status or

the manner prescribed by the court or by the law.

right of a party, or a particular fact.

method of applying legal remedies according to

definite established rules

no formal pleadings are required unless the statute

expressly so provides.
the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion

2. Special Proceedings defined:

a. American Jurisprudence: proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions.
i. in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."
3. CAB:
a. an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action
b. matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
i. requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
c. matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
d. Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court: as to advancement made or alleged to have been made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.
e. RTC is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of Natcher in the case for reconveyace and annulment of title with damages
f. the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass
upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife
g. the present issue is a mere question of procedure which may be waived
i. no waiver was done by the 6 children nor did they assail the authority of the trail court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.
ii. Generally: a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership
1. EXCEPTIONS: (effect= probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership.)
a. if the interested parties are all heirs
b. question is one of collation or advancement
c. parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and
the rights of third parties are not impaired,

2. MONTANER V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT

Facts: Petitioner Luisa Montaner (Luisa), a Roman Catholic, was married to deceased Alejandro Montaner
(Alejandro) at a Catholic Church . Private respondents Liling Disangcopan (Disangcopan) and her daughter
Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a complaint for judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court,
alleging (among others) that deceased Alejandro is a Muslim and that they are his first family. Luisa filed an
Answer with a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds: 1. Sharia has no jurisdiction because Alejandro is a
Roman Catholic; 2. Disangcopan failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and 3. Complaint is
barred by prescription. Sharia Court dismissed Luisas motion to dismiss. MR denied.
Issue: W/N Disangcopans complaint for judicial partition of properties should be dismissed by the
Sharia Court for failure to file the correct amount of (insufficient) docket fees?
Held and Ratio: SC upheld Sharia Courts dismissal. Allegation of insufficient payment of docket fees
involved two aspects: 1.Whether the Clerk of Court correctly assessed the docket fees; and 2. Whether

Disangcopan paid the correct assessment of the docket fees. Filing of the appropriate initiatory pleading and
the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the
party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the Clerk of Court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same
Clerk of Court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction
because the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the Clerk of Courts insufficient assessment.
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency. In this case, Luisa did not present the
Clerk of Courts assessment of the docket fees nor did the records include this assessment, accordingly, there
could be no determination whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the Clerk of Courts
assessment.

3.DE BORJA Tasiana Ongsingco vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan and Jose de Borja
July 25, 1955| Bautista Angelo
Facts:
Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of Francisco de Borja, who was declared
incompetent by the CFI of Rizal in Spec. Pro. No. 1764. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco
whose estate is being settled in Spec. Pro. No. 7866 in the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is the son of
Francisco de Borja and administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco.
After Francisco was declared incompetent, Tasiana took possession of two parcels of land situated in Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ejica and commenced the threshing of the palay crop standing thereon. Jose filed a motion in the
estate proceedings of Josefa praying that Tasiana be restrained from threshing the palays until the ownership of
the lands has been resolved by the court or by agreement of the parties.
Tasiana opposed the motion and stated that the question of ownership can only be threshed out elsewhere
and not by the probate court. She then filed an action in the CFI of Nueva Ecija to prevent Jose from interfering
with the harvest. The CFI of Nueve Ecija granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Tasiana.
Meanwhile, the CFI of Rizal issued an order restraining Tasiana in the threshing of the palay harvested in
the disputed lands. Tasian filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. She then filed a petition for
certiorari with prohibition in the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to resolve the ownership dispute between Tasiana Ongsingco and
Jose de Borja?
Held: No. In Franco vs. OBrien, it was held that the question of ownership is one which should be determined in
an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the
estate. In another case it was held that the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed
upon in testate or intestate proceedings[1] or stating the rule more elaborately, When questions arise as to the
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person but claimed by some other person to
be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative proceedings.[2]
Based from the foregoing, it thus appears obvious that the CFI of Rizal exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the
question of ownership in its capacity as probate court. Such question has been squarely raised in an action pending
in the CFI of Nueva Ecija. It is of no consequence that what respondent court merely did was look into the identity
of said properties. This question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven one
can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.

Doctrine: A probate court cannot act on questions of ownership lest it exceeds its jurisdiction.

