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DoesarobothaveanUmwelt?

ReflectionsonthequalitativebiosemioticsofJakobvon
Uexkll
CLAUSEMMECHE
Publishedin
Semioticavol.134(issue1/4):pp.6536932001.(Aspecialissueon
JakobvonUexkll)
Bibliographicalnote
Thepaperwaspresentedatthesessionon"SemioticsandCognitive
Sciences"attheInternationalSummerInstituteforSemioticand
StructuralStudies(ISISSS),June1018,1999,Imatra,Finland,andatthe
"2deg.SeminrioAvanadodeComunioeSmiotica:NovosModelos
deRepresentao:vidaartificialeintelignciaartificial",August1820,
1999,SoPaulo,Brazil.Seeacknowledgementsinnote52.Author's
address:CenterforthePhilosophyofNatureandScienceStudies,Niels
BohrInstitute,Blegdamsvej17,DK2100Copenhagen,Denmark.
Email:emmeche[at]nbi.dkWeb:www.nbi.dk/~emmeche/
Abstract
ItisarguedthatthenotionofUmweltisrelevantforcontemporary
discussionswithintheoreticalbiology,biosemiotics,thestudyof
ArtificialLife,AutonomousSystemsResearchandphilosophyof
biology.Focusisputonthequestionofwhetheranartificialcreaturecan
haveaphenomenalworldinthesenseoftheUmweltnotionofJakobvon
Uexkll,oneofthefoundingfiguresofbiosemiotics.Ratherthan
vitalism,Uexkll'spositioncanbeinterpretedasaversionofqualitative
organicism.AhistoricalsketchofAutonomousSystemsResearch(ASR)
ispresentedtoshowitstheoreticalrootsandfruitfuloppositionto
traditionalAIstylerobotics.Itisarguedthattheseartificialsystemsare
onlypartly'situated'becausetheydonotinthefullsenseoftheword
experienceanUmwelt.Adeeperunderstandingoftrulysituated
autonomoussystemsasbeingakindofcomplexselforganizingsemiotic
agentswithemergentqualitativepropertiesmustbegained,notonly
fromthebroadfieldoftheoreticalbiology,butalsofromtheperspective
ofbiosemioticsintheUexklltradition.Thepaperisthusan
investigationofanewnotionofautonomythatincludesaqualitative
aspectoftheorganism.ThisindicatesthattheUmweltconceptisnot
reducibletopurelyfunctionalnotions.
Introduction
HowdoestheUmweltconceptofJakobvonUexkllfitintocurrentdiscussionswithin
theoreticalbiology,philosophyofbiology,biosemioticsandArtificialLife,particularlythe
researchon'autonomoussystems'androbots?Toinvestigatethisquestion,theapproach
hereisnothistoricalUexkllscholarshipexposingtheoriginalcoreofphilosophicalideas
thatprovidedanimportantbackgroundfortheoriginalconceptionoftheUmweltinthe
writingsofJakobvonUexkll(someofwhichseemincompatiblewithamodern
evolutionistperspective)rather,Iwillshowthatsomeaspectsofhisthoughtsarestill
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interestingandprovideinspirationincontemporarybiology,cognitivescience,andother
fields.Therefore,IwillalsodrawuponhissonThurevonUexkll'sreflectionsinhis
furtherdevelopmentoftheUmwelttheory,whichisnotantievolutionary(hisfather's
approachwasantiDarwinian,whichisnotthesameasantievolutionarythoughoften
interpretedassuch).
Specifically,Iwillinvestigatetheplausibilityofthreetheses:(I)TheUmwelttheoryof
JakobvonUexkll,eventhoughhistheoreticalbiologywasoftencharacterizedasbeing
thoroughlyvitalist,caninthecontextofcontemporarysciencemoreadequatelybe
interpretedasabranchofqualitativeorganicismintheoreticalbiology.Qualitative
organicismisapositionwhichclaims,first,akindofmiddleroadposition,thatis,onthe
onehand,therearenomysteriousornonmaterialvitalpowersinorganisms(nonvitalism),
butontheotherhand,thecharacteristicpropertiesoflivingbeingscannotbefully
accountedforbyphysicsandchemistrybecausethesepropertiesarenonreducibleemergent
properties(emergentism)second,thatsomeoftheseemergentpropertieshavean
experiential,phenomenalorsubjectivecharacterwhichplaysamajorroleinthedynamics
ofthelivingsystem.Modernbiosemiotics(inspiredbyC.S.PeirceandJ.vonUexkll,
institutedbyT.A.Sebeok)isakindofqualitativeorganicism.(II)Thispositionshedslight
onrecentdiscussionsincognitivescience,artificiallifeandroboticsaboutthenatureof
representationandcognitionindeedgenuinesemioticquestionsastheydealwiththerole
ofinformationandsignsforanysystemthathasthepropertyofbeing'animallike,'thatis,
systemsthatmovebythemselvesandseemtobeguidedbyakindofentelechyor,in
modernbutshallowterms,abehaviouralprogramme.(III)Particularly,qualitative
organicismallowsustoapproachthequestionwhetherarobotcanhaveanUmweltinthe
sensethatJakobvonUexkllusedtheterm(asubjectivelyexperiencedphenomenalworld).
Theeventualityofapositiveanswertothisquestion,i.e.,aclaimthatarobotindeedcan
haveanUmwelt,seemscounterintuitivetotheextentthatarobotmaybeseenastousea
bewilderingwordanincarnationofthemechanicalandreductionistworldpictureto
whichJakobvonUexkllwassostronglyopposed.Butcertainideasandconceptsmay
sometimeleadustounexpectedconsequences,whichthreatenourcherishedmetaphysical
assumptions,andweshouldtrytofacesuchquestionswithanopenmind.
Askingthisthirdquestion,wemustalsoinquireifthatisthesameasasking"Cantherobot
haveamind"?Ifso,theUmweltisjustanotherwordfortheconceptofmind,andthe
theoryofJakobvonUexkllwouldnotcontributetosolveourquestion.Butthisisclearly
notthecase.Thoughonemightthink,thatifonehasaverybroadconceptofmind,e.g.,
motivatedbybiosemioticsandthephilosophyofPeirce,thentheUmweltofanimalsandthe
mindofanimalsmighthavethesameextension.However,mindassuchisnotcoextensive
withUmwelten,atleastforthesemioticnotionofmindonefindsinPeirce(SantaellaBraga
1994).ThemindisabroadernotionthantheUmwelt,so,forinstance,therecanbealotof
activityinalivingorganismwhichisofamental,orsemiotic,character,butwhichdoesnot
figureasapartoftheanimal'sexperiencedphenomenalworld.Clearly,thetwoconcepts
meandifferentthingsanddoneitherhavethesameintensionnorextension.Idonotknow
whetherPeircewouldhaveascribedmindlikepropertiestorobots,butitappearstobethe
casethathewouldbothbiologicalorganismsandrobotswithsensorsandeffectorscould
inprincipleembodythesamelogicalorsemioticprinciples(cf.Burks1975).
Themainroutebelowisthroughthefollowingpoints.Afterashortintroductiontothe
UmweltconceptofJakobvonUexkll(seealsootherarticlesinthisissue),histheorywill
besituatedinthetraditionofqualitativeorganicisminbiology,tobeintroduced.Letme
emphasizethattheUmwelttheorymaybeinterpretedinotherways(suchasbeingstrictly
vitalist),sowhatIintendisnotacriticalexpositionofJ.vonUexkll'sownversionbuta
reconstructionofthetheorymoreinlinewithcontemporarytheoreticalbiology.Thenext
stepisanhistoricaloverviewofresearchinroboticsandautonomoussystems,ascientific
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fieldthathasalreadyattractedtheattentionofsemioticians(cf.Meystel1998)andwhichis
deeplyinspiredbybiologicalconsiderations.Alongwiththatoverviewandinaseparate
sectionhereafter,thequestionwhetherarobotcanhaveanUmweltwillbefinallydecided
(hopefully).Theperspectivesofacloserapproachmentoftheoreticalbiology,semiotics,
autonomoussystemsresearchandcognitivesciencearediscussed.
TheUmweltconceptandpresentdaybiology
Umwelt:Notenvironment,notmind
TheUmweltmaybedefinedasthephenomenalaspectofthepartsoftheenvironmentofa
subject(ananimalorganism),thatis,thepartsthatitselectswithitsspeciesspecificsense
organsaccordingtoitsorganizationanditsbiologicalneeds(J.vonUexkll1940T.von
Uexkll1982a,1989).Inthatsense,thesubjectistheconstructorofitsownUmwelt,as
everythinginitislabelledwiththeperceptualcuesandeffectorcuesofthesubject.Thus,
onemustatleastdistinguishbetweentheseconcepts:(1)thehabitatoftheorganismas
'objectively'(orexternally)describedbyahumanscientificobserver(2)thenicheofthe
organisminthetraditionalecologicalsenseasthespecies'ecologicalfunctionwithinthe
ecosystem,(3)theUmweltastheexperiencedselfworldoftheorganism.[1]
TheUmweltnotiondeeplyinfluencedKonradLorenzinhisdevelopmentofethology,butit
neverreallybecameestablishedwithinethologyorgeneralbiologyandwassubsequently
forgottenforalongperiod.ThismayinpartbeduetothedominanceofDarwinianthinking
inbiologyandthefactthatJakobvonUexkllveryearlyhadbecomeaconvincedanti
Darwinistandwasalsosubsequentlyassociatedwiththevitalistoppositionagainst
mechanicisminbiology(seeHarrington1996foradditionalbiographicalinformation).
Lorenz,ofcourse,wasaDarwinist.AsRichards(1987:530)remarks,
DespiteLorenz'sadamantinecommitmenttoultraDarwinism,hisinstincttheoryborethe
signofanopenlyantiDarwinianthinkerJakobvonUexkll,aDrieschianvitalist.From
Uexkll,anindependentscholarofspousalmeans,Lorenzadaptedthenotionofa
"functionalsystem"(Funktionskreis).AccordingtoUexkll'stheory,afunctionalor
interactivesystemconstitutedtherelationbetweenananimal,withitsspecialorgansand
needs,anditsownexperiencedworld(dieUmwelt),thelivedrealityofwhichcorresponded
totheanimal'ssensoryabilitiesandrequirements.LorenztransformedUexkll'sconception
ofthefunctionalsystemintothatofthe"innatereleasingschemata"(angeborenenAuslse
Schemata).Thisinnatereleasingmechanism(IRM),ashealsotermedit,wasthereceptor
correlateintheanimalthatrespondedwithaparticularpatternofbehaviortospecific
elicitorycuesintheenvironment.
Thispassagehintsuponthehistoricalfactthatthefocusontheveryphenomenalaspectof
theUmweltinthesubsequentdevelopmentofthemainstreamstudyofanimalbehaviour
wasquicklytoneddownandalmostcompletelydisappeared,probablybecauseofinfluences
uponethologyfromsuchintellectualmovementsaspositivism,behaviourism,and,in
biology,neoDarwinismandmechanicism.
However,withthedevelopmentinthesecondhalfofthiscenturyofzoosemiotics,
biosemioticsandpsychosomaticmedicine,theUmweltnotioncameincreasinglyintouse
again.Thisshortquotationfromapaperon'Endosemiosis'byThurevonUexkll,Wernes
GeiggesandJrgM.Hermannsufficestorestatethecoreoftheconcept:"Jakobvon
UexkllcoinedthetermUmwelt('subjectiveuniverse','significantsurround','phenomenal
world',or'selfworld',asopposedtoUmgebung'environment'[...])"(T.vonUexkllet
al.1993:6).InanoteheretheauthorselaboratethatanUmweltisthesubjectiveworldof
whatismeaningfulimpingementforthelivingbeingintermsofitsinformationprocessing
equipment,signsystem,andcodes.Theycontinuetonotethatanimalsarewrappedin
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networksofsignprocesseswhichprotectthembytransposingtheenvironmentintoits
subjectivemeaning,whichareaccessibleonlytotheencodingsubject.
TwofeaturesoftheUmweltnotionareimportantinthiscontext:(1)Asnoted,thesystem's
Umweltcannotbeequatedwiththesystem'smind.Bywhatevermeansonecharacterizes
mind,itsactivityismoreencompassingthanwhatspecificallyisexperiencedbythesystem
asitsworld.Forinstanceinhumans,ourUmweltbecomesconsciousbymeansof
intentionalperception,cognitionandlanguagewhileanoceanofsubconsciousornon
consciousprocessesareactivepartsofthemind.(2)Anorganismhasonlyprimaryaccess
toitsownUmwelt,andonlyhumans(andsomeratherclever'mindreading'animalssuchas
certainpredatorsinterpretingthemindoftheirprey)maybyinferenceshaveindirectaccess
totheUmweltofotherspecies.However,this'indirectaccess'isneverthesamethingasthe
realUmweltofthespeciesinquestione.g.,ourscientificunderstandingofthesonar
systemofabatgivesusanindirectandfunctionalpictureofthebat'sUmwelt,butwe
cannotenterintothatUmweltitselfallwehaveisamodelinour(linguistic,cognitiveand
perceptual)Umweltofthebat'sUmwelt.Scienceattemptstobuildamodelbased'view
fromnowhere'(Nagel1986),butcanonlydosomediatedbyourspeciesspecificUmwelt,
oursubjectivepointofviewfromwhichwecollectivelyconstructasharedhumansphereof
publicknowledge.
Qualitativeorganicism
Anoftenseenmisinterpretationistheconstrualofphilosophyoftwentiethcenturybiology
asafightbetweenvitalismandmechanicismthatfinallywaswonbymechanicism.This
construaloverlooksthefactthatthemostinfluentialpositionturnedouttobeorganicist
(eventhoughpopularscienceaftertheadventandtriumphsofmolecularbiologytolda
differentstorytothepublic).The'resolutionofthedebate'betweenvitalismand
mechanicismwasnotamechaniststance,butasortofhistoricalcompromiseintheformof
whatIherecallmainstreamorganicism(exemplifiedbythewritingsofsuchwellknown
biologistsasJ.Needham,P.Weiss,C.H.Waddington,J.Woodger,E.Mayr,R.C.
