You are on page 1of 19

Shipping companies and shipyards are assisted in evaluating the technical implementation of

their ideas. The result is a tailor-made solution based on sound naval architectural principles and
integrating all design aspects from the operational and shipbuilding side.
Ship design and corresponding support is one of the core business areas of SDC and includes:

Concept designs
resulting in technical documents as a basis for shipbuilding
contracts

Basic designs
including key plans and main documents for approval of the
classification societies and administrations, used as the basis
for the detail design

Design support
e.g. weight estimation, speed-power estimations, freeboard, fuel oil
protection calculations etc.

Detail design support


assisting the shipyard/detailed design office in implementing the
basic design in the workshop drawings

STABILITY CALCULATION

Since the very beginning SDC has been known as a specialist for any kind of stability calculations for ships. Providing s
calculations for designers, shipyards and ship owners is a basic business of SDC. Our services cover calculation of all
regulations:

SOLAS and MARPOL-Conventions

HSC-, IBC-, IGC-, MODU-Codes

IMO Res.A265, A749, ADNR, etc...

Deterministic and probabilistic damage stability of all kinds of regulation e.g.

Water on deck

Crane stability and optimization (more information: Services - > Other services -> Crane stability + Optimization

Loading and discharging manual

Longitudinal strength

Grain stability

Ballast water management

Mobile offshore drilling units

Inclining and deadweight tests


SDC organizes and conducts
deadweight and Inclining tests
for passenger vessels according SOLAS, worldwide

MV "Europa"

MV "Deutschland"

MV "c.Columbus"

MV "Hanseatic"

and many others...

SDC uses NAPA, one of the most powerful CAE-Programs for ship design. SDC is key user and keeps the user suppor
NAPA in Germany.

STEEL DESIGN AND STRENGTH CALCULATION


Our steel design team provides an integrated construction and calculation
service:

Strength calculations according to all Classification Societies

Structural drawings for all kinds of vessels

Steel design concepts, feasibility studies, lengthening and conversions

FEM-Calculations for all kinds of structures

Local and global vibration analysis

Support for owners approvals

Hull Design Defects


Part I
by David Pascoe
This series of articles is written exclusively for marine surveyors to help identify
the wide range of structural defects that can be found in boats and yachts.
Because there is such a diversity in types of hulls, design styles and an everexpanding array of new construction materials, it is difficult for surveyors to keep
up to date on cause-and-effect evaluations.
Related Reading:
Hull Design Defects Part II

Whether the surveyor deals exclusively with prepurchase surveys, insurance


claims or marine expert related matters, learning how to locate, detect and
evaluate is a critical factor in the surveyor's work. This essay deals with basic
principles of hull design, along with cause and effect analysis of hull failures. It
will set the necessary foundation for this continuing series of essays.
Improper design and the improper selection and use of materials is the primary
cause of most non-damage related structural failures. Contrary to common belief,
actual manufacturing defects only rarely figure into structural failures. It should
come as no surprise to any surveyor that the boat building industry, much like the
automotive industry which, after more than 70 years of mass production, backed
up with their enormous financial resources, is still fraught with frequent design
defects. But unlike the automotive industry, boats are not manufactured in units
numbering millions, rather 10's and 100's at best.
Because of this, design faults are spread over a very wide array of different
builders and tens of thousands different models over the years so that rarely do
major design errors ever become widely documented. To make matters worse,
there are very few avenues for dissemination of information, and virtually no one
who maintains any kind of database on hull failures. This essay will attempt to
illustrate the most common defects, the cause and the visible effects that the
surveyor can use as a basis for conducting a thorough structural survey.
Structural Principles
Before we go directly into reviewing problems, its important that we first review
the major principles of hull design. From and engineering standpoint, fiberglass
boats have similarities to both bridges and aircraft airframes. A discussion of
these similarities will help us to better understand the forces that act on a boat
hull, and the structural principles required to build one.
Boats are similar to bridges in that the hull must have a framing system to
support it because the hull itself, like a bridge, spans a fluid substance. Whereas
a bridge spans air, a hull spans water, and while water is more dense, it is still a
fluid and offers lesser means of support that solid ground. Further, when a boat is
hauled out and set on blocks, often only one at each end of the hull, that hull then
literally becomes a bridge spanning open air. Unless the hull has an adequate
system of framing and girders to span the unsupported sections, like a bridge it
will buckle and collapse.
We can add to this the fact that boats are dynamic objects; they often travel at
high speeds over rough water and even occasionally, if not frequently, become
airborne. Thus, the stresses on a boat hull are far more than a matter of just

gravity and mass, but are multiplied by velocity and compounded by slamming.
And as anyone who has ever done a belly-flopper off a diving board knows,
water becomes hard as a rock when a wide, flat object falls upon it squarely.
Most bridges do not consist of a flat deck supported by girders underneath.
Rather, most bridges are either in the form of a truss, or they are suspended from
above by a combination of rigid and flexible supports. A boat is also similar to this
principle since the hull bottom and sides do not alone constitute the entire
structural framework. Boats that lack weather decks and superstructures, for
example, are far weaker than their cousins who do have these additional
structures. Thus, decks and superstructures also constitute major structural
elements of most boats and ships.
And here it is that fiberglass boats develop similarities to modern jet aircraft.
Aircraft utilize the principle of monocoque construction. That is, the body of the
aircraft does not have a frame but essentially is the frame. The skin of the aircraft
and the framing system are so closely integrated that they essentially become
one structure and its hard to tell where one ends and the other begins. Modern
jet aircraft are essentially flying pipes with wings, and it is from this engineering
principle that they gain their strength, despite the extremely light construction.
Modern fiberglass boats make use of this principle of monocoque construction
and in this way are more closely related to aircraft than they are to their woodenboat ancestors from which they evolved. A wood boat is the sum of its many
parts while a fiberglass boat hull is essentially one component. The combination
of molded hull and deck joined together creates a unified whole that is much
stronger than the sum of its parts. But boats are proportionately far heavier than
aircraft and are subjected to different stresses. Aircraft don't fly off the tops of
waves; boats do. While the bottoms of hulls take the major brunt of stresses, and
must be designed to withstand them, the monocoque construction still plays a
major role in providing strength to the overall structure.
There is no better illustration of this than the offshore racer type boat, a long
skinny hull equipped with tremendous horsepower. In the so-called "cigarette"
type boat, the deck provides a major part of the hull strength that, lacking a
strong deck, the hull would buckle. These decks are not "hull covers" but
designed as structural elements. These race boats are true monocoque
structures because the hull and deck structures are not screwed or bolted
together, but literally bonded together to become one piece.

Here's a good example of poor design and construction detail. Utilizing a glass
over plywood framing system, there are no fillets under the frames or stringers
which are butted hard against the hull. This creates hardspots with the propensity
for stress cracking. In addition, the length-to-height ratio of the tall stringers
creates instability where the stringers are likely to buckle under inpact loading.
Additional framing between the stringers is needed to stabilize them. Also note
that there are only two hull side stiffeners so that flexing of the sides is likely to
cause hull/deck joint breakage. In the forward section, a dog leg in the stringer
profile can be seen.
Dynamics of Hull Stress
Power boat hulls are essentially modified rectangles with a shallow vee on the
bottom. When a boat falls off, or slams down off a wave, the bottom impacts the
water and suddenly stops its downward movement. This sudden stop sends
shock waves up the hull sides that are then transmitted to the deck and any
upper structures that may exist. In the meantime, while the hull suddenly stops its
downward movement, everything inside the hull wants to continue on downward,
creating even more stress.