4. Pacioles v. Chuatoco-ching

Facts:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments worth
P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by
her husband, petitioner, and their two minor children. milio Pacioles husband of deceased Miguelita filed with the
RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise
the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest
in the estate. Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half
of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners. She then nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to
act as special administrator.
The intestate court then issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the
estate and then declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. Petitioner
then submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys
fees. Respondent opposed on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is premature and
precipitate, considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture. Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas
estate as an heir and co-owner. She prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
The intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. It also ordered that a hearing on
oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the
properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties
of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
Petitioner questrioned this order but the MR was denied. The Petition for Certiorari with the CA. This is a Petition
for Certiorari to the CA.
Issue: Did the lower court acted with GADALEJ in ordering that a hearing be set to determine the ownership of the
properties in an intestate procedding?
Held: YES May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
Ratio::
The general rule is that the intestae court cannot hear and pass upon questions of ownership. However the intestae
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership provisionally and when merely incidentalif the purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory of he estate of the deceased. But this

case does not fall under the above mentioned deviation from the general rule, thus the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion in ordering that a hearing be set for determining the ownership of the properties in question.
The facts of this case show that the inventorty is not disputed. In fact, in repondents Manifestation and
Opposition, respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner. Respondent could have opposed
petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or considered to be
hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation
placed on the real estate properties. Also, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative, did not submit his own
inventory
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should
or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure from the intestate court a final determination of
her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is
not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging
to Miguelita's estate given that she had Torrens title over such properties. (Miguela cannot even determine in
particular the properties she is claiming.

5. VDA. DE MANALO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
- Troadio Manalo died intestate survived by wife and 11 children left several properties in Manila and Tarlac.
- 8 children (resps) pet for the judicial settlement of the estate in RTC Manila & appointment of bro Romeo as
admin
- TC order declaring the whole world in default, except the government.
- order of general default set aside upon motion of pets (wife & remaining 3 children)
- TC order admitting the petition for judicial settlement of estate.
- Pets pet for certiorari under Rule 65
- absence of earnest efforts towards compromise among members of the same family; and no certification
of non
forum shopping was attached to the petition.
- CA denied the petition & MFR
- Pets petition claiming Pet for issuance of letters of admin, settlement & distribution of estate is an ordinary civil
action thus should be dismissed under Rule 16, Sec 1(j) of the ROC on the ground that a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied with as there was failure to comply with the requirement in Art 222 CC
ISSUE:
Is the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate an ordinary civil
action, thus Rule 16, Sec 1(j) Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 222 CC apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
petition NO
HELD:
Rule: In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averment and the character of the
relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling.
o scrutiny of the Petition for ILASD of Estate belies herein petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of
an ordinary civil action.
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate
fact of death
residence at the time of his said death
enumeration of the names of his legal heirs
tentative list of the properties left w/c are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
o petition contains certain averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action & so petitioners, as
oppositors took advantage of such in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and
ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of the
Civil Code.

civil action/suit - action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a
right, or the protection or redress of a wrong.
o Art 222 applicable only to ordinary civil actions
Use of term suit
excerpt from the report of the Code Commission to make it applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.
Special proceedings remedy where petitioner seeks to establish a status, right or particular fact.
o Pet for ILASD of Estate = special proc

6. KILOSBAYAN VERSUS JANOLO (wala ko kau kasabot ani na kaso)

Facts: On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[1] filed a petition[2] under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the
amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over
which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided. Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition,
petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating
from the proceedings in the RTC case.
Issue: Can substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry be effected
through an ex parte application?
Ruling: The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,[68] stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or
citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or [o]ne having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.[69] In this case,
impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming
an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, while petitioners interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a
responsive pleading.
7. Vda. de Chua vs. CA, GR 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two illegitimate sons with her. On May 28,
1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the
two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent
being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the
said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the
marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer
Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
DavaoCity; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was
born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent
was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was
later appealed to the appellate court, but it decided infavor of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of the marriage of Antonietta
Garcia to Roberto Chua.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein
failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a
valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence
Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and
a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this
being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as
evidence would make the marriage dubious.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SWEEPINGLY HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S REMEDY
IS APPEA?
As to the last assignment of errors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the proper remedy of the petitioner in
said court was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action for certiorari; which can be availed of if a party has
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Except for her bare allegation that an