Lewontin,R.Levins,S.J.Gould)functioningmoreorlesstacitlyasabackground
philosophyofbiology.Forsomeofthosewhohavedevotedmuchintellectualenergyto
fightreductionistthinkinginbiology(whichisindeedcommonbutalso,mostoften,merely
programmatic)thisinterpretationmaysoundsurprising,butoneshoulddistinguishbetween
illfoundedspontaneoustalkaboutorganismsasbeingmerelymechanicalaggregatesof
molecules,andtherealconceptualstructureandscientificpracticewithindomainslike
evolutionaryormolecularbiologywherereductiontochemistryorphysicsisneverreally
theissue.Inscience,metaphysicalattachmentsandscientificresearchmaybeconnected,
butoftenonlylooselyso:Itisquitepossibleforadherentsofmetaphysicalvitalism,
organicismandmechanicismtoworktogetherinthesamelaboratoryprogressingin
substantiatingthesameparadigm,abstainingfromphilosophicalconflictsorrestricting
themselvestoaninstrumentalistdiscourse.Scientistsoftenhaveaverypragmaticstance
towardsfoundations,anattitudewhichischaracteristicalsoofmainstreamorganicism.Itis
neverthelesspossibletoexplicatethatposition.Organicismtakesthecomplexityand
physicaluniquenessoftheorganismasasignofthedistinctivenessofbiologyasanatural
sciencesuigeneris.[2]Thispositionhasseveralhistoricalrootsoneprecursoristhe
emergentistmovementatthebeginningofthe20thcentury,especiallyinBritain.[3]This
middleroad,althoughhereoftenframedwithinanaturalistevolutionaryperspective,was
anticipatedbyKant'smorecritical(nonnaturalist)notionofalivingorganism.[4]
AccordingtoKant,wecannotdispensewithaheuristicprincipleofpurposefulnesswhen
weconsideranorganism,thatistosay,"Anorganizedproductofnatureisoneinwhich
everypartisreciprocallypurpose[end]andmeans.Initnothingisvain,withoutpurpose,
ortobeascribedtoablindmechanismofnature."(Kant1790[1951:222]).However,
withinmainstreamorganicismthisteleologyisinterpretedasamoreorless'mechanical'
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teleonomybeingtheresultoftheforcesofblindvariationandnaturalselection,plus
eventuallysomeadditional'orderforfree'orphysicalselforganization.Mainstream
organicismasapositionisthusnonvitalist,ontologicallynonreductionist(allowingfor
methodologicalreduction)andemergentist.Whatisstudiedasemergentpropertiesare
commonmaterialstructuresandprocesseswithinseverallevelsoflivingsystems
(developmentalsystems,evolution,selforganizingpropertiesetc.),allofwhicharetreated
intheusualwayasobjectswithnointrinsicexperientialproperties.Forinstancein
behaviouralstudies,theethologistsarenotallowedtomakeuseofsubjectivistor
anthropocentriclanguagedescribinganimalbehaviour.
Incontrast,qualitativeorganicismrepresentsamore'coloured'viewonlivingbeingsit
emphasizesnotonlytheontologicalrealityofbiologicalhigherlevelpropertiesorentities
(suchassystemsofselfreproducingorganismsbeingpartsofthespecies'historical
lineages)butalsotheexistenceofphenomenologicalorqualitativeaspectsofatleastsome
higherlevelproperties.Whensensinglightorcolours,anorganismisnotmerely
performingadetectionofsomeexternalsignalswhichthengetprocessedinternally
(describedintermsofneurochemistryor'informationprocessing'orwhatever)something
additionalisgoingon(atleastifwewantthefullstory),namelytheorganism'sown
experienceofthelight,andthisexperienceisseenassomethingveryreal.Eventhoughit
hasasubjectivemodeofexistenceitisanobjectivelyrealphenomenon(inrecent
philosophyofmind,Searle1992isoneofthefewtoemhasizetheontologicalrealityof
subjectiveexperiencehowever,heismostofthetimeonlytalkingabouthuman
experience).Asascientificpositionqualitativeorganicismisconcernedwithqualities
whicharenotonlyofthefamouscategoryof'primary'qualities(roughlycorrespondingto
thescientificallymeasurablequanta)includingshape,magnitude,andnumberbutalso
concernedwiththe'secondary'qualitiesofcolour,taste,sound,feeling,etc.[5]Oneshould
notequatequalitativeorganicismormainstreamorganicismwithcoherentstances,theories
orparadigmsthoughforbothoptionsonecanfindrepresentativeswithinrecenttheoretical
biology.[6]Someauthorsmaynotbeconsistent,somemayonlyimplicitlyexpresseither
ideatheimportantthingistorecognizethatinfacttwodifferentconceptionsoflifeand
biosemiosisareatstake.
ItisobviousthattheUmweltnotionisofcentralimportancetothedevelopmentofa
coherenttheoryofthequalitativeexperientialworldoftheorganism,ataskpresentday
biologymustface,insteadofcontinuingtoignoreahugephenomenalrealmoftheliving
worldtheexperientialworldofanimalappetites,desires,feelings,sensations,etc.[7]For
suchatask,theoreticalinspirationcanbefoundinthefieldsofsemioticsaswellasartificial
lifeandautonomoussystemsresearch.TheexperientialUmweltisrootedinthematerial
andsemioticbodyoftheorganism,whichagainissituatedinaspecificpartofthehabitat
dependingonits(Eltonian)niche.AnactualtheoryoftheUmweltmustnotpositany
vitalistspiritualorocculthiddenpowersto'explain'theemergenceoftheUmweltenin
evolution,however,itmustacknowledgetherichnessandrealityofthephenomenaof
organismicsensing,actingandperceiving.Theimplicationofsuchanadventurecouldbe
importantnotonlytobiology,butaswelltosemiotics(togroundthesignnotioninnature),
tophilosophyofmind(toovercomedualismandsolvetheproblemsofnonreductive
superveniencephysicalism),andtogeneralunderstandingoftherelationbetweenthe
humanandotherspecies.Couldwecreateanartificial'organism'withanUmweltmore
alientousthanthatofachimporafruitfly?
Autonomoussystems:Abriefhistory
Itisoftensuggestedthatmanydevicesthatareabletoservespecifichumanpurposescould
bemoreconvenientandusefuliftheycouldbe'autonomousagents',thatis,notonlybe
computationalinputoutputdevices,butmovearoundascyberneticsystemsbytheirown
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motormodulesguidedbysensors,makingdecisions,havingthecapacityofactingmoreor
lessintelligentlygivenonlypartialinformation,learningbytheirmistakes,adaptingto
heterogeneousandchangingenvironments,andhavingasortoflifeoftheirown.Nodoubt
suchdevicescouldalsocausealotofharm(buthereI'lldisregardconcernsabout
technologyassessmentandethicalimplications).Variousresearchprogrammeshavebeen
launchedandarerunningforthestudyanddesignofwhatiscalled'autonomoussystems',
'situatedagents','distributedAIsystems',and'multiagentsystems'notonlyforthe
purposeofdesigning'useful'agents,butoftenmainlytoinvestigatewhatitreallyisfora
systemtobeautonomousandhavesomesortofagency.
Thisfieldofresearch,heredenotedASR(autonomoussystemsresearch),iscontinuouswith
classicalArtificialIntelligenceresearch(AI)inseveralaspects,especiallyinitsimplicit
structuralism:Theaimisnotsomuchthescientificstudyofnaturalformsofthe
phenomenon(intelligentbehaviour)asitsgeneralandmoreabstractprocessualstructure,
obviouslytoseeifotherinstancesofitsstructurecouldbedesignedartificiallytosolve
specificproblems.InthecaseofclassicalAI,datingbacktothe1950sand1960sandstill
existingtoday,thepurposewasnotsomuchthescientificstudyofhumanintelligence,
whichmorebecamethefocusofcognitivescience(CS),asitwas(andstillis)thecreation
ofaclusteroftheoriesofpossibleintelligentsystemsthatcanbeimplementedinphysical
instancesofTuringmachines.WiththeinventionofArtificialLife(AL)asaresearch
programmeinthemid1980s(thefirstconferencewasin87),thetheoreticalpurposewas
thestudyof'lifeasitcouldbe,'toextend,sotospeak,thebasesetofexamplesprovidedby
traditional'carbonchauvinist'biologywhichwasblamedforhavingdealtempiricallyonly
withasingleclassoflivingsystemsthosethataccidentallyhappenedtohaveevolvedon
Earth.[8]Likewise,thestudyofautonomoussystems(whichpartlybuildsuponandis
continuouswithtopicsinAI,CS,andAL)isnotsomuchfocusedonthecausalstructureof
naturallyrealisedautonomoussystems(microbes,plants,animals,humans)asitisfocused
onthestructureofanyconceivablesystemthatcanpossiblyrealizeautonomousbehaviour.
Thisstructuralismmaybeviewedasimportantforcreativedesignandengineeringofnew
systemstypes,anecessaryliberationfromthefocusonempiricalinvestigationofnaturally
realizedsystems.However,withinAI,andcertainlyalsowithinASR,ithascreated
epistemologicalconfusioninrelationtothepygmalionsyndrome(cf.Emmeche1994a:63,
134155).Thisisthefallacyoftakinganartificiallycreatedmodelnotonlytobe
representingrealitybuttobejustanotherinstanceofreality.IfacomputationalALsystem,
suchasTomRay'sTIERRA(inLangtonetal.,eds.1992),istakennotsimplytomodel
someabstractaspectsofevolutionbynaturalselection,buttobeaninstanceoflife,onehas
committedthepygmalionfallacy.Therehasbeenanextensivedebatewhetherthisisreally
afallacyorapartandparcelofthe'strong'ALprogramme.[9]Similarly,onecouldclaim
thatthedevicescreatedwithinthefieldofASRareeitherjustmoreorlessinteresting
modelsof'real'livingautonomousorganisms(wheretheartificialsystemsarenot
intrinsicallyautonomous,becausethepropertyofautonomyisascribedtothemintheir
functionasamodel),orthattheyaresimplycyberneticmachinesthatcertainlymaybehave
asiftheywereautonomous,butwherethisautonomyiseithertoosimpletocatchthe
intendedpropertyoftherealthing,orsimplyofanothercategoryofbehaviour.Theconcept
ofanUmweltisseldomusedinthisdiscussion,[10]althougharealunderstandingofthe
Umweltconceptmayhavedeepimplicationsforthepossibilityof'strongAL'(theideaof
notsimplysimulatingorimitatinglifeprocessesbutcreatinggenuinelifedenovo,from
scratchsotosay,byartificialmeans).
Thepointhereisnottosaythatresearchinautonomoussystems,animatsandroboticshas
failedbecausethesesystemswillneverbecome'trulyautonomous',orthattheyare
biologicallyunrealistic,useless,wacky,orsimilarallegationsthismayindeedbesofor
someorallspecificsystemscreateduntilnow,butoneshouldacknowledgearichand
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variedfieldofresearchandtechnologicaldevelopmentthatcaninspireandinvigoratenot
onlythecomingindustryof'intelligentdesign'butalsoalotofscientificinvestigations.Itis
averyopenquestionwhatwillbeachievedbythisresearchinthefuture,andthepointhere
istoarticulatequestions,ratherthangivingdefinitiveanswers.Acrucialquestionis
whethersuchsystemscanhaveanUmwelt,andifso,howwoulditlookandhowcouldwe
know,andifnot,whynot?Approachingthesequestionsinvolvesinvestigationofthe
metaphysicalideasandpresuppositionsofthisresearch.Whatkindsofsystemsarereally
autonomousisittheoneswithanintrinsicrelationbetweenUmweltandautonomy?
Anoteonterminology:Theterm'autonomous'intheliteratureofASRisusedinavariety
ofways,mostoftenwithinformalmeanings.Autonomousmeansinordinarylanguagea
person,aregionorastatethatisselfgoverningindependentsubjecttoitsownlaws.[11]A
connotationisfreedom,suchasfreedomofthewill.Suchconnotationsdependofcourseof
whatkindofsystemisviewedasbeingautonomous.[12]Thetermautonomousderives
fromtheGreekwordauto,orautosmeaningself,thesameandnomosmeaninglawi.e.,
selfgoverning,selfsteering,spontaneousopposedtoheteronomousmeaningexternally
controlled.InthebiologicaltheoryofMaturanaandVarela(1980),thetermwasgivena
specificmeaning,viz.theconditionofsubordinatingallchangestothemaintenanceof
organizationand"theselfassertingcapacityoflivingsystemstomaintaintheiridentity
throughtheactivecompensationsofdeformations"(ibid.,p.135).[13]However,within
ASR,whatcountasan'autonomousagent'wouldoftenbeclassifiedasbeinganon
autonomous(heteropoietic)systembythecriteriagivenbytheirtheoryofautopoiesis.
Cybernetics,robotics,classicalAI:somehistoricalforerunners
Theideaofautonomoussystemsoriginatesbothinprescientificideasofwhatconstitutes
adaptive,intelligenttasksolvingbehaviorinman,animalsandmachines,andintheearly
attemptstomodelandconstructsystemswithseeminglygoaldirectedbehaviorduringthe
earlyperiodofcybernetics,informationtheoryandrelateddisciplines(systemstheory,
operationtheory,andgeneralengineeringscience).Alsootherfieldsbecamecrucialforthis
developmentlateron,suchasautomaticreasoning,patternrecognition,'intelligent'data
bases,expertsystems,otherAItechniques,andtheclassicfieldofAIstylerobotics.The
historyoftheoriginandinterchangeofideasbetweenthedifferentdisciplinesofthe
'systemsthinking'movementisrelevantforunderstandingthehistoricalbackgroundof
ASR,buttoocomplicatedtobedealtwithhere.[14]However,cyberneticsdeservesour
attention,partlybecauseASRcanbeseenasanextensionofsomeaspectsoftheoriginal
researchprogramofcybernetics,andpartlybecauseaspectsofcyberneticsmaybeviewed
asamechanistversionofthefunctionalcircleoftheUmwelttheory.