When the hull impacts the water, the resultant stresses work to cause the hull to
want to buckle transversely and longitudinally. The impact with the water is never
uniform along the length of the hull so that one end, or one side, of the hull is
more stressed than the other. One effect is to try to break the boat in half like
snapping a stick in half. The other effect is to bow the hull sides inward or
outward, the effect of bending along the horizontal plane. Yet another is twisting
or torsional stress along the entire length of the hull.
In actual operation under heavy conditions, the hull sides of most boats will
deflect to greater or lesser degrees depending on how well it is designed. This is
the result of impact loading, bending and torsional loading on the hull caused by
high velocity over waves, porpoising and so on. If you've ever wondered why so
many boats have rub rails falling off and weak and damaged hull/deck joints, you
probably thought that this was primarily due to hitting up against dock pilings. But
the real reason is that many boats have poorly designed hull/deck joints that are
simply lap joints screwed together. It is the stress transferred from the hull bottom
to the hull sides and thence to hull/deck join that causes the screws that join
these parts together to break loose. Putting screws into fiberglass is a terrible
means of making connections. Screw joins are simply too weak to work
effectively.
So it is that the deck - and the superstructure that is often integral with the deck,
i.e., are molded as one piece - are not only part of a unified structure, but also
absorb much of the load initially induced on the hull. This also accounts for much
of the damage and cracking found in and around deck structures, and why on
many boats windows, doors and hatches and portholes just never seem to stop
leaking. The whole structure is working so that no amount of caulking, bedding
and gasketing can ever stop the leaks because they just open up again
These are the effects of stress on the exterior boat hull and structure. But the
stress doesn't end there for we've not yet considered the hull framing system.
The framing system consists of stringers, bulkheads and frames in more
conventional construction. Yet increasingly builders are seeking to reduce costs
and streamline production by eliminating much of the detail work involved in the
framing system. They are doing this by again utilizing the principle of monocoque
construction which takes the form of premolded "liners" or so-called 'grid liners,"
a premolded combination internal framing system and accommodation
components. And rather than bonding these parts together with conventional
tabbing or taping, instead they are being glued together with some sort of
adhesive putty.
Although the use of liners has been around for a long time, the combining of a
framing system with a liner is new. And as any experienced surveyor can see, it
poses some obvious problems, but that's a subject I'll deal with in Part II. In the
meantime, the conventional stringer, bulkhead and frame system is the method
used by about 98% of all boats over 30 feet.
Stringers
In power boats, stringers provide the majority of the longitudinal hull resistance to
bending in the vertical plane. The apex of the vee at the bottom or keel adds
additional strenght. This is qualified by whether the deck is also designed to give
the hull longitudinal rigidity. Depending on design, some decks, particularly on
motor yachts with very short decks and lots of windows, are so small as to add
very little additional strength. On the other hand, the typical flybridge sport
fisherman with its long foredeck, relatively small windows and strong house
sides, adds a great deal of rigidity to a hull. So it is that we can now understand
why there is a lot more to the strength of hull than just the framing system. In
monocoque, or semi-monocoque construction, the whole structure must be
considered. And it is precisely here that so many untrained "designers" who lack
a solid background in engineering, make their mistakes.
Mistakes involving stringer design and installation are legion, about which a
whole book could be written. And yet the principles for creating an effective
stringer system are very simple and easy to achieve. Surely there are not many
designers or builders who do not understand this. Or are there? Problems usually
arise as a result of other design and marketing considerations. Typical examples
are when a designer wants to create a small boat with 6'6" headroom or wants to
install unusually large engines. The machinery spaces, which are not subject to
appearance and marketing considerations, are usually sacrificed.

In order to get the 6'6" head room or make high profile engines or other
equipment fit, the principles of proper stringer design are often sacrificed. In other
words, the principles of sound hull design get sacrificed for marketing
considerations and the surveyor needs to be constantly aware of this fact. Its the
primary reason why, in this day when all is known how to build a good boat, bad
boats are still being built. Give the customer what he wants, even if the product is
going to fall apart.
The principles of good stringer design are simple. They must run uninterrupted
from one end of the hull to the other. They must be of adequate height to width
ratio, i.e., structural modulus, to resist impact loading on the hull skin, be of
sufficient strength to carry the engine load, be stabilized against lateral
movement if high profile, and be securely attached to the hull so that they don't
break loose. The profile, or top of the stringer, should run in a straight line. If
there are any changes in the profile, then special design reinforcements must be
added.

Dog leg in stringer which was cut down to make the engine fit. The stringer
proved to be so weak that the engine bounced every time the hull hit a wave,
ultimately bending the shaft and wrecking the transmission. Also notice the hard
spots created by the fuel tank mounting pads at top of photo that caused stress
cracks in the hull.
These principles are often compromised by designs that utilized dog-legs, step
downs, step ups (meaning an inconsistent profile along their length), perforations
with large and ill-placed holes, inadequate section modulus and numerous other
faults. In nearly all the cases that I have seen, there is no compelling reason why
these faults should have occurred. What these design faults unfortunately
suggests is that the designers really don't understand the basic engineering
principles. Yet in most cases of failure that I have seen, the builder could have
had his cake and eat it too by giving a little more thought to the problem. What is
compromised in one way can always be built up in another. There's always an
alternative solution. The builder just didn't take the time to consider it.
Bulkheads
serve two very distinct functions. First, bulkheads act as transverse frames. More
importantly, the bulkhead is the structural element that prevents torsional stress
or twisting of the hull. Unified with a stringer system, they form a structural web
and a truss. Remove the bulkheads and its rather like removing the trusses from
a bridge or a roof. The overall strength can be reduced to the point of structural
failure. And because of the efforts of interior designers to produce small boats
with the appearance of wide open interior spaces by the elimination of full, and
even partial bulkheads, that hull structures begin to fall apart.

Here's what often happens when a large cut out is made in a structural bulkhead.
In this case, the 3/4" plywood was fractured in three places.
One builder that produced a 34 footer which had only one partial internal
bulkhead - an engine room bulkhead that was only slightly more than half the
height of the freeboard of the hull - resulted in severe structural failures in much
of the model line. You probably know the boat, the 34 Wellcraft Grand Sport. In
this model line, not only did major hull skin and stringer failures occur, but in
many cases the single plywood bulkheads fractured from side to side.
Even companies with reputations for building very rugged hulls occasionally
make silly mistakes. In a nearby photo you will see the result when Bertram
decided to make very large cut outs in the centers of plywood bulkheads to save

weight. They unthinkingly removed all the strength from the plywood bulkhead
with predictable results; the bulkheads fractured.
And we know how engine room fore and aft bulkheads constitute one of the
foremost structural elements of medium size yachts, and we've witnessed what
happens the builder unthinkingly decides to cut a big hole in the bulkhead and
install a door. For whatever reason, it did not occur to the builder or designer that
he was destroying the structural integrity of the bulkhead.