ordinary appeal would be inadequate, nothing on record would indicate that extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
prohibition is warranted.
Finally, petitioner further argues as supplement to her memorandum that the ruling of the Court of Appeals
treating the Special Proceeding No. 331 as one for both guardianship and settlement of estate is in contravention of
our ruling in Gomez vs. Imperial, 28 which the petitioner quotes:
The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased is a function pertaining property not to the
guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.
Petitioner's reliance on said case is misplaced. In the Gomez case, the action before the lower court was merely
one for guardianship. Therefore said court did not have the jurisdiction to distribute the estate of the deceased.
While in the case at bar, the petition filed before the court was both for guardianship and settlement of estate.
8. SPOUSES TOPACIO V BANCO FILIPINO
GR 157644 | Nov 17, 2010 | J. Brion

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil actions and not to special proceedings.

Facts:
1.

Petitioners Sps Topacio filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision and resolution
denying their MR and affirming in toto the RTC decision, which issued an alias writ of possession in favor of
respondent Banco Filipino.

2.

Sps Topacio obtained a P400,000 loan from the bank and gave an REM as security. They failed to pay
prompting the bank to extra-judicially foreclose. To satisfy the obligation, the provincial sheriff sold in auction the
mortgaged the property, where bank emerged as highest bidder. A Cert of Sale was issued to the bank and was
registered with ROD.

3.

Bank filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which RTC granted conditioned on the posting of
P100,000 bond, which bank posted.

4.

Writ of possession was not implemented because of Sps Topacios Writ to set aside auction sale and writ of
possession. RTC thereafter issued TRO and writ of prelim injunction sheriff from implementing writ of possession.

5.

Bank filed an Answer to dissolve the writ of prelim injunction, to which Sps Topacio filed a reply for its
maintenance

6.

More than 2 years after and several postponements, the Judge dismissed banks petition for failure to
prosecute. However, no copy of this decision was served on respondent bank, whose operations were shut down
by Monetary Bank

7.

Nearly 6 years later, bank filed a motion to clarify the order of dismissal and moved for issuance of an alias
writ of possession, which was denied.

8.

Bank filed an MR. New judge reconsidered and issued alias writ. Petitioners file MR, claiming that dismissal
order has long been final and executory and alias writ should be made in a separate motion. Both RTC and CA
denied.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in affirming RTC decision considering:

1) the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order constitutes an adjudication on the merits which has already attained
finality, (that res judicata has set in) and
2) a writ of possession may not be enforced upon mere motion of the applicant after the lapse of more than
five (5) years from the time of its issuance.
Held:
1. No. Res judicata applies in the concept of bar by prior judgment if the following requisites concur: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be,
between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.
No res judicata because the first element of res judicata is lacking. In the present case, SC notes that the
December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to have become final and executory in view of the absence
of a valid service, whether personally or via registered mail, on the respondents counsel. We note in this regard
that the petitioners do not dispute the CA finding that the records failed to show that the private respondent was
furnished with a copy of the said order of dismissal[.] Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never attained finality.
2. No. The petitioners finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February 16, 1984, may no
longer be enforced by a mere motion, but by a separate action, considering that more than five years had elapsed
from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute
of limitations.
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court only applies to civil actions.
In rejecting a similar argument, the Court has held that Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds
application only to civil actions and not to special proceedings.
This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured
as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of
land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex parte petition for the
issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action governed by the Rules of Civil

Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the
methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in
nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.
In sum, based on these considerations, the SC finds that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing
an alias writ of possession in favor of the Respondent. Petition denied.