Theideaofanartandscienceofcontroloverawholerangeoffieldsinwhichthisnotionis
applicablewasofferedbythemathematicianNorbertWienerin1948.Cyberneticsisa
theoryoffeedbacksystems,i.e.,selfregulatingsystemssuchasmachinesandanimals.The
centralnotionisfeedback,i.e.,feedingbackinformationofsomechangeofparameters
describingthestateofapartofasystem(e.g.,somemeasureofoutputorperformance)to
themechanismsresponsibleforeffectingthesechanges,oftenwiththefunctionof
regulatingthesystem'sbehaviourtokeepitinastableregionofinteractionwiththe
environment(negativefeedback).[15]
Asignificantexampleisthesensorperception(cognition)motorsystemofourownbody.
Whenwemovetocatchaball,weinterpretourviewoftheball'smovementtopredictits
futuretrajectory.Ourattempttocatchtheballinvolvesthisanticipationofitsmovementin
determiningthemovementofourbody.Astheballgetscloser,wefinditdepartedfromthe
expectedtrajectory,andwemustadjustourmovementaccordingly.Inthecybernetic
description'we'orthesubjectisdescribedasaninformationprocessingmechanism.Thus
thevisualsystemcanbeseenasprovidinginputstoacontroller(ourbrain)whichmust
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generatecontrolsignalstocausethemotorsystem(ourmuscles)tobehaveinsomedesired
way(ballcatching).Feedforwardanticipatestherelationbetweenthesystemandthe
environmenttodetermineacourseofactionfeedbackmonitorsdiscrepancieswhichcanbe
usedtoadjusttheactions.Thus,thecontrolproblemistochoosetheinputtothesystemso
astocauseitsoutputtobehaveinsomedesiredwayeitherstayclosetoareferencevalue
(theregulatorproblem)ortofollowcloseuponsomedesiredtrajectory(thetracking
problem).Asacontrolsignaldefinedbyitsanticipatedeffectmaynotachievethateffect,a
feedbackisneededtocomparetheanticipatedwiththeactualandtodeterminea
compensatorychange.Overcompensationgivesrisetoinstabilityundercompensation
yieldspooradjustmenttonoiseandtooslowperformance(timedelays).Thus,cybernetic
principlesarerelativelyeasytodescribeontheoveralllevel,asweintuitivelycomprehend
theprinciplesofballcatchingin,say,baseball.Mathematicallytheyaremoredifficultto
analyze,andtosimulatethistypeofbehaviorinfullscalecomplexityandinrealtimeis
computationallyveryhard.Nobodyhasyetbeenabletodesignanautonomousagentthat
couldimitateevenatinypartofthegraceofhumanballcatchingwhensituatedinanatural
setting,e.g.,atenniscourt.
Thecyberneticdescriptionoftheinformationbeingfedbackandforthbetweenthesystem's
componentsfocusontheroleoftheindividualsignswithinwhatUexkllcalledawhole
functionalcircle.Superficially,thetheoreticallanguageoftheUmwelttheorymaybe
translatedtothelanguageofcyberneticswithnolossofmeaning.However,cybernetics(as
wellasclassicalAI)isanexternalistdescription,itdoesnotacknowledgeasubjective
worldoftheorganismexperiencedfromwithin.Thusthe'information'ofcybernetic
feedbackisnotthesameconceptastheperceptualandoperationalsignsofthefunctional
circle.Thelatterconceptsaremostadequatelyinterpretedassemioticconceptsrequiring
triadicrelationsbetweensign,objectandinterpretants.[16]Inthatsenseacomplete
meaningpreservingtranslationfromcyberneticstoUmwelttheorymightnotbepossible,
thetwomodesofdescriptionarepartlyincommensurable(butcyberneticnotionscanbere
interpretedandgeneralizedinasemioticframework).Thisdistinctionisimportant,because
anysimpledevicethatmeaningfullycanbedescribedasprocessingsignalsisinformation
controlledinthatsimplesense,eventhoughsuchacyberneticdevicemaynothavean
Umwelt.Itwouldseemabsurdtoascribeaphenomenalselfworldtoaflywheelgovernor
(evenafairlysimple'self').
Whatbecameofcybernetics?Today,aftertheintroductionofcomputers,theoreticalstudies
oftheproblemsofcontrolhavebecomesosophisticatedandtheirapplication(to
engineering,biomedicine,economics,andcertainlytoroboticsandAI)havebecomeso
firmlyrootedandselfevidentthatitisdifficulttorecapturetheintellectualexcitement
broughtaboutbyWiener'sideas.Furthermore,afterthecognitiverevolutioninpsychology
inthe1960s,moreemphasiswasputonhigherlevelcognitivecapacitieswhichwere
unmanageableandintractablebypurelycyberneticprinciples,astheyseemedtopresuppose
theactionofextensivesymbolicsystemsforreasoningandrepresentinginformationabout
thenatureofthetaskstobesolved.ThisinitiatedthewholedevelopmentofCSandbefore
that,AI.Thoughtoocrudetocountasahistoricalvalidscheme,itisnotquiteunfairtosay
thattheinterestinautonomoussystemswasrepresentedatthebeginningbycyberneticsand
systemssciencethen,in1950sand60sbythenewfieldsofAIandroboticsandforthe
past30yearsbytheeverchangingmeetingpointsbetweenAI,CS,robotics,neuroscience,
andrecently,theArtificialLifeversionoftheoreticalbiology,andASR.Thisdoesnotmean
thatcyberneticsassuchis'dead'orthatnoscientificexchangeorresearchtakesplaceany
longerunderthebannerofcybernetics(e.g.,Heylighenelal.,eds.,1990),butthewhole
fieldhaschangedwiththedevelopmentsofcomplexsystemsresearch,CS,AI,etc.
CyberneticprinciplesarestronglyintegratedwithinthecoreofASR.(Asepistemology,
cyberneticsdevelopedintoBateson's'ecologyofmind'orvonFoerster's'secondorder
cybernetics',bothofwhicharemoreinlinewithabiosemioticstudyof'theviewfrom
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within').Letustakealookatthenotionofautonomyfromamoretraditionalroboticspoint
ofview,tounderstandwhatthenew'embodiedcognition'andASRmovementisreacting
against.
GoodOldFashionedRobotics
JustasAItodaymustbeseenhistoricallyasembracingbothaclassicallogocentric'Good
OldFashionedAI'traditionandsomemorerecentandtheoreticallybroaderresearch
programmes(neitheroftheseareespeciallyconcernedwithrobotics),soistheterm
'robotics'ambigious,andinthissectionweshallstarttofocusonacorrespondingtradition
oflogocentric,AIstyle,'GoodOldFashionedRobotics'(GOFR).
Thoughtherearedistinctagendaswithinthecurrentresearchprogramsofroboticsfrom
pragmaticonessuchasdevelopingbetterattentionbasedmotorcontrolsystemstoperform
simplepredefinedtasksusefulattheassemblylinesintheindustry,tohighlyambitious
onessuchasembodyinggeneralintelligentsystemsas'servants'forhumanbeingsthe
generalassumptionofAIstyleroboticsthatboomedinthe1980sisthatknowledgebased
performancecanbeintelligentthoughmediatedbyamachine.Inpractice,AIsystemsmay
beautonomous(asrobots),ortheymaybeintelligenceamplifiers,whenusedtoenhance
humanperformanceindecisionmaking.[17]RoboticAIsystemsshouldbecapableof
recognizingobjectsorscenes(asarealservant[18]can)andinteractwithworlds,thatis,
realworldsorcomputersimulatedones(ifthelab'sfundingsaretoolowtotakeon
engineers).Informationforrealworldinteractionmaybeprovidedbytelevisioncameras
andsimpletouchsensors('bumpers').
Suchacompleteroboticsystemhasalearningcapacity.Itmaylearnextractinguseful
visualfeaturesoftheinformationitreceivesandcalibrateitsinternallyrepresented'visual
space'bytouchexplorationofobjectsintheworld.Suchroboticdevices[19]employpattern
recognitionwithstoredknowledge(oftenrepresentedinstablesymbolicform)inorderto
infer(fromincomingsignalsandthestoredknowledgeoftheirobjectworld)thethree
dimensionalshapesandnonsensedpropertiesofobjects,eventhoughthesenseddataare
limitedandneverstrictlyadequate.Atleastthiswas(andtosomeextentcontinuestobe)
theambitiousconstructiongoalofsuchsystems.Theirpatternperceptionansichisusually
notsocleverasitshouldbe,theemphasisbeingoneffectiveuseoflimitedrealtimesensed
databyprogramsthatemploystoredknowledge.Thisgenerallyfailsinatypicalsituations,
forinferencestotheworlddependonappropriateassumptions,andwhatis'appropriate'is
againhighlycontextspecificanddependingonthetotalsituationwhiletheknowledgebase
oftherobotisrestrictedtoafewmicroworldsituations.Thisisaninstanceofthegeneral
frameproblemofAI,notaminortechnicalnuisancebutaseriousobstacletothedesignof
anykindofsystemthatisintendedtomodelacomplexandchangingworld(fordetails,see
Janlert1987).
CurrentAIresearchisaimedatdevelopingprogramsratherthansophisticatedhardware.
Therobotdevicesmayserveastestbedsforsuggestingandtestingprogramsiftheyare
usedinAIresearchatall.However,AIisnotjustadvancedcommunicationengineeringor
logicprogramming.Besidethegoalofconstructing'intelligent'tools,AIcanbe(butnot
necessarilyhastobe)presentedasaclaimaboutthenatureofthemind.WhatJohn
Haugeland(1985)dubsGOFAIGoodOldFashionedArtificialIntelligenceisthe
strongclaimthat(a)ourabilitytodealwiththingsintelligentlyisduetoourcapacityto
thinkaboutthemreasonably(includingsubconsciousthinking)and(b)ourcapacityto
thinkaboutthingsreasonableamountstoafacultyforinternal'automatic'symbol
manipulationactingonasetofstablestoredrepresentations.Thisimpliesthattheinternal
symbolmanipulationsmustbeinterpretedasbeingabouttheoutsideworld(i.e.,about
whateverthesystemdealswithintelligently),andthattheinternal'reasonable'symbol
manipulationsmustbecarriedoutbysomecomputationalsubsystem('innercomputers').
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Thisisnotjustofphilosophicalinterest,forthisparadigm,whenappliedtotheartof
buildingrobots,createsapictureofarobotasavehicleembeddinganadvancedAI
computer,forinstanceahugeexpertsystem(wheretheexpertiseideallyshouldbecommon
sense!)endowedwithsensorsandeffectors.
InthisAIstyle,or,aswemightcallit,GoodOldFashionedRobotics,thetraditional
emphasisofartificialintelligenceresearchemphasisonexplicitknowledge,rational
choiceandproblemsolvinghasproveddifficulttoapplytoconstructionofselfmoving,
selforientingautonomousrobots.Thefewsystemsbuiltoftenshowdeficienciessuchas
brittleness,inflexibility,norealtimeoperation,etc.TheproblemsthathaveappearedinAI
inthiscontextsuchastheproblemofnonmonotonicreasoningandtheframeproblem
(Pylyshyn,ed.1987)areofcourseoftheoreticalinterestandarestudiedintheirownright,
buttheyremainunsolved(atleastwithinrealistictimeconstraints)andthesuggestionsfor
solutiondonotappeartobeparticularlyusefultothedevelopmentofsituatedsystems.
AnothercharacteristicofAIstyleroboticsisthetraditionaltopdowndesignapproach.
Noneofthemodulesthemselvesgeneratethebehaviorofthetotalrobotonehasto
combinetogethermanyofthemodulestogetanybehavioratallfromthesystem.
Improvementsintheperformanceoftherobotproceedsbyimprovingtheindividual
functionalmodules.Thisisdifficult,becauseoftheinflexibilityofthefunctional
competenceofthevariouspartswherechangesinonemodulewillnegativelyeffectthe
performanceofanother,sothetotaldesignhastobereconsideredineachstepofdesign
change(thisproblemistosomeextendremediedinthenewdesignapproachesto
autonomousagents).Theemphasesonexplicitnessofknowledge,rationalityandexternal
(andtopdown)designareveryunrealisticfromthepointofviewofbiologyandreal
animals'behaviorandUmwelt.
GoodOldFashionedRoboticsinheritsthephysicalsymbolsystemhypothesisofAI.This
hypothesis,[20]whichisveryfarfromrealbiology,statesthattheprocessesrequiredto
produceintelligentbehaviourcanbeachievedwithacollectionofphysicalsymbolsanda
setofmechanismsthatproduceaseries,overtime,ofstructuresbuiltfromthosesymbols.
Thedigitalcomputershouldfunctionasatoolwithwhichthesymbolstructuresareformed
andmanipulated.SymbolstructuresinanAIprogramareusedtorepresentgeneral
knowledgeaboutaproblemdomain(suchasplayingchess,performingmedicaldiagnosis,
or,morerelevantforautonomousrobots,performingfunctionaldistinctionsbetweenobjects
andcreatingcategoriesofmovementsoftheorgansofahumanbeing)andtospecify
knowledgeaboutthesolutiontothecurrentproblem.Whyshouldsymbolsystemsplaya
necessaryroleinintelligentaction?FromtheAItyperoboticspointofview[21](cf.Newell
1980),theanswerseemstobethat(a)rationalitydemandsdesignationofpotential
situations(b)symbolssystemsprovideit(c)onlysymbolsystemscanprovideitwhen
sufficientnoveltyanddiversityoftasksarepermitted.
Thus,theideaimplicitinAIstyleroboticsisthatperceptionandmotorinterfacesdeliver
setsofsymbolsonwhichthecentralsystem,orreasoningengine,operatesinadomain
independentwayofthesymbols.Theirmeaningsareunimportanttothereasoner,butthe
coherenceofthecompleteprocessemergeswhen(1)anobserverofthesystemknowsthe
groundingsofthesymbolswithinhisorherexperience,[22]or(2)thesystemfunctionsso
wellthatthecompletesystem(thereasoningengineandthesensormotormodules)
constitutesthelocusofemergentmeaninginthesenseofwelladaptedfunctioning.Implicit
intheparadigmofthesymbolhypothesisistheideathatsymbolsandtheirconcatenations
represententitiesintheworld,beitindividualthings,properties,concepts,intentionalstates
ofotheragents,perceptualqualities,etc.Thecentralintelligenceoftherobotdealswith
symbolswhichmustbefedintoitbytheperceptionsystem.Itmustsomehowbegivena
(correctorapproximatelycorrect)descriptionoftheworldintermsoftyped,named
individualsandtheirrelationships.TheseassumptionsarecriticaltotheapproachofGood
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OldFashionedRobotics,andduetothenewapproachesofASR,theyaregenerallyno
longerheldtrue.