This is another good example of the structural integrity of a bulkhead being


defeated by cutting it full of holes. It is perforated like a postage stamp and is
destined to fail.
To do their job, bulkheads must be adequately secured to the hull bottom, sides
and underside of the deck. Judging by 30 years of inspecting fiberglass boats, its
a fair statement to say that many builders don't think that this is very important
considering the large number of bulkheads that surveyors find to be broken
loose. Probably at least half of all boat builders don't tie the bulkhead to the deck,
and often for good reason. The bottoms of their boats are so flexible that the
bulkhead will telegraph the deflection of the hull into the deck, causing damage to
the deck. Therefore, if they leave a gap at the top, at least it won't tear the deck
apart, just everything else that the bulkhead is attached to, or is attached to it.
While we've been talking so far about structural bulkheads, bulkheads come in
several varieties, including full, partial and nonstructural partitions. While I know
of no published rules on the subject, my own rule is that to be classified as a full
bulkhead (1) it must span the width of the hull, (2) span no less than 75% of the
depth of the hull and be attached to the bottom, (3) have no openings larger than
50% of the height of the bulkhead, and (4) such openings must be centered in
the vertical plane and be adequately strengthened to compensate for the cut out.
An opening that effectively cuts the bulkhead in half is not a full bulkhead but a
partial. For maximum effectiveness, the bulkhead must be attached to all four
sides of the hull.

Floor frames under main mast of large sail boat. Properly designed by the
designer, the builder apparently saw nothing wrong with drilling the frames full of
holes. Here you can follow the fracture along the perforated effect of the holes at
right and left sides. Frame was so weakened that ply separation also occurred. A
marine surveyor got sued because he either did not find or report this condition,
which was far more extensive than this photo shows.
Partial bulkheads are really nothing more than frames and do not serve any
greater function than frames. It is a mistake to call a hull partition with two doors
in it a bulkhead, for it is really only a partition, or a partial bulkhead at best.
Surveyors often mistake partitions for bulkheads. Remember that to be classified
as such, a bulkhead must be serving the purpose of tying the four sides of the
hull together (bottom, deck and sides). If its shot full of holes and openings, its
not achieving that purpose.
Partitions simply serve the function of separating one space from another while
providing little, if any major structural strength. Builders often make the mistake
of thinking that partitions are structural bulkheads and this is because they don't
have any trained engineers or designers on staff. And just because a partition
may be taped into the hull does not mean that its structural; the taping is usually

there just to hold the partition in place, not the partition to hold the hull together.
Sail boats and some smaller power boats often have plywood partitions that are
screwed to bosses on an inner liner. Again, these should not be mistaken for
bulkheads.
Frames
Frames serve the purpose of stiffening panels between bulkheads and stringers.
Fiberglass boats often lack frames where they are needed. Obviously, if a panel
is flexing too much, additional framing would prevent that condition. Some
builders scrimp on frames because frames create additional detail work and adds
more to labor cost. Fortunately, where excessive panel weakness is discovered,
adding frames after the fact is usually fairly easy to accomplish. So long as there
is accessibility, correcting panel weakness is usually not difficult or costly.
Rigid or Flexible Hulls
Aluminum and steel boats are examples of vessels built to be completely rigid.
By the nature of the material, these hulls will not tolerate flexing. Fiberglass
boats, however, are another story. Fiberglass boats can be designed to be either
flexible or rigid. For example, if you examine Bertram hulls built over the years
one can see a very abrupt change in hull design philosophy. Somewhere in the
mid 1980's, Bertram made a transition from very rigid hulls to fairly flexible hulls.
And as the Bertram engineers have proved from years of extensive R&D (they
were one of the few boat builders that took R&D seriously) you can build light,
floppy hulls without danger of them falling apart. Moreover, there is a legitimate
need to attempt to reduce costs by reducing the weight of the most costly
materials. All you have to do to see how this is possible is to look at the aircraft
industry which has invested billions in R&D.
In recent years, boat builders have been observing and borrowing some of the
fruits of this technology. Unfortunately, aircraft and marine design principles,
while having similarities, are not the same. Equally unfortunate is the fact that
some boat builders attempt to incorporate this new technology directly into their
products without any R&D of their own. And herein lies the problem.
It is entirely possible to take just about any hull and reduce its glass/resin content
by 25-35%. In fact, back in 1985 I undertook such a project by taking the plans
for a 55' Hatteras with a design weight of 72,000 lbs and redesigned to come in
at 42,000 pounds, including a huge 50% reduction in the weight of the basic hull
structure. This was done by applying basic airframe design with modifications for
marine. The end result had two serious problems that were anticipated. First, the
hull weight was reduced by means of an intricate framing system. The problem
with that was that anything that was saved on materials cost was more than
offset by increased labor costs of achieving the detail work.
Even less did I anticipate the effect on how the hull would handle with a 41%
overall weight reduction. Scale model testing revealed the boat to be so light that
it would pitch and roll so violently that it would be uninhabitable to human beings.
It developed a whip-snap roll in a 3' sea that would literally throw people off the
deck. Or when pitching, launch them like a trampoline! So much as for ultra light
boats. Weight is a factor that provides stability.
But the project did prove the viability of ultralite, flexible hull construction. Rather
like the old Cleveland Browns Rubber Band Defense, designed to bend but not
break. The point here is that builders can get away with a lot of shortcuts if they
know how to do it right, and if the increased labor costs don't make it impractical.
Its easy to design a flexible hull that flexes without breaking. What do I mean by
flexible? Well, if on a sea trial you run a tape measure between the top of the
engine stringer and the underside of the deck, you'll probably be surprised to see
the stringers flexing by as much as 1/2" even on what you consider to be a well
made boat. If you were to string diagonal measures from one corner of a large
compartment to another, in the manner used to measure squareness of square
or rectangular structures, you will find that when you put a boat into a hard turn,
one of those measures is going to go very slack. That's because the hull is being
twisted by the torsion of the turn.
The early models of the 60' Hatteras Convertible were a prime example of a large
hull that was inadequately bulkheaded. These hulls would twist so badly that
when you put it into a hard, full speed turn, the propeller shafts would bind up in
the bearings. And you can just imagine the effects on shafts, engines and

transmissions! This was not so much a matter of a boat with not enough
bulkheads, but rather the bulkheads that it did have were poorly designed and
executed.
Design-wise, rigid hulls are easier to design and build. With a flexible hull, very
rigid attachments of internal components becomes a problem because the flexing
starts to tear everything loose. The designer overcomes this by making the
interior sort of "free floating." For example, in designing a flexible hull, you do not
use the hull or framing system (stringers and structural bulkheads) as a
foundation for the interior components such as the sole and cabinetry work.
Instead, you build a shelf on the upper hull sides and literally suspend the interior
from the shelf. That way when the bottom flexes and the hull sides pant, it
doesn't work so hard to tear the interior apart.
Conversely, if the designer is confidant that the hull is rigid, he can go ahead and
place the soles on top of stringers (although this is never a really good idea) and
attach components to bulkheads or hull sides. For slow speed boats that don't
skip across the tops of waves, this is the way its usually done. The hull isn't going
to flex that much that its going to rip the interior apart. Whereas the slow boat
builder can get away with all sorts of haphazard design, the fast boat builder
cannot.
There are limits, of course, to just how far a designer can go with flexibility. In
terms of rigidity, we're talking about the difference of the bottom flexing 1/4 to 1/2"
or not at all. With the increasing lust for speed and advent of high performance
diesels, flexibility causes serious problems. Flexibility is okay for slow or
moderate speed vessels, but becomes disastrous to high speed yachts. The
reason is not so much inherent in the hull structure itself, but rather in the drive
train. Delivering a thousand or more horsepower through a long and large
diameter shaft demands higher tolerances of the drive system, and therefore
mandates more rigid hulls, not less. Along the length of a 30' drive train, the hull
must be absolutely rigid; it cannot deflect or twist lest the whole drive system be
thrown out of alignment.
To gain an appreciation for the significance of this, just look at the massive
structural system found in high performance Hatteras or Vikings, shown below.
When you're dealing with a quarter million dollars or more worth of engines and
transmissions, it doesn't pay to fool around. Mistakes are just too costly. On
recent survey of a high performance 48 Hatteras and I was absolutely astounded
at the massive stringer system in this boat. Although I had seen it before, I didn't
really appreciated how large it was. The width of the top hat bottom supports
actually covered nearly 50% of the bottom panel area.