9.NOCUM V. LUCIO TAN

ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
Date: Sept. 23, 2005
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constitutin the plaintiff's cause of action. Objections to venue in civil
actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint for damages (moral and exemplary) for alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations against him in 2 articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Petitioners Inquirer and reporter Nocum ,
and ALPAP and Capt. Umali, in their respective joint answers alleged that the complaint stated no cause of
action. ALPAP and Capt. Umali also alleged that the venue was improperly laid. The complaint failed to state
the resdience of complainant Lucio Tan at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC of Makati: Complaint was dismissed without prejudice on the ground of improper venue
Lucio Tan filed an omnibus motion seeking reconsideration and admission of the amended complaint now
alleging that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati" and that " This caricature was
printed and first published in the City of Makati."
RTC then set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the defect in the original complaint has already
been cured in the Amended complaint which can still be properly admitted purusuant to Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of CivPro since the Order of Dismissal was not yet final. Also, the amendment was merely formal.
2 petitions for certiorari were then filed (one by Nocum and PDI, one by ALPAP and Umali) but CA dismissed the
petition. The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied. Thus, the appeal at the SC. After the filing of
comment by Tan and the reply filed by PDI and Nocum, SC resolved to give due course to the petition.
Contention of PDI and Nocum: Art 360 of RPC vests jurisdiction over all civil and criminal complaints for libel on
the RTC of the place (1) where the libelous article was printed and first published; or (2) where the
complainant, if pirivate person, resides; or (3) where the complaint, if a public official, holds office. Thus,
since the original lcomplaint stated only the business adress of Lucio Tan and not his actual residence or the
place of printing and first publication, the original complaint failed to confer jurisdiction on the RTC.
iSSUE:/ HELD:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the original complaint? YES.
RATIO:
Jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here. RTC acquired jurisdiction over

the case when the case was filed before it. Tan's cause of action is for damages arising from libel, jurisdiction of
which is vested with the RTC. Art. 360 of RPC provides that is the CFI that is specifically designated to try a libel
case.
Jurisdiction is different from venue. (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case while venue is
the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue is a matter
of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter, venue
establishes a relation between the plaintiff and the defendant, or the petitioner and the respondent; and (d)
Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties while venue may be conferred by the act or
agreement of the parties.
In this case, the additional allegations in the Amended Complainant as to place of printing and first publication
referred only to the question of venue and not jurisidiction. They would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor
would failure to include them divest RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. Tan's failure to allege these allegations
gave the court, the power upon motion by a party, to dismiss on the ground that the venue was not properly laid.
The amendment was not intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court,where originally it had none. The
amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. Venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction
except in criminal actions. Assuming that the venue was improperly laid, the issue would be procedural, not a
jurisdictional impediment. In civil cases, venue may be waived. By dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue, RTC had jurisdiction over the case. PDI and Nocum recognized RTC's jurisdiction by filing their answers to
the complaint by questioning the propriety of venue instead of a motion to dismiss.
Objections to venue in civil actions arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of
jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive. Venue relates to trial and not jurisdiction.
In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of
jurisdiction.

10. RULE 4 VENUE

G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, respondent.

NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Paraaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to
Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner
sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were
under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC
Paraaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to
be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise
inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay
City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of
Paraaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as
respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper
venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are
located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the
other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the

jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the
motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that
it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of
improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law.[16] It may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the
parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the
proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be
left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be
waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it
relates to the place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this
stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered,
he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed
waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules
of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in
the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action
and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner
for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the
real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits
without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where
the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

11. GARCIA FULE V. CA

FACTS:
- Amado Garcia died - left property in Calamba, Laguna.
- Virginia Garcia Fule (illeg sis) pet for letters of admin & ex parte appointment as special administratix in CFI
Laguna
- Motion was granted.
- Preciosa Garcia (wife) and in behalf of their child opposed
> failure to satisfy jurisdictional requirement & improper venue (avers no domicile/residence of deceased
as
required by Rule 79 Sec. 21) death certs presented by Fule show QC as deceaseds last residence
> Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is not entitled to
succeed
1 Rule 79 Sec 2 - petition should show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts
such as death, name, last residence, existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks administration as next of kin, creditor or
otherwise to be appointed