Beforewegoonwiththishistoricalsketch,weshouldreconsiderwhythistheoretical
notionofaninternalsymbolsystemshouldbeincontrasttotheUmwelttheory?Perhapsa
farfetchedquestion,asthetwotheoriesappeartobecompletelyincommensurable.One
mightneverthelessinterpretthesituationasifAIstyleroboticsindeedisahypothesisabout
thestructureofthespecifichumanUmwelt,whichis,insomesenseandtosomeextent,
symbolicandrational.Butthisoverlooks,first,thefactthattheUmwelttheoryprovidesa
separateepistemologyforthespecifichumanUmweltonthelevelofanthroposemiosis(T.
vonUexkll1986a,1986b,1989)thatcannotbereducedtothephysicalsymbolhypothesis,
andsecond,thefactthatthephilosophicalcorrelativetoAIstyleroboticsisamaterialist
versionoffunctionalismwithinphilosophyofmindthethesisthatthemindistothebrain
asapieceofsoftwareistothehardware.Evidentlythisnotionishardtomakecompatible
withtheUmwelttheory.Onthecontrary,JakobvonUexkll'sstudiesofthespecies
specificUmweltenofvariousanimalscanbeseenasanticipatinglater'ecologicalstudiesof
perception'(theGibsonschool)andnotionsofembodimentandsituatednessinASR(e.g.,
HendriksJansen1996)developedinoppositiontoAIstylerobotics.
Biomechanicalvehiclesasprotoautonomoussystems
Peoplehaveoftendreamtofbuildingprecisemechanicalanaloguesoflivingbeings,evenif
thesebeingswerenotconsideredtobevery"intelligent",andhistoricalaccountsof
automatacantellmanyinterestingexamples.[23]In1950W.GreyWalter,thedirectorof
thephysiologicaldepartmentattheBurdonNeurologicalInstituteinBristol,published"An
imitationoflife"[24]describingtwomechanicaltortoises,ElmerandElsie,withonlytwo
sensoryorganseach,andtwoelectronicnervecells.HecalledthemMachinaSpeculatrix,to
illustratetheir"exploratory,speculative"behaviour.Historicallytheyrepresentearly
instancesof'animats'orautonomousagents,constructedfromsimplecyberneticprinciples.
Eachmachinecarriesonlytwofunctionalunits,orcontrolsystems,onelightsensitiveand
theothertouchsensitive.Withthesetwosenseorgans(an'eye'orphotocellwhichcould
scanthesurroundingsforlightstimuli,andasimpleswitchsensorfortouch)twominiature
radiotubestwoeffectorsormotors(oneforcrawlingandoneforsteering)andpower
supplyviabatteries,themachinescouldproduce'lifelike'behaviour.Inabsenceofadequate
lightstimulusElmer(orElsie)explorescontinuously(thephotocellislinkedwitharotating
steeringmechanism),andatthesametimethemotordrivesthemachineforwardina
crawlingmotion.Thetwomotionscombinetogivethemachineacycloidalgait,whilethe
photocell'locks'ineverydirectioninturn.TheresultisthatinthedarkElmerexploresina
thoroughmanneraconsiderablearea,remainingalerttothepossibilityoflightandavoiding
obstaclesthatitcannotpushaside.Whenthephotocellseesalight,theresultantsignalis
amplifiedbybothtubesintheamplifier.Iflightisweak,onlyachangeofilluminationis
transmittedasaneffectivesignal.Astrongersignalisamplifiedwithoutlossofitsabsolute
level.Theeffectistohaltthesteeringmechanismsothatthemachinemovestowardthe
lightsourceanalogoustoabiologicalbehaviourknownas'positivetropism'(e.g.,amoth
flyingintoacandle).ButElmerdoesnotgointothelightsource:whenthebrilliance
exceedsacertainvaluethesignalbecomesstrongenoughtooperatearelayinthefirsttube,
whichhasthereverseeffectfromthesecondone.Thesteeringmechanismisthenturnedon
againatdoublespeedsothatthemachinesheersawayandseeksamoregentleclimate.It
willcirclearoundasinglelightsourceinacomplexpathofadvanceandwithdrawalwith
twolightsourcesitwillcontinuallystrollbackandforthbetweenthetwo.Whenbatteries
arewellcharged,itisattractedtolightfromafar,butatthethresholdthebrillianceisgreat
enoughtoactasrepellentsothatthemachinewandersoffforfurtherexploration.When
batteriesstarttorundown,thesensitivityoftheamplifierisenhancedsothattheattraction
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oflightisfeltfromevenfartheraway.Butsoonthelevelofsensitivityfalls,themachine
eventuallyfindsitselfattheentrancetoits'kennel'(alightemittingboxwithacertain
brightness)anditwillbeattractedrighthome,forthelightnolongerseemssodazzling.In
thekennelboxitmakescontactwiththechargeranditsbatteriescangetrecharged.
GreyWalterexperimentedwithvariationsofthissetupandobservedhownewcomplex
behaviourcouldemergeintheinteractionsoftwomachinesiftheycouldsenseeachother
(aswhensmalllightweremountedontheshellofthetortoises).Henotedthatthese
machines,thoughcrude,give"aneerieimpressionofpurposefulness,independenceand
spontaneity"(1950,p.45).[25]Apparentlythesedevicesbehaveasiftheyhaveautonomous
agency,andonecouldevenask,asweshalldobelow,whethertheyhaveaprimitive
Umwelt(thoughWaltertomyknowledgeneverthoughtso),justlikeJ.vonUexkllhad
emphasizedthesimplicityoftheUmweltofticks,bugs,andothersmallcreatures.
Atthattimethesemachines(includinglatermodifiedversionsbyWalter)seemedtobe
powerfulmodelsofautonomousbehaviour.[26]However,duringthe1950sand60s
considerablemoreeffortwasgivenattemptstoconstructintelligentprogramsthatcould
simulatehighercognitivecapacities,andWaltercontinuedhisworkinotherdirectionssuch
asthestudyofbrainfunctionandstimuliassociationinautisticchildren.
In1984appearedabookbyValentinoBraitenberg,Vehicles:ExperimentsinSynthetic
Psychology[27]thatbecameconsequentialnotonlyforcyberneticmindedpsychologists,
butalsoforfutureworkinArtificialLifeandthecoalescenceofcomputationalALwith
hardwaretechniquesfromrobotics.Braitenberg,withabackgroundincyberneticsand
neuroanatomy,describesanumberofsmall,verysimplecreatures,thatis,machineswith
sensorsandmotoraction(mostlywheels),easilydesignedbysimpleengineering
techniques,whichcancreateoftenhighlydiverseformsofbehaviour.Braitenberg,whowas
interestedinstructureswithinanimalbrainsthatseemedtobeinterpretableas"piecesof
computingmachinery",consideredthevehicles(hedidnotusethetermautonomous
systems)asiftheywereanimalsinanaturalenvironment.Then,onebecomestemptedto
usepsychologicallanguageindescribingtheirbehaviour,eventhoughoneknowsthat,
accordingtohim,thereisnothinginthesevehiclesthattheirdesignershavenotputin
themselves(thisisredolentofDennett's'intentionalstance'[28]).Braitenbergmakessome
observationswhichareofgeneralimportancetothedevelopmentofautonomoussystems,
weshallbrieflyconsiderthemostimportant.
Thefirstpointisaboutthekindofphysicsinwhichthevehicle'lives'.Avehiclemustbe
abletomove,butevenplanetsmove,sowhatisspecialtothemovementofanautonomous
system?BraitenbergdescribesthesimplestspeciesVehicle1asequippedwithjustone
sensorinthefrontandonemotorintheendofthedevicewithaverysimplesensormotor
connection(Figure1).

Figure1.Vehicle1.Theleftmostlittleboxisamotororganthe
bodywiththesensormotorconnectionisinthemiddletheYforkis
asensorandthearrowindicatesthedirectionofmovement.
Themorethereisofthequality(e.g.,temperature)towhichthesensoristuned,thefaster
themotorgoes.Thevehiclemovesinthedirectionithappenstobepointingitwillslow
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downincoldareasandspeedupwhereitiswarm.Butitlivesontheground(orinwater),
thatis,inaworldinwhichNewton'slawofinertiadoesnotmakedirectsenserather,itisa
worldoffriction,anAristotelianworldinthissense.Frictionslowsdownthebody,andif
thevehicleentersintoacoldregionwheretheforceexertedbyitsmotor,being
proportionatetotemperature,becomessmallerthanthefrictionalforce,iteventuallycomes
torest.NowBraitenbergasksustoimagineavehicleofthiskindswimmingaroundina
pond:"Itisrestless,youwouldsay,anddoesnotlikewarmwater.Butitisquitestupid,
sinceitisnotabletoturnbacktothenicecoldspotitovershootinitsrestlessness.Anyway,
youwouldsay,itisALIVE,sinceyouhaveneverseenaparticleofdeadmattermove
aroundquitelikethat"(Braitenberg1984:5).
ByakindofincrementalmethodologyBraitenbergincreasesthecomplexityofaseriesof
vehicles,Vehicle2beingjustakindofduplicationofthefirstone,withtwomotorsandtwo
sensorsintherespectivecornersofthetrunk,andcomingintwodistinctvarieties
dependingonwhethertherightsensorisconnectedtotherightmotorandviceversaorthey
arecrossconnected(seeFigure2).Ifthereisnocrossing,themotoronthesideofthebody,
whichgivesthehighestexposuretothesensorofthestuffthatexcitesthesensor,willtend
tomovefaster,sothatasaresult,thevehiclewillturnawayfromthesource(itwill'fear'it,
asBraitenbergsays).Inthevehiclewithcrossingtheresultingmovementwillturnthe
vehicletowardthesource(indicatedbythesunicon)andwilleventuallyhitit.

Figure2.Vehicle2.
Thisis,ofcourse,justthebeginningandBraitenbergdevelopedawholeseriesofagents
withawidespectrumofcapacitieswhichheinterpretedfromhisintentionalstanceas
showing'fear','aggression','love',etc.Weshallnotdwellonthedetails,becausethe
importancetoASRisclear.Eventhoughcyberneticprinciplescouldnotserveasabasisfor
'crackingthecognitionproblem'(e.g.,constructingsystemsthatwouldshowgeneral
intelligence,generalproblemsolvingcapacity,planning,etc.),theconstructionof
biomechanicalvehiclesrevealedthatsimplebehavioursofsimplemachinesmay,ina
variedenvironmentandinteractingwithothermachines,producesomethingwhichlooks
likeorganismsgovernedbyquasiintelligentcontrolstructures.Liketruelivinganimals,
theyseemtoconstitutesimplefunctionalcirclesofsemioticprocessesofsigninterpretation
andsignaction.WhyshouldtheynothaveUmwelten?
Thevariousattemptstobuildbiomechanicalautonomous[29]vehiclesdifferinone
importantrespectfromtheearlierclockworkautomata(e.g.,the"drawing"automatonof
theJaquetDrozfamily,cf.ChapuisandDroz1958)aswellastheAItypeofrobotsthat
followedthecyberneticperiod:Theydidnotrelyonacentral"program".Robotsand19th
centuryautomatadidthat:Theprogramwasresponsibleforthemodel'sdynamicbehaviour.
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Whetheritwasarotatingdrumwithpegstriggingleversinsequence,asetofmotordriven
cams,orsomeothermechanism,themovementthattheautomatonrealizedwas"calledfor"
byacentralcontrolmachinery.Asemphasizedbythenewmovementofcomplex
dynamicalsystemsresearch,[30]thereinlaythesourceoffailureofthesemodelsandthe
limitedperspectiveofawholeprogramofmodelinghumanandanimalsystemsthat
followedrightupto(andincluded)muchoftheworkinAI.Themostpromisingapproaches
tomodelcomplexphenomenalikelifeorintelligencebecamethosewhichdispensedwith
thenotionofacentralizedglobalcontroller,andfocusedinsteadonthemechanismsforthe
distributedcontrolofbehavior,situatedactivity,andthetypesofemergentdynamicsthat
formoutoflocalinteractingagents.GreyWalterandValentinoBraitenbergdida
pioneeringjobtomodelautonomoussystemswithoutpresupposingelaborateandexplicitly
encodedcontrolstructures.Inabiosemioticperspectiveitisahistoricalirony,oratleast
interesting,thatbothsucharelatively'mechanical'paradigmascybernetics,and'thevitalist'
JakobvonUexkll'sideaoftheUmwelt,withitsemphaticnotionoftheunityofthe
organismanditssensedenvironment,mustbeseenasprecursorstotherecentconceptsof
situatednessandembodiedcognitiondevelopedinthecontextofASR.Let'stakealookat
thatresearch.