Stringer system of a 48' Hatteras Hi Performance Convertible. Note that the width
of the top hats are about the same as the width of the bottom panel spans. This
is a good example of structural overkill, yet demonstates the builder's concern
with strength. Also note the webs between stringers under the engine mounts
that provide extra stability. Despite the appearance, these top hats are actually
quite thin. When slamming occurs, the thin sections will absorb much of the
impact, hence the web sections to increase stability and insure that the engine
beds do not move.
Now, did it cost the builder more to do it this way than in the usual way? Not
likely, they just had to spend some extra time thinking about what to do. The
actual execution and materials cost was probably no higher than any other
design. The point here should be painfully obvious; ultimately it costs more to do
it wrong that to do it right.
The bottom line is that whether a hull is successfully flexible or rigid is dependent
on design and function. In a high speed vessel, everything else about a hull can
be flexible, but the foundation of the drive system must be absolutely rigid.
Another point to remember is that the smaller the diameter of the shaft, the more
bending it can tolerate. Shafts from 1" to 1-1/2" can tolerate a heck of a lot of

bending caused by a flexing hull. But when you get up to 2" diameter, these
powerful systems will not tolerate movement of the foundation and the systems
will begin to self-destruct.

The importance of stringer stability is revealed by this stabilizing strut, in addition


to the mounting frame above it. Yacht: 56' Magnum, 2600 HP. With this kind of
horsepower, the mounting system and shafts will not tolerate movement.
Material Trends
If you read industry magazines like Composites and Professional Boat Builder, its
hard not to be impressed by these advertising vehicles efforts to influence the
use of aerospace composites and techniques into boat building. Every issue of
these two magazines devotes a major part of its space to promote the use of
exotic materials and very complex technology for building pleasure craft. In an
industry known for its trial and error, seat of the pants methods of development,
one could effectively argue that high technology is probably the last thing this
business needs to become involved with.
In my estimation, what they are attempting to do, is to promote and transfer these
high tech materials from the aerospace industry, which was backed up by the
bounteous source of federal tax dollars, to an industry well known for its critical
capitalization problems. They are promoting the very same technology utilized in
the production of military war planes such as the F117 and B2 bombers (the later
of which has a $2 billion per copy price tag) to the construction of pleasure craft.
Viewed in this light, the economics of this trend don't look very promising.
Currently the experimentation with these materials is largely confined to custom
boats with very wealthy patrons who are willing to foot the bill in order to posses
the latest and greatest. However, there has been some extension into production
building, mainly so-called niche markets such as race boats, both power and sail.
And to the extent that it is clear that the production boat building industry does
not possess the necessary capital resources, nor the profit margins to sustain
them, their incorporation of this technology into production building is very likely
to continue along the lines of trial and error. What this portends for the surveyor
are the risks of failing to locate design failures during surveys, failures involving
design, materials and construction techniques that fall into the realm of the
experimental. Make no mistake about it, experimentation with new materials
directly into a product is the norm, not the exception.
With this basis understanding of the principles of good hull design, we can now
begin to study the effects of what happens when these principles are violated.
Related Reading: Hull Design Defects Part II

HOME>MARINE SURVEYING>

David Pascoe - Biography


David Pascoe is a second generation marine surveyor in his family who began
his surveying career at age 16 as an apprentice in 1965 as the era of wooden
boats was drawing to a close.
Certified by the National Association of Marine Surveyors in 1972, he has
conducted over 5,000 pre purchase surveys in addition to having conducted
hundreds of boating accident investigations, including fires, sinkings, hull failures
and machinery failure analysis.
Over forty years of knowledge and experience are brought to bear in following
books. David Pascoe is the author of:

"Mid Size Power Boats" (2003)

"Buyers Guide to Outboard Boats" (2002)

"Surveying Fiberglass Power Boats" (2001, 2nd Edition - 2005)

"Marine Investigations" (2004).

In addition to readers in the United States, boaters and boat industry


professionals worldwide from over 70 countries have purchased David Pascoe's
books, since introduction of his first book in 2001.
In 2012, David Pascoe has retired from marine surveying business at age 65.
Biography - Long version

Hull Design Defects


Part II
by David Pascoe
Anyone who has ever seen airframe construction, particularly jet aircraft,
understands why aircraft can be built with skins that are extremely thin. And
while an aircraft isn't subjected to the same type of forces as a boat hull, the
fuselage is the hull and must be strong in different ways. Rather than being
framed, one could correctly say that an airframe is corrugated, for that's exactly
what it is. The skin can be extremely thin because the frames are so close
together.
Related Reading:
Hull Design Defects Part I

Boat hulls, of course, are not built that way, although they could be. Wooden
canoes or clinker construction is similar. Instead, modern fiberglass boat hulls
relay on a limited number of major girders and frames. Girders, or stringers as
they're called in yacht construction, serve a dual purpose of both supporting the
bottom and providing longitudinal rigidity to the hull. Frames provide lateral
support but very limited transverse stability so that they have only one purpose
and that is to support the bottom.
It is very helpful to think of a boat bottom as an upside down bridge. The main
difference is that bridges are not subjected to any force from the under side. But
boat hulls are subjected to forces from both sides. It is also helpful to think of a
boat hull not as a continuous, single skin, but as being made of panels that span
the stringers and frames. In hull design terms, the span between supports are
referred to as panels. These are the unsupported distances between supports.
When designing a hull, it is the thickness and strength of the unsupported panel
to resist bending forces that is of critical importance, precisely because the panel
is not supported. Our previous discussion talked about the differences between
flexible and rigid hulls. The amount of flexibility of the hull panel is dependent on
frame spacing and strength. For the purposes of this discussion, we'll assume
that the framing system is completely rigid.
There are very few pleasure yachts built in which the framing is so close and the
panels so thick that some bending does not take place under heavy load
conditions. In fact, flat fiberglass panels have a high modulus of elasticity,
meaning that they can bend a lot without damage to the panel. This is one of the
features of reinforced plastic that makes it so forgiving. But that forgivingness
induces the tendency for designers to stretch things a little too far in terms of
what they can get away with. If that weren't true, we wouldn't have so many boat
hulls with structural failures.
Fiberglass laminates, because they're not a rigidly controlled, machine made
substance, are subject to human error and variance in their uniformity. Neither
the thickness nor the quality of the lamination are subject to much control. This
means that while the same laminating schedule may be maintained throughout a
model line, the resultant strength of fiberglass hulls can vary widely from boat to
boat. Tests have shown that laminate strength on nominally "good" laminates can
easily vary by +/-33%. By "good" it is meant that the laminate has no major
defects, but rather simply variance in resin/glass ratios. This also explains why
one of an apparently same series of hulls fails while others don't. All surveyors
who are serious students of hull failures have encountered this anomaly that
often seems to defy explanation.