from him2
- CFI denied opposition
- CA reversed and annulled the appointment of Fule
- Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30k.
ISSUES/HELD
a.) Venue v. Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION power/authority of court over subject matter
o Jurisdiction over all probate cases is w/ CFIs independently from the place of residence of the
deceased (Judiciary act 1948)
o Not changed by procedure
o There are cases though that if such power is not exercised conformably w/ procedure, court loses power to
exercise it legally. However, this doesnt amount to loss of jurisdiction over subject matter but only over
the person or that judgment may be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
VENUE place where each case shall be brought
o Because there are many CFIs, ROC fixed the venue (of settlement of estates, probate of will & issuance
of letters of admin) place of residence of deceased / province
Death Certificate deceased resided in QC at the time of his death, therefore the venue of Laguna
was improper (death cert admissible to prove residence of deaceased at time of his death)
o Rule 73 Sec 13 - really a matter of venue
Clause so far.
Caption Settlement of estate of Deceased Person. Venue and Processes
Contained in a law of procedure merely a matter of method & convenience to parties
o Rule 4 Sec 4 - Venue is subject to waiver
but Preciosa did not waive it, merely requested for alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse
b.) What does the word resides in Rule 73 Sec 1 mean
Resides actual residence
- Requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place
- In statutes fixing venue residence & domicile synonymous even when statue uses domicile, it is
still construed as residence & not domicile in its technical sense
- Elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed.
- Popular sense the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode
- No particular length of time required but must be more than temporary
legal residence or domicile requires bodily presence and an intention to make it ones domicile.
DISPOSITION: Fules petition DENIED.

12. PACIFIC BANKING CORP vs CA

FACTS: [Consolidated Case]

2NCC Art. 992.

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestado from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
3 RULE 73 Sec.1. if the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled at the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death. And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the CFI of any province in which he had estate.The court 1 st taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.

CASE#1 (union)(5th division)

1

Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines
and, was placed under liquidation.
a

RTC: the Central Bank filed a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation."
a

DENIED!

The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal.
a

RTC ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union.

The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order.
a

The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.

Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union), herein petitioner, filed a complaint-inintervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential,
Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.
a

A Liquidator was appointed.

The respondent judge disallowed Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late.
(Filed more than 15 days after receipt of the decision)

*CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

a

CA held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the RTC was a special proceeding
and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30
days.

Since the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the
Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time.

RTC should give due course to the appeal.

*SC: The Union filed a petition

a

The union contends that the case is a special proceeding and that the appeal was filed out of time.

CASE #2 (stockholders/investors)(14th divison)

1

*RTC: Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondent, filed claims for the payment of investment in
the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18.
a

Respondent judge directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents as preferred creditors.

The Liquidator moved for reconsideration

a

DENIED!

The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders.

a

As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the
record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15
days.

The judge directed the execution of his order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

*CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

a

CA held that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action.

Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered is 15 days

Since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of
appeal was filed late.

*SC: The Liquidator filed a petition

a

Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking
Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action

HELD: SPECIAL PROCEEDING

Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:

1. Action defined. Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
( I made a table para masmadali maintindihan haha joel )

ACTION (CIVIL ACTION)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

The act by which one sues another in a court of

justice for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

The act by which one seeks to establish the status

or right of a party, or a particular fact.

A formal demand of a right by one against

another.

A petition for a declaration of a status, right or

fact.

Proper remedy of a party litigant that seeks to

recover property from another.

Proper remedy of a party whose purpose is to seek

the appointment of a guardian for an insane.

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a
wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or
omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be
able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations . Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition
only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the
order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Since a petition for liquidation is in the nature of a special proceeding, the period of appeal is 30 days and the
party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to
perfect his appeal.

In CASE#2 (Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the
23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal
is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are
allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with
respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court
where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final.

In CASE#1 (union), CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As
already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on
December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for
the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on
appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for
extension to file a record on appeal.

CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition and its decision should be affirmed.

Note:

Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for
the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to
rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under
Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the
payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the
liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors
and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an
insolvent corporation.

13. SHEKER vs ESTATE OF ALICE SHEKER

Civil Procedure Certification of Non-Forum Shopping Not Required in a Contingent Money Claim
Alice Sheker died and her estate was left under the administration of Victoria Medina. Alice left a holographic will
which was admitted to probate by the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The trial court issued an order for all
creditors to file their claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, Alan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent
money claim in the amount of P206,250.00 representing the amount of his commission as an agent for selling some
properties for Alice; and another P275k as reimbursements for expenses he incurred.
Medina moved for the dismissal of Alan Shekers claim alleging among others that the money claim filed by Alan
Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of non-forum shopping thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated NOT by Alan
Shekers money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Shekers will. Under
Sections1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all
persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and
the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain
exceptions.

A money claim in a probate proceeding is like a creditors motion for claims which is to be recognized and taken
into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. And as a motion, its office is not to
initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the
motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected
with and dependent upon the principal remedy.