AutonomousAgents
Duringthe1990snewideas,conceptsandmethodshavebeenusedtorevitalizethebestof
theoldcyberneticapproachtosimplerobotdesign(alsorevivedbyBraitenbergonamore
simplescale)asetofprojectsthatbecameknownasdesignofautonomoussystems,agents,
oranimats.Alreadyfromthemiddleofthe1980s,RodneyA.Brooksandhisgroupat
MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology'sArtificialIntelligenceLaboratorydevelopeda
practicalcritiqueofthe"DeliberativeThinkingparadigm",[31]thatis,thethesisthat
intelligenttaskscanbe(andalwayshavetobe)implementedbyareasoningprocess
operatingonasymbolicinternalmodelwhichwasdescribedasGoodOldFashionedAI
andRoboticsabove.Thiscritique,togetherwithanewsetofmodelingtechniquesand
constructionprinciples,graduallygainedininfluence[32]andbecameknownasthe
'reactivesystemsmovement','agentsresearch',etc.Closelyparalleltothismovementand
deeplyinspiredbyit,newnotionsofcognitiveprocessesasbeingenactedinembodied
situatedsystemsweredeveloped.[33]Interestingly,oneofthesourcesfromwhichthisnew
paradigmofrobotconstructionandembodiedcognitionwasinspired,wasJakobvon
Uexkll'sUmwelttheoryasitwasusedtoemphasize,first,thetightdynamicconnection
betweentheanimal'sbodyplananditsexperiencedworld,andsecond,thattheworld
perceivedbytheanimalwastotallydifferentlyfromtheworldperceivedbythezoologist,
indicatingtheneedforanincreasedawarenessofthefactthatarobotwouldliveina
'perceived'worldthatdifferedmuchfromwhattherobotbuilderimmediatelymightbeable
tosee.[34]
Theprinciplesofagentsdesign
Brooks'groupandotherresearchersfounditunrealistictohopethatmoreactionoriented
taskscouldbesuccessfullyimplementedbya'deliberative'machineinrealtime,sothey
startedtodevelopnewideasabouthowautonomousagentsshouldbeorganizedaproject
that,accordingtoMaes(1990)ledtoradicallydifferentarchitectures.Thesearchitectures
(asdiscussedin,e.g.,Maes1990Brooks1986a(sameargumentasinBrooks1991b)
Brooks1992MeyerandGuillot1991Wilson1991BrooksandMaeseds.1994Clark
1997,ZiemkeandSharkey1998)aregenerallycharacterizedby
*emergentfunctionality
*taskleveldecomposition
*moredirectcouplingofperceptiontoaction
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*distributednessanddecentralization
*dynamicinteractionwiththeenvironment
*physicalgrounding(situatednessandembodiment)
*intrinsicmechanismstocopewithresourcelimitationsandincompleteknowledge
Thefunctionalityofanagentisconsideredasanemergentpropertyoftheintensive
interactionofthesystemwithitsdynamicenvironment.[35]Thespecificationofthe
behaviouroftheagentalonedoesnotexplainthefunctionalitythatisdisplayedwhenthe
agentisoperating.Instead,thefunctionalityistoalargeextentgroundedintheproperties
oftheenvironment.Whatseemstobeacomplexbehaviourdoesnotnecessarilyhavetobe
codedintheagentitcanbeanoutcomeafewsimplebehaviouralrulesandtheinteraction
withtheenvironment.Theenvironmentisnottakenintoaccountpredictivelyor
dynamically,butitscharacteristicsareexploitedtoservethefunctioningofthesystem.
Thus,onecannotsimply'tell'theseagentshowtoachieveagoal.Onehastofindan
interactionloopinvolvingthesystemandtheenvironmentwhichwillconverge(giventhat
theenvironmenthastheexpectedproperties)towardsthedesiredgoal(thissoundsperhaps
easy,butinfactoftenprovestobehardto'find'suchaloop).
Thesecondfeatureistaskleveldecomposition.Thisdoesnotmeanthesameastask
decompositioninclassicalAI.Anagentisviewedasacollectionofmoduleswhicheach
havetheirownspecificdomainofinteraction,orcompetence.Themodulesoperatequasi
autonomouslyandaresolelyresponsibleforthesensing,modeling,computationor
reasoning,andmotorcontrolwhichisnecessarytoachievetheirspecificcompetence.The
agentdesignapproachdoesnotabstainfromusingrepresentationalnotionsorAIreasoning
techniques,buttheconceptualframeworkwithinwhichthesenotionsareseenhaschanged,
becausethereisnocentralreasoningmodulethatplansorgovernstheoverallbehavior,nor
anyglobalplanningactivitywithinonehierarchicalgoalstructure.Toavoidcostlyand
unnecessaryduplicationsofthemodules,theymaymakeusageof'virtualsensors'.
Communicationamongthemodulesisreducedtoaminimumandhappensnotbyusing
highlevellanguages,butonaninformationlowlevel.Thegeneralbehavioroftheagentis
notalinearcompositionofthebehaviorsofitsmodules,butmayemergebytheinteractions
ofthebehaviorsgeneratedbytheindividualmodules.
Thedirectcouplingofperceptiontoactionisfacilitatedbytheuseofreasoningmethods
whichoperateonrepresentationswhichareclosetotheinformationofthesensors(i.e.,
'analogical'representations[36]).Ifaproblemsuchascategorizationofobjectscanbe
solvedbyprocessesdealingwithsensationorperceptionratherthansymboliccognition,
thisispreferred.Perceptionmaybemadelessgeneralthoughmorerealisticthereisno
needfortheperceptionsystemtodeliveradescriptionoftheworldasintheAIstylerobots.
Thespecial'subsumptionarchitecture'[37]enablesthedesignerstoconnectperceptionmore
tightlytoaction,embeddingrobotsconcretelyintheworld,touseanotherpopularphraseof
thisapproach.Again,wemayask:Whynotseethisasanattempttodevelopamore
specifictheoryoftheinternalworkingsofanUmwelt?Weshallsoonreturntothis
question.
Theagentsapproachor"nouvelleAI"isbasedonthephysicalgroundinghypothesis.It
statesthattobuildasystemthatisintelligentitisnecessarytohaveitsrepresentations
groundedinthephysicalworld.[38]Whatexactlythismeansisseldommadefullyexplicit,
butsomehintstotheideacanbegiven.Aphysicallygroundedsystemisonethatis
connectedtotheworldbysensorsandactuators/effectors,inafunctionalcircleasitwere.
Thusitisnotadequatetostudy,e.g.,problemsofperceptionmerelybysimulation
techniquestypedinputandoutputarenolongerofinterestbecausetheyarenotphysically
grounded.Intrinsictotheideaisalsothatsystemsshouldbebuildinabottomupmanner.
Highlevelabstractionshavetobemadeconcrete.Theconstructedsystemhastoexpressall
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itsgoalsanddesiresasphysicalaction(asopposedtostorednondynamicrepresentationsin
thememory)andthesystemshouldextractallitsinformationfromphysicalsensors,i.e.,
theinitialinputshouldnotbedeliveredtothesystemsassymbolicinformation,ratheras
physicalaction.Thedesignerofsuchasystemisforcedtomakemuchmoredesign
componentsexplicit.Everyshortcuthasadirectimpactuponsystemcompetencethereis
noslackintheinput/outputrepresentation.Oftentheverynotionofrepresentationas
somethingexplicitandstableiscriticized.[39](Thishasevenledsomeresearcherstoan
'antirepresentationalistviewofcognition',whichis,however,aninadequatewayof
expressingthefactthatGOFAIhadarestrictedandsimplisticviewonsuchcategoriesas
'representation'and'symbol'oneshouldratherreconstructvariouskindsofrepresentation
invariouskindsofsystemsasacontinuumofcaseswithinageneralsemioticandtriadic
modelofrepresentation,assuggestedbyKatzandQueiroz1999).Aslightlydifferentway
tostatetheideaofphysicalgroundingisbythenotionsofsituatednessandembodiment
(Brooks1991a,1991b,cf.HendriksJansen1996).Situatednessimpliesthattherobotsare
situatedinaworldtheydonotdealwithabstractdescriptions,butwiththehereandnowof
theenvironmentthatdirectlyinfluencesthebehaviourofthesystem.Embodimentimplies
thattherobothavebodiesandexperiencetheworlddirectlyandthattheactionshavean
immediatefeedbackupontherobot'sownsensations.[40]Computersimulatedrobotsmay
be'situated'inavirtualenvironment,buttheyarecertainlynotembodied.
Lifeandintelligence:theperspectivesofagentsresearch
Onemightask,ofcourse,iftheserequirementsaresufficienttosecurethatasystemso
constructedwithsuchandsuchbehaviouralcapacitiesisintelligent(intherationalistic
Newellsenseofbeing'generalintelligent')?Probablynot!Buthere,onemustnoticea
crucialdifferencebetweenGoodOldFashionedRoboticsandthenewapproachwith
respecttotheapprehensionoftheconceptofintelligence.Totheclassicalapproach,
intelligentbehaviourpresupposesthecapacityforrationalmanipulationofelaborate
internalsymbolicstructuresa'languageofthought'ofsomekindrepresentingstateof
affairsintherealworld.Thoughalanguageofthoughtneednotbeusedforlinguistic
communication,itisthoughtthatveryfew(ifany)animalspeciescanhavea
representationalcapacityofthesameorderofmagnitudeandcomplexityasthatofthe
glossophileHomosapiens.Ontheotherhand,researchersinsituatedactivity,agentsand
ArtificialLifeagreethatmanyanimalsare'intelligent'tosomeextent.Thefactualevolution
ofintelligentanimalsisconsideredtobeaninstructivestandardtounderstandthebasic
requirementsofintelligentbehaviour.Computationally,themostdifficultthingstoachieve
byevolutionseemstobetheabilitytomovearoundinadynamicenvironment,andto
processsensoryinformationinadaptivewaystoensuresurvivalandreproduction.Thispart
ofintelligenceiswhereevolutionhasconcentrateditstimethephysicallygroundedpartsof
animalsystems.[41]FromtheperspectiveoftheUmwelttheory,wecanseethesepartsas
closelyrelatedtotheemergenceofcomplexUmwelten.SotheprimaryUmweltevolutionis
computationallycostlysotospeak:ittakesmanyevolutionarytimesteps.Thisisalsothe
caseforsimplerlifeformssuchasunicellulareukaryoticcells(Protozoa)whichlacka
nervoussystemandagenuineUmwelt,butdo(accordingtoT.vonUexkll1986a)havea
simpler'autokineticorselfmovingcircle'bywhichtheyenterintosemioticinteractions
withtheirexteriormilieu.
Theevolutionaryperspectiveof'nouvelleAI'seemstobepromising.Agrowinggroupof
AIspecialistsrecognizethelimitationsofthepurelylogicalapproachtoconstructing
thinkingmachinesandareattractedbybiologicallyinspireddesignprincipleswhichmay
formabasisforthearchitectureofhardwareandsoftwareincomputersofthefuture.[42]
BiologicallyinspiredALtechniquesserveasinspirationforfindingmorenaturalwaysof
viewingthedesignproblemsofrobotics.Organismswerenotreleasedintonatureonlyafter
theywereconstructedasfunctionallyperfectdesignsevolutionoperateslikeatinkerwho
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fixesabrokenmachineusingthematerialsathand.Noteverydesignisagooddesign,
manyaretriedoutinevolutionbutquitefewbasictypessurvive.Therobotbuildersmay
learnsomethingbystudyingtheevolutionarygame.Insteadofconstructingexpensive,
complicatedmachinesdesignedforalimitednumberofwelldefinedtasks,onemight
insteadbuild,tofollowBrooks'advice,awholeflockofcheap,simple,andperhapsrather
unpredictablemachinesandallowthemtoevolvegradually.
ForcognitivesciencethenewASR,or'BehaviourBasedAI'movement,mayleadtoa
considerablechangeofperspective.Perhapsonemightnotbeableto"crackthecognition
problem"orcreateanunderstandablescientifictheoryofthoughtuntilweunderstandwhat
itmeanstosaythatsomethingisalive.Lifecamebeforerealintelligence,andautonomous
systemsandALifeshouldcomebeforerealAI.TheproblemwithAIresearchmaybethat
onehassprungdirectlyintothemostcomplexexampleofintelligence,humanintelligence.
Itistemptingtosuspectthatwehavebeencheatedbythefactthatcomputerscandosome
thingswhichpeoplefinddifficult.ASR,ALandAIareinaprocessofbeingtransformed
intoacontinuumofprojectswhichattempttomodeladaptive,learningandcognitive
abilitiesinallthevaryingdegreesofcomplexityweknowfrombiologyandpsychology.
ASRcanbeviewedasasciencewhichconcernsitselfwiththeminimallevelforthinking
andthelowerlimitforsignmanipulationand'computation':howsimplemustaphysical
systembebeforewecannotanymorecallitcomputational(cf.Emmeche1994b)andalive?
Or,phrasedintermsoftheUmwelttheory:Whatistheminimal(artificialornatural)
systemrealizingitsownUmwelt?
This'AImustbeASthesis'[43](or:'intelligencedemandsautonomy')canbeformulatedas
follows:"Thedumbestsmartthingyoucandoistostayalive"(Belew1991).Animalsdoit,
andhumansdoit,too.Intelligencedoesnotconcerneither/or,butdifferentwaysof
managingtherequirementsofselfmaintenanceandadaptation.Organisms'apparently
highlyevolved,coherentbehaviourcanoftenbeexplainedfromthequitesimplereciprocal
interactionswitharichandvariedenvironment.Muchofthecomplexityseemstolieinthe
milieu.Thinkofanant.[44]Itcrawlsaroundontheforestfloor,carefullyavoidinglarge
barriersbutmusttakeminordetoursinordertogetspacefordragginghomeapineneedle
totheantnest.Theantpausesfromhisworkandexchangesinformationwithafellowant.
Itusuallyhasanespeciallycomplexroute,soitseems.Buttheantasabehaviouralsystem,
aswellasitsUmwelt,isquitesimplethecomplexityistoagreatdegreeareflectionof
theenvironmentinwhichitfindsitself.Thepointhereisthatifwehavevisionsof
constructingserviceable,sociablerobotsorsuchthings,wemustfirstdiscovertheminimal
procedureswhichenableananimaltocopeminimallywithitsnearestsurroundings.This
doesnotsoundlikemuch,butitis!Anantcanneverimaginewhatitmeetsonitspath.
Openness,adaptabilityandflexibilitybecomemoreimportantthanhavingareadyresponse
toeveryconceivablesituation,regardlessofwhethertheresponsecanbecodedasaframe,
ascheme,ascript,orasoneoftheotherAItechniquesofrepresentingknowledge.Thusit
appearsthatUmwelt,autonomy,'intelligent'actionandembodiedknowledgeareclosely
coupled.Butisthisthewholestory?Havesomeratherhardproblemsbeenleftout?
Isanybodyhome?CanUmweltenbeartificial?
Whenaskedifitispossiblefortheseartificial(humanconstructed)robotlikeanimatsor
autonomoussystemstohaveanUmwelt,peopleseemtohavetwoquitedifferentintuitions.