Example of hard spot caused by improper stringer design and installation.


Bottom hinges around hard edge of stringer wood core. At right (or bottom), wood
core is elevated by a soft material so that it does not touch the hull skin and the
load is bourn by the more flexible tabbing.
When investigating bottom panel failure, it is economically unfeasible to attempt
to evaluate the strength of a large panel, particularly one without a uniform
shape. To do so, every square inch of the panel would have to be analyzed.
However, if we could, there can be no doubt but that we'd find all sorts of
imperfections and defects. To illustrate an extreme example, in one case I found
two candy bar wrappers laminated into a hull. Accumulated saw dust caused by
the lay-up shop being located near the carpenter shop is yet another, not to
mention the fact that lamination is a sloppy, dangerous job that often entails a
very high turnover rate in workers that makes training very difficult and costly.
The point here is that final product values usually end up considerably below
design strength unless the designer leaves a healthy margin of error. Assuming
of course, that a degreed engineer is involved which, in many cases there isn't.
So what we end up with is many builders who utilize trial and error and
experience as a means of determining the lay-up schedule. The conscientious
builder will usually slightly over build, while the profit-minded builder will skimp
where ever possible. And here is where the problems begin.
Panel or Laminate Failure
There are three primary causes of panel failure: inadequate design strength or
thickness, design shape error, and lay-up faults. These can be stand alone
problems, or may appear in any combination of the three, including all together.
Assuming that a hull is properly framed out, and that the laminate does not have
serious imperfections, panel damage and failure can occur when the panel is too
thin. While fiberglass is flexible, there are limits on how much it can bend before
structural deformation causes the plastic to start disbonding or shattering.
Bending, as we know, causes tension on one side of the laminate and
compression on the other. Compression causes the plastic to crumble around the
glass fibers. Tension causes interlaminar sheer that works to separate the plastic
from the fibers, or ply from ply.
Now, in a typical laminate, particularly one using weaves, we have fibers running
in all directions. On the tension side, the fibers prevent the plastic from deforming
up to the limit of the strength of the fibers. When the stress exceeds the strength
of the bond of the plastic to fibers, these fibers then pull loose. When the bending
is repeated hundreds or thousands of cycles, this process then results in
significant weakening of the panel. You can't see this damage, but it is there. This
weakening becomes progressive and so the panel starts bending more and
more. Eventually, stress cracks begin to appear, usually first on the exterior, but
also on the interior particularly, if the inside of the hull is gelcoated or painted so
as to show up the cracks.
Hard Spots or Hinge Effect
If this condition continues long enough unchecked, it can eventually result in
fatigue failure of the panel. In the real world, this description of factors is rarely
this simple. All sorts of design defects and other faults may exist to compound
the situation.
Simple panel failure caused by inadequate thickness is both common and easy
to detect. Panel failure unrelated to any other factors always occur near the
center of the panel, or the periphery of the dimple caused by deflection. That is
because the center is the area least supported by frames.
Panel failures that occur close to, or exactly at the intersect of a frame (here a
frame is meant to be any structural member), then there is a contributory cause.
This is known as the "hard spot" or "hinge effect." Obviously, were the panel thick

enough, no hinging would take place, so hinging is always compounded by other


faults.
When a panel bends, at some point near a frame that bending is going to be
resisted by the frame. If the bending occurs exactly at the intersect of the panel
and frame, there exists at this point an abrupt resistance to bending. This sudden
resistance causes a bend to occur with a very short radius, and it is the radius of
the bend that has everything to do with how much bending can occur without
damage or failure.
The shorter the radius of the bend, the greater the compression and tension load,
the sooner structural deformation begins. This is why frames and bulkheads
should never make sharp intersects with either bottom or side panels. Short
radius bends are prevented by adding bosses or fillets in way of the panel/frame
intersect. This spreads out the load over a wider area, increases the radius and
reduces compression/tension loading. As previously mentioned, panel defection
in itself is not a bad thing.

Stress cracking is one of the visible effects of panel deflection. In this case, the
panel was dimpled or "oil canning" as the eliptical array of the stress cracks
indicate. The number of cracks tends to indicate the severity of the deflection or
bending.
This short radius or sudden change in direction is what is referred to as hard
spots or hinge effect. It means the panel is bending sharply around the frame or
anything else inside the hull that is rigid such as a deck support post or a fuel
tank bed in contact with the hull.
Stress Cracks
Stress cracks are the warning signal that a panel is bending beyond the limits of
its strength. Stress cracks can appear either as a result of a one-time event such
as slamming hard off of a wave, or it can be the result of repetitive stress cycles.
This is one of the things that makes the evaluation of stress cracking so difficult.
My 30 years of experience suggests that fairly large numbers of boats sustain
single incident stress cracking with no evidence that the damage becomes
progressive. On the other hand, this can be extremely hard to know with any
certainty because no one has the ability to follow the life history of a boat. Yet,
because the surveyor encounters so many boats with stress cracks on the
bottom, it is the surveyor's task to make that evaluation.

Natural hinge points such as chine flats and other angular surfaces require the
build up of extra laminations called fillets which add extra strength. Lacking
these, bending and stress cracking is likely to occur.
Most stress cracking occurs as a result of repetitive panel bending or hard spots
caused by improper design of internal components, combined with inadequate
panel thickness. This type of stress cracking is usually progressive because the
bending is not intermittent, but occurs nearly every time the vessel is used. The
great difficulty, and therefore the great danger to surveyors, is that most boats get
used more often in calm water conditions so that a potentially dangerous
condition can exist for years without ever resulting in a failure. It can happen that
a boat with a weak bottom is used only in protected waters where pounding
almost never occurs. Then, suddenly, the boat is moved to another location

where the conditions are different, and now the hull is subject to frequent
slamming and stressing.

The hinge effect, or stress cracking initiated by hinging off of an internal structural
such as a stringer, produces parallel cracks such as these. The deposits made
by weepage of styrene based fluids indicates that the cracks penetrate well
beyond the gelcoat.
Evaluating stress cracks is very difficult and there are no clear-cut rules. Every
case has to be evaluated independently. Yet hard spots are easy to identify
because the area of cracking is usually small. It may show as a star burst
pattern, as concentric circles of cracks, or a short series of parallel, arcing
cracks. These are easily evaluated simply by going to that exact point on the
interior to see what is causing it, and then to recommend a method of eliminating
the hard spot. Moreover, reinforcing an apparently weakened panel is usually not
difficult to accomplish.
Cracking due to overall panel deflection
Cracking due to overall panel deflection is also easy to detect, but much more
difficult to evaluate. On bottoms painted with anti-fouling paint, remember that the
paint is very brittle and does an excellent job in magnifying cracks. Cracks will
usually appear in the paint long before they will show up in gelcoat which is
usually a bit more pliable. By removing the bottom paint, we can usually find out
if the cracks also show up in the gelcoat. Be careful not to obliterate cracks in
gelcoat by scraping as this is easy to do. If cracks don't show up in the gelcoat,
I'll use my finger and try to rub dirt over the surface to try to get invisible cracks to
show up, then wipe clean with a rag. If the cracks are serious or old, they'll stand
out. If nothing shows up under the paint, it would be a fair assessment to assume
that the weakening is not serious.
The age of the boat
The age of the boat plays a very important role in evaluating the significance of
stress cracking. This is because older boats have been subjected vastly greater
number of stress cycles than newer boats. If cracks show up in the paint on an
older boat, but don't appear visible in the gelcoat, or are only faintly visible, I
usually dismiss them. If the condition has existed for a long time and there's no
evidence that it is highly progressive, I feel safe with that judgment.
The prominence of cracks
The prominence of cracks is another indicator of their significance. When cracks
initiate, they usually start out as a very fine fissure. As cracks age, the very sharp
edges of the crack will erode over time. That means that the appearance of the
crack will be wider or more prominent. Cracks that stand out prominently should
be regarded as a red flag. Cracks that are old and progressive will stand out
clearly, even after you've scraped bottom paint away. At this point, the cracks will
appear as a clear black lines. If bad enough, they will clearly reveal a fissure.
Remember that stress cracks that appear on the exterior bottom are the result of
the tension side of the bend since compression loading tends not to produce
cracks.
Examining the same area on the interior is likely to tell us much more about the
significance because the tension loading may appear on this side also,
depending on how the panel is bending. However, this is only true if the interior is
coated with gelcoat or paint. If it is a raw laminate surface, stress cracking may or
may not show up, especially if the surface is very dirty and permanently stained.
Dirt and oil may work its way into the stress cracks and completely obscure them,
even if you wipe the surface clean.
The number of parallel cracks
The number of parallel cracks is another indicator of how serious the condition is.
When there are 4 or more parallel cracks, there is good reason to believe that
panel bending is going beyond load limits. But, again, we have to evaluate in
terms of age. If its a fairly new boat with a three or more parallel cracks, odds are
that this is a progressive condition that could ultimately lead to panel failure.

Sail and power boats tend to exhibit different cracking patterns. This is because
sail boat bottoms are usually curved while power boat panels tend to be flat.
Flexing convex curves result in the condition known as oil-canning which
produces large dimples that can reveal circular patterns of cracking, or cracking
that appears in a parallel series of arcs. This condition should be considered as
dangerous with a high potential for ultimate failure.
Power boat panel defection tends to parallel either hull stringers, bottom strakes
or bulkheads. It will only show up as curving arcs if the panel defection is severe
in conjunction with oil-canning. This happens rarely, so when it does, beware that
the problem is very serious indeed. The most common cracking is found inside
the concave curve of a strake. This is because the strake forms a natural hinge
point, or a hard spot. Strakes that are not filled and filleted almost invariably end
up causing stress cracking. This is easy to determine by looking to see if there is
a strake depression on the interior of the hull. If there is, the strake has not been
filled and filleted and is the cause of the cracking.

Stress cracking appearing transversely across a bottom strake. In this case, it


was caused by a 27' boat having only one structural bulkhead, located in the
wrong place and no transverse framing. Torsional twisting of the hull caused the
cracking which is on the verge catestrophic failure.
Improperly installed stringers often cause hard spots, particularly in smaller
boats, that results in cracking and possible ultimate long term failure. This is
usually very easy to detect by sounding the bottom and locating the stringers.
Again, it is the age of the boat and the severity of the cracking that determines its
significance.

These stress crack appearing on the interior bottom under an engine were nicely
shown up by black diesel oil via the capillary effect. The 11 parallel cracks
indicate that the degree of panel bending is severe and the possibility of failure
must be considered. In this case, there were an insufficient number of transverse
frames.
Delamination
Delamination, contrary to what one might expect, is not a common occurrence in
conjunction with panel deflection and stress cracking on solid laminates. In fact, it
is very rare. Out of 3600 surveys, I can't ever recall having found any. Panel
bending does not produce enough interlaminar shear to cause ply separation
unless the panel contains defects and the bending is very serve. Still, its a good
idea to tap around a bit when cracks are visible. However, delamination is often
found after complete panel failure occurs - i.e. the panel splits open - but this
happens as a result of the final fracturing and stress initiated during the final
failure mode, so it is not wise to use the absence of delamination as a positive
evaluation factor.
Cored Bottoms
Cored bottoms are an altogether different story. But then a cored bottom is a
problem just waiting to happen anyway. Coring a hull bottom is just plain foolish,
no matter what any builder or the glowing reports in the magazines may tell you.
Remember that these people get their income from advertising revenue derived
from the people who advance these materials. In other words, they are biased.
Core materials are simply too weak and hull bottoms take too much of a beating
for cores to survive. When we find cored bottoms, the presence of stress
cracking should be regarded with the same reaction as to skin cancer. Horror!
Here, stress cracking raises the potential for water ingress into the core, with all

the attendant problems that poses, including the potential for delamination. When
cores are involved, ply separation or delamination is highly likely. Consider the
hull guilty until proven innocent.
We should be especially wary of sailboats with cored bottoms. If you get sued
after a sailboat core fills with water or its keel falls off, take your lumps because
you deserve to get sued for not finding the problem. There is only one safe way
to handle a cored sailboat bottom, and that is to declaim all knowledge of what is
going on inside that core. You can't see it, test it or know what is happening
inside unless a failure is already well advanced. Failures involving cored bottoms
are legion. Even worse, it can happen that there are no visible, outward signs of
trouble before failure occur. Failures can occur suddenly, and without
warning.Disavow all responsibility, in writing, in detail, and all ability to determine
the condition of the hull.

To determine whether a hull is cored or not, look for those areas on the interior
hull where the core terminates. In this photo, the core can clearly be seen
standing out around the bow of this yacht.
Hull Sides
Stress cracking on hull sides is something that generally did not happen until the
mid 1980's when builders began skimping on hull side laminate. Hull sides have
gotten so flimsy in the last decade that its almost laughable if the construction of
some of these boats wasn't so pathetic. Hull side cracking is a problem that
shows up almost exclusively in low to mid price range boats. The cheaper the
boat, the more likely you'll find it.
This is rarely a problem to the hull side itself. The cracking usually occurs as a
result of severe panting because the sides are thin and unsupported. The sides
themselves don't fail because the panels are so large and the flexing occurs over
such a large area that the radius of bend is too large to cause damage to the
laminate strictly as a result of panting. However, because the stress is
transmitted vertically up the hull side, the forces of interlaminar shear are very
high. Therefore, delamination becomes a distinct possibility. Nowhere is this
more true that in vessels that have been repowered with more powerful engines.
In this case, total hull side failures have been known to occur even with high
quality boats.
Hull side panting can be a problem because there are other things attached to
the hull sides. Panting of the sides can cause disturbance not only to internal
components, but also to the hull/deck joint. A boat with floppy hull sides is not
very likely to have the deck bonded to the hull, but rather just be screwed on.
Panting hull sides almost invariably results in shearing of the hull/deck joint and
complete loosening of the fasteners. This is why we find so many boats with the
rub rails falling off. The screws holding the rub rails on are set into the hull/deck
joint and the shearing load applied to these screws breaks them loose. See
AlsoSCREW IT!
Hull sides should be generally sounded (cored or solid) and closely examined for
stress cracking. Stress cracking is most easily telegraphed through painted on
boot stripes because the paint is more brittle, so look for it there. Because side
failures are rare, the cracking needs to be evaluated in terms of the whole
structure. The cracking is more likely to be a sign of other problems. Suspect bad
deck joins and look for broken bulkhead tabbing. Also watch out for through hull
fittings that may be loosened or damaged as a result of panting.
Liners
Builders are always searching for ways to reduce labor costs, and one of these is
the use of interior liners. Experienced surveyors are all too familiar with the
problems that liners present. First is that a liner tends to obscure all internal
structural members so that the surveyor cannot make an evaluation of the hull
structure. Secondly, liners tend to preclude the use of proper bulkheads and
frames because a liner can't be placed where a structural bulkhead exists.
Thirdly, the design of the liner needs to substitute for the structural members is