Oneofthesecanbeexpressedastheanswer"Yes,whynot?Ifsuchasimplelivingcreature
asthetickdoeshaveanUmwelt,evenaverysimpleone,whynottherobot?",aquite
reasonableansweritseems.Another,opposinganswerwouldbe:"No,ofcoursenot!How
foolish!It'sjustapieceofelectronics.Nomatterhowcomplicatedthecircuitsofits
artificialneuralnetworkare(orwhateverintermediatessensorandmotormodules),how
couldyoueventhinkitshouldfeelanythingatall?".PersonallyIwouldimmediatelyand
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intuitivelytendtothenoUmweltinarobotanswer,thoughIcancertainlyfollowsome
argumentsfortheyesthereisanswer.Butasintuitionssimplydividepeopleandmaybe
misleading,letuslookatsomearguments.
TherobotdoeshaveanUmweltanswercanbestatedlikethis:Premises:1.Allittakesto
constituteanUmweltinthesenseofaphenomenalexperiencedspeciesspecific(or'device
specific')worldisacertaincircularinformationbasedrelationbetweensensordevicesand
motordevicesasdescribedbythenotionofafunctionalcircle.2.Clearly,evensimple
artificialanimats(likeGreyWalter'sElmer)instantiatesuchacircle,justlikesimple
animalsdo.3.Conclusion:artificialautonomoussystemssuchasrobotsdohaveanUmwelt
(fromwhichitperdefinitionemfollowsthatfortherobottheremustbesomethingitisfelt
likeorexperiencedliketobejustasthereisforme,adog,oratick).
ThenoUmweltinarobotanswer,acknowledgingthattherobotindeedinstantiatesa
functionalcircleinthesenseofacausalfeedbackloop,doesnotholdthiscircletobeatrue
instanceofafunctionalcircleinthesemioticsenseofforming,bysignaction,thebackbone
ofanexperiencedUmwelt.Whynot?Becausefromthisperspective,whatgivesthe
Umweltitsphenomenalcharacterisnotthefunctionalcyberneticaspectofsignal
processingwithinthesystem(andatthesystemenvironmentinterface),butthefactthatthe
livingorganismisbeforehandconstitutedasanactivesubjectwithsomeagency.Thus,only
genuinelivingbeings(organismsandespeciallyanimals)canbesaidtoliveexperientially
inanUmwelt.
HerethecounterargumentwouldbethatthenoUmweltanswerseemstopresupposewhat
thatargumentshouldshowbyputtingthecriteriafortheexistenceofanUmweltinsidethe
agentasakindofhidden(occult!)capacity,incidentallyonlyfoundinsomekindsof
devices,viz.theorganicnonartificialones,insteadofallowingforanobjectively
accessiblebehavioralcriterionfortheexistenceofanUmwelt(e.g.,theexistenceofwhat
mustbedescribedasinformationprocessingwithinsomegiventypeoffunctional
architecture).ThusthenoUmweltanswerisreallynotanargument,itisarestatementofan
aprioriintuition.
Inasensethiscounterisfair,butthepresumptionthatonlyobjectivelyaccessible
behavioralcriteriacountascriteriaforanythingwecanidentifyandstudyscientificallyis
anexternalistpresumptionwhichdoesnotnecessarilyholdtrueforarationalunderstanding
ofacertainrangeofphenomena(intentionalphenomena,qualia,consciousness,etc.),at
leastfromthepointofviewofsometraditionsofscientificinquirywhicharenot
exclusivelyexternalist(e.g.,semiotics,phenomenology,hermeneutics).Furthermore,the
Umweltinarobotanswerpresumesthattoassignaninformationalcyberneticdescription
ofthedevice'sdynamicsistriviallythesameasidentifyingandexplainingtheexistenceof
arobot'sUmweltasanintrinsicphenomenonwhichishardlyconvincing,asitwould
implythatevensimplercyberneticdevices(astheflywheelgovernor)shouldrealizean
Umwelt.
Beforeresolvingthisissue,wehavetolookcloserat(a)thesubjectcharacterofthe
UmweltaccordingtotheveryUmweltconcept(b)thesemioticaspectoftheUmweltand
itsdependenceonqualitativeaspectsofsignactionandsigninterpretation(especiallythe
notionofqualisign)(c)thepossiblerealizabilityofsignactioninnonorganicmediaand
(d)thegeneralepistemicnonaccessibilityof(atleastcertainqualitativeaspectsof)the
Umweltbyothersthanitsowner.Finally,(e)wewilldiscussvarioussortsof'situatedness'
inASRandtheartificialityofrobotsituatedness.
(a)IfwhatitmeanstohaveanUmweltistobeanactivesubjectwithsomeagency,we
shouldkeepinmindthatthewaysuchathingasanUmweltexists(accordingtothe
definitionoftheUmweltgivenabove)isontologicallydifferentfromthewaythephysical
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environment(asstudiedbyecology)exists,orthewaytheneuralsystemasacomplex
dynamicbiophysicalnetwork(asstudiedbyneurobiology)exists,orthewaytheobservable
behaviouroftheanimal(asstudiedbyethology)exists.Tosaythatitissubjectivemeans
exactlythatitexistsinthemodeofanactiveexperiencingsubject,whichisnotsomething
thatcanbeseenordescribedfromapurelyexternalpointofview(cf.T.vonUexkll
1982a,Nagel1986,Searle1992).
(b)Thatthissubjectiveaspectofanimalsensation,perceptionandevencognitionis
accessibleforasemioticdescriptionisbecauseofitsverycharacterofbeingbasedupon
triadicsignrelations,whicharenotjustadaptive(andthusbiologicallymeaningfulfromthe
Darwinianfunctionalistperspectiveofsurvival),buttrulysignificant(intheinner
experientialsense)fortheanimalinquestion.Asignmayhaveallsortsofrelationstoother
signsandallsortsofeffectsinitsprocessofbeinginterpretedbythesystemof
interpretance(inthiscasetheorganism),butaccordingtoPeirce'ssignnotionevenmore
developedsignssuchassymbols(andtheargumentsofhumans)includewithinthem
simpler('degenerate')signs,inwhichtheaspectsofsecondnessandfirstnessaremore
prominent.Thatis,theinternalsignsmediatinganUmwelt'sMerkweltandWirkwelt(i.e.,
mediatingtheperceptorandmotor/operatororgans)dohaveaqualitativeaspecttothem,an
aspectthatisoftenoverlookedbothbysemioticiansandbiologists.Asinglesignmaybea
tokenofsomegeneraltype(e.g.,aperceivedpatternmayberecognizedbytheorganismas
beingofacertaindangerouskind,say,apredator),butithasalwaysalsoanaspectofbeing
atone,i.e.,beingqualitativelyfeltinsomeway(e.g.,unpleasant).Thetone/token/typeisa
genuinetriad,wherethefirstnesspropertyofthetoneisalwayspartlyhidden,sotospeak,
withinthe'objective'ormoreexternalpropertyofthatsign'sbelongingtoatype.This
correspondstothefirsttrichotomyofsignsinPeirce(thattrichotomyaccordingtothe
characteroftherepresentamenitself),whereeverylegisignisalwaysrealisedbya
particularsinsign,andeveryconcretesinsigninvolvesaqualisign.[45]Oneshould
rememberthatthedifferentkindsofsignsinPeirce'sclassificationarenotisolateddistinct
entitiesbuthavespecificinternalrelations,suchasinclusiverelationofthehigher
categoriesofsignsincludingorpresupposingthelowerones.[46]Whatisaqualisign?Only
phenomenologicallycanweapproachaclearideaofthequalisignitisofanexperiential
character,itis,asPeircesays,"anyqualityinsofarasitisasign","e.g.,afeelingof'red'".
[47]Thus,theUmwelt,asasemioticphenomenon,includesqualisignswithverysensuous
'tonal'qualities.(Thatsemiosisisgenerallyaphenomenonofthirdnessdoesnotmeanthat
thequalitativefirstnessofsignsisabsent.)
(c)Couldqualisignsberealizedinartefacts,devicesdesignedbyhumans?Idonotbelieve
thattobethecase,butIthinkitdepends.FromaPeirceanpointofview,thismightbethe
case(atleastpotentially),butitdependsupon1.thesemiosiccapacitiesoftheconstituent
materialstorealizehabitformationandcontinuouslivingfeelingand2.theorganizationof
theverydevice.Whyarethematerialsimportant?Isn'tthatcarbonbiochauvinism?Ihave
arguedelsewherethatinbiologicalcells,thesignaspectsoftheirinternalactionsarenot
mediumindependent,thatis,theprocessstructureofthe'information'inthecellcanonly
berealizedbythecell'shighlyspecificbiomolecularmaterials(Emmeche1992).Ifsucha
materialdeviceasarobotcouldhavethatspecialorganicflexibilityofananimalthatallows
ittoinstantiateanythinglikethelawofmind,thatis,thetendencytoletsignsinfluenceor
affiliatewithothersignsinaselforganizingmanner,itisdifficulttoseewhysuchdevices
shouldnotbeabletorealizegenuinesigns(includingqualisigns)andthusnotsimplybe
systematicallyinterpretableasdoingsobyanexternalhumanobserver(whichistheusual
caseforrobots:theareeasilyinterpretedasbeingintentionalagents,buttakingthis
'intentionalstance'bytheirconstructorsdoesofcoursenottellanythingabouttheeventual
existenceoftheirown'feelings').Ifthatartificiallyconstructedsystemrealizesqualisign
actionandlivingfeeling,itwouldhavemindinPeirce'ssense.Butwouldithavean
Umwelt?Isthereanybodyhomeinthere,experiencingsomething?Rememberthe
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extremelybroadscopeofsemiosisandmindinPeirce'ssense.Iftheveryuniverseanyway
isperfusedwithsigns,accordingtoPeirceanpansemiotics(asMerrell1996),thisstateof
affairsmaynothelpustodecidewhetherarobotisexperiencinganythingwhetherithasan
Umwelt.Itmighthave,wecouldimagine,ifthequalisignsandallitshigherformsof
semiosisbecameorganizedinsuchawayastomakepossibletheemergenceofthatsortof
unityandexperientialcoherencethatcharacterizes'anUmweltasweknowit'(ourown).
(d)Buthowshouldweknow?AnUmweltcanonlybedirectlyknownfromwithin.Does
thegeneralepistemicnonaccessibilityofanyUmweltbyotherthanitsownerimplythat
whenwefaceanactualorfuturerobot,weareexactlyinthesamesituationasfacingatick,
asnake,hummingbird,oradog?TheydohaveanUmwelt,buthowthisUmweltreallyis
andhowitisfeltlikeisimpossibletosay.[48]Thesetwosituationsareparallelbutnotthe
same.Inthecaseofanylivinganimalwithacentralnervoussystem(includingatick!),we
canberathersurethattheydohaveanUmweltsomehow.Themachineviewoflifeandof
otherpeoplehasbeentranscended.Philosophically,theonlysolutiontothesocalled
'problemofotherminds'(howcanwebesurethatotherpersonsdohaveamind?)iseither
tosaypragmaticallythatthisisnoproblematall,ortosay,becauseIknowIhave,andthey
aresimilartome,byanalogytheymusthavetoo,anditisthebestexplanationoftheir
behaviourthatitisindeedconnectedtoandpartlyexplainablebytheirminds.Theanalogy
solutionisalsowhatwedo(oftenlessconvincingly)withanimals.Weknowthat'thereis
someonehome'inthedog'sorganism,thoughtheactualcontentofitsmentalstatesis
hardertoinfer.Evenharderforthesnake,andsoon.Butthiseverydayanalogicalinference
isinfactbackedupbybiology.Thebird'sbrainasanorganisindeednotonlyanalogousin
thebiologicalsense(sameoverallfunction)toourbrain,itishomologoustoit(ithasthe
sameevolutionaryorigin).[49]Wealldescendfromverysimplecreatureswhichdidhave
basicallythesamekindoforgancalledanervoussystem(NS),includingabrain.Sointhe
animalcase,the'problemofotheranimal'sUmwelt'isansweredbyacombinationofan
externalistexplanationoftheNShomology(whereNSplaystheroleofanecessary
conditionforanUmwelt),andaninternalistknowledgeofone'sownexperientialUmwelt,
plustheanalogyinferencejustmentioned(supportedbythegeneralUmwelttheory).Butin
therobotcase,the'problemofarobot'sUmwelt'isdifferent.Itcannotbeposedasa
'problemofanothermachine'sUmwelt',becausewearenotmachines(cf.Kampis1991),
thatis,wecannotusetheanalogyinferencenorcanwecanweappealtoevolutionary
homology.Soevenifarobotbehaveslikeafullyautonomoussystem,theinferencethatthe
robotthendoeshaveanUmweltisnotwarrantedbythesearguments.