has displaced. Fourth, the liner usually affords no access to examine its structure
and how it is attached.
Liners are most commonly used in boats up to about 32' but have been found in
boats up to 42'. The larger the boat, the greater the potential for trouble because
of this tendency of liners to displace or eliminate traditional framing methods.
Boats with liners over 30' are known to have a disproportionately larger number
of structural problems, a situation that is entirely predictable.
When liners displace bulkheads and frames, several things happen. First, the hull
becomes highly prone to twisting or wracking. When bulkheads are eliminated,
unsupported panel size naturally increases. And when that happens, panel
deflection and failures increase. Because the liner usually covers up so much of
the interior, this makes the surveyors job doubly difficult and exposes him to
more risk of failure to locate serious problems.
Grid/Liners
Grid/liners are a new development in which the designer attempts to include all of
the vessel's framing system into a full, complete hull liner. So far, the use of grid
liners is limited to only a few builders of small boats, but the idea is likely to
spread because it presents the possibility of eliminating all the difficult laminating
detail work of bulkheads and stringers inside the mold. With a grid liner, the detail
work can be transferred to a low profile mold on the shop floor that is more
accessible and easier to work.
While this may streamline production, this method has a number of problems.
One is that the liner has to be bonded to the hull, and obviously the builder
cannot laminate it to the hull once it is set into place. The only solution, of course,
is to glue the liner into the hull. The problem with adhesives is that they only work
perfectly under perfect conditions, something we don't see much of in boat
building.
The only things that glue together well are parts with identically uniform surfaces.
For example, gluing two pieces of wood together that are perfectly flat makes for
a very strong joint. But allow the slightest surface irregularity and the joint
becomes very weak. That's not just true of wood but any material. Unfortunately,
the interiors of laminated hulls can hardly be called uniform. Will the grid/liners
remain bonded to the hull? Only time will tell. Our experience with bonding putty
in cored hulls tells us that there's not likely to be any better level of success in
this application than for foam cores. See related article Hi Tech Materials.
Essentially what they are doing is spreading the glue on the interior of the hull,
and then dropping the liner in and hoping that a complete bond takes place. The
builder will never know because he can't see the results. The bonding surface is
just as likely, indeed, probably more so, to be full of voids or gaps where the two
parts are not bonded together. And a void in a glue joint or laminate is a stress
initiator that propagates delamination.
Sail boats utilize grid/liners more frequently. Fortunately, a sailboat hull is
considerable more amenable to this design, both by its shape and the fact that
they are not subjected to the forces of high speed. Even so, one of the largest
boats built with a full grid/liner was a Hunter 60 that experienced total liner
disbonding and failure. Yet even their smaller models were widely known for liner
failures.
If this method gains wider acceptance, its going to pose a whole new range of
problems for surveyors.
Interior Effects of Weak Hulls
When liners are used, they either have to sit on top of stringers, the bottom, or be
suspended from the hull sides. In either case, the liner is not completely isolated
from the hull, and if the hull is experiencing problems with excessive panel
deflection or panting, that deflection is most likely going to be transmitted to the
liner in one way or another.
In sailboats, liners are either tabbed, glued to the hull or both. In powerboats,
liners usually rest on top of stringers and are usually joined to the hull at the
deck, whether by bonding or mechanical fasteners. Flexing of the hull is usually
transmitted to the liner. Linered boats usually have a number of wood
components inside such as cabinets, trim seating and the like. These

components are usually fastened to the liner with screws. If both the hull and
liner are flexing, then it is common to find evidence of this. Look for screws
backing out, misaligned parts, cracked moldings and little piles of wood dust that
indicates friction against the wood. Unusually large gaps between parts or things
like built-in refrigerators backing out of their holes are often indicators of trouble.
Extensive stress cracking in liners is another indicator. Theoretically, the liner
should not be subjected to much stress, so when cracks appear the condition
requires careful evaluation. Be particularly alert to stress cracks around
companionway doors and at the bottom corners of the sole or foot well. Serious
cracks in these areas are a strong indicator of serious working. Another critical
area in power boats is the coaming around the windshield area where the fore
deck terminates into the cockpit. Cracks in all three locations indicate serious
trouble. If that's the case, also examine the hull/deck joint. If the screws are loose
at the mid section, the hull is probably bending excessively and may indicate a
serious structural design flaw.
The Effects of Speed
The faster a boat goes, the more stress it is subjected to. It follows, then, that
high speed boats are considerably more vulnerable to design defects. This also
means that that any evidence of stress cracking or other problems needs to be
evaluated relative to the vessel's speed, as well as it's age.
Unless you've had experience with high speed vessels in rough water conditions,
its hard to appreciate the extreme forces involved. Considering how hard it is on
the human body, its a little easier to imagine the stress on the hull. High
performance boats, those which are intended to give the impression that they're
capable of being operated fast and hard, are those that are most susceptible to
problems simply because they are used harder. And because of that, they are
substantially less tolerant of design flaws.
A good example of this is a 41' Cigarette race-style boat which was really a
tripple engine, 1400 HP, luxury go-fast boat. This boat was designed with
stringers that steps in them. That is, that the stringers had different heights at
different locations in the hull. At the only full bulkhead in the vessel - the
cockpit/cabin bulkhead, the stringers stepped down from 24" high to 12" high.
This created a serious stress initiator point which caused the stringers to fracture
at this point. Not only that, but the bulkhead had broken loose because the hull
was bending longitudinally so bad that the hull sides were bowing outward and
the hull/deck joint popped open.
This boat had a full interior liner and no part of the hull other than the aft engine
room was visible. The failures were foretold by serious cracks in the cabin liner,
around the companionway door, as well as the very loose guard rails. These
cracks were sufficiently severe that it was clear that they were not the result of
normal stress or improperly designed curves or a generally weak liner. The
combination of all these indicators pointed to a hull that was starting to break in
half.
In another case, also a Cigarette, the builder had tried a three, rather than four
stringer arrangement, with one stringer on the centerline. Apparently the designer
did not know that no stringer was needed at the vee of the bilge because this
was a natural strong point. Yet stringers were needed outboard on the bottom
panels where there was now only one on each side instead of two. The stringers
on both sides fractured and the bottom split open.
Yet another was the case of a Wellcraft 40 footer which had only one transverse
bulkhead, and in which the transverse frames were not bonded to the stringers.
These stringers were very tall, glass over plywood, and when pounding occurred,
the stringers buckled because, lacking any bonding to transverse members, they
had no lateral stability because they were too thin.. This hull began to selfdestruct during the delivery from builder to the owner in less than 30 hours
operating time.
Another builder designed and built perfectly good stringers, but then proceeded
to drill them full of three inch diameter holes for reasons known only to the
builder. The degree of ignorance displayed by these builders was truly
astonishing.