(e)Doesthatmeanweshoulddistinguishbetweentrue'situatedness'foranimalsand
artificialrobotsituatednessinthecontextofASRandAL?Thosewhoenthusiasticallyhave
drawnparallelsbetween'situatedcognition'inrobotsandinhumans(cf.HendriksJansen
1996,Clark1997)maystillmisssomecrucialqualitiesoftruebiologicalcognition.One
interestingpossibilitycomestomind:Thatonlysystems(whetherrobotsororganisms)
whichdohaveanexperientialUmweltcouldrealizesuchcomplexbehaviorsaswesee
amonghighervertebratesandinhumans.[50]IftheUmweltisahigherlevelemergent
phenomenon,emergingfromtheembodiedsignprocessesinthenervoussystemofa
situatedagent,anecessaryconditionforthesystem'sgracefulperformancemightwellbe
theconstraintsoftheUmweltupontheparticularpatternsofmovement,akindof
'downwardcausation'.[51]Inartificialneuralnetworks,justasincomputationalCellular
Automata,allthecausalefficacyofthedynamicsofthesystemseemstobelocatedatthe
lowlevelrulesofinputoutputbehavioroftheindividualcomponents,thuswhatappearsto
beemergentforanobservermayinfactjustbeemergentintheeyesofthatbeholder
(Cariani1992).Incontrast,fortheintrinsicemergentperceptionandcognitioninanimals
andhumans,itmightbethecasethat'mindovermatter'isnotjustametaphysical
speculation,but,whentransformedwithinageneralUmwelttheoryofdynamiclevelsof
interactionandsemioticlevelsofinterpretation,becomesatrueprincipleofself
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organizationanddownwardcausationincomplexsystems(cf.Lemke2000).Thisis
certainlythepositionofthebiosemioticvariantofqualitativeorganicism:Theemergent
phenomenaexperiencedascomponentsofthesystem'sUmweltplayadirectroleinthe
behavioraldynamicsofthatlivingsystem:theyconstituteacomplexsystemof
interpretance(cf.Sebeok'sinternalmodelingsystem)thatcontinuallyshapestheindividual
movementsoftheanimal.Here,weareremindedoftheoldAristotelianideathattheanimal
soulandgenuineanimatemotionisoneandthesamephenomenon(cf.SheetsJohnston
1998,2000).Alsoimpliedhereisastrongnotionofthequalitativecomplexityofcertain
systems.Accordingtothisnotionasystemisqualitativelycomplexif(i)itisself
organizing,(ii)ithasanUmweltwithexperientialqualia,and(iii)aconditionfor(i)is
having(ii)whichmeans,thatinordertohavethecapacityforaprocessofself
organization,andonthebehaviorallevelahighordergracefulbehavior,thesystemhasto
havesomeaspectofqualitativeexperience.Thatis,theUmwelthassomehowthecausal
powersoforganizing(bydownwardcausation)thetotal'self'ofthesystem,tomakeit
cohere,togiveititsformofmovement.Theverynotionofaqualitativeexperientialself
maybeinterpretedasanemergentpropertyofthepartsofthesystemandtheirdynamics,
includingtheorganismenvironmentinteractionsandthegenealogicaltrajectoryofthe
systemovertime:Theselfcanbeinterpretedasaninteractional,situated,historicaland
emergentself,theveryagencyaspectofalivingsystem.Thisnotionofcomplexitycannot
bereducedtoanylinearincreaseofaquantitativemeasure.
Intherealmofagentsmovingthroughachangingandchallengingenvironmentwecan
formulatethedifferencebetweenartificiallysituatedrobotsandtrulysituatedanimalswith
anUmweltasthedifferencebetween,ontheonehand,tobeabletolookwhereoneis
going,lookout,watchone'sstepsallofwhichanautonomoussystemhasto'learn'ifit
shouldactlikeanagentandontheotherhand,tobeabletobeholdsomethinginone's
experientialworld,seeandfeelitwithone's'innereye'.Thebigclaim(notyetprovenand
maybeinprincipleunverifiable)ofqualitativeorganicismisthathavinganexperiential
Umweltisapreconditionforreallybeingabletoachievefullscaleautonomywithallits
gracefulnessofmovementthatonlyhigheranimalshaveyetachieved.Iftheartificial
systemsareonlypartly'situated'astheydonotinthefullsenseofthewordexperiencean
Umwelt,thereisindeedsomehopebyacloserapproachmentoftheoreticalbiology,
semiotics,autonomoussystemsresearchandcognitivescienceforgainingadeeper
understandingoftrulysituatedautonomoussystemsasbeingakindofcomplexself
organizingsemioticagentswithemergentqualitativeproperties.[52]
Notes
[1]AsfortheUmweltpartofthisdistinction,onecouldfurtherdemarcatebetweenthe
Umweltinamorenarrowsenseasthespecies'significantsurroundandtheInnenweltasan
individualorganism'sactualversionofthatsurround(cf.Andersonetal.1984:13)butthis
distinctionisnotnecessaryinthepresentcontext.InnenweltdoesnotfigureinJ.von
Uexkll(1940),orinT.vonUexkll'sglossarytothistext.
[2]Needhamsufficestoserveasanexamplehere:"Todayweareperfectlyclear(...)that
theorganisationoflivingsystemsistheproblem,nottheaxiomaticstartingpoint,of
biologicalresearch.Organisingrelationsexist,buttheyarenotimmunefromscientific
graspandunderstanding.Ontheotherhand,theirlawsarenotlikelytobereducibletothe
lawsgoverningthebehaviourofmoleculesatlowerlevelsofcomplexity."(fromthe1937
essay"Integrativelevels:arevaluationoftheideaofprogress",in:Needham1943).
[3]OnBritishemergentism,seeBeckermannetal.,eds.,1992ontheroleofthenotionof
theorganismasaspecialemergentlevelofintegration,seeSalthe1988.
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[4]Kant'sphilosophyofbiologyinKritikderUrteilskraftwasasignificantsourceforJakob
vonUexkll.
[5]Conceivingamathematicalbasisformechanics,Galileo(15641642)inSaggiatore
(1623)elaboratedadistinctionrecommendedbyDemocritus(c460371BC)betweenthose
qualitiesinherentinorproducedbyinorganicbodies(shape,size,locationinspaceand
time,andmotion)andallotherqualitieswhichisintheobserver,notinNature(heat,sound,
tasteetc.).RobertBoyle(16271691)latercalledthisradicaldemarcationprimaryand
secondaryqualities,adistinctionLocke(16321704)systematised.
[6]Thoughoneshouldnotputindividualthinkersincategoriesthatdonotadequately
expresstheirviewsjusttogiveaveryroughindicationofpossiblerepresentativesofthe
twopositions,mainstreamorganicismisoftenexpressedwithinsuchheterogeneous
currentsas'classical'neodarwinism(E.Mayr,etc.),'dynamical'darwinismfocusingonself
organizingsystemsandselection(S.Kauffman,D.Depew,B.Weber),artificiallifeand
autonomousagentapproaches(C.Langton,R.Brooks,etc.),thedevelopmentalsystems
approach(S.Oyama,P.Griffiths,E.NeumannHeld),themorphodynamicfieldapproach
(B.Goodwin),andhierarchicalconceptionsofevolution(S.Gould,N.Eldredge,S.Salthe,
etc.).Qualitativeorganicismisrepresentedbybiosemiotics(J.Hoffmeyer,T.Sebeok,J.
andT.vonUexkll,K.Kull,etc.),'theanimateapproach'(M.SheetsJohnstone),thenotion
ofabiologicalscienceofqualities(B.Goodwin),andtosomeextentalsobystudiesof
animalcommunicationfromthepointofviewofan'ecologyofmind'(G.Bateson),and
even'activitytheory'derivingfromthesovietculturalhistoryschool(Luria,Vygotsky,
etc.).IfindtheSecondOrderCybernetics(H.VonFoerster,G.Pasketc.)andthe
"internalism"(seeVandeVijveretal.,eds.,1998)ofthinkerslikeK.Matsuno,S.Salthe
andothersmoredifficulttoplace,butitisprobablyrelatedtoqualitativeorganicismas
well.
[7]Itisoftenassumedthattotheextentthatthesesubjectiveaspectsofanimallife,say
pain,canbeseenassubservingsurvivaloftheorganism,theydohaveafunctionaladaptive
explanationwithinaneodarwinianframeofevolutionbynaturalselection.Thisisnotso.
Selectioncannot'see'thepainsofananimal.Theanimalcould,fromthepointofviewof
theselectivestory,justaswellbeaninsentientzombiethathadpreservedthesame
functionalinputoutputrelationbetween,say,detectionofinflictingactionsuponthe
organismanditsadaptivewithdrawalfromsuchactionswhichcausedeventualdetriments.
Theneodarwinianexplanationschemeisacompletelyexternalistapproachandcannot
accountfortheinternalexperientialworldoftheanimal.Thereisassuchnoreasonwhy
highlyorganizedinformationprocessingdarwiniandevicesshouldfeelanythingatall.
[8]Theaccusationforcarbonchauvinismcouldnotbedirectedagainstsuchdisciplinesas
ecologyorethologyitonlybecamepossiblyasaresultofthe'molecularrevolution'in
biologyaftertheWatson/Crickdiscovery.
[9]Forsomecriticalvoices,seePattee1989Kampis1991Cariani1992Emmeche1994b
Morenoetal.1997.
[10]althoughsimilarideasmaybeintroduced,e.g.Rasmussen(1992)whousesJohn
Wheeler's'meaningcircuit'topostulatethatanartificialorganismmustperceivearealityof
somekind.Interestingly,Sebeok(1991)relatesWheeler'saswellasJ.v.Uexkll'sideasto
'thedoctrineofsigns'.
[11]Inmoralphilosophy,thetermisusedinthissense(e.g.,Mele1995),asourceof
potentialconfusion.
[12]Anexampleofabiologicaluseisthedesignation"theautonomicnervoussystem",that
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is,thesystemofmotor(efferent)nervefibressupplyingsmoothandcardiacmusclesand
glands(comprisingthesympatheticandparasympatheticnervoussystem),whichisnot
'controlledbywill'(oftheautonomousperson)butisselfgoverning.
[13]Here,theconceptoforganizationisconsideredastherelationsthatdefineasystemas
aunityanddeterminethedynamicsofinteractionsandtransformationsthatthesystemmay
undergotheorganizationofalivingsystemisconsideredasautopoietic.
[14]Forahistoryofcybernetics,seeMayr(1970),ofsystemsthinkingseeLilienfeld
(1978).
[15]Anexampleisamachineinwhichwedistinguishfourparts:aflywheelW,agovernor
G,afuelsupplydeviceF,andacylinderCthisis,asonecansee,framedovertheJames
Watt'governor'inventedtoregulatethevelocityofrotationinsteamengines,wherethe
output(rotationvelocity)regulatedtheinput(thesteam).Themachineisconnectedtothe
outsideworldbytheenergyinputandthe'load'whichisconsideredasavariableand
weighingupontheW.ThecentralpointisthatthemachineiscircularinthesensethatW
drivesGwhichaltersFwhichfeedsCwhich,inturn,drivesW.Howdoesitwork?The
moreF,thehighervelocityofC.ThehigherC,thehigherspeedofW.And,asthefeedback
isnegative,thehigherspeedofW,thelowersupplyofF.(Ifthefeedbackwerepositive
if,forinstance,higherspeedofWcausedhighersupplyofFthemachinewouldgointoa
runaway,operatingexponentiallyfasteruntilsomepartsmightbreak).Theexampleisdue
toG.Bateson,whowasmuchinspiredofcyberneticprinciplesinhisattempttodevelopa
"mentalecology".Henotes(inBateson1979[1980:117])thatinthe1930swhenhebegan
tostudythesesystems,manyselfcorrectivesystemswerealreadyknownasindividual
cases,butthecyberneticprinciplesremainedunknown.Helistsamongtheindividualcases
Lamarck'stransformation(1809),Watt'sgovernor(late18thcentury),AlfredRussel
Wallace'sperceptionofnaturalselection(1856),ClarkMaxwell'sanalysisofthesteam
enginewithagovernor(1868),ClaudeBernard'smilieuinterne,HegelianandMarxian
analysesofsocialprocesses,andWalterCannon'sWisdomoftheBody(1932).Onemight
addFelixLincke'slecturefrom1879,TheMechanicalRelay,whichwasprobablythefirst
attempttooutlineaunifyingtheoryoffeedbackcontrolapplicabletomachinesaswellas
toanimals(cf.Mayr1970).
[16]AdetailedPeirceanreinterpretationofJ.vonUexkll'sfunctionalcircleisnotmy
principalaimhere(thoughseebelowonqualisignsintheUmwelt),butThurevonUexkll
hasgonesomewayinthatdirection(e.g.,Uexkll1982b),seealsoHoffmeyer1996,and
Salthe,thisvolume.NotethatthePeirceannotionofrepresentation(cf.Nth1997)isboth
verycomplex,general,anddynamic,andcannotbeequatedwiththesimplisticAIideaof
representationasadirectmappingbetweeninternalsymbolsandexternalobjects(cf.fig.2
inZiemke&Sharkey,thisvolume).
[17]Thenotionof"intelligenceamplifier"isofcoursevague,becausesuchaidsasslide
rules,pocketcalculatorsorevenpaperandpencilmayberegardedas'intelligence
amplifiers'forhumansthoughtheyarenotintelligent(Gregory1981).Thestrongclaimof
roboticsandASRthatintelligencemayberealizedartificiallycanbeformulatedinthis
way:Totheextentthatthesedevicesreallyareautonomous,theirintelligenceis'intrinsic'to
them,itisnotderivedfromhumanintelligenceormerelyascribedtothesystem.Thisof
coursebegsthequestionofwhatitmeanstobe'reallyautonomous'(isitsimplythe
capacitytofunctionforsometimewithouthumanintervention?isittheabilitytomove
aroundandorient'oneself'inanenvironmentandsolvesimpleproblems?isitbeingan
autopoieticsystem?orisit,forinstance,thecapacitytogoonandlivealifeofone'sown,
reproduce,andthuscontributetothemaintenanceofanevolvingpopulation?).
[18]AcommentatorofAIandRoboticsonceremarkedthatthemajorgoalofthisspeciesof
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researchseemstobesynthesizing'thelostmother'asaneternalandnondemandingservant
tocareforyouanddoallthetiresomepracticalworkthatyourownmotherusedtodofor
youwhenyouwasachild.This,infact,isanotherdefinitionofafullfledgedautonomous
systems:Anartificialmotherthatkeepsyougoing!
[19]TraditionalAItyperoboticsissurveyedin,e.g.,Gevarter(1985)seealsoPylyshyn,
ed.(1987).
[20]SeeNewell(1980)whoformulatesthishypothesisthus:"Thenecessaryandsufficient
conditionforaphysicalsystemtoexhibitgeneralintelligentactionisthatitbeaphysical
symbolsystem"(p.170)wherethephysicalsymbolsystemisa"universalmachine"which
isphysicallyrealizable"anyreasonablesymbolsystemisuniversal(relativetophysical
limitations"(p.169).Newelldefines"universal"withreferencetoChurch'sthesis(also
calledtheChurchTuringthesis).HeclearlystatesthattheadvancesinAI(suchas
reasoningandproblemsolving)"faroutstripwhathasbeenaccomplishedbyotherattempts
tobuildintelligentmachines,suchastheworkinbuildingrobotsdrivendirectlyby
circuits..."(p.171).Brooks(1990),inhiscritiqueofthethesisasparadigmatictoAItype
roboticsismoresloppy:"Thesymbolsystemhypothesisstatesthatintelligenceoperateson
asystemofsymbols".