Examples like this should lay to rest forever any assumption that boat builders
always know what they're doing. All too often they don't. Surveyors should be
mindful of the fact that, more often than not, boats are designed not by naval
architects, but by people with no formal training whatsoever. This is not to say
that unschooled designers are not qualified. Many are if only by experience of
trial and error. Unfortunately, too many people from the marketing department are
actively involved with structural design when they shouldn't be.
These issues are raised, not to be gratuitously critical, but to point out how easy
it is for a surveyor to take structural design for granted, and to fall into the trap of
not looking closely. Luxury and high speed are rather like trying to mix water and
oil. The mix is not easy to achieve. The effects of speed multiply relative to the
mass or weight of the vessel. To create a high speed yacht that does not start to
fall apart when abused - as they are likely to be - requires some serious
engineering, engineering that as often as not is lacking. Paying close attention to
these warning signs will go a long way toward keeping the surveyor out of
trouble.
Related Reading: Hull Design Defects Part I

ICE STRENGTHENED SHIPS


Antarctic Ships: Overview Historical: L'Astrolabe &
Zelee | Aurora | Belgica | Discovery | Endurance
Ships then
Erebus / Terror: Ross-Antarctica Franklin-Arctic Franklin timeand now - a
line Franklin-Map | Fram Fram 2 | Nimrod | Terra Nova
comparison
Modern: Ice-strengthened and icebreakers | James Clark
Ross | Kapitan Khlebnikov | Yamal
In the very earliest days of polar exploration, ice-strengthened ships were
used. These were originally wooden and based on existing designs, but
beefed up.
Particularly around the waterline with double planking to the hull, strengthening
cross members inside the ship and bands of iron around the outside and / or
metal sheeting at the bows, stern and along the keel.
Such strengthening was designed to help the ship push through ice and also in
case the ship was "nipped" by the ice. Nipped is an innocuous sounding word to
describe a terrible and powerful event when ice floes around a ship driven by
winds and tides (often many miles distant) push against the ship trapping it as if
in a vice and causing damage - sometimes damage enough to reduce the ship to
match-wood.
Such damage might be survivable, it might cause the loss of the ship when the
ice finally relents - the ship now no longer being able to float as happened to
Shackleton's Endurance or it might cause the loss of the ship in as little as 15
minutes from first pressure being exerted. In the days of wooden ships, the only
vessel that could survive such treatment was the Fram, built for Fridtjof Nansen.
The Fram was prodigiously strong, but it's chief defence was that when squeezed
from the sides it would respond by rising up due to a rounded hull shape. Even
the mighty Fram at one point looked to be be in danger when ice floes built up to
such an extent that they might fall on it and prevent it rising when squeezed.
These days, ships that go to the polar regions are of course no longer made of
wood, but of steel. They still need to be specially strengthened to work in ice
conditions. An ordinary ship with no strengthening will not risk touching ice
at all, no matter how gently. A modern ship weighing thousands of tonnes
meeting an iceberg weighing perhaps as much again or up to thousands of times
more can easily sustain enough damage to require major repairs or to sink
her. Ice will easily hole a non-strengthened ship.
Ships therefore that have any chance of contacting ice are at least icestrengthened if not being designed to plough through the ice as do ice-breakers.
Icebreakers are needed if there is a trade route to keep ice free, if there are
military reasons for patrolling in areas with heavy sea ice or if you need to work in
heavy ice conditions, particularly in winter. Icebreakers are expensive to build
and very expensive in fuel to run (sometimes powered by gas turbines or a
nuclear generator). They are uncomfortable to travel in on the open sea. All ships
designed for the ice have rounded keels with no protuberances, these things
provide stability in normal ships and result in ships that are designed to contact
ice rolling heavily in a even a light sea.
Rounded keels and a lack of stabilizing fins means that progress is quicker and
smoother through ice and that there aren't any parts to be ripped off. A further
discomfort comes from breaking through continuous thick ice with constant
vibration, noise and jarring against the ice.
Icebreakers are generally owned by those countries with an interest in the northeast and north-west passages in the Arctic or that have other shipping lanes and
ports that need to be kept open during the winter months.
Ice strengthening on the other hand is found much more commonly in ships designed for
Arctic or Antarctic work. There is no actual universal definition of what needs to be done to a
ship to be "officially ice strengthened" and it can be applied to all manner of ships, whether supply
ships, tankers, container ships, warships etc. Commonly ice-strengthened ships can cope with
continuous one year old ice about 50cm - 100cm thick.

Breaking ice by any ship is not a case of forcing the ice aside, but by the
ship riding up and over the ice in front of it, with the weight of the ship then
breaking the ice, this may be a continuous process or can result in a lot of backand-forth in particular thick places.

Characteristics of Ice Breakers


Ice breakers have the features of ice strengthened ships and then some of their own too.
Heavy for their size, to make them more effective at breaking through ice when they are pushed up above it by
their engines.
Very gradual upwards slope at the bow, particularly at the water line to allow the bow to ride up over ice
before the weight breaks through.
Hull made from special steels designed for optimum strength at low temperatures Air bubbling systems to
assist ice-breaking. Air is forced under pressure from 2m or so below the water line where ice is met, helping
to break it and move it out of the way.
Heated water jets below the waterline to help when breaking through ice.
Ability to rapidly move large amounts of water ballast within the ship to shift the weight when needing to
break ice. The ships can be rocked from side to side in this manner.
Hull divided by bulkheads into a series of watertight compartments in case it is holed.
Extra thick steel at the bow, the stern and at the waterline.
An "ice horn" to protect the rudder and propeller when in reverse, and an "ice knife" in front to protect it when
in forwards motion.
Electric propulsion to the propellers. Electric motors can apply torque when not actually turning or when only
turning slowly, so hitting a large piece of ice will not stop the engine.
Extra strong propellers with replaceable blades. There may also be a propeller inspection well to examine
them in operation and the facility to change blades while at sea.
Very powerful engines. The engine may be diesel possibly with extra power supplied by gas turbines for ice
breaking or be nuclear powered.
Powerful searchlights for use in dark winter conditions.

Characteristics of ice-strengthened ships


Most of the ships that supply Antarctic bases are ice strengthened
rather than full blown ice breakers.
Double hull, with a gap between them, the gap may be air or filled with
water ballast. If the outer hull is punctured the inner will hopefully not
be.
Flat hull shape with a rounded rather than pointed bow. This allows
the front of the ship to drive forwards, rise above the ice and then let
the weight of the ship break the ice.
Specially formulated hull polymer paints for strength and also low
friction when in contact with ice.
Special engine cooling arrangements so that the inlet for water taken
on board to cool the engine doesn't get blocked with ice - likewise the
water outlet.
No stabilizers or any other kind of hull protuberance that might get
ripped off by ice
Helicopter, for scientific work, but also for spotting leads and open
water in the ice to guide the ship.
Rudder and propeller protected by the shape of the hull, so that ice
moving backwards is less likely to cause damage.
Thicker than normal steel, particularly at the bow and at the level of
the water-line
Reinforced "ice belt" that typically extends about 1m above and below
the water line. This is where the hull has thicker steel and also has
extra internal ribs to help the stiffening. These are usually twice as
many of these ribs than in a comparable "normal" ship.
Powerful bow and stern thrusters to help maneuvering in tight spaces
such as pack ice.

You might also like