[21]However,fromtheperspectivesofnewrobotics(AutonomousSystemsResearch,see
below)onemayquestiontheextenttowhichtheoreticianslikeSimon,Newell,Fodor,and
Pylyshynactuallyevercaredmuchabouttherealhardtheoreticalandpracticalissues
involvedinrobotbuilding.
[22]ThisistheonlyalternativeBrooks(1990)seesinhiscritiqueofthesymbolsystem
hypothesis.Noticethatthisistheimportant"symbolgroundingproblem"(Harnad1990),
seealsotheseriesofpapersbyStevanHarnadreferredtoinHayesetal.(1992).
[23]AfamousEuropeanexampleofsuchearlymandesigned"autonomous"systemis
JacquedeVaucanson'smechanicalduckfrom1735seeChapuis&Droz(1958)Langton's
introduction"ArtificialLife"inLangton,ed.(1989).
[24]Walter(1950),andthefollowuppaper"Amachinethatlearns"(1951).
[25]Thus,GreyWalternotonlyanticipatedthenotionofautonomousagents,healso
observedemergentcollectivebehaviourlongtimebeforerecentworkoncollective
behaviourandswarmintelligence(e.g.,VarelaandBourgine,eds.1992).
[26]GreyWaltereventhoughtthat"itwouldevenbetechnicallyfeasibletobuildprocesses
ofselfrepairandofreproductionintothesemachines"(1950:45).Inthisrespecthewas
overoptimisticanddidnotacknowledgethefundamentalproblemsof'realizing'biological
selfreproduction(compareKampis1991).YetitwasWalterwhowasthefirsttoshowthat
simplecontroldevicescouldproducelifelikebehaviour,withlearning.
[27]Braitenberg(1984)isaclassicessayonthesynthesisofcomplexbehaviourfromthe
interactionsofsimplecomponents.
[28]SeeDennett(1987).Theintentionalstanceistheideathatweshouldnotthinkofour
mentalvocabularyof'belief,'hope','fear',etc.,asactuallystandingforgenuinemental
phenomena,butratherasjustamannerofspeaking.Itisausefulvocabularyforpredicting
andreferringtobehaviour,butitshouldnotbetakenliterallyasreferringtoreal,intrinsic,
subjective,psychologicalphenomenaitisratheramatteroftakingan'intentionalstance'
towardanykindofautonomoussystem(intheintuitivesenseofautonomy),whetheritbe
aninsect,arobot,orahumanbeing.EventhoughitclearlydiffersfromJ.vonUexkll's
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certaintyaboutthegenuinecharacteroftheexperientialorsubjectivecontentofthe
Umwelt,bothaDennettianandUexkllianmethodologyforthestudyofbehaviourrequire
theresearchertotaketheintentionalstance.
[29]Orquasiautonomousmightbeabettertermhere.Whenitcomestoreal
demonstrations(videotapedor'live'attheconferences)ofthevariousspeciesofsituated
agentsandanimatsfromtheearlyversionsofBraitenbergtothemostrecentonestheir
performanceisnottooimpressive.Atypicalplacetobe'situated'isonaplanefloorwith
smoothobstaclesformingplatesperpendiculartothefloorandnogroundruggednessatall.
Andyet,thesesmallheroesoftengetcaughtinacornerorentangledintheprotruding
sensorsofacompanionagentandthen,asfromheavensent,the(in)visiblehandoftheir
creatorcomesdownandputsthemonthewheelsagain.Theartofcarefulroboteducation
hasnotgottherecognitionitdeserves.
[30]E.g.,Weisbuch,ed.(1991),seealsoEmmeche(1997)forareview.
[31]Cf.PattieMaes'paper"DesigningAutonomousAgents",inMaes,ed.(1990).Brooks'
ideasonsubsumptionarchitecturewerefirsteitherignoredorattackedbyresearchersin
traditionalrobotics,buttheapproachhasbeengraduallyaccepted,andin1991Brooks
receivedthe"ComputersandThought"award,thehighestawardinAI.Theapproachis
nowknownbynicknamessuchas"agentsdesign","subsumptionarchitecturetheory",
"situatedagents","nouvelleAI",and"BehaviourBasedAI".Theterm"autonomous
systems",thoughsometimesdesignatingBrooks'approachtoo,isoftenusedinabroader
sense,includingsubsumptionarchitecturetheory.OnthedevelopmentofBrooksideas,see
alsoLevy(1992).
[32]AnindicationofwhichwaswhenthejournalRoboticsin1988changednameto
RoboticsandAutonomousSystems.SeealsoLevy(1992)andBrooks'papers.
[33]WinogradandFlores(1986),Varelaetal.(1991)HendriksJansen(1996)Clark
(1997).
[34]ComparealsoAndyClark'scommentthat"Thesimilaritybetweentheoperational
worldsofHerbert[oneofBrook'srobotsfromthe1980s,CE]andthetick[asdescribedby
J.vonUexkll]isstriking:Bothrelyonsimplecuesthatarespecifictotheirneeds,and
bothprofitnotbotheringtorepresentothertypesofdetail"(Clark1997,p.25).Itremainsto
beaccuratelyaccessedbyhistoriansofsciencetowhatextenttheUmwelttheoryreally
determinedtheconceptualdevelopmentwithinASR,butRodneyBrookswasclearly
influenced(Brooks1986b).ForamorecriticaluseoftheUmweltnotioninassessingthe
meritsofASR,seeSharkeyandZiemke(1998)andtheirpaperinthisspecialissue.
[35]Maes(1990)Maesdoesnotdefinethenotionofemergence,whichseemstobe
observerdependent,cf.Cariani(1992),Emmeche(1994a).
[36]CompareSteels(1990)whodistinguishbetween(a)categorialrepresentationsand(b)
analogicalrepresentations,where(a)includesymbolicaswellassubsymbolic(i.e.,
perceptronlikenetworkswithcategoriescodedintermsofpatternsofactivationovera
collectionofunits)representations,while(b)includevarioustypesofmaps(e.g.,for
sensoryinformation,afrequencymap,asonarmap,a'smell'map,acolourmap).
[37]Asubsumptionprogramisbuiltonacomputationalsubstratethatisorganizedintoa
seriesofincrementallayers,each(generally)connectingperceptiontoaction.Thesubstrate
isanetworkoffinitestatemachinesaugmentedwithtimingelements.Itisbestunderstood
incontradistinctiontotheGoodOldFashionedRoboticsparadigmaccordingtowhichthe
robotfirstperceivestheenvironment,thenstartstoreasonaboutit,triestobuildamodelof
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theworldandlayplansashowtoachievethegoalsrepresentedintherobot.Onlywhenthis
isdone,therobotwouldact,sotospeak,bytranslatingitscognitionintobehaviour.Brooks
thoughtthatthecouplingofactiontoperceptionshouldbemoredirect,withoutthe
"cognitivebottleneck"ofthetraditionalarchitectures.Thisisnottogiveuprulefollowing
behaviour.Buttheagentshouldconsistofaseriesofmodules(eachafinitestatemachine
hencerulebased,eveniftherulesmaybelowlevelinformational).Informationfrom
sensorsabouttheworldwillbeprocessedaccordingtotherules,butinparallelineach
module,andthebehaviourofthemultimoduleagentwillemergefromthecontinualseries
ofactionsinvolved.Thus,thesubsumptionarchitectureconsistsoflayersofbehaviour
modulesthattriggerotherbehaviourswhenneeded.Noticethebottomupstructure:the
basiclevelbehaviourscopewithobjectsintheworldonamomenttomomentbasis.Low
levelbehavioursaredeterminedbysensorinputsonthelegs,forinstance.Thenextlevel
mightbea'walk'behaviouranevenhigheroneare'explore'.(Brooks1992).
[38]"Oncethiscommitment[physicalgrounding]ismade,theneedforsymbolic
representationssoonfadesentirely.Thekeyobservationisthattheworldisitsownbest
model.Itisalwaysexactlyuptodate.Italwayscontainseverydetailthereistobeknown.
Thetrickistosenseitappropriatelyandoftenenough"(Brooks1990).StevenHarnad
proposedtosolvethesymbolgroundingproblembyconstructionofhybridsofsymbolic
andnonsymbolicsensormotorsystemsclosetoBrooks'ideaof"physicalgrounding"(see
Harnad1990).
[39]SeeforinstancePeschl(1994)whostatesthat"'representations'canbebetter
characterizedasfindingastablerelation/covariancebetween"[theenvironment]"andinside
therepresentation/bodysystem.Thiscanbeachievedbyadaptational/constructivechanges
intheneuralsubstratumwhichleadstoanembodieddynamicscapableofgeneration
functionallyfittingbehaviour('representationswithoutrepresentations')"(ibid.p.423).
[40]AneglectedissueinASR(seebelow)iswhetheranartificialrobotreallyexperience
sensations(oranythingatall)orhaveabodyinthetruesenseofanorganism.Froma
biologicalpointofviewthelaterclaimistriviallyfalseasarobotandananimalare
constructedandmaintainedbyfundamentallydifferenttypesofprocesses.Brooksclaims
realrobots(asopposedtocomputersimulatedrobots)tobeembodied.Asweshallsee,this
claimiscrucialtodiscussiswewanttoassertthattheyalsocanhaveanUmwelt.Seealso
theworkofTomZiemkeandNoelSharkey.
[41]ThisisBrooks(1990)argumentfromtime.Asevolutionofthefirstsimpleliving
organismsonEarthtookroughlyabillionyears,thiswasaslowprocess.(Recentevidence
questionsthisestimateandsuggeststhattheappearanceofearlylifewasamuchfaster
process).Anotherbillionyearspassedbeforephotosyntheticplantsappeared,andalmost
onebillionandahalfyears(ca.550millionyearsago)thefirstvertebratesarrivedto
createorganismswithinformationprocessingsystemsareratherhardproblems.Thenthings
startedtomovefastreptilesarrivedaround370millionyearsago,mammals250million
yearsago,thefirstprimatesappearedaround120millionyearsago,thepredecessorstothe
greatapesjust18millionyearsago.Manlikecreaturesarrived2.5millionyearsago.Man
inventedagriculture19000yearsago,anddevelopedwritingand"expertknowledge"less
than5000yearsago.Thus,problemsolvingbehaviour,language,expertknowledgeand
reasonseemstoberathersimple,oncetheessenceofbeingandreactingareavailable!
[42]SeecommentbyBelew(1991),whohasworkedonmachinelearning.
[43]StanleySaltherightlypointedoutthatthecorrectrelationisnotAI=AS,but{AS
{AI}}.
[44]Infact,alotofresearchinartificiallifeand'swarmintelligence'havebeenconcerned
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withunderstandingthestructureofpatternsofcollectivebehaviourinants,wasps,andother
socialinsects.See,e.g.,Deneubourghetal.(1992),otherpapersinthatvolume,andthe
papersoncollectivebehaviourinMornetal.,eds.(1995).
[45]CP4.537Fn3p.423(invol.4ofPeirce193158):"Thetype,tokenandtonearethe
legisigns,sinsignsandqualisignsdiscussedin2.243f".Comparealso"Aqualityoffeeling,
initself,isnoobjectandisattachedtonoobject.Itisameretoneofconsciousness"(CP
7.530)andthestatementthat"thereisacertaintingeortoneoffeelingconnectedwith
livingandbeingawake,thoughwecannotattendtoit,forwantofabackground"(CP
8.294).
[46]ThisiswhatLiszka(1996:46)callstheinclusionrule.Thisruleapplieswithineachof
thethreemajordivisions(i.e.,accordingtothefeatureofsignitself(qualisignsinsign
legisign)accordingtothesign'srelationtotheobject(icon,index,symbol)andaccording
tothesign'spowertodetermineaninterpretant(rheme,dicisign,argument)).Thetrue
logicalimplicationisthatforeachpossiblekindofsignwithinthetenclassesschemeof
Peirce,allwillincludeaqualisign(evenanargument,whichisalsoasymboliclegisign),
eventhoughthequalitativeaspectofthesignmaynotbethedominantaspect.Thusmy
analysisfollowsLiszka(andPeirce),butwhatIgivespecialemphasizesisthephenomenal
andqualitativeaspectofeverysemiosis.
[47]CP2.254inPeirce(193158)[p.115inPeirce1955].Weseldomjustexperience
qualisignsinourUmwelttheyarerathertobethoughtofasthesensualbackgroundofour
perception.Merrell(1996:43)describestheperceptionofadrawingofaNeckercubeas
offeringan"exampleoftheofthisbare,passiveseeingincontrasttoseeingasandseeing
thatsuchandsuchisthecase(...)seeingthedrawingasimmediacyentailsafeelingor
sensingofnothingmorethanaquality(Firstness):Whitenesspunctuatedwiththin
intermittentblackness.Asplitmomentlateritisseenintermsofsomeexistententity'out
there'inthe'semioticallyreal'merelyasasetofinterconnectedlines.Butitisnot(yet)
activelyseenasacube".Thustheemergenceofthecubeperceptcorrespondstothe
'development'ofalegisign,thatincludeswithinitthesinsignandthequalisigninthissense
qualisignspermeateourUmwelt.
[48]Thoughitisindeedpossibletoreconstruct,externally,amodel(inourUmwelt)ofthe
creature'sphenomenalworldcompareSalthe(thisvolume)andCariani(1996).
[49]SeealsoJesperHoffmeyer'sarticle(thisvolume)referringtoPoppermakingthesame
point.
[50]AsimilarremarkisbrieflystatedinanoteinafamousessaybyThomasNagel,where
heemphasizesthatthesubjectivecharacterofexperienceisnotanalyzableintermsof
functionalstatessincethesecouldbeascribedtorobotsthatbehavedlikepeoplethough
theyexperiencednothing:"Perhapstherecouldnotactuallybesuchrobots.Perhaps
anythingcomplexenoughtobehavelikeapersonwouldhaveexperiences."(Nagel1974
[1981p.392]).
[51]Interleveldownwardcausationshouldnotbeseenasaninstanceoftheusual
(temporal)efficientcausation,butratherasafunctionalandformalcause.SeeEmmeche,
KppeandStjernfelt2000.
[52]IwillliketothankRicardoGudwin,JesperHoffmeyer,KaleviKull,WinfriedNth,
StanleySaltheandTomZiemkeforhelpfulcommentsandcriticismonearlierversionsof
thepaper.

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